**INDEPENDENT INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING**

---

**FIRST WITNESS STATEMENT OF**

**SECURITY SERVICE WITNESS Z**

---

1. I, Witness Z, make this statement on behalf of the Security Service for the purpose of the Undercover Policing Inquiry ('UCPI') following a Rule 9 Request dated 24 February 2020.

2. This witness statement addresses the detailed Rule 9 request and, in summary, provides an overview of the roles and responsibilities of the Security Service between 1968 to present, including the Security Service's understanding of the role of Special Branch vis-à-vis the Security Service in counter subversion, and addresses the liaison between the Security Service and the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) between 1968-1982.

3. I have been employed by the Security Service for over 30 years and have extensive experience of the Security Service's human intelligence operations. I am currently a senior manager within the Security Service's covert human intelligence operations capability. I am appropriately placed to provide the statement on behalf of the Security Service, given my current and previous roles, and my experience of the functions and operation of the Security Service generally.

4. I make this statement based on (1) information and documents provided to me by colleagues in the Security Service, (2) the documents contained within the UCPI Corporate Witness Statement Pack, and (3) my experience of the functions and operation of the Security Service generally. As this is a corporate witness statement, it has been drafted with assistance from staff across the Security Service, legal advisors and counsel.

5. In so far as the contents of this statement are within my personal knowledge, they are true, and in so far as they are not within my personal knowledge they are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

6. In recognition of the importance of the matters that UCPI is considering, the Security Service has sought to engage transparently with the UCPI and has given it unfettered access to all material on its corporate record that is potentially relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference. Where material has been deemed relevant, the Security Service has sought to disclose it into OPEN in as transparent a form as possible, keeping redactions to a necessary minimum in accordance with the Restriction Order on the grounds of national security.

7. Consistent with this approach, this witness statement has been drafted to ensure it can be disclosed into OPEN in full. Whilst this witness statement does not include sensitive information, I am satisfied that this statement properly and fully addresses the questions set out in the Rule 9 request. In so far as is possible, the documents relied upon in this statement are publicly available, and will otherwise be disclosed into OPEN with the minimum redactions possible.

Terminology used in this Witness Statement

8. Over the relevant period, both the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) and the Security Service used 'agents' to gather intelligence. However, in the terminology of the MPSB, 'agent' is used to refer to both a member of the public providing information (also known as an informant) and also an MPSB officer working undercover (i.e. an undercover officer, or 'UCO'). In contrast, the Security Service uses the term 'agent' only to refer to an informant. When I refer to an MPSB 'agent' in this statement, I intended to reflect the wider definition adopted by the MPSB.

9. Consistent with the approach taken by the UCPI, this statement will use the name SDS throughout, notwithstanding the SDS had different names at different times between 1968 and 2008.

## PART I – OVERVIEW OF ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

### The Role and Remit of the Security Service from 1968 to date

### The Maxwell Fyfe Directive

10. In 1952, the then Home Secretary (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe) issued a Directive (MFD) to the then Director General of the Security Service (DG) (Sir Percy Sillitoe), setting out the main functions of the Security Service. The MFD established the Security Service's responsibility for counter-subversion as follows (emphasis added):

> *"The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State."*[1] [Underline added]

11. The MFD governed the role and remit of the Security Service in 1968. There was, at that time, an absence of supporting guidance and consequently the interpretation and application of the wording in the MFD was a matter for the DG.

12. In a 1971 report to the then Home Secretary (Reginald Maudling) on the Security Service's role in relation to industrial action, the then DG (Sir Martin Furnival Jones) advised that:

> *"The tendency over the sixty years of the Security Service's existence has been to keep the Service within narrow limits and at once to insulate it from involvement in politics while bringing it increasingly under formal controls. Both tendencies have been healthy. Because the work of the Security Service has*

---

[1] Sir Maxwell Fyfe Directive, p2, UCPI0000034262.

*to remain secret, there is a special obligation to see that it is kept within strict limits erring, if at all, on the side of caution."*[2]

13. In 1972, Director F (the head of the branch of the Security Service that dealt with subversion) defined subversion as:

*"...activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."*[3]

14. Director F's definition was formally adopted by Lord Harris of Greenwich, Minister of State at the Home Office, in a debate in the House of Lords on 26 February 1975.[4]

15. This definition was accepted as appropriate by the Select Committee on Home Affairs and became commonly referred to as "*the Harris definition*".

16. In December 1977, the Deputy Director General (DDG) clarified the counter-subversive role of the Security Service as the *"provider (sic) of objective factual information about the security status of individuals and groups..."*.[5]

17. In February 1978, the DDG clarified that subversion did not equate to "*activity which threatens Government's policies or may threaten its very existence"*. The DDG reiterated the importance of the Security Service firmly adhering to the objective non-partisan approach of the MFD.[6]

---

[2] *"The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of Security Service"* by Christopher Andrew, p.590 (*'Defence of the Realm'),* UCPI0000034263.
[3] *Defence of the Realm,* p.591, UCPI0000034264.
[4] Hansard, HL Debate, 26 February 1975, Vol 357, col 947, UCPI00000034265.
[5] *Defence of the Realm,* p. 658, UCPI0000034266.
[6] *Defence of the Realm,* p. 659, UCPI0000034266.

18. On 28 January 1985, it was reported in The Times Newspaper that the then Home Secretary (Leon Brittan MP), in response to questioning on striking workers and subversion, said that:

> "*There is a clear distinction between subversion and opposition to the policies of the government of the day or peaceful campaigning to bring about changes in those policies or to influence public opinion generally*".[7]

**The Security Service Act 1989**

19. In 1988 the Security Service Bill was put before Parliament in order to establish, for the first time, a legal framework for the Security Service. In the Second Reading debate on the Bill on 15 December 1988, the then Home Secretary (Rt. Hon. Douglas Hurd MP) expanded upon his predecessor's comment on subversion:

> *"The Security Service is not interested in the normal and proper conduct of the trade unions of this country; it is not interested in thwarting those who seek to persuade others that Government policies... are wrong or that their priorities are wrong. It is not interested in those who join together to make their views heard on, for example, the environment or on our defence policies. It is interested in any who might collectively or individually, overtly or clandestinely, be planning the deliberate overthrow of our parliamentary democracy and in doing so present a real threat to our security and safety".*[8]

20. The Security Service Act 1989 (SSA 1989) received Royal Assent on 27 April 1989. Section 1(2) SSA 1989, which came into force on 18 December 1989, defined the function of the Security Service:

> *"The function of the Security Service shall be the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions*

---

[7] "Britain Defends Special Branch Right to Spy on Strikers", The Times, 28 January 1985, UCPI00000034268.
[8] Hansard, HC Debate, 15 December 1988, Vol 143 col 1107, UCPI0000034269.

*intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means"* [Emphasis added].

21. Whilst the SSA 1989 does not use the term "subversion", the language used by Lord Harris in 1975 is reflected in the wording of s.1(2), as highlighted in the emphasis I have applied in paragraph 20 above. It was also endorsed by Douglas Hurd MP in the Second Reading Debate.[9]

22. Section 1 SSA 1989 remains in force and continues to define and govern the functions of the Security Service, including its counter-subversion activity. Section 2 SSA 1989, places a duty on the DG to ensure that there are arrangements in place to secure that no information is obtained, or disclosed, by the Security Service except so far as is necessary for the proper discharge of its functions.

23. The Security Service is now governed by a strict framework of legislation and oversight designed to ensure that its powers are used only (1) for the performance of its functions (i.e. the purposes for which it exists as set out by law), and (2) where it is necessary and proportionate to do so. The Security Service's remit, however, remains as set out in the SSA 1989. The threats have naturally evolved over the years, resulting in changes in the Security Service's operational focus. For example, the Security Service stopped investigating subversion in 1996, increased its focus on counter-terrorism in 1984, took over the lead on Northern Ireland terrorism in 1992, stopped investigating serious crime in 2006, and started investigating right wing, left wing, anarchist, and single-issue extremism in 2020.

## The Role of Special Branch

24. The first Special Branch was formed in London in 1881. Each British police force went on to form its own Special Branch (SB), with the largest (MPSB) being part of the Metropolitan Police Service. Originally focussed on containing and bringing to

---

[9] Hansard, HC Debate, 15 December 1988, Vol 143 col 1106, UCPI0000034270.

justice the Fenians and other politically extreme Irish groups, the MPSB was later tasked with the requirement to pass information to the government of the day about many home-grown foreign and anarchist groups, the activities of the Russian secret police in London, and even the suffragette movement.[10]

*The Role of Special Branch vis-à-vis the Security Service*

25. It was understood in March 1967 that MPSB's responsibility was the protection of state personages and the prevention of crimes directed against the state. I note that this role is much wider than subversion, which was the area in which the Security Service's interests overlapped[11]. Day to day liaison with the Security Service at that time was initiated by officers of the Security Service who needed information about persons and organisations known or suspected to be involved in subversive and similar activities in the Metropolitan Police area.[12]

26. In 1972, the Security Service considered that, in respect of the coverage and reporting of industrial disputes, the MPSB's remit was to provide the Commissioner/Home Office with intelligence about the law and order of industrial disputes within the London area, and to provide the Security Service with intelligence about the subversive elements of these disputes. The MPSB's remit did not include undertaking work already covered by other Government departments, such as the production of general reports on industrial and trade union matters, nor did it have any responsibility for safeguarding national security, which remained the sole responsibility of the Security Service.[13]

---

[10] *Special Branch: A History: 1883-2006*, by Ray Wilson, UCPI0000034271.
[11] I understand that, as many of the MPSB's records from the time have been destroyed, the majority of records that remain available for the purposes of this Inquiry are those shared by MPSB with the Security Service. There is therefore a danger that the material is not properly representative of the full scope of the MPSB/SDS's activities, in that it does not take into account the wider role and activities of the SDS that were un-related to subversion (on which the Security Service would not hold any documents or information).
[12] 'Responsibilities of Special Branch Metropolitan Police, UCPI0000030040-1.
[13] UCPI0000031254, p.5-7 & 11.

Law and Order Role

27. The MPSB's role was limited to issues of law and order. The MPSB ran agents only in those organisations which they considered might become involved in politically motivated crime or be responsible for outbreaks of public disorder, against which police executive action could be taken. The MPSB's remit did not extend to running agents on behalf of the Security Service. The Security Service did not consider that MPSB agents were working for the Security Service; in September 1969 the Security Service considered that, being adapted to rather different objectives, the information from Security Service and MPBS agents was complimentary, and "*the by-product of each assists the other*". [14]

28. For example, in a meeting between the Security Services and MPSB on 6 December 1972, the Security Service discussed with MPSB the need for long term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions. This was on the basis that 'subversion in industry' was listed in MPSB's responsibilities. The Security Service was informed that the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (Sir Robert Mark) was of the view that MPSB's role was to collect information about likely law and order trouble spots on which police executive action could be taken.[15] The MPSB were not to be involved in agent running on the Security Service's behalf, not least because of staff shortages, and despite the fact that 'subversion in industry' was listed as one of the responsibilities of the then 'C Squad' within the MSPB.

29. In a subsequent meeting with the Security Service on 25 January 1973, MPSB explained that they considered it their task to try and run agents only in those organisations which they considered might become involved in politically motivated crime or be responsible for outbreaks of public disorder. They were not concerned with running agents in organisations which presented only a political subversive

---

[14] UCPI0000030903, p 2.
[15] 'Relations with M.P.S.B. about Industrial Subversion', UCPI0000031256.

threat. Although MPSB were aware that some of their work was passed, and was of benefit, to the Security Service, *"[t]heir interest in subversive organisations waxed and waned according to the extent they judged an organisation presented a criminal or law and order problem."*[16]

30. The Security Service's understanding of the MSPB's role is further evidenced in a note of a meeting on 9 December 1977, where the Security Service were informed that the then Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir David McKnee, had made it clear that MPSB agents were to be run solely in the context of law and order. "*If an organisation posed no law and order problem - no agents.*"[17]

31. On 7 June 1982, the same principle was reiterated to Security Service officers prior to a meeting with those responsible for running the SDS at the time, DCI David Short and HN68. The Security Service officers were reminded that the primary justification for the SDS was for advance information on potential law and order problems.[18]

32. Notably, once the placement of agents by the MPSB in a particular group could no longer be justified according to their law and order objective, MPSB took steps to move the agent on, even where the Security Service was interested in continued coverage of the group for national security purposes.[19]

SB Guidance

33. The focus of the SB on law and order was affirmed in guidance issued by the Home Office in December 1984, titled 'Guidelines on the work of a Special Branch' ("1984 Guidelines").[20] These Guidelines were drawn up in consultation with the Security Service, and were based, in large part, on the terms of references for SBs issued by the Association of Chief Police Officers in 1970. The 1984 Guidelines identified that the work of SB is to assist the Chief Officer with preserving the Queen's peace.

---

[16] UCPI0000031258.
[17] UCPI0000030060, p.1.
[18] UCPI0000028779.
[19] UCPI0000028802.
[20] 'Guidelines on the Work of a Special Branch' UCPI000004538 and UCPI000004584.

34. Paragraphs 5-12 of the 1984 Guidelines identified the tasks which would most commonly fall to be undertaken by Special Branch (SB), in carrying out that role. This included:

I. the gathering of information about threats to public order;

II. assisting the Security Service in defending the Realm against espionage, sabotage and subversive activities;

III. providing information about extremists and terrorist groups to the Security Service (or to Metropolitan Police Special Branch in relation to Irish Republican groups);

IV. providing armed personal protection to 'at risk' individuals;

V. policing airports and seaports;

VI. assisting with immigration matters, and;

VII. enquiring into offences connected with firearms and explosives.

35. At paragraph 20 of the 1984 Guidelines, the terms "espionage", "sabotage", "terrorism" and "subversion" were defined. Subversion was defined as follows:

> *"Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and which are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."*

36. The remit of SBs (including MPSB) vis-à-vis the Security Service is identified at §6 of the 1984 Guidelines, which specifically included assistance on subversion:

> *"Special Branch assists the Security Service in carrying out its tasks of defending the Realm against attempts at espionage and sabotage or from the actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged to be subversive to the State. A large part of this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism, including the activities of international terrorists and terrorist organisations"* [emphasis added].

37. The SBs were required to take great care when investigating subversive organisations, not have their actions misrepresented as wrongful police interference in the exercise of civil and political liberties. SB enquiries into subversive activities in particularly sensitive fields, for example in educational establishments, in Trade Unions, in industry and among racial minorities, which might have been necessary to meet the requirements of the Security Service were to be initiated only after consultation with the Security Service. SB Chief Officers were also required, when operating in support of the Security Service, to attach importance to the need to consult the Security Service and to seek its advice as necessary.

38. It is clear that the MPSB's role in counter subversion was to uphold law and order. The placement of SDS agents, following its creation, was to provide intelligence for the law and order and public order requirements of the police. Their primary purpose was not to fulfil Security Service requirements. Those organisations which were considered to pose a public order threat were, however, also often subversive organisations which were under investigation by the Security Service. In addition, while the Security Service did not investigate threats to public order, some public order threats were sufficiently serious to amount to subversion. In light of this overlap, and to prevent duplication of resources, the MPSB and SDS would share intelligence relevant to subversion with the Security Service.

1996 to Present

39. In 1996, the Security Service ceased investigating subversion and consequently its work vis-à-vis the SB in counter-subversion also ceased.

40. The MPSB ceased to exist in 2006 when it was merged with another unit to become SO15, although regional SBs remain in existence. Today, SO15 is the specialist operations branch responsible for countering the threat from terrorism on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service[21].

---

[21] See https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/our-network/ UCPI0000034277.

41. I have been asked to explain the Security Service's understanding of SO15's role in counter subversion, vis-à-vis the Security Service. As, however, the Security Service ceased investigating subversion in 1996, ten years prior to the creation of SO15, the Security Service has not had, and does not have, involvement with SO15 on counter subversion. The Security Service and SO15 work closely on countering the threat from terrorism.

*Roles and Responsibilities in relation to Northern Irish Related Terrorism*

42. I have been asked to address respective roles of the Security Service and Special Branch in relation to Northern Irish related terrorism. In light of the Inquiry's Terms of Reference, I address this question in terms of the responsibilities for Northern Ireland related terrorism on the mainland only.

43. The 1984 Guidelines made it clear that whilst each police force in England and Wales had its own SB, the MPSB had responsibility throughout Great Britain in relation to Irish Republican extremism.[22]

44. With respect to the relative roles of the MPSB and the Security Service, the MPSB maintained the lead on NI-related terrorism until 1992, following which the Security Service had primary responsibility and the lead for intelligence concerning NI-related terrorism. In the period 1968-1982, insofar as the MPSB's remit in respect of NI-related terrorism overlapped with the Security Service's interest in subversion, it appears that the MPSB would still have provided assistance consistent with their wider remit.

[22] UCPI000004538 and UCPI000004584.

## PART II – LIAISON BETWEEN THE SECURITY SERVICE AND THE SPECIAL DEMONSTRATION SQUAD FOR THE PURPOSES OF TRANCHE 1 OF THE INQUIRY'S INVESTIGATION (SDS UNDERCOVER POLICING DEPLOYMENTS COMMENCING 1968 – 1982)

### The Organisation of Security Service 1968 – 1983

45. Between 1968 and 1983, the structure of Security Service, the responsibilities of the various branches, and the sections within those branches, changed many times according to the Security Service's priorities at particular times. I set out below the main responsibilities of the branches and sections, which are of most relevance to the Inquiry. Organisational charts for the Security Service in 1968 and 1976 are set out at Appendix A. The responsibilities of the relevant branches were as follows:

**1968**

A Branch Intelligence resources and operations

E Branch Counter-subversion overseas; intelligence organisation and liaison overseas (abolished in 1971)

F Branch Counter-subversion home

**1976**

A Branch Intelligence resources and operations

F Branch Counter-subversion (F) and counter-terrorism (FX)

46. F Branch was the branch within the Security Service that had primary responsibility for liaison with the both MPSB and the provincial SBs. Within F Branch, F2B dealt with Trotskyist groups, Militant Tendency and the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP). F2C investigated Communists, Anarchists, and Extreme Right Wing (XRW). F3 took over the work of E Branch following its dissolution in 1971 and was responsible for investigating the international dimension of subversion. F4 was responsible for running agents within counter subversion. F6 was the section responsible for coordinating the joint coverage of subversive groups, and individuals, of interest to the Security Service. This section managed the relationship with the SDS. In July 1976, F7 was created and became primarily responsible for the investigation of Trotskyist, Anarchist and right-wing organisations.

47. A Branch, which was responsible for 'Intelligence resources and operations', had responsibility for conducting surveillance. As a consequence, A Branch had a liaison relationship with MPSB in respect of surveillance conducted by the MPSB, with the aim of preventing operational overlap. A Branch's work with MPSB was either through, or approved by, F Branch.[23]

## Subversion in the United Kingdom 1968 – 1983

48. The Security Service first produced 'The Brief Guide to Subversion' (hereafter, 'the Guide') in 1969 and it was reproduced with revisions in 1975 and 1984. The Security Service has a copy of the 1984 Guide but no longer retains a copy of the 1969 or 1975 revisions.

49. Consistent with the definition of subversion set out in paragraph 13 above, the Guide includes only subversive groups or organisations which are defined as those whose ideology or politics *"threaten the safety or well being of the state and are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means"*. All foreign based terrorist groups and Irish subversive organisations are noted to be excluded from the Guide.

*Overview of Subversive Activity*

50. I am unable to provide, in the present day, a detailed and accurate overview of subversive activity between 1968 and 1983, nor am I able to comment, in any detail, on the level of concern any particular activity or group caused the Security Service at the time. In order to assist the Inquiry, I summarise below the organisations that appear to have been of primary interest to the Security Service in respect of its investigations into subversion during the relevant period.

51. Between 1968 and 1983, within the context of its investigations into subversion, the Security Service was most interested in subversive groups that sought to influence non-subversive organisations, through obtaining membership of those

[23] UCPI0000030776; UCPI0000030773 and UCPI0000030774.

organisations (for example Trade Unions), in order to achieve the subversive goal of undermining parliamentary democracy. Notably, in 1972, the Security Service was under "increasing pressure from Whitehall... for more detailed information on subversive activities in industrial disputes"[24]. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), whose subversive activities had been of interest to the Security Service since the 1920's, was one of the main targets during the early 1970s, particularly given the CPGB's interest in industry. In a report to the Prime Minister in 1972 on Subversion in the UK, the Security Service noted that the CPGB, with 29,000 members, was the strongest subversive group in the country and having consistently failed to attract the electorate, it was pursuing political power through infiltrating unions.[25]

52. Ultra-Left groups, consisting of Trotskyists, Maoists, and Anarchists, were considered a threat but didn't take high priority until the mid-1970s. In the 1972 Report, it is noted that the Trotskyist groups, taken together, were about 4,000 strong. They aimed to identify and make contacts in groups considered alienated from society, for the purpose of hastening their disillusionment with the capitalist system and ultimately to further the cause of revolution, and sought to use a deliberately violent challenge to authority. The Maoists and Anarchists were said to be the only other significant subversive groups but the Maoists numbered less than 500 and the Anarchists, whilst all theoretically dedicated to the overthrow of any system of government, had only a few who were prepared to carry their beliefs beyond the bounds of lawful protest.[26]

53. From the mid 1970's, Trotskyite groups, such as the Socialist Workers Party, began to seek subversive influence within political institutions. To prevent violence and maintain the protection of parliamentary democracy, the Security Service used

---

[24] UCPI0000031256.
[25] 'Subversion in the UK – 1972' p.1-6 UCPI00000034279.
[26] p.3-5 UCPI00000034279.

intelligence gained on these groups to work with the police to prevent and prosecute subversive actors.

54. The attempts by the CPBG and Trotskyists to spread their influence through other organisations is evident from the assessment of the Security Service that by the mid 1970's CPGB members held 8 of the 15 seats on the CND's national executive and in April 1982, the CND, which had expanded significantly, remained a target for CPBG and Trotskyist groups.[27]

55. The Security Service's priorities were influenced by the historical context of the Cold War at the time. The USSR's expansionist support of revolutionary movements worldwide, and incidents such as in Paris in May 1968, in which ultra-left student demonstrations turned violent and Communist-backed general strikes brought France close to revolution, meant there was sufficient concern to justify monitoring subversive groups in Britain who were seeking to undermine parliamentary democracy.

56. There was, therefore, a proper basis for the Security Service's interest in these organisations. I note, however, that counter-subversion, whilst a main priority for the Security Service through 1968 to 1983, was just one priority alongside others, including counter-espionage, protective security, and counter-terrorism. It appears from the 1972 Guide that the Security Service did not consider that subversive organisations posed a particularly high priority threat, and the pressure to investigate these organisations often came from the Prime Minister and Whitehall.

57. I am unable to comment on the 1984 Guide to Subversion, save to observe that I understand that it provided, at the time, a reference point for the Security Service in respect of every organisation that was suspected of some involvement in subversive activity. The Guide does not contain assessments of the threats the organisations posed and it appears simply to have been a point of reference, providing basic information about the relevant groups.

---

[27] *'Defence of the Realm'*, p.673 UCPI00000034274.

## Liaison between the Security Service and Special Branch 1968 – 1983

58. The Security Service has a long-standing liaison relationship with Special Branch, including regional SB's as well as MPSB. Whilst this statement necessarily focusses on the Security Service's liaison with MPSB concerning counter subversion between 1968-1983, it should be noted that the working relationship between MPSB and the Security Service was well established prior to 1968 and extended beyond the provision of SDS information on subversive activities.

59. The MPSB assisted the Security Service in a variety of areas including, *inter alia*; (i) providing the policing aspects of an operation, for example to effect an arrest following an investigation, (ii) the passing of information on would be asylum seekers and defectors who surfaced at police stations in the Metropolitan area, and (iii) providing the Security Service with a continuous source of information on arrivals and departures of security suspects at air and sea ports. In addition, the Security Service provided intelligence it gained as a by-product of its investigations about major crimes in the Metropolitan area.[28] In so far as I am aware, this is an accurate summary, in general terms, of the liaison arrangements in place in 1968.

60. There was a good working relationship between MPSB and the Security Service in 1967. The close cooperation prior to the creation of the SDS is evidenced by discussions on intelligence collection and the creation of a scheme of pro-forma reporting, which was introduced for the simplification and standardisation of security reports provided by MPSB to the Security Service in July 1967.[29] The close working relationship with MPSB continued, and was not affected by the creation of the SDS, believed by the Inquiry to have been formed on 30 July 1968.

61. In general, however, the Security Service had a closer relationship with the provincial SBs, who managed their agents in conjunction with F4. In 1969, it was noted that F4's dealings with receptive provincial SB branches had, over the years,

---

[28] UCPI0000030040.
[29] UCPI0000030042; UCPI0000030764 & UCPI0000030877.

resulted in comprehensive and deep coverage of one particular subversive group.[30] At the same time, it was noted that F4 had achieved an increasingly close rapport with MPSB, with the object of co-ordinating agent coverage and eliminating wasteful duplication of effort.[31] There was particularly close cooperation in the sphere of Revolutionary Protest Groups.

62. In 1972, it was noted that the Security Service's relationship with MPSB was getting a little closer to that enjoyed with provincial police forces, but that there was "*a long way to go*".[32] This was still the case in 1977, when it was noted that the relationship with MPSB was still not as close as the Security Service's relationship with provincial police forces.[33]

63. The working relationship between the Security Service and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) continued to be a close working relationship, between two bodies with distinct roles. Within the MPS, the MPSB continued to fulfil functions beyond assistance with counter-subversion. Within the context of counter-subversion, the liaison relationship grew closer as the work of the SDS developed, as explained below. There is no reason to suggest that the creation of the SDS had any negative impact on the cooperation between the Security Service and the wider MPS.

*Working Relationship with the SDS*

64. The SDS is believed by the Inquiry to have formed on 30 July 1968 following violent anti-war demonstrations in London. It is now understood that a small number of MPSB officers were initially deployed to infiltrate the groups of demonstrators to provide intelligence about those organising public disorder. Subsequently, the unit expanded its remit to include any group intent on committing serious public disorder. The unit was initially known as the Special Operations Squad (SOS) but

---

[30] UCPI0000030903, p.1 §4.
[31] UCPI0000030903, p.1 §5.
[32] UCPI0000030067.
[33] UCPI0000030776.

in around 1972/3 it was renamed the Special Demonstration Squad. It is understood that, within the MPSB, C Squad was the department that had the remit of monitoring 'subversives', and the SDS was a "a unit within a unit"[34], on this basis it is understood that the SDS was a unit within C Squad.

65. On 1 August 1968, the director of the Security Service's F Branch was informed by Commander Smith and Chief Superintendent Cunningham, that MPSB's Detective Chief Inspector Dixon[35] had been put in charge of a "*special Special Branch*" squad to co-ordinate intelligence concerning an operation in respect of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) demonstration on 27 October 1968.[36] On 29 August 1968, an officer of F4 Branch, met Senior Superintendent Cunningham and DCI Dixon to discuss issues of joint coverage of the demonstration. During the meeting, he was informed that, under DCI Dixon, Special Branch had set up a special squad of "*bearded and unwashed males and scruffy females*" who were participating in demonstrations where they made contact with students, with the aim of turning them into short-term informers. DCI Dixon indicated they would pass on any information they picked up that might be of interest to the Security Service.[37] From the Security Service's files, this appears to be the Security Service's first recorded knowledge of the squad which was to become the SDS.

66. I have been asked at what level and with what frequency were meetings held either between the SDS and the Security Service, or between the Security Service and senior MPSB managers at which the SDS were present. It is understood that DCI Dixon was initially in charge of the SDS and it is clear that he attended meetings between the Security Service and senior MPSB Officers. On 14 January 1969, a meeting was held between a senior F4 Officer and Chief Superintendent Cunningham of MSPB at Scotland Yard to discuss joint coverage of Trotskyist and

---

[34] *Undercover: The True Story of Britain's Secret Police*, by Rob Evans and Paul Lewis, p.107 UCPI0000034272.
[35] HN325 had been involved in MPSB's liaison with F4 prior to the creation of the SDS, and since at least 1967: UCPI0000030764. For note, HN325has also been referred to in the documents under the spelling of 'DCI Dickson',
[36] UCPI0000030045.
[37] UCPI0000030046.

Anarchist organisations. DCI Dixon joined the meeting and indicated that he had coverage of various groups.[38] From the Security Service's documents, it does not appear that, at this initial stage, there was regular liaison directly between the SDS and the Security Service. For example, we have only been able to find one other record of a meeting between F4 and DCI Dixon in 1969.[39] There was, however, a continuing liaison relationship between the Security Service and the wider MPSB. It appears that, at that time, the 'Hairy Squad' (now understood to be officers of the SDS) was considered to be one part of the MPSB's resources in the MPSB's day-to-day intelligence gathering on groups it considered posed a threat to law and order.

67. In September 1969, an F4 officer noted that the MPSB had resorted to the use of primarily short-term sources, namely paid informants and MPSB officers disguised as militant characters (the 'Hairy Squad'). The officer noted that whilst these tactics, improvised of necessity at short notice to deal with riot conditions, had paid off handsomely in containing demonstrations when used in conjunction with intelligence derived from other MPSB and Security Service sources, the *"MPSB informants [had] not been capable of deep and long-term penetration of the revolutionary organisations involved"*.[40] Whilst the MPSB was considered to only have short-term sources, there was still close cooperation between the MPSB and the Security Service in respect of particular protest groups. For example, information in respect of Revolutionary Protest Groups was channelled to the Security Service.[41]

68. Documents reviewed by the Security Service suggest that meetings with the MPSB, at which senior officers from the SDS were present, remained intermittent from 1969 to 1973. For example, in a meeting in January 1972, the Security Service were briefed on the organisations 'currently penetrated' by SDS.[42] It was agreed

---

[38] UCPI0000030766.
[39] UCPI0000030064.
[40] UCPI0000030903, p.1.
[41] UCPI0000030903, p.2.
[42] UCPI0000030066, p.2-3.

that the next meeting should be called 'when mutually convenient'. The next meeting where the Security Service discussed possible MPSB assistance in coverage of subversion in industry appears to have been in December 1972. SDS officers were, however, not present at this meeting[43].

69. On 16 January 1973, the Security Service were informed that there was reorganisation within the MPSB. HN294 was, by this time, in charge of the 'Hairies' with HN324 .[44] At the meeting, Chief Superintendent Rollo Watts agreed that the relationship between C Squad and F1 consisted of overlapping spheres of interest. The responsible desk in F branch was invited to deal directly with HN324. The MPSB insisted that desk officers should not deal directly with the sergeants and inspectors of C Squad but with the Chief Inspector who controlled the extreme left sections[45].

70. At a meeting with D.A.C Vic Gilbert later the same month, the Security Service became aware, apparently for the first time, that the MPSB considered it their task to try to run long-term agents (as opposed to contacts/informants who provided information on an ad-hoc basis) in organisations which they considered might become involved in politically motivated crime or be responsible for outbreaks of public disorder.[46]

71. It appears that, over the following two years, there was more regular contact and liaison between the MPSB and the Security Service involving SDS. For example, the Security Service has records of two meetings (in January and November 1973) between HN294 and senior officers of the Security Service in which targets and the SDS were discussed.[47]

---

[43] UCPI0000031256.
[44] UCPI0000031257, p.1.
[45] UCPI0000031257, p.2-3.
[46] UCPI0000031258.
[47] UCPI0000030069 & UCPI0000030049.

72. In a meeting in January 1974, HN294 was informed about the creation of F6 and it was noted that the "*hairy squad*" was operating *"at full steam*". During that meeting, the Security Service and HN294 agreed to maintain contact in case they could be of assistance to each other.[48] This appears to have been the start of a more regular liaison relationship, with several, albeit irregular, meetings taking place during 1974-5 between SDS managers and the relevant Security Service Branch (particularly F6, which was created in January 1974). This is further supported by the fact that the Security Service opened a liaison file in 1974, titled 'F4 correspondence concerning agents and informants run by MPSB' (the MPSB Agent Liaison File), in which SDS reporting was filed.

73. The meetings appear to have remained relatively *ad hoc* and were likely to have been in response to whatever was happening at the time. Informal meetings, for example in a public house, would also have occurred in order to build relationships. The meetings were primarily between senior SDS or MPSB officers.

74. In a meeting with Chief Superintendent Wilson, then of C Squad MPSB, on 22 September 1975, the Security Service was informed that, as a consequence of a reorganisation of C Squad, Chief Inspectors were no longer specialist officers handling specialist sub-sections. The previous arrangement, whereby desk officers could deal directly with the C Squad Chief Inspectors was no longer permitted. DCS Wilson wanted all future requests for information or action to be directed to him or to Superintendent [redacted].[49]

75. The frequency of meetings between the SDS and the Security Service appear to have tapered in 1976 and 1977. By September 1977, following, at least in part, the discovery that the Security Service and the SDS had both covered the same meeting of a target group, it was acknowledged that there was a need for better coordination in the targeting of resources, and improved clarity from MPSB as to which fields they could provide information on.[50]

---

[48] UCPI0000030050.
[49] UCPI0000031559.
[50] UCPI0000030059.

76. On 13 October 1977, Director F and FX met with DAC Bob Bryan for a discussion about collaboration between MPSB and F Branch in the identification of targets and the allocation of investigative resources. Director F explained that the Security Service's relationship with provincial police forces enabled them to agree targets and priorities for coverage and, whilst the MPSB might not want to enter into that type of arrangement, they might be able to coordinate activities to ensure they were complementary. It was agreed that, as a first step, meetings would be held between the relevant sections of F Branch and the MPSB to consider existing coverage of targets, and that overall reviews of coverage and collaboration should take place every six months.[51] Whilst this meeting addressed wider MPSB work, a follow up letter from DAC Bryan made it clear that *"the same kind of discussions should ensue in regard to the more sensitive activities of our SDS"*.[52]

77. As agreed in the October meeting, in November 1977, F6 met with DCS DCI Dickinson and Superintendent Wilson of 'C' Squad to discuss targets and priorities. It was noted at the meeting that future discussions would need to follow in due course with other squads and other parts of F Branch[53]. However, the growing spirit of cooperation appears to have been curtailed the following month, after a meeting between F6 and Commander Rollo Watts, who stated that in his view there was too much pressure for joint agent running operations, and the Commissioner had made it clear that if there was no law and order threat posed by an organisation, there would be no MPSB agent. Nevertheless, Commander Watts still offered to provide a list of targets covered by agents, informants, and the Hairy Squad which would enable checks on coverage.[54] There is little information about liaison during 1978, which appears to have been limited.

78. On 22 February 1979, officers from F6 met withHN135, to discuss the way in which cooperation between F6 and SDS could be developed. The meeting agreed that

---

[51] UCPI0000030776.
[52] UCPI0000030777.
[53] UCPI0000030772.
[54] UCPI0000030060.

F6 would act as the focal point for both the Security Service's targeting requests for SDS and for the handling of feedback on routine SDS reports.[55] It was agreed that SDS and F6 would hold regular meetings at approximately monthly intervals.[56] In August 1979, the SDS was noted as being "very ready" to accept general briefs and feedback from the Security Service, which would be accepted in the form of a minute to the head of C Squad.[57]

79. From the latter half of 1979, there were regular meetings between the Security Service and the SDS, and between 1980 and 1983, it appears that there were usually monthly meetings. In July 1981, it was noted that the Ultra-Left subsection of F6 worked in close liaison with the SDS and monthly targeting meetings were held with SDS[58]. These meetings were primarily conducted by F6, with other branches, particularly F7, providing briefings to F6 in advance of such meetings. The SDS were represented by senior SDS officers. On occasion Director F would meet with senior MPSB officers[59] and at times there was liaison between the Director General of the Security Service and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police about the work of the SDS.[60]

80. The SDS and the Security Service also arranged occasional meetings for SDS managers and F7 desk officers to discuss problems and matters of current interest. The first such meeting occurred on 3 February 1981.[61] The next meeting was held on 11 August 1981.[62] A further meeting was held in June 1982, but in contradiction to the previous two meetings, this was a meeting between the F7 Desk Officers and the Assistant Head of the SDS.[63]

81. Although I am only asked to consider meetings between 1968-1983, I provide the following to put this statement in context. After 1983, the Security Service and the

---

[55] UCPI0000028835.
[56] UCPI0000030893, p.1.
[57] UCPI0000030893, p.1.
[58] UCPI0000030761, p.3.
[59] UCPI0000030776.
[60] UCPI0000030761.
[61] UCPI0000028817.
[62] UCPI0000029202.
[63] UCPI0000028779 & Document 46 UCPI0000028783.

SDS continued a liaison relationship up until 1996, when the Security Service officially cut back on its role in subversion. The SDS and Security Service would continue to meet throughout the remainder of the 1980s, on a roughly monthly basis, to discuss targeting and queries. Within the 1990s, liaison with the SDS became less frequent, which was in line with the operational priorities of the SDS at the time.

*Filing of SDS Intelligence Reports*

82. At the relevant times, the Security Service's corporate record was exclusively hard copy (the Hard Copy Corporate Record). All material filed to the Hard Copy Corporate Record was on paper and stored within a physical file structure. The hard copy files included two general types: Personal Files (PF), which contained information on individuals who were the subject of a Security Service investigation, and various types of Non-Personal Files including Organisation Files (OF), Subject Files (SF), Police Files, Administrative Files and Project files.

83. Prior to 1974, any intelligence received from MPSB would have been filed on all relevant files. So, for example, a source report from an MPSB source concerning information about an subject of interest ('SOI') attending a Socialist Worker Demonstration would be filed on any files where the Security Service interest in the subject was such that the threshold had been met to create a file, this may include on the SOI's PF, on the relevant OF (in this example the OF for the Socialist Worker Party) and in some instances the source's PF.

84. In November 1974, a system was agreed between the Security Service and SDS for handling reports based on SDS penetration. SDS reports would be sent by courier direct to F6, marked with a generic code used for all SDS reports, and filed in a single file linked to the MPSB Agent Liaison File, titled '*Demonstration Squad Special Branch; Source Reports*'.[64]

---

[64] UCPI0000030053, p.2.

*Dissemination of SDS Reporting and Knowledge of the SDS*

85. SDS reporting was distributed through the Security Service by F6, and would have been disseminated for the same reasons as any other intelligence was disseminated at the time, namely to those Branches within the Security Service who had an active interest in the relevant subversive group or intelligence. It appears that, on at least one occasion, the Security Service considered disseminating SDS intelligence to liaison partners.[65] However, we have found no evidence to suggest that any SDS intelligence was, in fact, shared outside the Security Service.

86. From early in the relationship, the Security Service was made aware of the sensitivity of the SDS. At a meeting in September 1975, DCS Wilson of C Squad emphasised to senior officers in F1, that the SDS was one of the MPSB's most closely protected secrets.[66] Following this meeting, senior officers discussed the need to remind F1 officers that the MPSB considered that the existence of the SDS was sensitive, and that the existence of the SDS was not generally known to members of the Security Service. The officers further discussed that it might be best to let F6 handle all matters with an SDS connection.[67]

87. Whilst it is clear from the Security Service files that members of F Branch would have been aware of the existence of the SDS, any wider knowledge within the Security Service would have been on the basis of the need to know principle; a fundamental principle that governs the handling of sensitive information. The knowledge of the SDS would have been restricted on this basis. For example, officers of K Branch would have been made aware of the existence of SDS when an issue arose which required their input,[68] and others outside F Branch may have become aware of the SDS when providing assistance in the development of SDS cover identities, discussed below.[69] These examples are consistent with the need to know principle and wider knowledge of the SDS within the Security Service

---

[65] UCPI0000028816, §2b.
[66] UCPI0000031559.
[67] UCPI0000031560.
[68] UCPI0000028780.
[69] UCPI0000028810.

cannot be inferred from the involvement of specific officers outside F Branch when specific circumstances arose.

*1968 and the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign*

88. On 1 August 1968, the Security Service met with the MSPB in relation to the Vietnam Solidary Campaign's (VSC) planned march on 27 October 1968. Present at that meeting was DCI Dixon, who it was noted had been put in charge of a "*special Special Branch*" squad. As explained above, this is understood to have been one of the first times the Security Service were aware of the existence of what would become known as the SDS. This meeting, however, is best described as a meeting between the Security Service and the MPSB, rather than a meeting between the Security Service and the SDS alone. The meeting discussed how the MPSB had the responsibility of providing all the necessary information in advance of the demonstration.[70]

89. At the time, the Security Service had an active interest in Maoists, Anarchists and Trotskyists, who were seeking influence through organisations such as the VSC.As a consequence, the subversive aspects of the VSC were of interest to the Security Service. It is also clear that the VSC demonstration posed a potentially significant law and order problem for the MPSB. Given the well-established working relationship between MPSB and the Security Service at this time, it is not surprising that there was close co-ordination in respect of a demonstration that fell within the distinct remits of both organisations.

90. Whilst I have not had sight of any particular documents that record how useful SDS intelligence was in respect of the VSC demonstration, I note that, at this point in time, the SDS had only been in existence for two days (on the Inquiry's understanding that the SDS was created on 30 July 1968). Thus, at the time of the demonstration, any reporting would have been provided by MPSB. As explained below, the Security Service generally found MPSB and SDS reporting to be useful, and there is nothing to suggest that any reporting on the subversive elements

---

[70] UCPI0000030045.

within VSC was materially different, whether it originated from SDS directly, or wider MPSB.

*London Universities and Polytechnics*

91. I have also been asked about the Security Service's interest in London Universities and polytechnics, following a meeting at the end of August 1968, which reviewed the Security Service and MPSB's joint coverage of these organisations. The Security Service's interest in London Universities and polytechnics was confined to left-wing radical and active student unions, some of which had members who were Trotskyist agitators.

92. In 1967, the Security Service's newly founded University Research Group was given the mammoth task of tracking down all students at British universities who had been Communists or Communist sympathizers from 1929 to 1954, and identifying their current employment[71].

93. Although, as detailed below, the Security Service generally found MPSB and SDS reporting to be useful, it is unclear to what extent any MPSB/SDS reporting relating to universities and polytechnics was of use to the Security Service in either respect.

*Trotskyist/Anarchist Fields*

94. At a meeting in January 1969, it was recorded that the Security Service and MPSB were "intent on the utmost co-operation" in the Trotskyist/Anarchist fields.[72] This cooperation must be assessed in its context. The relationship between the Security Service and the MPSB (including the SDS) was, in general, one of reporting agents providing intelligence to the Security Service. There is nothing to suggest that the cooperation between the MPSB and the Security Service was different in respect of the Trotskyist and Anarchist organisations than in respect of any other organisation in which there was an overlapping interest. The co-operation between the Security Service and MPSB derived from the need for particular coverage of,

---

[71] '*Defence of the Realm*', p440 UCPI0000034276.
[72] UCPI0000030766.

or particular interests in, organisations which posed both a subversion threat and a threat to law and order.

95. It is difficult to assess what benefit the Security Service's relationship with MPSB was in Trotskyist/Anarchist fields, or the extent to which MPSB were able to assist. It is apparent that the MPSB did not have, in 1969, long term agents. In March 1973, the Security Service understood that the SDS was paying particular attention to two Trotskyist organisations, which were regarded as posing a current, and probably long term law and order problem.[73] The extent to which this provided intelligence which was of assistance to the Security Service is not known.

*Distinction in Targets*

96. As has been set out at paragraphs 27-32 above, the close cooperation between MPSB and the Security Service was confined to where there was an overlap between their respective interests. The MPSB's remit was to run agents only in those organisations which they considered might become involved in politically motivated crime or be responsible for outbreaks of public disorder. The MPSB was not concerned with running agents in organisations which presented only a subversive threat. Similarly, a non-subversive organisation which posed a threat to law and order would not have been of interest to the Security Service. For example, in April 1981 the SDS offered to provide details of individuals who were beginning to apply to join the Right to Work March. The Security Service declined this offer on the basis that it had no intelligence interest in those individuals.[74] It follows that a proportion of SDS work would have been of no interest to the Security Service, and would have been carried out without the knowledge of the Security Service.

97. Again, as set out above, it appears that this distinction sometimes resulted in the MPSB being unable to assist the Security Service in areas in which the Security

---

[73] UCPI0000030069.
[74] UCPI0000028819.

Service was seeking assistance. In 1972, the Security Service discussed with the MPSB the need for long term agent penetration in subversive groups, active within the trade unions. The Metropolitan Police Commissioner had, however, determined that running agents in trade unions was not a matter for the MPSB, whose role was to collect information about likely law and order trouble spots.[75] In a further meeting in January 1973 to discuss the Commissioner's position, MPSB considered that its task was limited to running agents in organisations which might become involved in politically motivated crime or be responsible for outbreaks of public disorder. The MPSB's interest in subversive organisations waxed and waned according to the extent the organisation was assessed to pose a threat to law and order.[76]

98. This distinction was fully appreciated by the Security Service and it was acknowledged that certain activities or organisations were outside the MPSB's remit. Even where the distinction in respective remits limited the extent of cooperation, it did not undermine or affect the relationship. This is evidenced by the meeting in November 1977, referred to at paragraph 78 above, during which Cdr Watts of MPSB sought to reduce the growing cooperation in agent handling by emphasising that MPSB agents were to be run solely in the context of law and order. Despite those limits, Cdr Watts indicated he was prepared to provide a list of targets covered by MPSB's agents, informants, and the Hairy Squad to prevent wasted coverage.[77]

99. I have seen nothing to indicate that the distinctions between the role of the SDS/MPSB and that of the Security Service had any negative affect on the working relationship. Whilst at times there might have been frustration at the unwillingness of the MPSB to target particular organisations that the Security Service felt fell within the MPSB's remit, I have not seen anything to suggest that the long term relationship was affected. There appears to have been an appreciation of the

---

[75] UCPI0000031256.
[76] UCPI0000031258.
[77] UCPI0000030060.

different roles, and any work and cooperation was undertaken with the understanding that there were limits to each other's remit [78].

*Assistance Provided to SDS between 1968 and 1983*

100. In August 1979, the Head of the SDS asked whether the Security Service could provide cover for SDS sources, particularly the provision of background information on education in their early career. The Security Service agreed it would respond to requests as they arose, the frequency of which was anticipated as being no more than two or three times a year.[79] The Security Service did provide the SDS with occasional and limited assistance with the development of SDS undercover officers' cover identities.

101. For example, on 2 October 1979, the Security Service acceded to a request from the Head of the SDS to assist in obtaining documentation to provide cover for one of their sources[80]. On 24 March 1980, the SDS reported how documentation had been very helpful and explored the possibility of the Security Service providing different documentary evidence of for another of their sources. The F6 officer indicated that he would investigate this but he did not hold out much hope[81].

102. I have no reason to believe that such requests were regularly made, or acceded to or that, between 1979 and 1983, the Security Service provided regular assistance to the SDS to develop the undercover legends. It appears that assistance was occasional, intermittent and depended on the nature of the assistance sought.

103. In February 1973, the MPSB informed the Security Service that three agents were paid out of a £100 quarterly subsidy received from the Security Service. It is unclear whether these were SDS agents; I note that, in at least one case, the name

---

[78] UCPI0000028779; UCPI0000030772.
[79] UCPI0000030893.
[80] UCPI0000028810.
[81] UCPI0000028813.

of the group targeted by the agent was not known to the Security Service.[82] Further, where it had the necessary coverage, the Security Service was able to warn SDS that their operations might be at risk of compromise.[83] There is also limited evidence to suggest that the Security Service was occasionally able to help protect the safety of an SDS officer at risk of being compromised.[84]

104. There is no evidence that any other significant assistance was provided to the SDS by the Security Service. In particular, there is no evidence that the Security Service had any involvement in the original creation of SDS agents' cover identities, nor did the Security Service provide any assistance with the management of SDS agents. The SDS was solely responsible for the control and management of its agents. For example, in July 1982, the Security Service was informed that the SDS would almost certainly withdraw a particular agent because of serious doubts about their performance, and also that information on an individual of interest to the Security Service might be 'bedevilled' by the fact that another SDS agent had 'probably bedded' the individual, and had 'been warned off by his bosses'.[85] There is no evidence to suggest that the Security Service was routinely informed of misconduct by SDS officers.

105. In 1979, the Security Service was asked by the SDS whether it could provide some specific assistance to help officers with their cover [86]. There is no evidence that the Security Service gave consideration, or acceded, to this request. As a consequence, I am unable to comment on what difficulties there might have been in accommodating this request.

---

[82] UCPI0000031258.
[83] UCPI0000030054.
[84] UCPI0000028795.
[85] UCPI0000027446.
[86] UCPI0000030893.

*Indication of Intelligence Requirements and Discussion of Targets*

106. The primary relationship between the Security Service and the SDS consisted of the Security Service providing intelligence requirements and briefings to the SDS, and the SDS providing intelligence to the Security Service where the SDS had coverage as a consequence of their interest in the maintenance of law and order. The meetings held between the Security Service and the SDS discussed subversive organisations and frequently discussed targets.[87]

107. After a meeting in February 1979, the Head of the SDS welcomed 'tactical targeting' and F6 became the main contact point for the Security Service's targeting requests and the handling of feedback on routine SDS reports[88]. As I set out above, between 1980 and 1983, there were regular (approximately monthly) meetings between the SDS and F6. In advance of these meetings, the relevant sections of the security service, usually F7, would produce general briefs for the SDS, typically outlining recent intelligence on particular groups and areas of current interest, and setting out their intelligence requirements. In September 1981, the SDS acknowledged that the Security Service briefs *"made it much easier to brief [their] hairies"*.[89]

108. Whilst the meetings with the SDS discussed the targeting of SDS agents, it is important to note that the decisions on deployment of SDS agents were taken by the SDS alone. Further, for various reasons, including lack of relevance to the MPSB's remit and availability or resources, the SDS did not provide intelligence in relation to all Security Service requests[90]. The SDS were responsible for their agents and, while the Security Service's briefings may have influenced SDS decisions, the Security Service had no control over the placement or targeting of the SDS agents.

109. The Security Service's intelligence requirements varied depending on the organisation from which intelligence was sought. The briefs drafted by the Security

---

[87] See, for example, UCPI0000030049; UCPI0000030772; UCPI0000028816; UCPI0000028819.
[88] UCPI0000028835.
[89] UCPI0000029203.
[90] UCPI0000030051.

Service (usually F7) in advance of meetings with the SDS, would indicate the intelligence requirements. This would often include requests for information on groups or individuals of interest and whether certain groups had disbanded. The information sought was sometimes more detailed, for instance concerning the membership and operation of an organisation.[91]

110. The information sought by the Security Service required a level of intrinsic knowledge that, as regular attendants and members of the subversive groups, SDS was able to provide. SDS officers were privy to specific and up-to-date information that related directly to the strength of the groups and the individuals within them. They were subject matter experts about the functioning of the groups, and that was the type of intelligence which the Security Service sought.

*Debriefing of SDS officers by the Security Service*

111. As I have set out above, the contact between SDS and the Security Service was primarily conducted by senior officers, with the SDS often being represented by either the Head or Deputy Head of the SDS. As explained below, the Security Service did, on occasion, seek to debrief SDS officers, usually once they had ceased their undercover work. Not all requests were acceded to.

112. In June 1982, the Security Service requested permission to regularly debrief ex-SDS operatives. The Head of SDS said, whilst he saw no objection, it was a matter of policy that Detective Chief Superintendent Geoff Craft would need to decide.[92] It is understood the first de-briefing occurred in early 1982. A thank you note, dated 8 March 1982 records that the Security Service met with one of the

---

[91] The following are examples of the briefing notes setting out the Security Service's intelligence requirements: UCPI0000029198 p. 2-11; UCPI0000029199; UCPI0000028827; UCPI0000029029 p.2-6; UCPI0000028844; UCPI0000027519 p. 3-5; UCPI0000028781; UCPI0000028794; UCPI0000028807; UCPI0000029218; UCPI0000029221; UCPI0000029230; UCPI0000029233.
[92] UCPI0000027446.

SDS agents who was able to provide intelligence on a number of areas in respect of an organisation the agent had been involved with.[93]

113. A request was made to the Head of SDS on 20 October 1982 to de-brief an agent following his withdrawal from operational work, but it appears that this debrief did not take place[94]. A similar request was made in respect of another agent in June 1983.[95] This request was agreed by Det Supt Craft[96], and the de-brief took place on 27 July 1983. The note recording the fact of this debrief notes that this was the second de-brief of an SDS source.[97]

114. The fact that only two debriefs took place between June 1982 and July 1983 suggests that Det Ch Supt Craft did not accede to the request for regular debriefs.

115. A further request was made to the Head of SDS on 6 December 1983 to meet an SDS agent to discuss ways into the Anarchist field in South London. Det Ch Supt Craft cleared this request and the meeting took place on 20 December.[98] It appears, however, that there had previously been an unofficial meeting with the agent in early August 1982, which had been facilitated by Assistant Head. It was noted that such contact was against SDS policy.[99]

116. Between 1968 and 1983, the Security Services' documents summarised above indicate that there were official de-briefings of three SDS agents, and that other meetings with SDS agents were contrary to SDS policy. De-briefings were clearly *ad hoc* and subject to the approval of Det Ch Supt Craft.

117. The de-briefs with the three SDS sources were considered to have been of use to the Security Service. For example, the first de-brief provided intelligence on a

---

[93] UCPI0000027518.
[94] UCPI0000028799, p.2.
[95] UCPI0000029219.
[96] UCPI0000027539.
[97] UCPI0000029226, p.2.
[98] UCPI0000028728 & UCPI0000029060.
[99] UCPI0000028795, p.2

number of areas in respect of an organisation[100] and the third de-brief appears to have been a fruitful and beneficial discussion concerning access to a group known to the SDS agent.[101]

118. I have been asked whether the Security Service met SDS officers for any other purpose. On 22 February 1979, the Head of SDS (HN135) accepted the principle of a detailed briefing for an SDS agent in person, but noted that the agent first needed to settle down with a new SDS handler.[102] I am unable to say whether this briefing took place.

*Utility of SDS Reporting to the Security Service*

119. Between 1968 and 1983, the Security Service relied on MPSB reporting and SDS sources to help it cover organisations and areas where it had no coverage, thereby reducing the coverage that the Security Service might have needed to establish for itself. As explained above, efforts were made to ensure that SDS sources and Security Service agents did not overlap and between 1979 and 1983, F6 provided regular briefs to the SDS. The development in the relationship is evidence that the Security Service found, on the whole, SDS reporting to be useful, enabling them to gain intelligence into subversive organisations which may not have otherwise been readily available.

120. I note that not all MPSB reporting was considered useful. In 1972, MPSB issued a series of reports on Industrial subversion which were of no use to the Security Service, an example of which is an 11-page report on Industrial Unrest in the Port Industry in 1972[103]. A note to Director F dated 2 October 1972, records the dangers of what were considered to be inaccurate reports from the MPSB, and notes that the MPSB were effectively usurping the role already covered by the

---

[100] UCPI0000027518.
[101] UCPI0000029060.
[102] UCPI0000028835.
[103] UCPI0000031253.

Security Service and the Department of Employment[104]. The note states that the Security Service would "*continue to try to establish closer contact with the officers working for [the] Chief Inspector … in the industrial field, but are unlikely radically to alter their approach*". The issue of the MPSB reports into industry appears to have continued through 1973, as in a note dated 11 December 1973, it was noted that there was no requirement for the general background reports that had been produced.[105]

121. Beyond the issue of the MPSB's reporting into industrial subversion and disputes, it is clear that the Security Service found SDS reporting to be of significant intelligence value, particularly throughout the period 1979 to 1983. For example:

a) In August 1979, SDS reporting was said to have provided useful information with very good reports on SWP and another group's matters.[106]

b) The SDS coverage of the SWP Annual National Delegate Conference in 1980 was described as "*a splendid performance*".[107]

c) An SDS report on the SWP conference in February 1981 was described as 'excellent' and F7 were most impressed at SDS coverage on a lot of the Ultra Left organisations at that time.[108]

d) In a meeting with the SDS on 17 July 1981, F6 congratulated SDS on some of their recent reports which had been of "*exceptionally high standard*" and SDS were told "*how much they had been appreciated by the desks*".[109]

---

[104] UCPI0000003125 3
[105] UCPI0000031254, p.11.
[106] UCPI0000030893-1.
[107] UCPI0000028837.
[108] UCPI0000028817-1.
[109] UCPI0000028828.

e) In a Loose Minute dated 24 February 1982, SDS reporting which provided a general view of a District of the SWP was described as an "*invaluable source of information*".[110]

f) In June 1982, the ability of other SB squads and the Security Service to relax their attempts to find informants was attributed to SDS's excellent coverage of SWP.[111]

g) At a meeting in February 1983, F7 and F6 officers made it clear to the SDS the extent to which the SDS information was appreciated, and the work of a particular agent was commended.[112]

122. Although the Security Service did find SDS reporting helpful, there were recognised limitations in what the SDS could provide. In an internal note to F6 from F7 on the SWP and SDS, it was noted that, for obvious reasons, there was little variety in reporting, both geographically and organisationally.[113]

123. I have been asked how useful the SDS reporting is considered to have been now, and for what purpose was the reporting useful. It appears from the review of documents that the SDS reporting was useful to assist the Security Service in building the wider intelligence pictures in respect of subversive individuals and organisations. It is clear from a review of the Security Service's intelligence requirements, summarised above, that the purpose of the reporting for the Security Service was to obtain detailed information about the functioning of these groups and the individuals within them, which in turn would help towards the Security Service's assessment, when combined with other intelligence, of the subversive threat that each group, or individual, posed. The SDS reporting did not provide comprehensive coverage of these organisations, in part as a consequence of their law and order remit. It is clear to me that the SDS reporting was one element of

---

[110] UCPI000002**7519, p.3.**
[111] UCPI0000028799, p.2.
[112] UCPI0000029193.
[113] UCPI0000027528, p.1.

intelligence that the Security Service relied upon to fulfil its functions to protect the United Kingdom from subversion.

Security Service Interest in Personal Details

124. The Security Service appears to have sought personal details of individuals involved in the organisations primarily to enable their identification. For example, in 1982 a brief for the SDS asked for an SDS source to indicate whether the person in a photograph was the same person mentioned in a previous report and, if so, whether the source could provide any particulars.[114] Similarly, in a brief for the SDS in July 1982, a request was made for 'identifying particulars' of an individual.[115] Another brief from F7 explained that a named individual was proving difficult to identify, and his address and approximate age was sought from the SDS in order to assist in the identification.[116]

125. It appears, therefore, that identifying particulars were sought, which could have included age, employment and address for multiple reasons. The primary purpose appears to have been to assist in the identification of members of the subversive groups. If the individual was of interest to the Security Service, further particulars may have been sought to build up the wider intelligence picture about them.

Talent Spotting

126. Throughout the development of the relationship between the SDS and Security Service, offers were made to "talent spot" on behalf of the Security Service. In a meeting with Director F on 6 December 1972, having refused to put MPSB agents into trade unions, AC Colin Woods indicated that he had no objection to MPSB assisting the Security Service in talent spotting.[117] However, in a meeting in November 1973, DSC Watts and HN294 emphasised that MPSB officers would

---

[114] UCPI0000028771.
[115] UCPI0000028788.
[116] UCPI0000029210.
[117] UCPI0000031256.

not be suitable to talent spot for F4 agents, and it was noted that previous attempts at doing so had failed.[118] Although, by the following January it appears that HN294's second in command, DI Derek Brice , appeared to be willing to talent spot.[119] Four years later, in a meeting in November 1977, the SDS were again informed that they could assist by talent spotting.[120] This was followed by a meeting in December 1977, with Commander Watts who offered to talent spot in areas of mutual interest and suggest names of individuals who may be useful to the Security Service who the SDS had no intention of taking up, or had no funds for.[121] The possibility of talent spotting was raised again in a meeting on 10 September 1982 and in response DCI Short was noted as being receptive to the idea but there was 'head office' apprehension of anything that could blow the SDS operation.[122]

127. Despite the discussions over the years about the possibility of talent spotting, I have not seen documents that evidence that MPSB or SDS ever actively engaged in talent spotting for the Security Service. In October 1982, F6 asked DCI Short how the MPSB might become more sensitive to F6's agent requirements. DCI Short thought that the only possible way would be for a policy approach which reflected downward instructions to each SB officer to be aware of talent spotting as part of his job. Both F6 and DCI Short agreed that many of the historical conflicts between the Security Service and the MPSB might make such a result unlikely.[123]

Use of SDS to Identify from Photographs

128. Sometimes the SDS were asked to assist by identifying individuals from photographs provided to them by the Security Service. Whilst some photographs are recorded as having been returned without confirmation as to whether there was

---

[118] UCPI0000030049.
[119] UCPI0000030050.
[120] UCPI0000030772-1.
[121] UCPI0000030060-1.
[122] UCPI0000028795-2.
[123] UCPI0000028799.

any positive identification, there were occasions where the SDS were able to confirm identities from photographs (for example, see paragraph 124 above).[124]

Regional Special Branches

129. Generally, as set out above, the Security Service's relationship with regional SB's was closer than the relationship with MPSB.[125] However, there is no suggestion that provincial SBs engaged in the systematic use of undercover police officers. As noted in September 1969, the infiltration achieved by the Hairy Squad was "*unthinkable outside the vast anonymous conurbation of London*". [126]

**STATEMENT OF TRUTH**

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed:

Witness Z

Witness Z

Date: 22 March 2021

[124] UCPI0000028771.
[125] UCPI0000030776.
[126] UCPI0000030903-2.

## Annexe A - Security Service Organisation Charts in 1968 and 1976

1968
organisation
chart






UCPI0000034350/42

1976
organisation
chart






UCPI0000034350/43