

Undercover Policing Inquiry

Response to Rule 9 Request

**FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE LORD PETER HAIN OF NEATH**

Date signed: 3 March 2020

Question 1 - Personal details

1. My name is Peter Gerald Hain. My date of birth is 16.2.50.
2. I am providing this witness statement in response to the Rule 9 request dated 20.12.19 sent to me by the Undercover Policing Inquiry.
3. It provides an overview of my years of activism and also describes my time in Parliament. It describes, so far as I am able to, my interaction with the following undercover police officers ('UCO's):
 - Jill Mosdell
 - Mike Ferguson / HN135
 - 'Dick Epps' / HN336
 - 'Michael Scott' / HN298

- 'Rick Gibson' / HN297
- 'Roger Harris' / HN200

Preliminary points

4. Before turning to the questions that the Inquiry has asked of me, I would like to summarise some preliminary points of concern. I hope this will assist whoever is reading this statement in understanding some general themes that are present in my answers. I have set out these points in greater detail when providing answers to the specific questions, below.

5. I have been a Member of Parliament between 1991 and 2015, becoming a senior member of the Labour Government for which I held several positions as Secretary of State. I am a Privy Councillor and a member of the House of Lords since November 2015. But before that time I was a political activist, involved in **non-violent** activities and organising against some of the most abhorrent and appalling manifestations of racism and prejudice that existed during the 20th century, in particular the apartheid regime in South Africa. I believe history has vindicated the position that many of us took in protesting against apartheid, but with the passage of time it may be easy for some to forget the depth and strength of support that existed for the South African apartheid regime at that time, including amongst very senior members of the British Government. It is also ironic, and easy to forget how those of us who organised against racism and apartheid were portrayed as enemies of democracy or as having a far left communist agenda.

6. I am grateful to the Chair of this Inquiry for the disclosure I have received thus far. However I believe more should be forthcoming ¹. It is important that there should be full disclosure to the victims and subjects of undercover policing. From the senior political position I now hold it is clear that this inquiry is uncovering a particularly unpleasant and often hidden chapter in the history of this country and our democracy and this can only be fully revealed if those affected are provided with as much disclosure as possible.

7. It is my view that these documents, insofar as they relate to the campaigns in which I was involved, show an inaccurate, exaggerated, misjudged and wholly disproportionate use of intelligence and undercover policing at that time. It is hard not to be struck by the sense that such activity was out of control. Worse, it shows the UK police had entirely the wrong focus – preoccupied with gathering information on peaceful non-violent activists through inappropriate covert means, while sharing information with and showing far less concern about the activities of those who supported racist and far right ideologies.

8. As a former Secretary of State and current member of the House of Lords, I have read these documents with three questions at the forefront of my mind. I would respectfully suggest that these may be helpful to the Inquiry:

¹ Paras 287, 362.

- (1) What was the purpose of the surveillance?
 - Was the purpose legitimate?
 - Was it reasonable?
 - Even if one purpose could be justified was there a secondary purpose that was not (e.g. support for the South African apartheid regime and their corrupt practices).
 - Is there any evidence within these documents for any purpose which the police now seek to present as the purpose at the time. In my experience there is always a danger of 'retro-fitting' legitimacy on to activity that was not legitimate at the time. Evidence of what existed at the time is important.

- (2) Was there an appropriate legal framework in place for the surveillance at that time?
 - What was the legal framework?
 - Where is it evidenced?
 - What were the checks and balances in place?

- (3) Even if such a legal framework was in place, which seems unlikely, was the surveillance that was carried out proportionate in the circumstances of my case and others?
 - What was the threat posed by the groups who were placed under surveillance?
 - What was the extent of the intrusion into the lives of those involved?
 - Was the intrusion carried out in pursuit of meeting the threat posed?

- Was such intrusion proportionate?

9. It seems difficult to resist the conclusion from what I have read that poor reasons, badly articulated, if at all led to poor decision making. Worse, that lack of clarity and lack of checks and balances meant that officers and those supervising them were not putting their own actions under scrutiny and were not acting proportionately. This led to an institutional culture of inappropriate and highly politicised surveillance, which may explain how it continued and developed as time went on.
10. The answers to these questions are so important because it reveals how undercover policing can become politicised, and be carried out in an uncontrolled way. It reminds all the public authorities engaged how easily this can happen and how it must be avoided for the future. It is also a salutary lesson in how we should approach non-violent protestors who are organising to uphold the principles of human rights and democracy. Regarding them as the enemy and taking disproportionate, unjustified steps against them takes our society down a dangerous path and, as happened in this case, on the wrong side of history. Much may have changed since then and hopefully this Inquiry will highlight how hopelessly lacking a framework was when I was an activist and where the shortcomings still exist today. This is a vital message for those in charge of policing and intelligence as they seek to tackle perceived threats and act in a proportionate manner.

11. I would like to emphasise that I am proud of the activities in which I took part. I also think those who supported the apartheid regime and the racism that we were protesting against should reflect on how they feel about their own activities.

12. I do not consider myself a 'victim' in the same way that many of the people who are core participants to this inquiry are victims. This includes the women who have suffered huge damage by being unknowingly misled and exploited through intimate relationships with undercover officers; and grieving families who were spied upon at the most traumatic and vulnerable times of their lives. But although I am not a victim I am appalled at the activities revealed in these documents. The potential threat such activity had to the struggle against racism and apartheid and the lives of those committed to peaceful democratic change is almost impossible to define. It is a chilling reminder of how hard those struggles had to be fought with officers of our own state treating us with suspicion and without proper respect for our rights, our privacy and our lives.

13. I will now turn to the answer the specific questions I have been asked.

Question 2 - Overview of my activism and political career

14. I am asked to provide a brief outline of my political career, as an activist outside Parliament and my role in Parliament and Government.

15. I moved from South Africa to England, with my parents and siblings in April 1966.
16. My principal roles in activism before becoming a Parliamentarian were as follows.
17. I was active in the **Anti-Apartheid Movement ('AAM')** between 1967 and 1994, when it was wound up. I held no official position, other than, possibly serving on its National Committee.
18. I joined the **Young Liberals ('YLs')** in 1968. I was its Publicity Vice-Chair between 1969-70; its National Chair 1971-73; a National Executive Member 1973-75; its National President 1975-77.
19. I, with others, set up the **Stop the Seventy Tour ('STST')** campaign in 1969. I was its National Chair from September 1969 until May 1970 when it was wound up immediately after the decision that the white South African cricket tour scheduled for 1970 would not go ahead.
20. I was a Founder Member and National Press Officer of the **Anti-Nazi League ('ANL')** between 1977 and 1981 and became its Parliamentary Officer when it was relaunched in 1991.
21. I joined the **Labour Party** in September 1977.

22. I served as **Labour MP** for Neath, Wales between April 1991 and May 2015.
23. I have 12 years' **Senior UK Government** experience. I was a **Cabinet Minister** for seven years and a government minister for five years 1997-2008 and 2009-10, including:
- Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
 - Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
 - Leader of the House of Commons
 - Secretary of State for Wales
 - Foreign Minister (Africa, Middle East, South Asia, UN)
 - Europe Minister
 - Energy Minister
 - Welsh Minister
24. I was made a **Privy Councillor** in 2001.
25. I have been a **Member of House of Lords**, The Right Honourable Lord Hain of Neath, since November 2015.
26. I have written two books with passages relevant to the Inquiry and to this statement.
27. In 1971 my book '**Don't play with apartheid – the background to the Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign**' ('DPWA') was first published. I refer in

particular to pages 115 – 214. The contents of this book formed the basis of a private prosecution brought against me for conspiracy, relating to my role in the Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign (known as STST) campaign ². I describe this case in my memoirs ³.

28. In 2012 my memoirs, '**Outside In**' ('OI') were published. I refer in particular to pages 42 to 140.
29. I am co-authoring with Professor André Odendaal a book '**Pitch Battles: protest, prejudice and play**', to be published in May 2020 marking the 50th anniversary of the cancellation of the 1970 cricket tour. However it does not add in any way material to the Inquiry to the two books above.

Question 3 - Aliases

30. I have never used an alias.

Question 4 - Intelligence reports and other documents

31. I have received and been asked to consider about 70 documents provided to me by the Inquiry ('disclosure'). I have no way of knowing if this disclosure is a complete set of all intelligence gathered on or about me in connection with

² I refer to this below, para 92.

³ P80 OI.

the Inquiry. I suspect it is not - see my comments on 'documents' ⁴ and other references ⁵ in this statement to Special Branch ('SB') materials, in the public domain, but not provided to me by the Inquiry.

32. The disclosure from the Inquiry is, I understand, just the material the Inquiry wishes to provide to me in order to assist me in answering about 60, mainly closed and focussed questions, and to which I seek to respond in the first part of this statement.

33. I note that the police have held documents for almost 50 years, and individual officers have known, over that time what they have done towards me and the campaigns I have been involved in. While I held suspicions since that time that I have been subject to surveillance and worse, I only become aware of the undercover policing scandal in broad terms when it came into the public domain in about 2010 with the exposé on Mark Kennedy / 'Stone' and only became aware that it might impact me in about 2015, at which point I immediately raised it in Parliament ⁶. The restriction order ('RO') which applies to the disclosure means that I have had limited opportunity to discuss this with others and present all relevant information and evidence to the Inquiry.

⁴ Paras 287, 362.

⁵ For example, paras 95, 119, 330, 332, 345.

⁶ See para 300 onwards.

34. For those reasons this statement should not therefore be considered my last or full account of how I have been affected by undercover policing. It may be necessary for me to revisit or elaborate on some parts of my answers as further information develops.

STOP THE SEVENTY TOUR CAMPAIGN ('STST')

Question 5 – Summary of my political activities as a member of the STST

35. I am asked to summarise my political activities as a member of the STST.

36. I founded the STST and was active throughout the campaign - 1969 and 1970⁷. I refer to relevant passages of **Don't Play with Apartheid** and **Outside In**⁸.

37. The hub of STST was my parents' modest flat in 21a Gwendolen Avenue, Putney London SW15 where I lived at the time, between 1966 and 1971⁹. My parents (Adelaine and Walter Hain) and my siblings (Tom, Jo-anne and Sally) were heavily involved in the campaign. Many STST (and Putney YL, below) meetings took place there. National committee meetings of the STST were held in the front living room.

⁷ See para 19.

⁸ P201-2 DPWA. P51 OI.

⁹ P52, 59 OI.

38. I note that some of the intelligence reports refer to meetings at that house and appear to confirm the presence of UCOs at those meetings. I was concerned at the time that STST had been infiltrated including at the national level and also that my phone was tapped ¹⁰.
39. There were no full timers in the campaign. It was a completely voluntary body, contrary to allegations in the press that we were paid. It started off with 3 or 4 of us in the summer of 1969 and ended up with about 100,000 activists across the country ready and planning to stop the planned all-white South African cricket tour beginning in June 1970.
40. My mother was pivotal to the group. She was very active at my home and acted as the group's unofficial secretary. She died aged nearly 92 in September 2019, before disclosure was provided to me by the Inquiry.
41. A variety of national groups were affiliated to the STST national committee and its activists. These groups included: the Anti-Apartheid Movement, National Union of Students, National League of Young Liberals, Student Christian Movement, International Socialists, Young Communist League and so on.
42. Apart from affiliates to its national committee, the STST was not a membership organisation with a constitution. Activists were not on a centrally

¹⁰ P54 OI.

held membership list. There was no list as such, only one of volunteer local organisers, including in Edinburgh Gordon Brown, many years later to become UK Prime Minister.

43. It was a very loose movement where spontaneity, independence and local autonomy were the driving principles ¹¹. It consisted of local groups often focused upon the 25 matches in the Springbok rugby tour of October 1969 to January 1970 and then around the dozen matches planned for the 1970 cricket tour – eg in local student unions, local anti-apartheid groups, YL groups, socialist groups, United Nations Groups, church groups, trade union groups, anti-racist groups etc.
44. It had clear principles, mainly a commitment to truly non-racial sports teams from South Africa which for generations had been selected from whites only. It was committed to non-violent direct action (NVDA) – in the tradition of the Suffragettes and Gandhi's struggle for India's independence – to oppose apartheid and stop all-white sports tours ¹². As STST's leader I was always completely open about that. I said this in media interviews and speeches, and this was repeated by other STST activists at public meetings. Anyone engaged in the campaign understood this.

¹¹ P195, 199 DPWA. P51, 63 OI.

¹² P137 DPWA. P47 OI.

Q 5.1 Aims of STST

45. I am asked what STST's aims were. STST's aim was to stop the planned cricket tour by the all-white South African team, to England in summer 1970. As part of this, we sought heavily to disrupt the all-white Springbok rugby tour of the UK in winter 1969/70 in order to make clear that the much more vulnerable cricket tour would be rendered impossible and should therefore be cancelled. I was pleased to learn many years later, when I first met Nelson Mandela in 1991, that our campaign – including my own actions - became known to all the political prisoners in Robben Island in South Africa and provided them with an enormous morale boost ¹³. The wider objective was to isolate white South Africa from international sport and so help defeat apartheid itself ¹⁴. All these objectives were eventually achieved. In recognition of my and STST's contribution to these results in December 2015 I received from South Africa the OR Tambo National Award in Silver for my 'excellent contribution to the freedom struggle'.

Q5.2 Methods of STST

46. I am asked what methods STST used to advance its aims. I describe some of the methods used in **Don't Play with Apartheid (DPWA)** and **Outside In (OI)** ¹⁵.

¹³ P56 OI.

¹⁴ P193 DPWA. P48, 50 OI.

¹⁵ P124 (place for direct action), 129 (slogans), 141 (demos in hotels and at coaches), 143 (hotels), 146 (dye on pitches), 149 (hotels and coaches), 151 (demonstrations in grounds, attracting violence towards us), 178 (being a 'constant presence'), 181 (leafletting), 183 (posters) DPWA.

47. As explained above, STST's overarching strategy was one of NVDA and civil disobedience, following years of important but ineffectual pickets and protests outside rugby and cricket grounds in the UK where white South African teams played. Our methods should be seen in the context of the appalling brutality of the apartheid South African regime, which, through our modest campaigning tactics, we sought to halt.

48. These NVDA methods included the following, directed at the all-white South African sports teams:

- Q5.2.1 The disruption of rugby matches or training sessions¹⁶.
- Q5.2.2 Obstructing the rugby team's coach, including an activist chaining himself to the steering wheel resulting in one of the Springboks breaking the activist's jaw¹⁷.
- Q5.2.3 Using a female activist to 'pick up' a white South African player and / or lure them to private party ¹⁸ (if they attended, we then planned to persuade them not to be part of an all-white team and stand down from the team; get them to understand what we were doing and why; and encourage them to go home and preach non-racial sport in apartheid South Africa).

¹⁶ P124, 129, 151 DPWA.

¹⁷ P141-2 DPWA.

¹⁸ P147, 154 DPWA. P55 OI.

- Q5.2.4 The spraying of weed killer on the Worcester Country outfield in opposition to the forthcoming cricket tour ¹⁹ (this is not something I advocated, supported or organised as I did not really want to damage pitches or property except to put painted slogans on the side of walls and buildings associated with the tour – minor damage which did not risk injury to people).

49. STST's methods did not include injury to people. This was why I was opposed to the putting of tin tacks on pitches, a tactic quite falsely attributed by an Undercover Officer to me and STST in the 2002 'True Spies' documentary [p2 of doc 69: UCPI0000031845-12]. Nor did it include significant or pointless damage to stadia. It is always possible that some individuals may have done some of these things, but I did not encourage or do it and nor did STST and our disapproval of such activity was well known. Daubing slogans on cricket and rugby grounds was however part of STST's NVDA approach. This, minor damage to property, was the understood and accepted limit to STST's action involving property.

Q5.3 Vetting of members of STST

50. I am asked if STST vetted its members. It did not 'vet' in the sense that we did not have a vetting squad. Unlike the AAM, the STST was not a national membership organisation – so there were no 'members' in any formal sense.

¹⁹ P165 DPWA.

51. We involved people who we thought were in line with our objectives. There was, as with all the other campaigns I have been involved in, a clear understanding that those who participated were fully committed to the principles of NVDA and peaceful civil disobedience. It should be remembered that STST was not a tight conspiratorial army. There was no command and control structure, disciplinary processes, rules etc and it was not even a membership organisation.
52. Having said that, there were informal mechanisms to prevent the campaign being taken over by more radical elements. Those who were actively involved in the campaign were generally known personally to others and were therefore informally vetted as not being extreme radicals. And then, once someone was active, the generally accepted principles of NVDA would mean that anyone who began to propose more radical action would have effectively been rejected from the group/their ideas would not have been picked up. This same point applies to all campaigns I was involved in – below.
53. If we had suspicions of someone, then we made that known. I recall that there was someone claiming to come from 'Surrey Anti-Apartheid group' who volunteered to go through and put in order the card index of contacts we had across the country. That card index was kept at my family home in Putney and maintained by my mother. We had suspicions of that person and we stopped him undertaking that task. I wondered at the time, and I now wonder, in the light of disclosure I have received showing the collation of names and

addresses of other organisations, whether this was a State agent, an undercover officer. I would be grateful for this information to be provided to me by the Inquiry as soon as possible, so that I can make any further appropriate comments.

54. At doc 69 [UCPI0000031845] there is an account of an UCO, Mike Ferguson, asserting in a 'True Spies' Panorama documentary that he successfully deflected attention onto another, innocent, campaigner when there were suspicions that our group was infiltrated. That other person was said to have been ejected from the meeting, the campaign. I note that there has, so far, been no other disclosure from the police / the Inquiry to me on this event and I note that the Inquiry appears not to have made known the cover name of Mike Ferguson.

55. I do not remember the incident described immediately above, of someone being suspected of being an informant and being asked to leave the group. Nor do I recognise the theatrical account given by Mike Ferguson (suggestions otherwise in the True Spies documentary have been taken right out of context). Although these events are half a century ago, and many of the people involved have since died, nobody else can recall the incident either. This suggests it might be fabricated.

56. According to the extract from the statement by UCO 'Dick Epps' provided to me by the Inquiry Mike Ferguson was 'effectively, my 'right hand man'. I had no 'right hand man' as he claims. However, I do recall being worried about

infiltration at this time and was convinced that there was an informer in our group. My concerns arose as a result of some information about the campaign leaking out. Nevertheless no really crucial information did leak.

Q5.4 Security Precautions of STST

57. I am asked if STST took other security precautions, such as keeping plans, tactics, other matters confidential. Obviously, some of our plans required secrecy. We bought tickets for sports matches, eg rugby at Twickenham, so we could get activists into the grounds. We did not put an advert in the paper or make press statement about getting tickets or our plans once we got in. We got trusted people, including some of my relatives, to get the tickets. They were provided with money, from fundraising, to do that.

Q5.5 STST concern about infiltration

58. I am asked if STST was concerned about infiltration by police or others. We were concerned about infiltration. I, in particular, was conscious and concerned about the threat²⁰. I had been brought up in Pretoria in a world of informants and constant surveillance, mail intercepts, phone taps. This brought a healthy awareness of the measure the State might take against dissidents.

²⁰ P156, 174 DPWA.

59. We were aware that the British police and British security services were collaborating with apartheid South Africa's security services to target anti-apartheid activists. There were well know examples of it. As it happens, although we had these concerns and were targeted by these bodies and were very careful to try to identify and thwart what they were doing towards us, their initiatives did not have any practical effect on our campaign. If they saw us as a threat to 'British civilisation' (as many right-wing commentators and MPs claimed), they did not stop us – and our activities were, by and large, carried out very successfully and the cricket tour was of course abandoned under pressure primarily from STST.

Question 6 – The intelligence reports, relating to STST, in which I am named²¹

60. These reports, in which I have been named and which relate to the activities of the STST between March and May 1970, have been provided by former SDS undercover officers, Jill Mosdell or Mike Ferguson. I note, however, that I am not asked to comment on Jill Mosdell. I do not know either of these officers. I assume that these are their real names. I would wish and need to know their cover names and see contemporaneous photos of them and have more information about the way they sought to spy on me in order to be in the best position to respond to these reports and their actions.

²¹ doc 2: UCPI0000008660, doc 3: UCPI0000014399, doc 4: UCPI0000008686, doc 5: MPS-0736273-CLF, doc 6: UCPI0000008606, doc 7: UCPI0000008604, doc 8: UCPI0000008635

61. It is significant that there appear to be no reports on the actions of STST activists in January 1970 on 20-odd cricket grounds²². STST did not itself plan or authorise these but I was aware of how they were organised. It seems that the UCO were not aware of this. It is not credible that these officers were acting properly and were, as they claim, close to me. If they had been they would have known about this highly significant and cathartic event. It led to the number of planned cricket matches being almost halved from over 20 to 12. It signalled a dramatic escalation in the campaign. Slogans were painted on pavilions and (against instructions by the organisers) weed killer was used on I think two grounds. In that context it is difficult to understand what, if any, was the reason for this surveillance and who, if anyone, was checking that it was carried out reliably or with a clear and proportionate purpose.
62. Other events were inaccurately described or fabricated – leading one to doubt the purpose of undercover policing and the motives of the UCOs in making inflammatory comments to their supervisors.
63. There is a boast that we planned to use tin tacks at Twickenham [**doc 69: UCPI0000031845-12**]. This was never discussed at any stage nor was it in any sense part of our plan, for it would have fundamentally transgressed my and STST's commitment to non-violence. The only reported instance of tin tacks was in January 1970 when a teacher ran onto the pitch of a rugby

²² P145, 165 DPWA. P57 OI.

match in Bristol and began sprinkling them around. In my 1972 conspiracy trial set down for the Old Bailey I called this teacher as a witness. He confirmed that he ran onto the pitch in Bristol, on his own initiative and that this had nothing to do with me – indeed we had never met. Whilst video footage in the True Spies documentary appears to show police officer using magnets to search for tin-tacks, I am not aware that any were ever discovered at matches at Twickenham.

64. There was a plan to use smoke flares inside Twickenham in January 1970. There was also a plan to throw white dye on the pitch which – when made wet on damp grass – turned the grass black so that when the white Springboks rolled on it during rucks, mauls or tackles, their skin would be smudged from white to black: our slogan was 'Paint them Black and Send them back' ²³.

Question 7 - 'Dick Epps' on Mike Ferguson

65. I have been shown three paragraphs of an extract of a statement by an UCO, called 'Dick Epps' ²⁴.
66. I not recall anyone by the name of 'Dick Epps'. I may be assisted were I to be shown a photo of him, from the time, the 1970s, and more information about his appearance and his supposed interaction with me.

²³ P146 DPWA. P55 OI.

²⁴ From 'Stop the 70's Tour were a passionate group' To '...impressed by his ability to do it'.

67. 'Dick Epps' suggests that STST *'were a passionate group and the potential for violence and public disorder at demonstrations was huge'*. I completely reject the implication that STST were prone, in any way, to violence or disorder. It is just untrue. In contrast, I refer, below, to the violence used towards peaceful STST campaigners ²⁵.
68. 'Dick Epps' refers to STST getting *'up to all sorts of well publicised antics: digging up the pitch at Lords, pouring oil over the wicket'*. Again, this is simply false. The only such incident I can recall was five years later in 1975 during a Test match when the pitch at Headingley ground in Leeds was dug up and oil put on it, but by Peter Chappell a supporter and friend of George Davis *vis*, a convicted bank robber ²⁶. Oil was never used, to my knowledge, by anti-apartheid activists at Lords or its pitch dug up at all or anything similar at Lords.
69. He talks of the role of Mike Ferguson in the campaign, in particular becoming my 'right hand man'. I had no such 'right hand man' and would have remembered that person, had he existed. Both his supposed role and his effectiveness appears to have been inflated by 'Dick Epps'. Again, nothing Mike Ferguson or other UCOs did appears significantly to have disrupted or

²⁵ See para 84, also p146, 151 DPWA.

²⁶ http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/19/newsid_2534000/2534763.stm.

stopped our activities or campaign. We stopped the tour, achieving STST's objective 100 per cent.

70. There is a considerable degree of sheer fabrication and exaggerated self-importance in Mike Ferguson's claims.

71. However, if Mike Ferguson did, as is claimed, take up any sort of active role within the STST campaign then this raises very serious concerns for the politicised nature of the undercover policing. STST was a genuine political campaigning group focussed on an issue of major importance. It is a concern to me that the police might have placed someone so prominent in such a large and significant campaign. As a matter of principle, as a legitimate political campaign the activities of STST should have been conducted and directed by genuine campaigners and not UCOs. It undermines the democratic role of campaigning organisations if UCOs are taking on active roles within them.

72. Furthermore, if the purported justification for the UCOs was to monitor the activities of more radical elements within STST (or the AAM) then this would not justify UCOs taking on these more active roles in the organisations. Effectively through such 'politicised' roles, it appears that UCOs became involved, without safeguards, in what, became a form of 'political policing'.

73. I note that 'Dick Epps' himself states that he did not see the role that Mike Ferguson took on as necessary for the job UCOs were required to do and

'Dick Epps' was not sure why he took on such a role. This appears to be an admission that the activities of UCOs exceeded any semblance of a legitimate role and lacked proper and effective oversight.

74. I make the same points about any UCOs who gained a position of responsibility in relation to all the campaigns I was involved in.

Question 8 – STST's first national conference on 7 March 1970

75. I am asked about a report on STST's first national conference on 7.3.70 [**doc 2: UCPI0000008660**]. I note that there is another 'secret' (Special Branch?) 'memorandum' about this same event ²⁷. It is in the public domain but does not form part of the disclosure from the Inquiry. I wrote about this event too ²⁸.

76. In answer to one of the Inquiry's questions, it is accurate to say that the morning session was open to the public and media (Mike Brearley subsequently England cricket captain spoke at that event for example) but the afternoon session was for STST delegates only.

²⁷ From 'DAC SB 346/70/9' to 'DAC'A' (Ops).

²⁸ P173 DPWA. P60 OI.

Q8.1 The report summary of my speech to the morning session.

77. Para 7 of the report summarises a speech I gave. The depiction of my approach to sport and South Africa in the final paragraph is the approach I took.
78. I am asked what I meant by comments attributed to me about 'attacking' not only 'apartheid' but also 'the capitalist system which nurtured it'. The capitalist system supplied arms to and traded with the South African apartheid regime. My point was that there is a clear link between segregation in sport on the one hand and racism in the country as a whole. Further, my point was that the economic system – supported by trade and arms from Western capitalist countries like Britain, France and the USA – underpinned it all. However, neither I nor STST for which I spoke ever advocated, planned or intended large scale disorder or violence of the kind that might have come, in some revolutionary notion, anywhere near 'challenging the capitalist system'.

Q8.2 Violence and NVDA

79. I am asked about para 8 of the report and the reference to 'violence'. This report does not accurately summarise STST's attitude to violence. STST was implacably committed to NVDA.
80. It should be remembered that STST was not a command and control organisation with disciplinary processes or the vetting of members. It was a

movement basically led from the centre and I was its national chair and media spokesperson. The clearly understood principles of NVDA were accepted throughout the movement but neither I nor others at the centre could or sought to determine the specifics of what others, in the regions or locally, did to stop the tour.

81. My and STST's single-minded objective was entirely limited to stopping apartheid sports tours. For my own part, I was not in favour of demonstrators going beyond NVDA. I opposed confronting the police, putting tin tacks on pitches (as this might be a danger to players) or attacks on sports pitches or pavilions involving any more than painted slogans or markings.
82. I for example demonstrated in July 1969 at Bristol during a tennis tie between Britain and white South Africa, by running on the court, stopping play for a few minutes and being carried off by police without resisting.
83. Similarly, I was grabbed by police at each of the Twickenham games I went to and was carried out by police without any violence involved²⁹. My objective was not to have a fight with the police or in some abstractly fanciful way through them with the State. It was to stop the matches as I knew this would have a decisive impact on stopping apartheid, which it did.

²⁹ P131, 136 DPWA.

84. It is important to record that, where there was violence, this invariably came from fans at these whites-only South African sporting events and / or from the police and / or from stewards. Examples of this are well documented ³⁰.
85. For example, there is the protest at the Swansea match on 15th November 1969 where there was a very violent confrontation between demonstrators and the police / rugby followers ³¹. It is agreed by all (including a contemporary report in the *Times*) that the violence was initiated when the police removed non-violent demonstrators from the pitch and threw them into the hands of rugby vigilantes who beat them up ³².

Question 9 - The extent to which STST broke the law in order to further its aim.

86. This question arises from a reference (para 6) in a report dated 7.4.70 [doc 3: UCPI0000014399] on the London Region Conference of STST on 5.4.70 to a concern about the possibility of 'conspiracy charges'.
87. We were aware of this possibility ³³.
88. I assume by the term 'law', I am asked about the criminal law.

³⁰ P146, 151, DPWA.

³¹ P133, 136, 151, 154 DPWA.

³² See also the report on the 50th anniversary of this event on BBC Wales <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-50422755>.

³³ P199 DPWA.

89. It should be borne in mind that trespass was, at that time, only a civil wrong. So a major tactic adopted by STST, of running onto sports pitches or demonstrations at and in places like hotels, was not a criminal offence.
90. As to conspiracy, I understand that a feature of this criminal offence, criticised at the time and rectified since after a Law Commission Report in 1977 urged reform in cases like mine, was that the use of this charge enabled prosecutors to bring into the criminal sphere activities (such as trespass) which, by themselves, were only civil or summary in nature.
91. Earlier in 1970, I was approached by a friendly solicitor who warned me that, through my open public advocacy of disrupting matches I left myself open to criminal allegations of conspiracy, as might fellow activists like Mike Craft, Jonathan Rosenhead and Ernest Rodker. We were advised to be careful. I said, in response, that our whole movement was based on this strategy and I planned to keep on saying the same things publicly. So I mentioned, at the conference, the danger of conspiracy charges, to make others aware.

Conspiracy prosecution

92. Of course, I was indeed prosecuted for conspiracy. I recount this in detail in **Outside In**³⁴. It began when, in about January 1970 Sir Peter Rawlinson,

³⁴ P80 onwards, OI.

then (Conservative) shadow AG urged the Labour AG to prosecute me for conspiracy³⁵. But that, a public prosecution, did not happen.

93. However, on the day the cricket tour was cancelled a barrister Francis Bennion announced he planned a private prosecution against me, for conspiracy. His formal request to the DPP to take over the prosecution was refused even after Rawlinson took over as Attorney General following the June 1970 election. However Bennion was able to raise funds from business, government and private sources.
94. He also was able to obtain a transcript of the October 1969 AGM of the Anti-Apartheid Movement from a covert agent attending it.
95. Further, it appears from police files which are in the public domain but which were not disclosed to me by the Inquiry that there was a level of police interest, activity and information sharing in this prosecution. I produced these documents, obtained by my current solicitors, from National Archives, in 2020 [doc 71: UCPI0000034087].
96. A Metropolitan Police report dated 27.05.1970 refers to Francis Bennion seeking a summons for his private prosecution of me at Bow St Magistrates' Court. It shows that the police were aware of the private prosecution from an early stage. It refers to the involvement of the A8 branch of the police. There

³⁵ P59 OI.

is also reference in the report to 'information supplied by Special Branch' and the report copied to SB, as well as the police's A8 branch. Similar points can be made about a second report dated 21.07.70, a report shared with SB.

97. After discussions with my lawyers, after the prosecution case had ended, I represented myself during the rest of the trial. I chose not to give evidence but ensured my point of view was expressed through my opening and closing speeches and in questions asked of prosecution witnesses. There were four counts of conspiracy with 'others unknown' containing some 900 particulars of incidents at over 30 whites-only South African matches the length and breadth of the British Isles, nearly half a dozen of which I attended. I was acquitted of the 3 most serious counts, after the jury was hung. I was convicted of the 4th count by a majority of the jury. This was the most minor count and related to peacefully sitting on a tennis court in Bristol in July 1969 for several minutes, for which I was fined £200.

Question 10 - Private meeting of STST National Committee at my home in Putney, South London

98. I am asked about a report of a meeting of the STST committee on 3.5.70 [doc 6: UCPI0000008606] at 21A Gwendolen Avenue. This was my parents' family flat where my siblings and I also lived. It was therefore a private address and this meeting, and others of the STST committee, were private. Only members of the STST committee were invited. They were invited by Hugh Geach, secretary to STST.

Question 11 - 'Militant action' by STST.

99. I am asked, about a report of the North West London committee of STST held on 29.7.70 in Hampstead [doc 10: UCPI0000014427-CLF] which states that 'STST would provide militant action' to support the anti-apartheid movement.
100. I am asked about what militant action had taken place in the past. I refer to my comments, above, in relation to the methods adopted by the STST ³⁶.
101. I am asked what militant action STST planned for the future. It planned none as by July 1970 STST no longer existed. It was wound up once, in May 1970, the planned cricket tour was abandoned.

Question 12 – UCO referred to in the 'True Spies' programme

102. I am asked about transcripts (pages 11-13) from the 'True Spies' BBC Panorama documentary from October 2002 [doc 69: UCPI0000031845].
103. Q12.1. The transcript refers to the 'Stop the '70 tour campaign' and the "Stop the Tour' campaign' and I am asked if this is a reference to the planned 1970 tour or a subsequent Stop the Tour campaign. The report refers to the planned 1970 cricket tour by the white only South African cricket team of the UK and the campaign around it in 1969 and 1970. There was a campaign to

³⁶ See my answers to question 5.2, para 46 onwards.

stop all white racist tours, later in the 1970s, but I don't think this comment is a reference to that.

104. Q12.2. I am asked if I recall the UCO in this transcript – an UCO called 'Mike', 'the 'Hairy' who got very close to the top', supposedly became my 'number two' and whose handler was 'Wilf'.
105. I would be better placed to respond if I had a contemporaneous or other photo of the officer and more detail of his appearance and interaction with me. I note that there appears to be more information in the public domain about Mike Ferguson, supposedly provided by his daughter, than has been provided to me by the Inquiry ³⁷.
106. On the basis of the information provided so far, I do not recall this officer, nor some of his reports, which contain fabrications. I do recall a rather chaotic character based in Reading who claimed to be a trade unionist and who often was around to help and he had a van. I cannot recall his name but did phone him from time to time. I don't recall him attending STST national committee meetings. I ask the Inquiry to provide me with more information about the UCO so I have more to go on in working out whether the Reading person was this UCO and, if not, who the UCO may have been.

³⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2015/may/26/my-dad-undercover-policeman-cop-clare-carson>.

107. I reiterate my comments, above, about the exaggerated, supposed role of Mike Ferguson ³⁸ .
108. Furthermore, although I am not asked about this here, I should emphasise that the suggestion in the transcripts that we planned to 'throw flare bombs, smoke bombs and metal tacks onto the pitch' is misleading and wrong. We did throw smoke flares but never metal tacks because these would have damaged players and contravened STST's values of NVDA.
109. Two events may be elided in these comments. First I recall being concerned that STST was infiltrated. Second was the incident over someone who offered to update our membership records (as explained above ³⁹).
110. There is also a general point to make – that it was in the UCOs' interests to fabricate, hype or even make up things which they did know about.

THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT ('AAM')

Question 13 – My involvement with AAM

111. I am asked about my political activities as a member of the AAM. I was very active supporting the activities of the AAM between 1967 and 1994, when it

³⁸ Para 69.

³⁹ Para 53.

was wound up ⁴⁰. I was elected onto its national committee, but otherwise had no particular position within it. I attended AAM pickets outside the South African Embassy (for example calling for Nelson Mandela's release from prison) and joined marches and rallies and spoke at meetings.

Q13.1 Aims of AAM

112. I am asked about its aims. Its aim was to defeat apartheid in South Africa by conventional campaigning.

Q13.2 Methods of AAM

113. I am asked about the methods of AAM. It sought to achieve its aims by organising marches, rallies, pickets, lobbies delegations, conferences. It did not endorse the sort of NVDA tactics of disruption of events in the way that the STST campaign did. The AAM was a conventional pressure group. It was by far the most effective such group across the world, many exiles from South Africa like me having come to the UK were involved.

Q13.3 Vetting of members by AAM

114. So far as I was aware, it did not vet its members. It did not have the capacity to do so. It was however a subscription-based membership organisation with an AGM, which elected its national committee and executive committee.

Q13.4 AAM security measures to keep plans confidential

⁴⁰ P44 onwards OI.

115. I do not know if the AAM took security measures to keep its plans confidential. I was not active in its executive functions, so did not know or now do not recall this sort of thing.
116. I cannot comment on precise precautions it may have taken to keep its plans confidential or to protect itself generally, but I speculate that it must have done so, given that it was under attack by the agents of apartheid.
117. It faced harassment from South African security agents including its London HQ being burgled and firebombed.
118. It was revealed at my 1972 conspiracy trial ⁴¹ that the October 1969 AGM was covertly recorded by a South African security service agent who provided the prosecution with a transcript including me speaking at it advocating NVDA.
119. I see that in the public domain there are two Special Branch documents, dated 12.11.69 and 15.12.69 which are reports on that meeting (I produce these [doc 72:UCPI0000034088]). These documents do not, it appears, identify the nature of their source (not even to note – as other reports do - that they come from a 'reliable', 'secret', 'sensitive' source).
120. I am mentioned by name in the reports. In the first it is said that I 'spoke at length about the urgent need to stop the South African rugby and cricket

⁴¹ Para 92 onwards.

tours'. In the second, their report on the STST campaign is recorded over more than one page and refers to me (also Jonathan Rosenhead) as part of the 'core of the coming protest movement'. It is reported that I was elected to the national committee.

121. I note that these documents have not been disclosed to me by the Inquiry.

122. One conclusion to draw is that this information, from that public meeting, was provided to SB by the South African State's agents in the same way that the transcripts of the meeting were provided by the South African security services to the prosecutors in my conspiracy trial. This is not to rule out the possibility that an UCO was also present and reporting on that meeting and even supplying information to the South African authorities. I would like to know from the Inquiry whether this was the case.

Q13.5 AAM concern about infiltration.

123. For similar reasons to those set out above, I believe that the AAM was concerned about infiltration by the police or others.

Question 14 – The 4 intelligence reports provided to me about AAM ⁴²

124. I have been provided by the Inquiry with four intelligence reports about the AAM, three dating from 1970 and one from 1973. They include reports on

⁴² doc 11: MPS-0742862, doc 12: MPS-0742860, doc 13: MPS-0742861, doc 34: MPS-0732378
Page 37 of 103

the AAM's AGMs. The reports list hundreds of individuals and organisations connected with the campaign and attending the meetings it reports on, including the number plates of some of the cars of those attending.

125. Reading these four intelligence reports, I am struck by the pointlessness of UCOs attending, reporting on and keeping reports of these meetings. The AAM was a mainstream democratic organisation, rather than one focussed on protesting. It had bishops as its presidents – such as the Right Reverend Ambrose Reeves and the Right Reverend Trevor Huddleston. Also active and prominent was the Right Reverend David Sheppard, former England cricket captain and Bishop of Liverpool and Woolwich (on whom I note, there was a SB file ⁴³).

126. The list of those present in at the AGM on 28.10.73 referred to in the report dated 16.10.73 [**Doc 34: MPS-0732378**] included MPs such as Neil Kinnock, Bob Hughes, Frank Judd, Roy Prentice, David Steel, Jeremy Thorpe. It listed affiliate organisations like the Labour Party. As a Parliamentarian and former senior member of Government this minute detail into surveillance of legitimate activity of members of Parliament is striking.

⁴³ Appendix C to an intelligence report dated 25.10.70 [**doc 12: MPS-0742860**]

127. I also feel compelled to say that it seems incredible that the police thought it was proportionate to spend resources and time doing surveillance within this organisation rather than catching racists and fascists, or drug dealers and violent criminals. It strengthens the view from these documents that there was simply a complete lack of appropriate framework and assessment of proportionality to the surveillance. It had become – perhaps, not even deliberately – politicised by wrongly regarding one group of non-violent activists as a threat and failing properly to assess the threat posed by those we were opposing.

Questions 15 and 16 on an AAM demonstration on 25 October 1970

128. I am asked about an AAM demonstration on 25.10.70 [**doc 12: MPS-0742860**].

129. I see I am recorded as being present which I assume I was. I was not a speaker or convenor. I assume I attended as an ordinary activist, a supporter of the AAM.

130. I see it was a conventional rally, the speakers including Labour MPs and Liberal Party leader Jeremy Thorpe.

131. Question 15. There appears to be reference, at para 6, to an incident involving disorder. There is reference to a group appearing to attempt to

breach the police cordon. I am asked about that. I don't recall that part of the event.

132. Question 16. I am asked how well the Metropolitan police policed the demonstration and in particular how prepared they appeared to be for it. I cannot recall this incident or, therefore answer this question.
133. However, it appears, even in the way described by the report, to have been a large peaceful, conventional rally and presumably planned and publicised as such. This tallies with my recollection of AAM demonstrations which were usually well-marshalled and planned in cooperation with the police.
134. It is this sort of report on this sort of event that makes me question why exactly precious police resources were deployed and what UCOs were doing at demonstrations like this. The AAM did not endorse or propose NVDA of the type taken by, say, the STST and this would have been known widely both by activists and the authorities.

Question 17 – The UCO, 'Michael Scott'

135. I am asked if I recall an UCO, 'Michael Scott' and his actions in the light of a report on the 1973 AGM of the AAM prepared by him [**doc 34: MPS-0732378**].

136. I cannot recall him on current information. I would be greatly assisted by seeing a contemporaneous photo of him or other information describing him and what contact he supposedly had with me. It is particularly difficult to work out whether I knew this Michael Scott as there was a prominent anti-apartheid and anti-nuclear campaigner, a priest, who was active at the same time ⁴⁴. My solicitors have asked the Inquiry for photos of Michael Scott the undercover officer and confirmation that that Michael Scott is not the same as the priest, Michael Scott. That clarification has not yet been received. Having said that, I think it almost inconceivable that they are the same person.

ACTION COMMITTEE AGAINST RACISM

Question 18 – My role in ACAR

137. I am asked to summarise my political activities as a member of the Committee. I was its Chair. I founded it with Mike Craft, Jonathan Rosenhead and Ernest Rodker among others, former STST activists. I was active between July 1970 and 1973 ⁴⁵.

Q18.1. Aims of ACAR

138. I am asked about its aims. ACAR's aim was to combat apartheid and UK racism using similar tactics to STST.

⁴⁴ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Scott_\(priest\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Scott_(priest)).

⁴⁵ P70 OI.

Q18.2 Methods of ACAR

139. ACAR's methods included conventional campaigning and NVDA.

Q18.3 Vetting of members by ACAR

140. ACAR did not vet its members. They were trusted activists. We had no other means of 'vetting' members.

Q18.4 Security Precautions by ACAR

141. ACAR did not take any particular security precautions other than keep planned actions confidential.

Q18.5. Concerns about infiltration into ACAR

142. ACAR was concerned about infiltration by the police or others.

Two reports, relating to events in September 1971⁴⁶

143. I was not present at these events.

144. I note that the reports were prepared by UCO, Jill Mosdell, but I do not appear to have been asked about her or been provided with her cover name or photos or other description or an account of her contact with me.

⁴⁶ doc 14: UCPI000008245-CLF and doc 15: UCPI000008689-CLF

Questions 19 and 20 - England Rugby Tour of South Africa 1972 and the Richmond Hotel Demonstration

145. I am asked to comment on the planning and execution of the demonstration at the Richmond hotel, around the departure of the English rugby team for a flight to South Africa ⁴⁷. I am also asked about the subsequent prosecution and the role of an UCO, 'Michael Scott' in these events.
146. I was involved in the planning of this demonstration ⁴⁸. I recall having discussions with, among others, Ernest Rodker and Jonathan Rosenhead about this. I am not sure if Mike Craft was involved in those discussions (and I note that Christabel Gurney was also involved in the demonstration). We discussed ways of disrupting the departure of the English rugby team's flight to South Africa for the tour on its departure from London to Heathrow by coach. Our information came from friendly sports journalists opposed to apartheid – I knew a couple of rugby correspondents who, confidentially, gave me information about teams' itineraries. I recall that the plan included ordering skips to the hotel, on the pretext that they were needed for waste disposal to collect bulky things from the hotel. These would clog up traffic and so delay the departure.

⁴⁷ I am asked about **document MPS-0729386**; however, as this document is not contained within the inquiry's disclosure to me and the same incident is referred to in a report dated 15.5.72 which has been provided [**doc 29: MPS-0526782**], I will make reference to that document instead.

⁴⁸ P69 OI.

147. I note that it is suggested that 'Michael Scott' the UCO involved in the demonstration supposedly learned about it from my mother on the phone. According to the report he 'had occasion to telephone Hain's home where Mrs HAIN (Peter HAIN's mother) told him that if he were interested in doing something positive he should go forthwith to [No.] Rumbold Road, SW6', Ernest Rodker's address (p7 of a report dated [] 5.72 [Doc 29: MPS-0526782-CLF]). My mother died a few months before the documents were provided to me. However, I am sure – given her experiences in apartheid South Africa and security-consciousness – that there is no way she would have alerted anyone about that protest and I am not sure two years after STST was disbanded she even knew about this demonstration. We were concerned at the time that our phones were tapped and I wonder if the reality is that information was obtained through a telephone tap and whether, in this report, the source of the information was obscured even within SB records.
148. I was not at the discussions at Ernest Rodker's house on the day of the demonstration, before it happened. Nor was I at the demonstration itself.
149. I did not follow the progress of the criminal investigation or the role of 'Michael Scott' in this incident, the planning, demonstration, arrests or court proceedings. However I am concerned to read in the documents provided to me by the Inquiry, that an UCO, by virtue of being a defendant, may have been privy to confidential discussions between defendants and their lawyers.

This would appear to me to be an abuse of 'Michael Scott's' position as a defendant.

150. Again (see above) I may be assisted in commenting further by being provided with contemporaneous photographs, a physical description of 'Michael Scott' or more information about his contact with me.

151. There is one comment in the material it is important to mention. There is reference to the police being conscious of the 'potential of embarrassment to police' if 'Michael Scott' were to have been involved in the protest and in the criminal prosecution, in his cover name and then for it, later to come out that he was an UCO. This seems to highlight a failure to have procedures and criteria for the oversight of UCOs in this position. There is no mention in the note of more important concerns - that the other defendants in the criminal proceedings should have a fair trial and that innocent demonstrators should not be convicted of offences they have not committed. The only concerns expressed seem to be for institutional damage to police. The failure to view activists as individuals with their own legitimate rights and interests and place those second to the unfettered gathering of information may be a precursor to some of the more gross abuses of activists that happened in later tranches of the inquiry.

YOUNG LIBERALS ('YL')

Question 21 – my political activities as a member of the YL, including dates and positions held.

152. I am asked to summarise my political activities as a member of the YLs. I was active in the YLs between 1968 and 1977 ⁴⁹.

Q21.1. YL's connections with the Liberal Party.

153. The YL were formally affiliated to the national Liberal Party. The YL were its official youth wing. It was the conventional youth wing of a conventional political movement.

Q21.2. Aims of YL

154. Its aims were therefore the same as the Liberal Party itself, though it was more radical. Its policies were more socialist.

Q21.3. Methods of YL

155. Its methods for advancing its aims were the conventional ones – it organised conferences and meetings. It occasionally organised and often supported others' demonstrations. When there were elections the YL were encouraged to participate and support the candidates. It also supported NVDA protests and many YLs were involved in STST.

⁴⁹ Para 18 above and p45, 114 OI.

Q21.4. Vetting of members by YL

156. I am not aware of it vetting members. We had no capacity to do so.

Q21.5. Security precautions by YL

157. I am not aware of it taking any security precautions to keep its plans or other affairs confidential. We were an open organisation.

Q21.6. YL concerns about infiltration

158. I am asked if the YL were concerned about infiltration by the police or others.

159. Lots of young liberals were also involved in STST and I, of course, was very prominent in that, as well as being known to be a YL. There were visits to Northern Ireland too. Young liberals were involved in direct action and civil disobedience. Individuals made their own decisions about what action to take and these included, for example, sitting down at pedestrian crossings to campaign against the Immigration Act. This represents the general level of disruption that NVDA would take.

160. As a result we were aware of the likelihood that the YL were heavily penetrated by the police and others. But we were not concerned about it.

Question 22 - Intelligence reports that have been provided to me – 16 in total

161. I have been provided with a bundle of 16 documents with intelligence reports on the YL (including one on the 'Commitment' campaign). They span the period January 1972 and June 1975⁵⁰. I have no way of knowing if this is complete set of all intelligence on the group. I suspect it is not.

Question 23 - 90 Fawe Park Road, Putney

162. Q23.1. Many of the meetings of the Putney branch of the YL and featured in these reports took place at 90 Fawe Park Road, Putney. This was from 1971 my parents' private residence. I lived there from 1971 to 1975, when I got married.

163. Q23.2. The meetings were not open to the public. They were only open to genuine YL members.

164. A police officer, on duty, who identified him / herself as such would not have been permitted to attend such a meeting.

⁵⁰ doc 16: UCPI0000008551, doc 17: UCPI0000008554, doc 18: UCPI0000008240, doc 19: UCPI0000008242, doc 20: UCPI0000008241, doc 21: UCPI0000008244, doc 22: UCPI0000008558, doc 23: UCPI0000008248, doc 24: UCPI0000008560, doc 25: UCPI0000008254, doc 26: UCPI0000008255, doc 28: UCPI0000008257, doc 33: UCPI0000008267, doc 35: UCPI0000008268, doc 37: UCPI0000008256, doc 39: UCPI0000007365.

Question 24 – The UCO, 'Michael Scott'

165. It has been pointed out that the majority of these reports were submitted by UCO 'Michael Scott' / HN298. I am asked if I recall him in the context of the YL and, if so, what I recall and his actions.
166. I cannot recall him or his actions at all. I note however [doc 18: UCPI0000008240] that 'Mike Scott' was elected membership secretary of the YL Putney branch.
167. I may be able to answer these questions better if provided with a contemporaneous photo of him or other description of his appearance or his contact with me. Similarly, if permitted to discuss this with others involved in the YL at the time, and/or show them a photo of 'Mike Scott', I might be able to answer these questions. The restriction order which applies to me has not, yet, been varied, to allow me to do so.

Question 25 - Croydon Commitment ('CC').

168. I am asked about CC, in connection with intelligence reports dated 3.3.72 [doc 24: UCPI0000008560] and 4.5.72 [doc: UCPI0000008255].

Q25.1 What was CC?

169. CC was a self-styled militant faction within the YLs.

Q25.2. CC's relationship with the YL

170. I always thought that CC were trying to disrupt the YLs. They seemed to recommend more and more outlandish things. This raised my suspicions.

Q25.3. Aims of CC

171. Its aims were those of a quasi-anarchist theatrical faction.

Q25.4. Methods advocated by CC

172. The methods it advocated to achieve its aims included the burning of Census Forms during the National Census

Q25.5. Methods used by CC

173. The methods it used to achieve these aims included ineffectual protests and militant postures mostly, as I recall, on environmental matters.

174. I am asked about the accuracy of some of the contents of a report on the 1972 annual conference of the Young Liberal movement and on Commitment in particular [doc 26: UCPI0000008255]. It includes quite a sophisticated and accurate description of Commitment and indeed of me. For example it refers to me being of the centre left, as opposed to being inclined towards an anarchist group.

Question 26 – Speech by David Steel to Young Liberals on 31 March 1972

175. I am also asked about a phrase at para 33 of the report [doc 26: UCPI0000008255] about David Steel's speech, in his capacity as President of the Young Liberals, to the conference of the Young Liberals in Morecambe on 31 March 1972. I am asked if the description of David Steel's speech was a 'fair description' of it.
176. It was a long time ago. But I don't think the author of the report gives a fair description of the speech. I recall the speech being rousing.
177. Brian Milton's response to David Steel's speech is described in the document (para 34). It may be relevant that he was a Commitment supporter and I would say he was an agent provocateur in YL. He seemed to stir things up and I thought he might be a plant, maybe a UCO. I was also similarly concerned about a Scottish-accented colleague of Milton's called Colin Deans.

WEST CROSS ACTION GROUP

Question 27 - My political activities in WCAG

178. I am asked about my political activities in this group. I had no particular position within WCAG. There were no formal positions as it was an informal group.

Q27.1. Aims of WCAG

179. Its aim was to stop the West Cross motorway being built. It was an environmental, green cause.

Q27.2. Methods of WCAG

180. Its methods included NVDA – including sit down type protests.

Q27.3. Vetting of members by WCAG

181. It was not the sort of group to vet its members. It consisted of a very small group, about a dozen or so, who all knew and trusted each other.

Q27.4. Security precautions taken by WCAG

182. It took no special precautions to keep its plans etc confidential.

Q27.5. WCAG concerns about infiltration

183. It was not concerned about infiltration by the police or others.

Question 28 - Intelligence reports – three reports involving WCAG, in which I was named

184. I have been referred to three reports on WCAG dated 15.6.72 [doc 30: UCPI0000008258], 28.6.72 [doc 31: UCPI0000008260] and 30.6.72 [doc 32: Doc 32: UCPI0000008259]. I don't know what other intelligence was

gathered and stored on me. Again, this was gathered by police officer HN298, 'Michael Scott'.

Question 29 - the accuracy of part of one of the reports.

185. Paragraph 6 of the report dated 28.6.72 about a meeting on ~~25~~25.6.72 [doc 31: UCPI0000008260], appears fairly accurate, as I recall it. I was always security conscious and I may have advocated painting the road.

PALESTINE SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN

Questions 30 and 31 - Report on plans for a Palestine Day Rally scheduled for 14th May 1972

186. I am asked about a report dated 9.5.72 [doc 27: UCPI0000008566]. I think I probably did speak at the event in the end. It's the sort of thing I was doing at the time. I would probably have done so in my capacity as a YL. I was Young Liberal National Chairman then.

187. While I was a supporter of the Palestinian cause, I was not a member of the PSC. I cannot therefore comment in detail on its aims and methods. Nor can I comment on whether it vetted its members or took other security precautions to keep its plans, tactics or other matters confidential. I do not know whether it was concerned about the infiltration of police or others or, if it was concerned, why it was concerned.

ANARCHIST WORKERS ASSOCIATION ('AWA')

Question 32- My relationship and interactions with AWA

188. I am asked to comment in the light of a report dated 17.4.75 [doc 38: UCPI0000007076-CLF] on the AWA with documents about the AWA attached.
189. I am asked about my relationship / interactions with the AWA.
190. I am puzzled why I am asked about this. I am only mentioned in a postscript which reads as follows: "Postscript: A note on terminology. One section of the US anarchist movement I didn't go into in any depth is the right-wing free-marketeers, in effect anti-statist capitalists. They call themselves 'libertarians'. In no way are they to be confused with fascists, being in many ways quite radical, and cooperating with 'leftists' frequently. The nearest equivalent in this country are the Young Liberals of the Hain genre. Consequently the term libertarian communist caused quite a stir among many people".
191. I do not recall any involvement in this association at all. I was not a member or associated. I most certainly did not agree with its aims or methods, given its title. I did not agree with anything with 'anarchist' in front of it.

192. I cannot therefore answer questions put to me about its aims, methods, vetting of members, other security precautions or any concern it might have had about infiltration.

CAMPAIGN FOR THE REPEAL OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1971 ('CRIA')

Questions 33 and 34 – Campaign meetings in September 1975

193. I am asked to comment on reports dated 15.9.75 [doc 40: UCPI0000007562], 24.9.75 [doc 41: UCPI0000007626] and 29.9.75 [doc 42: UCPI0000007658] on campaign meetings in September 1975 at which a public meeting was planned and at which an invitation to me to speak was discussed.

194. I don't recall the invitation and I don't recall attending the meeting. I don't think that I did attend it.

195. I don't recall the organisation. I cannot therefore comment on its aims and methods. Nor can I say whether it vetted its members or took other security precautions to keep its plans, tactics or other matters confidential. I cannot say whether or not it was concerned about infiltration by the police or others, or, if it was concerned, why it was concerned.

196. I do recall of course the Act and the YLs' campaign around it. I organised a YL sit down at a pedestrian crossing at Charing Cross road, symbolically to

hold up traffic. I was arrested, prosecuted and given a £50 fine, at a magistrates' court.

STOP ALL RACIALIST TOURS ('SART')

Question 35 and 36 – Reports on SART

197. I have been asked to consider reports on SART dating from January 1976 [doc 43: UCPI0000009520] and September 1979 [doc 54: UCPI0000013374].

198. I was active in SART between approximately 1972 and 1980. I held the position of Chair ⁵¹.

Q36.1. Aims of SART

199. As its title suggest, its aim was to Stop all Racialist Tours

Q36.2. Methods of SART

200. Its methods included both conventional campaigning and NVDA, eg sitting down to protest against the British Lions tour, sitting in the team's hotel to get the captain to come to talk to us. The demonstration at the Richmond hotel took place as part of SART.

⁵¹ P69 OI. The demonstration at the Richmond hotel took place as part of SART, see para 145 onwards.

Q36.3. Vetting of members by SART

201. SART did not have 'members' as such. We were similar to STST. There was therefore no question of 'vetting' its members.

Q36.4. Security precautions taken by SART

202. SART took security precautions to keep its plans, tactics or other matters confidential in some cases, when it was planning direct action.

Q36.5. SART concerns about infiltration

203. SART was concerned about infiltration. Its main concern was about South African security agents, rather than the UK police.

Question 37 - SART meeting and methods

204. I am asked to comment on para 4 of a report dated 18.9.79 about SART's national planning meeting in London on 16.9.79 [doc 54: UCPI0000013374]. Paragraph 4 does accurately summarise the sort of thing I would have said at such a meeting. The kinds of direct action mentioned are the types of direct action that SART would have used.

TROOPS OUT MOVEMENT ('TOM')

Question 38 and 39 - Reports on TOM dating from March and June 1976 and UCO
'Rick Gibson'

205. I have been asked to comment on two reports dating from March 1976 [**doc 44: MPS-0728785**] and June 1976 [**doc 45: UCPI0000009763**]. In particular, I have been referred to 'Rick Gibson', the cover name of an SDS officer and whose name appears in these reports and asked questions about him.
206. I do not recall meeting him at any point. I don't know him. A photo and other information about his appearance at the time and activity in relation to me may help me consider this further.
207. I cannot recall anything of him or his actions.
208. I was not a member of the Troops Out Movement and nor was I involved in its organisation. I see they wanted to invite me to be involved, but I was not at the meeting described in these reports.

ANTI-NAZI LEAGUE ('ANL')

Question 40 – My political activities in connection with ANL

200. I am asked about my political activities in connection with the ANL.
201. I was active in the ANL between 1977 and 1981. Along with the STST, the ANL was one of most successful campaigns I was involved in. I was a founder member and also its national press officer. I describe my time in the ANL in **Outside In** ⁵².
202. The ANL's structure was very similar to the STST. With a national committee that the founders including me selected, it was a very loose, spontaneously driven and diverse movement. For example it included 'vegetarians against the Nazis', 'skateboarders against the Nazis' and 'miners against the Nazis' groups.
203. Although there was a central group of organisers, mostly voluntary, it encouraged autonomy among its campaigners around the country. People were encouraged to do their own thing and we aimed to encourage as many people as possible into a movement to fight the Nazis. We sought to win people to our cause of non-racism and democracy, and away from the Nazis and fascists.

⁵² P118 onwards OI.

204. We were very successful in building this movement, which numbered hundreds of thousands of active supporters around the country.
205. Paul Holborow is better placed than I am to speak about the ANL (and SWP). He is mentioned in many of the documents. He was a National Committee member of the SWP. He was also secretary to the ANL.

Q40.1. Aims of ANL

206. The ANL's aim was to confront and challenge the rise of the far right in the UK, the National Front ('NF') in particular. The ANL's aim was to prevent the NF from organising or having any platform to spread its hate.
207. This should also be seen in its context. The NF was a big political threat, not only on the streets but also in mainstream politics. In about 1976-77, it was polling strongly in by-elections and in greater London elections, pushing the Liberals to 4th place. It was recruiting disaffected working class youngsters, wearing Nazi paraphernalia.
208. The ANL was formed to defeat them. And it did: its national organiser Martin Webster admitted as much in court. He made this concession in a libel case I brought against him. He had tried to smear me, accusing me of planting bombs in South Africa as teenager – a complete lie. This was around 1982.

He was the defendant and under oath volunteered that ANL had effectively destroyed the NF ⁵³.

209. This illustrates to me a wider point, relevant to the Inquiry. What justification was there for UCO to infiltrate the ANL?

Q40.2. Methods of ANL

210. The ANL's methods were similar to the STST's too.

211. We sought to demonstrate wherever the NF planned to hold public events. So we publicly urged people to come to NF rallies and demonstrations and protest against the NF, and prevent the NF's event taking place.

212. Learning the lessons from the confrontations of Oswald Mosely's blackshirts in Cable Street in the East End of London in October 1936 'our position was that we would mass to prevent the NF swaggering through black or Jewish communities and causing violence as a result. It was up to the police or local councils to prevent the NF marching and meeting – then there would be no opportunity for confrontations, either with opposing ANL demonstrators, or with local residents fearful of the presence of Nazis in their neighbourhood' ⁵⁴.

⁵³ Refs from this Wikipedia page on MW - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Webster
13.^ D Renton, The Anti-Nazi League as social movement Archived 7 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine.

14.^ Ed Vulliamy (4 March 2007). "Blood and glory". The Observer. London.

⁵⁴ P119-20 OI.

213. I was opposed to violence. I actively discouraged people from using violence. But I was determined we demonstrated wherever the NF appeared. That is because where racism went, violence and attacks on black (and sometimes Jewish) people always followed. It was therefore essential that we were physically present wherever the NF were, to demonstrate against them - stopping them marching and holding public rallies, stopping them from intimidating and breeding violence and racist attacks against local people. We sought, through counter-demonstrations, to stop the NF from organising and carrying out its own demonstrations.

214. I certainly did not wish or aim to pick a fight with the police. The police were on occasions violent towards us. There was the notorious incident in Southall in May 1979 where the police attacked the ANL and an activist, Blair Peach, was killed. The police specialist public order unit – the Special Patrol Group ('SPG') - was most likely responsible. There was a lot of public criticism of the police at the time and the truth about the police's responsibility took years to come out and still may not be completely known ⁵⁵.

215. We also organised major events positively to advance our policy of anti-racism and encourage more support. For example we organised local 'Rock Against Racism' concerts and national 'Carnivals Against the Nazis'.

⁵⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/apr/27/blair-peach-killed-police-met-report>. Also p119 OI.

Q40.3. Vetting of members by ANL

216. The ANL was not a membership organisation and did not vet its members. However, there was, as with all the other campaigns I have been involved in, a clear understanding that those who participated were fully committed to the principles of NVDA and peaceful civil disobedience.

Q40.4. Security precautions taken by ANL

217. We were often very public about what we were doing. When we became aware of a venue where the NF planned a protest, we publicly urged people to come and protest against them.
218. We also took security precautions to protect ourselves. We had stewards at public meetings I spoke at to stop fascists disrupting them by removing them from the meeting (this happened at one event in Acton I recall). Apart from that Nazis targeted and broke up meetings at which I was speaking in Hemel Hempstead and Roehampton.

Q40.5. ANL concerns about infiltration

219. We had a residual concern about infiltration by the police or others. But this did not stop us getting on with what we were doing or the ways of organising ourselves.
220. We were concerned about Nazi infiltration and attacks on us. Our HQ in Little Newport Street off Charing Cross was attacked with arson in 1978.

Question 41 – Comments on 10 reports relating to ANL

221. I have been provided with 10 reports and documents connected with the ANL – dating from 1978 (7 reports), 1979, 1994 and 1995 ⁵⁶.

222. I doubt this is anywhere close to a full list of all ANL reports, particularly those relevant to me.

Question 42 - Disruption and confrontation with ANL

223. I am asked about a report dated January 1978 about the NF's planned rally in London in April 1978 at which two prominent Nazis, John Tyndall and Martin Webster were due to speak [doc 46: UCPI0000011673]. In it it is suggested (para 3) that in 1978 I was drawing up plans to cause disruption and a confrontation outside Islington Town Hall at the time of council elections. I am asked to comment.

224. This is not true. I personally was not drawing up such plans. The ANL may have been making plans to organise an event to protest against the NF in line with its tactic of challenging the NF wherever it sought to appear in public. I

⁵⁶ doc 46: UCPI0000011673, doc 47: UCPI0000011855, doc 48: UCPI0000011887, doc 49: UCPI0000011970, doc 50: UCPI0000021639, doc 51: UCPI0000021653, doc 52: UCPI0000012890, doc 53: UCPI0000021231, doc 67: MPS-0742234, doc 68: UCPI0000027940.

would have supported the ANL's principle of doing so. It was not our objective to cause public disorder.

Question 43 – ANL demonstration on 25 February 1978.

225. I am asked about a meeting where there was discussion about an NF demonstration and a counter-demonstration on 25 February 1978 [doc 47: UCPI0000011855].
226. I recall that we had a demonstration against the NF at the time of a by-election in Ilford North constituency. It was near a school I think and I spoke at an ANL rally. It was a big demonstration. Paul Holborow was there too. If the demonstration in the report [doc 47: UCPI0000011855] refers to this protest then I attended it.
227. I am asked about public disorder at the demonstration.
228. My objective at all events was always to avoid violent confrontation. With Paul I did my utmost to stop public disorder. This would have been the same at this demonstration. Indeed, it was particularly important that there be no violence in my view as this was a demonstration at the time of a by-election and my fear was that any disorder might be used against the Labour candidate (I had joined the Labour Party the previous year). I discussed the importance of this with Paul and got his agreement to ensure SWP activists too did all they could to avoid violence.

229. I recall that the demonstration had all gone smoothly, with full police cooperation negotiated in advance. The protest was coming to an end.
230. Then a small Maoist group broke through to the rear of our ANL cordons, as I recall using a small lorry, seeking confrontation with police and undermining the ANL with which they disagreed: it was difficult to manage.
231. This is an instance which provides a good example of a wider point I want to make about policing. Instead of directing its time and resources towards groups like the ANL, the police should have considered putting its resources towards the policing of potentially violent groups. They cannot justify, in my mind, surveillance on groups like ANL as a way of gaining intelligence on or an entry into extremist groups.

Question 44 - Relations between ANL and the Socialist Workers Party ('SWP') in 1978.

232. I am asked to comment on a report, from March 1978, on the relationship between the SWP and the ANL [doc 48: UCPI0000011887].
233. I think it is probably a pretty accurate assessment of the relationship between the SWP and ANL.

234. The SWP's influence and power within the ANL was strong. Nobody ever hid that, least of all me. The SWP provided a lot of organisational background and support to the ANL.
235. But it should not be overlooked that the ANL had an energy and power and reach of its own. It became a big movement which reached well, well beyond the SWP, including, for example, voluminous supporters of Labour and of no party. It was able to mobilise tens of thousands of activists across the country. The SWP assisted with this, but it was beyond the ability of the SWP to control them.
236. In the end, it was the Labour Party which benefitted most from young people joining the ANL, as they went on to join Labour rather than the SWP. Most ANL activists had not been involved in politics before. Through their experience, in the ANL, of anti-racist activity, they were politicised. But contrary to what the SWP no doubt hoped and as the SWP leaders privately admitted, the Labour Party mainly benefitted from recruitment of people whose first experience was ANL.
237. The SWP did however have some power and influence. The ANL's national secretary Paul Holborow, was one of the leading figures in the SWP. Many of the SWP's other key influential figures were also active and influential in ANL. I found them easy to work with. The SWP had a reputation in the left for sectarianism. But they deliberately curbed that in relation to the ANL. This enabled the ANL to build itself into a mass movement on the organising

principle of 'unity in action' putting aside the many differences I for example had with them as a self-styled 'revolutionary' body.

Question 45 – ANL and the Brockwell Park Carnival on 24 September 1978

238. I am asked to describe an event, a joint ANL-'Rock against Racism' 'Carnival Against the Nazis' in Brockwell Park, Brixton, south London, on Sunday 24.9.78, referred to in a report dated 12.10.78 [doc 52: UCPI0000012890].

239. It was organised by the ANL. It was a rock concert, combined with political speeches ⁵⁷. It was an afternoon / evening event. It started with speeches, including mine. It ended with a straightforward concert.

240. From memory, Elvis Costello, among others played at Brockwell Park. I certainly remember him playing at at least one of our concerts. There was an earlier Carnival in the spring of 1978 (30.4.78), in Victoria Park, East London ⁵⁸. The performers there included the likes of the Clash, Tom Robinson and Steel Pulse.

241. I recall speaking at both events.

⁵⁷ <http://www.ukrockfestivals.com/ani-Brockwell-pk-9-28-78.html>.

⁵⁸ <http://www.ukrockfestivals.com/victoria-park-1978.html>.

242. The concerts were very successful and well attended. The first one attracted about 100k people. This one attracted about 50 to 60k. The events were fundraisers for the ANL. They cost a lot of money to lay on, but we also successfully fundraised – with collection boxes at the event.
243. The Brockwell Park concert was a celebratory event, a political rock concert, to mobilise against racism and Nazism.
244. There was nothing untoward which should have attracted UC police interest. I cannot see anything suggested in the report on why an UCO should attend and report on it. Indeed, there was official liaison with the police about arrangements for the event. There was no need for it to attract the attention or energies of undercover police.

Question 46 – The relationship between ANL and SWP in 1994.

245. I am asked to comment on a report on an ANL conference in Camden in 1994 [doc 67: MPS-0742234].
246. I am asked if this report accurately described the relationship between the ANL and SWP at this time. It suggests that the ANL was an SWP front organisation.
247. This was emphatically not the case and the report hypes and distorts the true picture in keeping with many such UCO reports.

248. The relationship remained, as I describe above ⁵⁹, one of support but not complete control by the SWP of the ANL. While the SWP was at its heart, the ANL remained autonomous, distinct and powerful in its own right. National politicians like me (I was an MP at this point) were an important part of the coalition the ANL represented.
249. There were significant figures from the SWP in the ANL. Paul Holborow was still involved in the ANL, but he had, by then, stepped down as national organiser, though he remained on the National Committee. Jerry Fitzpatrick and then Julie Waterson took over though. Both were active in the SWP.
250. It is suggested that the ANL was of 'great financial benefit' to the SWP. If that was the case – and I doubt it was 'great' – that was because the SWP did our design and printing and were paid for doing so, but very speedily at very competitive rates, even cheaper than might be available from commercial sources. The ANL was certainly not a significant or serious source of income for the SWP.

⁵⁹ Para 232 onwards.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY ('SWP')

Question 47 and 48 – Comments on two reports relating to my connection with SWP the first dating from 1979 [doc 55: UCPI0000013675] and the second from 1981 and the Right to Work public meeting held on 21 October 1981 [doc 63: UCPI0000016691]

251. I am asked about the Right to Work Public Meeting held on 21.10.81 referred to in a report dated 5.11.81 [doc 63: UCPI0000016691]. I don't think I was present at this meeting. I cannot see from the reports that I was listed as attending.

252. I do not know much about the Right to Work campaign. I think that Jack Dromey, then an organiser with the Transport and General Workers Union and currently a Labour MP, was involved in that.

LABOUR PARTY SPECIAL CONFERENCE

Question 49 – Comments on the report about my presence outside the conference centre of the Labour Party Special Conference on 31 May 1980 [doc 57: UCPI0000014020]

253. I have been asked a number of questions, arising from a report dated 11.6.80 of my presence outside the conference centre on 31.5.80 at the time of a Labour Party special conference [doc 57: UCPI0000014020].

254. I was present at the conference, as described in the report.
255. The purpose of the conference was to consider reforms democratising the Labour Party constitution.
256. I was a delegate to the conference, from the Putney Labour Party branch. I think I took my sons to the crèche there. They were 4 and 2 years old at the time. This was a sign of how benign and mainstream the conference was.
257. It is likely I was at moments outside the Conference Centre, with others, holding a demonstration and / or dishing out ANL leaflets.
258. I ask myself why on earth there was an undercover officer present, a report prepared and kept on this event. I cannot see anything legitimate in doing this. It begs the question whether they ever went to Conservative or Liberal party conferences?

VOICES FOR WITHDRAWAL ('VAW') / LABOUR COMMITTEE ON IRELAND

Question 50 and 51 - Intelligence reports relating to this movement dating from 1980 and 1981 and a report on a meeting at Conway Hall on 14 June 1980 [doc 58: UCPI0000014080 and doc 62: UCPI0000015590]

259. I am asked to answer a number of questions in the light of a report on a meeting on 14.6.80 in the Conway Hall [doc 58: UCPI0000014080].

Q51.1. Who organised it

260. Contrary to what is said in the report, I can say emphatically – in response to the question I am asked - that VAW was not organised by the Liberal Party.

261. I say this because it is very unlikely that the Chair of the Trades Council would have been involved if it were. It seems more likely to have been a campaign in which the Labour movement or Trade unions or members of left wing groups would have been active.

262. I note who else was reportedly present at the meeting. I see that there were young Liberals speaking there, (para 14). But there were MPs also, eg the Labour MP Clive Soley. There was also a Sinn Fein speaker.

263. Taking all this together, it was clearly not a Liberal Party meeting. It is simply completely inconsistent with anything the Liberal Party would have organised and I can therefore say, confidently it was not organised by them.

Q51.2. My connection with VAW

264. I had no formal connection with VAW.

Q51.3. The aims of VAW

265. Its aim was to promote debate about Britain's continuing involvement in a Northern Ireland conflict that seemed to have no achievable objective.

Q51.4. Methods of VAW

266. As I recall, its principal method to advance its aims was the organising of meetings

Q51.5. Vetting of members by VAW

267. I am not aware of it vetting its members.

Q51.6. Security precautions taken by VAW

268. I am not aware of it taking any other security precautions to keep its plans, tactics or other matters confidential.

Q51.7. VAW concerns about infiltration

269. I am not aware of it being concerned about infiltration by the police or others.

Q51.8. Does paragraph 12 of the report accurately summarise my contribution to the meeting?

270. I am asked if para 12 accurately summarises my contribution to the meeting.

271. I do remember a great deal about speaking at this event. I spoke out strongly against terrorism and violence. A lot of the audience did not like that. They were aligned to the provisional IRA. I did not agree with their position. I recall my speech provoking discord, even mild heckling because I condemned all violence and terrorism.

Q51.9. Labour Party

272. The report (para 12) is correct to suggest that at this time I was a member of the Labour Party and addressing the meeting as such.

Question 52 – Comments on a report on a Labour Movement conference on Ireland, due to take place on 28 November 1981, including a flyer attached to that report (entitled 'Ireland: time for Tory policies to go') [doc 62: UCPI0000015590]

Q52.1. Aims of the Labour Committee on Ireland

273. The flyer accompanying the report does fairly state the Labour Committee on Ireland's aims.

Q52.2. Was the Labour Committee on Ireland part of the Labour Party?

274. The Committee was not part of the Labour Party. It was an outside body seeking to influence the Labour Party. It included many Labour Party members but it also comprised of other members of left-wing parties too.

Q52.3. Methods used by the Labour Committee on Ireland

275. I cannot confidently say what methods the Committee used to advance its aims.

276. From what I recall the Committee organised conferences and events, lobbied Parliament, encouraged local constituency parties to move relevant resolutions. I think that was it so far as methods were concerned.

Q52.4. My connection with Labour Committee on Ireland

277. My own connection with the Committee was to speak, occasionally at its events. I was not involved or active in its organisation.

Q52.5. Did the conference proposed on the flyer go ahead?

278. I am asked if the conference proposed in the flyer went ahead. I assume it did. I cannot recall if I participated in it. I was the Labour Party candidate for Putney by then.

RIGHT TO WORK MARCH

Question 53 and 54 – Comments on intelligence reports including two reports on Right to Work marches, from 1980 and 1981, both attaching documents around the campaign, leaflets etc and SWP role in those marches [doc 59: UCPI0000014302 and doc 61: UCPI0000015557]

279. I have been asked a number of questions about the SWP's role in these marches. I cannot remember much about them. So I cannot answer any of the questions posed to me by the Inquiry about these marches - eg about the role of the SWP in the marches, other political groups playing a role, the aims of the marches, any disorder at the marches.

280. I was aware of the marches. I was not involved in the organisation of the marches. It is possible I may have attended one of the marches but I cannot recall attending one specifically.

281. I cannot recall or comment on any disorder there may have been at these marches.

282. I see I am linked to this campaign simply as a signatory to 'Charter 80', a charter of human rights of Irish prisoners.

ACCURACY OF THE REPORTS

Question 55 – The accuracy of the intelligence reports that have been provided to me

283. I am asked about the accuracy of the reports I have been shown. There are a number of inaccuracies, some significant. I refer to them elsewhere in this statement, above.

284. For example there is the suggestion that Mike Ferguson became my 'number two' and successfully thwarted planned actions and deflected attention from himself. Another example is the suggestion that I may have encouraged the use of more violent tactics, such as tin tacks or serious criminal damage, against touring sporting teams. Both of these suggestions I emphatically reject.

285. The SB materials do not only contain inaccuracies. They also contain pernicious smears. I refer to some of these, below. They are contained in SB reports not provided to me by the Inquiry as disclosure, and which suggest a political agenda on the part of the UK state and coordination with the South African authorities.

286. These beg the question about the motives of the UCOs, and the potential for them to embellish events, even make up things, in order to justify their role or, potentially, to damage their targets, like me. This implies that instead of being limited to UCO work, their role was politicised.

287. My concern about the accuracy of the reports I have seen is matched by my concern that I appear only to have been provided with a small selection of relevant reports. More appears in the public domain and only came to my attention because others pointed them out to me⁶⁰. Some of these

⁶⁰ Ref <http://specialbranchfiles.uk/>, National Archives.

documents were submitted to the Inquiry as part of the application to be a core participant in this Inquiry. I must assume that much more exists, but has not been provided to me or is not available in the public domain.

Question 56 - 'Roger Harris' and reports on elected politicians

288. I have been provided with an extract, a paragraph, from a statement by an UCO, 'Roger Harris' ⁶¹, who explains how he may have been present at meetings addressed by me, reported on that, but 'was never tasked to report on elected politicians'.

289. I am asked if I recollect 'Roger Harris'. I have no recollections of him. I may be assisted if I were to be provided with a contemporaneous photograph of him, or provided with a description of him or his supposed contact with me.

290. I note his comments about not being tasked to report on elected politicians. This is the first and only piece of information I have been provided with, so far, about the police's policy and practice of covertly observing politicians, providing and circulating written reports on them and retaining these reports many years, even decades, later.

⁶¹ From 'I may have reported on elected politicians....' To '...never tasked to report on an elected politician'.

291. I would like to know who exactly authorised that? I refer, below ⁶², to my efforts, while in Parliament, to understand the degree of intelligence gathering on sitting MPs.

Question 57, 58, 59 – The impact, on me and other comments relating to the reports

292. I have been asked about the impact on me of learning I was spied on, whether I was surprised that the police deployed UCOs to report on my activities and whether I have any other comments.

My own experiences

293. I have been through quite a lot in my political life. I supported my parents, and was myself active in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. I had a knife pulled on me in a Putney pub by an NF member. I received a letter bomb ⁶³. I have been threatened with assassination and faced other threats of violence and assault ⁶⁴. Three meetings of mine were broken up by the NF and the BNP. At the height of the ANL rocks were thrown through the front windows of my terraced home in Putney, narrowly missing my toddler son Sam.

294. Against that background, I am not particularly disturbed by what I now know about undercover policing. I have not lain awake at night as a result of the

⁶² Para 300 onwards.

⁶³ Para 351 onwards. P79 OI.

⁶⁴ P63 OI.

knowledge that there were UCOs at many of the meetings I attended. This has just hardened my scepticism about role of UC policing and boundaries.

295. I don't see myself as victim as others clearly have been. I see myself as a target for surveillance which was illegitimate, completely disproportionate, democratically questionable and massively wasteful of precious police resources.
296. This comes out, for example, when I read reports of meetings in Putney, during my Young Liberal times, at my parents' home, with my sister present. Why were the UCOs doing that?
297. But I am acutely conscious that I am in a different position to some of the other non-state, non-police core participants (civil society activists). I have not been personally hurt in the way, for example, women who were abused in most emotionally disturbing and hurtful ways, have when they were led into apparently deep long term relationships with UCOs. Nor am I in the position, which the Lawrence family find themselves in, of having done nothing to attract the attention of undercover policing.
298. I've not had anything like that. I'm a pretty robust character, because of what I've been through.
299. But I was and am very concerned about the principle – both the impact on campaigners and on elected politicians.

My previous questions about undercover policing

300. I note that a lot of reports were prepared on MPs, speakers for example at meetings. Why were they watched, reports filed and kept?
301. I have raised questions about undercover policing in Parliament, before I stood down as an MP. I'm not satisfied that I have received a satisfactory answer. It is my hope that the Inquiry will provide full and satisfactory answers.
302. In 2013, I raised the question of undercover policing with the then Home Secretary, Teresa May ⁶⁵. I wrote to her again in January 2015, my concern being that undercover policing of elected representatives was in breach of the Wilson doctrine.
303. I raised this issue again in Parliament in March 2015 on the eve of the election, at which point I was standing down from the Houses of Parliament ⁶⁶.
304. Around the same time, I wrote to the Speaker of the House of Commons. I also raised this with the Home Secretary. My concerns were covered in the Guardian ⁶⁷.

⁶⁵ <https://peterhain.uk/2013/06/24/undercover-policing-2/>.

⁶⁶ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2015-03-26/debates/15032622000001/UndercoverPolicing>.

⁶⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/special-branch-watching-me-mp-democracy>; <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/25/police-spied-on-labour-mps-whistleblower>.

305. I, and 20 other MPs, received a letter from Mike Penning MP, then minister for policing, dated 27th March 2015. He recognised that 'we have known for some time that there were serious historical failings in undercover police practices. To improve the public's confidence in undercover work, we must ensure there is no repeat of these failings', He said that my, and others', concerns would be addressed by the Inquiry into undercover policing that the then Home Secretary had just set up and which would 'investigate thoroughly undercover policing and the operation of the Special Demonstration Squad'. He sought to reassure me that the Inquiry would 'get to the truth for the families and victims and make recommendations for the future'.

View of undercover policing

306. The sheer scale of the undercover infiltration of meetings and events I happened to be at, even on what may be the limited disclosure I have been provided, is staggering.
307. Most of these events were perfectly innocent by any standards. They were political meetings, conforming to the norms of conventional parliamentary democracy, eg my activities within the Putney young liberals.
308. Undercover policing aimed at stopping organised crime, drugs gangs, racists, serious violence and terrorism is appropriate. Indeed when Secretary of State for Northern Ireland I met UCOs operating in Northern Ireland and they had my full support.

309. But UC policing, entailing the expenditure of huge resources (presumably millions of pounds) over decades, involving spying on perfectly legitimate political activity and protest activity, is reprehensible.

Racist and politicised police

310. It should not be forgotten that at the time of my activism, a large section of the police held racist views and/or behaved in a racist way. It was frighteningly obvious and quite flagrant at times. Racism affected the approach taken by uniformed officers at demonstrations and it would be naïve to think that the same approach may not have influenced the work of undercover police officers infiltrating political activists and their superiors responsible for processing the intelligence, managing these UCOs and setting the unit's priorities generally. I do not think the scale and endemic nature of racism in the police at that time should be underestimated or glossed over.

311. It was very evident from some of our encounters with the police that some of their officers, not all, were expressing racist views and that they were – at the very least - pretty indifferent to our commitment to non-racialism and against apartheid. Those of us who were engaged in these campaigns and were white sometimes had people candidly disclose their racist views to us with great openness. I did meet some who were sympathetic to us, but they were few in number.

312. The police should be upholding the rights of all citizens, whatever the colour of their skin. I witnessed many incidents of black activists clearly targeted by the police, seemingly targeted as a result of their colour. I remember one particularly graphic incident at Twickenham police station, in November 1969, after the rugby match there. A black activist was being carried into the police station. Officers held either side of him so he was flat. They used his head as a battering ram to open the swing doors into the police station.
313. There should have been more tolerance and less surveillance of those who opposed racism and the support of apartheid rugby, cricket and tennis events.
314. I also have the impression that the police were anxious to discover plots, real or imagined, by activists against their targets, and to protect those Establishment figures, but were less keen to protect the interests of campaigners when they were at risk. I do not remember ever having been advised by the police about threats to my safety or offered any protection, though I know there were many.

Intelligence while in Parliament

315. I am concerned about reports that UCOs conducted spying operations on MPs, such as me, even after their election to Parliament⁶⁸. I would like to know whether this is true, and if so what has been recorded and kept on me while I was an MP and then in the House of Lords.

⁶⁸ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/25/police-spied-on-labour-mps-whistleblower>.
Page 85 of 103

316. I am concerned also that reports, from my time as an activist, have not only been prepared on me, but also kept on me many years later. For example, I have seen reports arising from me speaking at open ANL meeting decades ago. I wish to know why these have been kept for all these years.
317. They have been kept at a time I was in the government and in the Cabinet – for example while I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and a Foreign Office minister. At these times I was dealing with very sensitive intelligence, often seeing delicate raw intelligence. I was considering applications for and signing warrants to authorise various forms of surveillance to foil the most serious offences, eg to foil Islamic terror plots.
318. I was appointed to the Privy Council in 2001 and the records were still in existence. I had assumed, or at least been reassured, that any intelligence from surveillance from my activist days had been 'destroyed' by the time I was in Parliament and in Government. I refer to this passage in *Outside In*⁶⁹ referring to my time as Europe Minister:

'...in September 2001 MI5 was forced to open many of its secret files for the first time after an independent tribunal accepted that a blanket ban on releasing information was unlawful under the Data Protection Act. After media revelations about old MI5 files held on members of

⁶⁹ P354 OI.

our government, the head of MI5, Stephen Lander, came to see me at the Foreign Office. Low key and courteous, he confirmed there had indeed been such a file on me and I had been under regular surveillance. However he was at pains to say, I had nothing to worry about because the file had long been 'destroyed' when I had ceased to be of interest. What an anti-climax! It would have been good to see it. Furthermore, he was anxious to impress, I had 'never been regarded by the Service as a communist agent'. So that was all right then'.

319. I consider this to be one of the most unpleasant aspects of what I have now learned through this Inquiry. It is breath-taking that, as a democratically elected Parliamentarian and member of Government, I could be so misled about the state of intelligence being held about me, much of which I now know to be inaccurate. Obviously, I do not know who is responsible for me being told something that is untrue, but it is completely unacceptable.

320. This raises many, many questions. In terms of the Undercover Police Inquiry, they can only be answered, or part-answered if there is full disclosure to me (and to others in civil society who have been spied upon) of all Special Branch and undercover police officers' material on us. I note in this regard the strap line to the Inquiry's website - 'Getting to the truth of undercover policing and providing recommendations for the future'.

321. I feel that I have been living in a parallel universe, learning, now, that the public authorities, operating as part of the British state, retained reports on me

from the past while I was carrying out sensitive and significant security work for the Government of that state in my capacity as a Minister of State at the Foreign Office (1999-2001) and then as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (2005-7). Even after I became Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2007-8) and for Wales (2007-8, 2009-10) I continued to sign on request Warrants for the Home Secretary, if not available, seeing in the process highly sensitive intelligence on, for instance, terrorist suspects. It is a completely intolerable position for a minister to be in and I ask the Inquiry to look into this seriously.

322. Indeed, I am concerned that other people in a similar position to me might not even have been appointed to the positions they should have been appointed to because, like me, somewhere in a Metropolitan Police basement voluminous files containing reports such as the ones I have seen were held on them.

Nature of surveillance

323. I would also wish to make the point that as a boy, brought up in apartheid SA, we were subject to consistent surveillance, harassment, disruption, intimidation. By 'we' I mean my parents and their 4 children. This was at the hands of apartheid South Africa's security services.

324. There are echoes of this in some of what I've seen in the disclosed files. The relevant authorities should not have spied on me then in South Africa or in the UK in the 1960s, 1970s and beyond.

325. The patterns of policing in the UK and South Africa have parallels and raise the same questions about those who authorise them. Who is drawing a line between clearly illegitimate, borderline terrorist activity on the one hand and, on the other, political campaigning, including NVDA and civil disobedience which is, in my view, legitimate, albeit uncomfortable for the Establishment? Where is the line drawn?
326. In the case of undercover policing, in the UK, over the past 50 years, it seems to have got out of control – among officers on the ground, their handlers, the superiors to whom they reported. If, as seems to be the case, forensic kerbs were not placed on the limits of what was permitted, we end up with the scandals of surveillance on the Lawrences and the abusive relationships made with women.
327. The use of police resources is always a question of priorities. Most of what I have seen builds a picture of a warped set of priorities.
328. Basically, for the first 30 years of my political life in Britain, from the late 1960s to when elected an MP in 1991, I was subject to surveillance. It appears from the selection of reports I have been provided with that at many of the meetings I attended, including mostly routine publicly advertised meetings, open to the public, there was probably an UCO present.

Political activity viewed through a distorted 'Cold War' lens

329. The campaign against apartheid occurred at time when Cold War at its height and had an international element. It seems that many involved in policing activity viewed our activity through a distorted and completely misconceived 'Cold War' lens. No one seems to have properly considered how flawed this was.

330. It effectively portrayed those of us working against racism as communist subversives. The police's documents about undercover policing reflect this. This comment, from a SB report, in the public domain but not provided to me by the Inquiry appears to be typical: 'The Anti-Apartheid Movement is a "Stalinist" controlled movement which only supports the African National Congress (ANC). A number of Labour MPs are active supporters of the AAM....'⁷⁰. This report dates from 1993. I note that this was the security services' thinking, three years after Nelson Mandela was released from prison and engaged in negotiations with the apartheid government to transform the country.

331. The authorities appear to have completely blurred the distinction between legitimate protest movements and alleged communist insurgencies. The police appear to have seen us, and treated us as 'communist agitators', a convenient smear because most of us like me were emphatically not. Ironically most of us were strongly opposed to the Soviet Union.

⁷⁰ 'Special Branch Threat Assessment' in relation to an AAM march 20.6.93.

332. I am concerned by one Special Branch report dated 4.6.70

[doc 73: UCPI0000034089] which has not been provided to me as disclosure by the Inquiry, but which is in the public domain. I assume that it is typical of others, which have not been made known to me ⁷¹.

333. The paragraph which particularly concerns me is para 10:

'It is of interest to note, that although HAIN received most of the publicity during the past seven months, the real instigator behind HAIN was his mother, who constantly drove him on. Discrete enquiries into HAIN's background reveal that his mother, Adelaine Florence HAIN was born in Port Alfred, Cape Province on 16.2.1927. His father, Walter HAIN, was born on 16.2.1950. Mrs HAIN, I have been informed, is a strong-willed woman who has influenced and dominated her husband's political life and views and has greatly influenced Peter's left-wing political outlook. Since 1949 Mrs HAIN was one of the leading members of the SA CP [Communist Party] and because of her CP activities, early in 1960 she was arrested by the SA police under the Emergency Regulations and detained for 3 months. Walter HAIN was also active in the SA CP whilst there, he attended and addressed numerous CP meetings. Although not a member of the CP because of

⁷¹ SB report dated 4.6.70, 'the final of a series of reports regarding the Stop the 1970 Tour Committee and other organisations opposed to the South African Cricket Tour'.

his age, Peter was closely associated with the SA CP and in spite of his youth, was suspected to have taken part in CP underground activities. The HAIN family came to this country from Cape Town on 16.3.1966. Whilst there, Peter joined the AAM (membership No. 5576) and became chairman of the Putney Young Liberals. HAIN frequently uses the nom de plume 'Harold SMITH'. No information has come to hand that the HAIN family are currently members of the CP in this country'.

334. Pausing there, I ask myself why this document was not disclosed to me by the Inquiry. Is it because it was not made available to the Inquiry? Or does the Inquiry not think it was, in part at least, the fruit of undercover policing? Or it was too sensitive to disclose to me? It was provided to the Inquiry when I made my application to be a core participant in March 2017.
335. It is clear to me that the 'intelligence' in this part of the report came to the UK security services from the SA security services. It contains detail and slurs and errors that lay clear its source. It expresses exactly their line that the Hain family were all 'communists' and contains a lot of factual inaccuracies
336. The phrase 'discrete enquiries into Hain's background' is a giveaway. The detail could only have come from Pretoria.
337. The description of my mother would be right. She of my two parents was the most politically active. This would have come from the ground from SA

special branch who maintained constant surveillance of my parents and regularly searched the house.

338. The following is a straight lie: 'since 1949 Mrs Hain was one of the leading member of the SACP' (South African Communist Party). She was never a member of the SACP. Neither was my father and nor was I. She joined the SA Liberal Party with my father in 1954. My father was also never 'active in the SACP'.

339. This phrase, a reference to my father, 'he attended and addressed numerous CP meetings' is also a lie. The phrase 'Peter was closely associated with the SACP and ...was suspected to have taken part in CP underground activities' is another straight lie.

340. The background is that at the time my parents were politically active in Pretoria I was aged between 8 and 15. To my knowledge I never met a member of the SACP, let alone participated in its activities.

341. Of course, the SACP was banned in 1951. But this is a classic smear: everybody involved in anti-apartheid activity were labelled 'communists'.

342. There then comes a part which appears to be more UK-based 'intelligence', and equally flawed and scurrilous. The suggestion that I used a nom de plume 'Harold Smith' is a lie. Harold Smith was the landlord to the London flat we rented. We lived underneath Harold Smith's part of the house.

343. This part of this document appears to be an example of the classic Cold War prism through which anti-apartheid activists were deliberately portrayed by the apartheid government. Of more relevance to this Inquiry, this 'intelligence' was gullibly reproduced by British SB and intelligence services at the time.
344. But there are wider points, relevant to this Inquiry. The SA secret services wanted to portray us as communists. They spread this lie, slur, to their UK counter-parts. These counter-parts included, it appears, not only Special Branch but also their undercover police. Those UCOs were, at every opportunity bent on finding, wrongly, connections between anti-apartheid activists and communists.
345. An example of this echo can be found in another Special Branch report which is in the public domain but not provided to me in disclosure ⁷². I assume that it is based on UK secret services, Special Branch and / or UCOs' contributions. It lists (para 9) a number of organisations which have 'pledged their support' to STST. For example neither the International Marxist Group ('IMG') nor the Vietnam Solidarity Committee ('VSC') was affiliated to STST in the way other groups were, though individual supporters may have supported STST or joined our protests.

⁷² Report dated 7.4.70 on the opposition to the (then) forthcoming 70s tour.

346. This does beg the question whether the State was taking similar steps against our opponents, who, in my view, posed a much more serious threat, both politically and in terms of law and order.

347. Was the State maintaining the same sort of vigilant watch on the agents of apartheid active in Britain of which there were many or of right wing groups linked to them? These individuals and groups were much more prone to resort to violence and covert action – in contrast to the publicly open methods of the groups I was associated with. I refer to some relevant examples of these threats in **Outside In**.

The South African State

348. It is my clear view that the UK's undercover policing toward me cannot and should not be seen in isolation. It ran in parallel with apartheid South African State's attacks on me and other anti-apartheid activists. The question which needs to be answered is the degree of collusion, cooperation and intelligence sharing, between the UK and South African authorities. The anti-apartheid movement had concerns about this question at the time and this concern appears to have been discussed between SB and the Home Office at the time ⁷³. I hope that this Inquiry will consider this issue in its modules.

⁷³ Ref SB report of AAM AGM on 1.10.70 and correspondence between SB and the Home Office about para 28 of that report, which included an AAM branch's 'grave concern [about] a report of hidden association between Great Britain and South Africa, such as extending training and other facilities in Great Britain to South African police officers, prison officials, army personnel etc and asks ... the AAM to undertake research into such association'.

349. This question expresses itself in a number of ways. What information about me and others was provided to the South African authorities? To what extent did the framing, by the South African State of all anti-apartheid activists, as 'communists' willing to resort to violence, influence the tactics and intelligence gathered on us? To what extent were decisions about deploying undercover police against anti-apartheid activists influenced by the UK State's support of the apartheid South African regime? To what extent did the UK State know and turn a blind eye to the interventions of the SA state and its agents in the UK?

350. On this last point, I have already referred to the Bennion conspiracy trial ⁷⁴. The following further events may also be relevant ⁷⁵.

The letter bomb sent to me

351. In 1972 a letter bomb was sent to my home address, presumably by the South African security services ⁷⁶. By luck, it was spotted by my 14 year old sister and it did not go off. The Met's IRA bomb squad took the bomb and made it safe. They told me that it was powerful enough to blow me, my family and house to smithereens.

⁷⁴ Para 92 onwards.

⁷⁵ I document them in more detail in 'Outside In' and 'Pitch Battles: Protest, Play and Prejudice' to be published in May 2020.

⁷⁶ P78 OI.

352. This took place in the context of the apartheid regime killing anti-apartheid leaders across the world. South Africa had one of the world's most ruthless security services and a number of anti-apartheid activists were killed by letter bombs sent by BOSS, the South African Bureau for State Security, established in 1969. BOSS's 'Z-squad', set up explicitly to wage such terrorist attacks, took the final letter in the alphabet because it specialised in final solutions: assassination of apartheid's enemies. These victims included Dr Eduardo Mondlane, the President of the Mozambique liberation movement, FRELIMO, killed in Tanzania in 1969; Abraham Tiro, the Black Consciousness student leader, in Botswana; activist Ruth First, blown up in Maputo in 1982.

353. It begs the question whether the UK police vigorously pursued the investigation of the bomb sent to me or the threat posed by the South African State in the UK. I don't think they did. For example, I did not hear any further from the Metropolitan police. I never got a report back on what they had done to investigate this attack on me. They asked me not to make it public, something I have always regretted complying with⁷⁷.

⁷⁷ Though Des Wilson did a big feature on it in his Time Out magazine column.
Page 97 of 103

The bank robbery for which South African security services tried to frame me and for which I was acquitted in 1975

354. South African security services were also involved in trying to frame me for a bank robbery in October 1975.⁷⁸ This led to me being tried, and acquitted, in 1976 at the Old Bailey of a robbery at Barclays bank in Putney.

355. I learned from various sources that a South African agent had committed the theft and the South African authorities sought to frame me, in order to discredit me⁷⁹. I set this incident out in full in *Outside In*⁸⁰. Further, BOSS was likely to have had the active or tacit support of members of the rightist group within MI5. I learned from Colin Wallace, the former senior army information officer active in the 1970s, that he had established through a then serving British intelligence officer the contents of a record held by the security services in London. According to Wallace, it stated that the Metropolitan police were tipped off by MI5 almost immediately after the bank theft that I was responsible. Wallace said the security service record confirmed BOSS' involvement⁸¹.

The larger issues for this Inquiry to consider

356. More broadly, there is a weight of evidence that MI5 and the UK security services followed a wider strategy of infiltrating and collating intelligence on

⁷⁸ See my book on this, *A Putney Plot* - <https://peterhain.uk/publications/a-putney-plot-2/>. Also p95, 102 OI.

⁷⁹ eg Kenneth Wyatt, p99 and Diana Lefevre, p101 OI.

⁸⁰ P95 onwards OI.

⁸¹ P106 onwards OI.

liberal and left-leaning politicians and activists. This comes from former UK security service agents⁸². One, Peter Wright, for example asserted that a faction within MI5 was openly sympathetic to white South Africa during the height of the Cold War because it was seen as an ally against 'international communism'. Another, Colin Wallace corroborated this, adding that information was regularly 'traded' between MI5 and BOSS. Even joint operations were carried out where the agencies shared common objectives. Over the bank theft case, the interests of the British hard right and the South Africans coincided.

357. On 9.3.76, the Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson informed the House of Commons 'I have no doubt at all, there is strong South African participation in recent activities relating to the ... Liberal Party,' adding there had been 'very strong and heavily financed private master-minding of certain political operations'⁸³. This South African participation, he stated, was 'based on massive resources of business money and private agents of various kinds and various qualities'. Later 'the Hain case' was linked in Parliament to this matrix.

358. There are some echoes of this elsewhere, in the UK State's approach in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. They colluded with loyalist gangs,

⁸² Peter Wright (retired MI5 agent), Cathy Massiter (former MI5 intelligence officer) as well as Colin Wallace – p106 onwards of OI.

⁸³ [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1976-03-09/debates/ee498250-b101-4817-ad01-a29d9d7177bb/UnitedNations\(Secretary-General\)?highlight=south%20africa#contribution-712891ca-9891-4afa-887f-6252ff6e4ad5](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1976-03-09/debates/ee498250-b101-4817-ad01-a29d9d7177bb/UnitedNations(Secretary-General)?highlight=south%20africa#contribution-712891ca-9891-4afa-887f-6252ff6e4ad5).

resulting for example in their complicity in the murder of Pat Finucane, by loyalists, for which David Cameron apologised when he was British Prime Minister ⁸⁴.

359. Today, I read with alarm, but no surprise, of the recent revelations of the placing of the likes of Extinction Rebellion and Greenpeace on its terrorist watch list ⁸⁵. This illustrates why the issues raised in this Inquiry about surveillance on non-violent activity decades ago is so relevant. It reveals just how easy it is for the state to drift into wholly inappropriate surveillance. It almost makes me wonder whether the Women's Institute and all manner of citizens' groups I have spoken to, have been placed under surveillance too. There appears to have been a dangerous loss of clarity in determining who should or should not be placed under surveillance. This is very important: who is or is not violent or dangerous; who should or should not be placed under surveillance are critical questions for our democracy that go to the heart of freedom of expression and freedom of association. I like to think my work, along with others', gives me some authority on how important such democratic protest is and I urge this Inquiry to consider this an important dimension of its work. A state carrying out surveillance needs to approach these issues with great care, caution and proportionality in a way that appears to have been badly missing in the past and at times, is still absent in the present.

⁸⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/dec/12/pat-finucane-report-david-cameron-apologises>.

⁸⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/17/greenpeace-included-with-neo-nazis-on-uk-counter-terror-list>.

360. This even raises questions about the ideology, priorities and legitimacy of this form of policing tactic if the British state has so failed in the way it has been conducted.

Question 59 - Other Comments by me on my activities

361. I will defend everything I did and said during my period of activism.

Question 60 - Documents

362. I would like, as others in my position wish, to see all the Special Branch files on me and all the intelligence gathered on me by undercover officers. I am aware that UCO intelligence was often included in SB files without its source being made clear.

363. I am aware, from what I have seen in the public domain ⁸⁶ that SB collated more information on me and the campaigns I was active in, beyond what has been disclosed to me by the Inquiry.

364. It may be useful to compare the information actually held on me against the reassurances of its scope I was provided by Detective Superintendent Neil Hutchison, in his letter dated 23.6.15 [**doc 74:** UCPI0000034090] after I raised

⁸⁶ Eg National Archives, <http://specialbranchfiles.uk/>

this issue with the police in April 2015, following allegations made by Peter Francis ⁸⁷.

365. I would wish to learn what was compiled on me and may not, now, be available and why it is not available, if that exercise is possible.
366. I would like more information on the UCOs who spied on me – the details of all of them, their cover names, contemporaneous photographs and other ways to prompt me to identify them and what they may have done.
367. I am aware that activists are particularly concerned, also, about not seeing the full statements of all officers who spied on them at an early stage, or at all, in the Inquiry. I share this concern.
368. I would like this information not only to understand the extent of State surveillance on me, but also, more practically, in order for me to be in a position to provide further, fuller comments of assistance to the Inquiry.

⁸⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/25/police-spied-on-labour-mps-whistleblower>.

Question 61 and 62 – Further personal details requested by the Inquiry

369. I am white, Caucasian.

370. My gender is male.

Statement of Truth

371. I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'P. A. H.', written over a horizontal line.

Date:

3 March 2020

