

Tuesday, 4 May 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Day 9 of hearings in Tranche 1, Phase 2, at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone unless you're invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We're now going to begin with Ms Campbell summarising the evidence of one officer who's provided written evidence to the Inquiry and documents relating to one officer from whom we do not have a statement.

Ms Campbell.

Summary of evidence of HN301 "Bob Stubbs"

MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, Sir.

This is a summary for HN301, cover name "Bob Stubbs".

HN301 served in the SDS between 1971 and 1976. He used the cover name "Bob Stubbs" and was deployed primarily into the International Socialists. There is a

1 restriction order in place preventing the publication of  
2 his real name.

3 HN301 joined the Metropolitan Police in the late  
4 1960s, moving to Special Branch in the early 1970s. He  
5 joined the SDS in 1971 after being approached by  
6 a senior officer who he believes was probably HN332.

7 He believes he was selected for the SDS because of  
8 his relatively dark skin, which would allow him to  
9 infiltrate groups with primarily Middle Eastern members.  
10 He notes in his witness statement that, at the time,  
11 the "Black September" group and Palestinian hijackings  
12 were of "significant concern".

13 HN301 believes that he worked in the SDS back office  
14 for two or three months before going into the field. He  
15 notes that there was no formal training, but that he  
16 learned "all that [he] needed to" during this time, as  
17 he was able to read intelligence files on various groups  
18 and go along to the SDS meetings.

19 He states also that HN343 was an informal mentor to  
20 him, and was helpful both before and during his  
21 deployment.

22 HN301 was married at the time of his deployment. He  
23 does not recall any discussion on the possible impact  
24 his deployment might have on his family, and no SDS  
25 managers spoke to his wife before joining. He does not

1 remember being told how long he would be deployed for.

2 HN301 has no recollection of having been shown  
3 the document "Informants who take part in crime", or any  
4 Tradecraft manual before his deployment. He does not  
5 think that he was given any guidance or advice about  
6 becoming involved in the private life of activists,  
7 sexual relationships with activists, participation in  
8 criminality, encouraging or provoking others to  
9 participate in criminality, what to do if arrested or  
10 brought before a court, or the ethical or legal  
11 limitations of his deployment.

12 He states that the officers were expected to employ  
13 common sense, judgment and experience; and it would have  
14 been obvious, for example, that they were not to  
15 participate in criminality.

16 HN301 states that he did not use a deceased child's  
17 identity in selecting his cover name, and notes that his  
18 undercover identity was not sufficiently developed to  
19 include a cover back story beyond a cover employment.

20 HN301 rented cover accommodation, but believes he  
21 stayed there only once or twice and otherwise would  
22 mainly use it to park his cover vehicle.

23 At the start of his deployment, HN301 shared an SDS  
24 hire vehicle with HN338, however he was eventually given  
25 his own car. He had a driver's licence in his cover

1 name.

2 As many other officers, HN301 grew out his hair and  
3 beard before deployment and adopted a casual style of  
4 dress. He did not visit any people or places to develop  
5 his cover identity.

6 The first of HN301's cover jobs was that of  
7 a laboratory technician at Guy's and St Thomas'  
8 Hospital. He recalls that he did this job for a couple  
9 of months and was in the lab most days. He states that  
10 it was "pretty much a full-time job".

11 HN301 adopted this job in particular as it was known  
12 that a member of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign also  
13 worked in the laboratory. It was hoped that the officer  
14 would get to know this individual and be able to start  
15 attending meetings of the group. Ultimately, this did  
16 not occur, as HN301 was unable to get close to  
17 the individual.

18 He notes in his witness statement that he "always  
19 thought that this plan was pretty unrealistic". He  
20 states that he was directed towards this particular  
21 target by his managers.

22 After this targeting proved unsuccessful, HN301  
23 changed his focus towards the International Socialists,  
24 the IS; later known as the Socialist Workers Party,  
25 the SWP.

1           He left his laboratory job and became a handyman at  
2 a garage, a job which he also states he went to most  
3 days. He notes in his witness statement that, unlike  
4 his first tasking, this targeting was the result  
5 of "more of a collaborative decision" between himself  
6 and his managers.

7           HN301 states that he became a member of  
8 the Hammersmith and Fulham branch of the IS and started  
9 attending their publicly advertised meetings. Although  
10 the Inquiry does not hold any reporting from this  
11 officer before 1973, HN301 states that he would have  
12 joined the group in late 1971.

13           HN301 moved to the Wandsworth and Battersea branch  
14 of IS around 1974. Reporting also shows that he moved  
15 finally to the Paddington branch of IS, although  
16 the officer does not remember this branch specifically,  
17 noting that it may have split from the Hammersmith and  
18 Fulham branch. The officer cannot recall why he moved  
19 branches.

20           A report held by the Inquiry from January 1976 notes  
21 that "Bob Stubbs" had taken over as branch treasurer of  
22 the Paddington branch of the IS. In his statement,  
23 however, the officer states that he's confused by this  
24 report, as he believes he was treasurer of  
25 the Hammersmith and Fulham branch and, to his memory,

1 did so earlier in his deployment. He believes that it  
2 is likely that the position became vacant and he  
3 volunteered to fill it.

4 HN301 states that he thinks that SDS officers were  
5 encouraged to take positions that would permit access to  
6 information about the membership of a group, and can  
7 recall HN343 informing himself of this towards  
8 the beginning of his deployment. He notes that he would  
9 have informed his supervisors that the position was  
10 available, and presumes that they told him to put  
11 himself forward for the role.

12 HN301 states that he believes that the IS were of  
13 interest to the SDS "because of the possibility of  
14 public disorder and violence, particularly during  
15 anti-fascist counter protests".

16 HN301 states that, in his opinion, the objectives of  
17 the IS, which he describes as "to support workers in  
18 their struggle for fair treatment, to bring down  
19 the government and to establish socialism in the UK",  
20 could be considered subversive, but he is not sure that  
21 their day-to-day activities were actually subversive.

22 He states that the IS did not officially approve of  
23 the use of violence, but that he did witness violence  
24 and criminal damage at some protests.

25 In his statement, the officer recalls one

1 demonstration at Red Lion Square, involving  
2 the National Front and the IS, where he was punched by  
3 a police officer. He notes that he did not do anything  
4 to warrant being hit but believes that the situation  
5 must have been "rather chaotic and frightening for  
6 the officers present", and so does not feel aggrieved  
7 about the incident. The Inquiry holds no reporting from  
8 this officer on this particular event.

9 HN301 also recalls a time he saw a brick being  
10 thrown through a window during a demonstration, which he  
11 states that he phoned in to the office.

12 HN301 states that he himself was never violent and  
13 did not participate in public disorder.

14 While reporting on the IS, HN301 was also able to  
15 use his involvement with that group to attend meetings  
16 of other politically aligned organisations. These  
17 groups largely related to Irish matters. The officer  
18 recalls going to meetings of the Anti-Internment League  
19 and the Troops Out Movement; though he describes his  
20 involvement as less significant than his involvement in  
21 the IS.

22 He does not recall being directed towards these  
23 groups by his managers, but is sure that he would have  
24 informed his managers of the possibility of going along  
25 to these meetings, and they would have indicated that he

1           should attend. A report held by the Inquiry from  
2           December 1974 also lists 301 as a member of  
3           the international subcommittee of the Belfast Ten  
4           Defence Committee, present at its inaugural meeting.  
5           There are also two reports from this officer relating to  
6           the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, or NICRA.  
7           The officer does not, however, remember being involved  
8           in either of those groups.

9           HN301 recalls that the main objective of  
10          the Anti-Internment League was "to stop the practice of  
11          imprisoning people in Northern Ireland without trial".  
12          HN301 states that as the activities of the AIL were  
13          connected to The Troubles, there was automatic interest  
14          in the desire to obtain intelligence.

15          He cannot recall the AIL posing any particular  
16          threat of public disorder, but suspects that some  
17          members approved of the use of violence as a political  
18          tool and of the activities of the Provisional IRA.

19          The Inquiry holds a report dated 16 October 1972 of  
20          the AIL national conference, which is signed off by  
21          HN301, HN298 and HN338.

22          HN301 notes that it would not be surprising to have  
23          three officers present at such a prominent  
24          event "particularly if each of us was involved with  
25          AIL in a different area of London". HN301 believes that



1 involvement with the AIL was likely incidental to  
2 the main groups upon which each officer focused.

3 HN301 reported on the west London branch of  
4 the Troops Out Movement. Reports on this group begin in  
5 late 1973, and the officer notes that this would have  
6 been at the beginning of TOM's activity, when it was  
7 still a relatively small movement.

8 He affirms that his involvement in the early days of  
9 TOM would not have conferred any special  
10 responsibilities on him. He does not remember reporting  
11 regularly on TOM and cannot recall if TOM had subversive  
12 aims. He states that:

13 "... I suspect that a number of their members  
14 approved of violence but I cannot recall TOM deploying  
15 violence, criminality or public disorder as a tactic.  
16 As with the AIL, I presume that SDS interest in  
17 TOM arose due to their connection to Irish extremism and  
18 the necessity of gathering intelligence about  
19 Irish-related matters."

20 The Inquiry holds reporting from this officer from  
21 May 1972 to May 1976. The officer is unable to judge  
22 the attribution of the reports provided, but accepts  
23 that where his name appears on a document, he was likely  
24 to be the author. HN301 states that he has no clear  
25 memory of the full extent of this reporting, and

1           therefore cannot comment on whether the documents  
2           provided by the Inquiry reflect his reporting  
3           accurately.

4           It is clear that there are some gaps in  
5           the reporting held by the Inquiry for this officer.  
6           The Inquiry holds no reports on the IS attributed to  
7           this officer for April 1973, and none between April 1973  
8           and April 1974. Although the officer believes he would  
9           have continued to report on the Hammersmith and Fulham  
10          branch of the IS during this time. There is likewise  
11          a gap in reporting between April and September 1974.  
12          The officer also notes that there are no reports  
13          relating to information given by telephone: a practice  
14          which would have been used to convey more pressing  
15          information to the office.

16          In terms of time spent in his cover identity, HN301  
17          notes he was occasionally at his cover flat, and more  
18          regularly in his cover employment. He would attend  
19          meetings with activists at least once per week, and go  
20          to a protest or march most weekends. He would also sell  
21          copies of the SWP newspaper on Saturday mornings. He  
22          cannot recall if he received overtime pay, or if his  
23          take-home pay was any different in the SDS.

24          HN301 describes having meetings at the SDS cover  
25          flat two to three times per week. There, they would

1 meet with managers and would hand over diaries and  
2 reports. He recalls there not being any real structure  
3 to the meetings, which included general conversations  
4 about "how we were getting on, what we had been up to,  
5 who we had interacted with that week".

6 HN301 also describes the meetings as an opportunity  
7 to socialise with other officers and have "a general  
8 chat about our personal lives". He notes that these  
9 meetings served as an informal way of monitoring  
10 the officers' welfare, an approach which he felt worked  
11 quite well. There were no formal arrangements for  
12 welfare.

13 When asked about senior officers attending these  
14 meetings, HN301 remembers the Commissioner of Police,  
15 Sir Robert Mark, attending the safe house on one  
16 occasion early in his deployment.

17 HN301 cannot recall being told how to approach his  
18 deployment or what information he should gather. He was  
19 given, in his words, "a substantial amount of free  
20 rein", but would have informed his managers of anything  
21 significant he was doing while undercover. He is sure  
22 that his superiors would have intervened if they had  
23 disapproved of anything.

24 HN301 understood that the SDS' function was to  
25 gather information about groups and individuals that

1 posed a threat of public disorder and violence, but  
2 states that the SDS "gradually morphed into more of  
3 a general intelligence-gathering unit".

4 HN301 states in his witness statement that while he  
5 believes some of the reporting could have been obtained  
6 by other means, much of the information could not have  
7 been obtained without direct involvement in the groups  
8 concerned, including the identity of those who regularly  
9 attended meetings and information about planned  
10 demonstrations.

11 HN301 regularly reported information about  
12 individual members of the groups he infiltrated. He  
13 states that he believed that this would have been  
14 helpful to build up as full a picture as possible.

15 He is not sure how the intelligence he gathered was  
16 used, but assumes that relevant parts were filtered to  
17 Special Branch squads and the Security Service. He  
18 states that the SDS could be described as "the executive  
19 arm of the Security Service", and states that quite  
20 a lot of intelligence was gathered on their behalf. He  
21 notes, however, that he had no direct contact with  
22 the Security Service during his deployment.

23 There is no evidence to suggest that HN301 engaged  
24 in any sexual activity in his cover identity. He states  
25 that he did not form any close relationships with

1           activists, but sometimes would have a pint with them  
2           after a meeting. The officer states that he did not  
3           participate in any criminal activity while undercover.  
4           He was never arrested, nor, to his knowledge, was any of  
5           his reporting used in connection with any criminal  
6           investigation or prosecution.

7           He states that he did not become aware of any  
8           legally privileged information. One report from  
9           April 1974 notes the possible formation of an IS  
10          lawyers' group, to give legal advice to members in  
11          the event of arrest by the police, and to assist trade  
12          unionists "to clash with the law on pickets, marches and  
13          demonstrations". HN301, however, does not believe that  
14          he was specifically tasked to report on IS legal  
15          services.

16          There is evidence of some tangential reporting on  
17          trade union activities. HN301 states that he did not  
18          join a trade union or become involved in trade union  
19          affairs while in the SDS. He does note that the IS  
20          would recruit members from the workplace. There is one  
21          report from March 1975 which notes the intention of  
22          the IS to stand a candidate in the Walsall by-election.  
23          However, there's no other significant reporting on  
24          political campaigns.

25          HN301 was withdrawn from the field around May 1976.

1 The officer suggests that his deployment was ended as he  
2 had spent five years in the field, which was typical at  
3 the time. He withdrew by telling his group that he had  
4 been offered a job elsewhere and was moving out of  
5 London. A report from this time notes that "Bob Stubbs"  
6 was now living and working in Portsmouth. The officer  
7 states that his deployment had no long-term effect on  
8 his welfare, but he felt that help would have been  
9 offered had he requested it.

10 HN301 states that he cannot comment upon  
11 the contribution his reporting made to policing, but  
12 that he hopes that his five years in the SDS were  
13 useful. HN301 retired from the police in the late 1990s  
14 at the rank of detective constable.

15 Sir, that concludes the summary for HN301.  
16 The Inquiry will be publishing the documents related to  
17 this officer on the website today.

18 In addition to this, the Inquiry will also be  
19 publishing documents related to the officer nominal  
20 HN303, cover name "Peter Collins", who is unable to give  
21 evidence due to poor health.

22 This officer, Sir, was deployed in early 1974 to  
23 1977, into the North London branch of the Workers'  
24 Revolutionary Party, and later tasked by that group to  
25 infiltrate the National Front. The Inquiry's analysis

1 of those documents can be found at page 131 to 137 of  
2 appendix 2 to Counsel to the Inquiry's opening statement  
3 for Tranche 1, Phase 2.

4 Thank you, Sir.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

6 We're now going to have a ten-minute break while we  
7 reassemble to hear live evidence.

8 Mr Fernandes.

9 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take  
10 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
11 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

12 The time is now 10.20 am, so we shall reconvene at  
13 10.30 am.

14 Thank you.

15 (10.21 am)

16 (A short break)

17 (10.30 am)

18 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

19 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
20 proceedings.

21 Chairman.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 As at the beginning of every live evidential  
24 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.  
25 If you're listening for the first time, please listen

1           carefully.

2           I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,  
3           the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make  
4           orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including  
5           its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have  
6           made a number of orders which affect what you may and  
7           may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave  
8           them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter  
9           and may have serious consequences for you.

10          If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an  
11          order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
12          the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it  
13          as if it had been a contempt of that court. If  
14          satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
15          the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
16          a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
17          a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
18          sequestration of their assets.

19          Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
20          the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
21          photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to  
22          record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
23          the hearing rooms.

24          You may bring your mobile telephone into the hearing  
25          rooms, but you may not use it for any of those purposes.



1           You may use it silently for any other purpose. In  
2           particular, you may transmit your account of what you  
3           have seen and heard in a hearing room to any other  
4           person, but only once at least ten minutes have elapsed  
5           since the event which you are describing took place.

6           This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
7           the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public  
8           disclosure of information, for example about  
9           the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.  
10          These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,  
11          whether by accident or design, information which I have  
12          ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes  
13          be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,  
14          I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order  
15          prohibiting further disclosure of the information  
16          outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that  
17          no further disclosure of that information may be made by  
18          mobile telephone or other portable electronic device  
19          from within the hearing room, or by any means outside  
20          it.

21          I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
22          not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
23          that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
24          to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
25          the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of

1 the public, are entitled to hear the same public  
2 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own  
3 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
4 best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt  
5 about the terms of this message, or what you may or may  
6 not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and,  
7 with my help if necessary, they will provide you with  
8 the answer.

9 HN298/"Michael Peter Scott"

10 THE CHAIRMAN: HN298, can you hear me?

11 Are you on mute by any chance?

12 A. No, I can hear you now.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Good.

14 Can you confirm, please, that apart from, I think,  
15 one person who is sitting behind your left shoulder  
16 there is no one else in the room from which you are  
17 giving evidence?

18 A. Yes, that's so.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

20 Do you want to be sworn or affirm?

21 A. Affirm.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Then Mr Fernandes will speak the relevant  
23 words to you in a moment.

24 Mr Fernandes.

25 (Witness affirmed)

1           Mr Barr, I think we're going to have our shorthand  
2           writer's break at about 11.45, are we not?

3           MR BARR: That's right, Sir.

4           THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

5           MR BARR: HN298, I'm not going to ask you your full name,  
6           for obvious reasons, but can you confirm that you are  
7           the person who we know by the nominal "HN298"?

8           A. Yes.

9           Q. You've provided us, helpfully, with a 73-page witness  
10          statement dated 5 February 2020. Are the contents of  
11          your witness statement true and correct to the best of  
12          your knowledge and belief?

13          A. Yes.

14          Q. Can I start, please, with your service in Special Branch  
15          before you joined the SDS. There was a period of time  
16          when you served on C Squad, wasn't there?

17          A. Yes.

18          Q. And during your time with C Squad, did you attend  
19          meetings of political activists?

20          A. Yes.

21          Q. And report upon them?

22          A. Yes.

23          Q. And doing that work, what was C Squad's area of  
24          responsibility?

25          A. Essentially communists.

1 Q. And did you gain an understanding of what Special Branch  
2 was interested in from an intelligence perspective as  
3 a result of doing that work?

4 A. Yes, I believe that I did.

5 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that when you were  
6 serving in C Squad, you knew that the SDS office was  
7 just a little bit down the corridor; is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was the existence of the SDS well known to members of  
10 C Squad?

11 A. I would think it was, yes.

12 Q. Do you know what happened to the SDS office later?

13 A. Perhaps you can clarify what you mean by that.

14 Q. Did there come a time when they moved out of the office  
15 that you knew them to occupy?

16 A. Not to my knowledge. I wasn't aware that they'd moved  
17 out, no.

18 Q. What was your understanding of the role of the SDS  
19 before you joined the unit?

20 A. It was to report on -- I mean, it was  
21 the Special Demonstration Squad, so it was essentially  
22 about demonstrations and giving information on ones that  
23 are likely to occur and ones that did occur.

24 Q. You tell us in your witness statement you wanted to join  
25 the SDS. Could you expand upon why it was that you

- 1           wanted to join the SDS?
- 2       A.   Because it was interesting.  It was an interesting thing  
3           to do.
- 4       Q.   What did you think was going to be interesting about it?
- 5       A.   It would -- it was just it would be interesting to play  
6           a new role, really.
- 7       Q.   And you tell us you took proactive steps to see if you  
8           could join the SDS.  Could you explain, without naming  
9           any names, what you did?
- 10      A.   Well, I certainly enquired about joining.  I can't  
11           remember to whom, but I indicated quite clearly that  
12           I would be interested in joining the Squad.
- 13      Q.   And what did that lead to?
- 14      A.   Well, I was -- it reached a point where I was interested  
15           -- it was indicated that I could join the Squad, and  
16           I began to grow a beard and grow my hair, and then  
17           I joined the Squad.
- 18      Q.   Can you recall whether you had an interview or not?
- 19      A.   No, I can't recall having an interview.  I mean,  
20           I suppose I must have had an interview of sorts.  I must  
21           have spoken to someone, but I can't recall it.
- 22      Q.   Can you recall whether you or your family were given any  
23           indication of what the work would involve?
- 24      A.   No.  I mean, certainly my family weren't.  They didn't  
25           come into it at all really.

- 1 Q. You were married at the time, were you?
- 2 A. I was, yes. And still am, after 50-odd years.
- 3 Q. Can you recall spending any time in the SDS office
- 4 before you deployed?
- 5 A. No, I can't.
- 6 Q. Did you get any formal training from the SDS?
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. Were you given any informal advice or guidance before
- 9 you deployed?
- 10 A. I may well have done, but I can't recall it.
- 11 Q. I'm going to ask you a few -- about some matters
- 12 specifically, just to see if that jogs your memory.
- 13 Can you recall whether you were told what you should
- 14 do if you were arrested?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. Can you recall whether you were given any guidance about
- 17 what to do if you came across activists being given
- 18 legal advice?
- 19 A. No.
- 20 Q. In your police career before you had joined the SDS,
- 21 would you have regarded it as normal to avoid any
- 22 conversations between a defendant in court and his or
- 23 her lawyers?
- 24 A. I -- can you repeat that?
- 25 Q. Yes. When you were a police officer before joining

1           the SDS, would you have regarded it as appropriate and  
2           normal to steer clear of any conversation between  
3           a defendant and his or her lawyers when in court?

4           A. I can't remember a set of circumstances where that would  
5           have been the case, but -- no, I just can't remember  
6           that.

7           Q. Were you given any advice or guidance about what to do  
8           if you ended up in court in your undercover identity?

9           A. No.

10          Q. Were you given any advice or guidance about assuming  
11          positions of responsibility within an activist group?

12          A. No.

13          Q. Can you help us with what your understanding of  
14          subversion was?

15          A. Well, subversion is when you would do or carry out acts  
16          which would endanger the wellbeing of the state.

17          Q. And what do you mean by "the wellbeing of the state"?

18          A. I mean the wellbeing of the people that live here.

19          Q. And how does that translate to the wellbeing of  
20          the government of the day?

21          A. Well, the government of the day, whoever they are, is  
22          elected, and so therefore they have a right to be there  
23          and govern; and so therefore, anything that was likely  
24          to endanger that proper democratic situation would be  
25          subversive.

1 Q. When you say "anything that might endanger", was there  
2 any threshold in your mind, or was it anything at all,  
3 no matter how trivial?

4 A. Trivial things would remain trivial and so of less  
5 consequence and of less importance.

6 Q. When you were reporting on the activities of groups that  
7 you might have considered to be subversive, did you  
8 apply any filter, or did you report everything that they  
9 were doing?

10 A. Most groups were not subversive, but some, of course,  
11 had a potential to be; and that's what we were reporting  
12 on: the circumstances which might lead to them being  
13 dangerous and subversive.

14 Q. Were you given any formal training on the definition  
15 of "subversion"?

16 A. No.

17 Q. In your witness pack, there was a document with  
18 the snappy title "Home Office Circular No 97 of 1967",  
19 which was about informants participating in crime. Can  
20 you recall ever seeing that document?

21 A. No.

22 Q. What was your understanding of an undercover officer's  
23 participation in crime, by which I mean were there  
24 circumstances in which you understood it might be  
25 appropriate?



1 A. There could be circumstances where, with the -- with  
2 the permission of your superior officers, that you might  
3 carry on in a situation which was contrary to the law.

4 Q. Had you been given any instruction about those  
5 circumstances?

6 A. Generally speaking, the -- you would not expect to be  
7 involved in anything that was contrary to -- to break  
8 the law. You wouldn't -- you are a police officer after  
9 all.

10 Q. That wasn't quite the answer to my question.  
11 The question was: were you given any instruction about  
12 that?

13 A. Not specific instruction. It was just common sense, and  
14 that was general understood, I think.

15 Q. Before you deployed, had you met any of the other SDS  
16 undercover police officers?

17 A. I can't recall having done so, but I may well have met  
18 in -- in one of the houses. I may well have met people  
19 there. I can't recall that though.

20 Q. Had you spoken to the managers, other than when you were  
21 accepted into the unit?

22 A. I spoke to them when I'd been accepted into the unit,  
23 but not -- prior to that I can't recall speaking to  
24 them.

25 Q. What I'm driving at, HN298, is you've been very clear

- 1           that you had very little instruction, no formal  
2           training. I'm just wondering how you knew what to do  
3           when you deployed.
- 4        A. I don't think it -- it was rocket science, really, to  
5           know what to do, that you were essentially leading  
6           a false life, you became a -- you took on a false  
7           persona, and you mixed in with whatever you were trying  
8           to infiltrate.
- 9        Q. Can we have a sense, please, of to what extent were you  
10           simply deployed and left to get on with it, and to what  
11           extent might you have been prepared for your deployment  
12           but simply be unable to remember the details?
- 13       A. No, I -- I suppose, in a sense, you were left to get on  
14           with it. But that was no bad thing. To go -- have  
15           a big rigmarole about what you should do and what you  
16           shouldn't do would be, I suppose, limiting  
17           the intelligence of your officers.
- 18       Q. Can we move now, please, to your cover identity. And  
19           you tell us in your witness statement that you went to  
20           Somerset House and you consulted the records there, and  
21           you chose to adopt the identity of a person whose birth  
22           certificate you examined; is that right?
- 23       A. Yes.
- 24       Q. Why did you choose to use that method?
- 25       A. I chose to select a name that I liked and felt easy

1           with, and whose date of birth was very similar to my  
2           own, so that I wouldn't get tripped up in terms of  
3           the age -- my age, and that was that. It seemed  
4           a common sense thing to do, to actually ...

5       Q. I'll come back to the details in a moment, but really  
6           what I was getting at is why did you choose to use  
7           the details of a real person, rather than, for example,  
8           just making up a fictional identity?

9       A. Because a real person has a birth certificate and  
10          a birth date that can be checked, so that if anyone was  
11          checking up on me, they would find -- find it there in  
12          Somerset House.

13      Q. Did you use any details other than the name and the date  
14          of birth?

15      A. What, where I was born, for example? Where I'd lived?  
16          Well, I -- I noted them, of course, but I hadn't really  
17          -- never had any occasion to use -- use it, where --  
18          no one -- no one was interested where you come from,  
19          you know, unless you had a strong accent, I suppose.

20      Q. Does it follow, if somebody had asked you where you were  
21          born, you would have given the location that was on  
22          the birth certificate?

23      A. Had -- had it arisen, I would have wanted to know, to  
24          start off with, why did they want to know that. What  
25          business is it of theirs? But, in the final event when

1           it seemed reasonable, then, yeah, I would have given  
2           the correct details.

3       Q.   I see.  Had you heard of this method being used before?

4       A.   No, I mean, what had gone before was not of any interest  
5           to me really.  I wanted to do it my way.

6       Q.   I see.

7           Had you been influenced in any way by what you might  
8           have seen or read in books or films?

9       A.   No.

10      Q.   Did you do any kind of risk assessment in your head as  
11         to what the pros and cons of using a real person's  
12         identity were, over and above the fact you would have  
13         a birth certificate which could be checked?

14      A.   I didn't really think there were any risks.  I mean,  
15         I did an instant risk assessment; and that was that  
16         there wasn't any risk.

17      Q.   You tell us in your witness statement that you didn't  
18         know whether the person was alive or dead; is that  
19         right?

20      A.   That's correct, yes.

21      Q.   Presumably, one of the risks would be if the person was  
22         dead, then researchers might not just find the birth  
23         certificate, they might also find the death certificate;  
24         and that would be quite difficult to explain, wouldn't  
25         it?

- 1 A. If I had to explain it. If I had to explain why I was  
2 dead, yes, it would be difficult, yeah.
- 3 Q. Can I take it that that didn't -- that risk didn't cross  
4 your mind at the time?
- 5 A. Oh, I didn't see it as a risk at all, actually.
- 6 Q. And if the person was still alive, would not another  
7 risk be that anyone researching your identity might  
8 actually track down the real Michael Peter Scott?
- 9 A. Why was that a risk? Why would that be a risk?
- 10 Q. Well, I'm asking you. Did you consider that that might  
11 be a risk?
- 12 A. No, I didn't. I didn't think it was a risk.
- 13 Q. Did you consider at that stage that if you ended up in  
14 a group where you got caught up in committing a criminal  
15 offence and the person was still alive, the real Michael  
16 Peter Scott might end up with a conviction on his  
17 criminal record?
- 18 A. What is the question, actually?
- 19 Q. Did you contemplate the risk that if you were convicted  
20 in the name "Michael Peter Scott", then the real Michael  
21 Peter Scott would end up with a criminal record?
- 22 A. Well, it's hardly -- I mean, what -- the circumstances  
23 what happened to me was not exactly a criminal record.  
24 It's -- it was really of no consequence, actually.
- 25 Q. At the moment, my question is just, did you contemplate

1           that as a risk?

2           A. No, I didn't contemplate that.

3           Q. Now, you have told us in your witness statement that you

4           had a driving licence?

5           A. Yes.

6           Q. Did you have that right from the start?

7           A. Yes.

8           Q. And you told us that you've had a library card and

9           a doctor's card?

10          A. Yes.

11          Q. Did you use Michael Scott's birth certificate to obtain

12          any documents?

13          A. Well, I can't recall now, but possibly so.

14          Q. Did you have a bank account in the name "Michael Peter

15          Scott"?

16          A. I did.

17          Q. Did you consider whether that might cause any

18          complications for the real Michael Peter Scott?

19          A. It might assist him, because my credit record was good.

20          Q. And you had fictional employment as a tank erector or,

21          estimator?

22          A. Yes.

23          Q. Was your cover identity tested by your managers before

24          you deployed?

25          A. They would ask me about it, I would guess. I can't

1 recall. But it was pretty sound, my cover employment.

2 Q. Did your managers know that you had adopted the identity  
3 of a real person?

4 A. I don't know. I can't recall.

5 Q. Did they warn you that your identity might be tested  
6 once you were deployed?

7 A. They didn't need to warn me. I don't know whether they  
8 did warn me or not, but one would expect at some point  
9 it might be.

10 Q. As far as you are aware, was your cover identity ever  
11 researched by any of the activist groups that you  
12 infiltrated?

13 A. Not to my knowledge.

14 Q. I've got the impression from your evidence that you were  
15 left to your own devices to devise your cover identity;  
16 is that fair?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you think, with the benefit of hindsight, that it  
19 would have been better to have had some form of  
20 instructions and guidance about how to do it?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Why not?

23 A. Well, I was perfectly capable of doing it myself, so  
24 I didn't really need anyone else giving my guidelines,  
25 especially when the office staff had no experience

- 1           themselves of it.
- 2       Q. I'm going to move now to tasking; and you've told us
- 3           that you were never tasked by managers to infiltrate any
- 4           specific groups; is that right?
- 5       A. Yes.
- 6       Q. But what you did was you attended meetings of groups
- 7           that you thought would be of interest to Special Branch?
- 8       A. Correct.
- 9       Q. And coming back to the question of how you knew what
- 10          would be of interest to Special Branch, in addition to
- 11          your work on C Squad, and without giving away any secret
- 12          information, how did you know what would be of interest
- 13          to Special Branch?
- 14       A. Well, it was the SDS squad, so anything that generated
- 15          demonstrations or a general nuisance, or anything that
- 16          was likely to be contrary to the law, those things were
- 17          of interest to Special Branch.
- 18       Q. All the groups that you infiltrated were on
- 19          the left wing of the political spectrum, weren't they?
- 20       A. Yes. Generally, yes.
- 21       Q. Why didn't you infiltrate any right wing groups?
- 22       A. Well, there weren't any right-wing groups that were
- 23          demonstrating or causing any problems, as far as I can
- 24          recall, at the time.
- 25       Q. I'd just like to explore your relationship with your



1 managers. Although you have made it very clear that you  
2 were left to self-task, presumably they were kept in  
3 the loop?

4 A. Oh yes, I kept them -- obviously we had regular meetings  
5 at safe houses, and I kept them informed of anything and  
6 everything I was doing.

7 Q. And did they steer you in any way from one group to  
8 another?

9 A. They never -- no, never steered me from one group to  
10 another, no, but they may well have indicated things  
11 that they were interested in, but I can't recall that  
12 being the case.

13 Q. Can you give us some examples of that?

14 A. Well, they may well have said that this particular group  
15 is of interest for some reason, and then -- and perhaps  
16 encouraged you to see if you could go in that direction.  
17 But I can't recall this being the case, but it seems  
18 fairly reasonable that they may well have done.

19 Q. And once you were infiltrating a group, would you have  
20 conversations about what Special Branch might want to  
21 learn about that group?

22 A. Well, Special Branch would want to know, with any group  
23 or any involvement, their name, their details,  
24 information of what they were trying to achieve, what  
25 the plans they have. These are fairly common things

1           really, from whichever group you infiltrated.

2       Q.    Would you discuss specific individuals?

3       A.    What, with the office?

4       Q.    Yes.

5       A.    Yes, perhaps -- yes, perhaps so.

6       Q.    And was the office interested in specific individuals?

7       A.    Occasionally they may well have been, although I can't

8           recall them being so.

9       Q.    You say that your movement between groups was fluid and

10           that it wasn't a case of deliberately leaving one group

11           for another.  Can you help us with what sort of factors

12           influenced your movement between groups?

13       A.    Some groups became more interesting, and therefore more

14           relevant to the branch, as time went on.  And so,

15           therefore, there was a natural movement -- in my case,

16           there was a natural movement from one group to another,

17           without necessarily departing from the first group.  You

18           just vanished and disappeared.

19       Q.    Because something more interesting came along?

20       A.    Yes.

21       Q.    Does the phrase "oblique approach" mean anything to you?

22       A.    No.

23       Q.    Was there any strategy of starting in groups that were

24           less threatening and moving to groups that were perhaps

25           harder to infiltrate, or more security-conscious?

- 1       A. I -- I did that in effect. I did that in effect,  
2           to groups that were less -- potentially less threatening  
3           but not necessarily less security-conscious.
- 4       Q. I'm asking you that because we all know that you ended  
5           up in the Workers Revolutionary Party, and I just wanted  
6           to know whether that was part of a plan, or whether that  
7           was just the way things worked out?
- 8       A. It wasn't part of a plan originally. Looking into  
9           the future, that wasn't -- you know, nothing was part of  
10          a plan really, it was, you know, going from one group to  
11          the next because it seemed a good idea at the time.
- 12      Q. But when it came to it, did your background in activism,  
13          which was by that stage several years long, help you to  
14          infiltrate the Workers Revolutionary Party?
- 15      A. Yes, it's just called experience really, that because  
16          I had more experience, I was able to do it fairly  
17          reasonably, you know.
- 18      Q. Did you get feedback on your reporting from your  
19          managers?
- 20      A. Not -- not an awful lot, no, but on some occasions there  
21          was feedback, you know, when --
- 22      Q. Good or bad, or both?
- 23      A. Generally good, actually, I think.
- 24      Q. You've told us that if a more interesting group came up,  
25          you would move to them. Did you have any other

- 1           targeting criteria?
- 2       A.   No.
- 3       Q.   Does the way you operated mean that sometimes you would
- 4           come across information which you thought was of
- 5           interest to Special Branch essentially by chance?
- 6       A.   Yes.  I mean, things often happened by chance.
- 7       Q.   How did you avoid duplicating work with your fellow
- 8           undercover officers if you were taking this
- 9           self-tasking, meandering approach through various
- 10          groups?
- 11       A.   Well, I think, if things were duplicated, it didn't make
- 12          any difference.  But obviously you didn't want lots of
- 13          people in the one -- dealing with the one thing.  There
- 14          were plenty of groups and activity out there.
- 15       Q.   Were you ever asked to move on because a particular
- 16          group was already covered?  No names, please.
- 17       A.   No.
- 18       Q.   Did you ever discuss with your managers whether
- 19          the activities of a group that you were reporting on
- 20          justified reporting upon them?
- 21       A.   No.
- 22       Q.   Did your managers ever express any views as to whether
- 23          or not the groups you were reporting on justified
- 24          reporting on or not?
- 25       A.   No.

- 1 Q. I'm going to move now to the safe house, and the way  
2 that you wrote up reports and used the safe house.
- 3 You tell us that you wrote up and signed reports in  
4 manuscript at home; is that right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And then you handed them in when you went to weekly  
7 meetings at the SDS safe house?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. And you tell us that you didn't have access to the file  
10 reference numbers that we see at the end of the reports,  
11 and therefore they must have been added by others when  
12 your reports were typed up?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. If you had wanted to consult a Special Branch file for  
15 another reason, because you wanted to learn about an  
16 individual or a group to assist you with your work,  
17 could you have asked for a file to be brought to you at  
18 the safe house?
- 19 A. I would imagine so, yes.
- 20 Q. Can you recall whether you ever did that?
- 21 A. I can't recall doing that, no.
- 22 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that the weekly  
23 meetings were like this:
- 24 "Everyone would congregate and if you had anything  
25 to discuss with your managers, you would. For example,

1           if there was an upcoming demonstration or major meeting  
2           that was going to be happening, you would give them  
3           a heads-up about it, in addition to putting in a written  
4           report."

5           I just want to explore the scene with you in  
6           a little more depth, please, 298.

7           First of all, can you give us an indication about  
8           the size of premises we are talking about as a safe  
9           house?

10          A. I suppose probably like a -- a three-bedroomed flat or  
11          house.

12          Q. And how many people are meeting at a weekly meeting,  
13          typically?

14          A. Well, I suppose about a dozen.

15          Q. And how should we picture you? Are we picturing you all  
16          in the living room sitting in the living room, or some  
17          other disposition?

18          A. Yeah, more or less. The lounge-type area. I don't know  
19          if there were any bedrooms. I can't -- I can't recall  
20          now. Yes, just in the communal area, which was like  
21          a lounge, I suppose.

22          Q. And there would be a mixture of  
23          undercover police officers and managers?

24          A. Yes.

25          Q. And we've got the picture, the lounge of the safe house,

1 a collection of undercover police officers and managers.

2 Could you please describe to us then what happens?

3 A. There were -- if you had any -- you wished to discuss  
4 anything with the office, then you did so. It was all  
5 fairly low-key. There were generally meals at these --  
6 at these meetings, and there were several of the --  
7 the officers there that were pretty good cooks. And so  
8 it was high quality eating, actually. And obviously  
9 there were drinks and things. It was a fairly social  
10 occasion almost, as well as a work occasion, for those  
11 that wished to discuss particular things with  
12 the office.

13 Q. So a laugh and a joke, as well as business?

14 A. Yeah, it wasn't all business. It was all fairly low  
15 key.

16 Q. Would it be fair to have a picture of people going round  
17 the room saying what they'd done that week?

18 A. No.

19 Q. So, can you help us?

20 A. Well, that didn't actually arise. I mean, I -- I can't  
21 ever recall discussing with any of the officers what  
22 they were involved in and what they did. And I never  
23 discussed with any of them what I did. It wasn't -- it  
24 didn't seem to get mentioned too much really -- or at  
25 all, actually.

- 1 Q. If you were all in the room together, presumably you  
2 would overhear what each other was saying?
- 3 A. If -- if you were of a mind to, I suppose, yes.
- 4 Q. I mean, would you talk about the events in your week  
5 just gone by?
- 6 A. No. I wouldn't talk about the events at all, or any of  
7 my involvement in anything.
- 8 Q. What would you say to your managers?
- 9 A. Ah, I'm not talking about to the managers. That's  
10 a different proposition. There were perhaps things that  
11 they needed to know, and therefore you would tell them.  
12 But if you're talking about other officers that were  
13 there, no one was really interested in what the other  
14 guy was doing. I mean, it wasn't any relevance really.
- 15 Q. I'm getting the picture now that you did talk to your  
16 managers about what you had been doing, you did so in  
17 a room in the presence of others, but you have given  
18 the impression --
- 19 A. -- (overspeaking) -- sorry. There was generally  
20 a separate room. You know, you could go in a separate  
21 room with the -- the admin staff, you know?
- 22 Q. Was that always done, religiously, or not?
- 23 A. Yes, I can -- I think it was always a separate room if  
24 you wished to speak to them about a specific thing.
- 25 Q. There may be a difference between wanting to speak to



1           your managers confidentially if needs be, and always  
2           speaking to them confidentially. Could you help us with  
3           which it was?

4           A. Well, in my -- I can only speak for myself. In my case,  
5           if it was confidential, then that's what it was.

6           I spoke to them in a confidential manner in a separate  
7           place.

8           Q. But if it wasn't confidential, presumably you'd be happy  
9           to tell your managers in front of everyone else?

10          A. But that wouldn't arise, because they were all --  
11          you know, if you're talking to them, you're talking to  
12          them, you're not talking to everyone else. In actual  
13          fact, no one else actually was really interested.

14          Q. Well, that may be -- there may be a separate point about  
15          whether anybody listened to what you were saying --

16          A. No, if you spoke to the admin staff, you spoke to them  
17          separately.

18          Q. So, are we to understand that the picture is more of  
19          a waiting room of officers, waiting to go and speak to  
20          managers privately in a different room?

21          A. I suppose, if you -- it might appear that way. But in  
22          actual fact, people weren't queuing up to speak to  
23          the office staff. I mean, they'd already submitted  
24          their reports and things. And so generally, you didn't  
25          need to speak to them at all, you know? So anyone that

- 1           wanted to speak to them was not queuing up, they just  
2           spoke to them, they just went in and spoke to them.
- 3       Q.   So what conversation was there in the living room?
- 4       A.   Just general chat about all kinds of different things.
- 5       Q.   And presumably, because you were all living the same  
6           clandestine lives, this was your one chance in the week  
7           to speak to one another, you'd talk about all sorts of  
8           things?
- 9       A.   Absolutely.  I mean, one -- one conversation I can  
10           remember having was about lead soldiers.
- 11      Q.   But amongst all the conversations of all sorts of kinds,  
12           you must also have naturally talked about what life was  
13           like undercover?
- 14      A.   Well, it wasn't naturally so, no.  I didn't.
- 15      Q.   So if somebody had a dilemma, what to do in a sticky  
16           situation, wouldn't people ask for advice, or share  
17           the problem?
- 18      A.   Well, I can't recall anyone asking my advice, and  
19           I certainly asked no one -- no one else's advice.
- 20      Q.   And if there were particular characters in the activist  
21           field, particularly if they moved from one group to  
22           another, would you not talk about them?
- 23      A.   Occasionally certain individuals got mentioned, yes,  
24           they did.
- 25      Q.   And if anything particularly dramatic had happened,

1           perhaps a particularly lively demonstration, presumably  
2           you'd talk about that?

3       A.   Possibly so.  I can't really recall having done so, but  
4           it may well have happened.

5       Q.   Did you discuss the groups themselves and their  
6           different natures?

7       A.   Certainly, certain individuals were mentioned, ones that  
8           tended to be unpleasant; and those individuals I think  
9           are now dead.

10      Q.   Did you discuss the politics of the groups concerned?

11      A.   Not really, no.

12      Q.   What does "not really" mean, please?

13      A.   Well, no.

14      Q.   Did you discuss what you were going to be doing in  
15           the next week?

16      A.   No.

17      Q.   If there was a big demonstration coming up, for example,  
18           at which more than one UCO might be present, is that  
19           something you might discuss?

20      A.   No.

21      Q.   Wouldn't it be natural to want to talk about some big  
22           event that was coming up?

23      A.   No.  It was fairly -- demonstrations and the like were  
24           fairly -- they're commonplace.  You know, after you've  
25           been doing it for a while, it was no -- they were no big

- 1 deal really.
- 2 Q. Did you deal with administrative matters, like pay and  
3 expenses?
- 4 A. Yes, your expenses claims were submitted on a weekly  
5 basis.
- 6 Q. And did you --
- 7 A. Yes, sorry, just for clarification, it's the completion  
8 of your diary, and so therefore the diaries were  
9 submitted.
- 10 Q. Did you get provided with updates from the Metropolitan  
11 Police Service and Special Branch about what was going  
12 on back in mainstream policing?
- 13 A. Not really, no.
- 14 Q. How well did you get to know your fellow UCOs?
- 15 A. As -- well, some you got to know. I suppose it's like  
16 any groups of people, some you like more than others;  
17 and therefore the ones that you like more than others,  
18 you tend to gravitate towards and you get to know them  
19 more.
- 20 Q. So without naming any names, did you strike up any  
21 particular friendships?
- 22 A. There were a few people there that were -- I was -- felt  
23 quite friendly with, but you didn't see them much at  
24 all. You know, you ...
- 25 Q. Sticking strictly to their nominal numbers and not their

1 names, can you tell us who they were, please?

2 A. HN299, I was quite friendly with him.

3 Q. Any more?

4 A. He's got two numbers here, hasn't he?

5 Q. Yes, he was given two numbers: 299 and 342.

6 A. Yes.

7 No, there were others that I was friendly with, but  
8 not especially so, because you didn't see them that  
9 much, you know?

10 Q. Would you welcome and get to know new team members?

11 A. Well, you would kind of superficially get to know them,  
12 but they weren't that frequent. I mean, they weren't --  
13 people were on the squad, you know, a matter of years  
14 and so therefore new people were not -- you know, once  
15 or twice I think there was new members, so didn't see  
16 them that much.

17 Q. You were -- you served with the SDS for almost five  
18 years, between 1971 and 1976, so you would have come  
19 across quite a number of other officers; that's right,  
20 isn't it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And you would have seen them usually approximately  
23 weekly?

24 A. Yes, although not everyone attended every meeting every  
25 week.

1 Q. And then did there come a time when the week meetings  
2 became more frequent than once a week?

3 A. Not that I can recall. I can't recall them being any  
4 more frequent at any time, no.

5 Q. And so, by 1975/1976, you would have been, for want of  
6 a better term, one of the old sweats?

7 A. Quite honestly, they all seemed like old sweats. Every  
8 -- everyone there seemed to have been there for years.

9 Q. I'm going to ask you about some specific officers now,  
10 please, 298.

11 First of all, Detective Constable Richard Clark, who  
12 we also know by the nominal HN297; one of the few whose  
13 real name we can use. Do you recall him?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And did he have a reputation as a ladies' man?

16 A. Not to my knowledge, he didn't.

17 Q. Was he a ladies' man?

18 A. Not to my knowledge, he wasn't.

19 Q. Did he ever speak about sexual encounters whilst he'd  
20 been undercover?

21 A. Not that I ever heard.

22 Q. Did you ever hear any banter which might have insinuated  
23 that he'd had sexual encounters with women undercover?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Do you think that if he had had sexual encounters with

1           women undercover, that might have been something that  
2           would have been raised in the office?

3       A.   I wouldn't have thought so.  I mean, I never heard any  
4           such thing raised in the office.  It seems to me  
5           unlikely that anyone would mention these things, but,  
6           you know ...

7       Q.   Why is that?

8       A.   It's just not the type of thing people would want to  
9           discuss, is it.

10      Q.   Why?

11      A.   Well, it's a private thing and that's a matter for them.

12      Q.   Was there ever any discussion about the rights and  
13           wrongs of having sexual relations with people whilst you  
14           were undercover?

15      A.   Discussions?  No.

16      Q.   I'm going to move on now to the officer we known as  
17           "HN300", and who used the cover name "Jim Pickford".  
18           Do you know who I'm talking about?

19      A.   No, I don't, actually.  I'll just have a look.

20      Q.   Can you check.

21      A.   Yes, I've found him, yeah.

22      Q.   Did he have a reputation as something of a ladies' man?

23      A.   No.

24      Q.   Did he ever speak about sexual encounters whilst he was  
25           undercover?

1 A. Not to my knowledge.

2 Q. Specifically, did he ever say anything about falling in  
3 love with a woman whom he had met whilst undercover?

4 A. No, I never heard any such comments or conversation.

5 Q. Did you hear any rumours?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Any banter?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Do you think that if he had fallen in love with an  
10 activist and gone on to marry her that you would have  
11 heard about it?

12 A. Well, possibly, but I didn't hear about it, so ... if  
13 that in fact took place.

14 Q. No names, please; use nominals if you need to. But did  
15 anybody ever speak about sexual encounters undercover  
16 whilst you were in the SDS?

17 A. No.

18 Q. Did you attend reunions after you'd left the SDS?

19 A. I attended Special Branch reunions, yes.

20 Q. Again, no names, please, use nominals if you need to,  
21 but was there ever any talk about sexual relationships  
22 undercover when you attended any of the reunions?

23 A. No.

24 Q. When you first joined the SDS, there were some female  
25 members of the squad, weren't there?



- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And when they left, they weren't replaced by female  
3 officers and the unit became all male, didn't it?
- 4 A. I wasn't aware of that.
- 5 Q. Perhaps you could cast your mind back, because  
6 presumably it would have been quite striking.
- 7 A. Well, there were women on the squad when I was there,  
8 and then when I left the squad, I remained in the job  
9 for a short time and then I left the police.
- 10 Q. Can you recall a time when you were on the SDS and there  
11 were no female members of the unit?
- 12 A. No, I can't recall such a time.
- 13 Q. Can you recall the atmosphere within the unit changing  
14 at all?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. I'm going to move now to the question of visits by  
17 senior officers. You tell us in your witness statement  
18 that you recall superintendent "Bushy" Bignell. I think  
19 the "Bushy" is some form of nickname, is it?
- 20 A. Well, he had a bushy beard, a bushy moustache, that's  
21 why.
- 22 Q. And you say he came to visit the unit?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Can you tell us a bit about where that was?
- 25 A. What, the location of the place?

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I can't -- I don't know. I can't recall.

3 Q. Was it the safe house?

4 A. Oh yeah, it was in a safe house, yeah.

5 Q. And can you recall what sort of things "Bushy" Bignell  
6 was told?

7 A. Well, he wasn't told anything by me. He was told by  
8 those -- the office staff that attend, the DI and the  
9 chief inspector.

10 Q. Would it be fair to say that he gleaned enough to know  
11 what the SDS was and what it was doing?

12 A. Well, he was in charge of it, so I would guess he must  
13 have had some idea what they were doing.

14 Q. And do you also recall Deputy Assistant  
15 Commissioner Vic Gilbert visiting? Did he visit  
16 the safe house?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. He was also in the chain of command, wasn't he?

19 A. Well, he was the boss of the branch, so yes, he was in  
20 the chain of command, yeah.

21 Q. And what would he have gleaned from visiting the safe  
22 house?

23 A. I would guess the purpose of attending at all was just  
24 to get a feeling for the place, and just to feel how  
25 the -- the officers were responding to each other, and

1           how the whole thing gelled, really. That's the purpose  
2           of him coming, I would expect. He may well have other  
3           reasons for attending, but that's what I would have  
4           assumed he would have attended for.

5           Q. I'm going to ask you some questions about a manager we  
6           know as "HN294". Please don't use his name, but if you  
7           could check the list, please.

8           A. Oh yes. Yes.

9           Q. Do you know whether HN294 had any undercover policing  
10          experience?

11          A. Not to my knowledge.

12          Q. I'm going to move on now to your deployment itself.  
13          The earliest reports that we have recovered are reports  
14          about the Spartacus League in south-west London. Does  
15          that accord with your recollection as to who you first  
16          reported on?

17          A. No.

18          Q. Who do you think you first reported on?

19          A. I first reported on the Young Liberals.

20          Q. We'll come back to them in a moment.

21                 So far as the Spartacus League is concerned, you say  
22          in your witness statement that it was a revolutionary  
23          group that held demonstrations and was therefore of  
24          interest. Can you help us with whether you had any  
25          personal experience of demonstrations organised by

1           the Spartacus League?

2       A.   None that I can recollect.

3       Q.   Did they have a reputation on the demonstration scene?

4       A.   Not that I can recollect.

5       Q.   So what was it about them that piqued your interest?

6       A.   I don't know that it did especially pique my interest.

7           I know there's reports there with my name on it, but

8           I can't recall -- I can't really recall specifically

9           the Spartacus League, attending --

10      Q.   -- (overspeaking) -- forgive me, sorry?  You were

11           saying?

12      A.   I can't remember attending meetings by

13           the Spartacus League.

14      Q.   Okay, thank you.

15           We'll have a look at one of those reports.

16           Could we have up, please, {MPS/732350}.

17           This is a report dated 30 July on

18           the South West Spartacus League.  It's about a meeting

19           that was held on 29 July at the Clapham Public Swimming

20           Baths.

21           Could we scroll down, please.  To the next page

22           {MPS/732350/2}.

23           Paragraph 3 tells us that there was a guest speaker

24           Brian Grogan.  Can you recall speaking to Brian Grogan?

25      A.   No.

1 Q. Could we scroll down, please, to paragraph 4. That  
2 reads:

3 "The meeting then reassembled into small informal  
4 discussions groups and I engaged Grogan in conversation.  
5 He said that the IMG had particularly good contacts with  
6 the shop stewards at the British Oxygen factory at  
7 Rainham Essex, which had come about due to the IMG's  
8 efforts in the formation of the claimants' union in  
9 the area. They hoped to continue this close liaison by  
10 a series of 'Red Circle' meetings in the Dagenham area,  
11 due to begin on 15 August. [Privacy] a prominent local  
12 union official will be present at some of these meetings  
13 and Grogan said that they hoped that a branch of IMG  
14 would be formed in the area."

15 Does that prompt any recollection?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And if we go to paragraph 5:

18 "He was quite excited at the prospect of  
19 the 'Revolutionary Training Camp' which IMG had set up  
20 in the New Forest. He said the idea of the camp, which  
21 was to start on Sunday 1st August, was to give all  
22 participants a good background in revolutionary  
23 thinking. The training will include such subjects as  
24 public speaking, theoretical teaching and instruction in  
25 the erection of barricades. The course was scheduled to

1 end on 7.8.71 and would be under canvass."

2 Does that ring any bells?

3 A. No.

4 Q. As far as your general recollection of the  
5 Spartacus League and the IMG is concerned, is that  
6 representative of the sort of activity that they were up  
7 to?

8 A. It's the sort of activity I would guess that they were  
9 up to, but I can't -- I had no knowledge that that was  
10 so.

11 Q. And this is the sort of information that you thought  
12 Special Branch would be interested in?

13 A. Well, Special Branch definitely would be interested in  
14 that, yes.

15 Q. And looking at the revolutionary training camp, it seems  
16 to be more about public speaking and theoretical  
17 teaching, and possibly demonstrations, than about armed  
18 revolution, or anything like that. Would it still be of  
19 interest to Special Branch even at this level?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And can you help us with why?

22 A. Because obviously any armed insurrection starts  
23 somewhere. It starts with things like that. At least,  
24 I would guess that that would be the case.

25 Q. Can we move now, please -- we can take that document

1 down -- move now to the International Socialists. We've  
2 got some reports from the Enfield branch. And you say  
3 in your witness statement that it was a revolutionary  
4 group that held demonstrations and was therefore of  
5 interest.

6 Did you have any first-hand experience of  
7 demonstrations organised by the International  
8 Socialists?

9 A. I would have -- I would have attended some meetings  
10 organised by IS. I can't specifically remember which  
11 ones they were. But, yes, the IS was of interest to  
12 the branch.

13 Q. Can you recall whether their demonstrations were  
14 deliberately orderly or disorderly?

15 A. I would expect them to be on the whole orderly, but  
16 there may well have been occasions when certain  
17 individuals decided they wished to make it disorderly.

18 Q. And from the point of view of revolution, where were  
19 the International Socialists on the scale, please?

20 A. Well, revolution begins with groups like the IS, and  
21 there has to be some roughing-up of the system in order  
22 to get on the road to revolution.

23 Q. The report's dated 1971. How far down the road to  
24 revolution was IS in 1971?

25 A. I don't think anyone was far down to the road to

1 revolution in 1971, but there were -- there was plenty  
2 of activity.

3 Q. Does it amount to this, that if a group had  
4 revolutionary aims, it would be of interest to  
5 Special Branch, in your view?

6 A. Yes, it would be, yes.

7 Q. Can we move now to the Young Liberals, and in particular  
8 the Putney branch. There's quite a lot of reporting on  
9 the Young Liberals, and it spans the period January 1972  
10 to August 1974.

11 Can you help us, first of all, please, 298, with how  
12 you came to start reporting on the Young Liberals?

13 A. The Young Liberals at that time were actually quite  
14 active in -- in being involved in demonstrations for  
15 stopping cricket tours and all kinds of sporting tours  
16 that they were involved in stopping, especially those  
17 from South Africa, and so it was -- it was a public  
18 order issue. And that's how I got involved in it.

19 Q. Can you recall how you came to come to the first  
20 meeting?

21 A. No, I can't.

22 Q. Some of the reports are about meetings which took place  
23 at a residential address in Fawe Park Road in Putney  
24 which was the address of the Hain family, can you recall  
25 that?



- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And we had evidence from Lord Hain last week that  
3 meetings took place in his parents' living room; is that  
4 right?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that so far as you  
7 were aware, the Liberal Party was not aware that  
8 undercover police officers were infiltrating its youth  
9 wing; is that right?
- 10 A. Well, I certainly didn't inform them.
- 11 Q. Did you know whether or not they had been informed?
- 12 A. No.
- 13 Q. Was there any discussion with your managers about  
14 infiltrating the youth wing of a mainstream political  
15 party?
- 16 A. They were just a group that were demonstrating. It  
17 wouldn't have mattered what party they were from. If  
18 they were demonstrating and perhaps making a nuisance of  
19 -- a nuisance of themselves, they would have been  
20 reported on. As far as I'm concerned, they would have  
21 been.
- 22 Q. Was it the mere fact of demonstrating, or did  
23 the demonstrations have to have a certain quality before  
24 they would be of interest?
- 25 A. Those particular demonstrations were quite disruptive,

1           you know, and so that -- that was the interest of them.

2           Q. We've heard some evidence that some members of  
3           the Young Liberals participated in non-violent direct  
4           action, and by that I am meaning conduct which was  
5           definitely not violent but which may not have been  
6           entirely lawful. Did you come across any such activity?

7           A. Well, certainly on one occasion I did. I was involved  
8           in one particular incident -- (overspeaking) --  
9           the Young Liberals.

10          Q. We'll come to that specific incident in a moment.

11                    But generally speaking, was it your understanding  
12           that the Young Liberals were involved in using  
13           non-violent direct action as a tactic?

14          A. Yes, that would be fair to say. I don't think there was  
15           anyone intended any violence to anyone.

16          Q. And how frequently were the Young Liberals using  
17           the tactic?

18          A. I suppose as frequently as -- as they thought it  
19           necessary, actually.

20          Q. How frequently was that?

21          A. Well, do you want me to put a number on it? I've no  
22           idea in terms of numbers what they did.

23          Q. If you've got no idea, I can't press you any further.

24                    Can I move now to the role of individuals.

25                    To what extent did the presence of Peter Hain in

1           the Young Liberals affect your decision to target that  
2           group?

3       A.   Clearly -- well, it wasn't the fact of Peter Hain being  
4           there.  He was -- I think he was the president of  
5           the Young Liberals at the time.  But in any event, much  
6           of this activity against South African rugby teams or  
7           the cricket teams were because of him.  His family were  
8           very opposed to apartheid.  Not just him, his parents as  
9           well.  And that was the -- that was the focus.  And  
10          he -- he was the one that made a lot of these things  
11          happen, I suppose.  He was involved with other people,  
12          but ... so yes, it was of interest.  Putney Young  
13          Liberals were of interest because he was there.

14       Q.   Did you get any praise from your managers for  
15           infiltrating the living room at Fawe Park Road?

16       A.   No, I think probably this kind of thing, they're  
17           actually too frightened of these things.  They happen  
18           and they're confronted with them, and they don't really  
19           want to make waves.  And this is how these things work.

20       Q.   Who doesn't want to make waves?

21       A.   They don't want you to make waves, but -- when they're  
22           confronted with it, but they're in essence obliged to go  
23           along with it.

24       Q.   Who is "they", please?

25       A.   The office staff, the admin, people in charge, you know?

- 1 Q. So was it regarded as a risky infiltration?
- 2 A. Not by me it wasn't, but I suspect that they may well  
3 have thought that it was.
- 4 Q. Risky to reputation rather than --
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And what was the risk to reputation?
- 7 A. Well, of course, such things, if they were to flare up,  
8 they could make a lot of fuss about it in the Houses of  
9 Parliament, and people would then be worried about their  
10 jobs and, you know, it filters down. So that I can  
11 imagine could pose a problem for them. But it didn't  
12 pose a problem to me.
- 13 Q. Could you sense that concern in your managers?
- 14 A. At the time, I think there was some concern, yes.
- 15 Q. We've talked about Peter Hain. Do the same sort of  
16 considerations apply to Ernest Rodker?
- 17 A. Ernest Rodker was not -- although he was a leading light  
18 in this kind of activity, he wasn't a person that was  
19 well known.
- 20 Q. And what about Professor Rosenhead?
- 21 A. Well, again, he was not -- he was not a person that I'd  
22 previously heard of prior to attending a meeting where  
23 he was -- he was also there.
- 24 Q. But once you got to know them, were they -- were either  
25 of them persons of interest?

1       A. I never got to know them really. I mean, I just  
2       attended meetings and -- but they were certainly -- in  
3       that particular sphere, they were the leading lights  
4       that actually organised the demonstration and had lots  
5       to say about -- I was an observer.

6       Q. There are a number of reports about the proceedings of  
7       the Young Liberals. I'm going to show you a few.

8                Shall we start, please, with the one which is at  
9       {UCPI/8240}.

10               Sir, this is tab 10 of the hard copy bundle.

11               Now, this is a report dated 26 January 1972. It's  
12       reporting on a meeting of the Putney branch of  
13       the Young Liberals, held on 20 January 1972, at which 14  
14       people are recorded as being present. And this is  
15       a report which bears your name at the end.

16               If we could look at the paragraph at the bottom of  
17       the screen at the moment, that reads:

18               "Peter Hain, the honorary President of the Putney  
19       branch, chaired the meeting and after a lengthy  
20       discussion it was decided by a show of hands that  
21       the branch should follow a more general plan of action  
22       than was previously mooted for the 'urban crisis'  
23       campaign. The campaign would now incorporate in one  
24       scheme a variety of environmental goals, as opposed to  
25       specific objectives such as the proposed assault on

1 the 'Battersea smell'."

2 Was the Putney branch of the Young Liberals interest  
3 in this environmental issue of interest to  
4 Special Branch of itself?

5 A. No.

6 Q. So why did you report it?

7 A. I can't recall reporting it.

8 Q. Assuming for the moment that you did, is there any  
9 explanation as to why this would be included in  
10 a report?

11 A. If you're attending meetings, you need to report what  
12 happens at those meetings. Not -- not on -- not on  
13 every occasion are they, you know, trying to uproot  
14 society. I mean, lots of these things that go on are  
15 quite mild, no problems with them, you know; they've got  
16 a right to do. But nevertheless, you report the good as  
17 well as the bad.

18 Q. So would it be fair to say there was an unfiltered  
19 approach to what you actually reported once you had  
20 decided that the group was of interest?

21 A. I suppose, yeah, by and large that would be the case.  
22 Unless it just seems total nonsense, in which case you  
23 wouldn't bother to report it at all. That obviously is  
24 of some -- it's of an interest, and it's got some  
25 substance to it. And so I can understand why that would

1           be reported, although I can't recall reporting it  
2           myself.

3           MR BARR: I do have some more questions on this document,  
4           but I think it may be an appropriate time to take  
5           a break and we can come back to those after the break.

6           THE CHAIRMAN: Can you come back in 15 minutes?

7           A. 15 minutes, fine, yes.

8           THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

9           MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take  
10          a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
11          to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

12                 The time is now 11.45 am, so we shall reconvene at  
13          12 pm.

14                 Thank you.

15          (11.47 pm)

16                                 (A short break)

17          (12.00 pm)

18          MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

19                 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
20          proceedings.

21                 Chairman.

22          THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23                 Mr Barr.

24          MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

25                 We were looking before the break, 298, at

1 the document that bears the number {UCPI/8240}, tab 10  
2 of the hard copy bundle. If we could have that back up,  
3 please. And if we could scroll down to the bottom half  
4 of that page, please.

5 It says:

6 "Nominations were taken for the executive posts of  
7 Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Membership Secretary  
8 and following persons were elected to those positions."

9 And document records that you were elected to  
10 the position of Membership Secretary.

11 Can you help us as to why you put yourself forward  
12 for that position?

13 A. I can't recall putting myself forward for that position,  
14 but having said that, the reason why I might was that,  
15 as the Membership Secretary, you have access to all  
16 the members; and that of course is of interest to  
17 the Branch to know who we're talking about.

18 Q. Is that something you would have done spontaneously, or  
19 would you have had an opportunity to consult with your  
20 managers before becoming the Membership Secretary?

21 A. I wouldn't consult with the office about whether  
22 I should do -- become Membership Secretary or not. No,  
23 it would be spontaneous.

24 Q. And presumably, though, you would have told them  
25 afterwards?



1 A. Oh yes, afterwards, because if this report is to be --  
2 to have been written by me, they would have received  
3 a copy of it.

4 Q. And did you get any reaction from your managers,  
5 favourable or otherwise, for assuming this position?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Did you get any approval or disapproval for taking this  
8 position without consulting them first?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Can you recall whether or not taking this position did  
11 give you access to membership details?

12 A. I can't recall it having given me access, no.

13 Q. Could we go over the page, please, {UCPI/8240/2}. Thank  
14 you.

15 At the end of the report it says:

16 "The following persons attended the meeting:

17 "Peter Hain.

18 "Jo-Ann Hain.

19 "Sally Hain."

20 And then some names that we have redacted to respect  
21 privacy. And your name appears there as well.

22 We heard evidence on Friday that at the time of this  
23 meeting, both Jo-Ann Hain and Sally Hain were teenagers  
24 under the age of 18. Did you realise that there were  
25 children in the room?

- 1 A. I've got no recollection at all of Jo-Ann Hain or  
2 Sally Hain, or any children, at any meetings, because  
3 they're of course of no relevance.
- 4 Q. From the point of view of your reporting, was the fact  
5 that they were there enough for them to be included in  
6 your report?
- 7 A. I can't actually recall having written this report,  
8 actually; and I can't recall being the Membership  
9 Secretary. I certainly never had any names or anything  
10 from it. And I -- I don't even recognise those two  
11 names, but --
- 12 Q. I appreciate it's a long time to remember, but this  
13 report does bear your name at the end of it, 298.
- 14 A. Yes, it does, but it bears my name in a form that  
15 I would have never used, just incidentally.
- 16 Q. Were you given any advice or guidance about whether or  
17 not you could report on children?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. And would it follow from the unfiltered approach, that  
20 we talked about just before the break, that you would  
21 include in your reports the names of anyone present,  
22 whoever they were?
- 23 A. Yes. I mean, it has been -- as has been shown by  
24 the Green movement, there are young ladies of a tender  
25 age that can be quite significant; and so I would have

1 possibly put them down anyway. If they were in  
2 attendance, I would put them down --

3 Q. -- (overspeaking) --

4 A. Sorry?

5 Q. I was just going to say, those are two slightly  
6 different reasons: reporting on them just because  
7 they're there, and reporting on them because they might  
8 be people who would be politically active in a way of  
9 interest to Special Branch.

10 A. Often, when you report and put names down, you don't  
11 know how significant these people are or are going to  
12 be. And the whole point of collating information is  
13 that you do exactly that. You know, you put them down,  
14 and if they constantly turn up at meetings all over  
15 the place, they start to be significant.

16 Q. Before the break we were talking about the sense of  
17 unease that your managers had about this part of your  
18 deployment. We see at the bottom of this page  
19 the nominal "HN294", who was the chief inspector of  
20 the SDS at the time. Is he one of the managers who had  
21 that sense of unease?

22 A. Well, I can't talk for them whether or not they had any  
23 unease about it. And I wasn't conscious of it, but  
24 I suspected that they might be uneasy about it.

25 Q. I see. Was he one of the suspects?

1       A. Well, he was the man in charge, and so I suspect that  
2            any rational person would have been mildly uneasy  
3            about it. I mean, he seemed a fairly rational bloke to  
4            me.

5       Q. Using nominals and not names, any other managers in that  
6            category at that time?

7       A. Well, he was the leading man, really.

8       Q. Can we take that report down, please.

9            Could we now look at the report that bears  
10           the number {UCPI/8254}, at tab 17 of the hard copy  
11           bundle.

12           Now, this is a report on the Young Liberals. It's  
13           another report which bears your name at the end. It's  
14           dated 12 April 1972, and it's a report on a meeting of  
15           the Putney branch of the Young Liberals, held on  
16           6 April, at which nine people are recorded as being  
17           present.

18           Could we look at paragraph 5, please.

19           Paragraph 5 reads:

20           "It was suggested that it would be impossible to  
21           disentangle the problems of Putney High Street from  
22           the projected motorway, which was supposedly designed to  
23           alleviate much of the existing problem of through flow  
24           traffic. This thought produced considerable discussion  
25           and it was decided that the display would be held on

1 Saturday, 15.4.72, avoiding where possible direct  
2 reference to the proposed motorway which would be  
3 the subject of an investigation of alternatives  
4 resulting in the compilation of a report in about two  
5 months time. Once the report had been prepared it would  
6 be possible to base direct action such as the closing of  
7 Putney High Street on sound reasoning which would permit  
8 other groups such as the Putney Society to take part.  
9 [Privacy] said [Privacy] [Privacy] of the Putney Society  
10 had expressed a willingness to assist in any proposed  
11 closure of the High Street."

12 So this report seems to be about concerns about  
13 traffic flow in central Putney, and there seems to be  
14 some suggestion of direct action.

15 Why was local activism about an issue such as Putney  
16 High Street of interest to Special Branch?

17 A. It was of interest to the police from the point of view  
18 that they were talking about closing the roads, closing  
19 the High Street. That clearly is of interest to  
20 the police. That's it. SDS is part of the police.

21 Q. Some might say that this was pretty minor activity.  
22 Did it ever cross your mind or fall for comment from  
23 your managers that undercover police resources might be  
24 better directed elsewhere?

25 A. I think the activities of the SDS were well directed,

1 and I think it was money well spent.

2 Q. Could we take that down, please, and could we have up  
3 the document which is at tab 18 of the hard copy bundle  
4 {UCPI/8254}.

5 This is a report on the 1972 Young Liberal annual  
6 conference?

7 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we have the wrong document up. It's  
8 8255. {UCPI/8255}.

9 MR BARR: 8255, thank you, yes.

10 The 1972 annual conference of the Young Liberal  
11 Movement.

12 Can you recall attending that conference, 298?

13 A. I do vaguely recall attending, yes, a conference.

14 Q. In that report, you describe Peter Hain as being of  
15 the "centre left". Is that a fair characterisation of  
16 his politics within the Young Liberals?

17 A. I would say so, yes.

18 Q. If we could go to page 10, please, {UCPI/8255/10}, and  
19 could we look at paragraph 33. That reads:

20 "The last session of the day was given over to an  
21 address by David Steel, MP, the President of  
22 the Young Liberals. His speech contained nothing of  
23 particular interest and was described by Brian Milton  
24 as 'a talk about opinion polls and concerted efforts and  
25 amounted to nothing more than a political speech by

1 a politician'."

2 Now, did reporting on Members of Parliament fall to  
3 be the subject of any comment from your managers?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Had you been given any guidance about reporting on MPs,  
6 either in the SDS or beforehand?

7 A. MPs are not above the law, and so in the context of  
8 the reporting, no, no comment was made.

9 Q. Of course, none of us is above the law, but  
10 the description that you've recorded and attributed to  
11 Brian Milton is "a talk about opinion polls and  
12 concerted efforts and amounted to nothing more than  
13 a political speech by a politician". You're not  
14 suggesting, are you, that David Steel was up to no good?

15 A. No, I mean, quite the contrary really. Brian Milton  
16 there was suggesting it was totally irrelevant.

17 Q. Just politics.

18 A. Yes, the whole thing was totally -- you know, for  
19 the meeting and its relevance to the Young Liberals, it  
20 was of no relevance.

21 Q. Did you consider that reporting on the ordinary  
22 political activities of a Member of Parliament as  
23 a police officer gave rise to any concerns?

24 A. Well, no. Personally, I -- it raised no concerns for  
25 me.

1 Q. Did any of your managers ever express any concerns about  
2 your reporting on Members of Parliament?

3 A. No.

4 Q. If we go to the -- can we look now at paragraph 34,  
5 please. It's a bit at the bottom I'm particularly  
6 interested in. This is some more commentary about what  
7 was going on during David Steel's address, and reading  
8 the last six lines:

9 "Throughout the address Steel was the target for  
10 a barrage of paper aeroplanes, originating from the box  
11 by the side of the stage which was occupied by students  
12 from the LSE. John 'Anarchy' Norton was the central  
13 figure from the LSE representatives and frequently  
14 throughout the four day conference, held aloft a flag  
15 adorned in the anarchist colours of red and black ..."

16 If we can go over the page, please, {UCPI/8255/11}:

17 "... bearing the legend 'We are wildly annoyed'. He  
18 was a source of constant amusement throughout  
19 the debates and during the elections was rewarded for  
20 his efforts, by sharing with the 'Blagdon Amateur  
21 Rapist' and 'John Morton's right leg' (the one that  
22 limps) the distinction of having been nominated for  
23 every single post within the YLM."

24 I just wanted to ask you, first of all, did you  
25 think that the label "Blagdon Amateur Rapist" was



1           amusing?

2       A.   Yes.

3       Q.   Isn't it in appalling taste?

4       A.   Some people may well consider it to be.

5       Q.   Secondly, the antics of these particular delegates are

6           at best juvenile, aren't they?

7       A.   They may well be considered to be that.

8       Q.   Were these the people in the wing of Young Liberals that

9           were of concern to Special Branch?

10      A.   These people were -- these people were activists in one

11           way or the other, by doing amusing things, or by

12           blocking roads, or whatever. The fact that they are

13           there and they are saying these things, you can't ignore

14           it; in just the same way that you can't ignore what

15           David Steel said. It's just a case of reporting what

16           happened, you know, at the -- at the conference.

17      Q.   But the reference to the flag in particular,

18           the anarchist flag, was it the anarchists within

19           the Young Liberals that were your primary concern?

20      A.   The group in the Young Liberals subsequently was

21           Commitment -- a group calling themselves "Commitment".

22           And, yes, they were of interest. I subsequently

23           attended meetings of Commitment, because they -- they

24           seemed to be the ones that were likely to cause problems

25           one way or the other.

1 Q. Were the problems they were causing of the level of  
2 paper aeroplanes, or were they more serious than that?

3 A. One would expect that they would -- or I expected that  
4 they could be more serious than that.

5 Q. Did they become more serious than that or not?

6 A. None of these people, in the end, turned out to be very  
7 serious.

8 Q. Once it turned out, in the end, that they weren't very  
9 serious, was there any discussion about the need to  
10 continue reporting upon them?

11 A. Well, I made that judgment, and I just moved on to  
12 somewhere else, some other group.

13 Q. Could we take that down now, please.

14 There are some reports in the bundle on a car that  
15 was used by Peter Hain and Peter Hain's private  
16 secretary. Why did you report those matters?

17 A. Should something appear on the screen that you're  
18 referring to?

19 Q. If you want to look at them to refresh your memory, we  
20 can call them up.

21 If we call up, please, {UCPI/8248}.

22 That's the report on Peter Hain's private secretary.

23 Is it possible to blow that up a little bit so that

24 298 can read it more easily? Thank you.

25 Can you read that, 298?

1 A. Yes, I can, yeah.

2 Q. So now you've refreshed your memory, can you explain why  
3 you reported that information?

4 A. Well, I can't recall reporting that information at all.  
5 I can't -- I've got no recollection of his private  
6 secretary, but I would say that had I have been  
7 conscious of it, I may well have submitted a report  
8 giving that information.

9 Q. Why?

10 A. Because it's related to other reports, and it's only by  
11 adding bits and pieces like this that you subsequently  
12 find out who is of interest and who isn't.

13 Q. Could we take that down now, please.

14 The report on the car is at {UCPI/8558}.

15 This one, I'm afraid, is very difficult to read, so  
16 could we blow it up as far as possible.

17 The second paragraph appears to read:

18 "Peter Hain regularly uses a red Volkswagen motor  
19 car ..."

20 Then it gives a registration number:

21 "... the registered owner of which is his mother --  
22 Mrs Adelaine Florence Hain of 90 Fawe Park Road, Putney,  
23 SW15."

24 And then it bears your name and then the manager's  
25 name, HN332.

1 Same question: why would you report that?

2 A. Well, I can't recall having reported that, but I would  
3 have done, had I have known it, that information,  
4 because, again, he was a person that was of interest,  
5 and therefore it makes sense to note the vehicles such  
6 people are using.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Could we take that document down now, please, and  
9 could we go to the document which is at tab 50  
10 {UCPI/8269}.

11 Now, we're moving forward a little bit in time, 298.  
12 This is the report on the Young Liberals council meeting  
13 in Birmingham, dated 13 August 1974. Again, this report  
14 bears your name at the end of it. Do you have any  
15 recollection of this?

16 A. No.

17 Q. What it says is:

18 "The 'Young liberal Movement' held a Council meeting  
19 in Birmingham on 22 and 23 June 1974. Amongst  
20 the various resolutions passed were two arising from  
21 the demonstration in Red Lion Square on 15.6.74.

22 "The following is the agreed text of  
23 the resolutions:

24 "(1)

25 "This Council notes with deep regret the death of

1 Warwick student Kevin Gately during the demonstration  
2 against fascism in Red Lion Square on Saturday  
3 June 15th."

4 Do you recall that event?

5 A. No.

6 Q. "It condemns the vicious and unnecessary attack on  
7 the left-wing demonstrators by the police and the  
8 blatant bias shown by the police in favour of the march  
9 organised by the National Front.

10 "It calls on the Home Secretary to set up an  
11 independent public inquiry into ..."

12 And if we could scroll up, please:

13 "(a) the circumstances surrounding Kevin Gately's  
14 death.

15 "(b) the activities of the Metropolitan Police Force  
16 on the day of the demonstration.

17 "(c) the specification of the different sections of  
18 the police involved.

19 "And demands the immediate disbandment of  
20 the police 'Special Patrol Group'.

21 "The Executive is mandated to write to the Home  
22 Secretary informing him of the Council's demand.

23 "(2)

24 "The following motion was passed without amendment:

25 "While unreservedly condemning the violent tactics

1 used by certain members of last Saturday's demonstration  
2 against the National Front, this Council expresses its  
3 grave concern at what it considers to be the  
4 overreaction of the police in dealing with the  
5 situation."

6 And if we can go over the page, please,

7 {UCPI/8269/2}:

8 "Further it instructs the Chairman to:

9 "(a) write to the Home Secretary calling for an  
10 independent public enquiry into the whole handling of  
11 the demonstration and in particular the death of  
12 Kevin Gately.

13 "(b) an enquiry into the wearing of paramilitary  
14 uniform by members of the National Front."

15 Why would information of this nature be reported?

16 A. I've got no recollection of having reported that. But,  
17 yes, it -- it is of significance -- giving my opinion on  
18 it, it is significant what they say; and, yes, it should  
19 be reported.

20 Q. And why is that?

21 A. Because if you're gathering information in order to  
22 reach decisions on things, you need as much information  
23 as you can glean, and this is just one little part of  
24 a jigsaw really.

25 Q. What sort of decisions are we talking about here?

1 A. Well, the disbursement of -- excuse me --  
2 the disbursement of police officers, where you would put  
3 police officers, whether you would use them at all,  
4 whether you would use the SPG, if it still exists,  
5 I don't know. Yeah, it's important to gather  
6 information. That's their role.

7 Q. Well, this reporting isn't about any forthcoming  
8 demonstration, this report is of a political  
9 organisation, the Young Liberals, resolving to press  
10 the Home Secretary of the day for a public inquiry into  
11 a demonstration that had already happened. Why is that  
12 of interest to the police?

13 A. Well, I think it's probably of interest to the Home  
14 Secretary, and I would imagine that such things -- such  
15 information as this gets passed along the line to him.

16 Q. Can you recall whether the campaign for a public inquiry  
17 following the Red Lion Square demonstration was a matter  
18 of discussion within the SDS?

19 A. It wasn't.

20 Q. Do you have any idea whether or not this information  
21 ended up on the Home Secretary's desk?

22 A. I have no idea.

23 Q. Do you think there was any concern about reporting on  
24 political activity of this nature?

25 A. There was no concern by me. I don't know whether anyone

1           else was concerned. I -- no one indicated to me that  
2           there were concerned about anything.

3       Q. If we could go up, please, to the preamble to  
4       paragraph 2 on the first page, {UCPI/8269/1}.

5           That reads:

6           "The following is the agreed text of  
7       the resolutions."

8           Were there resolutions other than those listed in  
9       the document? I appreciate I'm testing your memory.

10      A. I've got no recollection of this meeting at all. So no,  
11      I can't answer that.

12      Q. Thank you.

13           A general question now about the Young Liberals. To  
14      what extent was the Young Liberals' anti-apartheid  
15      activity relevant to your decision to report upon it?

16      A. Well, yes, it was, you know, significant, because their  
17      anti-apartheid activities -- excuse any -- included  
18      demonstrations against cricket tours and rugby tours,  
19      and that was -- that was -- they were things of public  
20      disorder, and they were of interest.

21      Q. And coming back to a topic that I raised with you  
22      earlier. As a self-tasking officer, did you not  
23      consider at all infiltrating the far right?

24      A. Well, as far as I know, there weren't any problems with  
25      the far right. I guess you mean the National Front?



1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I don't think they -- I wasn't aware of too many  
3 demonstrations organised by them.

4 Q. Can we move now to Commitment. You attended meetings at  
5 a private house in the Croydon/Thornton Heath area,  
6 didn't you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you tell us in your statement that they were small  
9 meetings, six to eight people?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. The document can be taken down now, please.

12 And Commitment was a libertarian anarchist group?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And its tactics you describe as being "to irritate and  
15 inconvenience some large companies"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Could we have a look, please, at the document which is  
18 at tab 16 {UCPI/8560}.

19 Again, I'm afraid very difficult to read, but it's  
20 paragraph 3 that I'm interested in. This is a report on  
21 Croydon Commitment. It says:

22 "The remainder of the evening was dominated by  
23 [Privacy] who spoke of a meeting between [Privacy],  
24 [Privacy] and Peter Hain, to decide on action against  
25 the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation's projected mining

1           incursion into the Snowdonia National Park. He bitterly  
2           criticised Lord Byers for being a director of a company  
3           prepared to destroy, purely for profit. It was a stain  
4           on the Liberal Party conscience which could not easily  
5           be removed."

6           Paragraph 4:

7           "He said [Privacy] and [Privacy] were particularly  
8           keen on some form of disruption and it had been agreed  
9           that a group should attend the annual general meeting of  
10          RTZ to be held in May, to question their motives and  
11          their excuses and, if necessary, to create chaos. He  
12          hastened to add 'we might cause chaos anyway!'"

13          Is that the sort of irritation/inconvenience to  
14          large companies that you were referring to?

15         A. Yes.

16         Q. Thank you. If you could take that down, please.

17          Were Commitment involved in public disorder?

18         A. I can't actually recall any public disorder that they --  
19          they were involved in.

20         Q. Were they committing any criminal offences?

21         A. Not to my knowledge.

22         Q. Were they trying to overthrow the state?

23         A. I shouldn't think so, no.

24         Q. Given the answers you've just given me, why infiltrate  
25          them at all?

1       A. Because potentially they could cause -- they could cause  
2       chaos at -- you know, in the streets. The fact that  
3       they didn't was probably lack of organisation rather  
4       than a will to do so.

5       Q. And was just the potential to cause disorder  
6       a sufficient threshold for the purposes of SDS  
7       reporting, in your experience?

8       A. When they -- they spoke about such things and spoke  
9       about doing such things, that was enough to be of  
10      interest, because clearly, if you speak about it, you  
11      can carry it out.

12     Q. But I'm getting the impression this was a group that was  
13      all talk and not very much action; is that fair?

14     A. Yeah, by and large that's fair, yeah.

15     Q. And so even a group that was all talk and not so much  
16      action was still of interest?

17     A. When it was -- when I concluded that that was the case,  
18      then I moved on.

19     Q. Can we move to the Croydon Libertarians. You've said  
20      that the Commitment Group and the Croydon Libertarians  
21      tended to merge into one another. Can you help us any  
22      further with that?

23     A. Some of the individuals that were -- that were involved  
24      in -- or involved in Commitment actually blended into  
25      one, but in that particular -- it was particularly led

1 by an individual and -- in Croydon, and they were what  
2 they saw as an anarchist group really, a libertarian  
3 group. But it all blended into one, and then as far as  
4 I was concerned they didn't actually do anything that  
5 was too bad, and I moved on.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 Let's look at the document which is at tab 41 of  
8 the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/8152}. Thank you. It's  
9 paragraphs 3 and 4. Thank you.

10 This is a report dated 12 April 1973.

11 A. Mm.

12 Q. The background is it's about a protest to direct public  
13 attention to the need for a road in Croydon to be made  
14 into a pedestrian precinct.

15 Paragraph 3 reads:

16 "It was organised and executed exclusively by  
17 members of Croydon Libertarians' and took the form of  
18 a length of chain being suspended across the road and  
19 secured at either end by padlocks.

20 "4. In the event the road was closed for little  
21 more than five minutes and disruption of traffic was  
22 slight. It was not quite clear even to the participants  
23 why it failed, especially as the event had not been  
24 publicised outside the immediate confines of those  
25 involved. The participants did not wait to see

1 the immediate effect of their protest but disappeared,  
2 to return a short time later to find the chain no longer  
3 in position. It was therefore assumed that either  
4 the padlocks had not been securely fastened or that an  
5 unsensitive lorry driver had been responsible for  
6 sabotaging the event. Police were absolved from blame  
7 as they had not been in evidence."

8 First of all, can you recall this?

9 A. I vaguely recall this, yes.

10 Q. Secondly, was the rapid disappearance of the chain  
11 anything to do with prior warning that you might have  
12 given about this stunt?

13 A. It may well have been so, yes.

14 Q. And was this level of protest typical of the Croydon  
15 Libertarians?

16 A. They didn't do this too often, but this was the general  
17 thinking. This is -- it was on this kind of level.  
18 No one was thinking of doing anything that was too  
19 dangerous or dramatic. It was this kind of level of  
20 stuff.

21 Q. Ernest Rodker was involved with the Croydon  
22 Libertarians. Did his involvement have anything to do  
23 with your reporting on the group?

24 A. I wasn't aware that Ernest Rodker was involved with  
25 the Croydon Libertarians.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 Can we take that down now, please.

3 I want to move to 12 May 1972 and the incident  
4 outside the Star & Garter Hotel at which you and others  
5 came to be arrested.

6 Can we start first of all with {UCPI/34071}.

7 We're told that that is a picture of  
8 the Star & Garter Hotel. Does that ring any bells?

9 A. No, it doesn't actually. I mean, I do recall  
10 the incident vaguely, but that picture doesn't assist me  
11 in that.

12 Q. Thank you. If we can take that down, please.

13 Can you recall whether your involvement in this  
14 event was as a member of the Young Liberals or  
15 Commitment, or some other group?

16 A. It was as a member of the Young Liberals that I attended  
17 there.

18 Q. And we know from the documents that you came to attend  
19 a planning meeting at Ernest Rodker's home; that's  
20 right, isn't it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can you recall how it is that you knew to go to  
23 Ernest Rodker's home?

24 A. Yes. Peter Hain's mother told me.

25 Q. Can you remember how she told you?

1 A. I think she said something to the effect that, "If you  
2 actually want to be actively involved, then you should  
3 go to this meeting."

4 Q. And was this a face-to-face conversation or not?

5 A. That I can't recall. I can't recall whether it was  
6 a phone call or whether I went to her home. I think  
7 I might have gone to her home, actually.

8 Q. How involved in the Young Liberals were you at that  
9 time?

10 A. Well, I was only involved insofar as -- yes, I mean,  
11 I attended meetings of the Young Liberals in Putney.

12 Q. How well did you know Mrs Hain?

13 A. Not well at all. She was just someone that I saw  
14 occasionally.

15 Q. Had you met her before?

16 A. I can't recall whether I had or not, actually. But  
17 I mean, I'd been -- I'd gone to her home several times,  
18 so the chances are that I'd met her.

19 Q. When you arrived at Mr Rodker's home, were you expected?

20 A. I can't recall arriving there. I can remember being  
21 there, but I don't know whether anyone expected me or  
22 not.

23 Q. Could we call up now, please, {MPS/526782}. This is  
24 tab 24. Could we go to page 7 {MPS/526782/7}.

25 This is part of a file on the whole incident. This

1 particular document, 298, is a memorandum which bears  
2 HN294's name, dated 16 May 1972. I want to draw your  
3 attention to the third paragraph down, which says:

4 "On Friday, 12th May DC HN298 had occasion to  
5 telephone Hain's home where Mrs Hain (Peter Hain's  
6 mother) told him that if he were interested in doing  
7 something positive he should go forthwith to [a house  
8 on] Rumbold Road, SW6. DC HN298 did so and result is as  
9 stated in his report."

10 Is that accurate or not?

11 A. Yes, it's probably accurate. I can't recall whether  
12 I -- I phoned there or whether I went there, so it's  
13 probably accurate that that was done at the time.

14 Q. Can we move now to page 9 {MPS/526782/9}.

15 This is a report which bears your name, also dated  
16 16 May. Before we go into the details of this, can you  
17 help us with whether or not you informed your managers  
18 before you went to Ernest Rodker's house?

19 A. No, I wouldn't have done.

20 Q. Why not?

21 A. There wasn't sufficient time. You can't go phoning your  
22 managers all the time. I mean, it's -- you know,  
23 I mean, you're expected to do a job and that's what  
24 I was doing.

25 Q. I see.



1 Paragraph 1 of this report reads:

2 "On Friday, 12.5.72 from 1.30 pm until [5].15 pm  
3 at ..."

4 And we've redacted the number:

5 "... Rumbold Road, Fulham SW6, the home of  
6 Ernie Rodker, a meeting was held to discuss actions  
7 aimed at delaying the departure of the English Rugby XV  
8 from their Richmond hotel, the ' Star & Garter', long  
9 enough for it to prove impossible for them to adhere to  
10 their 6.15 pm flight schedule."

11 I think I may have misread that. I think it may say  
12 3.15 that the meeting ended. Can you help us whether  
13 the meeting lasted until 3.15 or 5.15?

14 A. I can't recall.

15 Q. Does that report accurately summarise what the aim of  
16 the meeting was?

17 A. Yes, I believe it does.

18 Q. Paragraph 2 reads:

19 "There were 21 persons present at the meeting, all  
20 of whom with the exception of [Privacy] later  
21 participated in the activities around the hotel.  
22 Everyone there appeared to know Rodker but many of  
23 the number were not known to each other. There appeared  
24 to be only a small group of three or four who had  
25 actually been involved from the beginning in

1 the planning of what might correctly be described as  
2 a military style operation. Rodker was the key figure  
3 of this group which also included Jonathan Rosenhead and  
4 [Privacy]."

5 As a Special Branch SDS undercover officer, would  
6 you have been trying to report the number of persons  
7 present as accurately as possible?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Could we go to paragraph 4, please.

10 It says:

11 "After some discussion about who should fill what  
12 roles, which was governed to a large extent by whether  
13 or not they had a car which could be used, it was agreed  
14 that [Privacy] would be the 'strikers'. It was their  
15 job to turn off the fuel supply of the England Rugby  
16 team's coach or otherwise immobilise it, and then to  
17 indicate to [Privacy] who would be playing football in  
18 a nearby field, that it had been done. They in turn  
19 would wait until the players began to board the coach  
20 and then indicate to 'PT' who would be stationed on  
21 Richmond Hill looking down upon them. It was his job to  
22 inform Rodker and [Privacy] that the players were  
23 boarding the coach, and that they should block  
24 the Petersham Road side of the car park with their cars.  
25 After a time lapse of 1.5 minutes the other three cars,

1           also parked on Richmond Hill, were to block  
2           the Nightingale Lane car park exit. The drivers of  
3           the vehicles were then to lock them up and block  
4           the path of the coach with their bodies. To complicate  
5           matters further Rodker had ordered two 'skips' to arrive  
6           at the upper car park at 4 pm."

7           As best you can recall, is that an accurate summary  
8           of the plan?

9           A. As far as I can recall, yes.

10          Q. Can we go over the page, please {MPS/526782/9}. Look at  
11          paragraph 5. It says:

12                 "There was insufficient time to discuss fully many  
13                 of the facets of such a complicated scheme, such as  
14                 the methods of signalling, eg whether to wave red  
15                 handkerchiefs, take coats off and put them on etc.  
16                 Rosenhead volunteered the use of three flares which he  
17                 had with him but there was not much support for this.  
18                 (Later, at the car park he lit and threw a flare)."

19                 Do you have any recollection now of Rosenhead  
20                 lighting and throwing a flare?

21          A. No.

22          Q. Is it possible that this report is inaccurate on this  
23          point?

24          A. It seems unlikely that it would be inaccurate, but if  
25          I'd written the report and that's what it said in

1 the report, that's what would have been the case.

2 Q. Is it possible that you might have made a mistake as to  
3 who lit and threw a flare?

4 A. No. If I've written the report that said that he  
5 did it, then he would have done it.

6 Q. Can we look at paragraph 6, please:

7 "Before departing for Richmond, Rodker gave out  
8 the telephone numbers of several solicitors and  
9 the [National Council for Civil Liberties]. He  
10 destroyed all the notes he had made about the day's  
11 activities and told the others that if they were  
12 arrested it was essential that they should deny having  
13 met together previously and should say that they had  
14 received a note through the post, outlining the action  
15 which had been planned. He added that this was to  
16 squash any possibility of a charge for conspiracy."

17 Do you have any recollection now of that being said?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Working then purely from what you recorded at the time,  
20 why would Rodker have given out telephone numbers for  
21 solicitors?

22 A. I suppose in anticipation of being arrested.

23 Q. Was it your understanding that there was a risk of  
24 arrest?

25 A. He didn't give me any telephone numbers and I wasn't

1           aware of them, so ... There's always a risk of arrest,  
2           of course, if you're demonstrating and you do chain off  
3           roads and cause problems like that, you know, you might  
4           expect that you would be arrested.

5           Q. Can we go to paragraph 8, please. Thank you.

6                        "By 3.55 pm all were in their allotted positions and  
7           almost immediately the signal was received for Rodker  
8           and [Privacy] to leave. After 1.5 minutes the other  
9           cars departed for the Nightingale Lane exit. As they  
10          did so a lorry containing an empty 'skip' turned in  
11          front of them and drove into the car park. The three  
12          cars followed and were confronted by a Police Officer,  
13          who made no attempt to stop them blocking the coaches  
14          exit. They positioned the cars, locked them and left,  
15          later to join other demonstrators standing by  
16          the coaches with placards. It would appear that  
17          the officer's presence in the car park had deterred  
18          [Privacy] from making any attempt at  
19          immobilising the coach."

20                      Do you have any recollection of that now?

21          A. No.

22          Q. Do you have any reason to doubt the record that you made  
23          in 1972?

24          A. I don't doubt -- doubt it at all. I doubt whether in  
25          actual fact this was written by me, but I don't doubt

1           that that's what happened.

2           Q. Paragraph 9:

3                     "The police officer was offered assistance from  
4           local building workers, hotel staff and the rugby  
5           players in removing both the offending vehicles and the  
6           demonstrators which he apparently accepted."

7                     Can you remember that?

8           A. No.

9           Q. Can we go down to paragraph 10, please:

10                    "A melee ensued with the demonstrators sitting on  
11           and in front of the vehicles while they were being  
12           lifted. One of the hotel staff succeeded in ripping off  
13           half the front bumper of one car from its mounting.  
14           The owner of the vehicle, Jonathan Rosenhead later  
15           accused the police officer of doing the damage and  
16           surprisingly the officer accepted responsibility  
17           for it."

18                    Can you recall that?

19           A. No.

20           Q. You -- if it was you who wrote the report -- have used  
21           the word "melee ensued". Can I take it from your lack  
22           of recollection now that you're unable to help us with  
23           what you meant by the use of that word?

24           A. Yes.

25           Q. Can we go now to -- over the page to paragraph 12,

1 {MPS/526782/11}.

2 It says:

3 "At the police station there appeared to be little  
4 or no animosity between the police and the  
5 demonstrators, although there were some slight injuries  
6 to both. The prisoners were allowed the freedom of  
7 the cells and the corridor and were served with tea.  
8 [Privacy] was allowed to contact Ben Birnberg,  
9 solicitor, tell [Privacy] who agreed to represent all  
10 the defendants ..."

11 Then something has been redacted on the grounds it  
12 is legally privileged:

13 "The prisoners were bailed to appear at Richmond  
14 Magistrates' Court on 13.5.72 at 10 am."

15 Do you recall that?

16 A. Yes, I do recall that.

17 Q. And is the record that we've just read accurate?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Just pausing on the question of the legal advice that  
20 was recorded and has been redacted, did anyone ever say  
21 anything to you about whether or not you should have  
22 reported the contents of legal advice?

23 A. Who do you mean there, did anyone ...?

24 Q. Did your managers or anybody else ever take issue with  
25 you recording legal advice in that memorandum?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. In the time between the end of the meeting at Rodker's  
3 house and your going down to the hotel to participate in  
4 the demonstration, did you take any steps to inform your  
5 managers about what was going to happen?
- 6 A. There wasn't any time to do that. This wasn't an era --  
7 excuse me -- an era with mobile phones. You had to make  
8 arrangements with local -- find a local box, and stuff  
9 like that. No, there wasn't any time to do that. They  
10 geared it so that that was the case.
- 11 Q. Can we take this document down, please.
- 12 Would you have informed your managers if there had  
13 been an appropriate opportunity?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. Could we have up now, please, a document which is at  
16 tab 23 {MPS/737087}.
- 17 This is a document dated 13 May, that's to say  
18 the day after the demonstration. It's signed by -- or  
19 it bears the name of a chief inspector who appears to  
20 have been a part of a unit from Richmond police station,  
21 and it says that:
- 22 "On Friday 12 May 1972 at 3.42 pm information was  
23 received from [Privacy] General Manager of  
24 the Star & Garter Hotel, Richmond, Surrey, that  
25 the British Lions Rugby team was due to leave the hotel



1           shortly for London Airport on its way to South Africa.  
2           He believed that a demonstration was likely outside  
3           the hotel.

4           "The Patrolling Officer, SPS [redacted] attended at  
5           once. Just after 4.10 pm about 30 persons arrived and  
6           mingled with a crowd of hotel staff and residents and  
7           some building workers in the car park of the hotel. Two  
8           of them left Morris mini motor vehicles in the car park  
9           entrance at Nightingale Lane, blocking the way out for  
10          the rugby team's coach which was about to leave."

11          Stopping there, 298, did you know anything about  
12          the information that had been reported by the general  
13          manager at the Star & Garter Hotel?

14          A. No.

15          Q. This report says that about 30 persons arrived at  
16          the hotel. You recorded 21 people at Rodker's house, of  
17          whom 20 got involved in the demonstration. Can you  
18          recall whether you were joined by more people?

19          A. I can't recall.

20          Q. Can we go -- scroll up, please. It then reads:

21                 "With help from members of the public and police  
22                 whom he had called to the scene, the SPS tried to move  
23                 one of the vehicles. Then some of the thirty people who  
24                 had just arrived started sitting down in the road  
25                 outside the same entrance and completely blocked

1 the way. They did so in groups of three or four at  
2 a time. As each group sat, SPS [redacted] asked them to  
3 move. They refused, and they were arrested, whereupon  
4 a fresh group replaced them."

5 Do you have any independent recollection now of  
6 the events that are described in that paragraph?

7 A. Well, I recall being arrested. Certainly I ended up at  
8 the police station. But beyond that, I can't recall  
9 much about it at all really.

10 Q. In particular, can you recall whether people were  
11 arrested in groups of three or four at a time?

12 A. I don't recall that, no.

13 Q. Are you saying it didn't happen, or simply that you  
14 can't recall?

15 A. I just can't recall how we were arrested, but I recall  
16 being arrested at -- and I ended up in the police  
17 station. I don't actually remember physically anyone  
18 putting their hand on my shoulder and arresting me, but  
19 we ended up at the police station.

20 Q. Could we take that document down, please, and could we  
21 have up in its place {UCPI/33628}.

22 This is a handwritten letter by "PT" to  
23 Ernest Rodker dated 14 June 1972. Can we go to  
24 the second page, please, {UCPI/33628/2}, and blow it up.  
25 Thank you.

1           It's very difficult to read.

2           Could we just scroll down a little bit, please.

3           I'm just looking for a particular passage, if you  
4 would bear with me.

5           Yes, it's just -- the passage I want to read to you  
6 ends where the first privacy redaction is. It says:

7           "After about twenty minutes most of  
8 the demonstrators had disappeared, I could only see  
9 Mike Scott and a girl whose name I believe in [Privacy]  
10 trying to prevent the police from moving a red mini too  
11 roughly from the car park entrance."

12           Can you recall that?

13       A. No.

14       Q. This suggests that it was quite a long time into  
15 the incident. Is it possible that you were arrested  
16 quite late on in the course of events?

17       A. I -- not really. I thought I was arrested with  
18 the rest. I didn't think it was -- I think it was --  
19 more or less happened all at the one time; everyone was  
20 arrested.

21       Q. Might you have taken an active role in trying to prevent  
22 the removal of the mini "too roughly"?

23       A. I may -- I may well have done, I mean, it's acting out  
24 a role. But it's all very low key stuff, really.

25       MR BARR: Thank you. If you would take that document down

1 now, please.

2 Sir, would now be an appropriate time to break for  
3 lunch?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. We're now going to move on to  
5 the pleadings in the Magistrates' Court, which will take  
6 a little time.

7 MR FERNANDES: We will now take a break for lunch. May  
8 I remind those in the virtual hearing room to remember  
9 to join your break-out rooms, please.

10 The time is now 1.05 pm, so we shall resume at  
11 2.05 pm. Thank you.

12 (1.03 pm)

13 (The short adjournment)

14 (2.05 pm)

15 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to  
16 the afternoon session of today's evidential hearings.  
17 For those in the virtual hearing room, please remember  
18 to turn off both your camera and microphone.

19 I will now hand over to the Chairman,  
20 Sir John Mitting, to continue proceedings.  
21 Chairman.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 As at the beginning of all live evidential sessions,  
24 a recording made earlier is going to be played. If you  
25 haven't heard it before, please listen carefully.

1           I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,  
2           the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make  
3           orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including  
4           its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have  
5           made a number of orders which affect what you may and  
6           may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave  
7           them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter  
8           and may have serious consequences for you.

9           If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an  
10          order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
11          the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it  
12          as if it had been a contempt of that court. If  
13          satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
14          the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
15          a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
16          a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
17          sequestration of their assets.

18          Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
19          the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
20          photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to  
21          record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
22          the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone  
23          into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any  
24          of those purposes. You may use it silently for any  
25          other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your

1 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing  
2 room to any other person, but only once at least  
3 ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are  
4 describing took place.

5 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
6 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public  
7 disclosure of information, for example about  
8 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.  
9 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,  
10 whether by accident or design, information which I have  
11 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes  
12 be disclosed in a hearing. If and when that happens,  
13 I will immediately suspend the hearing and make an order  
14 prohibiting further disclosure of the information  
15 outside the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that  
16 no further disclosure of that information may be made by  
17 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device  
18 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside  
19 it.

20 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
21 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
22 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
23 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
24 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of  
25 the public, are entitled to hear the same public

1 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own  
2 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
3 best to ensure that you can. If you have any doubt  
4 about the terms of this message or what you may or may  
5 not do, you should not hesitate to ask one of them and,  
6 with my help if necessary, they will provide you with  
7 the answer.

8 Mr Barr.

9 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

10 298, we were back in 1972, on 12 May, outside  
11 the Star & Garter Hotel.

12 When you were arrested, do you have any recollection  
13 now about where you were?

14 A. I know it was in Richmond somewhere, but no, I mean,  
15 I remember the police station -- or vaguely, actually,  
16 but I remember being in the police station.

17 Q. Specifically, can you remember, when you were arrested,  
18 whether you were on the grounds of the hotel or on  
19 the road outside the hotel?

20 A. I believe I was in the road outside.

21 Q. And what's the -- do you have an actual recollection of  
22 that, or is that based just on a belief?

23 A. I've a very vague recollection of it. So I suppose it's  
24 based more on belief, actually.

25 Q. And so far as your conduct towards police officers on

1           the day is concerned, do you have any specific  
2           recollection about whether or not you tried to prevent  
3           the police removing the vehicles from the entrance and  
4           exit to the Star & Garter Hotel?

5           A. I don't really recollect it, but I know that I would not  
6           have done anything more than the slightest attempt to  
7           prevent any vehicle moving. It would have been just  
8           going through the motions really, that's all.

9           Q. After you had been arrested, you are summoned to appear  
10          at the Magistrates' Court, and you do so on 15 May; is  
11          that right?

12          A. Yes, I believe, yes.

13          Q. Was the court informed that you were really an  
14          undercover police officer?

15          A. No.

16          Q. Was the court informed that you were not Michael Peter  
17          Scott?

18          A. No.

19          Q. How do you know that?

20          A. Well, I didn't inform them, so unless someone else  
21          informed them ...

22          Q. Did anybody tell you that the court had been informed?

23          A. No.

24          Q. Did you enter a plea at that first appearance?

25          A. I can't actually remember doing so, but I believe that



1           we all voted -- all pleaded not guilty. I think that  
2           was the idea, I think.

3           Q. Let me show you one of the documents we've got.

4                     Could we have up, please, {MPS/526782}, and when  
5           we've got it up, could we have page 13, please,  
6           {MPS/526782/13}.

7                     This is a report by Sergeant D Smith. Was he  
8           a Sergeant in the SDS at the time?

9           A. Yes.

10          Q. It's dated 15 May and it reads:

11                     "I was present this day at 10 am at Richmond  
12           Magistrates' Court when fourteen persons appeared  
13           charged with obstructing the highway on Friday 12th  
14           May 1972 on the occasion of the departure of the English  
15           Rugby Team from the Star & Garter Hotel, Richmond."

16                     There's a list of names, and if we scroll down we'll  
17           see that your cover name is one of them.

18          A. Right.

19          Q. And then if we go over the page, {MPS/526782/14}, it  
20           says, at paragraph 3 -- thank you:

21                     "All pleaded 'Not Guilty' to the charge as a result  
22           of which police asked for a remand on bail (each  
23           defendant in his/her own recognisance of £5) until  
24           14th June 1972 at 10 am at Mortlake Magistrates' Court  
25           so that police could be legally represented. This was

1           duly granted. All the defendants indicated they would  
2           apply for legal aid."

3           Can you remember it being the common intention to  
4           apply for legal aid?

5           A. I -- I've got no recollection at all of legal aid.

6           I know -- I remember the solicitor Ben Birnberg --  
7           I think it's Birnberg -- he was quite a well known civil  
8           rights type lawyer. And whatever he recommended or  
9           advised, that's what we would have all done. So if he  
10          said that, then that's what I would have done.

11          Q. Yes, your witness statement refers to that, and says  
12          that you went along with the not guilty plea. You said  
13          in your statement:

14                 "I did not want to make waves."

15                 What did you mean by that?

16          A. I -- I don't recall -- I mean, that was the idea, that  
17          you were -- would plead not guilty. So it's a natural  
18          thing, a natural follow-on that you would plead not  
19          guilty. But I certainly wouldn't have pleaded guilty.  
20          That would be kind of a crazy thing to have done. So  
21          I suppose, if I've said this about not making waves,  
22          that's what I would have meant.

23          Q. Why would it have been crazy to plead guilty?

24          A. Because I'm an undercover police officer. Everyone else  
25          is pleading not guilty and I put my hand up and say, "Oh

1           yeah, I was guilty." That would be silly, wouldn't it?

2           Q. Had you had an opportunity to speak to your managers  
3           between being arrested on the 12th and your first  
4           appearance on 15 May?

5           A. I may well have done, but I can't recall having done so.

6           Q. As far as you were aware, did they know that you were  
7           going to plead not guilty?

8           A. I don't know whether they knew or not, but -- it was  
9           never mentioned, as far as I'm concerned.

10          Q. Between your first appearance and the trial, we've got  
11          two intelligence reports bearing your name.

12                 If we could take the current document down, please,  
13          and have up in its place {MPS/737109}.

14                 Now, this is a report dated 25 May 1972, and  
15          therefore between first appearance and trial. It bears  
16          your name at the end, and also it's countersigned by  
17          HN294. And it starts at paragraph 1 by saying:

18                         "On Sunday 21.5.1972 from 4 pm until 6.30 pm at  
19                         [Privacy] [Privacy] the home of Jonathan Rosenhead,  
20                         a meeting of persons concerned in the demonstration to  
21                         prevent the English Rugby touring team departing  
22                         punctually from their Richmond hotel on 12.5.1972, was  
23                         held. Thirteen persons attended."

24                         And then there is various content which is  
25          discussing events on the 12th. Can you recall now

1           relaying the contents of this report to your managers?

2           A. I can't recall it, no.

3           Q. Can we safely assume that the way you worked will have  
4           meant that at one of the weekly meetings, you will have  
5           handed in a manuscript version of a report on this  
6           meeting?

7           A. I would guess so, yes.

8           Q. And was there any management comment on your reporting  
9           this conversation between defendants?

10          A. No, I can't recall any.

11          Q. Can we take that down, please, and can we now go to  
12          tab 26, which is {MPS/737108}.

13                    This is a report dated 13 June 1972, so shortly  
14                    before the trial, again bearing your name, countersigned  
15                    by HN294. It reads, at paragraph 2:

16                    "On Sunday 11.6.72 from 4.15 pm to 6.35 pm at  
17                    [Privacy] [Privacy] a meeting of some of those arrested  
18                    at a demonstration against the English Rugby Tour at  
19                    Richmond on 12.5.72 was held.

20                    "Several of those present had met Ben Birnberg  
21                    (Solicitor) the previous day to discuss the case.  
22                    Rosenhead reported Birnberg ..."

23                    And then we have redacted the following passages  
24                    because they are subject to legal professional  
25                    privilege.

1           When you showed your manuscript version of this  
2           report to your managers, did they react at all to your  
3           reporting the legal advice that Ben Birnberg had given?

4       A.   Well, I can't remember showing them this report, but  
5           I guess I probably did, if I -- if I wrote it.  There  
6           was, no, no especial reaction, I don't think.

7       Q.   Then if we go down the page, please, at paragraph 6, it  
8           reads:

9           "Several voices were raised against Birnberg  
10          representing them as it was alleged that he was only  
11          interested in the money; this was apparently  
12          substantiated by his demand for £20 as soon as possible.

13          "There was some concern over the costs of the case  
14          and there was unanimous agreement that these should be  
15          defrayed equally regardless of individual fines and  
16          costs.  Rodker suggested forming a defence fund as  
17          a means of raising a proportion of the expenses and it  
18          was decided to set up 'The Richmond Defence Fund'.  
19          [Privacy] agreed to insert an appeal in 'Peace News' and  
20          Rosenhead added 'And Christabel Gurney can do the same  
21          with AAM.'"

22          Can you recall anything at all about the setting up  
23          of a defence fund?

24       A.   No.

25       Q.   Can we take that document down, please, and can we go

1 back to tab 24, which is {MPS/526782}, and could we have  
2 page 3, please, {MPS/526782/3}.

3 This is a memorandum from HN294 to the commander  
4 operations dated 26 June 1972, so a little after  
5 the trial. The paragraph I want to take you to was  
6 the third paragraph, which reads:

7 "The remaining seven asked for their cases to be  
8 heard at a higher court and have been further remanded  
9 until 28.6.72. In the event, it was not necessary for  
10 our man to apply for legal aid."

11 Can you recall whether or not you applied for legal  
12 aid?

13 A. No, I can't remember it.

14 Q. Can we take that down, please.

15 I'd like to go now to the trial on 14 June 1972 at  
16 Mortlake Magistrates' Court. On that occasion, to  
17 the best of your knowledge, was the court informed that  
18 you were an undercover police officer?

19 A. To the best of my knowledge, no, they weren't informed.

20 Q. To the best of your knowledge, was the court informed  
21 that you were not in fact Michael Peter Scott?

22 A. I certainly didn't inform them.

23 Q. As far as you are aware, did anybody else?

24 A. No.

25 Q. As far as you are aware, were the prosecution told that

- 1           you were in fact an undercover police officer?
- 2       A.   No.
- 3       Q.   As far as you are aware, was the defence told that you
- 4           were an undercover police officer?
- 5       A.   No.
- 6       Q.   You went through the trial as "Michael Peter Scott"; is
- 7           that right?
- 8       A.   Yes.
- 9       Q.   Did you give evidence?
- 10      A.   I can't recall having done so, but -- no, I can't recall
- 11           having done so. I must have stood there in the dock and
- 12           nodded my head or done something, I suppose.
- 13      Q.   So at the very least, you identified yourself to
- 14           the court as "Michael Peter Scott"?
- 15      A.   Yes, I would expect I must have done that, yes.
- 16      Q.   You were convicted of both obstructing the highway and
- 17           obstructing police, and you were fined for the first of
- 18           those offences; is that right?
- 19      A.   Yes.
- 20      Q.   Who paid the fine?
- 21      A.   Well, I would have put it down to my expenses, and it
- 22           would have gone in with my other expenses.
- 23      Q.   Moving now to the fact that some of your co-defendants
- 24           elected trial by jury at the Crown Court, we know that
- 25           that took place on 12 July 1972. Did you attend that

1 trial?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Are you sure you didn't attend it?

4 A. Yes. I wasn't even aware of it, I don't think.

5 Q. Can we now look at the attitude of your managers to  
6 the events that we've just been through. And it would  
7 assist to do that if we call up again, please,  
8 {MPS/526782}. And if we could start at page  
9 {MPS/526782/7}.

10 This is the document we looked at a moment ago.  
11 It's HN294's memo to Commander Ops, dated 16 May.

12 It gives the impression, if we look at the bottom of  
13 the page, of your motives for what you did. I just want  
14 to read that to you and then ask you about it.

15 The last paragraph reads:

16 "DC HN298 was faced with a difficult  
17 decision: whether on learning of the extremists' plans,  
18 to withdraw and inform me so that counter-measures could  
19 be taken, which would almost certainly have exposed him  
20 at the very least as a police informant, or to go along  
21 with them in the hope that he would learn more of what  
22 seems to be a new combination of extremists. He chose  
23 to do the latter and was subsequently arrested with  
24 them. He was led to this decision by the fact that,  
25 although he did not know any of the people involved, he



1 was aware that Rodker had been a key figure in  
2 the spectacular antics of the Stop the Seventy Tour  
3 Campaign which had resulted in large scale disorder, and  
4 got the impression that other, perhaps more nefarious  
5 activities would be attempted if this current  
6 demonstration was successful."

7 Is that an accurate summation of why you went along  
8 with the plan?

9 A. More or less, but it indicates there that somehow I had  
10 the opportunity to inform him, but in actual fact I had  
11 no opportunity to inform them. But yes, I went along  
12 with it, because it seemed the sensible thing to do.

13 Q. Pausing there. Having had no opportunity to inform your  
14 managers of what was going on, was there an opportunity  
15 to avoid arrest?

16 A. Well, I suppose if I'd -- if I hadn't taken part in  
17 the demonstration, there would have -- you know, if  
18 I'd have just -- but I was there, part of  
19 the demonstration.

20 Q. Could you have held back, for example, and avoided an  
21 arrest?

22 A. Possibly. I don't know. I can't recall that. But  
23 there would be no point in going to a demonstration if,  
24 when it come to demonstrating, you actually stepped back  
25 and said, "No", you know, "I don't want to demonstrate".

1 I was part of the group and this is what we did. There  
2 was nothing too bad about anything that anyone did.

3 Q. Did you feel that participating in the events that led  
4 to your arrest helped with your undercover work?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Could we go over the page, please, {MPS/526782/8}, and  
7 the second paragraph there reads:

8 "The decision on which I should be obliged for your  
9 guidance is whether DC HN298 should continue his attempt  
10 to learn more of them. To do this he will probably have  
11 to apply, as they are doing, for legal aid and attend  
12 meetings with all those arrested to discuss tactics etc.  
13 Whilst I am reasonably confident that DC HN298 could,  
14 with assistance, carry this off, there is, of course  
15 the potential of embarrassment to police if his true  
16 identity should ever be disclosed.

17 "Alternatively, he could disappear from  
18 the political scene.

19 "Both are technically possible but if the latter  
20 decision is reached we would lose intelligence coverage  
21 of what in the past has been a troublesome area of  
22 the public order field."

23 Did you have any discussions with HN294 about  
24 whether you should go ahead with the trial or,  
25 alternatively, disappear from the political scene?

- 1 A. I don't think those were the alternatives, actually.  
2 I didn't -- I have no recollection of the trial and --  
3 or going to it; and I certainly didn't disappear from  
4 the scene, I just didn't go to the court, or anything  
5 else.
- 6 Q. What I'm asking is, can you recall discussing with HN294  
7 what you should do?
- 8 A. I can't recall that, but it may well have taken place.
- 9 Q. In terms of the reference to "the potential of  
10 embarrassment to police", was that discussed with you at  
11 all?
- 12 A. Not that I can recollect, no.
- 13 Q. Do you know what 294 is referring to when he speaks of  
14 -- writes of "potential of embarrassment"?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. Could you enlighten us, please?
- 17 A. Well, obviously if a police officer is amidst a group of  
18 people that get arrested, then obviously they could all  
19 say, "Oh, he told us to do it," or some silly thing like  
20 that, "He was an agent provocateur." So yes, there's  
21 a potential to be an embarrassment there, yes.
- 22 Q. Was there also the potential for embarrassment of being  
23 an undercover police officer spying on  
24 the Young Liberals?
- 25 A. Yes, anything to do with those groups. I mean, yes,

1           there was potential.

2           Q. Can we, in the same document, please, go back to page 1  
3           {MPS/526782/1}.

4           This is a memorandum from Commander Ops, who at that  
5           stage was M Rodger, to the Deputy Assistant  
6           Commissioner. I'd like to draw your attention to some  
7           of the second paragraph, which reads:

8           "Faced with an awkward dilemma for so young an  
9           officer, I feel that DC HN298 acted with refreshing  
10          initiative, as a result of which he must now have both  
11          feet inside the door of this group of  
12          anarchist-orientated extremists under the control and  
13          direction of Ernest Rodker. This man has been a thorn  
14          in the flesh for several years now, having had no fewer  
15          than 14 court appearances prior to 1963 for offences  
16          involving public disorder."

17          My first question arising from that passage is, at  
18          any stage, was it made known to you that a very senior  
19          officer in Special Branch felt that you had acted with  
20          refreshing initiative?

21          A. No.

22          Q. Did you get any feedback from senior officers about your  
23          actions on 12 May?

24          A. No.

25          Q. Did you get any sense that your managers felt that you

1           had further established yourself within the group that  
2           you were infiltrating?

3           A. No.

4           Q. The description of Ernest Rodker that I have just read,  
5           was that one that was familiar to you at the time?

6           A. I was familiar with Ernest Rodker, yes.

7           Q. In this way or not?

8           A. That he could be a thorn in the side of police, yes. He  
9           was -- I would say he was quite an intelligent man, and  
10          he was probably quite a good organiser. And therefore  
11          he was able to organise things that were disruptive and  
12          were an irritation to the police.

13          Q. Did you regard him as one to watch?

14          A. Oh yes, he was definitely one of the people that  
15          actually did things, and -- so, yes, I mean, the idea  
16          was to know what -- what he was up to.

17                 He was a very -- pretty careful in terms of  
18          security, you know. He did things in a certain way.  
19          For example, that meeting, there was no opportunity for  
20          anyone to wander off. It was straight from that meeting  
21          to the demonstration. There was no opportunity for  
22          me to phone anyone or do anything. And that was his  
23          organisation that made that evolve in that way. So he  
24          was a good organiser, yeah.

25          Q. Thank you.

1           Could we move to page 2, please, {MPS/526782/2}.

2           This is a memo from the DAC to Commander Ops, dated  
3           18 May. It follows a document that we've just been  
4           looking at:

5           "We have discussed the problems posed by DC HN298's  
6           arrest, which I regard merely as one of the hazards  
7           associated with the valuable type of work he is doing.  
8           There is absolutely no criticism of the officer."

9           Was there any criticism of you by managers?

10          A. No, I don't think so. I wasn't aware of any criticism.  
11          I quite understood how it would give them a little bit  
12          of a jolt for it to happen; they've then got to explain  
13          themselves to their senior officers. But I never felt  
14          any criticism, no.

15          Q. And were you aware whether your managers regarded what  
16          happened to you as a hazard of the work you were doing?

17          A. I think it was an inevitable thing really, if you were  
18          involved in these -- these groups, to -- you know, for  
19          this kind of thing to happen. It's -- it's part of  
20          the job really.

21          Q. And then it reads:

22                 "Provided the charges against HN298 and the others  
23                 arrested with him remain as at present formulated, then  
24                 we should not run into difficulties and HN298 will have  
25                 to go through with it. On the other hand, if we learn

1           that more serious charges may be preferred,  
2           eg conspiracy, then we shall have to reconsider  
3           the whole position. Please ensure that DI HN294 reports  
4           to you immediately any developments in that respect."

5           So, we see from that passage that there appears to  
6           have been a concern about the possibility that more  
7           serious charges could be preferred. Was that made known  
8           to you?

9           A. Well, I was aware that such a thing could happen, but it  
10          seemed to me unlikely, because it was just a -- it was  
11          not an incident where anyone was hurt, or any serious  
12          damage to anything, so it didn't seem likely to me that  
13          it would escalate.

14          Q. Did anyone explain to you that you -- that the position  
15          may be reconsidered if more serious charges were  
16          preferred?

17          A. No, they didn't.

18          Q. And then finally the memo reads:

19                 "I have informed ACC verbally of the situation."

20                 We understand "ACC" to be the Assistant Commissioner  
21                 (Crime); are we right?

22          A. Yes.

23          Q. And "ACC" is a very senior officer within the ranks of  
24          the Metropolitan Police; is that right?

25          A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Did you know that your progress through the criminal  
2 justice system had been elevated to that level of  
3 the Metropolitan Police hierarchy?
- 4 A. I believe that I did subsequently. I don't know at what  
5 stage I knew it. But I'm not surprised; I wasn't  
6 surprised that that would happen.
- 7 Q. Can I ask now about the real Michael Scott.  
8 And we can take that document down, please.  
9 Was any thought given by you to the consequences of  
10 being convicted in the name of a real person who might  
11 be alive?
- 12 A. In this particular case, it was such a low-key thing  
13 that no one -- it wouldn't matter who you were. If you  
14 had been convicted of such a thing, it would mean very  
15 little really.
- 16 Q. Can I take that as a no?
- 17 A. Yes. No, as a no.
- 18 Q. And did any of your managers give any consideration to  
19 the state of the real Michael Peter Scott's criminal  
20 record as a result of events?
- 21 A. If they did or didn't, I wasn't aware of it. But of  
22 course, I suppose, in their defence, they might not have  
23 known that he was a real person. They didn't know that  
24 he actually existed. I suspect they didn't know an  
25 anyway.



- 1 Q. Coming back to yourself in your real persona, did you  
2 consider yourself in your non-undercover life after  
3 June 1972 to be a person with a criminal record?
- 4 A. No, I didn't. I never gave it another thought really.
- 5 Q. When you were asked to declare whether or not you had  
6 been convicted of any offences in your life after that,  
7 did you declare your convictions at the Richmond  
8 Magistrates' Court or not?
- 9 A. Well, the real -- the real 298 wasn't convicted of  
10 anything, so he wouldn't declare it.
- 11 Q. Were you given any guidance or instruction about what to  
12 do on this from your managers?
- 13 A. Not that I can recall.
- 14 Q. We're going to move on now to the West Cross Action  
15 Group. And there are three reports in the bundle about  
16 the activities of the West Cross Action Group, who seem  
17 to have been protesting about the proposed construction  
18 of a motorway. Do you have any independent recollection  
19 now of the West Cross Action Group?
- 20 A. I vaguely remember it. I vaguely remember it, actually.
- 21 Q. And from what you can vaguely remember, can you help us  
22 with why you came to report on the West Cross Action  
23 Group?
- 24 A. Well, I suppose it's like anyone that is protesting  
25 about a road, there's the possibility that they would do

1 something to stop it happening, and that's of interest  
2 to the police.

3 Q. Let's have a look quickly at some of the documents. Can  
4 we start first at tab 27 at {UCPI/8258}.

5 If we look first of all at paragraph 2, it's  
6 difficult to read, but it says:

7 "On Sunday 11.6.72 from 7.30 pm to 10.15 pm at 90  
8 Fawe Park Road, SW15, a meeting of what was later to be  
9 known as the West Cross Action Group was held. 16  
10 persons attended."

11 So we are back in the Hains' living room, aren't we?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Paragraph 3:

14 "The meeting was convened by the invitation of  
15 Peter Hain, to selected persons, all Young Liberals, who  
16 either had a particular interest in motorways or who  
17 were likely to participate actively in any decisions  
18 reached. For this reason amongst those present were  
19 persons able to ensure good newspaper and television  
20 coverage should it be required, and those of proven  
21 organisational ability."

22 Would it be right for us to assume that it was  
23 the fact you had infiltrated the Young Liberals that  
24 took you naturally to the West Cross Action Group?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And when you've written "were likely to participate  
2 actively in any decision reached", what does that mean?

3 A. I guess it means that those people that have actually  
4 turned up at demonstrations and shown themselves  
5 prepared to do more than talk about it.

6 Q. Could we scroll down to the bottom of the page. Thank  
7 you.

8 There's a stamp at the bottom left of this document  
9 which reads "Box 500". We understand that to mean  
10 the Security Service. Does it -- did you know whether  
11 or not your reporting was going to be Security Service  
12 at the time?

13 A. I expected that many of these reports did. In fact,  
14 I suspect many of the reports that I've seen were  
15 actually written by them.

16 Q. What makes you think the reports were written by them?

17 A. Because some of the detail in it was -- probably used  
18 resources, more resources than were available to me.

19 Q. Coming back to this meeting, you're not suggesting, are  
20 you, anything other than it was you in the Hains' living  
21 room reporting on the West Cross Action Group?

22 A. It certainly seems that I was in the Hains' living room  
23 reporting on it, but other people may well have been  
24 there as well.

25 Q. Can we now go, please -- could we take that down -- to

1 tab 28, which is {UCPI/8260}.

2 Now, this is -- it's either 26 or 28 June, 298, and  
3 it's a report about a meeting held on 25 June, which  
4 appears to have been at the private home of somebody  
5 else in the West Cross Action Group.

6 Can we go to the bottom of the page and to  
7 paragraph 6 in particular. Thank you.

8 Again we see on the left it's been marked  
9 as "Box 500". Paragraph 6 reads:

10 "Peter Hain suggested that some form of direct  
11 action should be incorporated into the campaign and  
12 repeated a previous suggestion that painting the roads  
13 at points where the motorway would cross existing  
14 avenues might be a good idea. Hain, as security  
15 conscious as ever, added as an aside that perhaps if  
16 someone volunteered (which they did not) that person  
17 could go away and do it without informing the others.  
18 If such an action was embarked upon by any member of  
19 the group it is likely to be carried out late at night  
20 on 7.7.72 or during the day of 9.7.72. [Privacy] and  
21 [Privacy] have an intimate knowledge of the interchanges  
22 along the 3.5-mile route and if such activities are  
23 carried out at all, they are the most likely to be  
24 involved."

25 Was this the kind of non-violent direct action that

- 1           was typical of members of the Young Liberals?
- 2       A. I don't know that it was typical, but certainly some  
3           individuals that were in the Young Liberals and  
4           Commitment would have perhaps embarked upon things such  
5           as this.
- 6       Q. Did anybody ever give you to understand why  
7           the Security Service were interested in activities such  
8           as this?
- 9       A. I would have thought that where the Security Service had  
10           people, or the means of ascertaining this information,  
11           they passed it on to the police as a matter of course,  
12           I would think.
- 13      Q. Our understanding -- just to be clear, our understanding  
14           is this is a document that's gone from Special Branch to  
15           the Security Service and not the other way around.
- 16      A. Well, I don't know.
- 17      Q. Okay.
- 18                 If we could take that down, please.
- 19                 From your recollection, did the West Cross Action  
20           Group cause any public disorder?
- 21      A. Not that I can recollect.
- 22      Q. Did they go ahead with the plan to paint the roads?
- 23      A. Not that I can recall.
- 24      Q. Did they commit any criminal offences?
- 25      A. If they did, they didn't make me aware of them.

1 Q. And would it follow from the fact they were protesting  
2 against a motorway that they were in no way trying to  
3 overthrow parliamentary democracy?

4 A. They may well have been. They may well -- but I don't  
5 think so.

6 Q. Given the answers you've just given me, why did you feel  
7 it necessary to report on their activities?

8 A. Well, it wasn't all about overthrowing democracy, it was  
9 about nuisance value, and the fact that they caused  
10 problems and possibly danger to the public by their  
11 actions, and therefore this is the role of the police.  
12 This is what we have the police for, to look after us.  
13 That's the theory, at least. And that's -- that's  
14 the role -- they -- they fitted into that little slot.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 Can we move now to the Irish Solidarity Campaign,  
17 and we've got some reports that span between May and  
18 October of 1972. First of all, Bloody Sunday occurred  
19 on 30 January 1972. Is it fair to say that the period  
20 when you were reporting on the Irish Solidarity Campaign  
21 was one of heightened tension in Northern Ireland?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And indeed on the mainland?

24 A. Within the Irish community, yes.

25 Q. Was the Irish Solidarity Campaign violent?

- 1 A. Not -- not to my knowledge.
- 2 Q. Were they supportive of people who were violent?
- 3 A. Probably so, yes.
- 4 Q. Were they -- (overspeaking) -- was their support  
5 confined to words, or did it extend to deeds?
- 6 A. I suspect that it was confined to words and financial  
7 support. Although, in lots of these groups there were  
8 individuals that were also perhaps -- I shouldn't say  
9 lots of people; but there were individuals that were  
10 connected to the Irish Republican Army, either of their  
11 groupings. And -- but they were still involved in  
12 groups like this, the solidarity groups.
- 13 Q. How keen was Special Branch at this stage to obtain  
14 intelligence about Irish-related matters?
- 15 A. Well, I think they were, because after all, this was  
16 the function of Special Branch in its origins, and  
17 therefore they had a responsibility. So yes, they would  
18 have been interested to know about any -- anything like  
19 that.
- 20 Q. How did you come to start reporting on  
21 the Irish Solidarity Campaign?
- 22 A. I don't know. I guess I just slid into it, like lots of  
23 these different groups. There was meetings that  
24 I attended and -- and that was it, you know? Continued  
25 to attend the meetings.

- 1 Q. You moved on to the Anti-Internment League, it appears,  
2 because we've got some reports spanning September 1972  
3 to November 1973. Can you recall how you came to start  
4 infiltrating the AIL?
- 5 A. Well, lots of these groups had similar people and people  
6 belonged to the same groups, they went from one to  
7 the other. And often it's not -- it wasn't a case of  
8 either this or that, it was a case that it was basically  
9 the same underlying theme. It was about supporting --  
10 really supporting the rebellion in Ireland really.
- 11 Q. Let's have a look at an example report on the AIL. It's  
12 {MPS/728845}.
- 13 Now, this is a report on the AIL's October 1972  
14 conference, and it bears three names at the end, as well  
15 as a manager's signature. The names are yours and those  
16 of the officers we know as "HN338" and "HN301".
- 17 Were you at the 1972 AIL conference?
- 18 A. I can't recall being there.
- 19 Q. Does that mean that you might have been, you just can't  
20 recall? Or does that mean you are sure that you  
21 weren't?
- 22 A. I'm not sure that I wasn't there, but I can't recall  
23 being there.
- 24 Q. Was this a report that you would have prepared with  
25 HN338 and HN301 or not?



1 A. No.

2 Q. Is this a report that has been compiled by somebody else  
3 using intelligence which all three of you have produced?

4 A. Possibly so.

5 Q. Can we look, please, on page 3 at paragraph 8  
6 {MPS/728845/3}.

7 Paragraph 8 reads:

8 "[Privacy] stand on the Republican Movement was  
9 reiterated by [Privacy] a fellow-member of  
10 the Sinn Fein. Without any provocation this highly  
11 volatile young man made a bitter attack on anyone who  
12 even hinted at thinking unfavourably of the IRA  
13 Provisionals. He continued in the same vein and  
14 defended the bombings. He made it quite clear that he  
15 considered the bombings to be part of a well thought out  
16 strategy to rid Ireland of the tentacles of capitalism.  
17 The charge that they were indiscriminate was the cry of  
18 the uninformed and politically naive. In a final  
19 gesture of emotion he boasted that the IRA would, if  
20 necessary, bomb their way to the conference table and on  
21 to victory."

22 Is this an example of the sort of connection with  
23 the Provisional IRA that you were referring to earlier?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. How common was this sort of view within the AIL?

1       A. I think it wasn't tremendously common. These elements  
2       were there, but there are many people that were  
3       essentially liberals really, that just didn't believe in  
4       interning people and that kind of thing. Whereas  
5       they -- they put a -- they put a halt at going further  
6       than that. They didn't want to blow people up, but ...  
7       so you had the whole mix of people in these -- these  
8       groups, but there was an element of this -- this kind of  
9       thing in it.

10      Q. Can we go now, please, to page 5 of the document and  
11      paragraph 18 {MPS/728845/5}.

12                 Paragraph 18 reads:

13                 "At the end of the conference, it was apparent that  
14                 most persons who had attended were very disappointed  
15                 with the results. Their expectations of long and varied  
16                 debates, and deep political discussions fell  
17                 resoundingly flat. The main point to arise from  
18                 the weekend was the emergence of the IMG in the guise of  
19                 Lawless and Purdie as the new leaders of the [AIL],  
20                 a move which had of course been anticipated."

21                 Is it your recollection that at about this time  
22                 the AIL was emerging as more of a force within -- sorry  
23                 the IMG was emerging as more of a force within the AIL?

24      A. Yes.

25      Q. And was that sort of information of interest to

1 Special Branch?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Why?

4 A. To form -- if you're going to form a coherent and  
5 truthful picture of what is going on in these  
6 organisations, you know -- you need to know who these  
7 people are and from where they're coming. And so that's  
8 why it's important to know about them.

9 Q. Can you recall whether or not HN301, who used the cover  
10 name "Bob Stubbs", was the South London delegate to this  
11 conference?

12 A. I can't -- I can't recall that, no.

13 Q. Can we take this document down, please.

14 I'm going to try my luck now, 298, at seeing if we  
15 can read a very difficult document.

16 Can we have up, please, {UCPI/7991}. And if we  
17 could go to the second page, please, and paragraph 8  
18 {UCPI/7991/2}.

19 This is a report bearing your name from  
20 September 1972 about the Central London AIL. About  
21 two-thirds of the way down paragraph 8, if that could be  
22 expanded still further, please, it reads -- and it's in  
23 relation, I think, to Lawless:

24 "He added that the PD were now forming 'a force',  
25 which was understood to mean an armed unit quite

1 distinct from any involvement with either wings of  
2 the IRA."

3 Is "PD", People's Democracy?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Is this the sort of information that was of interest to  
6 Special Branch?

7 A. Yes, this is -- this is quite important stuff really,  
8 and, yes, that was in -- of relevance and importance to  
9 Special Branch.

10 Q. Now, I don't want you to refer to any other  
11 Special Branch sources, but do you know whether or not  
12 this was news to Special Branch or not?

13 A. I would guess that it was new -- news to them, but it  
14 may well not have been. It was certainly new to me. So  
15 they have -- I mean, the Branch has other access to  
16 information via the -- via --

17 Q. No need to go into other sources, thank you very much,  
18 298.

19 Could we take that document down, please.

20 I think it's right that you became the appointed  
21 person for donations of books and magazines for  
22 internees within the AIL; is that right?

23 A. Within -- well, within a group known as the "Belfast  
24 Ten", yes.

25 Q. How did that come about?

1 A. It seemed a good way of being supplied with information  
2 and a supply of books.

3 Q. And what sort of information were you hoping to glean?

4 A. Well, people that are obviously supporters of  
5 the Belfast Ten. They would be the ones that would be  
6 contributing books.

7 Q. And you'd report upon them if they did; is that right?

8 A. Well, it's all part of the -- the system, yeah.

9 Q. Can you recall whether anyone did make any donations?

10 A. I think there may well have been one or two, but that's  
11 about all, I think.

12 Q. Can we move on now to the Troops Out Movement. You say  
13 in your witness statement that you attended meetings of  
14 this organisation, but you wouldn't go so far as to  
15 describe yourself as infiltrating it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Could you explain the distinction?

18 A. Well, you can -- you can attend these things, like on  
19 the fringes, without actually deepening your involvement  
20 in it.

21 Q. The Troops Out Movement wasn't violent, was it?

22 A. Not as far as I know, no, but I suppose you always get  
23 nutters in these groups.

24 Q. And it wasn't trying to overthrow parliamentary  
25 democracy?

- 1 A. Possibly not.
- 2 Q. As far as you were aware, were its members committing,  
3 as a matter of group policy, criminal offences?
- 4 A. Not to my knowledge.
- 5 Q. So, why was it of interest to Special Branch?
- 6 A. Because the troops, I suppose, are of interest to all of  
7 us, including Special Branch, as an organisation  
8 upholding the law; they would be interested in anything  
9 that was actually anti-the troops. And these movements  
10 were anti-the troops, although not necessarily violently  
11 so.
- 12 Q. To be clear, was it just because they were soldiers, or  
13 was it because they were soldiers in Northern Ireland?
- 14 A. Well, the same soldiers are soldiers anywhere, they just  
15 might get sent to Northern Ireland and -- and so, yes,  
16 it was focused on those in Northern Ireland.
- 17 Q. And was it of interest to Special Branch because of  
18 the Irish connection?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Now, there came a time when Gery Lawless accused you of  
21 being a police officer. I think I gleaned from your  
22 witness statement that as best you can recall, this may  
23 have occurred at a TOM meeting; is that right?
- 24 A. He never accused me of anything while I was present.
- 25 Q. But you'd gathered that he'd made the acquisition to

1           somebody else; is that right?

2           A.  Someone told me that he'd -- he'd made the accusation.

3           Q.  And is there a connection with a TOM meeting?

4           A.  There wasn't, no.

5           Q.  I see.

6           A.  Not as far as I'm concerned there wasn't.  I was told by

7           someone not -- not an Irish person, it was nothing to do

8           with TOM.

9           Q.  In terms of Gery Lawless' influence within

10          the Troops Out Movement, is it right to say that the IMG

11          had a significant interest in TOM?

12          A.  Yes.

13          Q.  And was that of interest to Special Branch?

14          A.  Yes.

15          Q.  Could you expand upon that, please?

16          A.  Well, IMG is a -- perhaps a virulent -- a virulent

17          Marxist group, and they were endeavouring to infiltrate

18          anywhere where they could really cause problems.  But in

19          the case of Gery Lawless, he was Irish, of course, and

20          he was -- he was -- what can I say? -- he was a problem

21          wherever he went, so --

22          Q.  Why was that?

23          A.  He was just a nasty individual, actually.  But he's now

24          dead, so I suppose we shouldn't talk too nastily about

25          him.  But he wasn't a very nice man.  And he was

1           believed to be working for the Irish Security Service,  
2           so ...

3       Q.   Can you help us then with the context in which you came  
4           to learn that Gery Lawless had said to somebody else  
5           that he thought that you were a spy?

6       A.   I was told by a woman that he had said this.  That was  
7           the only time it occurred.  And then that was it really.

8       Q.   Did you ever find out what the basis for the allegation  
9           was?

10      A.   No, I didn't --

11      Q.   -- (overspeaking) -- sorry, carry on.

12      A.   I do know that my -- the address that I used,  
13           the landlady in that place was what you might call --  
14           well, she was Irish, but she was a very simple woman.  
15           And I think he -- he may well have known her, as it  
16           turned out.  I don't know.

17      Q.   I see.

18                 Now, you tell us in your witness statement that by  
19           chance you saw Gery Lawless in a phone booth whilst  
20           driving home.

21      A.   Yeah.

22      Q.   And that there was then an incident, which we will come  
23           to in a moment.

24                 How soon after learning about the allegation was it  
25           that you saw him in the phone booth?



1           A. It was actually pure chance, that it was on my way home  
2           from that very meeting. And I was driving by and there  
3           he was in the phone booth.

4           Q. Can you help us with what the -- which group it was that  
5           had met?

6           A. I can't actually recall which meeting it was. I mean,  
7           I've -- I reported it at the time, and the office was  
8           aware of it. I made them aware of it, but ...

9           Q. Can you recall where the phone booth was?

10          A. I think it was -- no, it might have been Islington,  
11          I don't know. I can't remember.

12          Q. Can you tell us, please, what happened next?

13          A. Well, he was in the phone box and I went over there and  
14          confronted him with these false allegations that he'd  
15          been alleged to have made, and that was it really.  
16          I punched him on the nose, which seemed to be justice.

17          Q. Did he say anything to you before you punched him on  
18          the nose?

19          A. He tried -- he was actually trying to take his belt off  
20          so that he could hit me with his belt. But, no, it was  
21          nothing more than that. He wasn't injured especially.  
22          And I went to the next meeting, because I couldn't let  
23          him get away with that. And he didn't turn up, of  
24          course. But following that meeting, I then -- you know,  
25          it was no good tempting fate, so I -- I left.

1 I didn't -- yes, I just didn't attend any more meetings  
2 of that group.

3 Q. Can I go back to the immediate buildup to you hitting  
4 Gery Lawless. Was there an exchange of words, or was it  
5 just one-sided from you?

6 A. No, there was -- he may well have something -- he may  
7 well have said something, but it wasn't of any  
8 importance to me at the time that I recollected it.  
9 I had -- he was a very -- he was a nasty character  
10 really.

11 Q. What I'd like to know is, should we go away with  
12 a picture of a verbal confrontation and escalating  
13 tempers, or was it something more straightforward than  
14 that?

15 A. Well, he was contained within the phone box, so,  
16 you know, I opened the door and he was in the phone box.  
17 So there -- you know, I -- I said that he'd been  
18 spreading these lies and what was the basis of it. And  
19 I got no sensible answer. Obviously he was a little bit  
20 surprised. I don't say he was frightened. He wasn't  
21 that kind of bloke. He may well have been frightened,  
22 but he didn't appear to be. He seemed to be struggling  
23 to undo his belt. But I didn't get any answer from him  
24 really.

25 Q. And you said in an earlier answer that they were false

1           allegations, but of course they weren't false,  
2           were they?

3           A. No, of course not, no.

4           Q. So this was all -- was this all an act on your part?

5           A. Yeah, of course. I mean, the whole thing is an act,  
6           isn't it.

7           Q. So, what I'd like to know is, did you -- was -- were  
8           your actions on that evening cold and calculated, or  
9           actions taken in hot blood?

10          A. Well, they were cold and calculated insofar as  
11          I stumbled across him almost. And having done so, then  
12          you've then got to do something about it. In my mind  
13          I had to. He didn't know I was there until I appeared  
14          and opened the door. But yes, it was the only -- in my  
15          opinion, the only sensible way to deal with it, because  
16          if you suddenly put up your hands and you confirm in his  
17          mind that he was right and it confirms in other people's  
18          minds that he was right. And that's why I went back to  
19          the next meeting.

20                 But of course, what happened was I actually had  
21          chipped the bone in my finger and I had -- I had  
22          the part of my arm wrapped up, you know, at  
23          the hospital. And so when I went back to the next  
24          meeting it was wrapped up. And subsequently, he said,  
25          "Oh yeah", he said, "I broke his arm," which I must

- 1           admit I found amusing as well.
- 2       Q.   At what point did you decide to hit him?
- 3       A.   As soon as I saw him and went over and opened the door,  
4           and said, "Why are you doing this?" And I didn't --  
5           I don't know what his response was, but it was enough  
6           for me to -- to hit him. He wasn't -- he wasn't badly  
7           hurt or anything.
- 8       Q.   Sorry, I'm not quite clear whether you had formed  
9           the intention to hit him before you opened the phone box  
10          door, or whether it was during the course of  
11          the conversation that ensued?
- 12      A.   I didn't go there with the intention of hitting him on  
13          the nose, I went to confront him with it, his  
14          accusations. So I opened the door and then said,  
15          you know, "What are you doing spreading these malicious  
16          lies?" Or something to that effect.
- 17      Q.   But at what point did you decide: I'm going to hit him?
- 18      A.   At the point he said "feck off", that's when I hit him.
- 19      Q.   I think, when we started your evidence, we established  
20          that you hadn't been given any formal training or  
21          guidance. At any point before this incident happened  
22          had you discussed in any way whatsoever, with either  
23          your fellow UCOs or your managers, what to do in  
24          the event that you were accused of being not who you  
25          said you were?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. Can I take it from that that you were acting entirely  
3 off your own bat in deciding to confront and then to hit  
4 Gery Lawless?
- 5 A. Yes. No blame lies with any senior officers.
- 6 Q. You, I think, mention that you reported events. What  
7 was the reaction of your managers to what you reported  
8 about this incident?
- 9 A. Well, I told them that I was -- wished to go back to  
10 the next meeting, and they expressed some level of  
11 reluctance about that, but they agreed that I should.  
12 But then when we went -- I went to the meeting, they  
13 also -- several officers went in a car and were close  
14 by. I don't know what they could have done, but if they  
15 felt it was necessary, they could have been of some  
16 assistance.
- 17 Q. Did they express an opinion one way or the other about  
18 the fact that you had hit Gery Lawless?
- 19 A. I don't recall them -- I don't recall them indicating --  
20 saying anything.
- 21 Q. You have described your amusement at Gery Lawless  
22 claiming to have broken your arm.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Is that the sort of anecdote that you would have shared  
25 with your colleagues at the SDS safe house?

1 A. Subsequently, yes, yeah.

2 Q. And with your managers?

3 A. Well, if they were there, I suppose, yes.

4 Q. And can you remember the reaction of your colleagues?

5 A. No.

6 Q. You'll have to forgive me for being a lawyer, 298, but  
7 what made you think it was acceptable to commit a crime  
8 of violence against a member of the public during  
9 the course of your deployment?

10 A. Well, it was acceptable to me, and I was the one that  
11 made the decision, I was the one that was there. And  
12 the person that was the so-called victim was  
13 Gery Lawless.

14 Q. But it was a crime of violence, wasn't it?

15 A. I don't think so, no.

16 Q. It wasn't something that you had to do, was it?

17 A. I felt that I had to do it, yes.

18 Q. Wouldn't words alone have sufficed?

19 A. No.

20 MR BARR: Sir, would now be an appropriate time to take  
21 the mid-afternoon break?

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

23 Almost on the last leg but not quite. Can you be  
24 ready in 15 minutes, please?

25 A. Yes.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

2 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
3 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
4 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

5 The time is now 3.20 pm, so we shall reconvene at  
6 3.35 pm. Thank you.

7 (3.19 pm)

8 (A short break)

9 (3.35 pm)

10 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

11 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
12 proceedings.

13 Chairman.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

15 Mr Barr, before you resume your questioning, can  
16 I just clarify one minor matter? In the schedule of  
17 those convicted arising out of the events at  
18 the Star & Garter, I think only one man, at his own  
19 election, went for trial to the Crown Court, Sutton  
20 Crown Court, on a charge of dangerous driving, which may  
21 have arisen out of the incident. I think everybody else  
22 was dealt with at the Magistrates' Court.

23 It may be that you didn't hear what I said. Let me  
24 repeat it.

25 Mr Barr, before we resume questioning, can I clarify

1 a point?

2 MR BARR: Sorry, Sir, I thought you were asking the witness,  
3 not me.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: No, sorry, I was asking you, because he  
5 wouldn't know either way.

6 MR BARR: My understanding is that the motoring offence went  
7 to the Crown Court. It's also right, of course, that  
8 Rodker and Rosenhead went to the Crown Court and there  
9 was a trial on 12 July.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm not sure that they said that. At least  
11 I don't think they said that; and the record would  
12 suggest otherwise.

13 MR BARR: Well, if I'm mistaken, then that's a matter to be  
14 clarified on the papers.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: I think there was evidence that they had  
16 contemplated going to the administrative court, to seek  
17 judicial review of a decision relating to it, but in  
18 the event it seems nothing happened. But it would be  
19 surprising if a Crown Court trial could have been  
20 arranged for that many people that quickly after  
21 electing to stand trial; and I don't think the offences  
22 were triable either way anyway, so I doubt they could  
23 have elected.

24 MR BARR: I can see that Ms Hummerstone is checking  
25 the records already, and so by the time I've finished



1           we'll have an answer for you one way or the other, Sir.

2           THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Then please resume your  
3           questions.

4           MR BARR: 298, the Workers Revolutionary Party. How and why  
5           did you come to infiltrate the WRP?

6           A. Well, to what we were talking about previously,  
7           I attended the second meeting, which Gery Lawless didn't  
8           attend, but I thought that the -- you know, the writing  
9           was on the wall, and it seemed to make sense not to go  
10          back there again, which I didn't, and to go off in  
11          another area which was of interest to the Branch, and  
12          that was the Workers Revolutionary Party.

13          Q. And could you help us with where on the political  
14          spectrum the Workers Revolutionary Party was?

15          A. The Workers Revolutionary Party was -- I suppose it  
16          really was revolutionary in the sense that their method  
17          was to infiltrate industry, to infiltrate the unions,  
18          and therefore exercise some real disruptive power. So,  
19          you know, they were quite -- they were certainly worthy  
20          of note. They were -- you needed to know what they were  
21          doing, because they could potentially be quite  
22          dangerous.

23          Q. And were they a Trotskyist group?

24          A. Yes, they were.

25          Q. And if we turn up, please, tab 61 {UCPI/6961}, please.

1           This is a report dated 24 March 1975 about the WRP.  
2           The report is generally about organising a march and  
3           demonstration from Hull to Liverpool. The paragraph I'm  
4           interested in is paragraph 5. It says:

5           "The Hull/Liverpool march will pass through  
6           Yorkshire mining areas and there will be tremendous  
7           pressure on Scargill to give some support.  
8           Nevertheless, he will be denounced as a 'Stalinist  
9           betrayeur of the working class'."

10          First of all, we're talking about Arthur Scargill,  
11          aren't we, of the National Union of Mineworkers?

12         A. Yes, that report deals with him, yes.

13         Q. And, secondly, does that quotation give a good sense of  
14          where on the political spectrum  
15          the Workers Revolutionary Party was?

16         A. Yes, I think it does.

17         Q. Thank you.

18                 Could we take that down now, please.

19                 Now, we know that HN303 also reported on  
20                 the Workers Revolutionary Party, and you tell us in your  
21                 witness statement that you were aware of his deployment.

22                 The Inquiry's understanding is that he was deployed  
23                 between 1973 to 1977, and spent some of that time  
24                 himself deployed by the Workers Revolutionary Party into  
25                 the extreme right wing, but it would appear from those

1           dates that you were both members of the SDS together for  
2           a number of years.

3                    Can you recall HN303 at your meetings in the safe  
4           house?

5           A.   Yes.

6           Q.   And did you discuss the Workers Revolutionary Party?

7           A.   No.

8           Q.   Were you aware that he was deployed into the far right  
9           by the WRP?

10          A.   No, I wasn't.

11          Q.   So you never discussed that at all?

12          A.   No.

13          Q.   Now, are you sure that you never, ever discussed  
14          the Workers Revolutionary Party on which you had both  
15          reported?

16          A.   Yes.

17          Q.   Did you discuss White Meadows at all?

18          A.   What is White Meadows? Is that a training camp?

19          Q.   Yes, a training camp in Derbyshire?

20          A.   Never discussed it with him, no.

21          Q.   Now, you tell us that you infiltrated the Little Ilford  
22          branch?

23          A.   Yes.

24          Q.   And that you may also have attended some of the larger  
25          meetings in London?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But you doubt whether the other reporting is yours?

3 A. I can't remember which reporting we're referring to  
4 here.

5 Q. I see.

6 Well, there was quite a lot of reporting on the WRP  
7 in your witness pack, but we can look at one or two of  
8 those reports.

9 First of all, could we have up the document at  
10 tab 74, which is {UCPI/12752}.

11 Now, this is a report dated 2 July 1975 about  
12 the Workers Revolutionary Party. It's signed off in  
13 fact by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner M Rodger. It  
14 reads:

15 "The following information has been received from  
16 a reliable source:-

17 "On Sunday 29.6.75 a conference organised by  
18 the Workers Revolutionary Party's 'Shrewsbury Two Action  
19 Committee' was held at the Adelphi Hotel, Liverpool,  
20 from 3 pm to 8.30 pm. Between 450 and 500 people  
21 listened to speeches by Mike Banda, [Privacy] and Gerry  
22 Healey, which followed the often used WRP themes of  
23 criticising the Labour Government and the Trade Union  
24 Movement for failing to secure the release from prison  
25 of the 'Shrewsbury Two' and the police and judiciary for

1           putting them there in the first place. There were  
2           numerous questions and suggestions from the floor, none  
3           of particular interest."

4           Can you recall the WRP's campaign in support of  
5           the Shrewsbury Two?

6           A. No.

7           Q. Can you recall whether or not you attended the protests  
8           at the trial in 1973?

9           A. Where were -- where were the trials?

10          Q. I don't know precisely where they were.

11          A. Well, I see that meeting was in Liverpool, and I don't  
12          know who compiled that report, but I don't recall ever  
13          going to Liverpool.

14          Q. The trial may not necessarily have been in Liverpool, so  
15          please could you focus on whether or not you protested  
16          at a trial of the Shrewsbury Two.

17          A. Not that I can recall.

18          Q. Can you recall whether you were part of the protests  
19          when the convictions were appealed in 1974?

20          A. No, I can't recall that.

21          Q. Can you recall whether you went on the Wigan Builders  
22          Workers Action Committee marches in 1975?

23          A. No, I don't think I did.

24          Q. Did you ever meet Des Warren?

25          A. Not that I'm aware of.

1 Q. Do you know whether anyone else in the SDS reported on  
2 Des Warren?

3 A. I'm not -- not aware of that happening.

4 Q. Can we take that document down, please.

5 I'm being told that the trial was at Shrewsbury  
6 Crown Court, if that rings any bells?

7 A. No, not with me.

8 Q. Could we have up next, please, tab 62, {UCPI/6993},  
9 please.

10 This is a report dated 26 March 1975. Paragraph 1  
11 reads:

12 "Box 500 letter ... dated 3 July 1974 referred to  
13 the election of [Privacy] as an AUEW shop steward at  
14 [Privacy] plant, as reported by Special Branch on  
15 20.7.74 and asked for clarification of the  
16 term 'sleeping' WRP members."

17 Do you know what "sleeping WRP members" were?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Does this ring any bells?

20 A. No.

21 Q. The report goes on to say that sleeping WRP members are  
22 WRP members in unions where there are a lot of  
23 Stalinists, and they were keeping a low profile because  
24 of that. Does that ring any bells?

25 A. I can well see that that was the case, but it doesn't

1 directly ring any bells, no.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Could we take that down, please, and could we have  
4 up, please, {UCPI/7111}.

5 This is a report dated 28 April 1975. It reads:

6 "The following information has been received from  
7 a reliable source:

8 " ... the Secretary of the Little Ilford branch of  
9 the Workers Revolutionary Party, intends to marry  
10 [Privacy] also a member of the WRP, on 3 August 1975.

11 "The wedding will take place at a Roman Catholic  
12 Church to placate [Privacy] parents and [Privacy] ..."

13 I'm afraid I can't read the next bit:

14 "... expects to pay a substantial sum of 'conscience  
15 money' to the Party in order to lessen their wrath at  
16 his submission to the 'backward' sentiments of his  
17 family."

18 Now, because this is the Little Ilford branch, is it  
19 safe for us to assume that this is one of your reports?

20 A. I don't think it was. I can't recall that. I know  
21 the people likely to have been involved in that, but  
22 I don't recall supplying that information.

23 Q. Even if you don't recall doing it, might it in fact be  
24 your reporting?

25 A. Possibly so.

1 Q. Why report on this information?

2 A. Well, it's important to know that when members change  
3 their name by marriage and who they're married to, it's  
4 important to know. You build up a picture of what's  
5 going on.

6 Q. Could we have that down, please, and could we have up in  
7 its place tab 68 {UCPI/7176}.

8 This is a report dated 14 May 1975 on  
9 the Workers Revolutionary Party. It reads:

10 "The following information has been received from  
11 a reliable source:

12 "The Workers Revolutionary Party is actively  
13 considering infiltrating the Labour Party Young  
14 Socialists with a view to the eventual subversion of all  
15 branches of the LPYS. This is a practice which has  
16 already been used to considerable effect in  
17 the Tonbridge, Kent, area, where an entire branch of  
18 LPYS and a local councillor were recruited into  
19 the Party.

20 "Similar infiltration of other groups is being  
21 considered but apparently the Young Communist League has  
22 been rejected on the grounds that it is virtually  
23 non-existent."

24 Were you aware of entryism by the Workers  
25 Revolutionary Party into the Labour Party Young



1           Socialists?

2           A. I wasn't aware, but it's the kind of thing that you  
3           would expect to happen, in the same way that they would  
4           infiltrate the unions. It's par for the course, really.

5           Q. Thank you.

6                    Could we take that down, please.

7                    Now, you attended a course at the Workers  
8           Revolutionary Party education centre known  
9           as "White Meadows" in Derbyshire, didn't you?

10          A. I did.

11          Q. I think, having seen the documents, the best we can do  
12          is to locate that in time as being between 8 and either  
13          14 and 15 February 1976; is that right?

14          A. That sounds about right, yeah.

15          Q. And there are some management documents which show that  
16          the possibility of you being invited on to the course  
17          was anticipated, permission was obtained from senior  
18          officers; is that right?

19          A. Yes.

20          Q. And then you came to be invited at very short notice to  
21          go on that course. Was the short notice a deliberate  
22          security precaution?

23          A. I don't know for sure, but I suspect that it was, yes.

24          Q. The documents suggest that you telephoned Chief  
25          Inspector Craft to tell him that you were going. Can

- 1           you recall that telephone conversation?
- 2       A. No, I can't recall it, no.
- 3       Q. When you went on the White Meadows course, did you
- 4           believe that you had your senior officer's authority to
- 5           go?
- 6       A. Yes, I did have the authority --
- 7       Q. Sorry, carry on?
- 8       A. I was going to say, I've read the documents, which seem
- 9           to indicate that they had second thoughts after I'd
- 10          gone.
- 11       Q. Yes, the documents show that at a very senior level
- 12          permission was revoked on the Friday, you telephoned
- 13          Chief Inspector Craft on the Saturday, and another
- 14          senior officer is saying, "Well, we were going to tell
- 15          them on the Monday but it's too late now, he's gone."
- 16                Were you given to understand at any time whilst you
- 17          were at White Meadows that your permission had been
- 18          revoked?
- 19       A. No.
- 20       Q. Did you have any contact with the outside world whilst
- 21          you were at White Meadows?
- 22       A. No, it wasn't possible.
- 23       Q. Your recollection is that you produced a very detailed
- 24          report of your course at White Meadows; is that right?
- 25       A. That's correct.

1 Q. And there is a detailed report in the bundle, but you  
2 don't think that's yours; is that also correct?

3 A. I -- yes, when I looked through it. I mean, some time's  
4 gone by now, but I think that is the case, yeah.

5 Q. Is it possible that it is in fact your report?

6 A. No, my report, I think, was about 34 pages long.

7 Q. Is it possible that it's a report based upon your  
8 lengthier work?

9 A. I suppose it's -- it's possible.

10 Q. There are management documents which suggest that  
11 Rollo Watts, a very senior officer in  
12 the Metropolitan Police at the time, thought that it was  
13 very good work, and that the operation was to be  
14 congratulated. Did you ever receive any positive  
15 feedback for your work at White Meadows?

16 A. No.

17 Q. And there is also a document which suggests that  
18 the intelligence was passed on to the Security Service,  
19 who were "appreciative" of the White Meadows operation.  
20 Did the Security Service's appreciation ever filter down  
21 to you.

22 A. No.

23 Q. The management documents do refer to it being you who  
24 had gone to White Meadows, and they refer to it being  
25 your swan song. It's right, isn't it, that this did

1           take place very shortly before the end of your SDS  
2           deployment?

3       A.   Yes, probably so, yes.

4       Q.   You've seen the report.  Are the contents of that report  
5           an accurate description of what went on at  
6           White Meadows, as best you can recall?

7       A.   The report that I wrote, I haven't seen it since.

8       Q.   I'm talking about the report in the bundle.

9       A.   Yeah, I -- I can't recall that.  I know it wasn't my  
10          work.  It may well have been an amalgam of different  
11          bits and pieces, but ...

12       Q.   It paints a picture of an organisation which was very  
13          security conscious.  Is that your recollection?

14       A.   Oh yes.  It was very security conscious.

15       Q.   And it paints an organisation that was at pains to avoid  
16          publicity -- revolutionary publicity at that time, to  
17          avoid any trouble with the police and so forth; is that  
18          fair?

19       A.   Yes, that's fair, yes.

20       Q.   So, in terms of what this group was aiming at, is it  
21          fair to say that it had revolutionary goals but it was  
22          lying low at the time?

23       A.   They definitely had revolutionary goals.  The leader of  
24          the group, a man called Gerry Healey, he used to relate  
25          the time when he knew Trotsky.  And so there's an

1           indication of how the thinking went, because he admired  
2           Trotsky very much, and that's where the whole  
3           organisation was geared. It's geared to revolution, but  
4           not by means of infiltration into the unions and, as you  
5           said, the Labour Party, yeah.

6           Q. So not an immediate revolution by a long-term work in  
7           progress?

8           A. Yes, more or less.

9           Q. Is it right that you withdrew from the SDS in  
10          April 1976?

11          A. Yes, I didn't -- I was kicked off basically, that was  
12          it. They said, you know, "Your tenure's come to an  
13          end." That was it.

14          Q. Did you spend any time in the SDS office after you  
15          ceased your deployment as an undercover officer before  
16          moving on?

17          A. No.

18          Q. There is some reporting in the bundle that you were  
19          shown on the All Trades Union Alliance. Your witness  
20          statement states that you don't think that was your  
21          reporting; is that right?

22          A. Yes, I believe that was ...

23          Q. Can I ask you now a general question. Throughout your  
24          time as an undercover officer with the SDS, were you  
25          ever involved in any raucous demonstrations?

- 1 A. "Raucous" did you say?
- 2 Q. Yes.
- 3 A. I can't remember being directly involved in any raucous  
4 demonstrations, no.
- 5 Q. Can you recall being involved in any public disorder, by  
6 which I mean not necessarily personally but at  
7 demonstrations at which there was public disorder?
- 8 A. I remember being -- attending one in -- in Whitehall.  
9 I can't remember why I attended there, but that was what  
10 you might call "raucous".
- 11 I remember there was some fellow in a bowler hat  
12 trying to hit people with an umbrella, and that was what  
13 the scene was all about. But I can't remember what that  
14 was, but it was in -- so yes, I attended that, but  
15 I can't remember why or what it was all about.
- 16 Q. I want to ask you some questions now about one of your  
17 colleagues. We know him as "HN135", his real name  
18 Mike Ferguson. Can you recall Mike Ferguson?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. Did you hear anything about the work he did in  
21 the Anti-Apartheid Movement and  
22 the~Stop the Seventy Tour?
- 23 A. Is he deceased?
- 24 Q. Yes.
- 25 A. Oh right. Vaguely I heard things about it, yeah.

1 Q. Did you hear anything about how high up in either of  
2 those organisations he had come to be?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you hear whether or not he'd taken an active role in  
5 either the Anti-Apartheid Movement or  
6 the Stop the Seventy Tour?

7 A. I -- I had understood that he had at some point been  
8 involved in Stop the Seventy Tour.

9 Q. What else did you hear about Mike Ferguson's role in  
10 the Stop the Seventy Tour?

11 A. Nothing, actually. Nothing more than that.

12 Q. What else did you hear about Mike Ferguson's role in  
13 the Anti-Apartheid Movement?

14 A. Not -- nothing really, no.

15 Q. Were your managers aware of Mike Ferguson's work in  
16 the STST and the Anti-Apartheid Movement?

17 A. Yes, I'm sure they were aware, yes.

18 Q. Can I move now to Piers Corbyn. There is one report in  
19 the bundle which mentions Mr Corbyn. Was there any  
20 particular reason why you reported on Piers Corbyn?

21 A. He was just there, I suppose.

22 Q. Can you recall whether Mr Corbyn did anything that was  
23 of particular interest to Special Branch?

24 A. I think he was a member of the IMG, and so that in  
25 itself is of interest, whatever he was up to.

- 1 Q. I want to ask you now about your general behaviour  
2 undercover, and how you managed a long deployment.
- 3 To what extent did you socialise with the activists  
4 who you were reporting on?
- 5 A. Often the meetings were in pubs, and so you socialised  
6 in a limited scale there. But beyond that, I mean, one  
7 didn't meet someone and go dancing, or meet someone and  
8 go to the pictures or whatever. At least I didn't. So  
9 there's a very -- very limited basis, you know, for  
10 socialising.
- 11 Q. To what extent did you drink alcohol with --
- 12 A. Very, very limited. I'm not really a drinker. So,  
13 I mean, a pint is about my limit really.
- 14 Q. And how close were the relationships that you formed  
15 with activists?
- 16 A. Well, I was friendly with a lot of people, actually,  
17 you know, activists or otherwise. I mean, often people  
18 are quite personable. Even though they might think in  
19 terms of tossing a bomb at British soldiers, they can  
20 still be quite personable people that, you know, you  
21 need to get to know, you know, so ...
- 22 Q. How close did you get to people like that?
- 23 A. Well, I wouldn't say close, no. I mean, it's a very  
24 limited social mix really.
- 25 Q. Did you deliberately avoid getting too close?



1       A. Well, not that I deliberately avoided it. My very  
2       nature really is a loner. So although, you know, I can  
3       be friendly with people, I'm not really a crowd type of  
4       person. But yeah, I was friendly with people. You had  
5       to be. If I wanted to find out information, you needed  
6       to be friendly with people, otherwise they wouldn't tell  
7       you anything.

8       Q. Did moving between groups as frequently as you did make  
9       it easier to avoid forming very close friendships with  
10      people?

11     A. No, I mean, I wasn't -- I moved from one group to  
12     another, but this is over a period of years, you know.  
13     I -- I suppose you can have close friendships, you can  
14     meet someone and make an instant rapport with them. So  
15     you don't need a long time to get to -- you either know  
16     whether you like someone or not. So that can happen  
17     very quickly, I think.

18     Q. Was it necessary to do your job to get very close to  
19     people or not?

20     A. Not to get very close, no.

21     Q. Would you have foreseen dangers to your cover if you had  
22     got very close to people?

23     A. Yes, there -- there are dangers, yes.

24     Q. Did you discuss with your managers the extent to which  
25     you were or were not socialising with the activists in

1           the groups you infiltrated?

2       A.  No.

3       Q.  Were you asked about that subject by your managers?

4       A.  No.

5       Q.  Coming back to the question of your managers, you recall

6           in your witness statement a time when there was

7           a detective inspector and a detective sergeant.  Were

8           there also times when the SDS was headed up by a chief

9           inspector with a detective inspector as his number two?

10      A.  Yes.  I don't know whether -- I don't know whether

11           the DI that was in charge originally got promoted to

12           chief inspector.  But subsequently I think there might

13           have been a chief inspector.  I don't know really.  It

14           wasn't -- it wasn't actually -- this is the thing about

15           the Squad, it wasn't tremendously rank conscious.

16           You know, you knew who the bloke was that was in charge,

17           but it wasn't really a rank thing.  It's only back at

18           CO that rank was the overriding significance, yeah.

19      Q.  "CO" being central office?

20      A.  Yes, Scotland Yard, yes.

21      MR BARR:  298, I'm sure you'll be pleased to know that that

22           was the last of my questions for the moment.  There's

23           a procedure whereby you'll need to wait for a little

24           while, while we see whether anyone else wishes to

25           propose questions, and your own representatives may wish

1 to ask you questions.

2 Sir, in the meantime, Ms Hummerstone has made some  
3 checks. And it won't surprise you to know that you're  
4 right, Sir, that it does look as if Rodker and Rosenhead  
5 followed the divisional court route before being  
6 convicted in the Magistrates' Court. And I'm sorry if  
7 I confused anyone.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: HN298, we're going to break now for quarter  
9 of an hour. This is to allow the broadcast of our  
10 proceedings to catch up, because they're at a ten-minute  
11 delay. And anyone who has any questions that they wish  
12 Mr Barr to ask of you may do so at the end of that time,  
13 and also your own counsel may wish to ask you questions  
14 arising out of your evidence. But subject to that,  
15 you've almost finished.

16 Would you come back in quarter of an hour?

17 A. Yes.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

19 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
20 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
21 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

22 The time is now 4.10, so we shall reconvene at  
23 4.25 pm. Thank you.

24 (4.08 pm)

25 (A short break)

1 (4.25 pm)

2 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

3 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
4 proceedings.

5 Chairman.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

7 I understand, Mr Barr, there is one question that  
8 you've been asked to ask of this witness.

9 MR BARR: Sir, that's right.

10 Could we have up, please, {MPS/746258}, which is  
11 the witness statement. I'm interested in paragraph 18,  
12 which is at the bottom of the page on page 6  
13 {MPS/746258/6}.

14 That reads -- it's about the undercover identity  
15 that you used, 298. Your statement reads:

16 "I was not given any guidance or instruction about  
17 the creation of a false identity. I was not instructed  
18 by anyone on the SDS to attend Somerset House, but it  
19 seemed to me to be a reasonable place to go to obtain an  
20 identity, along with ..."

21 And if we could go over the page, please,  
22 {MPS/746258/7}:

23 "... the birth certificate, that could be used to  
24 obtain other documents, register at a GP, etc. I had  
25 gone to Somerset House previously on behalf of SB to do

1 searches; it was where you would go to obtain  
2 information about someone of interest."

3 And the question, 298, is, was it your previous  
4 experience of Somerset House which led you to choose  
5 this method of finding a cover name?

6 A. Yes.

7 MR BARR: Thank you. That was all.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

9 Is there any re-examination?

10 MR SANDERS: No, thank you, Sir.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: HN298, thank you for your patience. Your day  
12 of giving evidence is now finished, and you have  
13 probably -- although no one can ever say for certain --  
14 heard the last of this, as far as the Inquiry is  
15 concerned.

16 A. Thank you.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Now, we are now going to have another break  
18 of about a quarter of an hour, to enable us to set up  
19 the receipt of the evidence of "Mary", which is going to  
20 be read, I understand, by Mr Scobie. But that requires  
21 different technical arrangements, which take about  
22 a quarter of an hour to set up. We'll resume, then, at  
23 approximately 4.45.

24 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
25 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room

1 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

2 The time is 4.30 pm, so we shall resume at 4.45 pm.

3 Thank you.

4 (4.28 pm)

5 (A short break)

6 (4.45 pm)

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Scobie.

8 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

9 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
10 proceedings.

11 Chairman.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'm sorry I interrupted you.

13 Mr Scobie, you're going to read the statement of  
14 "Mary", I think.

15 Witness statement of "Mary"

16 MR SCOBIE: I am. Thank you very much.

17 This is the first witness statement of "Mary", dated  
18 26 March 2020.

19 This statement is provided to the Undercover  
20 Policing Inquiry further to the Rule 9 request on  
21 26 February 2020. This statement is provided further to  
22 the interactions with the man whom I knew as "Rick  
23 Gibson", but whom I now know to have been Richard Clark,  
24 an undercover officer.

25 The Inquiry has also asked me about

1 the undercover officers "Dave Hughes", "Jim Pickford"  
2 and "Gary Roberts". I would like to assist the Inquiry  
3 about these undercover officers, but without further  
4 information, disclosure or contemporaneous photographs,  
5 sadly I am unable to help further.

6 Personal details.

7 Question: Please give your full name and date of  
8 birth.

9 The core participant's name is "Mary".

10 Goldsmith's College.

11 Question: Please set out the dates on which you were  
12 a student at Goldsmith's College and the course which  
13 you studied.

14 I attended Goldsmith's College between  
15 September 1972 to July 1975. I studied for  
16 a certificate in education (Nursery Infant). This was  
17 a full teacher training qualification.

18 Question: please outline your political activities  
19 in the student movement as a member of  
20 the Socialist Society and in connection with  
21 the International Marxist Group, IMG.

22 When doing so, please include a summary of what  
23 the aims of the groups that you joined or supported were  
24 and the methods they used to try and achieve these aims.

25 I joined and was involved in the Socialist Society,

1           which was an alliance of socialist students of the far  
2           left. There were supporters of the International  
3           Marxist Group, the International Socialists, as well as  
4           many independent lefts, who were members of  
5           the Socialist Society.

6           We were separate from the Labour Club and the  
7           Communist Party students who were organised in  
8           the "Broad Left".

9           In my last year at Goldsmith's College I was  
10          involved in the student union. The Socialist Society  
11          were involved in many genuine campaigns to assist  
12          students in the college. Members of  
13          the Socialist Society also sought to organise and  
14          develop campaigns beyond the campus. We sought to link  
15          with campaigns in the workplaces, factories and in  
16          the community in South London in particular.

17          Outlined below are some of the campaigns that I was  
18          involved in alongside members of the Socialist Society,  
19          and an outline of how we organised.

20          Weekly meetings.

21          From recollection, we would meet every week. We  
22          would invite speakers to introduce topics on historical,  
23          economic and societal issues. Often they would involve  
24          international issues of the time, such as the national  
25          liberation struggle in Vietnam and South Africa.



1 I recall we also had speakers on issues of anti-racism,  
2 women's liberation, academic freedom, civil liberties,  
3 free speech and human rights in general.

4 Student welfare.

5 I recall we organised a campaign to demand that  
6 the university provide daytime crèche facilities for  
7 students and workers at the college. I think this  
8 campaign was successful. If it had not been for  
9 the members of the Socialist Society, this campaign and  
10 success would never have happened.

11 Trades Council.

12 We were affiliated to and attended the local Trade  
13 Council. Representatives of trade unions would send  
14 representatives from their branches to a Trades Council  
15 as a delegate. Usually, those delegates lived in  
16 the local area. As members of the Socialist Society, we  
17 felt it was not only politically necessary to show our  
18 solidarity and we hoped to support local workers in  
19 their struggles for pay and improved conditions.

20 I attended meetings of the Trades Council.

21 Miners' strike.

22 I recall we did a lot of activity to support  
23 the miners when they took national strike action in  
24 the early 1970s. I think we raised resolutions at  
25 the Students Union general meetings and raised

1 collections for the National Union of Mineworkers whilst  
2 they were on strike. The Socialist Society was active  
3 around worker struggles. We adopted a mine in Wales.  
4 I went to the mine and stayed with the families to show  
5 our solidarity. The Student Union had adopted the mine  
6 and the visit was to bring solidarity and, I assume, we  
7 brought financial support.

8 Health workers.

9 In addition to the miners, we also supported health  
10 workers, nurses, doctors, porters and cleaners, who also  
11 took strike action in the early 1970s. Again, we raised  
12 resolutions in the students union general meetings,  
13 securing the support the Goldsmith's College student  
14 union. Collections were raised to support the health  
15 workers, and I and others attended picket lines to  
16 support them.

17 The Troops Out Movement.

18 The Socialist Society was responsible for launching  
19 the Troops Out Movement in South East London. A meeting  
20 was organised to launch the organisation following  
21 contact from "Rick Gibson". I understand that he had  
22 written to the national office of the Troops Out  
23 Movement to join the organisation.

24 The National Abortion Campaign.

25 The Socialist Society also supported

1 the National Abortion Campaign and brought resolutions  
2 to the student body to support a woman's right to  
3 choose. The 1967 act was a groundbreaking piece of  
4 legislation that allowed doctors in Britain to perform  
5 abortions lawfully. However, the Abortion Amendment Act  
6 was introduced by James White MP in 1975. The Bill  
7 wanted to restrict the reasons why a woman could secure  
8 an abortion and which doctors could perform them.  
9 The Bill was never passed, largely thanks to  
10 the National Abortion Campaign, which formed in  
11 March 1975 in response to the Act, and gained a large  
12 support base from MPs, the general public and trade  
13 unions.

14 Social activities.

15 The Socialist Society arranged social activities  
16 such as plays and social events, often to raise money in  
17 solidarity with the many campaigns we supported  
18 politically.

19 Anti-fascism.

20 The Socialist Society involved ourselves in  
21 campaigns against the fascist National Front. It's  
22 important to understand that during this time  
23 the fascists were organised and had united in one  
24 organisation. Not only were they a threat to  
25 the progressive movement organising, but they were by

1           their very nature racist and anti-democratic. I felt  
2           that the state was standing by as the racists organised.  
3           I felt that the police, by their nature, were  
4           institutionally racist, and as a result let  
5           the National Front organise at will.

6           "Mary" describes her association with  
7           the Goldsmith's student union and the causes it  
8           supported, such as the National Abortion Campaign and  
9           Anti-Apartheid Movement.

10          International issues.

11          We organised campaigns and meetings on a number of  
12          international issues, and we supported a number of  
13          issues and campaigns including:

14          The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. Numerous meetings  
15          were held about the US intervention into Vietnam and  
16          against the national liberation struggle.

17          The Socialist Society involved itself in various  
18          campaigns to highlight the terrible consequences of this  
19          intervention, and we sided with the struggle of  
20          the Vietnamese people for-self determination.

21          Anti-Apartheid Movement.

22          I came to the UK from South Africa. This issue was  
23          close to my heart. The Socialist Society supported  
24          the Anti-Apartheid Movement and had numerous speakers  
25          over the years about the struggle for national

1 liberation of the black working class. Individually and  
2 collectively we attended pickets and protests over  
3 the years to support the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

4 Chile Solidarity Campaign.

5 The Socialist Society organised meetings around  
6 the Allende government, the situation in Chile and the  
7 overthrow by that democratically elected government by  
8 Pinochet. It was very important for us to show  
9 solidarity with the people of Chile, who were facing  
10 torture and execution at the hands of the Pinochet  
11 regime. When I left London to live in Cardiff,  
12 I continued to support the campaign.

13 Like all members of the Socialist Society, I was  
14 a committed activist and wanted to see an end to  
15 injustice and discrimination. I wanted to see a better  
16 future, and for me that would be a socialist future.

17 I was a supporter not a member of the International  
18 Marxist Group. However, for the purposes of this  
19 witness statement, it probably does not make much of  
20 a material difference. Although I was only a supporter  
21 of the International Marxist Group, I was allowed to  
22 attend the local branch meetings in South East London.

23 The International Marxist Group had a branch  
24 structure based on geographical areas. It produced  
25 a weekly newspaper. As a supporter, I was required to

1 sell "Red Weekly". I think the national conference,  
2 which was delegate based, then elected a national  
3 committee.

4 During the period I was spied upon, I supported  
5 the International Marxist Group, the Socialist Society,  
6 National Abortion Campaign and the Anti-Apartheid  
7 Movement.

8 I feel uncomfortable continuing to answer  
9 the questions that have been set about the International  
10 Marxist Group and my involvement in it. The questions  
11 appear loaded. Seriously, I thought this public inquiry  
12 was meant to be investigating undercover political  
13 policing.

14 The questions regarding "methods and organisation"  
15 should not be questions that are directed at those who  
16 were spied on, and who suffered the intrusion of  
17 political policing. I thought this was a public inquiry  
18 into undercover policing. In my view, the issue  
19 of "political policing" should be the centre of this  
20 investigation not the campaigners: it is the "spycops"  
21 who should be investigated not us.

22 However, the political campaigns that  
23 the International Marxist Group did and  
24 the Socialist Society involved itself in were all open.  
25 Democratic decisions were made after proper discussion

1 and debate. It is obvious that the organisations and  
2 campaigns were for social justice, in defence of  
3 human rights, and to raise the ideas of socialism, which  
4 the last time I checked, I am entitled to do in  
5 a democratic society.

6 I have been advised that the Chair has read all  
7 the documents and intelligence reports.

8 Surely, having read them, the Chair can see that  
9 the issues the Socialist Society and the International  
10 Marxist Group were involved in were issues that were in  
11 the forefront of what was going on in Britain at the  
12 time. We were campaigning for better conditions for  
13 the working class and better conditions for women. We  
14 joined with anti-racist campaigners as well, against  
15 the overt and institutional racism of the state and  
16 the police.

17 With the passage of time, the issues we were  
18 campaigning around have been shown to be completely  
19 justified. For instance, activists such as myself were  
20 involved in the struggle against apartheid. We were on  
21 the right side of history. We campaigned as part of  
22 the boycott movement, and we were right to do so. We  
23 campaigned against the racism of the police.

24 The campaigns supporting the black communities were  
25 the right thing to do, to expose the institutional

1 racism that led to the Macpherson Report, which showed  
2 that campaigners were right then and now to highlight  
3 this.

4 Over those years I actively supported the national  
5 liberation movements in Vietnam, and again, with  
6 the passage of time, I and others have been shown to be  
7 on the right side of history.

8 Both now and then, I opposed xenophobia, racism and  
9 anti-semitism. I support both the right of freedom of  
10 religious expression, but also the freedom not to be  
11 religious or to follow organised religion. I am for  
12 human rights, civil rights, and remain committed to  
13 social justice.

14 I do find these questions about the International  
15 Marxist Group and the Socialist Society and methods to  
16 be loaded and futile. As far as I'm concerned, at the  
17 time, I was a person who considered myself a socialist,  
18 a person who was defending civil liberties, democracy  
19 and human rights. In order to campaign effectively, it  
20 required challenging the state, which is our legal right  
21 and responsibility as citizens.

22 At no point was I ever involved in conspiracies or  
23 discussions to involve myself in illegal or violent  
24 activities. In fact, there are a number of occasions  
25 where I felt unprotected by the police when I should



1 have been protected. For example, a meeting that we'd  
2 organised in East Ham Town Hall was smashed up when  
3 fascists came into the building. The police who were  
4 outside the town hall stood back and let it happen.

5 Question: did you use an alias in relation to any of  
6 your political activity? If so, what was it?

7 I had originally forgotten that I even had a "party  
8 name", but I discovered from "Rick Gibson's" own note  
9 that my alias was "Millwall".

10 I was given the name "Millwall" because  
11 I sold "Red Weekly" every other week outside Millwall  
12 Football Club ground. I think it was called "The Den".  
13 I have to say I was a braver woman than I thought  
14 I would ever be. I also recall selling "Red Weekly"  
15 outside factories in South London.

16 Question: please consider the intelligence reports  
17 which the Inquiry has obtained and included in your  
18 witness bundle. You are named in each one of  
19 the enclosed reports, in some cases in the redacted at  
20 the end of the report. Are the details that have been  
21 recorded accurate? If not, please identify inaccurate  
22 reports and set out the respects in which the report is  
23 inaccurate.

24 At tab 13 intelligence report {UCPI/9562} it states:

25 "The following information has been received from

1 a reliable source. [Mary], who has been unemployed  
2 since leaving college last summer has taken work as  
3 a carpenters mate in Great Yarmouth, Norfolk. She will  
4 retain her flat at [Privacy] for weekend visits."

5 To Cardiff.

6 Recollection of events.

7 Question: please provide a factual account of your  
8 contact with and experience of "Rick Gibson", including  
9 how he behaved and the sexual contact you have  
10 previously described in your January 2018 witness  
11 statement. You can answer the specific questions about  
12 "Rick Gibson" below either separately or by  
13 incorporating them into your narrative.

14 With regards to this answer, the first point I would  
15 make is that the Chair and Counsel to the Inquiry need  
16 to refer to the first statement that was provided in  
17 January 2018. This, I hope, will provide a useful  
18 background.

19 My recollection of "Rick Gibson" was that he was  
20 easy to befriend. He was a harmless sort of person and  
21 he was not predatory. He was very mild, very bland and  
22 also very boring. I did not have protracted or frequent  
23 sexual encounters and at no point could he be  
24 considered "a boyfriend". He was friendly and was in  
25 contact with me I'd assume for political reasons, as he

1 had become a fellow activist.

2 We had become friends and had become fellow  
3 activists. He was a frequent visitor to both myself and  
4 to my flatmate, who was also an activist, at the flat we  
5 shared.

6 I did not initiate or make the first move, but had  
7 assumed that our sexual encounters were a manifestation  
8 of a mutual attraction. They proved to be half-hearted  
9 and fizzled out. I was not particularly concerned or  
10 upset that a long term relationship failed to  
11 materialise. First, I was not interested in one, and  
12 secondly, I had a long term partner.

13 Had I known he was a police officer, there is  
14 absolutely no way I would have had any sexual contact  
15 with him at all.

16 In my opinion, the sexual contact and his use of sex  
17 was a way of consolidating his history and to cement his  
18 reputation. He was using it to get closer to us as  
19 a group of activists.

20 In my view, these intelligence reports that have  
21 been disclosed to me consist of only sanitised,  
22 secondhand reports of "intelligence received", rather  
23 than first-hand reports from "Rick Gibson" himself.

24 I do find it appalling that in the course of  
25 preparing the reports for senior management, "Rick

1 Gibson" has seemingly left out reports about the sexual  
2 contact. If this was reported, did senior officers  
3 know? If so, it is appalling their silence or even  
4 acquiescence allowed this to continue.

5 I have had sight of a "Tradecraft Manual" written by  
6 Andy Coles, and used for Special Demonstration Squad  
7 recruits. I find the whole strategy and practice of  
8 undercover police officers having sexual relationships  
9 with activists as immoral, unprincipled and a criminal  
10 abuse of emotions. It's also an abuse of their own  
11 partners and families.

12 On one level, I'm not surprised what the state is  
13 capable of. Coming from South Africa, I was aware of  
14 what the Bureau of State Security, BOSS, was doing. But  
15 it still kind of surprises me what has appeared to have  
16 been sanctioned here in Britain. The Metropolitan  
17 Police Commissioner was sanctioning the spying on  
18 legitimate political campaigners who were campaigning  
19 for social justice and human rights.

20 I do accept that undercover policing can and should  
21 be allowed in issues relating to national security and  
22 serious criminal activity, such as terrorism. But this  
23 kind of spying and the activities surrounding it were so  
24 unnecessary and so out of control that it cannot and  
25 should not be accepted in a democratic society.

1           I believe that to "Rick Gibson" it would have been  
2           obvious that my fellow campaigners and I were not  
3           involved in any illegal activities. I am totally  
4           opposed to any acts of violence. My opposition to  
5           violence stems from my background of being aware of  
6           state violence in South Africa.

7           I would also add that the sexual contact that I and  
8           other women faced was a form of state violence.  
9           I particularly say this in relation to the women who  
10          were involved in long term relationships.

11          Looking back, I reflect that "Rick Gibson" was  
12          always strangely unobtainable. He would not exchange  
13          contact details and he always had reasons why he could  
14          not be contacted. I seem to remember he said he worked  
15          for the Water Board and was often away. In reality,  
16          "Rick Gibson" had no profile and kept his profile  
17          extremely low.

18          Finally, I am angry with the Metropolitan Police.  
19          It took it upon itself to do this and had a cavalier  
20          attitude to privacy. It did not consider the rights of  
21          people to be involved in legal and genuine political  
22          activities. I'm appalled that "Rick Gibson" and others  
23          were allowed to befriend activists and to spy on people  
24          holding legitimate political views.

25          Question: the intelligence report dated

1 17 February 1975 relates to a meeting in the students  
2 union bar at Goldsmith's College on 6 February. It  
3 appears to be accompanied by another report about you at  
4 Tab 2. Can you recall how long after you had first met  
5 "Rick Gibson" this meeting occurred?

6 The memory of my first meeting with "Rick Gibson" is  
7 a little bit hazy. I think I first met him in possibly  
8 early to mid-1974 or early January 1975. I recall first  
9 meeting him when he approached me at a political stall.  
10 The Socialist Society often had a weekly stall at  
11 Goldsmith's College to publicise our meetings or to ask  
12 people to sign a petition. This often helped to get  
13 into discussion and hopefully get them involved.

14 I think it is highly likely I spoke to "Rick Gibson"  
15 in December 1974 or early January 1975. It's likely  
16 that I met him prior to his first meeting in the student  
17 bar, which took place on 17 February 1975.

18 I understand that "Rick Gibson" wrote to  
19 the national office of the Troops Out Movement in  
20 December 1974. If that was the case, his letter and  
21 membership application was likely prompted by  
22 the Birmingham pub bombing in November 1974.

23 It's important to remember that "Rick Gibson" didn't  
24 so much infiltrate the South East London branch of  
25 the Troops Out Movement. Prior to his letter to

1 the national office of the Troops Out Movement, a branch  
2 did not exist. His letter prompted myself and other  
3 activists, such as Richard Chessum, to meet with him and  
4 launch it.

5 Question: did "Rick Gibson" participate in or  
6 encourage any crime?

7 Answer: not to my knowledge.

8 Question: did "Rick Gibson" become involved in  
9 criminal proceedings in any way?

10 Not to my knowledge.

11 Question: did "Rick Gibson" become involved in civil  
12 legal proceedings in any way?

13 Not to my knowledge.

14 Question: did "Rick Gibson" become privy to any  
15 confidential legal advice as a result of pretending to  
16 be an activist?

17 Not to my knowledge.

18 Question: when was the last time you can recall  
19 "Rick Gibson" and in what circumstances?

20 It's important to remember that from his first  
21 meeting with me and other activists at  
22 Goldsmith's College, we were just a stepping stone to  
23 bigger things. "Rick Gibson" was skilled enough to go  
24 from branch secretary of South East London to London  
25 organiser of the Troops Out Movement relatively quickly.

1 He then, as I understand it, became the convenor of  
2 the national offices.

3 I saw "Rick Gibson" probably for the last time in  
4 late 1975. I would certainly say that from this date,  
5 any meaningful contact became less and less. He  
6 occasionally may have come to my flat that I shared with  
7 another activist on occasions. But over the months, as  
8 he became more and more involved in the Troops Out  
9 Movement nationally and moved up the "career" ladder, he  
10 became more and more peripheral to me.

11 Question: can you recall any contact with any of  
12 the following? If so, please set out recollections that  
13 you have of these individuals.

14 "David Hughes".

15 I do not recall this person. I would welcome  
16 further information about why the Inquiry believes he is  
17 important to me. Did he spy on me? Did he spy on my  
18 friends? Is there a photograph available so that I can  
19 assist the Inquiry with their questions?

20 I'm aware that "David Hughes", HN299/342, was active  
21 between 1971 and 1975. I note that he had infiltrated  
22 the Anti-Internment League, the International Marxist  
23 Group and the Troops Out Movement.

24 On 18 June 2018, representations were made on behalf  
25 of "David Hughes" that his real name should not be



1 released and should be subject to a restriction order.

2 The submissions from lawyers acting for  
3 the Metropolitan Police argued from part 6:

4 "A restriction order protecting HN299/342's identity  
5 is a requirement in order for the Inquiry to meet its  
6 duty under the Human Rights Act 1988 not to act in a way  
7 which is incompatible with a Convention right.

8 The Convention right in issue is Article 8.

9 "Disclosure of HN299/342's real name would amount to  
10 an unjustified and/or disproportionate interference with  
11 his right to private life. In particular, the objective  
12 effect of disclosure is set out at paragraph 19 of  
13 the risk assessment. The level of risk posed by this  
14 interference with HN299/342's private life is set out in  
15 the Risk Assessment at paragraph 19. It is reasonable  
16 to infer that there would be some public interest in  
17 HN299/342 by virtue of his status as a former UCO."

18 The Chair, on 13 September 2018, advised that he was  
19 minded to grants this undercover officer a restriction  
20 order in relation to his real name. This despite  
21 the fact that the Chair stated:

22 "There is nothing to indicate that his deployment  
23 was anything other than unremarkable."

24 The Chair went on to advise:

25 "In the unlikely event that any member of any of

1 the groups can remember him, publication of his cover  
2 name, not of his real name, is what is required to  
3 prompt information or evidence from them. Publication  
4 of his real name would risk unwelcome media attention  
5 and the attention of those who may be ill-disposed  
6 towards him within his small community. It will not  
7 assist fulfillment of the terms of reference of  
8 the Inquiry."

9 I would not wish a person unwelcome media attention.  
10 However, I do find it ironic that the Metropolitan  
11 Police are using the right of privacy to defend its  
12 former officers. Where was my right to privacy?

13 As core participants have argued, maximum openness  
14 and disclosure is necessary:

15 "The Inquiry was established expressly and  
16 specifically ... to investigate undercover policing and  
17 in particular undercover political policing and ... to  
18 do so publicly in order to get to the full truth and to  
19 restore public confidence in a way that the preceding  
20 private reviews have been unable to do."

21 Without full disclosure, I am concerned this Inquiry  
22 will struggle to satisfy its remit.

23 Finally, in order to assist the Inquiry, I would  
24 request that a contemporaneous photograph is found of  
25 "David Hughes" for me to consider.

1 "Jim Pickford".

2 I do not recall this person. I would welcome  
3 further information about why the Inquiry believes he is  
4 important to me. Did he spy on me? Did he spy on my  
5 friends? Is there a photograph available so that I can  
6 assist the Inquiry with their questions?

7 I am aware that "Jim Pickford", HN300, was involved  
8 in and infiltrated a number of anarchist groups.  
9 However, I understand he was also involved with  
10 the Battersea and Wandsworth Trades Council. Given my  
11 own involvement in the South London Trades Council, it  
12 is possible that I may have come into contact with him.

13 However, I understand that further to Order 67 that  
14 his real name cannot be released because of his right to  
15 privacy under Article 8 of the European Court of Human  
16 Rights should be protected.

17 I understand he is now deceased and the request was  
18 made by his surviving children.

19 "Gary Roberts".

20 I do not recall this person. I would welcome  
21 further information about why the Inquiry believes he is  
22 important to me. Did he spy on me? Did he spy on my  
23 friends? Is there a photograph available so that I can  
24 assist the Inquiry with their questions?

25 I'm aware that "Gary Roberts", HN353, was involved

1 in the infiltration of the International Marxist Group  
2 and the International Socialists. I understand that his  
3 real name is restricted as his human rights and his  
4 right to privacy would be breached under Article 8. For  
5 the reasons outlined above, I find the police demanding  
6 their human rights and right to privacy as ironic, as  
7 they did not care about mine or others.

8 The "minded to" note by the Chair states:

9 "His deployments appear to have been unremarkable.  
10 There is no known allegation of misconduct against him."

11 The same was said about "Rick Gibson".

12 In the absence of contemporaneous photographs,  
13 I will be unable to assist the Inquiry about this  
14 undercover officer.

15 Impact.

16 Question: If not already covered in your answers to  
17 the above questions, please explain the impact that  
18 "Rick Gibson" had upon you including how you felt when  
19 you found out:

20 (a) That he was not who he said he was; and.

21 (b) That he was an undercover police officer.

22 I was simply astounded when I found out he was  
23 a police officer. When I discussed this with another  
24 activist in Goldsmith's College -- she also knew "Rick  
25 Gibson" -- certain aspects of "Rick Gibson's" behaviour

1 clearly fell into place that he would have or certainly  
2 could have been an undercover officer or MI5 officer.

3 There were a number of issues that should have been  
4 obvious to me such as: the fact that he was totally  
5 uncontactable. He would initiate contact with  
6 the activist who he was spying on, but overall "Rick  
7 Gibson" was elusive.

8 The fact that "Rick Gibson" had "no back history of  
9 any note". He didn't have a political back history of  
10 any sort that I was aware of. He also appeared to be  
11 extremely politically naive and also utterly new to  
12 the idea of activism.

13 For someone who wanted to support Irish  
14 self-determination he didn't seem to know much about  
15 the situation in Ireland and the role of the British  
16 state. Maybe our own humanity made allowance for his  
17 own apparent naivety.

18 Now I look back, it is clear that his sexual  
19 advances and use of sex was a way of ingratiating his  
20 way into the group as a whole.

21 I feel horrified that undercover policing did occur  
22 and that it carried on through the decades. I am  
23 disgusted that the police felt it appropriate to spy on  
24 people like me and others who were campaigning for  
25 better conditions for working class people, for

1 democracy, civil liberties and human rights. The use of  
2 sex as a strategy is appalling, and fact that it carried  
3 on throughout the decades is wrong on many levels.

4 I do not consider myself traumatised by what  
5 happened. I just feel embarrassed and foolish about  
6 the fact that I was used and conned. The fact that  
7 I was fooled in such a way really angers me as  
8 the police had no right to do this.

9 The only solace I can take is that not only was  
10 I convinced by "Rick Gibson" but everybody else was  
11 fooled by him until Big Flame found out who he really  
12 was.

13 Finally, I am anxious to establish what other  
14 personal information is held on me by the police,  
15 Special Branch and MI5. I'm anxious, having read  
16 the details contained within my file, that there are  
17 more entries from other officers, such as those  
18 mentioned above. And I am appalled that "Rick Gibson"  
19 is likely to have regaled to other officers and people  
20 in the Metropolitan Police of his stories whilst  
21 infiltrating both the Troops Out Movement and broadly  
22 speaking the International Marxist Group itself -- and  
23 no doubt his sexual "conquests".

24 I now also want to know what information the SDS and  
25 Metropolitan Police passed on to the Special Branch or

1 MI5 when I moved to Cardiff. I feel the intelligence  
2 reports that have been disclosed only form a small part  
3 of the whole picture, and I seek reassurances from  
4 the Inquiry.

5 Question: if you do recall any of "David Hughes",  
6 "Jim Pickford" and "Gary Roberts", please explain  
7 the impact they had upon you and the finding out that  
8 they too were undercover officers.

9 At this stage I do not know who these people are and  
10 in the absence of contemporaneous photographs it's very  
11 hard for me to provide any further information.

12 Other.

13 Question: please set out any other factual evidence  
14 that you can provide about the conduct of "Rick Gibson",  
15 "David Hughes", "Jim Pickford" and "Gary Roberts" to  
16 assist the Inquiry to get to the truth.

17 I have reported as much as I can on "Rick Gibson".

18 With regards to the other three undercover officers  
19 it is impossible given the passage of time to assist  
20 the Inquiry further, particularly without photographs.

21 Question: is there anything else you wish to add  
22 that may be of assistance to the work of the Inquiry?

23 With regards to the work of the Inquiry, I would  
24 like to know what the Metropolitan Police and other  
25 organisations, such as, potentially, MI5, hold in

1 relation to correspondence, whether my phone was tapped,  
2 whether they have photographs of me and also my friends.  
3 This is particularly relevant given that we were then in  
4 a paper-based society and much of this information  
5 should, I think, still be available and should be  
6 disclosed to me.

7 I would ask the Inquiry to advise whether "Rick  
8 Gibson" reported back on his sexual relationships to his  
9 superiors.

10 This type of political policing is completely  
11 unwarranted. The reports disclosed to me must have been  
12 seen by senior civil servants and Ministers. I would  
13 like to know who authorised this activity by the police  
14 and how it was justified. In a democratic society there  
15 is a duty to campaign and protest when and where  
16 necessary. The actions of the police and  
17 undercover officers bring democracy into disrepute.

18 Documents.

19 I have no further documents to provide.

20 Question: diversity information.

21 I have no further documents to provide.

22 Diversity information.

23 What is your racial origin?

24 Answer: white British.

25 What is your gender?



1 Female.

2 I believe the content of this statement to be true.

3 Signed "Mary".

4 And the date is 26 March 2020.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Scobie. I think that concludes  
6 proceedings for today.

7 MR SCOBIE: Thank you.

8 MR FERNANDES: Thank you, everyone. The hearings have now  
9 finished for the today. We shall resume at 10.00 am  
10 tomorrow.

11 (5.30 pm)

12 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Wednesday,

13 5 May 2021)

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