

1 Friday, 7 May 2021

2 (10.00 am)

3 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Day 12  
4 of hearings in Tranche 1 Phase 2 at  
5 the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is  
6 Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager.

7 For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please  
8 turn off both your camera and microphone unless you are  
9 invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up  
10 on all noises and you will be on screen.

11 I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting,  
12 to formally start proceedings.

13 Chairman.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

15 As at the beginning of every live evidential  
16 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.  
17 If you're listening to it for the first time, please  
18 listen carefully.

19 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,  
20 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make  
21 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including  
22 its hearings. In the exercise of that power I have made  
23 a number of orders which affect what you may and may not  
24 do in the hearing rooms and after you leave them.  
25 Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter and may

1 have serious consequences for you.

2 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an  
3 order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
4 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it  
5 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If  
6 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
7 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
8 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
9 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
10 sequestration of their assets.

11 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
12 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
13 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to  
14 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
15 the hearing rooms.

16 You may bring your mobile telephone into the hearing  
17 rooms, but you may not use it for any of those purposes.  
18 You may use it silently for any other purpose. In  
19 particular, you may transmit your account of what you  
20 have seen and heard in a hearing room to any other  
21 person, but only once at least ten minutes have elapsed  
22 since the event which you are describing took place.

23 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
24 the Inquiry I have made orders prohibiting the public  
25 disclosure of information, for example about

1 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.  
2 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,  
3 whether by accident or design, information which I have  
4 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes  
5 be disclosed in a hearing.

6 If and when that happens, I will immediately suspend  
7 the hearing and make an order prohibiting further  
8 disclosure of the information outside the hearing rooms.  
9 The consequence will be that no further disclosure of  
10 that information may be made by mobile telephone or  
11 other portable electronic device from within the hearing  
12 room, or by any means outside it.

13 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
14 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
15 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
16 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
17 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of  
18 the public, are entitled to hear the same public  
19 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own  
20 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
21 best to ensure that you can.

22 If you have any doubt about the terms of this  
23 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not  
24 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if  
25 necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

1 HN304

2 THE CHAIRMAN: HN304, can you hear me?

3 A. Yes, I can, Sir.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you wish to swear or to affirm?

5 A. To affirm.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may the words of affirmation be read to  
7 you, please.

8 (Witness affirmed)

9 Thank you.

10 You're going to have quite a long day. I understand  
11 that you would like, when we have our ordinary  
12 mid-morning and mid-afternoon breaks, to take 20 minutes  
13 rather than quarter of an hour. Have I understood  
14 correctly?

15 A. I believe so, yes, sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Then we will accommodate your wish.

17 A. Thank you.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr will now ask you questions.

19 Mr Barr.

20 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

21 HN304, are you the person that we know by  
22 the nominal "HN304"?

23 A. I am he.

24 Q. And are the contents of your witness statement, dated  
25 11 October 2019, true and correct to the best of your

- 1           knowledge and belief?
- 2       A.   Yes, they are.
- 3       Q.   Can I start, please, with your service before you joined
- 4           the SDS.  You tell us in your witness statement that you
- 5           served in, amongst other branches, B Squad.  When you
- 6           were working on B Squad, were you aware of the existence
- 7           of the SDS?
- 8       A.   I was not.
- 9       Q.   You tell us also that you worked for C Squad.  When you
- 10          were working on C Squad, were you aware of the existence
- 11          of the SDS?
- 12       A.   Very latterly.
- 13       Q.   And when you were aware of the existence of the SDS,
- 14          were you aware that some of the intelligence that you
- 15          may have been using was derived from the work of
- 16          undercover police officers serving in the SDS?
- 17       A.   I don't initially believe that I was.
- 18       Q.   You say "initially"; did there come a time when you
- 19          were?
- 20       A.   Yes, but I couldn't actually put a finger on that
- 21          defining moment.
- 22       Q.   And was there any process by which C Squad could ask
- 23          the SDS to gather particular intelligence that it was
- 24          seeking?
- 25       A.   I don't know.

1 Q. Can we move now to how you came to join the SDS. You  
2 tell us that you were approached by Detective Inspector  
3 Creamer?

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. Did he give you any background or briefing about the  
6 SDS?

7 A. No, he didn't.

8 Q. As best as you can recall it, what did he say to you?

9 A. He approached me and asked whether I would be willing,  
10 I believe, the coming -- the upcoming weekend or the one  
11 thereafter, to cover a meeting of activists that was  
12 being held in Central London at a polytechnic, in  
13 a disguised, non-police -- non-obvious police capacity.

14 Q. And you explain in your witness statement that you  
15 undertook that that duty. Can you tell us what happened  
16 after that?

17 A. I'm not quite sure what you're aiming for, sorry.

18 Q. I'm aiming for, as I understand it, Detective Inspector  
19 Creamer then asked you to go to room 1818 --

20 A. Ah.

21 Q. -- and that was how you got in touch with the SDS and  
22 came to join. Could you explain what happened?

23 A. Yes, I'm not sure whether it was Detective Inspector  
24 Creamer that asked me to go to that room, or whether  
25 I received a phone call from that room asking me to

1 present myself there, but I went there; and was -- and  
2 was there presented with the suggestion that I might  
3 like to consider my options.

4 Q. Were you interviewed for a position on the SDS?

5 A. Very informally, I would say.

6 Q. Who by? And you may wish to be careful about using real  
7 names and you may need to use ciphers?

8 A. Yes. I'm not sure that I can recall the name of  
9 the officer that interviewed me.

10 Q. Whereabouts was the SDS office at that time?

11 A. It was on the top floor of a tower block in Victoria.

12 Q. And was that part of S Squad?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that you were  
15 asked whether you were either married or in a stable  
16 relationship; is that right?

17 A. That's true.

18 Q. Why -- was it ever explained to you why they wanted to  
19 know that?

20 A. I believe it was explained, to my recollection, in very  
21 general terms that they felt that an officer in a stable  
22 relationship or a stable married relationship would be  
23 a more stable character, given the likely exposure to  
24 stresses and strains of the likely work involved.

25 Q. Did you ever get the impression that it was thought that

1           being married or in a stable relationship would make an  
2           officer less likely to involve themselves in sexual  
3           relations with people they met undercover?

4           A.   No.

5           Q.   You were told, according to your witness statement, to  
6           expect to serve in the SDS for four years; is that  
7           right?

8           A.   I was told, yes, more or less that, that a posting  
9           was -- was for the maximum duration of four years or  
10          thereabouts, as I think it was, to my recollection.

11          Q.   And perhaps using the rank and position of the person  
12          concerned, can you remember who told you that?

13          A.   In honesty, no, I can't remember either the rank or  
14          the position, but it was obviously -- I -- I would  
15          guess -- I can't remember the name of the person  
16          involved, but I would guess it would have been either  
17          a chief inspector or a superintendent, or maybe above.

18          Q.   And you were told that at the outset of your time at  
19          the SDS, were you?

20          A.   Yes.

21          Q.   Do you know whether your contemporaries were told  
22          the same thing?

23          A.   I don't know. I assume so.

24          Q.   You then tell us that you spent about five months in  
25          the SDS back office, where you read reports, handled



1           them, got to know cover names and how the filing system  
2           worked, together with secret stamping. Can you help us  
3           with, at that stage in the SDS's history, who was typing  
4           up reports?

5           A. There was a dedicated typing pool, and I believe that  
6           the typing up was done by -- I'm struggling here to  
7           recall, I'm sorry.

8           Q. Okay.

9                         And was there any protocol at that time as to  
10           whether or not the undercover officer needed to sign  
11           the final report?

12          A. I don't believe that they did need to.

13          Q. Did they need to check the contents?

14          A. Yes.

15          Q. And was that invariably done?

16          A. To the best of my recollection, yes.

17          Q. And we've seen that a typical report will often have  
18           a list of names of people who attended a particular  
19           event that is being reported on at the end with  
20           associated registry file details. Who obtained  
21           the registry file details for incorporation into  
22           the reports?

23          A. That would have been something that a person in my  
24           situation waiting -- awaiting deployment would have been  
25           asked to do.

1 Q. And did you ever have to take registry files to the SDS  
2 safe house for officers to look at?

3 A. I did not.

4 Q. Do you know whether that was something that ever  
5 happened?

6 A. I can't say that I know the answer to that question.

7 Q. You tell us that you got to know the cover names of  
8 the officers. Was that as a result of doing  
9 the paperwork, or meeting the officers, or both?

10 A. It was a bit of both really.

11 Q. And you tell us that you went to the safe house whilst  
12 you were awaiting your own deployment. How frequently  
13 did you visit the safe house during that period?

14 A. Oh, I would think that it was at least once and mostly  
15 twice a week.

16 Q. And how much information did you garner about what  
17 the SDS was doing and about the sort of fieldcraft that  
18 you would have to adopt when your turn came?

19 A. Are you expecting an answer in percentage terms?

20 Q. You can express it however you think fit.

21 A. In that case, a good deal. But for maybe obvious  
22 reasons, there were aspects of the work involved that  
23 could only be discovered by doing it.

24 Q. You say in your statement that you now know that your  
25 visits to the safe house were in part so that

1 the undercover officers could give their views about  
2 you. When it became your turn to be an  
3 undercover officer, were you invited to give your views  
4 about the next generation of undercover officers who  
5 were doing their turn in the back office?

6 A. Yes, but not -- as I recall, it was not done  
7 specifically to every officer who was out in the field  
8 who might have been in the safe house on any given --  
9 specific given occasion. If that was the information  
10 that was required, then it was -- it was made as  
11 a general invitation for whoever might be present to say  
12 whatever they thought might be appropriate.

13 Q. And what were you looking for in a new recruit?

14 A. What were they looking for? They were looking for --  
15 I imagine that they were looking for somebody who would  
16 not stand out in any way as obviously being a serving  
17 officer.

18 Q. I was asking what you were looking for, because you were  
19 being asked to express an opinion.

20 A. I'm sorry. I misunderstood. I misunderstood.

21 Well, more or less exactly the same as I've just  
22 said really.

23 Q. Okay, thank you.

24 You tell us that you were instructed to go along  
25 with any arrest at a demonstration, if that were to

1 occur. Were you given any information about any  
2 previous incidents where undercover officers had been  
3 arrested? And when you answer, if you could stick to  
4 nominals, rather than any names, please.

5 A. Yes. I don't believe I was given any further advice  
6 than really just to go along with and, at the earliest  
7 available opportunity, to notify the management.

8 Q. You say in your witness statement, on the question of  
9 relationships, that if there was any advice, then it was  
10 simply be very careful if you were going to get involved  
11 in private lives, especially if you were going to engage  
12 in a sexual relationship.

13 Can you recall who gave the advice -- again, using  
14 nominals?

15 A. You're finding all the holes in my memory. I have to  
16 say, with the best will that I have, I could not tell  
17 you specifically who gave that information.

18 Q. Are you able to help us with whether it was one of your  
19 fellow UCOs or whether it was someone in the management  
20 chain?

21 A. Oh, it was the management chain.

22 Q. And, again using nominals if you want to identify anyone  
23 in your answer, was that advice illustrated with any  
24 examples?

25 A. I can't recall that.

1 Q. Can you remember when in the course of your service you  
2 were given that advice?

3 A. I believe that was before my deployment.

4 Q. Was it oral or in writing?

5 A. It would have been oral.

6 Q. And can you recall whether you were told literally "be  
7 very careful", or whether it was expressed in some other  
8 way.

9 A. No, I think it was expressed more or less in those  
10 terms.

11 Q. And what did you understand being very careful to  
12 entail?

13 A. I understood it to mean -- I understood it to  
14 mean: really and truly this is not something that we  
15 advise, but if you have to, take every precaution of all  
16 kinds that you can imagine necessary.

17 Q. Does that amount ultimately to leaving it up to  
18 the undercover officer's discretion?

19 A. I believe it did.

20 Q. Now, when you say take every precaution possible, what  
21 precautions do you have in mind?

22 A. I'm thinking about precautions as the -- "precaution" as  
23 a euphemism for contraceptives, obviously, and just  
24 common sense precautions about preservation of identity  
25 of an individual, of a group of individuals, and of

- 1           the risk that would be entailed if the whole system  
2           became exposed, if that relationship became exposed.
- 3       Q.   And did the person who gave you the advice talk to you  
4           about contraception expressly, or is that just something  
5           that you took it to mean?
- 6       A.   The latter.  It was not -- it was not spoken of  
7           expressly, no.
- 8       Q.   You tell us that in the event, you didn't get involved  
9           sexually with anyone in your undercover identity; is  
10          that correct?
- 11      A.   That is correct.
- 12      Q.   Why not?
- 13      A.   I found the whole business of operating as an  
14          undercover officer stressful enough.
- 15      Q.   Did you have any views about the morality of engaging in  
16          sexual contact with someone who did not know who you  
17          really were?
- 18      A.   Probably only at the time nebulous views on that  
19          question, which have taken more definite shape over  
20          the ensuing gap of years.
- 21      Q.   Did you have any views about whether it was right or  
22          wrong for a police officer acting in an undercover role  
23          to have sexual relations with a member of the public who  
24          did not know who they really were?
- 25      A.   Yes, I felt that that was -- that was wrong.  I did feel

- 1           that was wrong.
- 2       Q. Moving to the attitude of your managers to  
3           the assumption of responsibility within a group, what  
4           advice were you given?
- 5       A. I'm not quite sure what question you're asking me  
6           really, Sir.
- 7       Q. Well, I can illustrate it. You infiltrated, as we shall  
8           see, the International Socialists, first of all. There  
9           are lots of positions within the International  
10          Socialists, such as the newspaper organiser, or  
11          the secretary of a branch, or the treasurer and so  
12          forth. Were you given any guidance or advice, one way  
13          or the other, as to whether or not you should take up  
14          such positions?
- 15       A. Not really, but it was usually my eyes and ears at the  
16          time; it was, I think, generally regarded as a good  
17          thing for an officer to get into an office of some  
18          description within the organisation.
- 19       Q. And how did you form that impression?
- 20       A. Reaction from the management.
- 21       Q. Can we move now to legal professional privilege. What  
22          was your understanding at the start of your deployment  
23          about the definition of "legal professional privilege"?
- 24       A. I don't know that I had an understanding of it.
- 25       Q. Were you given any tuition or guidance on that subject?

- 1 A. I can't recall that I was.
- 2 Q. What was your understanding of the definition  
3 of "subversion" at the start of your deployment?
- 4 A. Gosh, right. My understanding of "subversion" at that  
5 time would have been that which was -- that which was  
6 likely to cause disruption to an established system of  
7 government.
- 8 Q. And how would that translate to the government of  
9 the day?
- 10 A. Again, could you be -- could you elaborate on that?  
11 Could you --
- 12 Q. Yes, I can.
- 13 A. Please.
- 14 Q. Was it the system of parliamentary democracy that you  
15 are considering when asking whether someone is being  
16 subversive, or is it opposition to the government of  
17 the day, or both?
- 18 A. Well, I think it was probably both.
- 19 Q. And in terms of intention, to be subversive, did a group  
20 have to intend to oppose the government of the day and  
21 the system of parliamentary democracy to be subversive?
- 22 A. I was working for an unspoken or, but okay. Yes,  
23 I think so.
- 24 Q. And also did they have to have the means to achieve that  
25 end, or would the aim alone suffice?



1       A. I think -- I think it was taken generally that the aim  
2       led to the means, so that necessarily an organisation  
3       might start with aims without means, and hopefully that  
4       -- hopefully, in the eyes of that organisation, would  
5       progress to acquiring the means.

6       Q. And was Special Branch interested in such groups from  
7       the point at which they had merely the aims, or did  
8       Special Branch's interest only arise when a group had  
9       both the aims and the means?

10      A. Oh, I think the former, most definitely.

11      Q. Thank you for bearing with those rather semantic  
12      questions. We can move now to some more impressionistic  
13      ground.

14             Did you feel properly prepared for your deployment  
15      by the time you started?

16      A. If you had asked me that question four decades ago, you  
17      may have got a different answer to the one that I'm  
18      about to give you. No.

19      Q. And can I take it from what you've just said that at the  
20      time, you had a different view?

21      A. Yes, you can take -- you can take it very much as that,  
22      because I don't think that I asked enough questions at  
23      the time.

24      Q. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, which has led you to  
25      answer my question in the negative, why did you -- why

1           were you not properly prepared for your deployment, by  
2           which I mean in what respects?

3           A.   Yes.

4                     I just have a feeling that the management of the day  
5           really expected potential officers, those waiting for  
6           deployment, to fully understand all of the ramifications  
7           of such a posting, and maybe they -- maybe they -- or  
8           most certainly they expected that those waiting, those  
9           invited would ask far more questions than I certainly  
10          did.  But my feeling is that they felt that we should --  
11          we should know, we would know enough.

12          Q.   Were you encouraged to ask questions?

13          A.   I wasn't discouraged, but I wasn't -- as far as I can  
14          recall, I wasn't actively encouraged.

15          Q.   Would more formal training have helped?

16          A.   Yes, I think so.

17          Q.   Can we now move to your cover identity, please.  You  
18          tell us that you were instructed to go to Somerset House  
19          and find the identity of a child who had died not very  
20          old.  Who gave you that advice, using a nominal, please?

21          A.   I wish that I could recall with absolute certainty who  
22          was in charge of the management office at the time, but  
23          I can't, so I'm just going to have to say to you -- to  
24          the Inquiry that it was a chief inspector or above in  
25          the back office of that squad.

1 Q. I can tell you that as far as we are aware, Chief  
2 Inspector Kneale was in charge of the SDS until  
3 approximately January 1976, and then, as far as we are  
4 aware, Detective Inspector Craft acted as the chief  
5 inspector until around July 1976, when he did become  
6 the chief inspector.

7 Do either of those two names assist?

8 A. Yes, it would certainly have been one or the other, and  
9 probably the latter.

10 Q. And were you told why you should look for a child who  
11 had not died very old?

12 A. Yes, in just very general terms, that such an individual  
13 would have a very curtailed life experience or life  
14 history, and therefore it offered scope to -- in my  
15 case, or in any other UCO's case, to create a story that  
16 could not be easily contradicted.

17 Q. Did anyone go with you to Somerset House, or did you go  
18 on your own?

19 A. I went alone.

20 Q. Were you given any instructions as to how to go about  
21 the task other than the age of the child?

22 A. Only -- only really to -- obviously to choose an  
23 identity around which it would be more -- it would be  
24 easier rather than more difficult to hang a story.

25 Q. When you found the birth certificate what you chose to

1 use, what information from that birth certificate did  
2 you use in constructing your cover identity?

3 A. The name, the locality and the date of birth.

4 Q. Now, you tell us in your witness statement that there  
5 came a time when you took a detour to where the child  
6 had been born. I don't want you to tell us where that  
7 was. Can you tell us, first of all, though, did you do  
8 that of your own volition or on instructions?

9 A. My own volition.

10 Q. Did you tell your managers that you had done that?

11 A. I don't recall that I did.

12 Q. You say in your witness statement that you did it in  
13 case you were questioned on the child's background; is  
14 that right?

15 A. That is.

16 Q. Did you use the birth certificate to obtain a bank  
17 account?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Did you have a bank account in your cover identity?

20 A. I'm sorry, no.

21 Q. Were you told why it was the SDS practice to use  
22 deceased children's identities?

23 A. Only, again, in quite general terms, that in doing so  
24 there was a greatly reduced, towards zero, risk of  
25 meeting the person whose identity you had assumed.

1 Q. Were you told of any reasons why the SDS was not using  
2 purely fictitious identities?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you know whether or not the SDS had used purely  
5 fictitious identities in the past?

6 A. I did not know and I do not know now.

7 Q. Were you given any choice as to whether or not to use  
8 a deceased child's identity?

9 A. No.

10 Q. I'd just like a "yes" or "no" answer to this particular  
11 question, please.

12 Did you conduct any form of risk assessment, whether  
13 formally or just in your head, about how you might be  
14 compromised when living undercover?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Did you consider the possibility of being confronted by  
17 the death certificate of the child whose identity you  
18 used to build your cover identity?

19 A. I may have fleetingly considered the possibility, and  
20 more or less at the same instant discounted it.

21 Q. Why would you have discounted it?

22 A. As being unlikely, an extremely unlikely scenario,  
23 simple as that.

24 Q. Did you have any contingency plan up your sleeve in case  
25 it were to happen?

1 A. I didn't.

2 Q. Was that a topic of conversation that ever came up at  
3 the safe house?

4 A. No, not -- if -- if it did, I wasn't party to it.

5 Q. Was your cover identity tested by your managers before  
6 you deployed?

7 A. No. I believe that they took it on trust that we had  
8 established a solid identity.

9 Q. Were you warned that activists might test your cover  
10 identity?

11 A. No. Basically no. The answer to that is no.

12 Q. Did it ever occur to you that that might happen?

13 A. Again, if it did, it was a fleeting -- it was a fleeting  
14 thought and probably quickly dismissed.

15 Q. Did you have any contingency plan in place in case it  
16 was to happen?

17 A. At the time, no.

18 Q. Was your undercover identity ever tested whilst you were  
19 deployed?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Did you have any qualms about using a deceased child's  
22 identity?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Did any of your colleagues, as far as you are aware?  
25 A. I don't believe so. It was not -- it wasn't a subject

1           that was frequently, if ever, discussed between  
2           ourselves. And, no, I don't believe anyone had any  
3           qualms about it.

4       Q. Did you consider that there was a risk that knowledge of  
5           the use of that tactic might become public?

6       A. Peripherally, yes.

7       Q. Did you consider how the relatives of a deceased child  
8           might feel were that to happen?

9       A. No, sir.

10      Q. Was that ever discussed at the safe house?

11      A. No. To the best of my knowledge not.

12      Q. Looking back now with hindsight, what is your feeling  
13           about using deceased children's identities?

14      A. I think that it is understandable why it was done at the  
15           time. I don't think that it is a valid system.

16      Q. You describe in your witness statement a gradual  
17           introduction to the scene where you were going to  
18           operate. For example, going to pubs and cafes,  
19           familiarising yourself with the area, going to your  
20           cover employer.

21           Can you recall for approximately how long you did  
22           that before first approaching your target?

23      A. Not ever so long, because there was always implicit  
24           a desire made -- made implicit from the management,  
25           that, you know, they wanted you to get out and on with

1 the job. So no more than several weeks.

2 Q. Would it be fair to describe the International  
3 Socialists in late 1975/early 1976 as being hungry for  
4 recruits?

5 A. Oh, I think so, yes.

6 Q. So was it necessary to go to great lengths to establish  
7 your cover identity before approaching them?

8 A. I felt so.

9 Q. And what advantage do you think that gave you?

10 A. I felt and still feel that it enabled me to act and  
11 be -- behave and act and react more naturally, not  
12 stiltedly.

13 Q. In general terms, how conscious were you that your  
14 behaviour might influence whether or not you were  
15 compromised?

16 A. It was always a background consideration.

17 Q. And how did that background consideration influence  
18 the choices you made about how you behaved undercover?

19 A. Speaking, as I only can, for myself, and to go back to  
20 a comment that I made right at the start of the session,  
21 as time wore on under deployment, it became more and  
22 more of an incubus to me. So it was always  
23 a consideration that my identity might be discovered,  
24 revealed. And I can't now, four-decades-plus later,  
25 absolutely categorically and clearly elaborate to



1 the Inquiry how that affected my behaviour and  
2 deployment, save to say that I know that it did.

3 Q. So, to take -- I asked you, I'm very conscious, a very  
4 nebulous question. Let's be a little bit more specific.

5 Did you choose to be prominent within your group, or  
6 to be retiring within your group, according to how you  
7 felt it would affect your personal security?

8 A. Yes, I chose not to be prominent.

9 Q. Did you make choices about how close to get to  
10 individuals that you were meeting undercover, with  
11 a view to whether that might affect how safe you were?

12 A. Yes, absolutely. I am aware now, but at the time we are  
13 talking of, I unconsciously probably but kept what  
14 I would regard as a COVID-19 distance from them.

15 Q. I see.

16 Would you consider that, for example, to enter into  
17 an intimate relationship would generate risk, or would  
18 it generate cover?

19 A. I regarded it as likely to generate risk.

20 Q. Can I move now to the safe house, please. You tell us  
21 in your witness statement that you can recall  
22 twice-weekly meetings. Was that the case throughout  
23 your deployment?

24 A. Yes, I think it was.

25 Q. And you tell us that they were held during the day,

1           during the course of the working week. Was that  
2           invariably the case?

3           A. Invariably, yes.

4           Q. Can you give us an idea of how long these meetings  
5           lasted, please?

6           A. Yes. Typically, folk would arrive late morning,  
7           11 o'clock-ish. The meeting itself would last perhaps  
8           an hour-and-a-half/two hours, and then there would be  
9           lunch.

10          Q. And after lunch?

11          A. A dispersal.

12          Q. Long lunch?

13          A. Long lunch.

14          Q. And who --

15          A. And moist.

16          Q. I beg your pardon?

17          A. Long and moist.

18          Q. Long and moist, thank you.

19                 And who would attend the lunch -- sorry, who would  
20                 attend the meeting?

21          A. Well, undercover officers who, unless they had other  
22                 pre-existing commitments relating to their deployment,  
23                 most would attend --

24          Q. And --

25          A. -- and officers from the management.

- 1 Q. So would that normally be both the chief inspector and  
2 the inspector?
- 3 A. Yes, normally there was two, sometimes three.
- 4 Q. Would the sergeant here ever attend?
- 5 A. Sometimes, yes.
- 6 Q. And I think it follows from what you've said earlier,  
7 sometimes the next undercover officer being prepared for  
8 deployment?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. You tell us that there were two safe houses: one in  
11 the south and one in the west. As far as you can  
12 recall, were there always two safe houses during your  
13 time in the unit?
- 14 A. Yes, there were.
- 15 Q. And did they move, or was it always the same places?
- 16 A. One of -- one of -- one of the two changed locations at  
17 least -- at least once during my deployment.
- 18 Q. And can you help us with what sort of size of premises  
19 we are talking about?
- 20 A. We're talking about, typically, a large flat.
- 21 Q. And whereabouts would you hold the meeting?
- 22 A. In a communal room in a -- in a living room setting.
- 23 Q. And would you generally conduct either all or most of  
24 the meeting together in that room?
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. You've explained that there was always the option of  
2 having a one-to-one conversation with managers, if that  
3 was required. How frequently did you take up that  
4 option?
- 5 A. Seldom, if ever.
- 6 Q. How frequently did your colleagues take up that option?
- 7 A. My instinctive guesswork answer is: seldom.
- 8 Q. After the meeting when you had lunch, did everybody  
9 attend the lunch, or only some of you?
- 10 A. It wasn't compulsory. So most did, but by no means all  
11 on every occasion.
- 12 Q. And was there any division between managers and UCOs, or  
13 did you all attend according to whether you wished to?
- 14 A. Yes, simply that. There was no -- there was no  
15 hierarchy.
- 16 Q. Coming to what you did in a bit more detail, you tell us  
17 that you would submit your diaries. Could you tell us  
18 a little bit more about what your diary was used for and  
19 what sort of entries were made in it.
- 20 A. It was used as -- to convey in the broadest strokes  
21 the daily activities of the UCO, commencing from phoning  
22 in to start work, going to a premises until such and  
23 such a time, maybe meeting informants at such and such  
24 a hostelry, until late in the evening/early hours of  
25 the morning, when you finished work, and to submit any

- 1 expenses claims.
- 2 Q. And so would the diary, for example, be used to  
3 calculate overtime payments, or was that done  
4 separately?
- 5 A. Well, it was the basis of overtime payments, but  
6 I think -- from recollection, I think that was done  
7 separately.
- 8 Q. I'm understanding from your statement that another thing  
9 that you would do at the meetings would be to submit  
10 your written reports.
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. When and where did you write your reports?
- 13 A. Some were written at the safe house. In fact, probably  
14 most were, thinking about it.
- 15 Q. And what was the practice of your colleagues? Did it  
16 vary or did they all do that?
- 17 A. I think that was -- I'm not going to say that they all  
18 did it, but I think that was common practice.
- 19 Q. Were they read on the spot or were they simply taken  
20 away to be processed by the back office?
- 21 A. If they were read, they were just glanced through and  
22 then taken away.
- 23 Q. Did you ever get any feedback or questions about them at  
24 later meetings?
- 25 A. Once in a while, yes.

1 Q. You tell us that the discussions at the meeting didn't  
2 follow any particular agenda and were informal; is that  
3 right?

4 A. That's right.

5 Q. Laid-back?

6 A. Laid-back, no -- no agenda. No written agenda.

7 Q. I beg your pardon?

8 A. No written agenda.

9 Q. And did they follow a similar pattern every time, or  
10 not?

11 A. Yes, pretty much they did.

12 Q. And can you tell us what that was?

13 A. Yes, it was a light-hearted -- it was a fairly  
14 light-hearted gathering, over tea/coffee, to have a chat  
15 amongst ourselves, chat to management officers if we  
16 wished, for them to see -- check that everybody and  
17 everything was going more or less according to the grand  
18 plan, and to enjoy a relaxing morning/lunchtime during  
19 the -- during the meeting, and afterwards at a lunch or  
20 at a -- a hostelry.

21 Q. And would you, for example, discuss professional issues  
22 that had arisen over the course of the previous week?

23 A. With other UCOs?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. Yes, possibly.

- 1 Q. Was there discussion about what you could or should do  
2 and what you should and should not do?
- 3 A. No, I think there was -- there was sometimes discussion  
4 about -- between -- between UCOs, about what was  
5 definable as being on or off duty. There were one or  
6 two camps. Some -- some people believed that as a UCO,  
7 one was always on duty; others took a different stance.  
8 But in terms of what one should or should not do, not so  
9 much.
- 10 Q. What was the significance of the boundary between being  
11 on and off duty?
- 12 A. Well, it was to do with overtime claims. Expenses and  
13 overtime claims.
- 14 Q. Did managers set boundaries about what you could and  
15 could not do at these meetings?
- 16 A. No, it was very nebulous. It was left up to each  
17 individual to submit his or her hours' claims; and I can  
18 only assume, since mine were never challenged, that they  
19 fell within acceptable limits, but I know that, one or  
20 two cases, eyebrows were raised.
- 21 Q. Did your managers set boundaries about issues other than  
22 overtime? Behaviour, in particular, I'm thinking about.
- 23 A. I have no clear recollection of them doing so or having  
24 done so, no.
- 25 Q. Would you discuss salient events in the week gone by,

- 1 say, for example, a big demonstration?
- 2 A. Yes. Yes, that would be -- that would be a topic of  
3 conversation, whether or not any organisation that  
4 I might have been infiltrating had got involved. But if  
5 there had been a big demonstration, then it would be  
6 a topic of general conversation.
- 7 Q. What sort of things would people remark about in that  
8 connection?
- 9 A. Discrepancies -- generally, discrepancies in  
10 the official count and -- of attendees and the numbers  
11 claimed to have been present by the organisers of  
12 the event, police behaviour; that kind of thing.
- 13 Q. Would prominent personalities be discussed?
- 14 A. Yes, quite possibly.
- 15 Q. Would there be discussion about whether or not the group  
16 or groups involved had posed a threat to public order?
- 17 A. Yes, maybe sometimes, yes, there would have been.
- 18 Q. Put more bluntly, how they had behaved?
- 19 A. Yes, I mean, I think that that would -- that would have  
20 been a one-way traffic from the individual UCO or UCOs'  
21 monitoring to the management, rather than a general  
22 topic of conversation amongst the UCOs.
- 23 Q. And more generally, would there be discussion about  
24 the aims and effectiveness of the groups that were being  
25 infiltrated?



1       A.  Sometimes, yes.  I think that probably not unreasonable  
2       to say that from a UCO's point of view, it was very  
3       often the -- the considered viewpoint that active --  
4       activists or activist organisations were over-hopeful of  
5       their effect.  They were -- I think they were belittled  
6       rather.

7       Q.  So was it common knowledge that a lot of these groups  
8       had barks that were very considerably worse than their  
9       bites?

10      A.  Yes, I think so.

11      Q.  Did you discuss the commission of crimes by members of  
12      the groups?

13      A.  At the meetings?  At our meetings?

14      Q.  Yes.

15      A.  Not that I can recall.  I'm sure there must have been  
16      occasions when that was a topic of discussion amongst  
17      one or two UCOs, but I never took part in such, and  
18      I can't swear that I heard of any.

19      Q.  Was the commission of crime by the groups that were  
20      being infiltrated very common, to your knowledge?

21      A.  No.

22      Q.  Did you discuss the groups' politics?

23      A.  At our meetings?

24      Q.  Yes.

25      A.  Yes, sometimes, but generally speaking, going back to

1           what I said a couple of moments ago, I got at the time,  
2           and I still have the feeling, that the politics were not  
3           disregarded but belittled.

4       Q.   So, I'm getting the impression that insofar as it was  
5           raised, it was to belittle them rather than necessarily  
6           to understand them; or is that unfair?

7       A.   Not -- not -- it's not unfair.  It carries a nuance that  
8           I didn't intend.  Your statement carries a nuance that  
9           I didn't intend, because I don't think that there was  
10          a collective drive amongst UCOs to belittle  
11          organisations, members, or their politics.  That's just  
12          what happened.

13      Q.   Did you discuss welfare issues?

14      A.   Occasionally.

15      Q.   Was it a case of a problem shared is a problem solved?

16      A.   Yes.  Yes, sometimes.  I mean, I can't give you any --  
17          I can't give the Inquiry any specific instances relating  
18          to myself, but I know that -- from recollection, that  
19          individual UCOs did have -- did use the meetings as an  
20          opportunity to -- to discuss welfare concerns.

21      Q.   Avoiding anything that was entirely outside work, are  
22          there any examples of the sort of welfare issues that  
23          were arising from undercover work that you could share  
24          with us?

25      A.   Affecting me personally?

- 1 Q. No, just that your colleagues may have shared.
- 2 A. Oh. I can't recall.
- 3 Q. You've told us in your witness statement that there were  
4 occasions when the people in the room would mock  
5 the plans and the organisational skills of the groups  
6 being infiltrated. How common was that?
- 7 A. Relatively common.
- 8 Q. And was the feeling that the general level of  
9 organisational skill within the groups being infiltrated  
10 was low?
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. How well did you get on with your colleagues?
- 13 A. As an overall group, well.
- 14 Q. And how well did you get to know them?
- 15 A. To the extent that I did not, outside of work, socialise  
16 with any of them, moderately well.
- 17 Q. Did you form any particular friendships?
- 18 A. Not that I can actually call a particular friendship.  
19 As I say, I did not -- I didn't socialise outside of  
20 work with any of them, so it was a working friendship.
- 21 Q. Would it -- would I be getting the right picture if I'm  
22 understanding that you were able to relax and have  
23 a laugh with them?
- 24 A. Oh yes.
- 25 Q. Was there a wide range of personalities within the group

1 of UCOs you served with?

2 A. I think so, yes. Yes, I think where you've got a group  
3 of -- any group at all, if you were to pluck 12, 14, 20  
4 people off the street in any location at any time, you  
5 would have a range -- a fairly wide range of  
6 personalities. And that was certainly the case in this  
7 instance.

8 Q. And would you share anecdotes?

9 A. Yes, sometimes.

10 Q. And jokes?

11 A. And jokes.

12 Q. And banter?

13 A. And banter.

14 Q. And was that confined to the UCOs, or did the managers  
15 join in?

16 A. Oh, I think the managers joined in pretty much.

17 Q. Now, the content of your witness statement suggests that  
18 the joking and the banter might extend to some of  
19 the women who were in the groups being targeted; is that  
20 right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And that some of the jokes may have been of a sexual  
23 nature?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can you give us some examples, please.

1       A. I wish I could. I can't give you chapter and verse at  
2       all of any particular incident. I can say that I am  
3       left with the recollection that on more than one  
4       occasion, such subjects were raised and engaged in by  
5       all present.

6       Q. Would it be fair to say that these were probably jokes  
7       and banter that a 1970s feminist woman would have found  
8       offensive?

9       A. Indeed. And also that more than a wider range of  
10      the general public in 2020 or 2021 would certainly find  
11      offensive.

12     Q. And by the standards of Special Branch in the late  
13      1970s, how did they compare?

14     A. What, with the general public?

15     Q. Well, can we start with how the banter in the safe house  
16      would compare to banter generally within Special Branch  
17      in the late 1970s?

18     A. Oh, I see. Right. I'm sorry.

19             I don't think there was a significant difference.  
20             I mean, it was -- the culture of the time was as it was,  
21             and the police service being what it was then, it made  
22             precious little difference that I could see, and I can  
23             see now, whether one was a mainstream CID or uniform  
24             officer or a Special Branch officer. The nuts and bolts  
25             of the humour, so-called, were the same.

- 1 Q. And how -- now to go to the question that you were  
2 posing, how would it compare to society generally in  
3 the late 1970s?
- 4 A. Oh, I think it would -- I think it would have been  
5 regarded even then as offensive.
- 6 Q. Can I move now to some specific personalities. I want  
7 to ask you first of all about the officer whose real  
8 name was Richard Clark, whose cover name was "Rick  
9 Gibson" and we know as "HN297".
- 10 Can you tell us what you gleaned from the meetings  
11 about the behaviour of Richard Clark whilst he was  
12 undercover?
- 13 A. The clearest recollection that I have is that whilst  
14 I was in the back office awaiting deployment, it became  
15 known to me that he had let it be known to  
16 the management that he feared being unmasked, and that  
17 as a result of that, management and he himself  
18 constructed a meeting that he was to attend with his  
19 activists and management would be scattered around --  
20 I think it was a meeting in a public house. And they  
21 were there -- the management were there obviously to see  
22 what went on, but to make sure that he remained safe.
- 23 Q. How concerned were your managers about this?
- 24 A. Can I ask whether you mean for his safety or for  
25 the role?

1 Q. Well, that was going to be my next question, so you can  
2 -- how concerned that they were about  
3 -- (overspeaking) -- by --

4 A. I beg your pardon.

5 I think they were far more -- I think they were far  
6 more concerned with the role than with the safety of  
7 the officer; although they would deny that, wouldn't  
8 they?

9 Q. Well, I'm going to explore this a little bit further,  
10 because it's obviously interesting.

11 In terms of his safety, as far as you understood it,  
12 was there a risk to his safety?

13 A. Yes, I think there was a risk to his safety. Although,  
14 I don't know how that risk would have manifested.

15 Q. And in terms of the role, as you put it, could you  
16 elaborate on what you mean by that?

17 A. Well, his -- his -- his function as an  
18 undercover officer and supplier of covert information.

19 Q. So they didn't want to lose the source; is that what  
20 you're saying?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And what about the overall operational security of  
23 the SDS as a unit?

24 A. Well, yes, I imagine -- I imagine that that also must  
25 have been -- quite obviously that must have been of

1 concern to the management, that if one -- if one brick  
2 falls out of the building, maybe others will become  
3 unstable, or will be discovered to be unstable.

4 Q. How security conscious was the management of the SDS?

5 A. Apparently quite.

6 Q. And how concerned were they to keep the existence and  
7 operations of the SDS out of the public eye?

8 A. Very.

9 Q. Are you able to give us any -- we'll come to the end of  
10 your deployment in due course, but apart from that, are  
11 you able to give us any examples to illustrate that?

12 Again, without naming any names, please.

13 A. Sitting here now, not without you prompting.

14 Q. Can I move now to what you heard in terms of joking and  
15 banter about Richard Clark and sexual activity in his  
16 undercover role. Could you tell us what you can recall,  
17 please?

18 A. I can tell you simply that although I cannot recall  
19 the conversation -- any conversation verbatim, I can  
20 tell you that what I heard left me in no doubt that  
21 the management were aware of that officer's behaviour.

22 Q. And when you say "that officer's behaviour", what  
23 behaviour are we talking about?

24 A. Sexual -- sexual relations.

25 Q. Do you know with how many women?



- 1 A. I don't.
- 2 Q. Do you know whether it was understood to be  
3 a relationship, or one-night stands, or something in  
4 between?
- 5 A. I don't know that either. I can't answer that for  
6 certain.
- 7 Q. In terms of who the DCI was at this stage, are we  
8 talking about Chief Inspector Kneale or Chief Inspector  
9 Craft?
- 10 A. I believe it was Chief Inspector Kneale.
- 11 Q. And in terms of the detective inspectors, are you  
12 including in the circle of knowledge Detective Inspector  
13 Craft?
- 14 A. I'm including anybody who was in that management  
15 structure at that time. They could not have failed to  
16 have drawn the obvious conclusions from the comments  
17 that were being made.
- 18 Q. I appreciate it's a very long time ago. Can you recall  
19 whether that would include Detective Inspector McIntosh?
- 20 A. I can't recall the chronology. If he was -- if he was  
21 -- if he had been deployed, or if he had been working in  
22 that office at that time, he would have known.
- 23 Q. And can you recall whether it would have included  
24 the sergeant we known as "HN368"?
- 25 A. Excuse me, may I just refer?

1 Q. Of course.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 Now, you've explained to us that you were left in no  
5 doubt that there had been sexual contact. Can you  
6 expand upon why it was that you are so clear about that?

7 A. Simply because of the nature of the -- of the banter at  
8 the time. It was -- it was dealt with as banter, but  
9 the comments that were being made, which were of a -- of  
10 a gross nature, would have left no young -- and  
11 by "young", I'm talking of anyone of my age at that time  
12 or older, anybody in their 30s, 40s, 50s at that time,  
13 would have left nobody in any doubt as to the nature of  
14 the relationship. That's all I can tell you really  
15 about that. It was made quite plain, with jokes and  
16 banter, that they knew, we knew, and management knew  
17 what was going on.

18 MR BARR: Thank you, 304.

19 Sir, would now be a good time to take our  
20 mid-morning break?

21 A. Yes, please.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it would. We'll break for 20 minutes.

23 Before we do, can I just do something I should have  
24 done at the start of your evidence. I can see  
25 a gentleman over your left shoulder. Can you confirm



1 activity was because of the nature of the banter, and in  
2 particular you referred to a gross comment. Could you  
3 tell us, please, what the gross comment was?

4 A. I may not have been utterly clear. I -- I didn't mean  
5 to refer to one specific gross comment but comments that  
6 were made that were gross. And would that I could, but  
7 I cannot recall exactly what was said, but it would --  
8 it would leave nobody in any doubt as to what was -- as  
9 to what was meant.

10 Q. Can you remember any of the comments at all?

11 A. I -- I can remember a comment, but I have to say that  
12 I'm not -- I can't swear that this particular comment  
13 was made in relation to Rick Clark.

14 Q. With that caveat, could you share it with us, please?

15 A. Yes, very well.

16 A comment was made -- and I can't remember who made  
17 it -- but a comment was made about, "Oh, he'll have made  
18 her bite the blankets again last night."

19 Q. Can we move now, please, to the officer that we know  
20 as "HN300", who used the cover name "Jim Pickford".  
21 Without using his real name, are you -- do you know who  
22 we are talking about?

23 A. Indeed I do.

24 Q. You have described him in your witness statement  
25 as "always chasing after women". Was that an

- 1           established reputation by the time you were on the SDS?
- 2       A.   Yes.  Anybody that knew that officer -- anybody that
- 3           knew that officer, at any stage of his service, would
- 4           very quickly have known what his
- 5           propensities/proclivities were in that regard.
- 6       Q.   Could you help us as to how that would have become so
- 7           apparent so quickly?
- 8       A.   In large part because the officer himself made light of
- 9           it and really didn't keep anything very secret,
- 10          especially when it came to how much it was costing him
- 11          in alimony.
- 12       Q.   So we know that he was by that stage on his second
- 13          marriage.  Did he also make comments and talk about his
- 14          sexual activities and proclivities?
- 15       A.   No.  No, not in that respect he didn't.  Not as to
- 16          detailed accounts of his sexual activities, no.
- 17       Q.   What then caused you to describe him as a philanderer?
- 18       A.   Knowledge of the man and the fact that it was common
- 19          knowledge outside -- within and outside of S squad that
- 20          that was the nature of the person, that he could not be
- 21          in the presence of a woman without trying it on.
- 22       Q.   And was that something that you had observed yourself?
- 23       A.   Yes.
- 24       Q.   On more than one occasion?
- 25       A.   Yes.

1 Q. Did he talk about women in his target group?

2 A. I can't -- I can't recall that. I'm sorry, I can't  
3 recall that he did.

4 Q. Might he have done so?

5 A. I'd be surprised if he hadn't.

6 Q. Did he ever speak about falling in love with someone  
7 whom he had met undercover?

8 A. Not in my hearing, but I don't think that that was  
9 something that he did: fall in love.

10 Q. Are you talking now about the man generally?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Did he speak about forming a sexual relationship with  
13 someone he'd met undercover?

14 A. I believe he did, yes.

15 Q. Can you help us, as far as you can recall, with  
16 the detail of that?

17 A. I can't. No, I can't recall any detail.

18 Q. Was it one woman, or more than one woman?

19 A. To the best of my recollection, it was one woman.

20 Q. The Inquiry has heard some evidence that HN300 went on  
21 to marry someone who he had met undercover in his  
22 deployment. Were you aware of that?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Was HN300 the subject of comment and banter at  
25 the safe house in relation to his sexual activity?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And did that extend to the woman with whom he'd had sex  
3 undercover?

4 A. I believe so, yes.

5 Q. Would your managers have been aware of that?

6 A. I hope that they would. I don't see how they could have  
7 failed.

8 Q. Can I now move to the officer that we know as "HN106",  
9 who used the cover name "Barry Tompkins".

10 A. May I refer, please?

11 Q. Of course.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Can you recall whether or not he had a reputation with  
14 women?

15 A. No.

16 Q. No, you can't recall, or no, he didn't?

17 A. No, I can't recall. I beg your pardon.

18 Q. Can you recall an anecdote being shared in  
19 the safe house about a female activist who could lactate  
20 on demand?

21 A. I don't recall that.

22 Q. Can you recall any comment or banter at the safe house  
23 to the effect that HN106 had had a sexual relationship  
24 with any woman whilst undercover?

25 A. No, I can't recall that.

- 1 Q. Can I move now to the officer we know as "HN155", who  
2 used the cover name "Phil Cooper".
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. Did he have a reputation with women?
- 5 A. I believe he did.
- 6 Q. Can you recall any comment or banter at the safe house  
7 concerning him and sexual activity whilst undercover?
- 8 A. To the best of my knowledge, any talk of that officer  
9 had more to do with financial matters than with sexual  
10 activity.
- 11 Q. What was the reputation that he had with women?
- 12 A. I must say, I wasn't fully aware. I'm not surprised --  
13 I would not be surprised to hear that he did have  
14 a reputation with women. I wasn't, I think, fully aware  
15 at the time that he did have. As I've just said, as far  
16 as I'm aware, the outstanding reputation that he had was  
17 for the size of his claims -- expenses claims and  
18 overtime claims.
- 19 Q. Are you able to help us one way or the other with  
20 whether or not HN155 had sexual contact with activists  
21 whilst undercover?
- 22 A. No, I can't help you with that. But I would not be  
23 surprised to hear it.
- 24 Q. And is there any basis for that lack of surprise?
- 25 A. Only knowing what I know of him as a person.



1 Q. And what is it about knowing him as a person that makes  
2 you think he might have done that?

3 A. He is a very charming, easy-going, light-hearted  
4 individual, who would find no problem striking up or  
5 making an acquaintanceship in any group. He is an  
6 outgoing personality.

7 Q. And what about qualms? Is he the sort of man who would  
8 or would not have had qualms about accepting an offer of  
9 sex undercover?

10 A. Hm. Small qualms. Small to no qualms, I would imagine.

11 Q. And is that based on your knowledge of him?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Are you able to help us with any examples of the sort of  
14 behaviours that have taken you to that opinion?

15 A. Not beyond what I just -- the small sketch -- thumbnail  
16 sketch of his character that I -- that I gave just now,  
17 no.

18 Q. Can I move now to the officer who we know by  
19 the nominal "HN354" and who used the cover name  
20 "Vince Miller".

21 I know in your witness statement that you said that  
22 you couldn't recall him. I just want to put a few  
23 things to you in case they remind you. Before we start,  
24 is it still your recollection that you can't remember  
25 him, or do you now remember him?

1 A. I remember him now.

2 Q. You remember him now.

3 How much time did you spend together before you both

4 deployed?

5 A. I can't answer that. I really can't remember.

6 Q. You were both deployed in geographically nearby places

7 --

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. -- for a long time in the late 70s. How well did you

10 get to know him?

11 A. Not ever so well.

12 Q. Were you aware that he was deployed in Walthamstow?

13 A. Latterly.

14 Q. Did you talk to one another about what you were doing?

15 A. No, I don't think we did.

16 Q. Would you have heard what he said about what he was

17 doing in conversations at the safe house?

18 A. I might have heard, yes, but I'm not aware that I --

19 that I did hear any comments that he made.

20 Q. Was he a talkative individual?

21 A. Yes. I wouldn't say garrulous, but talkative, yeah.

22 Q. Did he, to your recollection, talk about women and

23 sexual relationships during the course of his undercover

24 deployment?

25 A. To my recollection, he didn't.

- 1 Q. Did he have a reputation with women?
- 2 A. Not that I was aware, which is not to say that he  
3 didn't; I was not aware of it.
- 4 Q. You've told us in your witness statement that you did  
5 hear jokes and banter about an officer, and you can't  
6 remember who it was, in connection with  
7 a sexual relationship. Might that have been HN354?
- 8 A. It might, but I don't believe it was.
- 9 Q. Have you any further recollection now as to who that was  
10 about?
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. HN304, you have been very patient with my questions  
13 about specific individuals. I'm going to step back  
14 a little bit and ask you some more broad-based questions  
15 on the same topic.  
16 What was the reaction of your colleagues to  
17 the information that was being shared about  
18 sexual relationships undercover?
- 19 A. I think it could best be summed up as, "Good on you",  
20 "Well done", "Go for it".
- 21 Q. Was there any consideration or discussion of what might  
22 happen if the women concerned were ever to find out  
23 the real identity of the undercover officer?
- 24 A. I don't recall such a conversation, no.
- 25 Q. Was there any appreciation of how the women might feel

- 1           if that were to occur?
- 2       A. I think that was not on the horizon. Not on -- not on  
3           their radar.
- 4       Q. Turning to your managers, you have stated that they  
5           appeared to turn a blind eye to the bits of banter and  
6           innuendo. Is that something that applies to all of  
7           the managers or only some of them?
- 8       A. I would say across the board.
- 9       Q. You've said that they must have known it was bound to  
10           happen with certain individuals who had a predilection  
11           for chasing women before, during and after their time  
12           with the SDS. Were you referring there to HN300?
- 13      A. Yes.
- 14      Q. Were you referring to HN297?
- 15      A. Yes.
- 16      Q. Were you referring to anyone else?
- 17      A. No.
- 18      Q. Is there anything else you can tell us about the basis  
19           for your opinion that the managers were turning a blind  
20           eye to sexual relationships undercover?
- 21      A. No, I don't think there is.
- 22      Q. Was there any adverse comment from managers about  
23           the banter about these relationships?
- 24      A. Not in my hearing there wasn't.
- 25      Q. Did the managers ever join in in the "good on you" type

- 1 of comment?
- 2 A. No, I wouldn't say that they joined in at that level,  
3 but I don't recall hearing an outright criticism or  
4 disapproval.
- 5 Q. At what level did they join in?
- 6 A. Just the lowest level of -- well, a -- a low level of  
7 communal humour at the situation.
- 8 Q. Was there any disapproval at all ever ventilated by any  
9 manager about a sexual relationship whilst you served on  
10 the SDS?
- 11 A. I -- if there was, I didn't ever hear it.
- 12 Q. You have explained that job satisfaction appeared to you  
13 to be a paramount consideration for managers -- job  
14 satisfaction of undercover officers, that is; and that  
15 you've said:
- 16 "... it sometimes seemed the managers did not want  
17 to instruct the UCOs at all ... but it seemed as though  
18 they were deliberately blind in some areas, such as  
19 sexual activity by UCOs while undercover."
- 20 Are you meaning to convey that the desire to keep  
21 undercover officers deployed outweighed what they were  
22 hearing about sexual relationships?
- 23 A. I believe that to be true. That's what I meant to  
24 convey, and I believe that to be true.
- 25 Q. And was it a case, did you sense, that there was some

1 balancing exercise, or did you sense that they simply  
2 were untroubled by the fact of sexual relationships?

3 A. As far as I could see, they were not troubled.

4 Q. You have said that in hindsight, the situation needed  
5 much stricter guidance. What did you have in mind?

6 A. I think that I had in mind that prospective UCOs should  
7 be schooled for far longer and in much greater breadth  
8 for all considerations of the work they were about to  
9 undertake.

10 Q. Do you think that they should also have been screened so  
11 that those with a predilection for chasing women were  
12 excluded?

13 A. Well, yes, but from a management -- managerial point of  
14 view, had they done so, they would have -- presumably  
15 they would have known that they were denying the system  
16 information, because it strikes me that an officer  
17 who -- an undercover officer who strikes up a deep  
18 relationship -- sexual relationship, or a series  
19 thereof, may be to the detriment of his own personal  
20 background relationship, whatever that might have been  
21 or might be, that individual in a sexual relationship  
22 with an activist is far more likely to be in a position  
23 to obtain valuable information than somebody like  
24 myself.

25 Q. Did you ever sense that the managers' position in

1 relation to sexual relationships went beyond  
2 indifference to a tacit understanding that it might lead  
3 to better intelligence product?

4 A. I think there was a tacit acceptance.

5 Q. Can you help us with what the basis for believing that  
6 is?

7 A. Only insofar as I've already said: I never heard, or do  
8 not recall ever having heard, an outspoken active  
9 disagreement or disapproval.

10 Q. We have received evidence that most of the members of  
11 the SDS in the late 1970s were either married or in  
12 stable, long term relationships. Did you as a unit ever  
13 socialise with partners?

14 A. I never did, no. I don't recall ever having done so,  
15 no.

16 Q. If -- returning to the theme of tighter instruction and  
17 guidance and so forth, if there had been more extensive  
18 guidance, if there had been some formal training with  
19 clear prohibitions on sexual activity undercover, do you  
20 think that would have prevented sexual activity all  
21 together or not?

22 A. Almost certainly not.

23 Q. Could you expand upon that opinion, please, or the basis  
24 for that opinion.

25 A. Yes, I mean to say, really, that in some individuals it

- 1           may have cut some ice and have had the desired effect.
- 2           But other individuals would have listened and nodded.
- 3           But individuals being what they are, are a widely varied
- 4           spectrum of characteristics or characters, and some
- 5           would have -- I don't think it would have had any
- 6           effect.
- 7           Q. Do you think that they might have been less open about
- 8           what they were doing?
- 9           A. It's a possibility, certainly.
- 10          Q. Can I ask some even more general questions now, please.
- 11          A. Do I have the power to say "no"? No, I don't.
- 12          Q. Was there ever any discussion about attitudes to
- 13          women's liberation in the safe house?
- 14          A. Yes, I believe there was. I'm -- I'm very nebulous
- 15          about it, but I do believe there was.
- 16          Q. And can you recall whether there was any particular tide
- 17          of opinion?
- 18          A. Yes, I think that it was, generally speaking, of a piece
- 19          with the attitudes of the male population of this
- 20          country at the time, which was that it was a bunch of
- 21          angry women that, you know, could well be ignored.
- 22          Q. Was there any general discussion about the merits of
- 23          the left-wing political opinions of those you were
- 24          collectively infiltrating?
- 25          A. Yes, there was occasional discussion along those lines.



- 1 Q. And was there any particular tide of opinion within  
2 the unit as to those opinions?
- 3 A. I think that if every undercover officer told the truth,  
4 they would have to admit that at some point during their  
5 deployment they had some sympathy for the ideas and  
6 tenets of the group or groups that they were involved  
7 with. Sort of like a Stockholm syndrome.
- 8 Q. To what extent would this sympathy develop?
- 9 A. Only, I suspect, as a -- as a mental -- a mental  
10 exercise, a mental construct within an individual's  
11 mind.
- 12 Q. Was there discussion about the campaigning activities of  
13 the left wing groups infiltrated against racism?
- 14 A. I think -- I'm -- again, apologetically, I'm going to  
15 have to say I'm very nebulous on this. It was not  
16 something that I heard a great deal of.
- 17 Q. If this is a question too far, just say so, 304, but  
18 what I'm trying to establish is whether there was any  
19 tide of opinion -- general tide of opinion for or  
20 against that cause within the SDS safe house?
- 21 A. That is a question too far, which I am honestly unable  
22 to answer.
- 23 Q. I'm going to move on now to reporting, and starting with  
24 some general questions.
- 25 You have said that no scrap of information was ever

1           rejected as irrelevant, and any piece of information was  
2           fair game because it might become relevant later. Can  
3           you explain how you came to that understanding?

4           A. Yes, I think that the general ethos was that any  
5           information that is collected -- however it's collected,  
6           I have to say, not just by undercover officers, but any  
7           information that's collected, even if it appears trivial  
8           or totally from left field and irrelevant, you can't --  
9           you can't really be afforded -- you can't really be  
10          afforded the option of ignoring it, in case in months --  
11          weeks, months, years to come it is the missing piece in  
12          a jigsaw.

13          Q. And can I take it from your answer then that this was  
14          something you had already learned on Special Branch  
15          before joining the SDS?

16          A. Yes.

17          Q. And you said that reporting everything gave the true  
18          impression of an organisation. Was that the house line,  
19          as it were?

20          A. I think that, generally speaking, from a point of view  
21          of Special Branch reporting generally, it was accepted  
22          that we report to higher -- to senior officers; they  
23          assess and deal with it. It's not for us to make --  
24          it's not for the reporting officers to make  
25          the qualitative or quantitative decision as to what gets

1 reported or not.

2 Q. When reporting information, did you apply any filter at  
3 all?

4 A. Me, personally?

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What sort of filter would you apply?

8 A. I applied filters that I thought -- that I hoped would  
9 filter out what I thought was irrelevant information,  
10 regarding a lot of personal relationship information,  
11 or -- yes, well, that's basically it.

12 Q. And what had equipped you to make those judgments?

13 A. My conscience.

14 Q. Had training played any part in it?

15 A. I can't tell you that.

16 Q. Your practice and experience?

17 A. Possibly.

18 Q. Do you know what the approach of your colleagues was?

19 A. I know that some of them adopted the -- the quantitative  
20 approach. It's not -- insofar as it was -- they  
21 regarded it as not their role to -- to sift or weed out  
22 information.

23 Q. You've said in your witness statement "our job was only  
24 to report". Do you stand by that?

25 A. Yes, I think so. Yes, I do.

- 1 Q. You were provided with a pack of documents when you  
2 produced your witness statement, and you've told us that  
3 you think that there must be some of your original  
4 reports missing from that pack. First of all, there  
5 appears to be nothing from your reporting on the Croydon  
6 Socialist Workers Party. Did you report on  
7 the Socialist Workers Party in Croydon?
- 8 A. Yes, I did, but -- but not very much. I have to say, in  
9 honesty, I did not submit very much --
- 10 Q. As to other categories -- (overspeaking) -- I beg your  
11 pardon. Please continue.
- 12 A. This was, as you will be aware, right at the tail end --  
13 very much towards the tail end of my deployment, and  
14 I was, I suppose, to use a phrase, burnt out.
- 15 Q. In terms of other stages of your deployment, do you  
16 think that the reporting that we have been able to  
17 recover in relation to the Hackney branch of  
18 the International Socialists is complete or not?
- 19 A. I assume it must be, but I -- I would assume -- I had  
20 thought that there would be more.
- 21 Q. And what about the reporting that we've recovered on  
22 the various anarchist groups?
- 23 A. That seems more representative. But again, I'm  
24 surprised that there isn't a little more.
- 25 Q. Are there any specific categories of report that you

1 think we might have failed to obtain?

2 A. No, I can't identify any specific category.

3 Q. Can I move now to photographs. You've told us that

4 there were professional photographers within

5 Special Branch who took photographs from covert

6 locations when demonstrations took place; is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And that sometimes, as an undercover officer, you were

9 shown those photographs and then asked to identify who

10 the people in them were?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Was that common?

13 A. Yeah, relatively common, yes.

14 Q. And how do you know that they were taken covertly?

15 A. Because I think I recall that it was -- it was stated

16 that they were taken by the -- the Branch photographers.

17 Q. Did you ever take any photographs of activists?

18 A. No.

19 Q. As far as you are aware, did any of your colleagues?

20 A. I don't know.

21 Q. I'm just going to call up an example for you to look at

22 of a photograph.

23 It's a document, Sir, at tab 5.

24 If we could have up, please {UCPI/11265}.

25 You'll see this is a report of 7 July 1978.

1 A. Mm-hm.

2 Q. If we could go -- scroll down to the next page, please  
3 {UCPI/11265/2}.

4 This is, according to the report, an image of an  
5 anarcho-feminist. We've had to redact identifying  
6 features to safeguard her privacy, but is that the sort  
7 of photograph that you might have been shown to  
8 identify?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And what makes you think that was a photograph that was  
11 taken by a Special Branch photographer? Is there  
12 anything particular about it?

13 A. I said that that was the kind of photograph that we  
14 might have been shown to identify.

15 Q. Does that mean you're unable to tell us anything about  
16 its provenance?

17 A. I can't tell you anything about the provenance of that  
18 image or those images at all, no, sir.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 Is the way it's cropped of any significance?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Could you explain the significance of the cropping?

23 A. Only that that would lead me to believe that it was,  
24 the cropping, that the photograph was taken in-house and  
25 was cropped in-house. The cropping -- the cropping

1 speaks of it being an in-house photograph.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 Can we take that down now, please.

4 I want to turn next to the Hackney  
5 International Socialists. You tell us that you were  
6 specifically tasked to infiltrate the Hackney branch of  
7 the International Socialists; is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Who tasked you?

10 A. I think it was DCI Kneale.

11 Q. What information or explanation were you given for that  
12 tasking?

13 A. From -- from memory, I think only that it was an area  
14 where they -- where there was a lacuna in the reportage  
15 to SB.

16 Q. Were you told anything about why  
17 the International Socialists were of interest?

18 A. Yes, in general terms, only that they were a relatively  
19 simple organisation to infiltrate; they were not  
20 politically paranoid about infiltration, and therefore  
21 quite easy to -- relatively easy to infiltrate; and they  
22 were present on the streets.

23 Q. Were you being asked to infiltrate the International  
24 Socialists as a stepping stone for further deployment  
25 later on?

1 A. I don't know whether that was the intention at all at  
2 the time.

3 Q. Did you hear the phrase "oblique approach" whilst  
4 serving in the SDS?

5 A. I don't recall it. "Oblique approach", I don't recall  
6 it.

7 Q. What were you tasked to do?

8 A. I was tasked to identify membership of that branch of  
9 the International Socialists and their activities.

10 Q. Were you given any instructions to try and influence  
11 the course of that group's activities?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Were you given any instructions to disrupt the group in  
14 any way?

15 A. No. No, I was not.

16 Q. How did you go about infiltrating the Hackney branch of  
17 the International Socialists?

18 A. I went simply to the area where I knew that they would  
19 be most likely to be present. There was a well known  
20 meeting place, a bookshop and coffee shop in the High  
21 Street at the time. I got into the habit of using that,  
22 reading the notice boards, picking up leaflets that were  
23 lying around in their profusion from all kinds of  
24 organisations, and I ventured out into a street market  
25 on a Saturday morning and bought copies of



1 the publication and got talking to people.

2 Q. And where did that lead you?

3 A. It led me to be a member of the Hackney branch of  
4 the International Socialists.

5 Q. You describe in your witness statement a sequential  
6 process whereby you started to sell newspapers with  
7 them, then joined their pickets, and finally were  
8 invited to attend their private meetings; is that right?

9 A. Yes, I think that's -- I think that's right.

10 Q. And we've tried to locate the start of your deployment  
11 in time. Is it right to say you first deployed in or  
12 around the summer of 1976?

13 A. Yes. From memory, yes, that's about right.

14 Q. It was a very memorable baking-hot summer, wasn't it?

15 A. It was.

16 Q. Can I show you a couple of reports, please. The first  
17 one is a document, which is at tab 4 of the hard copy  
18 bundle, and has the reference number {UCPI/9764}.

19 This is dated 10 June 1976. It's dated -- it says:

20 "On Tuesday, 1 June 1976, from 7.30 pm to 9.30 pm,  
21 a meeting of the North East London Workers Action  
22 Support Group was held at Centreprise Bookshop,  
23 Kingsland High Road, Dalston ... Eight persons were  
24 present."

25 How familiar were you with the Centreprise Bookshop?

1 A. Very familiar.

2 Q. And the report goes on to say:

3 "The speaker at the meeting was [Privacy], a member  
4 of the International Communist League, who expounded at  
5 great length the ICL line on anti-facism."

6 And then goes on to deal with that issue in more  
7 detail.

8 Might this be your first report?

9 A. It might be, but I don't believe so.

10 Q. Can you explain why you don't think so?

11 A. I -- June seems -- June seems a bit on the early side,  
12 from recollection, although I can't offer you any  
13 further clarification on that. And I have no  
14 recollection of reporting on the ICL.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 Could we take that down, please, and have up in its  
17 place the document at tab 7, which is {UCPI/10659}. And  
18 this is a document dated 13 July 1976 about a meeting on  
19 8 July 1976.

20 Paragraph 2 reads:

21 "On Thursday 8 July 1976 from 8 pm to 9.50 pm at  
22 Centreprise, 136 Kingsland High Street, Dalston, E8,  
23 the Hackney Branch of the International Socialists held  
24 its regular weekly meeting. The chairperson was  
25 [Privacy] and about twenty persons were present."

1           It goes on to say:

2           "The meeting was opened with a short speech from  
3           [Privacy] [Privacy] a member of the Building Workers  
4           Branch of the International Socialists. [Privacy]  
5           confined his speech to the Right to Work Campaign and  
6           its march to Brighton in September."

7           Is this one of your reports?

8           A. I believe it is.

9           Q. And so can we take it that by no later than 13 July of  
10          1976, you were reporting about events earlier that  
11          month?

12          A. Yes.

13          Q. Might you have reported earlier, or do you think this is  
14          your first report?

15          A. I might have, but I -- I tend to think that this is one  
16          of the very earlier ( inaudible).

17          Q. We can take that down, please.

18                 He tell us in your witness statement that you went  
19                 to private meetings that were by invitation only, and  
20                 sometimes had quite low attendances, perhaps seven or  
21                 eight people; is that right?

22          A. Yes.

23          Q. Can you help us with how you conducted yourself when  
24          the group was carrying out its business with such small  
25          numbers?

1 A. Are you referring to whether or not I felt compelled to  
2 get more deeply involved, perhaps, than I would have  
3 otherwise wished?

4 Q. I think there are a number of components I'm interested  
5 in. First of all, to what extent did you speak up?

6 A. To some extent. Not greatly.

7 Q. And did you give any consideration to where to pitch  
8 your level of contribution?

9 A. Yes, I did, but to quantify or elaborate on that now is  
10 -- is a tall order, I must say.

11 Q. Can you help me with any principles that you -- on any  
12 considerations you took into account when deciding how  
13 to calibrate your contributions?

14 A. I think that throughout my deployment, there was  
15 a constant caveat flashing in front of my eyes just  
16 cautioning me against getting too deeply involved.

17 Q. And what was the reason for that caution?

18 A. Fear.

19 Q. Of being unmasked?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Were you given any guidance by your managers about how  
22 to play this?

23 A. I may well -- I -- we may well have been, but I can't  
24 recall what it was.

25 Q. When it came to votes, how did you decide whether to

1           vote or whether to abstain?

2       A.   On appearances.

3       Q.   Could you expand upon that, please?

4       A.   Certainly.

5           I think there was a calculation that I made based on  
6           very roughly going along the lines of: well, I've  
7           abstained for the last two or three, I'd better vote for  
8           something.

9       Q.   I see.  So if you'd always abstained, you would risk  
10       being uncovered?

11      A.   Well, yes, being -- being brought to notice.

12      Q.   And when you decided you needed to vote, what informed  
13       which way you voted?

14      A.   I can only give you a very -- a very nebulous and  
15       probably a totally unsatisfactory answer to that,  
16       because I -- it -- at this -- at this remove, it's  
17       difficult for me to say.  What informed ...

18           Again, self-preservation and involvement, and who  
19       else in the group I was going to be dealing with.

20      Q.   Who you wanted to make friends with?

21      A.   Yeah, who I -- who I trusted, who I -- I would like to  
22       have made friends with, and who I definitely may not  
23       have wanted to have made friends with.

24      Q.   I mean, what I'm driving at is, in such a small group of  
25       political activists, was it -- did it put you in

1 a difficult spot, both in terms of self-preservation and  
2 also whether you influenced the direction of the group?

3 A. It certainly put me in a difficult spot on -- on many  
4 occasions, the paucity of numbers, yeah. I never --  
5 I didn't ever consider putting myself in a position to  
6 influence group decisions or direction of group travel.

7 Q. Were you ever asked to assume positions of  
8 responsibility?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Did you ever assume any positions of responsibility?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Did you ever, for example, chair meetings?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Take responsibility for organising a sale of newspapers?

15 A. Once or twice, yes.

16 Q. And deal with -- did you ever assume the position of  
17 treasurer and deal with the money?

18 A. No, never.

19 Q. Could you help us with your understanding of what  
20 organising the sale of the newspapers involved?

21 A. Essentially just making sure that there were enough  
22 people to cover the ground at the -- at the pinch  
23 points, or the -- the points of maximal sales -- likely  
24 sales.

25 Q. And how did you approach that role? Did you try and

1           achieve maximal sales or not?

2           A. Me personally?

3           Q. Yes.

4           A. No, I -- I -- I simply contented myself with making sure

5           that there was enough -- that there were several people,

6           whoever was willing, largely speaking on a Saturday, or

7           some weekday evenings, but Saturday, to put themselves

8           out on the streets with a bundle of newspapers, that was

9           fine by me. I didn't -- I didn't insist

10          (    inaudible).black trousers

11          Q. Thank you.

12                 You also tell us that you attended public meetings,

13                 but that public meetings could be covered by ordinary

14                 members of Special Branch attending in plain clothes; is

15                 that right?

16          A. Yes.

17          Q. Did ordinary members of Special Branch in plain clothes

18                 attend public meetings of the Hackney branch of IS?

19          A. Not that I was aware.

20          Q. And so would I be right to assume then that whilst you

21                 were deployed, you covered those meetings?

22          A. Yes.

23          Q. How were decisions made about whether a meeting should

24                 be covered by an undercover police officer or just an

25                 ordinary member of Special Branch?

1       A. I don't know the answer to that, because it was never  
2       within my remit to make that decision. It was  
3       a decision that was made by a -- a Squad senior officer,  
4       and I suspect that it was made -- based upon whatever  
5       criteria, it mattered not whether -- whether they knew  
6       that there would be an undercover officer there or not.  
7       But I don't know. I can't answer that any other way.

8       Q. Thank you.

9                You tell us that although the majority of your work  
10       was with Hackney IS and you were a member of that  
11       branch, you would sometimes attend meetings of  
12       neighbouring branches, such as Finsbury Park and  
13       Islington; is that right?

14       A. Very occasionally.

15       Q. One of the things that you appear to have done early in  
16       the course of your deployment is agree to give a talk;  
17       is that right?

18       A. Probably.

19       Q. Right, let me help you.

20                Could we go, please, to tab 15 {UCPI/10831}.

21                This is a report dated 24 August 1976, and  
22       paragraph 2 reads:

23                "On Wednesday 11 August 1976, from 7.30 pm to  
24       10.15 pm, at [Privacy] the Hackney Branch of  
25       the International Socialists held an educational



1 meeting, entitled 'The Labour Party -- can socialism  
2 come through Parliament?' The Chairman was [Privacy] and  
3 five persons were present."

4 If we could now go to paragraph 3:

5 "Graham Coates talked for about twenty minutes on  
6 the general history of the Labour Party and the reasons  
7 why socialism would never be achieved by parliamentary  
8 means. This was followed by a general discussion on  
9 the subject, during which nothing of particular interest  
10 was mentioned.

11 "[Privacy] then announced that the Central Committee  
12 of the International Socialists was at present  
13 formulating plans for the establishment of a 'Youth  
14 Movement' within the Organisation; this, he said,  
15 smacked of 'ageism' and was tantamount to having two  
16 classes of membership within the International  
17 Socialists. He promised that this subject would be  
18 discussed at length by the whole Branch in the near  
19 future. It was at this point that [Privacy] burst into  
20 near hysterical laughter and said that any organisation  
21 that could establish such a group, which was so  
22 reminiscent of the 'Hitler Youth', within itself  
23 deserved the derision which it would certainly receive."

24 Going back to paragraph 3, did you give the talk on  
25 the history of the Labour Party?

1       A.  Yes.

2       Q.  And did you explain why socialism would never be  
3            achieved by parliamentary means?

4       A.  I must have done to some extent, yes.

5       Q.  And can we take it by the fact there was other business  
6            that you didn't talk for the whole meeting, but just for  
7            part of it?

8       A.  That's right.

9       Q.  Why did you give this talk?

10      A.  I can't recall, to be honest with you.  I don't know  
11            whether I'd been asked to do it.  I doubt that I would  
12            have volunteered.

13      Q.  Might it have been self-preservation then?

14      A.  Well, yes, in that case it would have been.

15      Q.  And do you think it would have helped to establish your  
16            credentials within the group?

17      A.  That would have been the hope.

18      Q.  And why did you choose to spin the talk in the way that  
19            is recorded here?

20      A.  I think probably at the time I think it would have been  
21            to fall in line with what I could see of IS doctrine.

22      Q.  Thank you.

23            Could you take that down now, please.  Can we go now  
24            to tab 10 {UCPI/10756}.

25            This is a report dated 2 August 1976, and it says at

1 paragraph 2:

2 "The International Socialists (North London  
3 Group) held a meeting on 'The fight against Racialism'  
4 on Thursday, 22 July, 1976, at the Earlsmead School,  
5 Broad Lane, N15, from 8 pm to 10 pm. Fifty-two persons  
6 attended the meeting which was chaired by [Privacy]

7 "The meeting was to have been addressed by [Privacy]  
8 [Privacy], a journalist with the Socialist Worker, but  
9 he was unable to attend. In his place, Paul Foot also a  
10 journalist on the above paper, spoke eloquently on the  
11 spectre of racialism. He started by outlining the  
12 history of the struggle for social equality by the  
13 masses and continued by ridiculing the attempt by  
14 Parliament to legislate through the Race Relations Act  
15 in the hope that the problem would go away. He went on  
16 to say that all racialists must be 'dealt with' wherever  
17 they appeared."

18 First of all, as far as you can recall, is that your  
19 reporting?

20 A. It may well be. I can't recall for certain.

21 Q. Why would you report on a talk against racism?

22 A. If I reported on that, it would have been really only to  
23 report a meeting of people, to identify people who were  
24 there, and on the -- to report on the -- on the speaker.

25 Q. Is this part and parcel of the "any piece of information

1 is fair game" approach?

2 A. I think so.

3 Q. Can we take that down, please, and go to tab 41, which  
4 is {UCPI/17759}.

5 This is a report dated 24 February 1977. I'm afraid  
6 it's not very easy to read. I'm picking up from  
7 paragraph 2:

8 "The Islington Branch of the Socialist Workers Party  
9 is to actively support the recently formed Islington 18  
10 Defence Committee, which operates from the Islington  
11 Community Law Centre, 161 Hornsey Road, N7, in its  
12 campaign to coordinate a defence for eighteen local  
13 coloured youths arrested on charges such as robbery and  
14 theft.

15 "It is hoped that either SWP branches will lend  
16 their support to the Committee and that pickets,  
17 demonstrations, public meetings and the distribution of  
18 leaflets will be organised outside local police stations  
19 and relevant prisons/detention centres. James Cronin,  
20 convenor of the Islington Branch of the SWP, hopes that  
21 he will be able to organise the Defence Committee into  
22 a larger anti-'racist police' committee and take up  
23 the many cases of police brutality and repression that  
24 come to light in the area.

25 "Attached to this report is a statement issued by

1 the Islington 18 Defence Committee giving its main aims  
2 as:

3 "i) 'Immediate dropping of these framed up charges.'

4 "ii) 'Full legal aid for all with free choice of  
5 solicitors.'

6 "iii) 'We call on local labour movement  
7 organisations to join with the defence committee in  
8 carrying out an inquiry into the actions of the police  
9 and especially Inspector Willham and Sergeant  
10 Gallagher.'

11 "iv) 'For jobs for all youth and an end to cheap  
12 labour schemes, such as 'job creation' and 'community  
13 industry'. We call for an increase in the direct labour  
14 force and a programme of public works to create jobs at  
15 proper union rates.'"

16 First of all, is this one of your reports?

17 A. I don't believe so.

18 Q. And why is that?

19 A. I have no recollection of it.

20 Q. It's in early 1977, so it's around the period you were  
21 transitioning from IS/SWP into the anarchist scene,  
22 isn't it?

23 A. Yes, it is.

24 Q. The report itself is a report about a justice campaign.  
25 Was that the sort of thing that the SDS would report as

1 part and parcel of the "any piece of information is fair  
2 game", or was it of particular interest to report on  
3 such campaigns?

4 A. No, the former. The former, I would say.

5 Q. Was there any prohibition on reporting on campaigns  
6 against the police?

7 A. I was not aware of any, no.

8 Q. Was there any advice about a need for sensitivity, or  
9 anything like that?

10 A. Not -- again, not that I was aware.

11 Q. Can we take that down now, please.

12 The Inquiry understands that both Blair Peach and  
13 his partner Celia Stubbs were members of the Hackney  
14 branch of the International Socialists; is that right?

15 A. I believe so. I didn't know either of them.

16 Q. We do have a report from the summer of 1976 at which  
17 Celia Stubbs is reported as being present. So are you  
18 saying that you didn't get to know them?

19 A. That's what I'm saying.

20 Q. Did you have any awareness of them as individuals when  
21 you were infiltrating the Hackney IS?

22 A. Not of Blair Peach.

23 Q. Can you tell us what awareness you had of Celia Stubbs?

24 A. Only that I had seen her around at -- at one or two  
25 meetings. Nothing more than that really. Very little

1 information on either of them.

2 Q. Can you recall whether you ever spoke to her?

3 A. I don't believe I ever did speak to her.

4 Q. Were you at the Southall demonstration on 23 April 1979?

5 A. Is that the demonstration that's commonly known as

6 "Grunwicks"?

7 Q. No, this is the demonstration at which Blair Peach was

8 killed.

9 A. Oh.

10 Q. Or received fatal injuries.

11 A. No, I wasn't there. What was the date again? Sorry.

12 Q. 23 April 1979.

13 A. No, I don't believe I was there.

14 Q. The demonstration at which Blair Peach received fatal

15 injuries and his subsequent death was presumably a very

16 big event in events that the SDS were interested in.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you recall it coming up in discussions at

19 the safe house?

20 A. No, I can't recall that.

21 Q. Do you think it would have come up in discussions at

22 the safe house?

23 A. It would have been odd had it not done so, but I have no

24 recollection of it.

25 Q. Can you recall any officers talking about attending

1 Blair Peach's laying in state?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Can you recall any officers talking about attending  
4 the funeral?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Can you recall any discussion at all about reporting on  
7 the justice campaign following Blair Peach's death?

8 A. No, I can't.

9 Q. Can I move now to violence involving the extreme right  
10 and the groups that you were infiltrating.

11 Can we look, first of all, at the document which is  
12 at tab 13 {UCPI/10769}.

13 HN304, this is a report dated 4 August 1976, and  
14 it's about a meeting in Stoke Newington Town Hall of  
15 the Hackney Community Relations Council. It's that  
16 organisation's first public meeting, according to  
17 the report. And the account given involves there being  
18 a National Front infiltrator who spoke up during  
19 the meeting, of National Front members congregating  
20 outside, and of there being a bomb hoax.

21 Is this one of your reports?

22 A. I believe so.

23 Q. Can you recall the events?

24 A. Vaguely.

25 Q. The picture that is painted is of the far right



1           intimidating the Hackney Community Relations Council; is  
2           that fair?

3           A. Yes.

4           Q. And was that typical, at the time, of the way the far  
5           right was behaving?

6           A. Yes.

7           Q. Can we take that down now, please.

8                     Can we go to tab 80, which is {UCPI/11139}.

9                     This is a report dated 25 October 1977. And  
10           I appreciate that by this stage you'd moved on from  
11           the SWP, but it's referring back to events the previous  
12           year. It's paragraph 3, please, if we could have that  
13           in the centre of the screen.

14                    It reads:

15                    "Last year during the mass picket of Brick Lane, E2,  
16           [Privacy] was attacked, together with [Privacy], when  
17           leaving the vicinity. [Privacy] had a number of teeth  
18           knocked out and, subsequently, police charged a number  
19           of supporters of the National Front with assault.  
20           The case has yet to be concluded at Crown Court.  
21           [Privacy] is worried about the fact that his name and  
22           address have been read out in open court and that he had  
23           noticed [Privacy], a NF observer, write it down. He  
24           has, therefore, asked on a number of occasions what he  
25           should do to protect himself but Party officials have

1 yet to advise him. It does not help that [Privacy] is  
2 a good friend of [Privacy], an East London teacher and  
3 SWP member, who has been the subject of an attack by  
4 supporters of the National Front outside his home  
5 address."

6 Did the fact of the attack which is the subject of  
7 this report come to your attention at the time?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And how typical was it of the way in which  
10 the National Front were behaving towards members of  
11 the Socialist Workers Party at the time?

12 A. Very typical.

13 Q. Can we take that down, please.

14 Can we go to tab 64, 11244. {UCPI/11244}.

15 Now, this, again, is a report which postdates your  
16 infiltration of IS/SWP. It's dated 30 August 1977.

17 The material paragraph is paragraph 2:

18 "[Privacy], a member of the Central Committee of  
19 the Socialist Workers Party, has, following the events  
20 at Lewisham on Saturday 13 August 1977, received  
21 a threat that Column 88 will burn down his house in  
22 the near future. The Party has taken this threat  
23 seriously because it believes that Column 88 is the most  
24 hard line of the 'neo-nazi' parties and has placed  
25 a guard on [Privacy] house."

1 Paragraph 3:  
2 "Column 88 is dealt with on ..."  
3 And then there's a file reference number.  
4 First of all, did you know anything about this  
5 threat of arson?  
6 A. No.  
7 Q. Was this typical of the way in which the National Front  
8 was behaving in the time that you were deployed?  
9 A. I would say this was at the very extreme end of how they  
10 behaved, but it doesn't surprise me.  
11 Q. The reference to events at Lewisham on Saturday,  
12 13 August 1977 is, to our understanding, a reference to  
13 the events that became known as  
14 the "Battle of Lewisham". Are you aware of  
15 the "Battle of Lewisham"?  
16 A. I've heard of it.  
17 Q. Again, this occurred whilst you were a member of the SDS  
18 and presumably, in public order terms, was a very big  
19 deal?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And no doubt something that would have been discussed by  
22 you and your colleagues in the SDS safe house?  
23 A. Certainly.  
24 Q. I don't want you to name any names, but is it right that  
25 a number of your colleagues were involved in reporting

1 on these events?

2 A. I believe so.

3 Q. Do you have any understanding about how useful their  
4 intelligence was perceived to be by your managers?

5 A. No, I don't.

6 Q. Can we move now to paragraph 3, where I drew attention  
7 to the fact of a file reference about Column 88.

8 I don't want you, when answering this next question, to  
9 give any details of sources, if you know what they were.

10 But is it right that far right groups were the subject  
11 of intelligence-gathering by Special Branch?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. If we could take that down.

14 Can we now go to tab 7, {UCPI/10659}.

15 This is a report dated 30 July 1976 on  
16 the International Socialists. We're back at  
17 the Centreprise Bookshop, or Centreprise Centre. I'm  
18 interested in paragraph 4. We looked at this earlier  
19 for other purposes. It reads:

20 "Several members of the audience then participated  
21 in a discussion on racialism in Hackney but no firm  
22 conclusions were reached. However, a negress in  
23 the audience stated that an organisation called the West  
24 Indian Defence Committee, based in Brixton, was^^  
25 presently engaged in arming with knives and coshes as

1 many black people in Brixton as possible and that this  
2 organisation was fully prepared to meet physical  
3 racialism in the area with physical attacks. Although  
4 no decisions were made by the Hackney Branch of  
5 the International Socialists, several members expressed  
6 both their approval of such actions and their regret  
7 that anti-racialist groups were not sufficiently  
8 organised in Hackney."

9 Is it right to say that self-defence groups were  
10 being formed and were arming themselves to deal with  
11 violence from the far right?

12 A. Yes, I think so, yes.

13 Q. And to what extent did you become aware of that?

14 A. Only -- only through occasional conversation and  
15 meetings such as this one, and -- and chats with fellow  
16 UCOs.

17 Q. Just pausing to pick up on the terminology used in this  
18 report, the word "negress" is used.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Why was that?

21 A. I have no idea. It struck me as odd when I -- when  
22 I saw it just now.

23 Q. Can we take that down, please and can we go to tab 4.  
24 This is {UCPI/9764}. Again, it's a document we looked  
25 at earlier when trying to locate the start of your

1 deployment. For the present purposes, I'd like to go  
2 down to paragraph 5, please. Thank you.

3 It says:

4 "In response to a question from [Privacy] from  
5 the floor, he stated that the only reason that  
6 the anti-fascist demonstrations appeared to attack  
7 the police and not the National Front was because  
8 the police actively supported and protected  
9 the National Front and, therefore, any such  
10 confrontation was an anti-fascist action. He said that  
11 this would always be misrepresented by the capitalist  
12 press."

13 Now, I appreciate, 304, that you don't think this is  
14 your report, but I want to ask you about the attitude  
15 that is recorded there, which appears to be  
16 a justification for attacking the police being mounted  
17 by a member of a left wing group. Did you ever come  
18 across such views being ventilated by members of  
19 the groups that you infiltrated?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And how prevalent was that view?

22 A. It was a widely held view at the time amongst left wing  
23 activists that the police would always side with extreme  
24 right wing groupings.

25 Q. And to what extent was that philosophy put into action

1 with attacks on the police?

2 A. I don't really know. I can't answer that.

3 Q. Did you ever witness that happening?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Can we take that down now, please, and go to tab 21.

6 That's {UCPI/21460}.

7 This is a report dated 12 October 1976 and

8 paragraph 2 reads:

9 "On Thursday 14th October 1996 a picket will be held  
10 outside the Burnt Oak Library, Welling Avenue, Burnt  
11 Oak, Edgware in order to protest against  
12 the National Front meeting that is being held there.

13 "The participants ..."

14 It's very difficult to read. Can we blow that up,  
15 please.:

16 "The participants of the picket will meet at  
17 the ..."

18 Then a location is given:

19 "... at 6.30 pm. It is believed that the Brent  
20 Trades Council has organised the picket and it is known  
21 that the International Socialists will give it their  
22 support but it is estimated that no more than 100  
23 persons will demonstrate."

24 First of all, is that one of your reports?

25 A. No.

1 Q. You can perhaps only help us generally. Is this  
2 the sort of intelligence about forthcoming  
3 demonstrations that was an important part of the SDS's  
4 work?

5 A. Yes, very much.

6 Q. Did you make reports similar to this?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR BARR: Sir, I'm about to move to a different topic.

9 Would now be a convenient time to break for lunch?

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it would. We'll have an hour's  
11 break.

12 MR FERNANDES: We will now take a break for lunch. Hearings  
13 will resume at 2 pm. For those in the virtual hearing  
14 room, please remember to join your break-out rooms,  
15 please. Thank you.

16 (1.00 pm)

17 (The short adjournment)

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25