

Tuesday, 4 May 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Day 9 of hearings in Tranche 1, Phase 2, at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone unless you're invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We're now going to begin with Ms Campbell summarising the evidence of one officer who's provided written evidence to the Inquiry and documents relating to one officer from whom we do not have a statement.

Ms Campbell.

Summary of evidence of HN301 "Bob Stubbs" by MS CAMPBELL

MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, Sir.

This is a summary for HN301, cover name "Bob Stubbs".

HN301 served in the SDS between 1971 and 1976. He used the cover name "Bob Stubbs" and was deployed primarily into the International Socialists. There is a

1 restriction order in place preventing the publication of
2 his real name.

3 HN301 joined the Metropolitan Police in the late
4 1960s, moving to Special Branch in the early 1970s. He
5 joined the SDS in 1971 after being approached by
6 a senior officer who he believes was probably HN332.

7 He believes he was selected for the SDS because of
8 his relatively dark skin, which would allow him to
9 infiltrate groups with primarily Middle Eastern members.
10 He notes in his witness statement that, at the time,
11 the "Black September" group and Palestinian hijackings
12 were of "significant concern".

13 HN301 believes that he worked in the SDS back office
14 for two or three months before going into the field. He
15 notes that there was no formal training, but that he
16 learned "all that [he] needed to" during this time, as
17 he was able to read intelligence files on various groups
18 and go along to the SDS meetings.

19 He states also that HN343 was an informal mentor to
20 him, and was helpful both before and during his
21 deployment.

22 HN301 was married at the time of his deployment. He
23 does not recall any discussion on the possible impact
24 his deployment might have on his family, and no SDS
25 managers spoke to his wife before joining. He does not

1 remember being told how long he would be deployed for.

2 HN301 has no recollection of having been shown
3 the document "Informants who take part in crime", or any
4 Tradecraft manual before his deployment. He does not
5 think that he was given any guidance or advice about
6 becoming involved in the private life of activists,
7 sexual relationships with activists, participation in
8 criminality, encouraging or provoking others to
9 participate in criminality, what to do if arrested or
10 brought before a court, or the ethical or legal
11 limitations of his deployment.

12 He states that the officers were expected to employ
13 common sense, judgment and experience; and it would have
14 been obvious, for example, that they were not to
15 participate in criminality.

16 HN301 states that he did not use a deceased child's
17 identity in selecting his cover name, and notes that his
18 undercover identity was not sufficiently developed to
19 include a cover back story beyond a cover employment.

20 HN301 rented cover accommodation, but believes he
21 stayed there only once or twice and otherwise would
22 mainly use it to park his cover vehicle.

23 At the start of his deployment, HN301 shared an SDS
24 hire vehicle with HN338, however he was eventually given
25 his own car. He had a driver's licence in his cover

1 name.

2 As many other officers, HN301 grew out his hair and
3 beard before deployment and adopted a casual style of
4 dress. He did not visit any people or places to develop
5 his cover identity.

6 The first of HN301's cover jobs was that of
7 a laboratory technician at Guy's and St Thomas'
8 Hospital. He recalls that he did this job for a couple
9 of months and was in the lab most days. He states that
10 it was "pretty much a full-time job".

11 HN301 adopted this job in particular as it was known
12 that a member of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign also
13 worked in the laboratory. It was hoped that the officer
14 would get to know this individual and be able to start
15 attending meetings of the group. Ultimately, this did
16 not occur, as HN301 was unable to get close to
17 the individual.

18 He notes in his witness statement that he "always
19 thought that this plan was pretty unrealistic". He
20 states that he was directed towards this particular
21 target by his managers.

22 After this targeting proved unsuccessful, HN301
23 changed his focus towards the International Socialists,
24 the IS; later known as the Socialist Workers Party,
25 the SWP.

1 He left his laboratory job and became a handyman at
2 a garage, a job which he also states he went to most
3 days. He notes in his witness statement that, unlike
4 his first tasking, this targeting was the result
5 of "more of a collaborative decision" between himself
6 and his managers.

7 HN301 states that he became a member of
8 the Hammersmith and Fulham branch of the IS and started
9 attending their publicly advertised meetings. Although
10 the Inquiry does not hold any reporting from this
11 officer before 1973, HN301 states that he would have
12 joined the group in late 1971.

13 HN301 moved to the Wandsworth and Battersea branch
14 of IS around 1974. Reporting also shows that he moved
15 finally to the Paddington branch of IS, although
16 the officer does not remember this branch specifically,
17 noting that it may have split from the Hammersmith and
18 Fulham branch. The officer cannot recall why he moved
19 branches.

20 A report held by the Inquiry from January 1976 notes
21 that "Bob Stubbs" had taken over as branch treasurer of
22 the Paddington branch of the IS. In his statement,
23 however, the officer states that he's confused by this
24 report, as he believes he was treasurer of
25 the Hammersmith and Fulham branch and, to his memory,

1 did so earlier in his deployment. He believes that it
2 is likely that the position became vacant and he
3 volunteered to fill it.

4 HN301 states that he thinks that SDS officers were
5 encouraged to take positions that would permit access to
6 information about the membership of a group, and can
7 recall HN343 informing himself of this towards
8 the beginning of his deployment. He notes that he would
9 have informed his supervisors that the position was
10 available, and presumes that they told him to put
11 himself forward for the role.

12 HN301 states that he believes that the IS were of
13 interest to the SDS "because of the possibility of
14 public disorder and violence, particularly during
15 anti-fascist counter protests".

16 HN301 states that, in his opinion, the objectives of
17 the IS, which he describes as "to support workers in
18 their struggle for fair treatment, to bring down
19 the government and to establish socialism in the UK",
20 could be considered subversive, but he is not sure that
21 their day-to-day activities were actually subversive.

22 He states that the IS did not officially approve of
23 the use of violence, but that he did witness violence
24 and criminal damage at some protests.

25 In his statement, the officer recalls one

1 demonstration at Red Lion Square, involving
2 the National Front and the IS, where he was punched by
3 a police officer. He notes that he did not do anything
4 to warrant being hit but believes that the situation
5 must have been "rather chaotic and frightening for
6 the officers present", and so does not feel aggrieved
7 about the incident. The Inquiry holds no reporting from
8 this officer on this particular event.

9 HN301 also recalls a time he saw a brick being
10 thrown through a window during a demonstration, which he
11 states that he phoned in to the office.

12 HN301 states that he himself was never violent and
13 did not participate in public disorder.

14 While reporting on the IS, HN301 was also able to
15 use his involvement with that group to attend meetings
16 of other politically aligned organisations. These
17 groups largely related to Irish matters. The officer
18 recalls going to meetings of the Anti-Internment League
19 and the Troops Out Movement; though he describes his
20 involvement as less significant than his involvement in
21 the IS.

22 He does not recall being directed towards these
23 groups by his managers, but is sure that he would have
24 informed his managers of the possibility of going along
25 to these meetings, and they would have indicated that he

1 should attend. A report held by the Inquiry from
2 December 1974 also lists 301 as a member of
3 the international subcommittee of the Belfast Ten
4 Defence Committee, present at its inaugural meeting.
5 There are also two reports from this officer relating to
6 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, or NICRA.
7 The officer does not, however, remember being involved
8 in either of those groups.

9 HN301 recalls that the main objective of
10 the Anti-Internment League was "to stop the practice of
11 imprisoning people in Northern Ireland without trial".
12 HN301 states that as the activities of the AIL were
13 connected to The Troubles, there was automatic interest
14 in the desire to obtain intelligence.

15 He cannot recall the AIL posing any particular
16 threat of public disorder, but suspects that some
17 members approved of the use of violence as a political
18 tool and of the activities of the Provisional IRA.

19 The Inquiry holds a report dated 16 October 1972 of
20 the AIL national conference, which is signed off by
21 HN301, HN298 and HN338.

22 HN301 notes that it would not be surprising to have
23 three officers present at such a prominent
24 event "particularly if each of us was involved with
25 AIL in a different area of London". HN301 believes that

1 involvement with the AIL was likely incidental to
2 the main groups upon which each officer focused.

3 HN301 reported on the west London branch of
4 the Troops Out Movement. Reports on this group begin in
5 late 1973, and the officer notes that this would have
6 been at the beginning of TOM's activity, when it was
7 still a relatively small movement.

8 He affirms that his involvement in the early days of
9 TOM would not have conferred any special
10 responsibilities on him. He does not remember reporting
11 regularly on TOM and cannot recall if TOM had subversive
12 aims. He states that:

13 "... I suspect that a number of their members
14 approved of violence but I cannot recall TOM deploying
15 violence, criminality or public disorder as a tactic.
16 As with the AIL, I presume that SDS interest in
17 TOM arose due to their connection to Irish extremism and
18 the necessity of gathering intelligence about
19 Irish-related matters."

20 The Inquiry holds reporting from this officer from
21 May 1972 to May 1976. The officer is unable to judge
22 the attribution of the reports provided, but accepts
23 that where his name appears on a document, he was likely
24 to be the author. HN301 states that he has no clear
25 memory of the full extent of this reporting, and

1 therefore cannot comment on whether the documents
2 provided by the Inquiry reflect his reporting
3 accurately.

4 It is clear that there are some gaps in
5 the reporting held by the Inquiry for this officer.
6 The Inquiry holds no reports on the IS attributed to
7 this officer for April 1973, and none between April 1973
8 and April 1974. Although the officer believes he would
9 have continued to report on the Hammersmith and Fulham
10 branch of the IS during this time. There is likewise
11 a gap in reporting between April and September 1974.
12 The officer also notes that there are no reports
13 relating to information given by telephone: a practice
14 which would have been used to convey more pressing
15 information to the office.

16 In terms of time spent in his cover identity, HN301
17 notes he was occasionally at his cover flat, and more
18 regularly in his cover employment. He would attend
19 meetings with activists at least once per week, and go
20 to a protest or march most weekends. He would also sell
21 copies of the SWP newspaper on Saturday mornings. He
22 cannot recall if he received overtime pay, or if his
23 take-home pay was any different in the SDS.

24 HN301 describes having meetings at the SDS cover
25 flat two to three times per week. There, they would

1 meet with managers and would hand over diaries and
2 reports. He recalls there not being any real structure
3 to the meetings, which included general conversations
4 about "how we were getting on, what we had been up to,
5 who we had interacted with that week".

6 HN301 also describes the meetings as an opportunity
7 to socialise with other officers and have "a general
8 chat about our personal lives". He notes that these
9 meetings served as an informal way of monitoring
10 the officers' welfare, an approach which he felt worked
11 quite well. There were no formal arrangements for
12 welfare.

13 When asked about senior officers attending these
14 meetings, HN301 remembers the Commissioner of Police,
15 Sir Robert Mark, attending the safe house on one
16 occasion early in his deployment.

17 HN301 cannot recall being told how to approach his
18 deployment or what information he should gather. He was
19 given, in his words, "a substantial amount of free
20 rein", but would have informed his managers of anything
21 significant he was doing while undercover. He is sure
22 that his superiors would have intervened if they had
23 disapproved of anything.

24 HN301 understood that the SDS' function was to
25 gather information about groups and individuals that

1 posed a threat of public disorder and violence, but
2 states that the SDS "gradually morphed into more of
3 a general intelligence-gathering unit".

4 HN301 states in his witness statement that while he
5 believes some of the reporting could have been obtained
6 by other means, much of the information could not have
7 been obtained without direct involvement in the groups
8 concerned, including the identity of those who regularly
9 attended meetings and information about planned
10 demonstrations.

11 HN301 regularly reported information about
12 individual members of the groups he infiltrated. He
13 states that he believed that this would have been
14 helpful to build up as full a picture as possible.

15 He is not sure how the intelligence he gathered was
16 used, but assumes that relevant parts were filtered to
17 Special Branch squads and the Security Service. He
18 states that the SDS could be described as "the executive
19 arm of the Security Service", and states that quite
20 a lot of intelligence was gathered on their behalf. He
21 notes, however, that he had no direct contact with
22 the Security Service during his deployment.

23 There is no evidence to suggest that HN301 engaged
24 in any sexual activity in his cover identity. He states
25 that he did not form any close relationships with

1 activists, but sometimes would have a pint with them
2 after a meeting. The officer states that he did not
3 participate in any criminal activity while undercover.
4 He was never arrested, nor, to his knowledge, was any of
5 his reporting used in connection with any criminal
6 investigation or prosecution.

7 He states that he did not become aware of any
8 legally privileged information. One report from
9 April 1974 notes the possible formation of an IS
10 lawyers' group, to give legal advice to members in
11 the event of arrest by the police, and to assist trade
12 unionists "to clash with the law on pickets, marches and
13 demonstrations". HN301, however, does not believe that
14 he was specifically tasked to report on IS legal
15 services.

16 There is evidence of some tangential reporting on
17 trade union activities. HN301 states that he did not
18 join a trade union or become involved in trade union
19 affairs while in the SDS. He does note that the IS
20 would recruit members from the workplace. There is one
21 report from March 1975 which notes the intention of
22 the IS to stand a candidate in the Walsall by-election.
23 However, there's no other significant reporting on
24 political campaigns.

25 HN301 was withdrawn from the field around May 1976.

1 The officer suggests that his deployment was ended as he
2 had spent five years in the field, which was typical at
3 the time. He withdrew by telling his group that he had
4 been offered a job elsewhere and was moving out of
5 London. A report from this time notes that "Bob Stubbs"
6 was now living and working in Portsmouth. The officer
7 states that his deployment had no long-term effect on
8 his welfare, but he felt that help would have been
9 offered had he requested it.

10 HN301 states that he cannot comment upon
11 the contribution his reporting made to policing, but
12 that he hopes that his five years in the SDS were
13 useful. HN301 retired from the police in the late 1990s
14 at the rank of detective constable.

15 Sir, that concludes the summary for HN301.
16 The Inquiry will be publishing the documents related to
17 this officer on the website today.

18 In addition to this, the Inquiry will also be
19 publishing documents related to the officer nominal
20 HN303, cover name "Peter Collins", who is unable to give
21 evidence due to poor health.

22 This officer, Sir, was deployed in early 1974 to
23 1977, into the North London branch of the Workers'
24 Revolutionary Party, and later tasked by that group to
25 infiltrate the National Front. The Inquiry's analysis

1 of those documents can be found at page 131 to 137 of
2 appendix 2 to Counsel to the Inquiry's opening statement
3 for Tranche 1, Phase 2.

4 Thank you, Sir.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 We're now going to have a ten-minute break while we
7 reassemble to hear live evidence.

8 Mr Fernandes.

9 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take
10 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
11 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

12 The time is now 10.20 am, so we shall reconvene at
13 10.30 am.

14 Thank you.

15 (10.21 am)

16 (A short break)

17 (10.30 am)

18 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

19 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
20 proceedings.

21 Chairman.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 As at the beginning of every live evidential
24 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.
25 If you're listening for the first time, please listen

1 carefully.

2 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
3 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
4 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including
5 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have
6 made a number of orders which affect what you may and
7 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave
8 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter
9 and may have serious consequences for you.

10 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an
11 order, I have the power to certify the matter to
12 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
13 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
14 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
15 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
16 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
17 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
18 sequestration of their assets.

19 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
20 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
21 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
22 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
23 the hearing rooms.

24 You may bring your mobile telephone into the hearing
25 rooms, but you may not use it for any of those purposes.

1 You may use it silently for any other purpose. In
2 particular, you may transmit your account of what you
3 have seen and heard in a hearing room to any other
4 person, but only once at least ten minutes have elapsed
5 since the event which you are describing took place.

6 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
7 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public
8 disclosure of information, for example about
9 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
10 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
11 whether by accident or design, information which I have
12 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
13 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,
14 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order
15 prohibiting further disclosure of the information
16 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that
17 no further disclosure of that information may be made by
18 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
19 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside
20 it.

21 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is
22 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
23 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
24 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
25 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of

1 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
2 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own
3 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
4 best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt
5 about the terms of this message, or what you may or may
6 not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and,
7 with my help if necessary, they will provide you with
8 the answer.

9 HN298/"Michael Peter Scott"

10 THE CHAIRMAN: HN298, can you hear me?

11 Are you on mute by any chance?

12 A. No, I can hear you now.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Good.

14 Can you confirm, please, that apart from, I think,
15 one person who is sitting behind your left shoulder
16 there is no one else in the room from which you are
17 giving evidence?

18 A. Yes, that's so.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 Do you want to be sworn or affirm?

21 A. Affirm.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Then Mr Fernandes will speak the relevant
23 words to you in a moment.

24 Mr Fernandes.

25 (Witness affirmed)

1 Mr Barr, I think we're going to have our shorthand
2 writer's break at about 11.45, are we not?

3 MR BARR: That's right, Sir.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

5 MR BARR: HN298, I'm not going to ask you your full name,
6 for obvious reasons, but can you confirm that you are
7 the person who we know by the nominal "HN298"?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You've provided us, helpfully, with a 73-page witness
10 statement dated 5 February 2020. Are the contents of
11 your witness statement true and correct to the best of
12 your knowledge and belief?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Can I start, please, with your service in Special Branch
15 before you joined the SDS. There was a period of time
16 when you served on C Squad, wasn't there?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And during your time with C Squad, did you attend
19 meetings of political activists?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And report upon them?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And doing that work, what was C Squad's area of
24 responsibility?

25 A. Essentially communists.

1 Q. And did you gain an understanding of what Special Branch
2 was interested in from an intelligence perspective as
3 a result of doing that work?

4 A. Yes, I believe that I did.

5 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that when you were
6 serving in C Squad, you knew that the SDS office was
7 just a little bit down the corridor; is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was the existence of the SDS well known to members of
10 C Squad?

11 A. I would think it was, yes.

12 Q. Do you know what happened to the SDS office later?

13 A. Perhaps you can clarify what you mean by that.

14 Q. Did there come a time when they moved out of the office
15 that you knew them to occupy?

16 A. Not to my knowledge. I wasn't aware that they'd moved
17 out, no.

18 Q. What was your understanding of the role of the SDS
19 before you joined the unit?

20 A. It was to report on -- I mean, it was
21 the Special Demonstration Squad, so it was essentially
22 about demonstrations and giving information on ones that
23 are likely to occur and ones that did occur.

24 Q. You tell us in your witness statement you wanted to join
25 the SDS. Could you expand upon why it was that you

- 1 wanted to join the SDS?
- 2 A. Because it was interesting. It was an interesting thing
3 to do.
- 4 Q. What did you think was going to be interesting about it?
- 5 A. It would -- it was just it would be interesting to play
6 a new role, really.
- 7 Q. And you tell us you took proactive steps to see if you
8 could join the SDS. Could you explain, without naming
9 any names, what you did?
- 10 A. Well, I certainly enquired about joining. I can't
11 remember to whom, but I indicated quite clearly that
12 I would be interested in joining the Squad.
- 13 Q. And what did that lead to?
- 14 A. Well, I was -- it reached a point where I was interested
15 -- it was indicated that I could join the Squad, and
16 I began to grow a beard and grow my hair, and then
17 I joined the Squad.
- 18 Q. Can you recall whether you had an interview or not?
- 19 A. No, I can't recall having an interview. I mean,
20 I suppose I must have had an interview of sorts. I must
21 have spoken to someone, but I can't recall it.
- 22 Q. Can you recall whether you or your family were given any
23 indication of what the work would involve?
- 24 A. No. I mean, certainly my family weren't. They didn't
25 come into it at all really.

1 Q. You were married at the time, were you?

2 A. I was, yes. And still am, after 50-odd years.

3 Q. Can you recall spending any time in the SDS office

4 before you deployed?

5 A. No, I can't.

6 Q. Did you get any formal training from the SDS?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Were you given any informal advice or guidance before

9 you deployed?

10 A. I may well have done, but I can't recall it.

11 Q. I'm going to ask you a few -- about some matters

12 specifically, just to see if that jogs your memory.

13 Can you recall whether you were told what you should

14 do if you were arrested?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Can you recall whether you were given any guidance about

17 what to do if you came across activists being given

18 legal advice?

19 A. No.

20 Q. In your police career before you had joined the SDS,

21 would you have regarded it as normal to avoid any

22 conversations between a defendant in court and his or

23 her lawyers?

24 A. I -- can you repeat that?

25 Q. Yes. When you were a police officer before joining

1 the SDS, would you have regarded it as appropriate and
2 normal to steer clear of any conversation between
3 a defendant and his or her lawyers when in court?

4 A. I can't remember a set of circumstances where that would
5 have been the case, but -- no, I just can't remember
6 that.

7 Q. Were you given any advice or guidance about what to do
8 if you ended up in court in your undercover identity?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Were you given any advice or guidance about assuming
11 positions of responsibility within an activist group?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Can you help us with what your understanding of
14 subversion was?

15 A. Well, subversion is when you would do or carry out acts
16 which would endanger the wellbeing of the state.

17 Q. And what do you mean by "the wellbeing of the state"?

18 A. I mean the wellbeing of the people that live here.

19 Q. And how does that translate to the wellbeing of
20 the government of the day?

21 A. Well, the government of the day, whoever they are, is
22 elected, and so therefore they have a right to be there
23 and govern; and so therefore, anything that was likely
24 to endanger that proper democratic situation would be
25 subversive.

1 Q. When you say "anything that might endanger", was there
2 any threshold in your mind, or was it anything at all,
3 no matter how trivial?

4 A. Trivial things would remain trivial and so of less
5 consequence and of less importance.

6 Q. When you were reporting on the activities of groups that
7 you might have considered to be subversive, did you
8 apply any filter, or did you report everything that they
9 were doing?

10 A. Most groups were not subversive, but some, of course,
11 had a potential to be; and that's what we were reporting
12 on: the circumstances which might lead to them being
13 dangerous and subversive.

14 Q. Were you given any formal training on the definition
15 of "subversion"?

16 A. No.

17 Q. In your witness pack, there was a document with
18 the snappy title "Home Office Circular No 97 of 1967",
19 which was about informants participating in crime. Can
20 you recall ever seeing that document?

21 A. No.

22 Q. What was your understanding of an undercover officer's
23 participation in crime, by which I mean were there
24 circumstances in which you understood it might be
25 appropriate?

1 A. There could be circumstances where, with the -- with
2 the permission of your superior officers, that you might
3 carry on in a situation which was contrary to the law.

4 Q. Had you been given any instruction about those
5 circumstances?

6 A. Generally speaking, the -- you would not expect to be
7 involved in anything that was contrary to -- to break
8 the law. You wouldn't -- you are a police officer after
9 all.

10 Q. That wasn't quite the answer to my question.
11 The question was: were you given any instruction about
12 that?

13 A. Not specific instruction. It was just common sense, and
14 that was general understood, I think.

15 Q. Before you deployed, had you met any of the other SDS
16 undercover police officers?

17 A. I can't recall having done so, but I may well have met
18 in -- in one of the houses. I may well have met people
19 there. I can't recall that though.

20 Q. Had you spoken to the managers, other than when you were
21 accepted into the unit?

22 A. I spoke to them when I'd been accepted into the unit,
23 but not -- prior to that I can't recall speaking to
24 them.

25 Q. What I'm driving at, HN298, is you've been very clear

- 1 that you had very little instruction, no formal
2 training. I'm just wondering how you knew what to do
3 when you deployed.
- 4 A. I don't think it -- it was rocket science, really, to
5 know what to do, that you were essentially leading
6 a false life, you became a -- you took on a false
7 persona, and you mixed in with whatever you were trying
8 to infiltrate.
- 9 Q. Can we have a sense, please, of to what extent were you
10 simply deployed and left to get on with it, and to what
11 extent might you have been prepared for your deployment
12 but simply be unable to remember the details?
- 13 A. No, I -- I suppose, in a sense, you were left to get on
14 with it. But that was no bad thing. To go -- have
15 a big rigmarole about what you should do and what you
16 shouldn't do would be, I suppose, limiting
17 the intelligence of your officers.
- 18 Q. Can we move now, please, to your cover identity. And
19 you tell us in your witness statement that you went to
20 Somerset House and you consulted the records there, and
21 you chose to adopt the identity of a person whose birth
22 certificate you examined; is that right?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Why did you choose to use that method?
- 25 A. I chose to select a name that I liked and felt easy

1 with, and whose date of birth was very similar to my
2 own, so that I wouldn't get tripped up in terms of
3 the age -- my age, and that was that. It seemed
4 a common sense thing to do, to actually ...

5 Q. I'll come back to the details in a moment, but really
6 what I was getting at is why did you choose to use
7 the details of a real person, rather than, for example,
8 just making up a fictional identity?

9 A. Because a real person has a birth certificate and
10 a birth date that can be checked, so that if anyone was
11 checking up on me, they would find -- find it there in
12 Somerset House.

13 Q. Did you use any details other than the name and the date
14 of birth?

15 A. What, where I was born, for example? Where I'd lived?
16 Well, I -- I noted them, of course, but I hadn't really
17 -- never had any occasion to use -- use it, where --
18 no one -- no one was interested where you come from,
19 you know, unless you had a strong accent, I suppose.

20 Q. Does it follow, if somebody had asked you where you were
21 born, you would have given the location that was on
22 the birth certificate?

23 A. Had -- had it arisen, I would have wanted to know, to
24 start off with, why did they want to know that. What
25 business is it of theirs? But, in the final event when

1 it seemed reasonable, then, yeah, I would have given
2 the correct details.

3 Q. I see. Had you heard of this method being used before?

4 A. No, I mean, what had gone before was not of any interest
5 to me really. I wanted to do it my way.

6 Q. I see.

7 Had you been influenced in any way by what you might
8 have seen or read in books or films?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Did you do any kind of risk assessment in your head as
11 to what the pros and cons of using a real person's
12 identity were, over and above the fact you would have
13 a birth certificate which could be checked?

14 A. I didn't really think there were any risks. I mean,
15 I did an instant risk assessment; and that was that
16 there wasn't any risk.

17 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that you didn't
18 know whether the person was alive or dead; is that
19 right?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 Q. Presumably, one of the risks would be if the person was
22 dead, then researchers might not just find the birth
23 certificate, they might also find the death certificate;
24 and that would be quite difficult to explain, wouldn't
25 it?

- 1 A. If I had to explain it. If I had to explain why I was
2 dead, yes, it would be difficult, yeah.
- 3 Q. Can I take it that that didn't -- that risk didn't cross
4 your mind at the time?
- 5 A. Oh, I didn't see it as a risk at all, actually.
- 6 Q. And if the person was still alive, would not another
7 risk be that anyone researching your identity might
8 actually track down the real Michael Peter Scott?
- 9 A. Why was that a risk? Why would that be a risk?
- 10 Q. Well, I'm asking you. Did you consider that that might
11 be a risk?
- 12 A. No, I didn't. I didn't think it was a risk.
- 13 Q. Did you consider at that stage that if you ended up in
14 a group where you got caught up in committing a criminal
15 offence and the person was still alive, the real Michael
16 Peter Scott might end up with a conviction on his
17 criminal record?
- 18 A. What is the question, actually?
- 19 Q. Did you contemplate the risk that if you were convicted
20 in the name "Michael Peter Scott", then the real Michael
21 Peter Scott would end up with a criminal record?
- 22 A. Well, it's hardly -- I mean, what -- the circumstances
23 what happened to me was not exactly a criminal record.
24 It's -- it was really of no consequence, actually.
- 25 Q. At the moment, my question is just, did you contemplate

1 that as a risk?

2 A. No, I didn't contemplate that.

3 Q. Now, you have told us in your witness statement that you

4 had a driving licence?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you have that right from the start?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you told us that you've had a library card and

9 a doctor's card?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did you use Michael Scott's birth certificate to obtain

12 any documents?

13 A. Well, I can't recall now, but possibly so.

14 Q. Did you have a bank account in the name "Michael Peter

15 Scott"?

16 A. I did.

17 Q. Did you consider whether that might cause any

18 complications for the real Michael Peter Scott?

19 A. It might assist him, because my credit record was good.

20 Q. And you had fictional employment as a tank erector or,

21 estimator?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Was your cover identity tested by your managers before

24 you deployed?

25 A. They would ask me about it, I would guess. I can't

1 recall. But it was pretty sound, my cover employment.

2 Q. Did your managers know that you had adopted the identity
3 of a real person?

4 A. I don't know. I can't recall.

5 Q. Did they warn you that your identity might be tested
6 once you were deployed?

7 A. They didn't need to warn me. I don't know whether they
8 did warn me or not, but one would expect at some point
9 it might be.

10 Q. As far as you are aware, was your cover identity ever
11 researched by any of the activist groups that you
12 infiltrated?

13 A. Not to my knowledge.

14 Q. I've got the impression from your evidence that you were
15 left to your own devices to devise your cover identity;
16 is that fair?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you think, with the benefit of hindsight, that it
19 would have been better to have had some form of
20 instructions and guidance about how to do it?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Well, I was perfectly capable of doing it myself, so
24 I didn't really need anyone else giving my guidelines,
25 especially when the office staff had no experience

- 1 themselves of it.
- 2 Q. I'm going to move now to tasking; and you've told us
- 3 that you were never tasked by managers to infiltrate any
- 4 specific groups; is that right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. But what you did was you attended meetings of groups
- 7 that you thought would be of interest to Special Branch?
- 8 A. Correct.
- 9 Q. And coming back to the question of how you knew what
- 10 would be of interest to Special Branch, in addition to
- 11 your work on C Squad, and without giving away any secret
- 12 information, how did you know what would be of interest
- 13 to Special Branch?
- 14 A. Well, it was the SDS squad, so anything that generated
- 15 demonstrations or a general nuisance, or anything that
- 16 was likely to be contrary to the law, those things were
- 17 of interest to Special Branch.
- 18 Q. All the groups that you infiltrated were on
- 19 the left wing of the political spectrum, weren't they?
- 20 A. Yes. Generally, yes.
- 21 Q. Why didn't you infiltrate any right wing groups?
- 22 A. Well, there weren't any right-wing groups that were
- 23 demonstrating or causing any problems, as far as I can
- 24 recall, at the time.
- 25 Q. I'd just like to explore your relationship with your

1 managers. Although you have made it very clear that you
2 were left to self-task, presumably they were kept in
3 the loop?

4 A. Oh yes, I kept them -- obviously we had regular meetings
5 at safe houses, and I kept them informed of anything and
6 everything I was doing.

7 Q. And did they steer you in any way from one group to
8 another?

9 A. They never -- no, never steered me from one group to
10 another, no, but they may well have indicated things
11 that they were interested in, but I can't recall that
12 being the case.

13 Q. Can you give us some examples of that?

14 A. Well, they may well have said that this particular group
15 is of interest for some reason, and then -- and perhaps
16 encouraged you to see if you could go in that direction.
17 But I can't recall this being the case, but it seems
18 fairly reasonable that they may well have done.

19 Q. And once you were infiltrating a group, would you have
20 conversations about what Special Branch might want to
21 learn about that group?

22 A. Well, Special Branch would want to know, with any group
23 or any involvement, their name, their details,
24 information of what they were trying to achieve, what
25 the plans they have. These are fairly common things

1 really, from whichever group you infiltrated.

2 Q. Would you discuss specific individuals?

3 A. What, with the office?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Yes, perhaps -- yes, perhaps so.

6 Q. And was the office interested in specific individuals?

7 A. Occasionally they may well have been, although I can't

8 recall them being so.

9 Q. You say that your movement between groups was fluid and

10 that it wasn't a case of deliberately leaving one group

11 for another. Can you help us with what sort of factors

12 influenced your movement between groups?

13 A. Some groups became more interesting, and therefore more

14 relevant to the branch, as time went on. And so,

15 therefore, there was a natural movement -- in my case,

16 there was a natural movement from one group to another,

17 without necessarily departing from the first group. You

18 just vanished and disappeared.

19 Q. Because something more interesting came along?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Does the phrase "oblique approach" mean anything to you?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Was there any strategy of starting in groups that were

24 less threatening and moving to groups that were perhaps

25 harder to infiltrate, or more security-conscious?

1 A. I -- I did that in effect. I did that in effect,
2 to groups that were less -- potentially less threatening
3 but not necessarily less security-conscious.

4 Q. I'm asking you that because we all know that you ended
5 up in the Workers Revolutionary Party, and I just wanted
6 to know whether that was part of a plan, or whether that
7 was just the way things worked out?

8 A. It wasn't part of a plan originally. Looking into
9 the future, that wasn't -- you know, nothing was part of
10 a plan really, it was, you know, going from one group to
11 the next because it seemed a good idea at the time.

12 Q. But when it came to it, did your background in activism,
13 which was by that stage several years long, help you to
14 infiltrate the Workers Revolutionary Party?

15 A. Yes, it's just called experience really, that because
16 I had more experience, I was able to do it fairly
17 reasonably, you know.

18 Q. Did you get feedback on your reporting from your
19 managers?

20 A. Not -- not an awful lot, no, but on some occasions there
21 was feedback, you know, when --

22 Q. Good or bad, or both?

23 A. Generally good, actually, I think.

24 Q. You've told us that if a more interesting group came up,
25 you would move to them. Did you have any other

- 1 targeting criteria?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. Does the way you operated mean that sometimes you would
- 4 come across information which you thought was of
- 5 interest to Special Branch essentially by chance?
- 6 A. Yes. I mean, things often happened by chance.
- 7 Q. How did you avoid duplicating work with your fellow
- 8 undercover officers if you were taking this
- 9 self-tasking, meandering approach through various
- 10 groups?
- 11 A. Well, I think, if things were duplicated, it didn't make
- 12 any difference. But obviously you didn't want lots of
- 13 people in the one -- dealing with the one thing. There
- 14 were plenty of groups and activity out there.
- 15 Q. Were you ever asked to move on because a particular
- 16 group was already covered? No names, please.
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Did you ever discuss with your managers whether
- 19 the activities of a group that you were reporting on
- 20 justified reporting upon them?
- 21 A. No.
- 22 Q. Did your managers ever express any views as to whether
- 23 or not the groups you were reporting on justified
- 24 reporting on or not?
- 25 A. No.

1 Q. I'm going to move now to the safe house, and the way
2 that you wrote up reports and used the safe house.

3 You tell us that you wrote up and signed reports in
4 manuscript at home; is that right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then you handed them in when you went to weekly
7 meetings at the SDS safe house?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you tell us that you didn't have access to the file
10 reference numbers that we see at the end of the reports,
11 and therefore they must have been added by others when
12 your reports were typed up?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. If you had wanted to consult a Special Branch file for
15 another reason, because you wanted to learn about an
16 individual or a group to assist you with your work,
17 could you have asked for a file to be brought to you at
18 the safe house?

19 A. I would imagine so, yes.

20 Q. Can you recall whether you ever did that?

21 A. I can't recall doing that, no.

22 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that the weekly
23 meetings were like this:

24 "Everyone would congregate and if you had anything
25 to discuss with your managers, you would. For example,

1 if there was an upcoming demonstration or major meeting
2 that was going to be happening, you would give them
3 a heads-up about it, in addition to putting in a written
4 report."

5 I just want to explore the scene with you in
6 a little more depth, please, 298.

7 First of all, can you give us an indication about
8 the size of premises we are talking about as a safe
9 house?

10 A. I suppose probably like a -- a three-bedroomed flat or
11 house.

12 Q. And how many people are meeting at a weekly meeting,
13 typically?

14 A. Well, I suppose about a dozen.

15 Q. And how should we picture you? Are we picturing you all
16 in the living room sitting in the living room, or some
17 other disposition?

18 A. Yeah, more or less. The lounge-type area. I don't know
19 if there were any bedrooms. I can't -- I can't recall
20 now. Yes, just in the communal area, which was like
21 a lounge, I suppose.

22 Q. And there would be a mixture of
23 undercover police officers and managers?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And we've got the picture, the lounge of the safe house,

1 a collection of undercover police officers and managers.
2 Could you please describe to us then what happens?
3 A. There were -- if you had any -- you wished to discuss
4 anything with the office, then you did so. It was all
5 fairly low-key. There were generally meals at these --
6 at these meetings, and there were several of the --
7 the officers there that were pretty good cooks. And so
8 it was high quality eating, actually. And obviously
9 there were drinks and things. It was a fairly social
10 occasion almost, as well as a work occasion, for those
11 that wished to discuss particular things with
12 the office.
13 Q. So a laugh and a joke, as well as business?
14 A. Yeah, it wasn't all business. It was all fairly low
15 key.
16 Q. Would it be fair to have a picture of people going round
17 the room saying what they'd done that week?
18 A. No.
19 Q. So, can you help us?
20 A. Well, that didn't actually arise. I mean, I -- I can't
21 ever recall discussing with any of the officers what
22 they were involved in and what they did. And I never
23 discussed with any of them what I did. It wasn't -- it
24 didn't seem to get mentioned too much really -- or at
25 all, actually.

- 1 Q. If you were all in the room together, presumably you
2 would overhear what each other was saying?
- 3 A. If -- if you were of a mind to, I suppose, yes.
- 4 Q. I mean, would you talk about the events in your week
5 just gone by?
- 6 A. No. I wouldn't talk about the events at all, or any of
7 my involvement in anything.
- 8 Q. What would you say to your managers?
- 9 A. Ah, I'm not talking about to the managers. That's
10 a different proposition. There were perhaps things that
11 they needed to know, and therefore you would tell them.
12 But if you're talking about other officers that were
13 there, no one was really interested in what the other
14 guy was doing. I mean, it wasn't any relevance really.
- 15 Q. I'm getting the picture now that you did talk to your
16 managers about what you had been doing, you did so in
17 a room in the presence of others, but you have given
18 the impression --
- 19 A. -- (overspeaking) -- sorry. There was generally
20 a separate room. You know, you could go in a separate
21 room with the -- the admin staff, you know?
- 22 Q. Was that always done, religiously, or not?
- 23 A. Yes, I can -- I think it was always a separate room if
24 you wished to speak to them about a specific thing.
- 25 Q. There may be a difference between wanting to speak to

1 your managers confidentially if needs be, and always
2 speaking to them confidentially. Could you help us with
3 which it was?

4 A. Well, in my -- I can only speak for myself. In my case,
5 if it was confidential, then that's what it was.

6 I spoke to them in a confidential manner in a separate
7 place.

8 Q. But if it wasn't confidential, presumably you'd be happy
9 to tell your managers in front of everyone else?

10 A. But that wouldn't arise, because they were all --
11 you know, if you're talking to them, you're talking to
12 them, you're not talking to everyone else. In actual
13 fact, no one else actually was really interested.

14 Q. Well, that may be -- there may be a separate point about
15 whether anybody listened to what you were saying --

16 A. No, if you spoke to the admin staff, you spoke to them
17 separately.

18 Q. So, are we to understand that the picture is more of
19 a waiting room of officers, waiting to go and speak to
20 managers privately in a different room?

21 A. I suppose, if you -- it might appear that way. But in
22 actual fact, people weren't queuing up to speak to
23 the office staff. I mean, they'd already submitted
24 their reports and things. And so generally, you didn't
25 need to speak to them at all, you know? So anyone that

- 1 wanted to speak to them was not queuing up, they just
2 spoke to them, they just went in and spoke to them.
- 3 Q. So what conversation was there in the living room?
- 4 A. Just general chat about all kinds of different things.
- 5 Q. And presumably, because you were all living the same
6 clandestine lives, this was your one chance in the week
7 to speak to one another, you'd talk about all sorts of
8 things?
- 9 A. Absolutely. I mean, one -- one conversation I can
10 remember having was about lead soldiers.
- 11 Q. But amongst all the conversations of all sorts of kinds,
12 you must also have naturally talked about what life was
13 like undercover?
- 14 A. Well, it wasn't naturally so, no. I didn't.
- 15 Q. So if somebody had a dilemma, what to do in a sticky
16 situation, wouldn't people ask for advice, or share
17 the problem?
- 18 A. Well, I can't recall anyone asking my advice, and
19 I certainly asked no one -- no one else's advice.
- 20 Q. And if there were particular characters in the activist
21 field, particularly if they moved from one group to
22 another, would you not talk about them?
- 23 A. Occasionally certain individuals got mentioned, yes,
24 they did.
- 25 Q. And if anything particularly dramatic had happened,

1 perhaps a particularly lively demonstration, presumably
2 you'd talk about that?

3 A. Possibly so. I can't really recall having done so, but
4 it may well have happened.

5 Q. Did you discuss the groups themselves and their
6 different natures?

7 A. Certainly, certain individuals were mentioned, ones that
8 tended to be unpleasant; and those individuals I think
9 are now dead.

10 Q. Did you discuss the politics of the groups concerned?

11 A. Not really, no.

12 Q. What does "not really" mean, please?

13 A. Well, no.

14 Q. Did you discuss what you were going to be doing in
15 the next week?

16 A. No.

17 Q. If there was a big demonstration coming up, for example,
18 at which more than one UCO might be present, is that
19 something you might discuss?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Wouldn't it be natural to want to talk about some big
22 event that was coming up?

23 A. No. It was fairly -- demonstrations and the like were
24 fairly -- they're commonplace. You know, after you've
25 been doing it for a while, it was no -- they were no big

- 1 deal really.
- 2 Q. Did you deal with administrative matters, like pay and
3 expenses?
- 4 A. Yes, your expenses claims were submitted on a weekly
5 basis.
- 6 Q. And did you --
- 7 A. Yes, sorry, just for clarification, it's the completion
8 of your diary, and so therefore the diaries were
9 submitted.
- 10 Q. Did you get provided with updates from the Metropolitan
11 Police Service and Special Branch about what was going
12 on back in mainstream policing?
- 13 A. Not really, no.
- 14 Q. How well did you get to know your fellow UCOs?
- 15 A. As -- well, some you got to know. I suppose it's like
16 any groups of people, some you like more than others;
17 and therefore the ones that you like more than others,
18 you tend to gravitate towards and you get to know them
19 more.
- 20 Q. So without naming any names, did you strike up any
21 particular friendships?
- 22 A. There were a few people there that were -- I was -- felt
23 quite friendly with, but you didn't see them much at
24 all. You know, you ...
- 25 Q. Sticking strictly to their nominal numbers and not their

- 1 names, can you tell us who they were, please?
- 2 A. HN299, I was quite friendly with him.
- 3 Q. Any more?
- 4 A. He's got two numbers here, hasn't he?
- 5 Q. Yes, he was given two numbers: 299 and 342.
- 6 A. Yes.
- 7 No, there were others that I was friendly with, but
8 not especially so, because you didn't see them that
9 much, you know?
- 10 Q. Would you welcome and get to know new team members?
- 11 A. Well, you would kind of superficially get to know them,
12 but they weren't that frequent. I mean, they weren't --
13 people were on the squad, you know, a matter of years
14 and so therefore new people were not -- you know, once
15 or twice I think there was new members, so didn't see
16 them that much.
- 17 Q. You were -- you served with the SDS for almost five
18 years, between 1971 and 1976, so you would have come
19 across quite a number of other officers; that's right,
20 isn't it?
- 21 A. Yes.
- 22 Q. And you would have seen them usually approximately
23 weekly?
- 24 A. Yes, although not everyone attended every meeting every
25 week.

1 Q. And then did there come a time when the week meetings
2 became more frequent than once a week?

3 A. Not that I can recall. I can't recall them being any
4 more frequent at any time, no.

5 Q. And so, by 1975/1976, you would have been, for want of
6 a better term, one of the old sweats?

7 A. Quite honestly, they all seemed like old sweats. Every
8 -- everyone there seemed to have been there for years.

9 Q. I'm going to ask you about some specific officers now,
10 please, 298.

11 First of all, Detective Constable Richard Clark, who
12 we also know by the nominal HN297; one of the few whose
13 real name we can use. Do you recall him?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And did he have a reputation as a ladies' man?

16 A. Not to my knowledge, he didn't.

17 Q. Was he a ladies' man?

18 A. Not to my knowledge, he wasn't.

19 Q. Did he ever speak about sexual encounters whilst he'd
20 been undercover?

21 A. Not that I ever heard.

22 Q. Did you ever hear any banter which might have insinuated
23 that he'd had sexual encounters with women undercover?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Do you think that if he had had sexual encounters with

1 women undercover, that might have been something that
2 would have been raised in the office?

3 A. I wouldn't have thought so. I mean, I never heard any
4 such thing raised in the office. It seems to me
5 unlikely that anyone would mention these things, but,
6 you know ...

7 Q. Why is that?

8 A. It's just not the type of thing people would want to
9 discuss, is it.

10 Q. Why?

11 A. Well, it's a private thing and that's a matter for them.

12 Q. Was there ever any discussion about the rights and
13 wrongs of having sexual relations with people whilst you
14 were undercover?

15 A. Discussions? No.

16 Q. I'm going to move on now to the officer we known as
17 "HN300", and who used the cover name "Jim Pickford".
18 Do you know who I'm talking about?

19 A. No, I don't, actually. I'll just have a look.

20 Q. Can you check.

21 A. Yes, I've found him, yeah.

22 Q. Did he have a reputation as something of a ladies' man?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Did he ever speak about sexual encounters whilst he was
25 undercover?

1 A. Not to my knowledge.

2 Q. Specifically, did he ever say anything about falling in
3 love with a woman whom he had met whilst undercover?

4 A. No, I never heard any such comments or conversation.

5 Q. Did you hear any rumours?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Any banter?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Do you think that if he had fallen in love with an
10 activist and gone on to marry her that you would have
11 heard about it?

12 A. Well, possibly, but I didn't hear about it, so ... if
13 that in fact took place.

14 Q. No names, please; use nominals if you need to. But did
15 anybody ever speak about sexual encounters undercover
16 whilst you were in the SDS?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Did you attend reunions after you'd left the SDS?

19 A. I attended Special Branch reunions, yes.

20 Q. Again, no names, please, use nominals if you need to,
21 but was there ever any talk about sexual relationships
22 undercover when you attended any of the reunions?

23 A. No.

24 Q. When you first joined the SDS, there were some female
25 members of the squad, weren't there?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And when they left, they weren't replaced by female
3 officers and the unit became all male, didn't it?
- 4 A. I wasn't aware of that.
- 5 Q. Perhaps you could cast your mind back, because
6 presumably it would have been quite striking.
- 7 A. Well, there were women on the squad when I was there,
8 and then when I left the squad, I remained in the job
9 for a short time and then I left the police.
- 10 Q. Can you recall a time when you were on the SDS and there
11 were no female members of the unit?
- 12 A. No, I can't recall such a time.
- 13 Q. Can you recall the atmosphere within the unit changing
14 at all?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. I'm going to move now to the question of visits by
17 senior officers. You tell us in your witness statement
18 that you recall superintendent "Bushy" Bignell. I think
19 the "Bushy" is some form of nickname, is it?
- 20 A. Well, he had a bushy beard, a bushy moustache, that's
21 why.
- 22 Q. And you say he came to visit the unit?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Can you tell us a bit about where that was?
- 25 A. What, the location of the place?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I can't -- I don't know. I can't recall.

3 Q. Was it the safe house?

4 A. Oh yeah, it was in a safe house, yeah.

5 Q. And can you recall what sort of things "Bushy" Bignell
6 was told?

7 A. Well, he wasn't told anything by me. He was told by
8 those -- the office staff that attend, the DI and the
9 chief inspector.

10 Q. Would it be fair to say that he gleaned enough to know
11 what the SDS was and what it was doing?

12 A. Well, he was in charge of it, so I would guess he must
13 have had some idea what they were doing.

14 Q. And do you also recall Deputy Assistant
15 Commissioner Vic Gilbert visiting? Did he visit
16 the safe house?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. He was also in the chain of command, wasn't he?

19 A. Well, he was the boss of the branch, so yes, he was in
20 the chain of command, yeah.

21 Q. And what would he have gleaned from visiting the safe
22 house?

23 A. I would guess the purpose of attending at all was just
24 to get a feeling for the place, and just to feel how
25 the -- the officers were responding to each other, and

1 how the whole thing gelled, really. That's the purpose
2 of him coming, I would expect. He may well have other
3 reasons for attending, but that's what I would have
4 assumed he would have attended for.

5 Q. I'm going to ask you some questions about a manager we
6 know as "HN294". Please don't use his name, but if you
7 could check the list, please.

8 A. Oh yes. Yes.

9 Q. Do you know whether HN294 had any undercover policing
10 experience?

11 A. Not to my knowledge.

12 Q. I'm going to move on now to your deployment itself.
13 The earliest reports that we have recovered are reports
14 about the Spartacus League in south-west London. Does
15 that accord with your recollection as to who you first
16 reported on?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Who do you think you first reported on?

19 A. I first reported on the Young Liberals.

20 Q. We'll come back to them in a moment.

21 So far as the Spartacus League is concerned, you say
22 in your witness statement that it was a revolutionary
23 group that held demonstrations and was therefore of
24 interest. Can you help us with whether you had any
25 personal experience of demonstrations organised by

1 the Spartacus League?

2 A. None that I can recollect.

3 Q. Did they have a reputation on the demonstration scene?

4 A. Not that I can recollect.

5 Q. So what was it about them that piqued your interest?

6 A. I don't know that it did especially pique my interest.

7 I know there's reports there with my name on it, but

8 I can't recall -- I can't really recall specifically

9 the Spartacus League, attending --

10 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- forgive me, sorry? You were

11 saying?

12 A. I can't remember attending meetings by

13 the Spartacus League.

14 Q. Okay, thank you.

15 We'll have a look at one of those reports.

16 Could we have up, please, {MPS/732350}.

17 This is a report dated 30 July on

18 the South West Spartacus League. It's about a meeting

19 that was held on 29 July at the Clapham Public Swimming

20 Baths.

21 Could we scroll down, please. To the next page

22 {MPS/732350/2}.

23 Paragraph 3 tells us that there was a guest speaker

24 Brian Grogan. Can you recall speaking to Brian Grogan?

25 A. No.

1 Q. Could we scroll down, please, to paragraph 4. That
2 reads:

3 "The meeting then reassembled into small informal
4 discussions groups and I engaged Grogan in conversation.
5 He said that the IMG had particularly good contacts with
6 the shop stewards at the British Oxygen factory at
7 Rainham Essex, which had come about due to the IMG's
8 efforts in the formation of the claimants' union in
9 the area. They hoped to continue this close liaison by
10 a series of 'Red Circle' meetings in the Dagenham area,
11 due to begin on 15 August. [Privacy] a prominent local
12 union official will be present at some of these meetings
13 and Grogan said that they hoped that a branch of IMG
14 would be formed in the area."

15 Does that prompt any recollection?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And if we go to paragraph 5:

18 "He was quite excited at the prospect of
19 the 'Revolutionary Training Camp' which IMG had set up
20 in the New Forest. He said the idea of the camp, which
21 was to start on Sunday 1st August, was to give all
22 participants a good background in revolutionary
23 thinking. The training will include such subjects as
24 public speaking, theoretical teaching and instruction in
25 the erection of barricades. The course was scheduled to

1 end on 7.8.71 and would be under canvass."

2 Does that ring any bells?

3 A. No.

4 Q. As far as your general recollection of the
5 Spartacus League and the IMG is concerned, is that
6 representative of the sort of activity that they were up
7 to?

8 A. It's the sort of activity I would guess that they were
9 up to, but I can't -- I had no knowledge that that was
10 so.

11 Q. And this is the sort of information that you thought
12 Special Branch would be interested in?

13 A. Well, Special Branch definitely would be interested in
14 that, yes.

15 Q. And looking at the revolutionary training camp, it seems
16 to be more about public speaking and theoretical
17 teaching, and possibly demonstrations, than about armed
18 revolution, or anything like that. Would it still be of
19 interest to Special Branch even at this level?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And can you help us with why?

22 A. Because obviously any armed insurrection starts
23 somewhere. It starts with things like that. At least,
24 I would guess that that would be the case.

25 Q. Can we move now, please -- we can take that document

1 down -- move now to the International Socialists. We've
2 got some reports from the Enfield branch. And you say
3 in your witness statement that it was a revolutionary
4 group that held demonstrations and was therefore of
5 interest.

6 Did you have any first-hand experience of
7 demonstrations organised by the International
8 Socialists?

9 A. I would have -- I would have attended some meetings
10 organised by IS. I can't specifically remember which
11 ones they were. But, yes, the IS was of interest to
12 the branch.

13 Q. Can you recall whether their demonstrations were
14 deliberately orderly or disorderly?

15 A. I would expect them to be on the whole orderly, but
16 there may well have been occasions when certain
17 individuals decided they wished to make it disorderly.

18 Q. And from the point of view of revolution, where were
19 the International Socialists on the scale, please?

20 A. Well, revolution begins with groups like the IS, and
21 there has to be some roughing-up of the system in order
22 to get on the road to revolution.

23 Q. The report's dated 1971. How far down the road to
24 revolution was IS in 1971?

25 A. I don't think anyone was far down to the road to

1 revolution in 1971, but there were -- there was plenty
2 of activity.

3 Q. Does it amount to this, that if a group had
4 revolutionary aims, it would be of interest to
5 Special Branch, in your view?

6 A. Yes, it would be, yes.

7 Q. Can we move now to the Young Liberals, and in particular
8 the Putney branch. There's quite a lot of reporting on
9 the Young Liberals, and it spans the period January 1972
10 to August 1974.

11 Can you help us, first of all, please, 298, with how
12 you came to start reporting on the Young Liberals?

13 A. The Young Liberals at that time were actually quite
14 active in -- in being involved in demonstrations for
15 stopping cricket tours and all kinds of sporting tours
16 that they were involved in stopping, especially those
17 from South Africa, and so it was -- it was a public
18 order issue. And that's how I got involved in it.

19 Q. Can you recall how you came to come to the first
20 meeting?

21 A. No, I can't.

22 Q. Some of the reports are about meetings which took place
23 at a residential address in Fawe Park Road in Putney
24 which was the address of the Hain family, can you recall
25 that?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And we had evidence from Lord Hain last week that
3 meetings took place in his parents' living room; is that
4 right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that so far as you
7 were aware, the Liberal Party was not aware that
8 undercover police officers were infiltrating its youth
9 wing; is that right?
- 10 A. Well, I certainly didn't inform them.
- 11 Q. Did you know whether or not they had been informed?
- 12 A. No.
- 13 Q. Was there any discussion with your managers about
14 infiltrating the youth wing of a mainstream political
15 party?
- 16 A. They were just a group that were demonstrating. It
17 wouldn't have mattered what party they were from. If
18 they were demonstrating and perhaps making a nuisance of
19 -- a nuisance of themselves, they would have been
20 reported on. As far as I'm concerned, they would have
21 been.
- 22 Q. Was it the mere fact of demonstrating, or did
23 the demonstrations have to have a certain quality before
24 they would be of interest?
- 25 A. Those particular demonstrations were quite disruptive,

1 you know, and so that -- that was the interest of them.

2 Q. We've heard some evidence that some members of
3 the Young Liberals participated in non-violent direct
4 action, and by that I am meaning conduct which was
5 definitely not violent but which may not have been
6 entirely lawful. Did you come across any such activity?

7 A. Well, certainly on one occasion I did. I was involved
8 in one particular incident -- (overspeaking) --
9 the Young Liberals.

10 Q. We'll come to that specific incident in a moment.

11 But generally speaking, was it your understanding
12 that the Young Liberals were involved in using
13 non-violent direct action as a tactic?

14 A. Yes, that would be fair to say. I don't think there was
15 anyone intended any violence to anyone.

16 Q. And how frequently were the Young Liberals using
17 the tactic?

18 A. I suppose as frequently as -- as they thought it
19 necessary, actually.

20 Q. How frequently was that?

21 A. Well, do you want me to put a number on it? I've no
22 idea in terms of numbers what they did.

23 Q. If you've got no idea, I can't press you any further.

24 Can I move now to the role of individuals.

25 To what extent did the presence of Peter Hain in

1 the Young Liberals affect your decision to target that
2 group?

3 A. Clearly -- well, it wasn't the fact of Peter Hain being
4 there. He was -- I think he was the president of
5 the Young Liberals at the time. But in any event, much
6 of this activity against South African rugby teams or
7 the cricket teams were because of him. His family were
8 very opposed to apartheid. Not just him, his parents as
9 well. And that was the -- that was the focus. And
10 he -- he was the one that made a lot of these things
11 happen, I suppose. He was involved with other people,
12 but ... so yes, it was of interest. Putney Young
13 Liberals were of interest because he was there.

14 Q. Did you get any praise from your managers for
15 infiltrating the living room at Fawe Park Road?

16 A. No, I think probably this kind of thing, they're
17 actually too frightened of these things. They happen
18 and they're confronted with them, and they don't really
19 want to make waves. And this is how these things work.

20 Q. Who doesn't want to make waves?

21 A. They don't want you to make waves, but -- when they're
22 confronted with it, but they're in essence obliged to go
23 along with it.

24 Q. Who is "they", please?

25 A. The office staff, the admin, people in charge, you know?

- 1 Q. So was it regarded as a risky infiltration?
- 2 A. Not by me it wasn't, but I suspect that they may well
3 have thought that it was.
- 4 Q. Risky to reputation rather than --
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And what was the risk to reputation?
- 7 A. Well, of course, such things, if they were to flare up,
8 they could make a lot of fuss about it in the Houses of
9 Parliament, and people would then be worried about their
10 jobs and, you know, it filters down. So that I can
11 imagine could pose a problem for them. But it didn't
12 pose a problem to me.
- 13 Q. Could you sense that concern in your managers?
- 14 A. At the time, I think there was some concern, yes.
- 15 Q. We've talked about Peter Hain. Do the same sort of
16 considerations apply to Ernest Rodker?
- 17 A. Ernest Rodker was not -- although he was a leading light
18 in this kind of activity, he wasn't a person that was
19 well known.
- 20 Q. And what about Professor Rosenhead?
- 21 A. Well, again, he was not -- he was not a person that I'd
22 previously heard of prior to attending a meeting where
23 he was -- he was also there.
- 24 Q. But once you got to know them, were they -- were either
25 of them persons of interest?

1 A. I never got to know them really. I mean, I just
2 attended meetings and -- but they were certainly -- in
3 that particular sphere, they were the leading lights
4 that actually organised the demonstration and had lots
5 to say about -- I was an observer.

6 Q. There are a number of reports about the proceedings of
7 the Young Liberals. I'm going to show you a few.

8 Shall we start, please, with the one which is at
9 {UCPI/8240}.

10 Sir, this is tab 10 of the hard copy bundle.

11 Now, this is a report dated 26 January 1972. It's
12 reporting on a meeting of the Putney branch of
13 the Young Liberals, held on 20 January 1972, at which 14
14 people are recorded as being present. And this is
15 a report which bears your name at the end.

16 If we could look at the paragraph at the bottom of
17 the screen at the moment, that reads:

18 "Peter Hain, the honorary President of the Putney
19 branch, chaired the meeting and after a lengthy
20 discussion it was decided by a show of hands that
21 the branch should follow a more general plan of action
22 than was previously mooted for the 'urban crisis'
23 campaign. The campaign would now incorporate in one
24 scheme a variety of environmental goals, as opposed to
25 specific objectives such as the proposed assault on

1 the 'Battersea smell'."

2 Was the Putney branch of the Young Liberals interest
3 in this environmental issue of interest to
4 Special Branch of itself?

5 A. No.

6 Q. So why did you report it?

7 A. I can't recall reporting it.

8 Q. Assuming for the moment that you did, is there any
9 explanation as to why this would be included in
10 a report?

11 A. If you're attending meetings, you need to report what
12 happens at those meetings. Not -- not on -- not on
13 every occasion are they, you know, trying to uproot
14 society. I mean, lots of these things that go on are
15 quite mild, no problems with them, you know; they've got
16 a right to do. But nevertheless, you report the good as
17 well as the bad.

18 Q. So would it be fair to say there was an unfiltered
19 approach to what you actually reported once you had
20 decided that the group was of interest?

21 A. I suppose, yeah, by and large that would be the case.
22 Unless it just seems total nonsense, in which case you
23 wouldn't bother to report it at all. That obviously is
24 of some -- it's of an interest, and it's got some
25 substance to it. And so I can understand why that would

1 the document that bears the number {UCPI/8240}, tab 10
2 of the hard copy bundle. If we could have that back up,
3 please. And if we could scroll down to the bottom half
4 of that page, please.

5 It says:

6 "Nominations were taken for the executive posts of
7 Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Membership Secretary
8 and following persons were elected to those positions."

9 And document records that you were elected to
10 the position of Membership Secretary.

11 Can you help us as to why you put yourself forward
12 for that position?

13 A. I can't recall putting myself forward for that position,
14 but having said that, the reason why I might was that,
15 as the Membership Secretary, you have access to all
16 the members; and that of course is of interest to
17 the Branch to know who we're talking about.

18 Q. Is that something you would have done spontaneously, or
19 would you have had an opportunity to consult with your
20 managers before becoming the Membership Secretary?

21 A. I wouldn't consult with the office about whether
22 I should do -- become Membership Secretary or not. No,
23 it would be spontaneous.

24 Q. And presumably, though, you would have told them
25 afterwards?

1 A. Oh yes, afterwards, because if this report is to be --
2 to have been written by me, they would have received
3 a copy of it.

4 Q. And did you get any reaction from your managers,
5 favourable or otherwise, for assuming this position?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did you get any approval or disapproval for taking this
8 position without consulting them first?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Can you recall whether or not taking this position did
11 give you access to membership details?

12 A. I can't recall it having given me access, no.

13 Q. Could we go over the page, please, {UCPI/8240/2}. Thank
14 you.

15 At the end of the report it says:

16 "The following persons attended the meeting:

17 "Peter Hain.

18 "Jo-Ann Hain.

19 "Sally Hain."

20 And then some names that we have redacted to respect
21 privacy. And your name appears there as well.

22 We heard evidence on Friday that at the time of this
23 meeting, both Jo-Ann Hain and Sally Hain were teenagers
24 under the age of 18. Did you realise that there were
25 children in the room?

- 1 A. I've got no recollection at all of Jo-Ann Hain or
2 Sally Hain, or any children, at any meetings, because
3 they're of course of no relevance.
- 4 Q. From the point of view of your reporting, was the fact
5 that they were there enough for them to be included in
6 your report?
- 7 A. I can't actually recall having written this report,
8 actually; and I can't recall being the Membership
9 Secretary. I certainly never had any names or anything
10 from it. And I -- I don't even recognise those two
11 names, but --
- 12 Q. I appreciate it's a long time to remember, but this
13 report does bear your name at the end of it, 298.
- 14 A. Yes, it does, but it bears my name in a form that
15 I would have never used, just incidentally.
- 16 Q. Were you given any advice or guidance about whether or
17 not you could report on children?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. And would it follow from the unfiltered approach, that
20 we talked about just before the break, that you would
21 include in your reports the names of anyone present,
22 whoever they were?
- 23 A. Yes. I mean, it has been -- as has been shown by
24 the Green movement, there are young ladies of a tender
25 age that can be quite significant; and so I would have

1 possibly put them down anyway. If they were in
2 attendance, I would put them down --

3 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

4 A. Sorry?

5 Q. I was just going to say, those are two slightly
6 different reasons: reporting on them just because
7 they're there, and reporting on them because they might
8 be people who would be politically active in a way of
9 interest to Special Branch.

10 A. Often, when you report and put names down, you don't
11 know how significant these people are or are going to
12 be. And the whole point of collating information is
13 that you do exactly that. You know, you put them down,
14 and if they constantly turn up at meetings all over
15 the place, they start to be significant.

16 Q. Before the break we were talking about the sense of
17 unease that your managers had about this part of your
18 deployment. We see at the bottom of this page
19 the nominal "HN294", who was the chief inspector of
20 the SDS at the time. Is he one of the managers who had
21 that sense of unease?

22 A. Well, I can't talk for them whether or not they had any
23 unease about it. And I wasn't conscious of it, but
24 I suspected that they might be uneasy about it.

25 Q. I see. Was he one of the suspects?

1 A. Well, he was the man in charge, and so I suspect that
2 any rational person would have been mildly uneasy
3 about it. I mean, he seemed a fairly rational bloke to
4 me.

5 Q. Using nominals and not names, any other managers in that
6 category at that time?

7 A. Well, he was the leading man, really.

8 Q. Can we take that report down, please.

9 Could we now look at the report that bears
10 the number {UCPI/8254}, at tab 17 of the hard copy
11 bundle.

12 Now, this is a report on the Young Liberals. It's
13 another report which bears your name at the end. It's
14 dated 12 April 1972, and it's a report on a meeting of
15 the Putney branch of the Young Liberals, held on
16 6 April, at which nine people are recorded as being
17 present.

18 Could we look at paragraph 5, please.

19 Paragraph 5 reads:

20 "It was suggested that it would be impossible to
21 disentangle the problems of Putney High Street from
22 the projected motorway, which was supposedly designed to
23 alleviate much of the existing problem of through flow
24 traffic. This thought produced considerable discussion
25 and it was decided that the display would be held on

1 Saturday, 15.4.72, avoiding where possible direct
2 reference to the proposed motorway which would be
3 the subject of an investigation of alternatives
4 resulting in the compilation of a report in about two
5 months time. Once the report had been prepared it would
6 be possible to base direct action such as the closing of
7 Putney High Street on sound reasoning which would permit
8 other groups such as the Putney Society to take part.
9 [Privacy] said [Privacy] [Privacy] of the Putney Society
10 had expressed a willingness to assist in any proposed
11 closure of the High Street."

12 So this report seems to be about concerns about
13 traffic flow in central Putney, and there seems to be
14 some suggestion of direct action.

15 Why was local activism about an issue such as Putney
16 High Street of interest to Special Branch?

17 A. It was of interest to the police from the point of view
18 that they were talking about closing the roads, closing
19 the High Street. That clearly is of interest to
20 the police. That's it. SDS is part of the police.

21 Q. Some might say that this was pretty minor activity.
22 Did it ever cross your mind or fall for comment from
23 your managers that undercover police resources might be
24 better directed elsewhere?

25 A. I think the activities of the SDS were well directed,

1 and I think it was money well spent.

2 Q. Could we take that down, please, and could we have up
3 the document which is at tab 18 of the hard copy bundle
4 {UCPI/8254}.

5 This is a report on the 1972 Young Liberal annual
6 conference?

7 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have the wrong document up. It's
8 8255. {UCPI/8255}.

9 MR BARR: 8255, thank you, yes.

10 The 1972 annual conference of the Young Liberal
11 Movement.

12 Can you recall attending that conference, 298?

13 A. I do vaguely recall attending, yes, a conference.

14 Q. In that report, you describe Peter Hain as being of
15 the "centre left". Is that a fair characterisation of
16 his politics within the Young Liberals?

17 A. I would say so, yes.

18 Q. If we could go to page 10, please, {UCPI/8255/10}, and
19 could we look at paragraph 33. That reads:

20 "The last session of the day was given over to an
21 address by David Steel, MP, the President of
22 the Young Liberals. His speech contained nothing of
23 particular interest and was described by Brian Milton
24 as 'a talk about opinion polls and concerted efforts and
25 amounted to nothing more than a political speech by

1 a politician'."

2 Now, did reporting on Members of Parliament fall to
3 be the subject of any comment from your managers?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Had you been given any guidance about reporting on MPs,
6 either in the SDS or beforehand?

7 A. MPs are not above the law, and so in the context of
8 the reporting, no, no comment was made.

9 Q. Of course, none of us is above the law, but
10 the description that you've recorded and attributed to
11 Brian Milton is "a talk about opinion polls and
12 concerted efforts and amounted to nothing more than
13 a political speech by a politician". You're not
14 suggesting, are you, that David Steel was up to no good?

15 A. No, I mean, quite the contrary really. Brian Milton
16 there was suggesting it was totally irrelevant.

17 Q. Just politics.

18 A. Yes, the whole thing was totally -- you know, for
19 the meeting and its relevance to the Young Liberals, it
20 was of no relevance.

21 Q. Did you consider that reporting on the ordinary
22 political activities of a Member of Parliament as
23 a police officer gave rise to any concerns?

24 A. Well, no. Personally, I -- it raised no concerns for
25 me.

1 Q. Did any of your managers ever express any concerns about
2 your reporting on Members of Parliament?

3 A. No.

4 Q. If we go to the -- can we look now at paragraph 34,
5 please. It's a bit at the bottom I'm particularly
6 interested in. This is some more commentary about what
7 was going on during David Steel's address, and reading
8 the last six lines:

9 "Throughout the address Steel was the target for
10 a barrage of paper aeroplanes, originating from the box
11 by the side of the stage which was occupied by students
12 from the LSE. John 'Anarchy' Norton was the central
13 figure from the LSE representatives and frequently
14 throughout the four day conference, held aloft a flag
15 adorned in the anarchist colours of red and black ..."

16 If we can go over the page, please, {UCPI/8255/11}:

17 "... bearing the legend 'We are wildly annoyed'. He
18 was a source of constant amusement throughout
19 the debates and during the elections was rewarded for
20 his efforts, by sharing with the 'Blagdon Amateur
21 Rapist' and 'John Morton's right leg' (the one that
22 limps) the distinction of having been nominated for
23 every single post within the YLM."

24 I just wanted to ask you, first of all, did you
25 think that the label "Blagdon Amateur Rapist" was

1 amusing?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Isn't it in appalling taste?

4 A. Some people may well consider it to be.

5 Q. Secondly, the antics of these particular delegates are

6 at best juvenile, aren't they?

7 A. They may well be considered to be that.

8 Q. Were these the people in the wing of Young Liberals that

9 were of concern to Special Branch?

10 A. These people were -- these people were activists in one

11 way or the other, by doing amusing things, or by

12 blocking roads, or whatever. The fact that they are

13 there and they are saying these things, you can't ignore

14 it; in just the same way that you can't ignore what

15 David Steel said. It's just a case of reporting what

16 happened, you know, at the -- at the conference.

17 Q. But the reference to the flag in particular,

18 the anarchist flag, was it the anarchists within

19 the Young Liberals that were your primary concern?

20 A. The group in the Young Liberals subsequently was

21 Commitment -- a group calling themselves "Commitment".

22 And, yes, they were of interest. I subsequently

23 attended meetings of Commitment, because they -- they

24 seemed to be the ones that were likely to cause problems

25 one way or the other.

1 Q. Were the problems they were causing of the level of
2 paper aeroplanes, or were they more serious than that?

3 A. One would expect that they would -- or I expected that
4 they could be more serious than that.

5 Q. Did they become more serious than that or not?

6 A. None of these people, in the end, turned out to be very
7 serious.

8 Q. Once it turned out, in the end, that they weren't very
9 serious, was there any discussion about the need to
10 continue reporting upon them?

11 A. Well, I made that judgment, and I just moved on to
12 somewhere else, some other group.

13 Q. Could we take that down now, please.

14 There are some reports in the bundle on a car that
15 was used by Peter Hain and Peter Hain's private
16 secretary. Why did you report those matters?

17 A. Should something appear on the screen that you're
18 referring to?

19 Q. If you want to look at them to refresh your memory, we
20 can call them up.

21 If we call up, please, {UCPI/8248}.

22 That's the report on Peter Hain's private secretary.

23 Is it possible to blow that up a little bit so that

24 298 can read it more easily? Thank you.

25 Can you read that, 298?

1 A. Yes, I can, yeah.

2 Q. So now you've refreshed your memory, can you explain why
3 you reported that information?

4 A. Well, I can't recall reporting that information at all.
5 I can't -- I've got no recollection of his private
6 secretary, but I would say that had I have been
7 conscious of it, I may well have submitted a report
8 giving that information.

9 Q. Why?

10 A. Because it's related to other reports, and it's only by
11 adding bits and pieces like this that you subsequently
12 find out who is of interest and who isn't.

13 Q. Could we take that down now, please.

14 The report on the car is at {UCPI/8558}.

15 This one, I'm afraid, is very difficult to read, so
16 could we blow it up as far as possible.

17 The second paragraph appears to read:

18 "Peter Hain regularly uses a red Volkswagen motor
19 car ..."

20 Then it gives a registration number:

21 "... the registered owner of which is his mother --
22 Mrs Adelaine Florence Hain of 90 Fawe Park Road, Putney,
23 SW15."

24 And then it bears your name and then the manager's
25 name, HN332.

1 Same question: why would you report that?

2 A. Well, I can't recall having reported that, but I would
3 have done, had I have known it, that information,
4 because, again, he was a person that was of interest,
5 and therefore it makes sense to note the vehicles such
6 people are using.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Could we take that document down now, please, and
9 could we go to the document which is at tab 50
10 {UCPI/8269}.

11 Now, we're moving forward a little bit in time, 298.
12 This is the report on the Young Liberals council meeting
13 in Birmingham, dated 13 August 1974. Again, this report
14 bears your name at the end of it. Do you have any
15 recollection of this?

16 A. No.

17 Q. What it says is:

18 "The 'Young liberal Movement' held a Council meeting
19 in Birmingham on 22 and 23 June 1974. Amongst
20 the various resolutions passed were two arising from
21 the demonstration in Red Lion Square on 15.6.74.

22 "The following is the agreed text of
23 the resolutions:

24 "(1)

25 "This Council notes with deep regret the death of

1 Warwick student Kevin Gately during the demonstration
2 against fascism in Red Lion Square on Saturday
3 June 15th."

4 Do you recall that event?

5 A. No.

6 Q. "It condemns the vicious and unnecessary attack on
7 the left-wing demonstrators by the police and the
8 blatant bias shown by the police in favour of the march
9 organised by the National Front.

10 "It calls on the Home Secretary to set up an
11 independent public inquiry into ..."

12 And if we could scroll up, please:

13 "(a) the circumstances surrounding Kevin Gately's
14 death.

15 "(b) the activities of the Metropolitan Police Force
16 on the day of the demonstration.

17 "(c) the specification of the different sections of
18 the police involved.

19 "And demands the immediate disbandment of
20 the police 'Special Patrol Group'.

21 "The Executive is mandated to write to the Home
22 Secretary informing him of the Council's demand.

23 "(2)

24 "The following motion was passed without amendment:

25 "While unreservedly condemning the violent tactics

1 used by certain members of last Saturday's demonstration
2 against the National Front, this Council expresses its
3 grave concern at what it considers to be the
4 overreaction of the police in dealing with the
5 situation."

6 And if we can go over the page, please,

7 {UCPI/8269/2}:

8 "Further it instructs the Chairman to:

9 "(a) write to the Home Secretary calling for an
10 independent public enquiry into the whole handling of
11 the demonstration and in particular the death of
12 Kevin Gately.

13 "(b) an enquiry into the wearing of paramilitary
14 uniform by members of the National Front."

15 Why would information of this nature be reported?

16 A. I've got no recollection of having reported that. But,
17 yes, it -- it is of significance -- giving my opinion on
18 it, it is significant what they say; and, yes, it should
19 be reported.

20 Q. And why is that?

21 A. Because if you're gathering information in order to
22 reach decisions on things, you need as much information
23 as you can glean, and this is just one little part of
24 a jigsaw really.

25 Q. What sort of decisions are we talking about here?

1 A. Well, the disbursement of -- excuse me --
2 the disbursement of police officers, where you would put
3 police officers, whether you would use them at all,
4 whether you would use the SPG, if it still exists,
5 I don't know. Yeah, it's important to gather
6 information. That's their role.

7 Q. Well, this reporting isn't about any forthcoming
8 demonstration, this report is of a political
9 organisation, the Young Liberals, resolving to press
10 the Home Secretary of the day for a public inquiry into
11 a demonstration that had already happened. Why is that
12 of interest to the police?

13 A. Well, I think it's probably of interest to the Home
14 Secretary, and I would imagine that such things -- such
15 information as this gets passed along the line to him.

16 Q. Can you recall whether the campaign for a public inquiry
17 following the Red Lion Square demonstration was a matter
18 of discussion within the SDS?

19 A. It wasn't.

20 Q. Do you have any idea whether or not this information
21 ended up on the Home Secretary's desk?

22 A. I have no idea.

23 Q. Do you think there was any concern about reporting on
24 political activity of this nature?

25 A. There was no concern by me. I don't know whether anyone

1 else was concerned. I -- no one indicated to me that
2 there were concerned about anything.

3 Q. If we could go up, please, to the preamble to
4 paragraph 2 on the first page, {UCPI/8269/1}.

5 That reads:

6 "The following is the agreed text of
7 the resolutions."

8 Were there resolutions other than those listed in
9 the document? I appreciate I'm testing your memory.

10 A. I've got no recollection of this meeting at all. So no,
11 I can't answer that.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 A general question now about the Young Liberals. To
14 what extent was the Young Liberals' anti-apartheid
15 activity relevant to your decision to report upon it?

16 A. Well, yes, it was, you know, significant, because their
17 anti-apartheid activities -- excuse any -- included
18 demonstrations against cricket tours and rugby tours,
19 and that was -- that was -- they were things of public
20 disorder, and they were of interest.

21 Q. And coming back to a topic that I raised with you
22 earlier. As a self-tasking officer, did you not
23 consider at all infiltrating the far right?

24 A. Well, as far as I know, there weren't any problems with
25 the far right. I guess you mean the National Front?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I don't think they -- I wasn't aware of too many
3 demonstrations organised by them.

4 Q. Can we move now to Commitment. You attended meetings at
5 a private house in the Croydon/Thornton Heath area,
6 didn't you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you tell us in your statement that they were small
9 meetings, six to eight people?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. The document can be taken down now, please.

12 And Commitment was a libertarian anarchist group?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And its tactics you describe as being "to irritate and
15 inconvenience some large companies"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Could we have a look, please, at the document which is
18 at tab 16 {UCPI/8560}.

19 Again, I'm afraid very difficult to read, but it's
20 paragraph 3 that I'm interested in. This is a report on
21 Croydon Commitment. It says:

22 "The remainder of the evening was dominated by
23 [Privacy] who spoke of a meeting between [Privacy],
24 [Privacy] and Peter Hain, to decide on action against
25 the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation's projected mining

1 incursion into the Snowdonia National Park. He bitterly
2 criticised Lord Byers for being a director of a company
3 prepared to destroy, purely for profit. It was a stain
4 on the Liberal Party conscience which could not easily
5 be removed."

6 Paragraph 4:

7 "He said [Privacy] and [Privacy] were particularly
8 keen on some form of disruption and it had been agreed
9 that a group should attend the annual general meeting of
10 RTZ to be held in May, to question their motives and
11 their excuses and, if necessary, to create chaos. He
12 hastened to add 'we might cause chaos anyway!'"

13 Is that the sort of irritation/inconvenience to
14 large companies that you were referring to?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. If you could take that down, please.

17 Were Commitment involved in public disorder?

18 A. I can't actually recall any public disorder that they --
19 they were involved in.

20 Q. Were they committing any criminal offences?

21 A. Not to my knowledge.

22 Q. Were they trying to overthrow the state?

23 A. I shouldn't think so, no.

24 Q. Given the answers you've just given me, why infiltrate
25 them at all?

1 A. Because potentially they could cause -- they could cause
2 chaos at -- you know, in the streets. The fact that
3 they didn't was probably lack of organisation rather
4 than a will to do so.

5 Q. And was just the potential to cause disorder
6 a sufficient threshold for the purposes of SDS
7 reporting, in your experience?

8 A. When they -- they spoke about such things and spoke
9 about doing such things, that was enough to be of
10 interest, because clearly, if you speak about it, you
11 can carry it out.

12 Q. But I'm getting the impression this was a group that was
13 all talk and not very much action; is that fair?

14 A. Yeah, by and large that's fair, yeah.

15 Q. And so even a group that was all talk and not so much
16 action was still of interest?

17 A. When it was -- when I concluded that that was the case,
18 then I moved on.

19 Q. Can we move to the Croydon Libertarians. You've said
20 that the Commitment Group and the Croydon Libertarians
21 tended to merge into one another. Can you help us any
22 further with that?

23 A. Some of the individuals that were -- that were involved
24 in -- or involved in Commitment actually blended into
25 one, but in that particular -- it was particularly led

1 by an individual and -- in Croydon, and they were what
2 they saw as an anarchist group really, a libertarian
3 group. But it all blended into one, and then as far as
4 I was concerned they didn't actually do anything that
5 was too bad, and I moved on.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Let's look at the document which is at tab 41 of
8 the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/8152}. Thank you. It's
9 paragraphs 3 and 4. Thank you.

10 This is a report dated 12 April 1973.

11 A. Mm.

12 Q. The background is it's about a protest to direct public
13 attention to the need for a road in Croydon to be made
14 into a pedestrian precinct.

15 Paragraph 3 reads:

16 "It was organised and executed exclusively by
17 members of Croydon Libertarians' and took the form of
18 a length of chain being suspended across the road and
19 secured at either end by padlocks.

20 "4. In the event the road was closed for little
21 more than five minutes and disruption of traffic was
22 slight. It was not quite clear even to the participants
23 why it failed, especially as the event had not been
24 publicised outside the immediate confines of those
25 involved. The participants did not wait to see

1 the immediate effect of their protest but disappeared,
2 to return a short time later to find the chain no longer
3 in position. It was therefore assumed that either
4 the padlocks had not been securely fastened or that an
5 unsensitive lorry driver had been responsible for
6 sabotaging the event. Police were absolved from blame
7 as they had not been in evidence."

8 First of all, can you recall this?

9 A. I vaguely recall this, yes.

10 Q. Secondly, was the rapid disappearance of the chain
11 anything to do with prior warning that you might have
12 given about this stunt?

13 A. It may well have been so, yes.

14 Q. And was this level of protest typical of the Croydon
15 Libertarians?

16 A. They didn't do this too often, but this was the general
17 thinking. This is -- it was on this kind of level.
18 No one was thinking of doing anything that was too
19 dangerous or dramatic. It was this kind of level of
20 stuff.

21 Q. Ernest Rodker was involved with the Croydon
22 Libertarians. Did his involvement have anything to do
23 with your reporting on the group?

24 A. I wasn't aware that Ernest Rodker was involved with
25 the Croydon Libertarians.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 Can we take that down now, please.

3 I want to move to 12 May 1972 and the incident
4 outside the Star & Garter Hotel at which you and others
5 came to be arrested.

6 Can we start first of all with {UCPI/34071}.

7 We're told that that is a picture of
8 the Star & Garter Hotel. Does that ring any bells?

9 A. No, it doesn't actually. I mean, I do recall
10 the incident vaguely, but that picture doesn't assist me
11 in that.

12 Q. Thank you. If we can take that down, please.

13 Can you recall whether your involvement in this
14 event was as a member of the Young Liberals or
15 Commitment, or some other group?

16 A. It was as a member of the Young Liberals that I attended
17 there.

18 Q. And we know from the documents that you came to attend
19 a planning meeting at Ernest Rodker's home; that's
20 right, isn't it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you recall how it is that you knew to go to
23 Ernest Rodker's home?

24 A. Yes. Peter Hain's mother told me.

25 Q. Can you remember how she told you?

1 A. I think she said something to the effect that, "If you
2 actually want to be actively involved, then you should
3 go to this meeting."

4 Q. And was this a face-to-face conversation or not?

5 A. That I can't recall. I can't recall whether it was
6 a phone call or whether I went to her home. I think
7 I might have gone to her home, actually.

8 Q. How involved in the Young Liberals were you at that
9 time?

10 A. Well, I was only involved insofar as -- yes, I mean,
11 I attended meetings of the Young Liberals in Putney.

12 Q. How well did you know Mrs Hain?

13 A. Not well at all. She was just someone that I saw
14 occasionally.

15 Q. Had you met her before?

16 A. I can't recall whether I had or not, actually. But
17 I mean, I'd been -- I'd gone to her home several times,
18 so the chances are that I'd met her.

19 Q. When you arrived at Mr Rodker's home, were you expected?

20 A. I can't recall arriving there. I can remember being
21 there, but I don't know whether anyone expected me or
22 not.

23 Q. Could we call up now, please, {MPS/526782}. This is
24 tab 24. Could we go to page 7 {MPS/526782/7}.

25 This is part of a file on the whole incident. This

1 particular document, 298, is a memorandum which bears
2 HN294's name, dated 16 May 1972. I want to draw your
3 attention to the third paragraph down, which says:

4 "On Friday, 12th May DC HN298 had occasion to
5 telephone Hain's home where Mrs Hain (Peter Hain's
6 mother) told him that if he were interested in doing
7 something positive he should go forthwith to [a house
8 on] Rumbold Road, SW6. DC HN298 did so and result is as
9 stated in his report."

10 Is that accurate or not?

11 A. Yes, it's probably accurate. I can't recall whether
12 I -- I phoned there or whether I went there, so it's
13 probably accurate that that was done at the time.

14 Q. Can we move now to page 9 {MPS/526782/9}.

15 This is a report which bears your name, also dated
16 16 May. Before we go into the details of this, can you
17 help us with whether or not you informed your managers
18 before you went to Ernest Rodker's house?

19 A. No, I wouldn't have done.

20 Q. Why not?

21 A. There wasn't sufficient time. You can't go phoning your
22 managers all the time. I mean, it's -- you know,
23 I mean, you're expected to do a job and that's what
24 I was doing.

25 Q. I see.

1 Paragraph 1 of this report reads:

2 "On Friday, 12.5.72 from 1.30 pm until [5].15 pm
3 at ..."

4 And we've redacted the number:

5 "... Rumbold Road, Fulham SW6, the home of
6 Ernie Rodker, a meeting was held to discuss actions
7 aimed at delaying the departure of the English Rugby XV
8 from their Richmond hotel, the ' Star & Garter', long
9 enough for it to prove impossible for them to adhere to
10 their 6.15 pm flight schedule."

11 I think I may have misread that. I think it may say
12 3.15 that the meeting ended. Can you help us whether
13 the meeting lasted until 3.15 or 5.15?

14 A. I can't recall.

15 Q. Does that report accurately summarise what the aim of
16 the meeting was?

17 A. Yes, I believe it does.

18 Q. Paragraph 2 reads:

19 "There were 21 persons present at the meeting, all
20 of whom with the exception of [Privacy] later
21 participated in the activities around the hotel.
22 Everyone there appeared to know Rodker but many of
23 the number were not known to each other. There appeared
24 to be only a small group of three or four who had
25 actually been involved from the beginning in

1 the planning of what might correctly be described as
2 a military style operation. Rodker was the key figure
3 of this group which also included Jonathan Rosenhead and
4 [Privacy]."

5 As a Special Branch SDS undercover officer, would
6 you have been trying to report the number of persons
7 present as accurately as possible?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Could we go to paragraph 4, please.

10 It says:

11 "After some discussion about who should fill what
12 roles, which was governed to a large extent by whether
13 or not they had a car which could be used, it was agreed
14 that [Privacy] would be the 'strikers'. It was their
15 job to turn off the fuel supply of the England Rugby
16 team's coach or otherwise immobilise it, and then to
17 indicate to [Privacy] who would be playing football in
18 a nearby field, that it had been done. They in turn
19 would wait until the players began to board the coach
20 and then indicate to 'PT' who would be stationed on
21 Richmond Hill looking down upon them. It was his job to
22 inform Rodker and [Privacy] that the players were
23 boarding the coach, and that they should block
24 the Petersham Road side of the car park with their cars.
25 After a time lapse of 1.5 minutes the other three cars,

1 also parked on Richmond Hill, were to block
2 the Nightingale Lane car park exit. The drivers of
3 the vehicles were then to lock them up and block
4 the path of the coach with their bodies. To complicate
5 matters further Rodker had ordered two 'skips' to arrive
6 at the upper car park at 4 pm."

7 As best you can recall, is that an accurate summary
8 of the plan?

9 A. As far as I can recall, yes.

10 Q. Can we go over the page, please {MPS/526782/9}. Look at
11 paragraph 5. It says:

12 "There was insufficient time to discuss fully many
13 of the facets of such a complicated scheme, such as
14 the methods of signalling, eg whether to wave red
15 handkerchiefs, take coats off and put them on etc.
16 Rosenhead volunteered the use of three flares which he
17 had with him but there was not much support for this.
18 (Later, at the car park he lit and threw a flare)."

19 Do you have any recollection now of Rosenhead
20 lighting and throwing a flare?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Is it possible that this report is inaccurate on this
23 point?

24 A. It seems unlikely that it would be inaccurate, but if
25 I'd written the report and that's what it said in

1 the report, that's what would have been the case.

2 Q. Is it possible that you might have made a mistake as to
3 who lit and threw a flare?

4 A. No. If I've written the report that said that he
5 did it, then he would have done it.

6 Q. Can we look at paragraph 6, please:

7 "Before departing for Richmond, Rodker gave out
8 the telephone numbers of several solicitors and
9 the [National Council for Civil Liberties]. He
10 destroyed all the notes he had made about the day's
11 activities and told the others that if they were
12 arrested it was essential that they should deny having
13 met together previously and should say that they had
14 received a note through the post, outlining the action
15 which had been planned. He added that this was to
16 squash any possibility of a charge for conspiracy."

17 Do you have any recollection now of that being said?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Working then purely from what you recorded at the time,
20 why would Rodker have given out telephone numbers for
21 solicitors?

22 A. I suppose in anticipation of being arrested.

23 Q. Was it your understanding that there was a risk of
24 arrest?

25 A. He didn't give me any telephone numbers and I wasn't

1 aware of them, so ... There's always a risk of arrest,
2 of course, if you're demonstrating and you do chain off
3 roads and cause problems like that, you know, you might
4 expect that you would be arrested.

5 Q. Can we go to paragraph 8, please. Thank you.

6 "By 3.55 pm all were in their allotted positions and
7 almost immediately the signal was received for Rodker
8 and [Privacy] to leave. After 1.5 minutes the other
9 cars departed for the Nightingale Lane exit. As they
10 did so a lorry containing an empty 'skip' turned in
11 front of them and drove into the car park. The three
12 cars followed and were confronted by a Police Officer,
13 who made no attempt to stop them blocking the coaches
14 exit. They positioned the cars, locked them and left,
15 later to join other demonstrators standing by
16 the coaches with placards. It would appear that
17 the officer's presence in the car park had deterred
18 [Privacy] from making any attempt at
19 immobilising the coach."

20 Do you have any recollection of that now?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Do you have any reason to doubt the record that you made
23 in 1972?

24 A. I don't doubt -- doubt it at all. I doubt whether in
25 actual fact this was written by me, but I don't doubt

1 that that's what happened.

2 Q. Paragraph 9:

3 "The police officer was offered assistance from
4 local building workers, hotel staff and the rugby
5 players in removing both the offending vehicles and the
6 demonstrators which he apparently accepted."

7 Can you remember that?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Can we go down to paragraph 10, please:

10 "A melee ensued with the demonstrators sitting on
11 and in front of the vehicles while they were being
12 lifted. One of the hotel staff succeeded in ripping off
13 half the front bumper of one car from its mounting.
14 The owner of the vehicle, Jonathan Rosenhead later
15 accused the police officer of doing the damage and
16 surprisingly the officer accepted responsibility
17 for it."

18 Can you recall that?

19 A. No.

20 Q. You -- if it was you who wrote the report -- have used
21 the word "melee ensued". Can I take it from your lack
22 of recollection now that you're unable to help us with
23 what you meant by the use of that word?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can we go now to -- over the page to paragraph 12,

1 {MPS/526782/11}.

2 It says:

3 "At the police station there appeared to be little
4 or no animosity between the police and the
5 demonstrators, although there were some slight injuries
6 to both. The prisoners were allowed the freedom of
7 the cells and the corridor and were served with tea.
8 [Privacy] was allowed to contact Ben Birnberg,
9 solicitor, tell [Privacy] who agreed to represent all
10 the defendants ..."

11 Then something has been redacted on the grounds it
12 is legally privileged:

13 "The prisoners were bailed to appear at Richmond
14 Magistrates' Court on 13.5.72 at 10 am."

15 Do you recall that?

16 A. Yes, I do recall that.

17 Q. And is the record that we've just read accurate?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Just pausing on the question of the legal advice that
20 was recorded and has been redacted, did anyone ever say
21 anything to you about whether or not you should have
22 reported the contents of legal advice?

23 A. Who do you mean there, did anyone ...?

24 Q. Did your managers or anybody else ever take issue with
25 you recording legal advice in that memorandum?

1 A. No.

2 Q. In the time between the end of the meeting at Rodker's
3 house and your going down to the hotel to participate in
4 the demonstration, did you take any steps to inform your
5 managers about what was going to happen?

6 A. There wasn't any time to do that. This wasn't an era --
7 excuse me -- an era with mobile phones. You had to make
8 arrangements with local -- find a local box, and stuff
9 like that. No, there wasn't any time to do that. They
10 geared it so that that was the case.

11 Q. Can we take this document down, please.

12 Would you have informed your managers if there had
13 been an appropriate opportunity?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Could we have up now, please, a document which is at
16 tab 23 {MPS/737087}.

17 This is a document dated 13 May, that's to say
18 the day after the demonstration. It's signed by -- or
19 it bears the name of a chief inspector who appears to
20 have been a part of a unit from Richmond police station,
21 and it says that:

22 "On Friday 12 May 1972 at 3.42 pm information was
23 received from [Privacy] General Manager of
24 the Star & Garter Hotel, Richmond, Surrey, that
25 the British Lions Rugby team was due to leave the hotel

1 shortly for London Airport on its way to South Africa.
2 He believed that a demonstration was likely outside
3 the hotel.

4 "The Patrolling Officer, SPS [redacted] attended at
5 once. Just after 4.10 pm about 30 persons arrived and
6 mingled with a crowd of hotel staff and residents and
7 some building workers in the car park of the hotel. Two
8 of them left Morris mini motor vehicles in the car park
9 entrance at Nightingale Lane, blocking the way out for
10 the rugby team's coach which was about to leave."

11 Stopping there, 298, did you know anything about
12 the information that had been reported by the general
13 manager at the Star & Garter Hotel?

14 A. No.

15 Q. This report says that about 30 persons arrived at
16 the hotel. You recorded 21 people at Rodker's house, of
17 whom 20 got involved in the demonstration. Can you
18 recall whether you were joined by more people?

19 A. I can't recall.

20 Q. Can we go -- scroll up, please. It then reads:

21 "With help from members of the public and police
22 whom he had called to the scene, the SPS tried to move
23 one of the vehicles. Then some of the thirty people who
24 had just arrived started sitting down in the road
25 outside the same entrance and completely blocked

1 the way. They did so in groups of three or four at
2 a time. As each group sat, SPS [redacted] asked them to
3 move. They refused, and they were arrested, whereupon
4 a fresh group replaced them."

5 Do you have any independent recollection now of
6 the events that are described in that paragraph?

7 A. Well, I recall being arrested. Certainly I ended up at
8 the police station. But beyond that, I can't recall
9 much about it at all really.

10 Q. In particular, can you recall whether people were
11 arrested in groups of three or four at a time?

12 A. I don't recall that, no.

13 Q. Are you saying it didn't happen, or simply that you
14 can't recall?

15 A. I just can't recall how we were arrested, but I recall
16 being arrested at -- and I ended up in the police
17 station. I don't actually remember physically anyone
18 putting their hand on my shoulder and arresting me, but
19 we ended up at the police station.

20 Q. Could we take that document down, please, and could we
21 have up in its place {UCPI/33628}.

22 This is a handwritten letter by "PT" to
23 Ernest Rodker dated 14 June 1972. Can we go to
24 the second page, please, {UCPI/33628/2}, and blow it up.
25 Thank you.

1 It's very difficult to read.

2 Could we just scroll down a little bit, please.

3 I'm just looking for a particular passage, if you
4 would bear with me.

5 Yes, it's just -- the passage I want to read to you
6 ends where the first privacy redaction is. It says:

7 "After about twenty minutes most of
8 the demonstrators had disappeared, I could only see
9 Mike Scott and a girl whose name I believe in [Privacy]
10 trying to prevent the police from moving a red mini too
11 roughly from the car park entrance."

12 Can you recall that?

13 A. No.

14 Q. This suggests that it was quite a long time into
15 the incident. Is it possible that you were arrested
16 quite late on in the course of events?

17 A. I -- not really. I thought I was arrested with
18 the rest. I didn't think it was -- I think it was --
19 more or less happened all at the one time; everyone was
20 arrested.

21 Q. Might you have taken an active role in trying to prevent
22 the removal of the mini "too roughly"?

23 A. I may -- I may well have done, I mean, it's acting out
24 a role. But it's all very low key stuff, really.

25 MR BARR: Thank you. If you would take that document down

1 now, please.

2 Sir, would now be an appropriate time to break for
3 lunch?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. We're now going to move on to
5 the pleadings in the Magistrates' Court, which will take
6 a little time.

7 MR FERNANDES: We will now take a break for lunch. May
8 I remind those in the virtual hearing room to remember
9 to join your break-out rooms, please.

10 The time is now 1.05 pm, so we shall resume at
11 2.05 pm. Thank you.

12 (1.03 pm)

13 (The short adjournment)

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