

Friday, 7 May 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to Day 12 of hearings in Tranche 1 Phase 2 at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager.

For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone unless you are invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

As at the beginning of every live evidential session, a recording made earlier is going to be played. If you're listening to it for the first time, please listen carefully.

I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute, the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including its hearings. In the exercise of that power I have made a number of orders which affect what you may and may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter and may

1 have serious consequences for you.

2 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an
3 order, I have the power to certify the matter to
4 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
5 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
6 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
7 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
8 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
9 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
10 sequestration of their assets.

11 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
12 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to
13 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
14 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
15 the hearing rooms.

16 You may bring your mobile telephone into the hearing
17 rooms, but you may not use it for any of those purposes.
18 You may use it silently for any other purpose. In
19 particular, you may transmit your account of what you
20 have seen and heard in a hearing room to any other
21 person, but only once at least ten minutes have elapsed
22 since the event which you are describing took place.

23 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
24 the Inquiry I have made orders prohibiting the public
25 disclosure of information, for example about

1 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
2 These orders must be upheld. It is inevitable that,
3 whether by accident or design, information which I have
4 ordered should not be publicly disclosed will sometimes
5 be disclosed in a hearing.

6 If and when that happens, I will immediately suspend
7 the hearing and make an order prohibiting further
8 disclosure of the information outside the hearing rooms.
9 The consequence will be that no further disclosure of
10 that information may be made by mobile telephone or
11 other portable electronic device from within the hearing
12 room, or by any means outside it.

13 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is
14 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
15 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
16 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
17 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
18 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
19 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own
20 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
21 best to ensure that you can.

22 If you have any doubt about the terms of this
23 message, or what you may or may not do, you should not
24 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if
25 necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

1 HN304

2 THE CHAIRMAN: HN304, can you hear me?

3 A. Yes, I can, Sir.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you wish to swear or to affirm?

5 A. To affirm.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may the words of affirmation be read to
7 you, please.

8 (Witness affirmed)

9 Thank you.

10 You're going to have quite a long day. I understand
11 that you would like, when we have our ordinary
12 mid-morning and mid-afternoon breaks, to take 20 minutes
13 rather than quarter of an hour. Have I understood
14 correctly?

15 A. I believe so, yes, sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Then we will accommodate your wish.

17 A. Thank you.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr will now ask you questions.

19 Mr Barr.

20 Questions by MR BARR

21 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

22 HN304, are you the person that we know by
23 the nominal "HN304"?

24 A. I am he.

25 Q. And are the contents of your witness statement, dated

- 1 11 October 2019, true and correct to the best of your
2 knowledge and belief?
- 3 A. Yes, they are.
- 4 Q. Can I start, please, with your service before you joined
5 the SDS. You tell us in your witness statement that you
6 served in, amongst other branches, B Squad. When you
7 were working on B Squad, were you aware of the existence
8 of the SDS?
- 9 A. I was not.
- 10 Q. You tell us also that you worked for C Squad. When you
11 were working on C Squad, were you aware of the existence
12 of the SDS?
- 13 A. Very latterly.
- 14 Q. And when you were aware of the existence of the SDS,
15 were you aware that some of the intelligence that you
16 may have been using was derived from the work of
17 undercover police officers serving in the SDS?
- 18 A. I don't initially believe that I was.
- 19 Q. You say "initially"; did there come a time when you
20 were?
- 21 A. Yes, but I couldn't actually put a finger on that
22 defining moment.
- 23 Q. And was there any process by which C Squad could ask
24 the SDS to gather particular intelligence that it was
25 seeking?

1 A. I don't know.

2 Q. Can we move now to how you came to join the SDS. You
3 tell us that you were approached by Detective Inspector
4 Creamer?

5 A. That's right.

6 Q. Did he give you any background or briefing about the
7 SDS?

8 A. No, he didn't.

9 Q. As best as you can recall it, what did he say to you?

10 A. He approached me and asked whether I would be willing,
11 I believe, the coming -- the upcoming weekend or the one
12 thereafter, to cover a meeting of activists that was
13 being held in Central London at a polytechnic, in
14 a disguised, non-police -- non-obvious police capacity.

15 Q. And you explain in your witness statement that you
16 undertook that that duty. Can you tell us what happened
17 after that?

18 A. I'm not quite sure what you're aiming for, sorry.

19 Q. I'm aiming for, as I understand it, Detective Inspector
20 Creamer then asked you to go to room 1818 --

21 A. Ah.

22 Q. -- and that was how you got in touch with the SDS and
23 came to join. Could you explain what happened?

24 A. Yes, I'm not sure whether it was Detective Inspector
25 Creamer that asked me to go to that room, or whether

1 I received a phone call from that room asking me to
2 present myself there, but I went there; and was -- and
3 was there presented with the suggestion that I might
4 like to consider my options.

5 Q. Were you interviewed for a position on the SDS?

6 A. Very informally, I would say.

7 Q. Who by? And you may wish to be careful about using real
8 names and you may need to use ciphers?

9 A. Yes. I'm not sure that I can recall the name of
10 the officer that interviewed me.

11 Q. Whereabouts was the SDS office at that time?

12 A. It was on the top floor of a tower block in Victoria.

13 Q. And was that part of S Squad?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You tell us in your witness statement that you were
16 asked whether you were either married or in a stable
17 relationship; is that right?

18 A. That's true.

19 Q. Why -- was it ever explained to you why they wanted to
20 know that?

21 A. I believe it was explained, to my recollection, in very
22 general terms that they felt that an officer in a stable
23 relationship or a stable married relationship would be
24 a more stable character, given the likely exposure to
25 stresses and strains of the likely work involved.

1 Q. Did you ever get the impression that it was thought that
2 being married or in a stable relationship would make an
3 officer less likely to involve themselves in sexual
4 relations with people they met undercover?

5 A. No.

6 Q. You were told, according to your witness statement, to
7 expect to serve in the SDS for four years; is that
8 right?

9 A. I was told, yes, more or less that, that a posting
10 was -- was for the maximum duration of four years or
11 thereabouts, as I think it was, to my recollection.

12 Q. And perhaps using the rank and position of the person
13 concerned, can you remember who told you that?

14 A. In honesty, no, I can't remember either the rank or
15 the position, but it was obviously -- I -- I would
16 guess -- I can't remember the name of the person
17 involved, but I would guess it would have been either
18 a chief inspector or a superintendent, or maybe above.

19 Q. And you were told that at the outset of your time at
20 the SDS, were you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Do you know whether your contemporaries were told
23 the same thing?

24 A. I don't know. I assume so.

25 Q. You then tell us that you spent about five months in

1 the SDS back office, where you read reports, handled
2 them, got to know cover names and how the filing system
3 worked, together with secret stamping. Can you help us
4 with, at that stage in the SDS's history, who was typing
5 up reports?

6 A. There was a dedicated typing pool, and I believe that
7 the typing up was done by -- I'm struggling here to
8 recall, I'm sorry.

9 Q. Okay.

10 And was there any protocol at that time as to
11 whether or not the undercover officer needed to sign
12 the final report?

13 A. I don't believe that they did need to.

14 Q. Did they need to check the contents?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And was that invariably done?

17 A. To the best of my recollection, yes.

18 Q. And we've seen that a typical report will often have
19 a list of names of people who attended a particular
20 event that is being reported on at the end with
21 associated registry file details. Who obtained
22 the registry file details for incorporation into
23 the reports?

24 A. That would have been something that a person in my
25 situation waiting -- awaiting deployment would have been

- 1 asked to do.
- 2 Q. And did you ever have to take registry files to the SDS
- 3 safe house for officers to look at?
- 4 A. I did not.
- 5 Q. Do you know whether that was something that ever
- 6 happened?
- 7 A. I can't say that I know the answer to that question.
- 8 Q. You tell us that you got to know the cover names of
- 9 the officers. Was that as a result of doing
- 10 the paperwork, or meeting the officers, or both?
- 11 A. It was a bit of both really.
- 12 Q. And you tell us that you went to the safe house whilst
- 13 you were awaiting your own deployment. How frequently
- 14 did you visit the safe house during that period?
- 15 A. Oh, I would think that it was at least once and mostly
- 16 twice a week.
- 17 Q. And how much information did you garner about what
- 18 the SDS was doing and about the sort of fieldcraft that
- 19 you would have to adopt when your turn came?
- 20 A. Are you expecting an answer in percentage terms?
- 21 Q. You can express it however you think fit.
- 22 A. In that case, a good deal. But for maybe obvious
- 23 reasons, there were aspects of the work involved that
- 24 could only be discovered by doing it.
- 25 Q. You say in your statement that you now know that your

1 visits to the safe house were in part so that
2 the undercover officers could give their views about
3 you. When it became your turn to be an
4 undercover officer, were you invited to give your views
5 about the next generation of undercover officers who
6 were doing their turn in the back office?

7 A. Yes, but not -- as I recall, it was not done
8 specifically to every officer who was out in the field
9 who might have been in the safe house on any given --
10 specific given occasion. If that was the information
11 that was required, then it was -- it was made as
12 a general invitation for whoever might be present to say
13 whatever they thought might be appropriate.

14 Q. And what were you looking for in a new recruit?

15 A. What were they looking for? They were looking for --
16 I imagine that they were looking for somebody who would
17 not stand out in any way as obviously being a serving
18 officer.

19 Q. I was asking what you were looking for, because you were
20 being asked to express an opinion.

21 A. I'm sorry. I misunderstood. I misunderstood.

22 Well, more or less exactly the same as I've just
23 said really.

24 Q. Okay, thank you.

25 You tell us that you were instructed to go along

1 with any arrest at a demonstration, if that were to
2 occur. Were you given any information about any
3 previous incidents where undercover officers had been
4 arrested? And when you answer, if you could stick to
5 nominals, rather than any names, please.

6 A. Yes. I don't believe I was given any further advice
7 than really just to go along with and, at the earliest
8 available opportunity, to notify the management.

9 Q. You say in your witness statement, on the question of
10 relationships, that if there was any advice, then it was
11 simply be very careful if you were going to get involved
12 in private lives, especially if you were going to engage
13 in a sexual relationship.

14 Can you recall who gave the advice -- again, using
15 nominals?

16 A. You're finding all the holes in my memory. I have to
17 say, with the best will that I have, I could not tell
18 you specifically who gave that information.

19 Q. Are you able to help us with whether it was one of your
20 fellow UCOs or whether it was someone in the management
21 chain?

22 A. Oh, it was the management chain.

23 Q. And, again using nominals if you want to identify anyone
24 in your answer, was that advice illustrated with any
25 examples?

1 A. I can't recall that.

2 Q. Can you remember when in the course of your service you
3 were given that advice?

4 A. I believe that was before my deployment.

5 Q. Was it oral or in writing?

6 A. It would have been oral.

7 Q. And can you recall whether you were told literally "be
8 very careful", or whether it was expressed in some other
9 way.

10 A. No, I think it was expressed more or less in those
11 terms.

12 Q. And what did you understand being very careful to
13 entail?

14 A. I understood it to mean -- I understood it to
15 mean: really and truly this is not something that we
16 advise, but if you have to, take every precaution of all
17 kinds that you can imagine necessary.

18 Q. Does that amount ultimately to leaving it up to
19 the undercover officer's discretion?

20 A. I believe it did.

21 Q. Now, when you say take every precaution possible, what
22 precautions do you have in mind?

23 A. I'm thinking about precautions as the -- "precaution" as
24 a euphemism for contraceptives, obviously, and just
25 common sense precautions about preservation of identity

1 of an individual, of a group of individuals, and of
2 the risk that would be entailed if the whole system
3 became exposed, if that relationship became exposed.

4 Q. And did the person who gave you the advice talk to you
5 about contraception expressly, or is that just something
6 that you took it to mean?

7 A. The latter. It was not -- it was not spoken of
8 expressly, no.

9 Q. You tell us that in the event, you didn't get involved
10 sexually with anyone in your undercover identity; is
11 that correct?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. Why not?

14 A. I found the whole business of operating as an
15 undercover officer stressful enough.

16 Q. Did you have any views about the morality of engaging in
17 sexual contact with someone who did not know who you
18 really were?

19 A. Probably only at the time nebulous views on that
20 question, which have taken more definite shape over
21 the ensuing gap of years.

22 Q. Did you have any views about whether it was right or
23 wrong for a police officer acting in an undercover role
24 to have sexual relations with a member of the public who
25 did not know who they really were?

1 A. Yes, I felt that that was -- that was wrong. I did feel
2 that was wrong.

3 Q. Moving to the attitude of your managers to
4 the assumption of responsibility within a group, what
5 advice were you given?

6 A. I'm not quite sure what question you're asking me
7 really, Sir.

8 Q. Well, I can illustrate it. You infiltrated, as we shall
9 see, the International Socialists, first of all. There
10 are lots of positions within the International
11 Socialists, such as the newspaper organiser, or
12 the secretary of a branch, or the treasurer and so
13 forth. Were you given any guidance or advice, one way
14 or the other, as to whether or not you should take up
15 such positions?

16 A. Not really, but it was usually my eyes and ears at the
17 time; it was, I think, generally regarded as a good
18 thing for an officer to get into an office of some
19 description within the organisation.

20 Q. And how did you form that impression?

21 A. Reaction from the management.

22 Q. Can we move now to legal professional privilege. What
23 was your understanding at the start of your deployment
24 about the definition of "legal professional privilege"?

25 A. I don't know that I had an understanding of it.

- 1 Q. Were you given any tuition or guidance on that subject?
- 2 A. I can't recall that I was.
- 3 Q. What was your understanding of the definition
4 of "subversion" at the start of your deployment?
- 5 A. Gosh, right. My understanding of "subversion" at that
6 time would have been that which was -- that which was
7 likely to cause disruption to an established system of
8 government.
- 9 Q. And how would that translate to the government of
10 the day?
- 11 A. Again, could you be -- could you elaborate on that?
12 Could you --
- 13 Q. Yes, I can.
- 14 A. Please.
- 15 Q. Was it the system of parliamentary democracy that you
16 are considering when asking whether someone is being
17 subversive, or is it opposition to the government of
18 the day, or both?
- 19 A. Well, I think it was probably both.
- 20 Q. And in terms of intention, to be subversive, did a group
21 have to intend to oppose the government of the day and
22 the system of parliamentary democracy to be subversive?
- 23 A. I was waiting for an unspoken "or", but okay. Yes,
24 I think so.
- 25 Q. And also did they have to have the means to achieve that

- 1 end, or would the aim alone suffice?
- 2 A. I think -- I think it was taken generally that the aim
3 led to the means, so that necessarily an organisation
4 might start with aims without means, and hopefully that
5 -- hopefully, in the eyes of that organisation, would
6 progress to acquiring the means.
- 7 Q. And was Special Branch interested in such groups from
8 the point at which they had merely the aims, or did
9 Special Branch's interest only arise when a group had
10 both the aims and the means?
- 11 A. Oh, I think the former, most definitely.
- 12 Q. Thank you for bearing with those rather semantic
13 questions. We can move now to some more impressionistic
14 ground.
- 15 Did you feel properly prepared for your deployment
16 by the time you started?
- 17 A. If you had asked me that question four decades ago, you
18 may have got a different answer to the one that I'm
19 about to give you. No.
- 20 Q. And can I take it from what you've just said that at the
21 time, you had a different view?
- 22 A. Yes, you can take -- you can take it very much as that,
23 because I don't think that I asked enough questions at
24 the time.
- 25 Q. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, which has led you to

1 answer my question in the negative, why did you -- why
2 were you not properly prepared for your deployment, by
3 which I mean in what respects?

4 A. Yes.

5 I just have a feeling that the management of the day
6 really expected potential officers, those waiting for
7 deployment, to fully understand all of the ramifications
8 of such a posting, and maybe they -- maybe they -- or
9 most certainly they expected that those waiting, those
10 invited would ask far more questions than I certainly
11 did. But my feeling is that they felt that we should --
12 we should know, we would know enough.

13 Q. Were you encouraged to ask questions?

14 A. I wasn't discouraged, but I wasn't -- as far as I can
15 recall, I wasn't actively encouraged.

16 Q. Would more formal training have helped?

17 A. Yes, I think so.

18 Q. Can we now move to your cover identity, please. You
19 tell us that you were instructed to go to Somerset House
20 and find the identity of a child who had died not very
21 old. Who gave you that advice, using a nominal, please?

22 A. I wish that I could recall with absolute certainty who
23 was in charge of the management office at the time, but
24 I can't, so I'm just going to have to say to you -- to
25 the Inquiry that it was a chief inspector or above in

1 the back office of that squad.

2 Q. I can tell you that as far as we are aware, Chief
3 Inspector Kneale was in charge of the SDS until
4 approximately January 1976, and then, as far as we are
5 aware, Detective Inspector Craft acted as the chief
6 inspector until around July 1976, when he did become
7 the chief inspector.

8 Do either of those two names assist?

9 A. Yes, it would certainly have been one or the other, and
10 probably the latter.

11 Q. And were you told why you should look for a child who
12 had not died very old?

13 A. Yes, in just very general terms, that such an individual
14 would have a very curtailed life experience or life
15 history, and therefore it offered scope to -- in my
16 case, or in any other UCO's case, to create a story that
17 could not be easily contradicted.

18 Q. Did anyone go with you to Somerset House, or did you go
19 on your own?

20 A. I went alone.

21 Q. Were you given any instructions as to how to go about
22 the task other than the age of the child?

23 A. Only -- only really to -- obviously to choose an
24 identity around which it would be more -- it would be
25 easier rather than more difficult to hang a story.

1 Q. When you found the birth certificate what you chose to
2 use, what information from that birth certificate did
3 you use in constructing your cover identity?

4 A. The name, the locality and the date of birth.

5 Q. Now, you tell us in your witness statement that there
6 came a time when you took a detour to where the child
7 had been born. I don't want you to tell us where that
8 was. Can you tell us, first of all, though, did you do
9 that of your own volition or on instructions?

10 A. My own volition.

11 Q. Did you tell your managers that you had done that?

12 A. I don't recall that I did.

13 Q. You say in your witness statement that you did it in
14 case you were questioned on the child's background; is
15 that right?

16 A. That is.

17 Q. Did you use the birth certificate to obtain a bank
18 account?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Did you have a bank account in your cover identity?

21 A. I'm sorry, no.

22 Q. Were you told why it was the SDS practice to use
23 deceased children's identities?

24 A. Only, again, in quite general terms, that in doing so
25 there was a greatly reduced, towards zero, risk of

- 1 meeting the person whose identity you had assumed.
- 2 Q. Were you told of any reasons why the SDS was not using
3 purely fictitious identities?
- 4 A. No.
- 5 Q. Did you know whether or not the SDS had used purely
6 fictitious identities in the past?
- 7 A. I did not know and I do not know now.
- 8 Q. Were you given any choice as to whether or not to use
9 a deceased child's identity?
- 10 A. No.
- 11 Q. I'd just like a "yes" or "no" answer to this particular
12 question, please.
- 13 Did you conduct any form of risk assessment, whether
14 formally or just in your head, about how you might be
15 compromised when living undercover?
- 16 A. No.
- 17 Q. Did you consider the possibility of being confronted by
18 the death certificate of the child whose identity you
19 used to build your cover identity?
- 20 A. I may have fleetingly considered the possibility, and
21 more or less at the same instant discounted it.
- 22 Q. Why would you have discounted it?
- 23 A. As being unlikely, an extremely unlikely scenario,
24 simple as that.
- 25 Q. Did you have any contingency plan up your sleeve in case

- 1 it were to happen?
- 2 A. I didn't.
- 3 Q. Was that a topic of conversation that ever came up at
- 4 the safe house?
- 5 A. No, not -- if -- if it did, I wasn't party to it.
- 6 Q. Was your cover identity tested by your managers before
- 7 you deployed?
- 8 A. No. I believe that they took it on trust that we had
- 9 established a solid identity.
- 10 Q. Were you warned that activists might test your cover
- 11 identity?
- 12 A. No. Basically no. The answer to that is no.
- 13 Q. Did it ever occur to you that that might happen?
- 14 A. Again, if it did, it was a fleeting -- it was a fleeting
- 15 thought and probably quickly dismissed.
- 16 Q. Did you have any contingency plan in place in case it
- 17 was to happen?
- 18 A. At the time, no.
- 19 Q. Was your undercover identity ever tested whilst you were
- 20 deployed?
- 21 A. No.
- 22 Q. Did you have any qualms about using a deceased child's
- 23 identity?
- 24 A. No.
- 25 Q. Did any of your colleagues, as far as you are aware?

1 A. I don't believe so. It was not -- it wasn't a subject
2 that was frequently, if ever, discussed between
3 ourselves. And, no, I don't believe anyone had any
4 qualms about it.

5 Q. Did you consider that there was a risk that knowledge of
6 the use of that tactic might become public?

7 A. Peripherally, yes.

8 Q. Did you consider how the relatives of a deceased child
9 might feel were that to happen?

10 A. No, sir.

11 Q. Was that ever discussed at the safe house?

12 A. No. To the best of my knowledge not.

13 Q. Looking back now with hindsight, what is your feeling
14 about using deceased children's identities?

15 A. I think that it is understandable why it was done at the
16 time. I don't think that it is a valid system.

17 Q. You describe in your witness statement a gradual
18 introduction to the scene where you were going to
19 operate. For example, going to pubs and cafes,
20 familiarising yourself with the area, going to your
21 cover employer.

22 Can you recall for approximately how long you did
23 that before first approaching your target?

24 A. Not ever so long, because there was always implicit
25 a desire made -- made implicit from the management,

1 that, you know, they wanted you to get out and on with
2 the job. So no more than several weeks.

3 Q. Would it be fair to describe the International
4 Socialists in late 1975/early 1976 as being hungry for
5 recruits?

6 A. Oh, I think so, yes.

7 Q. So was it necessary to go to great lengths to establish
8 your cover identity before approaching them?

9 A. I felt so.

10 Q. And what advantage do you think that gave you?

11 A. I felt and still feel that it enabled me to act and
12 be -- behave and act and react more naturally, not
13 stiltedly.

14 Q. In general terms, how conscious were you that your
15 behaviour might influence whether or not you were
16 compromised?

17 A. It was always a background consideration.

18 Q. And how did that background consideration influence
19 the choices you made about how you behaved undercover?

20 A. Speaking, as I only can, for myself, and to go back to
21 a comment that I made right at the start of the session,
22 as time wore on under deployment, it became more and
23 more of an incubus to me. So it was always
24 a consideration that my identity might be discovered,
25 revealed. And I can't now, four-decades-plus later,

1 absolutely categorically and clearly elaborate to
2 the Inquiry how that affected my behaviour and
3 deployment, save to say that I know that it did.

4 Q. So, to take -- I asked you, I'm very conscious, a very
5 nebulous question. Let's be a little bit more specific.

6 Did you choose to be prominent within your group, or
7 to be retiring within your group, according to how you
8 felt it would affect your personal security?

9 A. Yes, I chose not to be prominent.

10 Q. Did you make choices about how close to get to
11 individuals that you were meeting undercover, with
12 a view to whether that might affect how safe you were?

13 A. Yes, absolutely. I am aware now, but at the time we are
14 talking of, I unconsciously probably but kept what
15 I would regard as a COVID-19 distance from them.

16 Q. I see.

17 Would you consider that, for example, to enter into
18 an intimate relationship would generate risk, or would
19 it generate cover?

20 A. I regarded it as likely to generate risk.

21 Q. Can I move now to the safe house, please. You tell us
22 in your witness statement that you can recall
23 twice-weekly meetings. Was that the case throughout
24 your deployment?

25 A. Yes, I think it was.

1 Q. And you tell us that they were held during the day,
2 during the course of the working week. Was that
3 invariably the case?

4 A. Invariably, yes.

5 Q. Can you give us an idea of how long these meetings
6 lasted, please?

7 A. Yes. Typically, folk would arrive late morning,
8 11 o'clock-ish. The meeting itself would last perhaps
9 an hour-and-a-half/two hours, and then there would be
10 lunch.

11 Q. And after lunch?

12 A. A dispersal.

13 Q. Long lunch?

14 A. Long lunch.

15 Q. And who --

16 A. And moist.

17 Q. I beg your pardon?

18 A. Long and moist.

19 Q. Long and moist, thank you.

20 And who would attend the lunch -- sorry, who would
21 attend the meeting?

22 A. Well, undercover officers who, unless they had other
23 pre-existing commitments relating to their deployment,
24 most would attend --

25 Q. And --

- 1 A. -- and officers from the management.
- 2 Q. So would that normally be both the chief inspector and
3 the inspector?
- 4 A. Yes, normally there was two, sometimes three.
- 5 Q. Would the sergeant or the sergeant ever attend?
- 6 A. Sometimes, yes.
- 7 Q. And I think it follows from what you've said earlier,
8 sometimes the next undercover officer being prepared for
9 deployment?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. You tell us that there were two safe houses: one in
12 the south and one in the west. As far as you can
13 recall, were there always two safe houses during your
14 time in the unit?
- 15 A. Yes, there were.
- 16 Q. And did they move, or was it always the same places?
- 17 A. One of -- one of -- one of the two changed locations at
18 least -- at least once during my deployment.
- 19 Q. And can you help us with what sort of size of premises
20 we are talking about?
- 21 A. We're talking about, typically, a large flat.
- 22 Q. And whereabouts would you hold the meeting?
- 23 A. In a communal room in a -- in a living room setting.
- 24 Q. And would you generally conduct either all or most of
25 the meeting together in that room?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. You've explained that there was always the option of
3 having a one-to-one conversation with managers, if that
4 was required. How frequently did you take up that
5 option?
- 6 A. Seldom, if ever.
- 7 Q. How frequently did your colleagues take up that option?
- 8 A. My instinctive guesswork answer is: seldom.
- 9 Q. After the meeting when you had lunch, did everybody
10 attend the lunch, or only some of you?
- 11 A. It wasn't compulsory. So most did, but by no means all
12 on every occasion.
- 13 Q. And was there any division between managers and UCOs, or
14 did you all attend according to whether you wished to?
- 15 A. Yes, simply that. There was no -- there was no
16 hierarchy.
- 17 Q. Coming to what you did in a bit more detail, you tell us
18 that you would submit your diaries. Could you tell us
19 a little bit more about what your diary was used for and
20 what sort of entries were made in it.
- 21 A. It was used as -- to convey in the broadest strokes
22 the daily activities of the UCO, commencing from phoning
23 in to start work, going to a premises until such and
24 such a time, maybe meeting informants at such and such
25 a hostelry, until late in the evening/early hours of

1 the morning, when you finished work, and to submit any
2 expenses claims.

3 Q. And so would the diary, for example, be used to
4 calculate overtime payments, or was that done
5 separately?

6 A. Well, it was the basis of overtime payments, but
7 I think -- from recollection, I think that was done
8 separately.

9 Q. I'm understanding from your statement that another thing
10 that you would do at the meetings would be to submit
11 your written reports.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. When and where did you write your reports?

14 A. Some were written at the safe house. In fact, probably
15 most were, thinking about it.

16 Q. And what was the practice of your colleagues? Did it
17 vary or did they all do that?

18 A. I think that was -- I'm not going to say that they all
19 did it, but I think that was common practice.

20 Q. Were they read on the spot or were they simply taken
21 away to be processed by the back office?

22 A. If they were read, they were just glanced through and
23 then taken away.

24 Q. Did you ever get any feedback or questions about them at
25 later meetings?

- 1 A. Once in a while, yes.
- 2 Q. You tell us that the discussions at the meeting didn't
3 follow any particular agenda and were informal; is that
4 right?
- 5 A. That's right.
- 6 Q. Laid-back?
- 7 A. Laid-back, no -- no agenda. No written agenda.
- 8 Q. I beg your pardon?
- 9 A. No written agenda.
- 10 Q. And did they follow a similar pattern every time, or
11 not?
- 12 A. Yes, pretty much they did.
- 13 Q. And can you tell us what that was?
- 14 A. Yes, it was a light-hearted -- it was a fairly
15 light-hearted gathering, over tea/coffee, to have a chat
16 amongst ourselves, chat to management officers if we
17 wished, for them to see -- check that everybody and
18 everything was going more or less according to the grand
19 plan, and to enjoy a relaxing morning/lunchtime during
20 the -- during the meeting, and afterwards at a lunch or
21 at a -- a hostelry.
- 22 Q. And would you, for example, discuss professional issues
23 that had arisen over the course of the previous week?
- 24 A. With other UCOs?
- 25 Q. Yes.

- 1 A. Yes, possibly.
- 2 Q. Was there discussion about what you could or should do
3 and what you should and should not do?
- 4 A. No, I think there was -- there was sometimes discussion
5 about -- between -- between UCOs, about what was
6 definable as being on or off duty. There were one or
7 two camps. Some -- some people believed that as a UCO,
8 one was always on duty; others took a different stance.
9 But in terms of what one should or should not do, not so
10 much.
- 11 Q. What was the significance of the boundary between being
12 on and off duty?
- 13 A. Well, it was to do with overtime claims. Expenses and
14 overtime claims.
- 15 Q. Did managers set boundaries about what you could and
16 could not do at these meetings?
- 17 A. No, it was very nebulous. It was left up to each
18 individual to submit his or her hours' claims; and I can
19 only assume, since mine were never challenged, that they
20 fell within acceptable limits, but I know that, one or
21 two cases, eyebrows were raised.
- 22 Q. Did your managers set boundaries about issues other than
23 overtime? Behaviour, in particular, I'm thinking about.
- 24 A. I have no clear recollection of them doing so or having
25 done so, no.

- 1 Q. Would you discuss salient events in the week gone by,
2 say, for example, a big demonstration?
- 3 A. Yes. Yes, that would be -- that would be a topic of
4 conversation, whether or not any organisation that
5 I might have been infiltrating had got involved. But if
6 there had been a big demonstration, then it would be
7 a topic of general conversation.
- 8 Q. What sort of things would people remark about in that
9 connection?
- 10 A. Discrepancies -- generally, discrepancies in
11 the official count and -- of attendees and the numbers
12 claimed to have been present by the organisers of
13 the event, police behaviour; that kind of thing.
- 14 Q. Would prominent personalities be discussed?
- 15 A. Yes, quite possibly.
- 16 Q. Would there be discussion about whether or not the group
17 or groups involved had posed a threat to public order?
- 18 A. Yes, maybe sometimes, yes, there would have been.
- 19 Q. Put more bluntly, how they had behaved?
- 20 A. Yes, I mean, I think that that would -- that would have
21 been a one-way traffic from the individual UCO or UCOs'
22 monitoring to the management, rather than a general
23 topic of conversation amongst the UCOs.
- 24 Q. And more generally, would there be discussion about
25 the aims and effectiveness of the groups that were being

- 1 infiltrated?
- 2 A. Sometimes, yes. I think that probably not unreasonable
3 to say that from a UCO's point of view, it was very
4 often the -- the considered viewpoint that active --
5 activists or activist organisations were over-hopeful of
6 their effect. They were -- I think they were belittled
7 rather.
- 8 Q. So was it common knowledge that a lot of these groups
9 had barks that were very considerably worse than their
10 bites?
- 11 A. Yes, I think so.
- 12 Q. Did you discuss the commission of crimes by members of
13 the groups?
- 14 A. At the meetings? At our meetings?
- 15 Q. Yes.
- 16 A. Not that I can recall. I'm sure there must have been
17 occasions when that was a topic of discussion amongst
18 one or two UCOs, but I never took part in such, and
19 I can't swear that I heard of any.
- 20 Q. Was the commission of crime by the groups that were
21 being infiltrated very common, to your knowledge?
- 22 A. No.
- 23 Q. Did you discuss the groups' politics?
- 24 A. At our meetings?
- 25 Q. Yes.

1 A. Yes, sometimes, but generally speaking, going back to
2 what I said a couple of moments ago, I got at the time,
3 and I still have the feeling, that the politics were not
4 disregarded but belittled.

5 Q. So, I'm getting the impression that insofar as it was
6 raised, it was to belittle them rather than necessarily
7 to understand them; or is that unfair?

8 A. Not -- not -- it's not unfair. It carries a nuance that
9 I didn't intend. Your statement carries a nuance that
10 I didn't intend, because I don't think that there was
11 a collective drive amongst UCOs to belittle
12 organisations, members, or their politics. That's just
13 what happened.

14 Q. Did you discuss welfare issues?

15 A. Occasionally.

16 Q. Was it a case of a problem shared is a problem solved?

17 A. Yes. Yes, sometimes. I mean, I can't give you any --
18 I can't give the Inquiry any specific instances relating
19 to myself, but I know that -- from recollection, that
20 individual UCOs did have -- did use the meetings as an
21 opportunity to -- to discuss welfare concerns.

22 Q. Avoiding anything that was entirely outside work, are
23 there any examples of the sort of welfare issues that
24 were arising from undercover work that you could share
25 with us?

- 1 A. Affecting me personally?
- 2 Q. No, just that your colleagues may have shared.
- 3 A. Oh. I can't recall.
- 4 Q. You've told us in your witness statement that there were
5 occasions when the people in the room would mock
6 the plans and the organisational skills of the groups
7 being infiltrated. How common was that?
- 8 A. Relatively common.
- 9 Q. And was the feeling that the general level of
10 organisational skill within the groups being infiltrated
11 was low?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. How well did you get on with your colleagues?
- 14 A. As an overall group, well.
- 15 Q. And how well did you get to know them?
- 16 A. To the extent that I did not, outside of work, socialise
17 with any of them, moderately well.
- 18 Q. Did you form any particular friendships?
- 19 A. Not that I can actually call a particular friendship.
20 As I say, I did not -- I didn't socialise outside of
21 work with any of them, so it was a working friendship.
- 22 Q. Would it -- would I be getting the right picture if I'm
23 understanding that you were able to relax and have
24 a laugh with them?
- 25 A. Oh yes.

1 Q. Was there a wide range of personalities within the group
2 of UCOs you served with?

3 A. I think so, yes. Yes, I think where you've got a group
4 of -- any group at all, if you were to pluck 12, 14, 20
5 people off the street in any location at any time, you
6 would have a range -- a fairly wide range of
7 personalities. And that was certainly the case in this
8 instance.

9 Q. And would you share anecdotes?

10 A. Yes, sometimes.

11 Q. And jokes?

12 A. And jokes.

13 Q. And banter?

14 A. And banter.

15 Q. And was that confined to the UCOs, or did the managers
16 join in?

17 A. Oh, I think the managers joined in pretty much.

18 Q. Now, the content of your witness statement suggests that
19 the joking and the banter might extend to some of
20 the women who were in the groups being targeted; is that
21 right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And that some of the jokes may have been of a sexual
24 nature?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Can you give us some examples, please.

2 A. I wish I could. I can't give you chapter and verse at
3 all of any particular incident. I can say that I am
4 left with the recollection that on more than one
5 occasion, such subjects were raised and engaged in by
6 all present.

7 Q. Would it be fair to say that these were probably jokes
8 and banter that a 1970s feminist woman would have found
9 offensive?

10 A. Indeed. And also that more than a wider range of
11 the general public in 2020 or 2021 would certainly find
12 offensive.

13 Q. And by the standards of Special Branch in the late
14 1970s, how did they compare?

15 A. What, with the general public?

16 Q. Well, can we start with how the banter in the safe house
17 would compare to banter generally within Special Branch
18 in the late 1970s?

19 A. Oh, I see. Right. I'm sorry.

20 I don't think there was a significant difference.
21 I mean, it was -- the culture of the time was as it was,
22 and the police service being what it was then, it made
23 precious little difference that I could see, and I can
24 see now, whether one was a mainstream CID or uniform
25 officer or a Special Branch officer. The nuts and bolts

1 of the humour, so-called, were the same.

2 Q. And how -- now to go to the question that you were
3 posing, how would it compare to society generally in
4 the late 1970s?

5 A. Oh, I think it would -- I think it would have been
6 regarded even then as offensive.

7 Q. Can I move now to some specific personalities. I want
8 to ask you first of all about the officer whose real
9 name was Richard Clark, whose cover name was "Rick
10 Gibson" and we know as "HN297".

11 Can you tell us what you gleaned from the meetings
12 about the behaviour of Richard Clark whilst he was
13 undercover?

14 A. The clearest recollection that I have is that whilst
15 I was in the back office awaiting deployment, it became
16 known to me that he had let it be known to
17 the management that he feared being unmasked, and that
18 as a result of that, management and he himself
19 constructed a meeting that he was to attend with his
20 activists and management would be scattered around --
21 I think it was a meeting in a public house. And they
22 were there -- the management were there obviously to see
23 what went on, but to make sure that he remained safe.

24 Q. How concerned were your managers about this?

25 A. Can I ask whether you mean for his safety or for

1 the role?

2 Q. Well, that was going to be my next question, so you can

3 -- how concerned that they were about

4 -- (overspeaking) -- by --

5 A. I beg your pardon.

6 I think they were far more -- I think they were far

7 more concerned with the role than with the safety of

8 the officer; although they would deny that, wouldn't

9 they?

10 Q. Well, I'm going to explore this a little bit further,

11 because it's obviously interesting.

12 In terms of his safety, as far as you understood it,

13 was there a risk to his safety?

14 A. Yes, I think there was a risk to his safety. Although,

15 I don't know how that risk would have manifested.

16 Q. And in terms of the role, as you put it, could you

17 elaborate on what you mean by that?

18 A. Well, his -- his -- his function as an

19 undercover officer and supplier of covert information.

20 Q. So they didn't want to lose the source; is that what

21 you're saying?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And what about the overall operational security of

24 the SDS as a unit?

25 A. Well, yes, I imagine -- I imagine that that also must

1 have been -- quite obviously that must have been of
2 concern to the management, that if one -- if one brick
3 falls out of the building, maybe others will become
4 unstable, or will be discovered to be unstable.

5 Q. How security conscious was the management of the SDS?

6 A. Apparently quite.

7 Q. And how concerned were they to keep the existence and
8 operations of the SDS out of the public eye?

9 A. Very.

10 Q. Are you able to give us any -- we'll come to the end of
11 your deployment in due course, but apart from that, are
12 you able to give us any examples to illustrate that?

13 Again, without naming any names, please.

14 A. Sitting here now, not without you prompting.

15 Q. Can I move now to what you heard in terms of joking and
16 banter about Richard Clark and sexual activity in his
17 undercover role. Could you tell us what you can recall,
18 please?

19 A. I can tell you simply that although I cannot recall
20 the conversation -- any conversation verbatim, I can
21 tell you that what I heard left me in no doubt that
22 the management were aware of that officer's behaviour.

23 Q. And when you say "that officer's behaviour", what
24 behaviour are we talking about?

25 A. Sexual -- sexual relations.

- 1 Q. Do you know with how many women?
- 2 A. I don't.
- 3 Q. Do you know whether it was understood to be
4 a relationship, or one-night stands, or something in
5 between?
- 6 A. I don't know that either. I can't answer that for
7 certain.
- 8 Q. In terms of who the DCI was at this stage, are we
9 talking about Chief Inspector Kneale or Chief Inspector
10 Craft?
- 11 A. I believe it was Chief Inspector Kneale.
- 12 Q. And in terms of the detective inspectors, are you
13 including in the circle of knowledge Detective Inspector
14 Craft?
- 15 A. I'm including anybody who was in that management
16 structure at that time. They could not have failed to
17 have drawn the obvious conclusions from the comments
18 that were being made.
- 19 Q. I appreciate it's a very long time ago. Can you recall
20 whether that would include Detective Inspector McIntosh?
- 21 A. I can't recall the chronology. If he was -- if he was
22 -- if he had been deployed, or if he had been working in
23 that office at that time, he would have known.
- 24 Q. And can you recall whether it would have included
25 the sergeant we known as "HN368"?

1 A. Excuse me, may I just refer?

2 Q. Of course.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 Now, you've explained to us that you were left in no
6 doubt that there had been sexual contact. Can you
7 expand upon why it was that you are so clear about that?

8 A. Simply because of the nature of the -- of the banter at
9 the time. It was -- it was dealt with as banter, but
10 the comments that were being made, which were of a -- of
11 a gross nature, would have left no young -- and
12 by "young", I'm talking of anyone of my age at that time
13 or older, anybody in their 30s, 40s, 50s at that time,
14 would have left nobody in any doubt as to the nature of
15 the relationship. That's all I can tell you really
16 about that. It was made quite plain, with jokes and
17 banter, that they knew, we knew, and management knew
18 what was going on.

19 MR BARR: Thank you, 304.

20 Sir, would now be a good time to take our
21 mid-morning break?

22 A. Yes, please.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it would. We'll break for 20 minutes.

24 Before we do, can I just do something I should have
25 done at the start of your evidence. I can see

1 a gentleman over your left shoulder. Can you confirm
2 there's no one else in the room apart from him?

3 A. Sorry, Sir, are you talking to me?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: I was talking to you, yes, forgive me.

5 There's someone to your left ...

6 A. To my left there is an individual, yes, and there is
7 just myself and that individual in the room.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, that's all I wanted to know.

9 We'll break for 20 minutes.

10 A. Thank you, sir.

11 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take
12 a break. The time is now 11.17, so we shall reconvene
13 at 11.40 am. Thank you.

14 (11.17 am)

15 (A short break)

16 (11.40 am)

17 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

18 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
19 proceedings.

20 Chairman.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

22 Mr Barr.

23 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

24 304, before the break we were talking about "Rick
25 Gibson", Richard Clark. You told us that one of

1 the reasons that you are sure that there was sexual
2 activity was because of the nature of the banter, and in
3 particular you referred to a gross comment. Could you
4 tell us, please, what the gross comment was?

5 A. I may not have been utterly clear. I -- I didn't mean
6 to refer to one specific gross comment but comments that
7 were made that were gross. And would that I could, but
8 I cannot recall exactly what was said, but it would --
9 it would leave nobody in any doubt as to what was -- as
10 to what was meant.

11 Q. Can you remember any of the comments at all?

12 A. I -- I can remember a comment, but I have to say that
13 I'm not -- I can't swear that this particular comment
14 was made in relation to Rick Clark.

15 Q. With that caveat, could you share it with us, please?

16 A. Yes, very well.

17 A comment was made -- and I can't remember who made
18 it -- but a comment was made about, "Oh, he'll have made
19 her bite the blankets again last night."

20 Q. Can we move now, please, to the officer that we know
21 as "HN300", who used the cover name "Jim Pickford".

22 Without using his real name, are you -- do you know who
23 we are talking about?

24 A. Indeed I do.

25 Q. You have described him in your witness statement

1 as "always chasing after women". Was that an
2 established reputation by the time you were on the SDS?

3 A. Yes. Anybody that knew that officer -- anybody that
4 knew that officer, at any stage of his service, would
5 very quickly have known what his
6 propensities/proclivities were in that regard.

7 Q. Could you help us as to how that would have become so
8 apparent so quickly?

9 A. In large part because the officer himself made light of
10 it and really didn't keep anything very secret,
11 especially when it came to how much it was costing him
12 in alimony.

13 Q. So we know that he was by that stage on his second
14 marriage. Did he also make comments and talk about his
15 sexual activities and proclivities?

16 A. No. No, not in that respect he didn't. Not as to
17 detailed accounts of his sexual activities, no.

18 Q. What then caused you to describe him as a philanderer?

19 A. Knowledge of the man and the fact that it was common
20 knowledge outside -- within and outside of S squad that
21 that was the nature of the person, that he could not be
22 in the presence of a woman without trying it on.

23 Q. And was that something that you had observed yourself?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. On more than one occasion?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Did he talk about women in his target group?

3 A. I can't -- I can't recall that. I'm sorry, I can't

4 recall that he did.

5 Q. Might he have done so?

6 A. I'd be surprised if he hadn't.

7 Q. Did he ever speak about falling in love with someone

8 whom he had met undercover?

9 A. Not in my hearing, but I don't think that that was

10 something that he did: fall in love.

11 Q. Are you talking now about the man generally?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did he speak about forming a sexual relationship with

14 someone he'd met undercover?

15 A. I believe he did, yes.

16 Q. Can you help us, as far as you can recall, with

17 the detail of that?

18 A. I can't. No, I can't recall any detail.

19 Q. Was it one woman, or more than one woman?

20 A. To the best of my recollection, it was one woman.

21 Q. The Inquiry has heard some evidence that HN300 went on

22 to marry someone who he had met undercover in his

23 deployment. Were you aware of that?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Was HN300 the subject of comment and banter at

1 the safe house in relation to his sexual activity?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And did that extend to the woman with whom he'd had sex

4 undercover?

5 A. I believe so, yes.

6 Q. Would your managers have been aware of that?

7 A. I hope that they would. I don't see how they could have

8 failed.

9 Q. Can I now move to the officer that we know as "HN106",

10 who used the cover name "Barry Tompkins".

11 A. May I refer, please?

12 Q. Of course.

13 A. Right.

14 Q. Can you recall whether or not he had a reputation with

15 women?

16 A. No.

17 Q. No, you can't recall, or no, he didn't?

18 A. No, I can't recall. I beg your pardon.

19 Q. Can you recall an anecdote being shared in

20 the safe house about a female activist who could lactate

21 on demand?

22 A. I don't recall that.

23 Q. Can you recall any comment or banter at the safe house

24 to the effect that HN106 had had a sexual relationship

25 with any woman whilst undercover?

- 1 A. No, I can't recall that.
- 2 Q. Can I move now to the officer we know as "HN155", who
3 used the cover name "Phil Cooper".
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. Did he have a reputation with women?
- 6 A. I believe he did.
- 7 Q. Can you recall any comment or banter at the safe house
8 concerning him and sexual activity whilst undercover?
- 9 A. To the best of my knowledge, any talk of that officer
10 had more to do with financial matters than with sexual
11 activity.
- 12 Q. What was the reputation that he had with women?
- 13 A. I must say, I wasn't fully aware. I'm not surprised --
14 I would not be surprised to hear that he did have
15 a reputation with women. I wasn't, I think, fully aware
16 at the time that he did have. As I've just said, as far
17 as I'm aware, the outstanding reputation that he had was
18 for the size of his claims -- expenses claims and
19 overtime claims.
- 20 Q. Are you able to help us one way or the other with
21 whether or not HN155 had sexual contact with activists
22 whilst undercover?
- 23 A. No, I can't help you with that. But I would not be
24 surprised to hear it.
- 25 Q. And is there any basis for that lack of surprise?

- 1 A. Only knowing what I know of him as a person.
- 2 Q. And what is it about knowing him as a person that makes
3 you think he might have done that?
- 4 A. He is a very charming, easy-going, light-hearted
5 individual, who would find no problem striking up or
6 making an acquaintanceship in any group. He is an
7 outgoing personality.
- 8 Q. And what about qualms? Is he the sort of man who would
9 or would not have had qualms about accepting an offer of
10 sex undercover?
- 11 A. Hm. Small qualms. Small to no qualms, I would imagine.
- 12 Q. And is that based on your knowledge of him?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. Are you able to help us with any examples of the sort of
15 behaviours that have taken you to that opinion?
- 16 A. Not beyond what I just -- the small sketch -- thumbnail
17 sketch of his character that I -- that I gave just now,
18 no.
- 19 Q. Can I move now to the officer who we know by
20 the nominal "HN354" and who used the cover name
21 "Vince Miller".
- 22 I know in your witness statement that you said that
23 you couldn't recall him. I just want to put a few
24 things to you in case they remind you. Before we start,
25 is it still your recollection that you can't remember

1 him, or do you now remember him?

2 A. I remember him now.

3 Q. You remember him now.

4 How much time did you spend together before you both

5 deployed?

6 A. I can't answer that. I really can't remember.

7 Q. You were both deployed in geographically nearby places

8 --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. -- for a long time in the late 70s. How well did you

11 get to know him?

12 A. Not ever so well.

13 Q. Were you aware that he was deployed in Walthamstow?

14 A. Latterly.

15 Q. Did you talk to one another about what you were doing?

16 A. No, I don't think we did.

17 Q. Would you have heard what he said about what he was

18 doing in conversations at the safe house?

19 A. I might have heard, yes, but I'm not aware that I --

20 that I did hear any comments that he made.

21 Q. Was he a talkative individual?

22 A. Yes. I wouldn't say garrulous, but talkative, yeah.

23 Q. Did he, to your recollection, talk about women and

24 sexual relationships during the course of his undercover

25 deployment?

- 1 A. To my recollection, he didn't.
- 2 Q. Did he have a reputation with women?
- 3 A. Not that I was aware, which is not to say that he
4 didn't; I was not aware of it.
- 5 Q. You've told us in your witness statement that you did
6 hear jokes and banter about an officer, and you can't
7 remember who it was, in connection with
8 a sexual relationship. Might that have been HN354?
- 9 A. It might, but I don't believe it was.
- 10 Q. Have you any further recollection now as to who that was
11 about?
- 12 A. No.
- 13 Q. HN304, you have been very patient with my questions
14 about specific individuals. I'm going to step back
15 a little bit and ask you some more broad-based questions
16 on the same topic.
17 What was the reaction of your colleagues to
18 the information that was being shared about
19 sexual relationships undercover?
- 20 A. I think it could best be summed up as, "Good on you",
21 "Well done", "Go for it".
- 22 Q. Was there any consideration or discussion of what might
23 happen if the women concerned were ever to find out
24 the real identity of the undercover officer?
- 25 A. I don't recall such a conversation, no.

1 Q. Was there any appreciation of how the women might feel
2 if that were to occur?

3 A. I think that was not on the horizon. Not on -- not on
4 their radar.

5 Q. Turning to your managers, you have stated that they
6 appeared to turn a blind eye to the bits of banter and
7 innuendo. Is that something that applies to all of
8 the managers or only some of them?

9 A. I would say across the board.

10 Q. You've said that they must have known it was bound to
11 happen with certain individuals who had a predilection
12 for chasing women before, during and after their time
13 with the SDS. Were you referring there to HN300?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Were you referring to HN297?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Were you referring to anyone else?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Is there anything else you can tell us about the basis
20 for your opinion that the managers were turning a blind
21 eye to sexual relationships undercover?

22 A. No, I don't think there is.

23 Q. Was there any adverse comment from managers about
24 the banter about these relationships?

25 A. Not in my hearing there wasn't.

1 Q. Did the managers ever join in in the "good on you" type
2 of comment?

3 A. No, I wouldn't say that they joined in at that level,
4 but I don't recall hearing an outright criticism or
5 disapproval.

6 Q. At what level did they join in?

7 A. Just the lowest level of -- well, a -- a low level of
8 communal humour at the situation.

9 Q. Was there any disapproval at all ever ventilated by any
10 manager about a sexual relationship whilst you served on
11 the SDS?

12 A. I -- if there was, I didn't ever hear it.

13 Q. You have explained that job satisfaction appeared to you
14 to be a paramount consideration for managers -- job
15 satisfaction of undercover officers, that is; and that
16 you've said:

17 "... it sometimes seemed the managers did not want
18 to instruct the UCOs at all ... but it seemed as though
19 they were deliberately blind in some areas, such as
20 sexual activity by UCOs while undercover."

21 Are you meaning to convey that the desire to keep
22 undercover officers deployed outweighed what they were
23 hearing about sexual relationships?

24 A. I believe that to be true. That's what I meant to
25 convey, and I believe that to be true.

1 Q. And was it a case, did you sense, that there was some
2 balancing exercise, or did you sense that they simply
3 were untroubled by the fact of sexual relationships?
4 A. As far as I could see, they were not troubled.
5 Q. You have said that in hindsight, the situation needed
6 much stricter guidance. What did you have in mind?
7 A. I think that I had in mind that prospective UCOs should
8 be schooled for far longer and in much greater breadth
9 for all considerations of the work they were about to
10 undertake.
11 Q. Do you think that they should also have been screened so
12 that those with a predilection for chasing women were
13 excluded?
14 A. Well, yes, but from a management -- managerial point of
15 view, had they done so, they would have -- presumably
16 they would have known that they were denying the system
17 information, because it strikes me that an officer
18 who -- an undercover officer who strikes up a deep
19 relationship -- sexual relationship, or a series
20 thereof, may be to the detriment of his own personal
21 background relationship, whatever that might have been
22 or might be, that individual in a sexual relationship
23 with an activist is far more likely to be in a position
24 to obtain valuable information than somebody like
25 myself.

1 Q. Did you ever sense that the managers' position in
2 relation to sexual relationships went beyond
3 indifference to a tacit understanding that it might lead
4 to better intelligence product?

5 A. I think there was a tacit acceptance.

6 Q. Can you help us with what the basis for believing that
7 is?

8 A. Only insofar as I've already said: I never heard, or do
9 not recall ever having heard, an outspoken active
10 disagreement or disapproval.

11 Q. We have received evidence that most of the members of
12 the SDS in the late 1970s were either married or in
13 stable, long term relationships. Did you as a unit ever
14 socialise with partners?

15 A. I never did, no. I don't recall ever having done so,
16 no.

17 Q. If -- returning to the theme of tighter instruction and
18 guidance and so forth, if there had been more extensive
19 guidance, if there had been some formal training with
20 clear prohibitions on sexual activity undercover, do you
21 think that would have prevented sexual activity all
22 together or not?

23 A. Almost certainly not.

24 Q. Could you expand upon that opinion, please, or the basis
25 for that opinion.

1 A. Yes, I mean to say, really, that in some individuals it
2 may have cut some ice and have had the desired effect.
3 But other individuals would have listened and nodded.
4 But individuals being what they are, are a widely varied
5 spectrum of characteristics or characters, and some
6 would have -- I don't think it would have had any
7 effect.

8 Q. Do you think that they might have been less open about
9 what they were doing?

10 A. It's a possibility, certainly.

11 Q. Can I ask some even more general questions now, please.

12 A. Do I have the power to say "no"? No, I don't.

13 Q. Was there ever any discussion about attitudes to
14 women's liberation in the safe house?

15 A. Yes, I believe there was. I'm -- I'm very nebulous
16 about it, but I do believe there was.

17 Q. And can you recall whether there was any particular tide
18 of opinion?

19 A. Yes, I think that it was, generally speaking, of a piece
20 with the attitudes of the male population of this
21 country at the time, which was that it was a bunch of
22 angry women that, you know, could well be ignored.

23 Q. Was there any general discussion about the merits of
24 the left-wing political opinions of those you were
25 collectively infiltrating?

- 1 A. Yes, there was occasional discussion along those lines.
- 2 Q. And was there any particular tide of opinion within
3 the unit as to those opinions?
- 4 A. I think that if every undercover officer told the truth,
5 they would have to admit that at some point during their
6 deployment they had some sympathy for the ideas and
7 tenets of the group or groups that they were involved
8 with. Sort of like a Stockholm syndrome.
- 9 Q. To what extent would this sympathy develop?
- 10 A. Only, I suspect, as a -- as a mental -- a mental
11 exercise, a mental construct within an individual's
12 mind.
- 13 Q. Was there discussion about the campaigning activities of
14 the left wing groups infiltrated against racism?
- 15 A. I think -- I'm -- again, apologetically, I'm going to
16 have to say I'm very nebulous on this. It was not
17 something that I heard a great deal of.
- 18 Q. If this is a question too far, just say so, 304, but
19 what I'm trying to establish is whether there was any
20 tide of opinion -- general tide of opinion for or
21 against that cause within the SDS safe house?
- 22 A. That is a question too far, which I am honestly unable
23 to answer.
- 24 Q. I'm going to move on now to reporting, and starting with
25 some general questions.

1 You have said that no scrap of information was ever
2 rejected as irrelevant, and any piece of information was
3 fair game because it might become relevant later. Can
4 you explain how you came to that understanding?

5 A. Yes, I think that the general ethos was that any
6 information that is collected -- however it's collected,
7 I have to say, not just by undercover officers, but any
8 information that's collected, even if it appears trivial
9 or totally from left field and irrelevant, you can't --
10 you can't really be afforded -- you can't really be
11 afforded the option of ignoring it, in case in months --
12 weeks, months, years to come it is the missing piece in
13 a jigsaw.

14 Q. And can I take it from your answer then that this was
15 something you had already learned on Special Branch
16 before joining the SDS?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you said that reporting everything gave the true
19 impression of an organisation. Was that the house line,
20 as it were?

21 A. I think that, generally speaking, from a point of view
22 of Special Branch reporting generally, it was accepted
23 that we report to higher -- to senior officers; they
24 assess and deal with it. It's not for us to make --
25 it's not for the reporting officers to make

1 the qualitative or quantitative decision as to what gets
2 reported or not.

3 Q. When reporting information, did you apply any filter at
4 all?

5 A. Me, personally?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. What sort of filter would you apply?

9 A. I applied filters that I thought -- that I hoped would
10 filter out what I thought was irrelevant information,
11 regarding a lot of personal relationship information,
12 or -- yes, well, that's basically it.

13 Q. And what had equipped you to make those judgments?

14 A. My conscience.

15 Q. Had training played any part in it?

16 A. I can't tell you that.

17 Q. Your practice and experience?

18 A. Possibly.

19 Q. Do you know what the approach of your colleagues was?

20 A. I know that some of them adopted the -- the quantitative
21 approach. It's not -- insofar as it was -- they
22 regarded it as not their role to -- to sift or weed out
23 information.

24 Q. You've said in your witness statement "our job was only
25 to report". Do you stand by that?

- 1 A. Yes, I think so. Yes, I do.
- 2 Q. You were provided with a pack of documents when you
3 produced your witness statement, and you've told us that
4 you think that there must be some of your original
5 reports missing from that pack. First of all, there
6 appears to be nothing from your reporting on the Croydon
7 Socialist Workers Party. Did you report on
8 the Socialist Workers Party in Croydon?
- 9 A. Yes, I did, but -- but not very much. I have to say, in
10 honesty, I did not submit very much --
- 11 Q. As to other categories -- (overspeaking) -- I beg your
12 pardon. Please continue.
- 13 A. This was, as you will be aware, right at the tail end --
14 very much towards the tail end of my deployment, and
15 I was, I suppose, to use a phrase, burnt out.
- 16 Q. In terms of other stages of your deployment, do you
17 think that the reporting that we have been able to
18 recover in relation to the Hackney branch of
19 the International Socialists is complete or not?
- 20 A. I assume it must be, but I -- I would assume -- I had
21 thought that there would be more.
- 22 Q. And what about the reporting that we've recovered on
23 the various anarchist groups?
- 24 A. That seems more representative. But again, I'm
25 surprised that there isn't a little more.

1 Q. Are there any specific categories of report that you
2 think we might have failed to obtain?

3 A. No, I can't identify any specific category.

4 Q. Can I move now to photographs. You've told us that
5 there were professional photographers within
6 Special Branch who took photographs from covert
7 locations when demonstrations took place; is that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And that sometimes, as an undercover officer, you were
10 shown those photographs and then asked to identify who
11 the people in them were?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was that common?

14 A. Yeah, relatively common, yes.

15 Q. And how do you know that they were taken covertly?

16 A. Because I think I recall that it was -- it was stated
17 that they were taken by the -- the Branch photographers.

18 Q. Did you ever take any photographs of activists?

19 A. No.

20 Q. As far as you are aware, did any of your colleagues?

21 A. I don't know.

22 Q. I'm just going to call up an example for you to look at
23 of a photograph.

24 It's a document, Sir, at tab 5.

25 If we could have up, please {UCPI/11265}.

1 You'll see this is a report of 7 July 1978.

2 A. Mm-hm.

3 Q. If we could go -- scroll down to the next page, please
4 {UCPI/11265/2}.

5 This is, according to the report, an image of an
6 anarcho-feminist. We've had to redact identifying
7 features to safeguard her privacy, but is that the sort
8 of photograph that you might have been shown to
9 identify?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And what makes you think that was a photograph that was
12 taken by a Special Branch photographer? Is there
13 anything particular about it?

14 A. I said that that was the kind of photograph that we
15 might have been shown to identify.

16 Q. Does that mean you're unable to tell us anything about
17 its provenance?

18 A. I can't tell you anything about the provenance of that
19 image or those images at all, no, sir.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 Is the way it's cropped of any significance?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Could you explain the significance of the cropping?

24 A. Only that that would lead me to believe that it was,
25 the cropping, that the photograph was taken in-house and

1 was cropped in-house. The cropping -- the cropping
2 speaks of it being an in-house photograph.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 Can we take that down now, please.

5 I want to turn next to the Hackney
6 International Socialists. You tell us that you were
7 specifically tasked to infiltrate the Hackney branch of
8 the International Socialists; is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Who tasked you?

11 A. I think it was DCI Kneale.

12 Q. What information or explanation were you given for that
13 tasking?

14 A. From -- from memory, I think only that it was an area
15 where they -- where there was a lacuna in the reportage
16 to SB.

17 Q. Were you told anything about why
18 the International Socialists were of interest?

19 A. Yes, in general terms, only that they were a relatively
20 simple organisation to infiltrate; they were not
21 politically paranoid about infiltration, and therefore
22 quite easy to -- relatively easy to infiltrate; and they
23 were present on the streets.

24 Q. Were you being asked to infiltrate the International
25 Socialists as a stepping stone for further deployment

1 later on?

2 A. I don't know whether that was the intention at all at
3 the time.

4 Q. Did you hear the phrase "oblique approach" whilst
5 serving in the SDS?

6 A. I don't recall it. "Oblique approach", I don't recall
7 it.

8 Q. What were you tasked to do?

9 A. I was tasked to identify membership of that branch of
10 the International Socialists and their activities.

11 Q. Were you given any instructions to try and influence
12 the course of that group's activities?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Were you given any instructions to disrupt the group in
15 any way?

16 A. No. No, I was not.

17 Q. How did you go about infiltrating the Hackney branch of
18 the International Socialists?

19 A. I went simply to the area where I knew that they would
20 be most likely to be present. There was a well known
21 meeting place, a bookshop and coffee shop in the High
22 Street at the time. I got into the habit of using that,
23 reading the notice boards, picking up leaflets that were
24 lying around in their profusion from all kinds of
25 organisations, and I ventured out into a street market

1 on a Saturday morning and bought copies of
2 the publication and got talking to people.

3 Q. And where did that lead you?

4 A. It led me to be a member of the Hackney branch of
5 the International Socialists.

6 Q. You describe in your witness statement a sequential
7 process whereby you started to sell newspapers with
8 them, then joined their pickets, and finally were
9 invited to attend their private meetings; is that right?

10 A. Yes, I think that's -- I think that's right.

11 Q. And we've tried to locate the start of your deployment
12 in time. Is it right to say you first deployed in or
13 around the summer of 1976?

14 A. Yes. From memory, yes, that's about right.

15 Q. It was a very memorable baking-hot summer, wasn't it?

16 A. It was.

17 Q. Can I show you a couple of reports, please. The first
18 one is a document, which is at tab 4 of the hard copy
19 bundle, and has the reference number {UCPI/9764}.

20 This is dated 10 June 1976. It's dated -- it says:

21 "On Tuesday, 1 June 1976, from 7.30 pm to 9.30 pm,
22 a meeting of the North East London Workers Action
23 Support Group was held at Centreprise Bookshop,
24 Kingsland High Road, Dalston ... Eight persons were
25 present."

1 How familiar were you with the Centreprise Bookshop?

2 A. Very familiar.

3 Q. And the report goes on to say:

4 "The speaker at the meeting was [Privacy], a member
5 of the International Communist League, who expounded at
6 great length the ICL line on anti-fascism."

7 And then goes on to deal with that issue in more
8 detail.

9 Might this be your first report?

10 A. It might be, but I don't believe so.

11 Q. Can you explain why you don't think so?

12 A. I -- June seems -- June seems a bit on the early side,
13 from recollection, although I can't offer you any
14 further clarification on that. And I have no
15 recollection of reporting on the ICL.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Could we take that down, please, and have up in its
18 place the document at tab 7, which is {UCPI/10659}. And
19 this is a document dated 13 July 1976 about a meeting on
20 8 July 1976.

21 Paragraph 2 reads:

22 "On Thursday 8 July 1976 from 8 pm to 9.50 pm at
23 Centreprise, 136 Kingsland High Street, Dalston, E8,
24 the Hackney Branch of the International Socialists held
25 its regular weekly meeting. The chairperson was

1 [Privacy] and about twenty persons were present."

2 It goes on to say:

3 "The meeting was opened with a short speech from
4 [Privacy] [Privacy] a member of the Building Workers
5 Branch of the International Socialists. [Privacy]
6 confined his speech to the Right to Work Campaign and
7 its march to Brighton in September."

8 Is this one of your reports?

9 A. I believe it is.

10 Q. And so can we take it that by no later than 13 July of
11 1976, you were reporting about events earlier that
12 month?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Might you have reported earlier, or do you think this is
15 your first report?

16 A. I might have, but I -- I tend to think that this is one
17 of the very earlier postings(?).

18 Q. We can take that down, please.

19 He tell us in your witness statement that you went
20 to private meetings that were by invitation only, and
21 sometimes had quite low attendances, perhaps seven or
22 eight people; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Can you help us with how you conducted yourself when
25 the group was carrying out its business with such small

1 numbers?

2 A. Are you referring to whether or not I felt compelled to
3 get more deeply involved, perhaps, than I would have
4 otherwise wished?

5 Q. I think there are a number of components I'm interested
6 in. First of all, to what extent did you speak up?

7 A. To some extent. Not greatly.

8 Q. And did you give any consideration to where to pitch
9 your level of contribution?

10 A. Yes, I did, but to quantify or elaborate on that now is
11 -- is a tall order, I must say.

12 Q. Can you help me with any principles that you -- on any
13 considerations you took into account when deciding how
14 to calibrate your contributions?

15 A. I think that throughout my deployment, there was
16 a constant caveat flashing in front of my eyes just
17 cautioning me against getting too deeply involved.

18 Q. And what was the reason for that caution?

19 A. Fear.

20 Q. Of being unmasked?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Were you given any guidance by your managers about how
23 to play this?

24 A. I may well -- I -- we may well have been, but I can't
25 recall what it was.

- 1 Q. When it came to votes, how did you decide whether to
2 vote or whether to abstain?
- 3 A. On appearances.
- 4 Q. Could you expand upon that, please?
- 5 A. Certainly.
- 6 I think there was a calculation that I made based on
7 very roughly going along the lines of: well, I've
8 abstained for the last two or three, I'd better vote for
9 something.
- 10 Q. I see. So if you'd always abstained, you would risk
11 being uncovered?
- 12 A. Well, yes, being -- being brought to notice.
- 13 Q. And when you decided you needed to vote, what informed
14 which way you voted?
- 15 A. I can only give you a very -- a very nebulous and
16 probably a totally unsatisfactory answer to that,
17 because I -- it -- at this -- at this remove, it's
18 difficult for me to say. What informed ...
- 19 Again, self-preservation and involvement, and who
20 else in the group I was going to be dealing with.
- 21 Q. Who you wanted to make friends with?
- 22 A. Yeah, who I -- who I trusted, who I -- I would like to
23 have made friends with, and who I definitely may not
24 have wanted to have made friends with.
- 25 Q. I mean, what I'm driving at is, in such a small group of

1 political activists, was it -- did it put you in
2 a difficult spot, both in terms of self-preservation and
3 also whether you influenced the direction of the group?

4 A. It certainly put me in a difficult spot on -- on many
5 occasions, the paucity of numbers, yeah. I never --
6 I didn't ever consider putting myself in a position to
7 influence group decisions or direction of group travel.

8 Q. Were you ever asked to assume positions of
9 responsibility?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Did you ever assume any positions of responsibility?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Did you ever, for example, chair meetings?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Take responsibility for organising a sale of newspapers?

16 A. Once or twice, yes.

17 Q. And deal with -- did you ever assume the position of
18 treasurer and deal with the money?

19 A. No, never.

20 Q. Could you help us with your understanding of what
21 organising the sale of the newspapers involved?

22 A. Essentially just making sure that there were enough
23 people to cover the ground at the -- at the pinch
24 points, or the -- the points of maximal sales -- likely
25 sales.

- 1 Q. And how did you approach that role? Did you try and
2 achieve maximal sales or not?
- 3 A. Me personally?
- 4 Q. Yes.
- 5 A. No, I -- I -- I simply contented myself with making sure
6 that there was enough -- that there were several people,
7 whoever was willing, largely speaking on a Saturday, or
8 some weekday evenings, but Saturday, to put themselves
9 out on the streets with a bundle of newspapers, that was
10 fine by me. I didn't -- I didn't insist (inaudible).
- 11 Q. Thank you.
- 12 You also tell us that you attended public meetings,
13 but that public meetings could be covered by ordinary
14 members of Special Branch attending in plain clothes; is
15 that right?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Did ordinary members of Special Branch in plain clothes
18 attend public meetings of the Hackney branch of IS?
- 19 A. Not that I was aware.
- 20 Q. And so would I be right to assume then that whilst you
21 were deployed, you covered those meetings?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. How were decisions made about whether a meeting should
24 be covered by an undercover police officer or just an
25 ordinary member of Special Branch?

1 A. I don't know the answer to that, because it was never
2 within my remit to make that decision. It was
3 a decision that was made by a -- a Squad senior officer,
4 and I suspect that it was made -- based upon whatever
5 criteria, it mattered not whether -- whether they knew
6 that there would be an undercover officer there or not.
7 But I don't know. I can't answer that any other way.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 You tell us that although the majority of your work
10 was with Hackney IS and you were a member of that
11 branch, you would sometimes attend meetings of
12 neighbouring branches, such as Finsbury Park and
13 Islington; is that right?

14 A. Very occasionally.

15 Q. One of the things that you appear to have done early in
16 the course of your deployment is agree to give a talk;
17 is that right?

18 A. Probably.

19 Q. Right, let me help you.

20 Could we go, please, to tab 15 {UCPI/10831}.

21 This is a report dated 24 August 1976, and
22 paragraph 2 reads:

23 "On Wednesday 11 August 1976, from 7.30 pm to
24 10.15 pm, at [Privacy] the Hackney Branch of
25 the International Socialists held an educational

1 meeting, entitled 'The Labour Party -- can socialism
2 come through Parliament?' The Chairman was [Privacy] and
3 five persons were present."

4 If we could now go to paragraph 3:

5 "Graham Coates talked for about twenty minutes on
6 the general history of the Labour Party and the reasons
7 why socialism would never be achieved by parliamentary
8 means. This was followed by a general discussion on
9 the subject, during which nothing of particular interest
10 was mentioned.

11 "[Privacy] then announced that the Central Committee
12 of the International Socialists was at present
13 formulating plans for the establishment of a 'Youth
14 Movement' within the Organisation; this, he said,
15 smacked of 'ageism' and was tantamount to having two
16 classes of membership within the International
17 Socialists. He promised that this subject would be
18 discussed at length by the whole Branch in the near
19 future. It was at this point that [Privacy] burst into
20 near hysterical laughter and said that any organisation
21 that could establish such a group, which was so
22 reminiscent of the 'Hitler Youth', within itself
23 deserved the derision which it would certainly receive."

24 Going back to paragraph 3, did you give the talk on
25 the history of the Labour Party?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And did you explain why socialism would never be
3 achieved by parliamentary means?

4 A. I must have done to some extent, yes.

5 Q. And can we take it by the fact there was other business
6 that you didn't talk for the whole meeting, but just for
7 part of it?

8 A. That's right.

9 Q. Why did you give this talk?

10 A. I can't recall, to be honest with you. I don't know
11 whether I'd been asked to do it. I doubt that I would
12 have volunteered.

13 Q. Might it have been self-preservation then?

14 A. Well, yes, in that case it would have been.

15 Q. And do you think it would have helped to establish your
16 credentials within the group?

17 A. That would have been the hope.

18 Q. And why did you choose to spin the talk in the way that
19 is recorded here?

20 A. I think probably at the time I think it would have been
21 to fall in line with what I could see of IS doctrine.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Could you take that down now, please. Can we go now
24 to tab 10 {UCPI/10756}.

25 This is a report dated 2 August 1976, and it says at

1 paragraph 2:

2 "The International Socialists (North London
3 Group) held a meeting on 'The fight against Racialism'
4 on Thursday, 22 July, 1976, at the Earlsmead School,
5 Broad Lane, N15, from 8 pm to 10 pm. Fifty-two persons
6 attended the meeting which was chaired by [Privacy]

7 "The meeting was to have been addressed by [Privacy]
8 [Privacy], a journalist with the Socialist Worker, but
9 he was unable to attend. In his place, Paul Foot also a
10 journalist on the above paper, spoke eloquently on the
11 spectre of racialism. He started by outlining the
12 history of the struggle for social equality by the
13 masses and continued by ridiculing the attempt by
14 Parliament to legislate through the Race Relations Act
15 in the hope that the problem would go away. He went on
16 to say that all racialists must be 'dealt with' wherever
17 they appeared."

18 First of all, as far as you can recall, is that your
19 reporting?

20 A. It may well be. I can't recall for certain.

21 Q. Why would you report on a talk against racism?

22 A. If I reported on that, it would have been really only to
23 report a meeting of people, to identify people who were
24 there, and on the -- to report on the -- on the speaker.

25 Q. Is this part and parcel of the "any piece of information

1 is fair game" approach?

2 A. I think so.

3 Q. Can we take that down, please, and go to tab 41, which
4 is {UCPI/17759}.

5 This is a report dated 24 February 1977. I'm afraid
6 it's not very easy to read. I'm picking up from
7 paragraph 2:

8 "The Islington Branch of the Socialist Workers Party
9 is to actively support the recently formed Islington 18
10 Defence Committee, which operates from the Islington
11 Community Law Centre, 161 Hornsey Road, N7, in its
12 campaign to coordinate a defence for eighteen local
13 coloured youths arrested on charges such as robbery and
14 theft.

15 "It is hoped that either SWP branches will lend
16 their support to the Committee and that pickets,
17 demonstrations, public meetings and the distribution of
18 leaflets will be organised outside local police stations
19 and relevant prisons/detention centres. James Cronin,
20 convenor of the Islington Branch of the SWP, hopes that
21 he will be able to organise the Defence Committee into
22 a larger anti-'racist police' committee and take up
23 the many cases of police brutality and repression that
24 come to light in the area.

25 "Attached to this report is a statement issued by

1 the Islington 18 Defence Committee giving its main aims
2 as:

3 "i) 'Immediate dropping of these framed up charges.'

4 "ii) 'Full legal aid for all with free choice of
5 solicitors.'

6 "iii) 'We call on local labour movement
7 organisations to join with the defence committee in
8 carrying out an inquiry into the actions of the police
9 and especially Inspector Willham and Sergeant
10 Gallagher.'

11 "iv) 'For jobs for all youth and an end to cheap
12 labour schemes, such as 'job creation' and 'community
13 industry'. We call for an increase in the direct labour
14 force and a programme of public works to create jobs at
15 proper union rates.'"

16 First of all, is this one of your reports?

17 A. I don't believe so.

18 Q. And why is that?

19 A. I have no recollection of it.

20 Q. It's in early 1977, so it's around the period you were
21 transitioning from IS/SWP into the anarchist scene,
22 isn't it?

23 A. Yes, it is.

24 Q. The report itself is a report about a justice campaign.
25 Was that the sort of thing that the SDS would report as

1 part and parcel of the "any piece of information is fair
2 game", or was it of particular interest to report on
3 such campaigns?

4 A. No, the former. The former, I would say.

5 Q. Was there any prohibition on reporting on campaigns
6 against the police?

7 A. I was not aware of any, no.

8 Q. Was there any advice about a need for sensitivity, or
9 anything like that?

10 A. Not -- again, not that I was aware.

11 Q. Can we take that down now, please.

12 The Inquiry understands that both Blair Peach and
13 his partner Celia Stubbs were members of the Hackney
14 branch of the International Socialists; is that right?

15 A. I believe so. I didn't know either of them.

16 Q. We do have a report from the summer of 1976 at which
17 Celia Stubbs is reported as being present. So are you
18 saying that you didn't get to know them?

19 A. That's what I'm saying.

20 Q. Did you have any awareness of them as individuals when
21 you were infiltrating the Hackney IS?

22 A. Not of Blair Peach.

23 Q. Can you tell us what awareness you had of Celia Stubbs?

24 A. Only that I had seen her around at -- at one or two
25 meetings. Nothing more than that really. Very little

1 information on either of them.

2 Q. Can you recall whether you ever spoke to her?

3 A. I don't believe I ever did speak to her.

4 Q. Were you at the Southall demonstration on 23 April 1979?

5 A. Is that the demonstration that's commonly known as

6 "Grunwicks"?

7 Q. No, this is the demonstration at which Blair Peach was

8 killed.

9 A. Oh.

10 Q. Or received fatal injuries.

11 A. No, I wasn't there. What was the date again? Sorry.

12 Q. 23 April 1979.

13 A. No, I don't believe I was there.

14 Q. The demonstration at which Blair Peach received fatal

15 injuries and his subsequent death was presumably a very

16 big event in events that the SDS were interested in.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you recall it coming up in discussions at

19 the safe house?

20 A. No, I can't recall that.

21 Q. Do you think it would have come up in discussions at

22 the safe house?

23 A. It would have been odd had it not done so, but I have no

24 recollection of it.

25 Q. Can you recall any officers talking about attending

1 Blair Peach's laying in state?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Can you recall any officers talking about attending
4 the funeral?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Can you recall any discussion at all about reporting on
7 the justice campaign following Blair Peach's death?

8 A. No, I can't.

9 Q. Can I move now to violence involving the extreme right
10 and the groups that you were infiltrating.

11 Can we look, first of all, at the document which is
12 at tab 13 {UCPI/10769}.

13 HN304, this is a report dated 4 August 1976, and
14 it's about a meeting in Stoke Newington Town Hall of
15 the Hackney Community Relations Council. It's that
16 organisation's first public meeting, according to
17 the report. And the account given involves there being
18 a National Front infiltrator who spoke up during
19 the meeting, of National Front members congregating
20 outside, and of there being a bomb hoax.

21 Is this one of your reports?

22 A. I believe so.

23 Q. Can you recall the events?

24 A. Vaguely.

25 Q. The picture that is painted is of the far right

1 intimidating the Hackney Community Relations Council; is
2 that fair?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And was that typical, at the time, of the way the far
5 right was behaving?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Can we take that down now, please.

8 Can we go to tab 80, which is {UCPI/11139}.

9 This is a report dated 25 October 1977. And
10 I appreciate that by this stage you'd moved on from
11 the SWP, but it's referring back to events the previous
12 year. It's paragraph 3, please, if we could have that
13 in the centre of the screen.

14 It reads:

15 "Last year during the mass picket of Brick Lane, E2,
16 [Privacy] was attacked, together with [Privacy], when
17 leaving the vicinity. [Privacy] had a number of teeth
18 knocked out and, subsequently, police charged a number
19 of supporters of the National Front with assault.
20 The case has yet to be concluded at Crown Court.
21 [Privacy] is worried about the fact that his name and
22 address have been read out in open court and that he had
23 noticed [Privacy], a NF observer, write it down. He
24 has, therefore, asked on a number of occasions what he
25 should do to protect himself but Party officials have

1 yet to advise him. It does not help that [Privacy] is
2 a good friend of [Privacy], an East London teacher and
3 SWP member, who has been the subject of an attack by
4 supporters of the National Front outside his home
5 address."

6 Did the fact of the attack which is the subject of
7 this report come to your attention at the time?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And how typical was it of the way in which
10 the National Front were behaving towards members of
11 the Socialist Workers Party at the time?

12 A. Very typical.

13 Q. Can we take that down, please.

14 Can we go to tab 64, 11244. {UCPI/11244}.

15 Now, this, again, is a report which postdates your
16 infiltration of IS/SWP. It's dated 30 August 1977.

17 The material paragraph is paragraph 2:

18 "[Privacy], a member of the Central Committee of
19 the Socialist Workers Party, has, following the events
20 at Lewisham on Saturday 13 August 1977, received
21 a threat that Column 88 will burn down his house in
22 the near future. The Party has taken this threat
23 seriously because it believes that Column 88 is the most
24 hard line of the 'neo-nazi' parties and has placed
25 a guard on [Privacy] house."

1 Paragraph 3:
2 "Column 88 is dealt with on ..."
3 And then there's a file reference number.
4 First of all, did you know anything about this
5 threat of arson?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Was this typical of the way in which the National Front
8 was behaving in the time that you were deployed?
9 A. I would say this was at the very extreme end of how they
10 behaved, but it doesn't surprise me.
11 Q. The reference to events at Lewisham on Saturday,
12 13 August 1977 is, to our understanding, a reference to
13 the events that became known as
14 the "Battle of Lewisham". Are you aware of
15 the "Battle of Lewisham"?
16 A. I've heard of it.
17 Q. Again, this occurred whilst you were a member of the SDS
18 and presumably, in public order terms, was a very big
19 deal?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And no doubt something that would have been discussed by
22 you and your colleagues in the SDS safe house?
23 A. Certainly.
24 Q. I don't want you to name any names, but is it right that
25 a number of your colleagues were involved in reporting

1 on these events?

2 A. I believe so.

3 Q. Do you have any understanding about how useful their
4 intelligence was perceived to be by your managers?

5 A. No, I don't.

6 Q. Can we move now to paragraph 3, where I drew attention
7 to the fact of a file reference about Column 88.

8 I don't want you, when answering this next question, to
9 give any details of sources, if you know what they were.

10 But is it right that far right groups were the subject
11 of intelligence-gathering by Special Branch?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. If we could take that down.

14 Can we now go to tab 7, {UCPI/10659}.

15 This is a report dated 30 July 1976 on
16 the International Socialists. We're back at
17 the Centreprise Bookshop, or Centreprise Centre. I'm
18 interested in paragraph 4. We looked at this earlier
19 for other purposes. It reads:

20 "Several members of the audience then participated
21 in a discussion on racialism in Hackney but no firm
22 conclusions were reached. However, a negress in
23 the audience stated that an organisation called the West
24 Indian Defence Committee, based in Brixton, was
25 presently engaged in arming with knives and coshes as

1 many black people in Brixton as possible and that this
2 organisation was fully prepared to meet physical
3 racialism in the area with physical attacks. Although
4 no decisions were made by the Hackney Branch of
5 the International Socialists, several members expressed
6 both their approval of such actions and their regret
7 that anti-racialist groups were not sufficiently
8 organised in Hackney."

9 Is it right to say that self-defence groups were
10 being formed and were arming themselves to deal with
11 violence from the far right?

12 A. Yes, I think so, yes.

13 Q. And to what extent did you become aware of that?

14 A. Only -- only through occasional conversation and
15 meetings such as this one, and -- and chats with fellow
16 UCOs.

17 Q. Just pausing to pick up on the terminology used in this
18 report, the word "negress" is used.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Why was that?

21 A. I have no idea. It struck me as odd when I -- when
22 I saw it just now.

23 Q. Can we take that down, please, and can we go to tab 4.

24 This is {UCPI/9764}. Again, it's a document we looked
25 at earlier when trying to locate the start of your

1 deployment. For the present purposes, I'd like to go
2 down to paragraph 5, please. Thank you.

3 It says:

4 "In response to a question from [Privacy] from
5 the floor, he stated that the only reason that
6 the anti-fascist demonstrations appeared to attack
7 the police and not the National Front was because
8 the police actively supported and protected
9 the National Front and, therefore, any such
10 confrontation was an anti-fascist action. He said that
11 this would always be misrepresented by the capitalist
12 press."

13 Now, I appreciate, 304, that you don't think this is
14 your report, but I want to ask you about the attitude
15 that is recorded there, which appears to be
16 a justification for attacking the police being mounted
17 by a member of a left wing group.

18 Did you ever come across such views being ventilated
19 by members of the groups that you infiltrated?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And how prevalent was that view?

22 A. It was a widely held view at the time amongst left wing
23 activists that the police would always side with extreme
24 right wing groupings.

25 Q. And to what extent was that philosophy put into action

1 with attacks on the police?

2 A. I don't really know. I can't answer that.

3 Q. Did you ever witness that happening?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Can we take that down now, please, and go to tab 21.

6 That's {UCPI/21460}.

7 This is a report dated 12 October 1976, and

8 paragraph 2 reads:

9 "On Thursday 14th October 1976 a picket will be held
10 outside the Burnt Oak Library, Welling Avenue, Burnt
11 Oak, Edgware in order to protest against
12 the National Front meeting that is being held there.

13 "The participants ..."

14 It's very difficult to read. Can we blow that up,
15 please:

16 "The participants of the picket will meet at
17 the ..."

18 Then a location is given:

19 "... at 6.30 pm. It is believed that the Brent
20 Trades Council has organised the picket and it is known
21 that the International Socialists will give it their
22 support but it is estimated that no more than 100
23 persons will demonstrate."

24 First of all, is that one of your reports?

25 A. No.

1 Q. You can perhaps only help us generally. Is this
2 the sort of intelligence about forthcoming
3 demonstrations that was an important part of the SDS's
4 work?

5 A. Yes, very much.

6 Q. Did you make reports similar to this?

7 A. Yes.

8 MR BARR: Sir, I'm about to move to a different topic.

9 Would now be a convenient time to break for lunch?

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it would. We'll have an hour's
11 break.

12 MR FERNANDES: We will now take a break for lunch. Hearings
13 will resume at 2 pm. For those in the virtual hearing
14 room, please remember to join your break-out rooms,
15 please.

16 Thank you.

17 (1.00 pm)

18 (The short adjournment)

19 (2.00 pm)

20 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to
21 the afternoon session of today's evidential hearings.

22 For those in the virtual hearing room, please turn
23 off both your camera and microphone.

24 I will now hand over to the Chairman,
25 Sir John Mitting, to continue proceedings.

1 Chairman.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 As at the beginning of every live evidential
4 session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.
5 If you're listening to it for the first time, please
6 listen carefully.

7 I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,
8 the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make
9 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including
10 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have
11 made a number of orders which affect what you may and
12 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave
13 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter
14 and may have serious consequences for you.

15 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an
16 order, I have the power to certify the matter to
17 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it
18 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If
19 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits
20 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose
21 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including
22 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and
23 sequestration of their assets.

24 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in
25 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to

1 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to
2 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in
3 the hearing rooms. You may bring your mobile telephone
4 into the hearing rooms, but you may not use it for any
5 of those purposes. You may use it silently for any
6 other purpose. In particular, you may transmit your
7 account of what you have seen and heard in a hearing
8 room to any other person, but only once at least
9 ten minutes have elapsed since the event which you are
10 describing took place.

11 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of
12 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public
13 disclosure of information, for example about
14 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.
15 These orders must be upheld.

16 It is inevitable that, whether by accident or
17 design, information which I have ordered should not be
18 publicly disclosed will sometimes be disclosed in
19 a hearing. If and when that happens, I will immediately
20 suspend the hearing and make an order prohibiting
21 further disclosure of the information outside
22 the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that no
23 further disclosure of that information may be made by
24 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device
25 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside

1 it.

2 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is
3 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure
4 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am
5 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to
6 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of
7 the public, are entitled to hear the same public
8 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own
9 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their
10 best to ensure that you can.

11 If you have any doubt about the terms of this
12 message or what you may or may not do, you should not
13 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if
14 necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

15 Mr Barr.

16 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

17 304, I'd like to move now to the Grunwicks dispute.

18 Can you help us with your recollection of that
19 dispute? First of all, did you attend the pickets
20 outside the factory on any occasion?

21 A. No, I didn't.

22 Q. What is your knowledge of the dispute?

23 A. At this remove, it's very hazy, I have to say.

24 I believe that it -- if my recollection is correct, that
25 it involved discriminatory treatment of ethnic minority

1 women employees.

2 Q. And so, as far as any public order outside the factory
3 is concerned, are we to understand that you can't help
4 us directly?

5 A. No, you are correct.

6 Q. Can I ask for the document at tab 66, which is
7 {UCPI/10956}, to be displayed, please.

8 This is a report on the SWP dated 8 September 1977,
9 so I appreciate it won't be your reporting directly.
10 But I want to draw to your attention what was being said
11 about the Grunwicks dispute.

12 Can we start in the second half of paragraph 2,
13 please. It says:

14 "[Privacy] commented on the manner in which
15 the party had intervened, with limited success, in
16 the Heathrow dispute and maintained that from this point
17 the experience gained by the Party had been showing
18 dividends, with the Grunwick affair providing good
19 training ground in the use of tactics on the picket
20 line. However, he argued that the latter dispute had
21 been going on for too long before it had come to
22 the notice of the Party and he recommended that, in
23 future, branches and districts should play a greater
24 party in grass roots involvement at an early stage and
25 pass on contacts etc to the Centre."

1 If we could scroll down now, please:

2 "What was also needed, as disputes escalated within
3 factories, were cells having the limited opportunity to
4 persuade any labour still working to join their
5 colleagues on the picket line. Such cells could also
6 assist in organising occupations. To this end a local
7 list of unemployed comrades must be kept up-to-date, in
8 order that they can join a workforce at short notice and
9 start or build up a cell. In addition, greater use
10 should be made of daily newssheets.

11 "Because activity at picket lines had to be
12 improved, lessons and briefings on tactics would now be
13 organised beforehand. The issue at Grunwicks had shown
14 that what was needed was in excess of 1,000 comrades who
15 had a pre-set plan to attack or block the gates. This
16 would have to be done forcefully and quickly to wrest
17 the initiative from the police ..."

18 If we could have the next page up, please,
19 {UCPI/10956/2}:

20 "... (it was obvious that Police tactics had
21 hitherto relied on the basic inability of comrades to
22 organise and to carry out their plans).

23 "[Privacy] concluded by saying that the importance
24 of the struggle at Grunwicks could not be
25 over-emphasised and had the factory been stormed and

1 occupied in the first days of the mass picketing, then
2 the Police would most certainly not have been able to
3 re-take it without creating a confrontation with
4 the TUC and the Government. He declared that the SWP
5 had the ability to take such action but not
6 the 'know-how' to organise it -- this was the problem,
7 he said, that the Party must solve in the following
8 months."

9 Now, as someone who infiltrated IS immediately
10 before this, and the SWP in Croydon immediately after
11 this, and was privy to discussions in the safe house,
12 what I'm interested in is, does this level of strategy
13 and planning in relation to industrial disputes reflect
14 your understanding of what the SWP was trying to do with
15 its industrial strategy?

16 A. Yes. It's fair to say -- excuse me. It's fair to say
17 that the IS were moderately okay in handling small
18 pickets, small actions, but something on the scale of
19 Grunwicks I think certainly showed their -- their lack
20 of joined-up thinking, their lack of foresight.

21 Q. And was that something they wanted to change?

22 A. Oh yes, I think very much so.

23 Q. Moving generally, then, to the SWP and IS and public
24 order issues, to what extent, from your knowledge, did
25 these groups cause or contribute to public disorder,

1 either in industrial disputes or other demonstrations?

2 A. Demonstrations of the size of something that took place
3 at Grunwicks was a rarity, and that obviously caused
4 a large amount of public disruption and disorder. Any
5 large demonstration obviously caused heads to be
6 scratched and plans to be made to -- to cater for
7 the route of the march or the demonstration -- site of
8 the demonstration.

9 Q. How cooperative with police was IS and the SWP when it
10 came to planning demonstrations?

11 A. It's not something that I had -- that I was privy to,
12 but I think that they would have co-operated on an
13 upscaled basis, if you understand me?

14 Q. I'm not sure I do, actually. Could you explain what you
15 mean by that?

16 A. I think they would have co-operated, but they would have
17 used inflationary figures.

18 Q. I see.

19 I think the SWP is one of a few groups that makes
20 absolutely no bones about its ultimate revolutionary
21 aims. When you were infiltrating IS and SWP, how far
22 down the road to revolution had they got?

23 A. No further than they are now.

24 Q. And what did their revolutionary prospects appear to be
25 at the time?

1 A. To -- to members of the party, or to onlookers outside?

2 Q. To you.

3 A. To me, okay. Remote.

4 Q. In terms of criminality, putting aside flyposting, to
5 what extent was the SWP or IS involved as an
6 organisation in the commission of crime?

7 A. I would say minimal. And what there was, was more
8 likely to have been, for use of a word, maverick or
9 wildcat action, rather than coordinated.

10 Q. We've tried to identify amongst the documents the last
11 of your reporting from the Hackney
12 International Socialists.

13 If we could turn up tab 57, which is {UCPI/17375}.

14 This is a report dated 11 May, which is a cover to
15 submit a party bulletin from the SWP of February 1977.
16 Is this, as far as you were able to establish, the last
17 document that you were confident was yours?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 Could we take that down, please.

21 Anarchists, 304. You tell us that there came a time
22 when you moved into the anarchist field with your
23 managers' approval. Can you tell us what it was that
24 prompted you to seek your managers' approval for this
25 move?

- 1 A. A fascination within me about the subject of anarchism.
- 2 Q. Was there anything about your deployment into
3 the International Socialists, on the other side of
4 the equation, which prompted the change?
- 5 A. Yes, I basically found them boring, for want of a better
6 word, and not very active.
- 7 Q. You describe them as "very dull" in your witness
8 statement; or, to be precise, you found infiltrating
9 them very dull.
- 10 A. Mm-hm.
- 11 Q. In what way?
- 12 A. Well, they were -- they were always just happy to talk
13 about the party -- the party, the party, the party. But
14 they didn't actually do anything very much, from my
15 point of view, to make my life interesting, or more --
16 more sparky. And they were, to use a modern word, they
17 were really quite nerdy.
- 18 Q. So I'm getting the impression that this is really
19 a personal decision by you, based on how interesting
20 personally you had found the IS, and how interesting
21 personally you thought you might find the anarchist
22 scene; is that fair?
- 23 A. That's fair enough.
- 24 Q. And to what extent did your personal interest fit into
25 the scheme of the SDS's interests?

1 A. Well, as you said, I was -- I was given approval to make
2 the move, and so I think that another UCO had -- or was
3 about to vacate the anarchist field, and on that basis
4 I think it was approved that I could move in.

5 Q. You've also made clear that you thought that managers
6 wanted to bend over backwards to accommodate the wishes
7 of UCOs; is that right?

8 A. Yes, I think that's fair, within limits, yes.

9 Q. And so moving to the anarchist field was well within
10 those limits; is that right?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. The other officer we were talking about is HN300,
13 "Jim Pickford", isn't it?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Did you speak to HN300 before moving into the anarchist
16 scene?

17 A. I don't believe I did.

18 Q. Would an introduction from HN300 have helped you?

19 A. I don't believe it would have.

20 Q. Is that why you didn't seek him out?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You tell us that you had to use your own initiative to
23 get into the anarchist scene. Can you explain to us how
24 you did it?

25 A. It's difficult. I made myself thoroughly disreputable

1 looking, for a start. And then simply adopted tactics
2 which I explained earlier in regard to
3 the International Socialists, to find the likely
4 geographical location where I might run across
5 the group, or some publications, some information and
6 took it slowly that way.

7 Q. And you settled -- it was the East End, wasn't it, where
8 you went looking for anarchists?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And you say in your witness statement that you
11 challenged yourself to integrate into the movement, and
12 to make connections which you regarded as milestones.
13 So to what extent were you seeking to make contact with
14 and form relationships with individual activists?

15 A. To -- to a great extent. I'm not quite sure what --
16 what the corollary to that question is.

17 Q. I'm just going to come on to specific individuals.
18 Dave Morris was one of the people with whom you struck
19 up a relationship, isn't he?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And can you explain to us why it was that you wanted to
22 form that connection with him?

23 A. Because he -- he was -- he was very cagey as an
24 individual, but he was very -- very approachable at
25 the same time in -- in lots of ways. And he -- he just

1 -- well, I -- I knew a little about him, that he was
2 a key mover in the area at the time.

3 Q. And can you tell us how close you got to Dave Morris?

4 A. Close but not huggingly close.

5 Q. So how would you describe the relationship that you
6 formed with him?

7 A. A friendship but not a close friendship.

8 Q. And how long did that last for?

9 A. A year/18 months.

10 Q. And how well -- can you give us some sense of how well
11 you got to know him? Presumably, politically you knew
12 him very well?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Personally?

15 A. Moderate -- moderately well. I wouldn't say I knew
16 everything about him by any stretch of the imagination.
17 He was -- he was -- when I said just now he was quite
18 cagey, he took a long time to open up fully, if he ever
19 did -- and I don't suppose he ever did -- personally
20 about himself.

21 Q. Could I ask you just to look at a couple of reports
22 which mention him. First of all, the one which is at
23 tab 70, {UCPI/11003}.

24 This is a report dated the 22nd -- I think it's of
25 September 1977. It's specifically about Dave Morris.

1 It says:

2 "The following information has been received from
3 a reliable source:

4 "Dave Morris has stated to his close friends that,
5 although he is uncertain within himself about
6 the present and future trends of the Anarchist Movement,
7 he nevertheless feels that he is being inextricably
8 drawn towards the more violent side of it. He regards
9 it as inevitable in fact that he will eventually have to
10 resort to violence in order to achieve his ideals."

11 Is that one of your reports?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did Dave Morris, to your knowledge, in fact ever resort
14 to violence?

15 A. Not to my knowledge.

16 Q. And were you reporting this because you thought he would
17 resort to violence, or simply because it was something
18 you understood that he had stated to close friends?

19 A. It was information which I felt needed reporting. It's
20 as simple as that.

21 Q. In your experience of him, was Dave Morris a violent
22 man?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Could we take that down, please.

25 Could we go to tab 125, which is {UCPI/13241}.

1 This is a report dated 22 March 1979. We'll have to
2 see if we can blow it up to read it. It's extremely
3 difficult to read.

4 I think it says something to the effect of:

5 "Dave Morris [Privacy] intends to go to France to
6 participate in the May Day demonstrations there.

7 [Privacy] apparently anticipates that there will be
8 violent [something] with the French Police and he
9 intends to participate."

10 Is this your report?

11 A. I believe it is.

12 Q. Again, to your knowledge, did Dave Morris participate in
13 any violence in France?

14 A. I don't know whether he did or not. I have no knowledge
15 of it.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Can I ask you now about Albert Meltzer. Was he
18 another person that you deliberately sought out as part
19 of your infiltration of the anarchist scene?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And did you do that to enhance your cover, out of
22 personal interest, or for some other reason?

23 A. The first two really, to enhance my cover and out of
24 personal interest in the man.

25 Q. And where did you meet Mr Meltzer?

- 1 A. I think it was at what was known as the "Black Flag"
2 bookshop in Whitechapel High Street.
- 3 Q. Is that the same or different to the Freedom Bookshop?
- 4 A. It's the same.
- 5 Q. And how often did you meet him?
- 6 A. Only twice.
- 7 Q. And how well did you get to know him on those two
8 occasions?
- 9 A. Not especially well, I have to say.
- 10 Q. And did having met him enhance your credentials within
11 the anarchist scene?
- 12 A. I really don't know. It didn't do me any harm,
13 apparently, but I don't know whether it enhanced any
14 credentials.
- 15 Q. Now, you moved into the anarchist scene in the spring of
16 1977; is that right?
- 17 A. Yes, from recollection.
- 18 Q. On 23 April 1977, there was some serious public disorder
19 at Wood Green. Can you recall whether you were present
20 there or not?
- 21 A. I don't think I was.
- 22 Q. I can move on then to slightly quieter activities, that
23 of speaking and writing for the anarchist press. It's
24 right, isn't it, that you wrote some articles for
25 anarchist publications?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. What was your approach to deciding what to write?
- 3 A. I think, in the first instance, I asked what they wanted
4 an article written about.
- 5 Q. And can you recall what subjects you did write about?
- 6 A. I can -- I think I wrote two or three articles, but
7 I can certainly recall one, which was an article that
8 I wrote about work.
- 9 Q. Whether it was true work or exploitative work?
- 10 A. True work or exploitative work, yes.
- 11 Q. And how did you write those articles, by which I mean
12 expounding upon which view?
- 13 A. Expounding upon my feelings on the subject. My own
14 personal feelings on the subject.
- 15 Q. So you describe, when we're talking about writing for
16 the International Socialists, where you told me that you
17 wrote what you thought they would wish to hear. Am I to
18 understand that you are taking a different approach when
19 writing for the anarchist press?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. And can I take it that what you personally felt and
22 wished to express was not out of kilter with at least
23 some strands of thought within the anarchist movement?
- 24 A. You can, yes.
- 25 Q. Did you write in your cover name or in a pen name?

- 1 A. I wrote in my cover name.
- 2 Q. Did you tell your managers that you were doing this?
- 3 A. I don't think so, no.
- 4 Q. Do you think they would have had any concerns about you
5 writing for the anarchist press?
- 6 A. They may have done, I don't know. I think -- I'm trying
7 to recall whether I submitted a copy of the magazine.
8 I can't believe that I didn't.
- 9 Q. And so they would have seen from that your cover name?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Can I ask you now about some of the specific anarchist
12 groups that you reported on; perhaps with the precursor
13 that perhaps you could tell us a little bit about how
14 organised anarchist groups were in general.
- 15 A. It's an oxymoron really. Some -- some anarchists, from
16 my recollection, eschewed anything to do with any kind
17 of organisation. Others accepted that in order to
18 achieve any kind of political objective, there had to be
19 some degree of organisation.
- 20 Q. Presumably, as a police officer with some anarchist
21 leanings, you fell into the latter group?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Zero Collective. You tell us that their meetings were
24 often only three or four strong. To what extent did you
25 -- how did you calibrate your behaviour within that very

- 1 small group of people?
- 2 A. I found it much easier in that political climate than in
- 3 the one that I'd left behind in Hackney.
- 4 Q. And why was that?
- 5 A. I suppose, to coin a phrase, I felt more at home.
- 6 Q. Are we back in territory where you were able to express
- 7 your own views rather than having to adopt and pretend?
- 8 A. Much more so.
- 9 Q. You describe the group as being really not a threat to
- 10 anyone. Were they committing any criminal offences?
- 11 A. Not that I'm aware of.
- 12 Q. Were they involved in any way in public disorder?
- 13 A. Again, not that -- not on -- not on their own as that
- 14 small group. Whether or not they got involved with
- 15 larger groupings ... but no, I don't think so. I really
- 16 can't recall any -- any public order threat that those
- 17 people presented.
- 18 Q. And presumably they did wish to change our political
- 19 system; is that right?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. But how far down the road to change had they been able
- 22 to travel?
- 23 A. Metric or imperial?
- 24 Q. Take your choice.
- 25 A. 1 millimetre.

- 1 Q. And their prospects of getting any further?
- 2 A. Negligible.
- 3 Q. The Anarchy Collective. You tell us that it was
- 4 "tenuously connected with the Angry Brigade". Can you
- 5 help us with what the connection was?
- 6 A. Yes, I think the connection was in large part -- excuse
- 7 me -- a person by the name of Stuart Christie.
- 8 Q. And is he the person who was living in the Orkneys?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. And were the people that you were mixing with in contact
- 11 with him?
- 12 A. Certainly had been, and I think probably still were,
- 13 yes.
- 14 Q. Again, you paint the impression of very small meetings,
- 15 three to five people meeting in private homes; is that
- 16 right?
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Q. Were they discussing committing crimes?
- 19 A. No. No, they weren't.
- 20 Q. Were they involved in any form of public disorder?
- 21 A. No, not to my knowledge, no, they were not.
- 22 Q. How far down the route to changing our political system
- 23 had they got?
- 24 A. Nowhere at all.
- 25 Q. Prospects of making progress?

1 A. None.

2 Q. Could we have a look, please, at the document at tab 87.

3 This is {UCPI/8336}.

4 This is a report dated 9 December 1977, about
5 the Anarchy Collective. It refers to a meeting on
6 1 December 1977, at which eight persons were present.

7 And it appears that:

8 "Almost the entire evening was spent in discussion
9 on the firemen's strike."

10 In what ways did the Anarchy Collective support
11 the -- I think I should say firefighters' strike?

12 A. I really can't -- I can't remember how -- how they
13 decided to support it. I believe that there would
14 have -- there was leaflets or flyers of some
15 description, but I -- I can't be more -- more specific
16 now.

17 Q. Can we go down to the bottom of the page, please. Thank
18 you.

19 We see that you are listed as present, with
20 the letters "MC" encircled to the left of your name. Do
21 you know what the letters "MC" with a circle around them
22 mean?

23 A. I have no idea.

24 Q. You are also reported as having a registry file. Did
25 you know that there was a registry file on you in your

- 1 cover name?
- 2 A. No, but I'm not surprised.
- 3 Q. Why are you not surprised?
- 4 A. Because I was -- I was familiar with the -- to a certain
5 extent with the rationale of Special Branch.
- 6 Q. Could you explain further.
- 7 A. Well, quite simply, I think that the -- the Squad --
8 any -- any Squad chief superintendent or chief inspector
9 would have sanctioned the opening of a file on an
10 individual, whoever that individual was, if it was felt
11 to be of use or interest to Special Branch. Simple as
12 that.
- 13 Q. Do you know whether you were photographed for that file?
- 14 A. I believe photographs were taken of me, but I've no idea
15 whether they were -- no, I don't know.
- 16 Q. Can we take that down, please.
- 17 Persons Unknown, sometimes known as "PUNK". You say
18 that you think that you went to some of their meetings;
19 is that right?
- 20 A. Yeah.
- 21 Q. But you wouldn't describe what you did as really
22 infiltrating them in the same way that you infiltrated
23 the Anarchy Collective?
- 24 A. Correct.
- 25 Q. We've got documents in the bundle which explain

1 the genesis of Persons Unknown as a support group for
2 three defendants: Mills, Bennett and Ladd; is that
3 right?

4 A. From recollection, yes.

5 Q. And one of the things that PUNK did was to campaign
6 against increasing police powers. Can you recall that?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was gathering information on campaigns such as that by
9 the anarchists of interest to Special Branch?

10 A. I think it would all have been of interest, yes.

11 Q. Can you explain why?

12 A. It's like a vacuum cleaner, information; it has a strong
13 suck and pulls much after it.

14 Q. Can you recall whether there was any management reaction
15 to the reporting on PUNK's campaigns against increasing
16 police powers?

17 A. I can't recall, no. I seriously can't.

18 Q. Did Persons Unknown commit criminal offences?

19 A. I don't know whether they did or not. They were perhaps
20 more likely to.

21 Q. And did they get involved in public disorder?

22 A. Again, I don't know.

23 Q. The East London Libertarians. You say you may have
24 reported on them, but you cannot remember.

25 Are you able to assist us as to what, if any,

- 1 threats the East London Libertarians posed?
- 2 A. Yes, I can assist you on that, I think. I think --
- 3 I don't think they posed any more threat than any other
- 4 small, ragtag organisation of any political persuasion.
- 5 Q. You think it's possible that some of the reports on
- 6 the Federation of London Anarchist Groups and the
- 7 Freedom Collective might have been yours?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. And similarly, a report on the London Workers' Group.
- 10 Are you able to assist us on what, if any, threat any of
- 11 those groups posed?
- 12 A. Yes, I suppose that they were possibly more likely to
- 13 have a public order -- to be of detriment -- detrimental
- 14 effect on public order if they were so-called
- 15 "anarcho-syndicalists"; if they were broadly linked to
- 16 trade union movements and able to call out a lot of
- 17 support.
- 18 Q. You've explained in your statement that one of
- 19 the concerns which Special Branch had was the fact that
- 20 anarchists had been responsible for some serious bombing
- 21 attacks in the early 70s, the Angry Brigade. Did you
- 22 ever come across any talk of reviving such actions at
- 23 any point whilst you were in the anarchist field?
- 24 A. No, I did not.
- 25 Q. Did you come across any publications about how to make

- 1 bombs, or things like that?
- 2 A. If you are referring to the publication that became
3 known or was known as "The Anarchist Cookbook", I was
4 aware of that. Very aware of it. But I don't think it
5 was widely -- widely circulated.
- 6 Q. Did you see any copies whilst you were in the anarchist
7 scene?
- 8 A. I saw a copy once.
- 9 Q. And was it being kept for academic interest or for
10 "cooking" purposes?
- 11 A. It was being kept by -- excuse me. It was being kept by
12 a member of the Anarchy Collective at their home, for
13 unknown purposes.
- 14 Q. How well did you get to know the Freedom Collective?
- 15 A. Moderately well.
- 16 Q. And what did you learn, in broad terms, about it?
- 17 A. That -- in broad terms, that it was largely an
18 organisation of wishful thinkers.
- 19 Q. I've got an impression that the anarchist scene was
20 pretty fluid, although there are some important
21 differences between different types of anarchist.
- 22 What navigational markers marked your course through
23 the anarchist scene? Or, put another way, how did you
24 progress through from one group to another?
- 25 A. Rightly or wrongly, I followed my nose as to what

- 1 appealed. What I thought would be worthwhile.
- 2 Q. You've described a series of groups which posed no
3 threat, either in public order terms or in terms of
4 subversion. How rapidly did you form those conclusions?
- 5 A. Well, over a period of months.
- 6 Q. And how quickly did your managers appreciate that that
7 was the case?
- 8 A. I don't know. They never said.
- 9 Q. Do you think that your managers already knew that to be
10 the case from HN300's deployment?
- 11 A. It's quite possible, yes.
- 12 Q. Despite reporting no intelligence that would build
13 a picture of concern, is it right that your managers
14 never questioned your continued deployment into
15 the anarchist scene?
- 16 A. That's right.
- 17 Q. There came a time in -- is it late 1978 -- correct me if
18 I'm wrong -- when you were asked to move into
19 the Croydon SWP?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Why was that?
- 22 A. I think that was because they felt that my output, or,
23 looking at it from their end, my input to them, had
24 become insufficient.
- 25 Q. Can you help us with alternative approaches to obtaining

1 intelligence about anarchists? I don't want you to be
2 specific, but would it have been very easy to establish
3 what anarchists were doing without using an
4 undercover police officer?

5 A. It would have been much more difficult.

6 Q. Would it have been possible at all?

7 A. I find that very difficult to answer. I don't know.

8 Q. Can I ask you now about Big Flame, and can I take you to
9 tab 33 {UCPI/17641}.

10 This is a report dated 4 January 1977, about
11 the Federation of London Anarchist Groups. It's about
12 a meeting on 18 December 1976. At paragraph 3, it
13 reads:

14 "Dave Morris, from the Anarchy Collective, made
15 a short introductory speech, following which those
16 present split into small groups to discuss such subjects
17 as housing, claimants, the law and education.
18 Eventually it was agreed that the only way to build
19 a bigger campaign was to invite other organisations,
20 including Big Flame, to join FLAG in discussions on
21 the matter."

22 Are you able to say whether or not Big Flame was
23 itself an anarchist group?

24 A. I would say it was, yes.

25 Q. And what makes you say that?

1 A. I'm struggling to recall about them now really. I don't
2 know. I'm -- I'm struggling to recall them.

3 Q. Can we go, please, to tab 73. This is {UCPI/10997}.

4 This is a report dated 26 September 1977, about
5 a meeting of anarchists. Paragraph 2 reads:

6 "On Saturday 17 September 1977, between 8 pm and
7 11 pm at the Roebuck Public House, Tottenham Court Road,
8 W1, a private meeting of anarchists of varying
9 persuasions was held on the subject, 'How should we
10 react to racialism and anti-fascist demonstrations'.
11 About twenty-three people were present."

12 Paragraph 3:

13 "Typically, the meeting took on a disorganised
14 aspect, with a very loose control on the order of
15 speakers. Much of what was said was irrelevant,
16 although it soon became apparent that there were two
17 conflicting factions: (a) those who trod the pacifist
18 path and who advocated the holding of regular public
19 meetings on the subject (in the belief that time would
20 assist their cause) and (b) those others, whom it seemed
21 could hardly restrain themselves from rushing out
22 immediately to assault the nearest fascist/racialist."

23 Is this one of your reports?

24 A. I believe it is, yes, from memory.

25 Q. We see there a tension between two schools of thought:

1 one violent, one non-violent. Was that a conflicting
2 current within the anarchist scene?

3 A. It was -- it was a current of conflict, but I'm not sure
4 that I would say that it was a conflicting current. It
5 was -- there were two streams of differing -- differing
6 approach.

7 Q. And did you ever sense that there was a potential for
8 the violent side of that debate to get the upper hand?

9 A. I never got that sense, no.

10 Q. Can we go to tab 95, please. That's {UCPI/21703}.

11 This is not very easy to read, but I'm interested in
12 paragraphs 2 and 3. It's an SDS report from I think
13 24 May 19 -- it's hard to see exactly which year it is.
14 I think it looks like '78.

15 It says:

16 "On Friday [something] May 1978, a meeting of
17 anarchists took place at the London School of Economics
18 between 6 pm and 8 pm. Some sixty-five persons were
19 present. The chairman was [Privacy] and guest speaker
20 was [Privacy] of the Paedophile Information Exchange."

21 Then it goes on to say:

22 "Details of the meeting had been deliberately leaked
23 to the National Front in the hope that they would
24 respond by ..."

25 A. "Attempting", I think that says.

1 Q. You are right:
2 "... attempting to disrupt it. For this reason
3 a large number of anarchists and supporters were
4 present, including some members of
5 the Socialist Workers Party. In addition, it was
6 [something] that [Privacy] and other anarchists were on
7 the roof of the LSE with 'smoke bombs' and other
8 missiles to be aimed at any National Front members as
9 they gathered outside the building."

10 Is this one of your reports?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you know whether any violence ensued at this
13 incident?

14 A. No, I don't.

15 Q. Was the deliberate ambush of political opponents
16 a tactic that you ever came across?

17 A. It was something that was talked about, yes.

18 Q. Did it ever happen on your watch?

19 A. Not that I saw.

20 Q. Did you ever hear your colleagues in the SDS safe house
21 talking about such events?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Can we take that down, please, and can we go to tab 93,
24 which is {UCPI/21710}.

25 This is another shocker to read, I'm afraid.

1 It's a report dated 24 May 1978.

2 A. I think it says '79, doesn't it? Does it not
3 say "1979"?

4 Q. It's very hard to see.

5 If we go to tab -- sorry, to paragraph 6 at
6 the bottom, please:

7 "Conversation eventually turned to more serious
8 matters. It was generally agreed that the burning of
9 prison gates -- as suggested by [Privacy] at the Black
10 Aid meeting of 14 April ..."

11 It's either 1978 or 1979:

12 "... (previously reported) -- was unworkable. As an
13 alternative, it was agreed that the group
14 should 'attack' a school in a working class area and
15 Highbury Grover Comprehensive School was suggested.
16 The main object of such an exercise would be to point
17 out to the boys and girls the uselessness of ..."

18 A. "Academic".

19 Q. "... academic education; pupils and staff would be
20 locked either in or out and leaflets distributed, while
21 the headmaster and those teachers 'with a reputation'
22 would be publicly beaten. It was envisaged that
23 the attack would be only of a short duration (possibly
24 lasting no longer than fifteen minutes), to enable
25 comrades to escape before police arrived."

1 It that one of your reports?

2 A. No, it is not.

3 Q. Do you know whether the planned attack ever went ahead?

4 A. I do not -- (overspeaking) --

5 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- I beg your pardon?

6 A. I never heard anything about it.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Croydon Socialist Workers Party -- if we could take
9 that document down, please. I know that you returned to
10 Croydon SWP only for a few months. In those few months,
11 did the Croydon branch involve itself in any
12 demonstrations that became disorderly?

13 A. I'm not aware that they did, no.

14 Q. And were they involved in any criminal activity?

15 A. Similar answer, I'm afraid. No, not that I was aware.

16 Q. Can I move now to a more general topic about how you
17 dealt with social relationships undercover. We've
18 touched upon some of the specific relationships, but I'd
19 like to ask you some more general questions.

20 To what extent did you socialise with people in
21 the groups that you were infiltrating, starting first
22 with the International Socialists?

23 A. To the extent that I would go after a meeting with any
24 of them that -- well, if -- if a drink had been
25 suggested at a local public house, I would go with them

1 to there. But I didn't ever go to any of their houses.

2 Q. Did you drink with them individually or in a group, or
3 both?

4 A. In a group.

5 Q. Did you ever drink with members of IS individually?

6 A. I don't think that I did.

7 Q. With the anarchists, how much did you socialise with
8 them?

9 A. To a similar extent, really. With all the names that
10 you have mentioned, I would -- well, I used -- I used to
11 go to the home where the meetings were held of
12 the Anarchy Collective, and we would go on occasions out
13 for a drink, several members of the group together.
14 Never -- never one to one. Yes, pretty much similarly,
15 really.

16 Q. I'm sensing that you felt more at home in these groups.
17 Did that mean you socialised with them more?

18 A. To an -- yes, I think it did, yes.

19 Q. And were your managers aware of the extent to which you
20 were socialising?

21 A. I don't know the answer. Probably not --

22 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- sorry.

23 A. Probably not, but they would not have regarded it as
24 unusual.

25 Q. Did they ever ask you?

- 1 A. No.
- 2 Q. What sort of quantities of alcohol might you drink? Are
3 we talking very small amounts, drunk, or somewhere in
4 between?
- 5 A. Sometimes very small amounts; sometimes a little bit
6 more.
- 7 Q. Euphemistically "a little bit more", or ...?
- 8 A. Euphemistically "a little bit more".
- 9 Q. And what did drinking, euphemistically, "a little bit
10 more" with people you were infiltrating do for you in
11 terms of (a) information you got out of them and (b) any
12 risks you thought it might generate?
- 13 A. I'm not sure that it generated any more information.
14 No, I'm not sure that it -- that it generated any more
15 information. Certainly there was a risk of moderate
16 consumption of alcohol loosening a tongue that shouldn't
17 have been loosened.
- 18 Q. Are we talking about your tongue?
- 19 A. Yes, my tongue.
- 20 Q. So why did you do it?
- 21 A. To fit in.
- 22 Q. Can we move now to some of the reports on individuals
23 that we've got in your pack, and there are quite a few.
24 I'm just going to -- I'm not going to take you to them
25 all; we'll just go to a couple of examples.

1 Could we go, please, to tab 100 {UCPI/21776}.

2 This is a report from June 1978. And if we could
3 blow it up to look at paragraph 3, please. It says:

4 "Following the recent series of raids in London by
5 police searching for the contents of Iris Mills and
6 [something, something] Morris has seen fit to alter his
7 experience quite dramatically by saving off his beard
8 and moustache and by having his previously dark brown,
9 curly hair cut close to his head. This has revealed
10 that he has a long thin face, large Jewish nose and full
11 lips."

12 Is that one of your reports?

13 A. I can't recall whether it is or not, to be honest. It
14 could well be.

15 Q. And was that regarded at the time as an acceptable way
16 to describe somebody?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was there any management comment using descriptions such
19 as that?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Can we go to tab 14, please, {UCPI/10823}. And can we
22 have paragraph 5 at the bottom, please.

23 This is a report dated 23 August 1976 about
24 the International Socialists. Paragraph 5 reads:

25 "[Privacy] then introduced the main speaker of

1 the evening [Privacy] who was to talk about 'Women --
2 The fight for equality'. It was suggested that
3 [Privacy] who was thought to be a Junior School teacher,
4 might well be on the IS Central Committee (with special
5 responsibility for 'Women's Voice') by the end of
6 the year. She immediately pointed out that was her
7 first attempt at speaking to a 'mature' audience. In
8 addition to being attractive, [Privacy] was both
9 eloquent and forceful. She outlined the history of
10 the struggle for equality and then criticised
11 the Government for bringing about the closure of Nursery
12 Schools in various parts of the country."

13 Is this one of your reports?

14 A. I don't believe so, no.

15 Q. Was there any policing need to report the speaker as
16 being "attractive"?

17 A. I guess there wasn't, no.

18 Q. Was reporting on people in these terms something that
19 managers would object to or not?

20 A. That would not have -- that reporting there would not
21 have attracted comment.

22 Q. I don't think I need to turn up further examples, but
23 we've got examples in the bundle of children being
24 reported on, a disabled child being described as
25 a "mongol" child, another child being reported as

1 having "exact parenthood unknown", there are reports on
2 people's sexual orientation, and there's a report about
3 an affair. Can you help us with why such personal
4 information was reported and retained by the SDS?

5 A. I can only tell you that it was accepted, it was not
6 queried, and I assume that it was accepted and not
7 queried -- or not queried and accepted on the grounds
8 that you never know when it might come in useful, who it
9 might lead to, where it might lead.

10 Q. I think I should have been more clear on that question.
11 It was reported by the SDS, and retained, though, by
12 others; the unit didn't retain its own reports, did it?

13 A. No.

14 I would like to just say, if I may --

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. -- that, without in any way sanitising or neutralising
17 any of the reporting methods of the 1970s, it is
18 nevertheless fair to say that it was a different culture
19 and environment 45 years ago.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 Could we take that document down, please, and have
22 up tab 123, which is {UCPI/13226}.

23 I'm moving on to a different topic now, HN304. I'm
24 interested in paragraph 5 at the bottom of the page.

25 This is a report of 12 March 1979. It says at

1 paragraph 5:

2 "[Privacy] disclosed that her court appearance on
3 drugs charges was imminent. However, she was annoyed
4 that her barrister wanted to ignore the fact that
5 the drugs were found during the execution of a search
6 warrant for firearms by the Anti-Terrorist Squad.
7 The general consensus of opinion was that her case
8 should be used to create publicity for Persons Unknown
9 and that she should have another talk with her barrister
10 to ensure that the political nature of
11 the Anti-Terrorist Squad raid was brought up."

12 Was reporting on what people should and should not
13 say to their legal counsel something that was in any way
14 off limits when you were in the SDS?

15 A. I don't recall that it was proscribed. I don't recall
16 that it was really ever enlarged upon as a topic.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 If we could take that down, and if we could have up,
19 please, tab 126. That's {UCPI/13269}.

20 This is a report dated 30 March 1979, which reads in
21 the material part:

22 "[Privacy], one of the six anarchists currently
23 awaiting trial for conspiracy to rob etc, and [Privacy]
24 [Privacy], a member of Persons Unknown and the Rising
25 Free Collective, have recently moved into the flat above

1 [Privacy] at [Privacy]."

2 Is this one of your reports?

3 A. It could well be. I don't recall immediately that it
4 is, but it could well be.

5 Q. Can you recall these legal proceedings?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you know whether at any stage during your undercover
8 deployment you ever heard what legal advice was being
9 given to anybody?

10 A. I don't recall.

11 Q. Coming back just to the question of criminality,
12 conspiracy to rob. Was robbery an offence that you ever
13 came across in connection with anarchists you were
14 rubbing shoulders with?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Could that be taken down.

18 304, there came a time when your deployment was
19 terminated. Could you explain to us the circumstances
20 in which that occurred?

21 A. Yes. I -- as I said earlier -- much earlier today,
22 I laboured under, for the whole of my deployment,
23 increasing levels of stress. I found the work became
24 more and more and more stressful. That's the kind of
25 person that I am.

1 And, by 1979, life at home was becoming difficult,
2 work was becoming more onerous, and I made an error of
3 judgment on a particular day which resulted in my
4 immediate withdrawal and posting back to Scotland Yard.

5 Q. And your error of judgment was to tell a police officer
6 your real name?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. A police officer from a force other than
9 the Metropolitan Police?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. In connection with a traffic matter?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Did that lead to your prosecution?

14 A. No, it didn't.

15 Q. Sorry?

16 A. No, it did not.

17 Q. And you've described in your statement a conversation
18 with Chief Inspector Ferguson, who was in charge of
19 the unit at the time; is that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Can you describe to us Chief Inspector Ferguson's
22 demeanour when he was dismissing you from the SDS?

23 A. In one word: incandescent.

24 Q. And what had made him so angry?

25 A. He didn't actually tell me. I assume it was my lack of

- 1 discretion, my error of judgment.
- 2 Q. And as best as you can understand it, what risk did
3 telling a uniformed officer in a different force your
4 real name give rise to?
- 5 A. Who can tell? It could have had severe consequences, or
6 none at all. I don't know, is the answer to
7 the question.
- 8 Q. Did you sense that Chief Inspector Ferguson was
9 incandescent because it meant that it wasn't safe for
10 you to continue your deployment anymore, or were his
11 concerns wider than that?
- 12 A. My estimation was and is that it was a wider -- his
13 concern was wider than purely for me.
- 14 Q. Do you mean by that, concern about the operational
15 security of the unit as a whole?
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Was Chief Inspector Ferguson a man who was given often
18 to incandescence?
- 19 A. I only saw it on that one occasion, but I do believe
20 that his fuse was short.
- 21 Q. Do you know what the regional force was told?
- 22 A. I have not a clue.
- 23 MR BARR: Sir, I'm going to move on to another topic now.
- 24 Is now a convenient time to break?
- 25 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. We will have our usual 20-minute

1 break. Can we resume then, please.

2 Thank you.

3 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take
4 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
5 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

6 The time is now 3.15 pm, so we shall reconvene at
7 3.35 pm. Thank you.

8 (3.15 pm)

9 (A short break)

10 (3.35 pm)

11 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

12 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
13 proceedings.

14 Chairman.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 Mr Barr.

17 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

18 304, can we move, please, to the topic of welfare.
19 And you've told us on a couple of occasions that
20 the deployment began to get on top of you towards
21 the end; and you've explained that your productivity
22 dropped off. And also in your statement you tell us
23 that you experienced both long and short-term effects,
24 having left the SDS, as a result of your deployment; in
25 particular, you say in the short term you were very

1 twitchy, and in the long term you say it contributed to
2 your decision to leave the Metropolitan Police Service;
3 is that right?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. I'd like to, against that background, explore your
6 thoughts on how the SDS dealt with welfare matters. Do
7 you think there was more that could and should have been
8 done at the recruitment stage?

9 A. I think that, yes, the short answer to that question is
10 yes. I think that, as I said earlier, there should have
11 been a much broader, fuller, longer period of immersion
12 as a potential recruit.

13 Q. And in terms of training and guidance, do you think that
14 there should have been training and guidance about
15 welfare, warning signs and sources of assistance, and
16 that sort of thing?

17 A. Yes, given -- given that, at the time that I was
18 deployed, I was far from the first officer to be
19 deployed by that squad, then, yes, they had had time to
20 put together a system, a welfare concerned system, and
21 they had not really done so adequately, in my opinion.

22 Q. On the question of pastoral care during your deployment,
23 do you have any observations?

24 A. Nobody knows, I think -- I'll rephrase that.

25 Very few people probably know how they are going to

1 react to a long-term stressful situation. I didn't.
2 During my deployment, the management team, I think on
3 a sort of a circulating basis, went out and met me and,
4 as I say, in turn, other undercover officers, normally
5 at a public house for a lunch -- a short lunch. And
6 that was the opportunity for them to listen to any
7 concerns or to ask questions, and similarly for me to do
8 so.

9 Q. After you finished your deployment, do you think that
10 more should have been done to check on your welfare?

11 A. It's easy now for me to say yes. At the time, had you
12 asked me four/five/six months after that event, I don't
13 know how I would have answered. I seemed to be coping
14 okay on an at-work basis, but the whole business did, as
15 you mentioned, have shorter and longer-term effects. So
16 yes, maybe -- maybe that would have been better, but
17 that's very much with the benefit of hindsight.

18 Q. Longer term support after you had finished your
19 deployment?

20 A. Yes, I did feel -- not at the time but a little bit
21 afterwards, well, you know, I've gone through all of
22 this and now it's as if I don't exist.

23 Q. Were there any sources of support for you after you had
24 left the unit?

25 A. Not -- there may well have been, but I was totally

1 unaware of them. It had never been clearly pointed out
2 that, you know, in the event of the jibbering
3 heebie-jeebies, one could resort to such and such an
4 office or service, no, I don't know.

5 Q. Can I move now to visits from what I'm going to
6 call "the top brass".

7 You recall in your witness statement Sir Robert Mark
8 visiting the safe house. Was that whilst he was the
9 Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis?

10 A. Yes, it is.

11 Q. Can you help us with the format that that visit took?

12 A. Oh, gosh. I think that from -- from memory -- and
13 I think I'm right -- he was just introduced to -- for
14 a start, okay, let's get this right.

15 Maximum attendance was requested by the management
16 from the -- from the undercover officers. I don't know
17 whether everybody did attend, but most people were
18 there. And I think that he was introduced one by one to
19 people, had a few words, said a few words to everybody
20 as a group, expressed thanks. And I think that was --
21 I think that was about it.

22 Q. Does anything stick in your mind about what he said to
23 the group?

24 A. I can remember very clearly what he said in relation to
25 one officer.

1 Q. We don't, obviously, use names, but perhaps you could
2 use a nominal.

3 A. HN115.

4 Q. 115 or 155?

5 A. Sorry, 155.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. 155.

8 Q. And what did he have to say about 155?

9 A. When introduced to him, he said words to the effect of,
10 "Ah, yes, your name should be Gold."

11 Q. Was that something to do with the overtime claims?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you recall speaking to the Commissioner yourself?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Do you think the Commissioner would have left that
16 meeting with a good impression of what the SDS was and
17 was doing?

18 A. Yes, probably he would have.

19 Q. And you say in your statement that you recall Commander
20 Special Branch visiting. Was that a similar type of
21 arrangement?

22 A. Yes, I think it was. I'm struggling to remember
23 the name of the Commander, but nevertheless, yes.

24 Q. And would the Commander of Special Branch have left with
25 a good understanding of what the SDS was and was doing?

1 A. I hope so.

2 Q. And you say that you also think that the Superintendent
3 and Chief Superintendent may have visited on occasion?

4 A. Oh yes.

5 Q. Were they rather more closely involved in the work of
6 the SDS?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And in your time in the back office, did you see them at
9 all?

10 A. Occasionally.

11 Q. And did they take an interest in the work of the SDS?

12 A. Not obviously.

13 Q. Do you know whether these very senior managers knew
14 about the use of deceased children's identities?

15 A. I don't know, and so my answer would be, if you forced
16 one out of me, speculative.

17 Q. We don't want speculation, thank you.

18 And similarly, do you know whether or not these very
19 senior officers would have known about the sexual
20 relations that were going on undercover?

21 A. I refer you to my previous answer. It would be
22 speculation. I don't know.

23 Q. Moving now to some of your reflections on the utility of
24 the SDS. You've said that you don't think disaster
25 would have befallen the streets of the capital, apart

1 from maybe on a very small number of occasions, when
2 there were very large demonstrations, if the SDS hadn't
3 have been around. But you go on to say:

4 "But I think the work of the SDS helped to make sure
5 police resources were not being wasted on small
6 demonstrations and that larger demonstrations were
7 properly policed."

8 Could you expand upon that, please?

9 A. Yes. I maintain that I don't think London would have
10 been overrun or that the government or government
11 offices would have been ransacked and razed to
12 the ground but for the existence of the SDS. And --
13 but, at the same time, any public demonstration of
14 numbers on the streets of London was/is bound to cause
15 a level of disruption. So, where accurate figures or
16 information can be provided, and if it can only be
17 provided from that source, then it is beneficial.

18 Q. Can you give any examples of either particular
19 demonstrations or of particular feedback where the SDS's
20 input obviously made a difference?

21 A. No, not without -- not -- not clearly, I can't, no.

22 Q. I'd like to ask you now some questions about
23 Mike Ferguson.

24 You knew him as a manager, but he had been an
25 undercover police officer. My questions are

1 specifically about the Anti-Apartheid Movement and
2 Stop the Seventy Tour. This is activity before your
3 time on the unit.

4 Did you ever hear whether he had assumed positions
5 of responsibility in either the Anti-Apartheid Movement
6 or the Stop the Seventy Tour?

7 A. No, I didn't.

8 Q. I'm going to move now to some miscellaneous questions,
9 some of which arise from things you've said earlier
10 today.

11 First of all, HN155. You gave some evidence about
12 what sort of man he was. I wanted to clarify whether
13 that was an impression you gained solely from your time
14 on the SDS, or whether that was an impression that was
15 also informed by your -- his and your wider service in
16 Special Branch.

17 A. The latter. And, I might add, after I had terminated my
18 service with the Metropolitan Police and moved to
19 the county where I now live, I conducted a business for
20 a while, and he came to visit, and he was the same
21 person.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 At one point during your evidence, you talked about
24 getting some "occasional feedback" from your managers.
25 Can you expand a little bit, please, on what sort of

- 1 feedback you did get?
- 2 A. I'm not quite sure what -- feedback from information
3 that we had submitted?
- 4 Q. I'm thinking generally, on your intelligence reports:
5 what sort of feedback did you get on what you were doing
6 and providing?
- 7 A. I can only think that sometimes we would be asked -- or
8 I would -- I don't know about anybody else, but I would
9 be asked if I could make a point of finding out a little
10 bit more about X, Y or Z.
- 11 Q. You explained earlier in your evidence that
12 Special Branch did collect intelligence on the far
13 right. Can I ask whether the topic of infiltrating
14 the far right with undercover police officers was ever
15 discussed in the safe house whilst you were in the SDS?
- 16 A. I can't recall it.
- 17 Q. Finally, I asked you about the dispute at Grunwicks, and
18 you told me that you weren't there. Your witness
19 statement, at paragraph 107, reads:
- 20 "I witnessed public disorder whilst at
21 demonstrations at Grunwick film-processing factory in
22 North London with the IS."
- 23 Were we at crossed wires earlier?
- 24 A. It's quite possible, yes.
- 25 Q. Do you have any independent recollection now of actually

- 1 being at Grunwicks?
- 2 A. I think I was there just once, yes.
- 3 Q. And can you tell us as much as you can remember about
- 4 that occasion.
- 5 A. It was -- it was a hurly-burly. There were scuffles,
- 6 there was fighting, and to a degree, low level violence.
- 7 Q. Are you able to enlighten us, one way or the other, as
- 8 to whether the violence was instigated by
- 9 the protesters, the police, or whether it was six of one
- 10 and half a dozen of the other?
- 11 A. I couldn't possibly say at this remove.
- 12 Q. Your witness statement includes a sentence:
- 13 "I never witnessed any violence close-hand, but
- 14 heard afterwards from other activists that people had
- 15 been hit by the police."
- 16 Can you recall that?
- 17 A. Can I recall saying that, or can I recall --
- 18 Q. Can you recall hearing that?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. And was the topic of demonstrators being hit by police
- 21 something that cropped up from time to time when you
- 22 were in activist circles?
- 23 A. Yes, it was. It was not uncommon. And of course, there
- 24 was always an element of a badge of honour to it if, as
- 25 an activist, you could claim that you had been hit by

1 the police, because it just proved how rotten they were.

2 Q. Within the safe house, was there ever discussion of
3 violence by uniformed police officers towards either
4 activists, or undercover police officers pretending to
5 be activists?

6 A. There -- there may have been and -- I can make no
7 further comment than that, because my memory is so vague
8 on that subject. I can't reliably answer that question
9 for you.

10 MR BARR: 304, you've been very patient with me. I'm very
11 grateful. We've reached a stage of proceedings where we
12 take a short pause, to establish whether there are going
13 to be any more questions proposed for you, and
14 the Chairman, if he has any questions, will ask them
15 now.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: The pause can be 20 minutes if you want it to
17 be; it's normally 15. Which would you prefer?

18 A. 15 is fine, Sir.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: 15 is fine. Then we'll resume in 15 minutes.
20 Thank you.

21 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take
22 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room
23 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

24 The time is now 3.55 pm, so we shall resume at
25 4.10 pm. Thank you.

1 (3.52 pm)

2 (A short break)

3 (4.10 pm)

4 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

5 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue
6 proceedings.

7 Chairman.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

9 Mr Barr, are there any questions that you've been
10 requested to ask?

11 MR BARR: Yes, sir, there are a small number.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Then please do.

13 MR BARR: Three or four.

14 Can we go back to conversations in the safe house,
15 please. Was any of the banter and joking racist in
16 nature?

17 A. No, not overtly so, I don't think.

18 Q. Are you in a position to say positively that it wasn't,
19 or is it a case that it might have been and you simply
20 can't remember?

21 A. There is a possibility that it might have been, but
22 I don't think it was.

23 Q. Your witness statement said that you could not recall
24 HN354, whose cover name was "Vince Miller". When I came
25 to ask you questions about HN354, you had, by that

1 stage, recalled who it was.

2 Can you help us with what caused you to recall
3 the man that used the cover name "Vince Miller" again?

4 A. Yes, it was the cipher list.

5 Q. Have you read the witness statement of the woman who
6 uses the pseudonym "Madeleine"?

7 A. No.

8 Q. How did you feel when news about the SDS became public
9 in 2011, and in particular when you learned about
10 the fact that there had been a lot of sexual
11 relationships after your time in the SDS?

12 A. I felt not surprised and -- I'm trying to think of what
13 the word is to describe it. How did I feel? I felt
14 that it was almost a sense of inevitability.

15 Q. And do you link that to the prevailing culture that you
16 have described from your days in the SDS?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. During your deployment, did you ever hear discussions
19 about undercover officers having fathered children with
20 women in their target groups?

21 A. No, I didn't.

22 MR BARR: I think that covers it, Sir.

23 Thank you very much, 304.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

25 Is there any re-examination?

1 MR SANDERS: No, thank you, Sir.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Sanders.

3 HN304, you've had rather a long day. Thank you for
4 bearing with us. Your evidence has been of the greatest
5 interest, and I'm grateful to you for giving it
6 the attention that you have.

7 Thank you.

8 A. Thank you, Sir.

9 MR FERNANDES: Thank you, everyone. The hearings have now
10 finished for this week. We shall resume at 10.00 am on
11 Monday.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Can I say something before we do resume.

13 Monday is going to be a short day. We will hear
14 the evidence of "Madeleine", but her evidence will be --
15 although it will be heard in the hearing room, will not
16 be shown.

17 Thank you.

18 (4.14 pm)

19 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Monday,

20 10 May 2021)

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