

Thursday, 13 May 2021

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone and welcome to Day 16 of hearings in Tranche 1 Phase 2 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

My name is Neil Fernandes and I'm the hearings manager.

For those of you in the virtual hearing room, please turn off both your camera and microphone, unless you're invited to speak by the Chairman, as Zoom will pick up on all noises and you will be on screen.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Ms Campbell is now going to summarise the witness statement and documents relating to HN155. Ms Campbell.

Summary of evidence of HN155/"Phil Cooper"

MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, Sir.

HN155, "Phil Cooper".

HN155 served on the SDS from late 1979 to early 1984. He adopted the cover name "Phil Cooper", and was deployed primarily into the Socialist Workers Party and the associated Right to Work Campaign. There is a restriction order in place preventing the publication

1 of his real name, and he has been excused from giving  
2 oral evidence on medical grounds.

3 HN155 joined the MPS in the 1970s, moving to  
4 Special Branch a few years later. HN155 states that he  
5 had done a fair amount of undercover work prior to  
6 joining the SDS. He recalls that while involved with  
7 B Squad, he used to go undercover at pubs frequented by  
8 Sinn Fein, and would use a cover identity that included  
9 details about a cover employment and family background.  
10 While in Special Branch, HN155 was approached by  
11 Mike Ferguson, who suggested he apply for the SDS.

12 HN155's personal annual report from 1982 suggests  
13 that he joined the SDS around October 1979. However,  
14 the officer recalls that it was slightly before that  
15 date. He states that he sought to join the SDS as he  
16 enjoyed the flavour of undercover work in B Squad, and  
17 that he was confident he could maintain his cover in  
18 a social setting. He notes.

19 "The SDS was aimed at obtaining intelligence to  
20 protect the public and I considered this to be  
21 the ultimate task of being a policeman."

22 At the time of joining the SDS, HN155 had served for  
23 two years in Special Branch.

24 HN155 was married when he joined the SDS. He  
25 believes that at one point, the SDS managers wanted all

1 UCOs to be married. He cannot recall if any SDS  
2 managers spoke to him about the impact a deployment  
3 would have on him or his family, but he imagines that  
4 Mike Ferguson probably would have done. He does not  
5 recall any SDS managers visiting or speaking to his wife  
6 prior to his deployment.

7 HN155 recalls no formal training when he joined  
8 the SDS, but did spend a significant period in  
9 the back office before being deployed. He cannot recall  
10 exactly how long this was, but states that it could have  
11 been up to a year.

12 He recalls that as his deployment approached, senior  
13 officers would fire questions at him, suggesting  
14 a scenario and asking what he would do in such  
15 a situation. He also remembers at least one session  
16 before his deployment where he was interrogated by  
17 managers about his cover identity.

18 HN155 notes that his managers at the time,  
19 Mike Ferguson and HN68, both had been UCOs and were good  
20 at highlighting key issues.

21 HN155 cannot recall being given any guidance or  
22 advice about becoming involved in the private lives of  
23 activists or on sexual relationships in his cover  
24 identity. He states he likewise cannot recall any  
25 guidance on participation in criminality, encouraging

1 others to participate in crime or what to do if arrested  
2 or party to legally privileged information. His  
3 understanding was that he should "avoid getting into  
4 these situations in the first place".

5 HN155 does not recall using a deceased child's  
6 identity for his cover name but is aware that this was  
7 common practice at the time, and so, on reflection,  
8 believes that it is likely that he did so.

9 He cannot recall looking for death certificates or  
10 attending Somerset House. He cannot recall using any  
11 aspect of a deceased child's identity in his cover  
12 story.

13 His cover background was that he had grown up in  
14 the Liverpool area and had joined the Merchant Navy. He  
15 recalls doing some research into schools and addresses  
16 in Liverpool that no longer existed, so that it would be  
17 harder for anyone to trace, if investigated. He also  
18 visited Liverpool to prepare for his deployment.

19 HN155 states that he generally chose driving jobs as  
20 his cover employment, as it meant he would be out and  
21 about and not always accessible.

22 He notes that he did some work for most of his cover  
23 jobs, primarily to understand the nature of the job, if  
24 questioned. He had a driving licence in his cover name  
25 and was given use of an SDS car.

1           HN155 was involved in a car accident late into his  
2           deployment, and accepts that it appears to have been  
3           reported to the police under his cover name. He assumes  
4           that this was because the car was registered in that  
5           name. He cannot recall if any consideration was given  
6           to the lawfulness of reporting an accident in his cover  
7           name.

8           HN155 recalls having multiple cover addresses during  
9           his deployment, and states that activists would have  
10          visited his address from time to time. He notes that  
11          occasionally he would have stayed overnight somewhere on  
12          a sofa or floor, such as during the Right to Work march,  
13          but that he did not live with activists for any  
14          significant period of time.

15          HN155 recalls that he was directed by his managers  
16          to infiltrate the SWP in East London, but was otherwise  
17          left to his own initiative to direct his employment.  
18          Although the Inquiry does not hold any reporting from  
19          HN155 on the SWP before late September 1980, the officer  
20          believes he would have attended and reported on meetings  
21          before that date, probably from around March 1980 or  
22          earlier.

23          The first reporting held for this officer relates to  
24          the Waltham Forest Anti-Nuclear Campaign. HN155 cannot  
25          recall any specific involvement in this group, but

1 states that it is plausible that it was connected to his  
2 role in the SWP.

3 HN155 cannot remember which branch of the SWP he  
4 first became involved in, but accepts that he would have  
5 likely begun his infiltration at branch level.  
6 The officer does not seem to have reported extensively  
7 on any particular branches or districts. He notes that  
8 the SWP was keen to recruit, and therefore it was not  
9 difficult to get involved, and that he may have made his  
10 approach through meeting activists in the pub or buying  
11 the Socialist Worker newspaper.

12 It seems likely that through the Waltham Forest  
13 Anti-Nuclear Campaign, HN155 also became involved in  
14 the campaign opposing the construction of a nuclear  
15 power plant at Torness, Scotland. Although he doubts  
16 that the reports on this subject within his witness pack  
17 are necessarily his. It seems likely that he attended  
18 a protest at the site in the course of his deployment.

19 HN155 began reporting on the Right to Work Campaign  
20 some months after the start of his deployment. He  
21 states that he was not specifically directed to target  
22 the Right to Work Campaign, nor did he set out to  
23 infiltrate it, but became involved via the SWP.

24 He notes that the Right to Work Campaign was of  
25 interest to the SDS, as it involved large numbers of

1 people on marches lasting a number of days, with  
2 hundreds or thousands of local activists joining along  
3 the way, including "Marxists and anarchists". He states  
4 that it would have been important to provide local  
5 constabularies intelligence to assess the risk of public  
6 disorder and ensure an appropriate police presence.

7 HN155 recalls attending two Right to Work marches,  
8 but accepts that he may have attended more.

9 One such march took place between 23 September and  
10 10 October 1980, marching between Port Talbot and  
11 Brighton, and ending at the Conservative Party  
12 conference. HN155 states that he would have kept his  
13 managers constantly updated during the march, almost on  
14 a daily basis. HN155 states that he may also have  
15 attended a march in November 1980, between Manchester  
16 and Liverpool, but has no specific recollection of  
17 the event.

18 The Inquiry holds reporting on both of these  
19 marches, including a comprehensive report on the 1980  
20 Brighton march, likely to be attributable to HN155 and  
21 HN80, who was also involved in this group at the time.

22 Documents show that HN155 was also heavily involved  
23 in the organisation of the 1982 Right to Work march in  
24 his role as national treasurer for the campaign.

25 HN155 adopted at least two notable positions of

1 responsibility within the groups he reported on.

2 A report held by the Inquiry from April 1980 lists HN155  
3 as having been elected treasurer of the Waltham Forest  
4 Anti-Nuclear Campaign, though the officer states that he  
5 cannot recall holding this position.

6 In January 1982, HN155 became national treasurer of  
7 the Right to Work Campaign. This latter position  
8 allowed the officer control over the campaign's bank  
9 account, as well as access to personal bank details of  
10 certain individuals involved. He was also able to  
11 obtain private documents and correspondence with  
12 the organisers, one of whom was serving Member of  
13 Parliament, Ernie Roberts.

14 HN155 states in his witness statement that he did  
15 not consider taking a position of responsibility to be  
16 off-limits, as he would have sought to position himself  
17 wherever he would be best placed to gather intelligence.  
18 However, he asserts that he would not have sought to  
19 influence the group's actions. He cannot recall  
20 discussing with his managers before accepting  
21 the position, but notes that he would have kept them  
22 appraised of his actions.

23 HN155 states that he has little recollection of  
24 the reports he has been shown. He notes that he has not  
25 been provided with many reports on demonstrations, and



1 believes that reports not forwarded to Box 500 may be  
2 missing.

3 When asked about reporting on individuals, including  
4 the relationships and employment of activists, he states  
5 that such information would contribute to the overall  
6 intelligence picture of the groups and their members.  
7 It would be for others to assess the relevance of any  
8 information and any action that should be taken as  
9 a result.

10 HN155 provided detailed reports on SWP's structure  
11 and branches, and seems to have attended a number of  
12 major party events. Reporting suggests that he attended  
13 the 1981, 1982 and 1983 SWP national delegate  
14 conferences. He cannot recall attending these  
15 conferences or providing lists of delegates, but notes  
16 that he was "in and out of the SWP main office even in  
17 1981, to deliver the Socialist Worker newspaper", and so  
18 would have probably been able to obtain a list of  
19 delegates from that office.

20 He also reports on the annual SWP rally at Skegness  
21 in 1982 and 1983, and believes he would have collected  
22 the entrance money at this event, which would have  
23 provided him with a list of attendees.

24 A July 1982 report concerns a change of address for  
25 the SWP main office, and encloses a drawn floor plan.

1           HN155 indicates that he had a desk at the SWP main  
2           office due to his position as treasurer for the Right to  
3           Work Campaign. He notes that while he was never on  
4           the SWP central committee, he did have a working  
5           relationship with them due to his Right to Work role.  
6           Due to this position, HN155 was also able to receive and  
7           forward on SWP weekly internal information sheets  
8           circulated only to district secretaries, National  
9           Committee members and full time party organisers.

10           HN155 also reported on the SWP computer, enclosing  
11           a distribution list for the Socialist Worker newspaper.  
12           He notes in his witness statement:

13           "I was never required to consider, and I did not  
14           consider, the continued proportionality of reporting  
15           this information. As far as I was concerned, this was  
16           a question for more senior officers."

17           There is some reporting on trade union activities  
18           and membership within the context of the SWP and the  
19           Right to Work Campaign. HN155 states that he cannot  
20           recall joining a trade union or becoming involved in  
21           trade union affairs while deployed. However, he notes  
22           that:

23           "Extreme left wing activists intentionally made  
24           their way into trade unions, with the primary aim of  
25           upsetting the operation of large companies, rather than

1 to simply improve the working conditions of employees.  
2 This information was therefore a useful piece of  
3 a larger intelligence picture regarding the presence of  
4 left wing activists in trade unions at that time."

5 HN155 states that he did witness public disorder and  
6 violence whilst deployed, although he cannot now recall  
7 any particular incidents. HN155 states that he did not  
8 participate in any public disorder, and was not involved  
9 in any violence as a perpetrator or victim.

10 He understood Special Branch to have a role in  
11 countering subversion, and he states that he believed  
12 the SWP to be engaged in subversive activity. In his  
13 witness statement he refers particularly to the large  
14 amount of industrial action supported by the group. He  
15 states:

16 "The SWP were very confrontational towards people  
17 trying to break picket lines and would threaten violence  
18 towards anyone attempting to go back to work. They  
19 would also stop supply vehicles from entering business  
20 premises. It was these kinds of actions that crossed  
21 the boundary between legitimate strikes and what I would  
22 call industrial subversion."

23 Documents held by the Inquiry indicate  
24 Security Service interest in HN155's reporting.  
25 However, the officer states that he cannot recall ever

1 being given a list of questions from Box 500 directly,  
2 and believes that any requests may have been filtered  
3 down through his managers. HN155 recalls that he spent  
4 more and more time in his cover identity as his  
5 deployment progressed. Accordingly, he recalls that  
6 the overtime would have increased his take-home pay,  
7 although there was a significant cutback in overtime  
8 payments during his deployment.

9 HN155 recalls frequent meetings at the SDS  
10 safe house, but cannot remember if they were once or  
11 twice per week.

12 He states that he also regularly requested a private  
13 meeting with an SDS manager around every week or so, in  
14 order to discuss any particular issues that had arisen  
15 in his deployment. These meetings would usually take  
16 place in a pub.

17 He suspects that he would have written up reports at  
18 meetings in the safe house, but notes that much of his  
19 reporting would have been given verbally over the phone,  
20 and probably written down by someone else.

21 He recalls general discussion amongst UCOs during  
22 meetings, and states that the SDS managers would raise  
23 concerns and provide advice and guidance where needed.  
24 He recalls police commissioners visiting these meetings  
25 on occasion. He believes someone from

1 the Security Service may have attended once or twice as  
2 well, which he thinks was to thank the Squad for  
3 the intelligence they were collecting.

4 In his statement, HN155 denies engaging in any  
5 sexual activity whilst in his cover identity. There  
6 remains a significant dispute of fact regarding whether  
7 155 told his risk assessors that he engaged in sexual  
8 activity whilst he was deployed. Within a risk  
9 assessment prepared for the Inquiry in late 2017,  
10 the author records that:

11 "HN155 admitted to having a number of liaisons,  
12 although he would not necessarily use  
13 the term 'relationship', as they were short-lived. He  
14 stated that he needed to live a full alternative  
15 lifestyle in all aspects, but could not recall  
16 the specifics. None of the relationships were medium or  
17 long-term length. He stated there were groupies who  
18 wanted to spend the night with someone who was close to  
19 the SWP central committee. He was reluctant to discuss  
20 matters further, but thought that he would only have  
21 given the women his first name. He does not recall  
22 their names. He stated that not all of the dalliances  
23 [his word] would have led to sex. He initially stated  
24 that there may have been two or three women, but said  
25 that there may possibly have been a few more. N155

1 clarified during the fact check that these were purely  
2 social encounters, and not done to enhance his  
3 deployment. He did not comment upon whether his  
4 supervisors were aware."

5 Both the auditor, David Reid, and the second risk  
6 assessor, Brian Lockie, were left with the impression  
7 that HN155 was describing his own experiences whilst  
8 deployed.

9 HN155 disputes these conclusions, and asserts that  
10 both assessors have misinterpreted his comments. He  
11 states that:

12 "I was not as clear as I should have been about  
13 the dividing line between the specific factual details  
14 for my particular deployment and more hypothetical  
15 comments about such deployments more generally."

16 He continues:

17 "During the interview with the two risk assessors,  
18 which lasted a couple of hours, I recall being quite  
19 clear that I did not engage in any sexual activity  
20 whilst I was undercover. To the best of my  
21 recollection, the risk assessors responded that it would  
22 have been quite possible and not surprising if my  
23 deployment had taken such a turn, given its length and  
24 depth. I accepted this, and went on to discuss the SWP  
25 social scene, the status or cachet enjoyed by those

1 within its inner circle, meetings in pubs, flirtatious  
2 chat, and the fact that sexual activity could have been  
3 an option. I did not want to appear naive, and wanted  
4 to be open about the fact that I lived my alter ego's  
5 life to the full. Indeed, I think I may have said this  
6 to the risk assessors. I can understand how and why  
7 they came away thinking that I had been talking about  
8 myself, but this was not my intention and not what  
9 I meant."

10 He likewise takes issue with the fact-checking  
11 process, noting that he was asked to review the draft  
12 risk assessment "at short notice and quite urgently".  
13 He states:

14 "I would never have had any sexual relationship with  
15 a target. It would have jeopardised my own  
16 relationship, and it would also be a road to disaster  
17 because a relationship would scrutinise your own cover  
18 to a much greater extent. I am happy for my cover name  
19 to be released. I am certain that no female will come  
20 forward."

21 In a medical report dated 18 November 2020,  
22 submitted to the Inquiry and published on the UCPI  
23 website, HN155 is noted to be suffering from a number of  
24 physical and mental health conditions. Of note,  
25 the examining doctor states the following when

1 discussing HN155's fitness to give oral evidence:

2 "155 would be an unreliable witness. He finds it  
3 difficult to differentiate between what is real from  
4 what is imagined or possible", and "if asked a leading  
5 question or confirmatory question, he is likely to  
6 endorse any view or suggestion put to him, in the belief  
7 that this is what is required of him. He is also  
8 avoidant and will do whatever he can to avoid thinking  
9 about the traumas he experienced."

10 The full account on this issue given by HN155 can be  
11 found at paragraphs 114 to 115 of his witness statement,  
12 which will be published on the Inquiry website today.  
13 Relevant extracts of the risk assessment and the risk  
14 assessors' notes will also be published. The risk  
15 assessors themselves will be called as witnesses later  
16 today to address this issue.

17 HN155 states that he did not develop any close  
18 personal relationships with his target group during his  
19 deployment. He did not participate or encourage others  
20 to participate in criminality, and was never arrested  
21 nor, to his knowledge, was any of his reporting used in  
22 connection with criminal investigation or prosecution.

23 He states that, to his recollection, he did not  
24 become aware of any legally privileged information and  
25 was never specifically tasked to report on elected



1 politicians, although he may have reported on them if  
2 they had been speakers at events.

3 HN155 was withdrawn in early 1984. He recalls four  
4 years as being the standard deployment at the time.  
5 The Inquiry holds a transcript of a telephone call from  
6 December 1983, in which a discussion is had between two  
7 members of the SWP about HN155. The SWP members note  
8 that HN155 had provided a strange story and as a result,  
9 his cover was now blown with the group.

10 HN155 believes he was made aware of the call, and  
11 recalls discussions over whether he had been  
12 compromised. He states that he got the impression his  
13 senior managers were very concerned about this having an  
14 effect on obtaining future intelligence, but HN155  
15 believes that he did not change his withdrawal strategy  
16 because of this.

17 HN155 does not believe that this call precipitated  
18 his exit from the SDS, as he recalls formulating his  
19 withdrawal before that date. He states:

20 "I think my exit strategy may have led to this  
21 telephone call, rather than the other way around."

22 He told his group that he was leaving to rejoin  
23 the Merchant Navy after spending some time in Paris, and  
24 recalls "a certain amount of dismay amongst the SWP"  
25 that he was leaving. He notes that he was never

1 publicly outed as a UCO.

2 HN155's marriage ended whilst he was on the SDS, and  
3 he is aware that managers Barry Moss and Martin Gray  
4 visited his wife on one occasion during this time. He  
5 believes he was not present and was spoken to  
6 separately.

7 HN155 understands that his SDS managers visited his  
8 wife, as they were concerned that she might disclose  
9 information about his deployment. Although HN155 states  
10 that he was confident she would not have done so.

11 HN155 notes that he was generally quite impressed  
12 with the level of supervision by his SDS managers, but  
13 that it became reactive rather than proactive over time,  
14 and on this occasion he felt it was "overbearing".

15 HN155 states that his deployment was a significant  
16 contributory factor to his divorce, though not the sole  
17 reason. He notes that he was often away from home and  
18 had a young child, and that he was "wrapped up in his  
19 undercover work".

20 In a meeting with the Security Service in July 1982,  
21 HN68 is recorded as expressing "serious doubts about the  
22 performance of HN155". This is said to relate to  
23 the officer's failure to pay child maintenance and an  
24 incident where he left his cover vehicle outside his  
25 home address. HN155 does not recall this incident, and

1 notes that he finds some of the comments within this  
2 file note "objectionable".

3 Within a subsequent note, it is recorded that  
4 HN68 "is still very worried by the case because Cooper's  
5 position within the Right to Work movement gives him  
6 regular access to Ernie Roberts MP and meetings at  
7 the House of Commons". In contrast, the officer does  
8 not recall any contact with Mr Roberts, and considers  
9 any involvement would have been limited. The officer  
10 notes that he remained in the field for a further  
11 18 months, and therefore any perceived issues clearly  
12 were not considered serious enough to precipitate his  
13 withdrawal.

14 HN155 believes that there was very minimal  
15 monitoring of officers' welfare. However, he does not  
16 recall thinking that there should have been more  
17 support. He notes two exceptions to this, during his  
18 divorce, which he states was "handled in a deplorable  
19 way by the SDS senior management", and during his  
20 withdrawal. He states that during that period:

21 "I felt that some of the senior officers were more  
22 concerned about losing intelligence and repercussions  
23 for their careers rather than concern for my safety or  
24 welfare."

25 He felt like there was greater concern for welfare

1 early in his deployment, which he states was probably  
2 because those managers had all been UCOs, whereas his  
3 later managers did not have the same experience.

4 HN155 retired from the MPS in the 1980s at the rank  
5 of detective sergeant. When asked whether his  
6 deployment had any long-term effect on his welfare, he  
7 states:

8 "It is perhaps unsurprising that living in an alter  
9 ego for such a long period tends to make you a bit  
10 unsure of who you are. I did not find that there was  
11 anything in place to help me solve those identity  
12 issues. My deployment still has an effect on me now,  
13 especially having to speak about things that I thought  
14 were in the past as part of this Inquiry. The effects  
15 are quite deep-rooted and have probably made me more of  
16 an insular and secretive person. I'm not aware of any  
17 welfare services within the MPS being available to me as  
18 a former UCO."

19 HN155 states that he strongly disagrees with  
20 comments made by Bob Lambert in a discussion paper dated  
21 from May 1984 regarding his departure from the police.  
22 The paper describes HN155 as having played "the SDS  
23 card" in 1985 to extract himself from a dismissal from  
24 the police resulting from an assault.

25 It is suggested in the report that HN155

1 had "convinced his psychiatrists that he was suffering  
2 from Stockholm syndrome rather than, say, merely  
3 calculated selfish and devious behaviour, in order to  
4 obtain an ill-health pension." Lambert also alleges  
5 that HN155 wrote to a Special Branch commander  
6 threatening to expose the SDS.

7 Both the letter and threats to expose the SDS are  
8 denied by HN155, who states that he never met  
9 Bob Lambert and that Bob Lambert's report is therefore  
10 not based on any personal knowledge of him. He states:

11 "I accept that I was subject to a disciplinary  
12 allegation, and I simply said that I was mindful to  
13 appeal to the Home Secretary. The background of the  
14 incident was not fully disclosed in the disciplinary  
15 hearing. I did not actually appeal in the end, but at  
16 no point did I threaten to expose the SDS."

17 HN155 received two commendations for his work in  
18 the SDS, one of which was for supplying a full list of  
19 SWP membership requested by MI5. When asked what  
20 contribution he believes his reporting made to policing,  
21 HN155 states:

22 "I think my reporting and that of other SDS officers  
23 would have been invaluable to ensure an appropriate  
24 police presence at demonstrations. This helped prevent  
25 police violence and injury to demonstrators, police and

1           the general public. I think our reporting would have  
2           also helped to prevent subversion."

3           Sir, that concludes the summary. Thank you.

4   THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. We're now going to  
5           break for about five minutes, to permit the technical  
6           arrangements to be made for us to start hearing live  
7           evidence again.

8           Thank you.

9   MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take  
10          a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
11          to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.  
12          The time is now 10.30 am, so we shall reconvene at 10.35  
13          am.

14         (10.30 am)

15                                 (A short break)

16         (10.35 am)

17   MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

18          I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
19          proceedings.

20          Chairman.

21   THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

22          As always at the beginning of a live evidential  
23          session, a recording made earlier is going to be played.

24          I am conducting this Inquiry under a statute,  
25          the Inquiries Act 2005, which gives me the power to make

1 orders regulating the conduct of the Inquiry, including  
2 its hearings. In the exercise of that power, I have  
3 made a number of orders which affect what you may and  
4 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave  
5 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter  
6 and may have serious consequences for you.

7 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an  
8 order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
9 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it  
10 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If  
11 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
12 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
13 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
14 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
15 sequestration of their assets.

16 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
17 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
18 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to  
19 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
20 the hearing rooms.

21 You may bring your mobile telephone into the hearing  
22 rooms, but you may not use it for any of those purposes.  
23 You may use it silently for any other purpose. In  
24 particular, you may transmit your account of what you  
25 have seen and heard in a hearing room to any other

1 person, but only once at least ten minutes have elapsed  
2 since the event which you are describing took place.

3 This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
4 the Inquiry I have made orders prohibiting the public  
5 disclosure of information, for example about  
6 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.  
7 These orders must be upheld.

8 It is inevitable that, whether by accident or  
9 design, information which I have ordered should not be  
10 publicly disclosed will sometimes be disclosed in  
11 a hearing. If and when that happens, I will immediately  
12 suspend the hearing and make an order prohibiting  
13 further disclosure of the information outside  
14 the hearing rooms.

15 The consequence will be that no further disclosure  
16 of that information may be made by mobile telephone or  
17 other portable electronic device from within the hearing  
18 room, or by any means outside it.

19 I am sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
20 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
21 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
22 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
23 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of  
24 the public, are entitled to hear the same public  
25 evidence as I will hear and to reach your own



1 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
2 best to ensure that you can.

3 If you have any doubt about the terms of this  
4 message or what you may or may not do, you should not  
5 hesitate to ask one of them and, with my help if  
6 necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

7 HN96

8 THE CHAIRMAN: HN96, can you hear me?

9 A. Yes, good morning, Sir.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. Do you wish to swear or to  
11 affirm?

12 A. Affirm, please.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may the words of affirmation be read to  
14 you, please.

15 (Witness affirmed)

16 Thank you.

17 Can you confirm that apart from the man on your  
18 right-hand side -- to your right-hand side, there is no  
19 other person in the room from which you're speaking?

20 A. I can confirm there's no other person in the room, apart  
21 from the two people you mentioned, yes.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 Then Mr Gray will ask questions of you now.

24 Mr Gray.

25 Questions by MR GRAY

1 MR GRAY: Thank you, Sir.

2 HN96, can you please confirm that you are  
3 the individual and former undercover officer known to  
4 this Inquiry as "HN96"?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. HN96, is it right that you have provided to the Inquiry  
7 a witness statement running to 73 pages, which at  
8 the top right on the first page states, "First Witness  
9 Statement of HN96, date signed 16 December 2019"?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Have you had an opportunity to consider that statement  
12 recently?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And are the contents of that statement true to the best  
15 of your knowledge and belief?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I'm going to ask you some questions now, HN96, and I'm  
18 going to endeavour to follow the order in your witness  
19 statement. And I'd like first, please, to ask you about  
20 selection and how you came to be selected for the SDS.

21 You describe in paragraph 12 of your witness  
22 statement {MPS/745772/4} how you went to express your  
23 interest in joining the SDS to Chief Superintendent  
24 Craft; is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Did you do that by visiting him in the office  
2 face-to-face?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. And was that one conversation or more than one  
5 conversation?
- 6 A. One conversation.
- 7 Q. You then go on to describe how you heard nothing for  
8 quite some time before being told that you'd been  
9 selected to join the SDS; is that right?
- 10 A. That's correct.
- 11 Q. Are you able to recall how long it was between you  
12 expressing interest to Chief Superintendent Craft and  
13 you being notified you'd been selected to join the SDS?
- 14 A. I don't recall exactly, but it was a matter of months,  
15 not years. It would have been -- it would have been,  
16 yeah, months. I can't give you an exact number of  
17 months, but months, yes.
- 18 Q. A period of months?
- 19 A. Correct.
- 20 Q. Other than expressing an interest to Chief  
21 Superintendent Craft, is it right therefore that you  
22 were not involved yourself at all in the selection  
23 process, whether by way of interview, assessment or any  
24 other means?
- 25 A. That's correct, I wasn't involved at all.

1 Q. And the first you knew about your selection, I think you  
2 described, was actually hearing from another officer,  
3 who you ran into in an exam hall, before you were then  
4 telephoned a couple of months later by the then chief  
5 inspector of the SDS; is that right?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. You say in your witness statement at paragraph 16  
8 {MPS/745772/5} that you understand that SDS management  
9 spoke to your Special Branch supervising officers and to  
10 current and former SDS officers who knew you.

11 A. Yes, I think -- I think you'd expect that anybody going  
12 for a particular position, they would have done some  
13 research about who I was and what I'd been up to, and --  
14 and sought the views of -- of people that -- that would  
15 have a view on -- on my deployment.

16 Q. When did you come to learn that? Was that before you  
17 were selected or after you were selected?

18 A. Well, after I was selected, I -- I mean, common sense  
19 would have told me that they would have approached --  
20 the SDS unit would have approached officers in -- who  
21 were supervisory officers of me at the time where I was  
22 working within the department. So I would have been  
23 aware of that. Although I wasn't told that was  
24 the case, but I would have been -- I would have expected  
25 that to have been the case. And then of course, when

1 I was then recruited onto the unit, I -- I spoke to some  
2 of my colleagues there, who said, "Yes, we'd been asked  
3 what sort of a chap you were." So yeah, clearly there  
4 was some research about what I was and who I was, and  
5 whether I was suitable.

6 Q. So before you were selected, you assumed, or you applied  
7 your common sense, so as to reach the view that people  
8 who knew you would be spoken to, but that was confirmed,  
9 was, it after you joined the unit?

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. Can we please put up on the screen HN96's witness  
12 statement, that's {MPS/745772}, and in particular  
13 paragraph 18, please. {MPS/745772/5}.

14 HN96, I'm just going to read paragraph 18 for  
15 the benefit of those who are following the proceedings  
16 and can't see what's on the screen. Paragraph 18 of  
17 your statement reads as follow:

18 "I was married when I joined the unit. I understand  
19 that the SDS preferred to recruit married officers. One  
20 of the main dangers of the unit was over involvement  
21 with the role. It was felt that if you had a family at  
22 home you would approach the job in a different way to  
23 a single man who had nothing other than work in their  
24 lives. The thinking was that having a personal life  
25 away from the job allowed you to retain an objective

1 distance from your work and the group you were reporting  
2 on."

3 HN96, when did you come to understand that the SDS  
4 preferred to recruit married officers?

5 A. I believe once I had been selected for the unit, these  
6 were comments that were made to me by supervisory  
7 officers.

8 Q. Soon after you joined the unit?

9 A. Say that again?

10 Q. Soon after you joined the unit?

11 A. Yes, yes, it was apparent that the preference was for  
12 married officers.

13 Q. And you say that was because of comments made to you by  
14 your supervising officers. In that context did they  
15 make those comments? Where?

16 A. Well, again, I can't recall exactly, but it seemed  
17 common sense to me that they would want officers that  
18 had another life apart from the life that they were  
19 asking them to carry out. And I certainly was in  
20 agreement -- was in agreement with that; and of course  
21 I was married at the time, so --

22 Q. Do you recall which supervising officers --

23 A. I think it was -- I think it was --

24 Q. Consult your list --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- if needs be --

2 A. Yes. It would have been HN135.

3 Q. That's the officer known as -- well, Mike Ferguson; is

4 that correct?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Who was your supervising officer when you joined,

7 I think?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Returning to paragraph 18, HN96, the third sentence:

10 "One of the main dangers of the unit was over

11 involvement with the role."

12 Can you just explain, please, what you mean by that?

13 A. With all due respect, sir, I think that it's

14 self-explanatory. It means that if you have little to

15 go home to, you know, to your real -- to your real

16 identity, then the danger was that you would spend

17 longer than was required, longer than was perhaps

18 appropriate, longer than perhaps was safe, carrying out

19 your undercover role. And that was -- that was

20 the thinking behind that. And it was one that I --

21 I concurred with, that it made a lot of sense that --

22 that was the case.

23 Q. So in what ways do you think an SDS officer could become

24 over-involved with the role?

25 A. By -- by not -- not having another life to go -- to go

1 to.

2 Q. I understand that's why you might become over-involved  
3 in the role, but in what ways do you imagine --

4 A. Well, I think -- (overspeaking) --

5 Q. -- (inaudible) -- over-involved?

6 A. From my own perspective, I -- I felt I was a  
7 professional officer, that I was being asked to carry  
8 out a difficult job in a professional way, and -- and  
9 was aware from very early on in my deployment that --  
10 that you had to be very careful not to overexpose  
11 yourself to -- you know, to this -- this other life that  
12 you were leading, and that was -- that was something  
13 that I tried very hard to -- to maintain throughout  
14 the time I was -- I was doing this work.

15 Q. HN96, I understand how you say you approached the role,  
16 I understand why you consider that somebody with another  
17 life would have something to go back to, and would  
18 therefore not become overexposed, to use the word you've  
19 just used. But my question was, in what ways do you  
20 consider an SDS officer could become over-involved?  
21 What might that look like in terms of behaviour?

22 A. Well, this is very subjective opinion, because obviously  
23 individual officers behaved in different ways. In my  
24 opinion, it meant that they were too involved with  
25 the people that they were mixing with, that they lost



1 the perspective of what they were trying to achieve.

2 And there was a danger that they would -- they would  
3 expose themselves to -- in that role.

4 Q. So the concern there is one that they might expose  
5 themselves, what, as in expose their identity as an  
6 officer?

7 A. Yes, yes, yes.

8 Q. You go on in the next sentence to draw a distinction  
9 between how somebody with a family at home might  
10 approach the job to the way a "single man who had  
11 nothing other than work in their lives" might approach  
12 the job, and you say that the thinking was that having  
13 a personal life away from the job allowed you to  
14 maintain an objective distance from your work and the  
15 group you were reporting on.

16 What is the significance in that context of somebody  
17 being single as opposed to having a family at home?

18 A. Well, from a -- I think the simple answer would be they  
19 had nothing to go back to. They had -- they had -- they  
20 -- they became overly involved in this other life.

21 That's -- that's -- that was my opinion. I can't give  
22 you any good examples of that, but it was certainly  
23 a view I think that was held by other colleagues.

24 Q. Is what you're really saying in paragraph 18 that  
25 a married officer, or an officer with a family at home,

1 would be less likely to become intimately or sexually  
2 involved with a member of a target group than a single  
3 man with nothing else in their lives?

4 A. Well, that's a very loaded question, sir. And clearly  
5 the answer is yes. I'm saying that, you know, if you  
6 have a wife at home, then there's less likelihood for  
7 you to want to be involved with -- with -- with women in  
8 your other life. But I think -- but I think that's  
9 unfair for me to have to -- to -- to say that. To say  
10 that single officers were more prone to do that sort of  
11 thing. I think each -- each -- each man was --  
12 you know, from my point of view -- I -- I felt I -- I --  
13 I knew what was required, I knew how to behave in a --  
14 in a correct manner, and I assume my other colleagues  
15 would be the same.

16 Q. HN96, I'm not asking at this stage about what any of  
17 the other officers got up to during the course of their  
18 deployment, I'm simply trying to understand the basis  
19 for what you've described as the preference for the SDS  
20 to recruit married officers, a view held by your  
21 supervising officers when you joined the SDS. And my  
22 question is directed towards this paragraph of your  
23 witness statement; and really, asking you whether or not  
24 what the supervisors were concerned about was whether or  
25 not an SDS officer who was single might become

1           intimately or sexually involved with a member of  
2           the target group.

3           Is that what this paragraph really is directed to?

4       A.   The paragraph is referring to me, to -- to -- I -- I --  
5           I think it would be wrong for me to -- to assume that  
6           I'm speaking on behalf of everybody. To be quite frank,  
7           I can't remember in the group of men that I -- I worked  
8           with for -- for a period of time what their marital  
9           status was. I -- I -- I -- I believe they were -- they  
10          were all married anyway. And I -- I'm making some  
11          assumptions here, because I don't recall exactly, but  
12          I would -- I would -- I would assume that the --  
13          the senior officers who were responsible for engaging  
14          officers for this unit would have -- would have  
15          automatically have wanted to -- to engage -- employ  
16          married men. So I don't recall that there were single  
17          men that I worked with for that period of time.

18          Does that answer your question?

19       Q.   Well, HN96, was it your understanding shortly after you  
20           joined the SDS that married officers were preferred  
21           recruits?

22       A.   It was my understanding that married officers were  
23           preferred.

24       Q.   And was one of the reasons why that was the case, to  
25           the best of your understanding and from what you were

1 told, to reduce or try and avoid the risk of intimate or  
2 sexual relationships with members of target groups or  
3 other individuals?

4 A. I think that -- that assumption by you is incorrect.  
5 I think it was assumed that it would allow them to -- to  
6 live a more balanced life in connection with their real  
7 life and their undercover lives. Nothing to do with  
8 their sexual behaviour whilst doing that work.

9 Q. Nothing to do with sexual behaviour, as far as you were  
10 aware?

11 A. No, no, why would that even come up into the -- when you  
12 were first sent out there, you know? The answer is, no,  
13 I don't accept that comment of yours, that that was one  
14 of the reasons behind wanting married men to do  
15 the work, as opposed to single men.

16 Q. Can we take down the witness statement, please.

17 HN96, you go on in your witness statement, at  
18 paragraph 20, {MPS/745772/5}, to describe how, after you  
19 joined the SDS, you told the SDS that you thought it  
20 would be beneficial if they met with your then wife, so  
21 she would know who to contact if she was having any  
22 problems, or if she had any concerns relating to your  
23 work; is that right?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. And you describe how Mike Ferguson and Angus McIntosh

- 1 visited your home and spoke to your wife.
- 2 A. Correct.
- 3 Q. You say that that was after you joined the SDS. Was it  
4 before you were first deployed?
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. And do you recall approximately how long before?
- 7 A. A matter of months.
- 8 Q. So is this at the time that you're working in  
9 the back office?
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. Was this meeting your idea or your wife's idea?
- 12 A. My idea. My wife thought it was a good idea. I was --  
13 I -- and I can still recall at the time I was surprised  
14 that that wasn't something that the office -- that my  
15 senior officers would have done anyway, but I suppose  
16 I can understand why they were waiting for -- for  
17 perhaps the invitation from -- from the person  
18 concerned, but -- so yes, to answer your question, it  
19 was my idea to go with my wife, and we spoke to my -- my  
20 supervisory officers, who agreed that it was a good  
21 idea.
- 22 Q. What sort of concerns did you or your wife have at that  
23 stage about the potential impact of your work upon your  
24 wife or family?
- 25 A. Well, primarily contact. I was thinking about this

1 recently. When I was doing this sort of work, there was  
2 no mobile phones, there was no easy communication tools  
3 that exist today. How would I -- how would I -- how  
4 would my wife get in touch with me if she needed to, and  
5 vice versa? So we needed to have some -- some system in  
6 place where that would help with that.

7 And also, it would -- any concerns that my wife may  
8 have had about my deployment, the work that I was being  
9 asked to do, they could discuss it directly with my  
10 senior officers.

11 Q. Were those the sorts of concerns that your wife shared  
12 as well, about the potential impact of you being  
13 deployed in this role?

14 A. Well, yeah, of course, yeah. She was of -- she was  
15 concerned about -- I mean, we -- we didn't have a clear  
16 -- full, clear understanding of all the sort of nuances  
17 of what I was going to be asked to do. But, you know,  
18 it was main -- mainly to do with communication, who --  
19 who -- what point of contact did my wife have if there  
20 was a need to -- to -- you know, to -- to have that.  
21 That was -- that was the main reasoning behind me asking  
22 my -- my supervisor officers to come and speak to my  
23 wife.

24 Q. Was there just the one meeting?

25 A. I believe so. Although, of course it was made clear

1           that any time that -- that either -- particularly my  
2           wife, if she wanted to speak to somebody from -- from  
3           the office, then they would be available.

4           Q.   Because you say in paragraph 22 {MPS/745772/6} of your  
5           witness statement that the managers made it clear that  
6           they were available to help with issues that arose  
7           during your deployment.  What sort of issues did you  
8           understand them to be offering help with in that sense?

9           A.   Communication.  You know, if my wife needed to contact  
10          me, she didn't know, I mean, where I was, or exactly  
11          what I was doing.  It was purely that.  It was purely so  
12          that she had a point of contact, yes.

13          Q.   And you say in your witness statement -- again  
14          paragraph 20 -- that you believe that as a result of  
15          your request and this meeting, that this became  
16          a practice that was followed with all future  
17          undercover officers; is that right?

18          A.   That was my understanding.  I mean, I -- I -- it  
19          surprised me that that wasn't a practice that was  
20          already in place.  And I've not given it much thought  
21          since, but now you've asked me the question, I presume  
22          it's because the office -- the management thought that  
23          perhaps the request should come from the --  
24          the undercover officer, and -- and their respective  
25          partner, rather than the other way round.  But -- but

1           no, it wasn't -- it wasn't -- I think after  
2           I'd instigated this "let's get together and meet each  
3           other", that became a common practice.

4       Q.   So, following you suggesting it and this meeting taking  
5           place, in effect the burden shifted, and rather than  
6           the office wait for the undercover officer to raise  
7           the request, the office would initiate these sorts of  
8           meetings?

9       A.   That was my -- that was my perception, sir, yes.  
10           I mean, that was the only conclusion I could -- I could  
11           draw, because as far as I understood it, this -- this  
12           sort of meeting hadn't taken place with other officers,  
13           so -- yeah.

14      Q.   Did you or your then wife ever take up this offer of  
15           support during the course of your deployment, or take  
16           advantage of what the managers offered in terms of  
17           support?

18      A.   I don't recall that, no. I don't think there was ever  
19           -- ever an issue there that -- that -- that required  
20           that -- my wife to make contact, no.

21      Q.   As you say, actually, very much near the end of your  
22           witness statement, paragraph 347, that you don't think  
23           that your time undercover had any adverse effect on your  
24           welfare; is that right?

25      A.   Yes.



- 1 Q. Now, obviously you were deployed for a significant  
2 length of time, weren't you, sort of four and a half  
3 years or so in the field, roughly speaking?
- 4 A. Yes, yes.
- 5 Q. Are you aware of that time whilst you were deployed  
6 having any adverse effect on your then wife's welfare or  
7 on the welfare of any of your family members, apart from  
8 yourself?
- 9 A. No.
- 10 Q. Training and guidance, HN96.
- 11 You describe in your witness statement that there  
12 was no formal training for being an undercover officer  
13 when you joined the SDS; is that right?
- 14 A. Correct.
- 15 Q. And that the training and guidance you received was  
16 largely limited to guidance provided to you by HN296?
- 17 A. Yes, HN296, he gave me some words of his wisdom.  
18 I wouldn't say it was -- it was training or extensive  
19 guidance. It was more a case of, "This has been my  
20 experience, these are the things I would suggest that  
21 you -- you keep an eye on," etc. So that was it. It  
22 was words of -- words of wisdom, words of how -- how he  
23 thought I should conduct my -- myself. "Training" is  
24 too strong a word, sir.
- 25 Q. How many times did you discuss how to behave with HN296?

1 A. Well, I'm sure the Inquiry's already aware that -- that  
2 -- that officers on this unit met regularly, together  
3 with -- with management, and these were opportunities  
4 for me, at that time, as I was -- as you said -- as you  
5 mentioned earlier, was in -- in -- in the back office,  
6 getting myself organised, so every -- twice a week we  
7 met. So every -- so there was an opportunity at any  
8 time to discuss items with your colleagues. And if  
9 there were things that I felt were appropriate, then  
10 I would obviously raise it with -- either with HN296 or  
11 other officers that were on the unit at the time.

12 Q. So the conversations you describe with HN296, are those  
13 conversations that you had at the safe house meetings  
14 then, the twice-weekly meetings?

15 A. Yes. That was the only place that I -- I met with  
16 HN296.

17 Q. Because in your witness statement you describe how  
18 during your time in the SDS office, so before you were  
19 deployed but whilst you were in the back office -- this  
20 is paragraph 19 in your witness statement -- you  
21 describe how you had the opportunity during that period  
22 to talk to the field officers at twice-weekly meetings  
23 about what they were doing and how; is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So that would be talking here about the latter part of

- 1           1978; is that right?
- 2           A. Yes, yes, yes.
- 3           Q. How often did you attend the safe house meetings whilst
- 4           you were in the back office?
- 5           A. All the time.
- 6           Q. You attend each one during that period?
- 7           A. Yes.
- 8           Q. Unless there was a reason why you had missed it?
- 9           A. Exactly.
- 10          Q. And how many field officers did you discuss what they
- 11          were doing with?
- 12          A. Well, I can't be precise about that. I mean,
- 13          the Inquiry's aware that there were -- am I allowed to
- 14          use the number, or ...?
- 15          Q. Just in a rough number. How many officers would you
- 16          speak to about what they were doing?
- 17          A. As in officers doing undercover work, there was -- so
- 18          clearly some of them I -- I'd -- I'd have a better
- 19          understanding with. Some of them I'd had
- 20          a relationship -- a working relationship with them in --
- 21          in previous aspects of Special Branch work. So it was
- 22          -- you know, it was -- it was -- it was -- it was very
- 23          much a case of picking their brains as I felt
- 24          appropriate.
- 25          Q. Using your list of officers as necessary, can you help

1           us with which of the field officers at that point you  
2           had particular conversations with before you were  
3           deployed?

4           A.   HN21, HN80, HN126.

5           Q.   HN96, at these safe house meetings, before you were  
6           deployed, when you were attending in your back office  
7           role, how freely were the deployments talked about?

8           A.   They weren't. They weren't. I mean, there was -- and  
9           I learnt that subsequently when I became more  
10          established. There was almost an unwritten rule that  
11          you would not talk about a colleague's -- not discuss  
12          colleagues' -- what -- what they were doing or their  
13          deployment. So, in answer to your question, not very  
14          much.

15          Q.   If the deployments weren't being freely discussed, and  
16          people weren't talking about what they were doing and  
17          how and with whom, etc, how did you --

18          A.   -- (overspeaking) --

19          Q.   -- manage to speak to the undercover officers about  
20          their deployments?

21          A.   Well, let me give you an example. HN296, I -- I --  
22          I wasn't aware of -- of the area that he was involved  
23          no, but he said -- he advised me not to get too deeply  
24          involved, not -- not to become a leader, if that makes  
25          -- if that's the right word, not to become somebody who

1 was required to be available a lot. He said, "Be  
2 somebody -- a middle of the road sort of person". That  
3 was -- that was the sort of advice that he was giving  
4 me. Somebody that was there to help in various  
5 capacities, that would be seen as a -- as a willing  
6 worker, as opposed to being a leading light. That was  
7 some very sound advice which I found I -- I used  
8 without -- you know, the rest of my time doing this  
9 work.

10 Other officers, it was -- it was casual comments,  
11 you know? It wasn't in-depth. It sounds like I was  
12 having long, in-depth discussions with these officers.  
13 I wasn't. I was just trying to get a clear picture on  
14 how they -- some of the -- some of the -- perhaps "tips"  
15 are a better word. You know, good suggestions how they  
16 felt that they -- you know, that they -- they conducted  
17 what they were doing.

18 Q. You say -- (overspeaking) -- sorry, carry on.

19 A. I was going to say, bearing in mind -- and this sounds  
20 in some respects a bit arrogant, but I'd like to think  
21 I was chosen because I was a sensible, mature, thinking  
22 officer, that would draw his own conclusions about how  
23 he would conduct himself once he -- once I was out in  
24 the field, so to speak. And it was just -- it was --  
25 but it was -- it was an opportunity at these meetings to

1 -- just to, yeah, pick up some tips, if you like.

2 I think that's probably --

3 Q. I think you described it before as "casual tips" that  
4 you would pick up in conversation.

5 In paragraph 38 of your witness statement, what you  
6 say is:

7 "I had extensive conversations with officers who  
8 were already in the field about what they had done and  
9 how they had dealt with various situations that had  
10 arisen during their deployment."

11 A. Right.

12 Q. That sounds like, if I may say, a rather more detailed

13 --

14 A. -- (overspeaking) -- does.

15 Q. -- discussion, than occasional, casual tips?

16 A. Well, first of all, I said I agree with my statement,  
17 and I do. But my recollection was that extensive in  
18 the sense that I was attending these meetings on  
19 a regular basis, so I -- I had every opportunity to  
20 speak to -- to -- to various individuals whenever I felt  
21 it was necessary. But I -- I -- I think perhaps --  
22 perhaps the word "extensive" is too strong a word to  
23 use. It was a case of if I -- if I felt a need to ask  
24 them a particular question, I would. But there was no  
25 -- there was no -- "extensive" is too strong a word, I

1 think for that.

2 Q. What was the atmosphere like at these meetings?

3 A. Very friendly. I mean, the management were supportive,  
4 the officers themselves were pretty relaxed, you know,  
5 they were in an environment where they could be  
6 themselves.

7 Q. Was there a social aspect to it as well?

8 A. Yes, yes, yeah.

9 Q. Was alcohol consumed at the meetings?

10 A. Occasionally, yes, yeah.

11 Q. And when you had these discussions about other people's  
12 experiences and deployments that you've described,  
13 everybody was in the same room?

14 A. No, the accommodation we had was big enough for you to  
15 have a -- no, for example, if somebody was to have  
16 a private conversation with the supervising officers,  
17 then that was something that they could do privately in  
18 a different part of the accommodation. But, you know,  
19 the accommodation wasn't expensive, but it was big  
20 enough to -- you know, to -- to allow people to have --  
21 for it to be open, but for people to have private  
22 conversations if they wished.

23 Q. The conversations you had about the deployments of  
24 others and the tips you picked up, was that done in  
25 the general area?

1 A. As I recall, yes, yes.

2 Q. You referenced earlier in your oral evidence, and it's  
3 in your witness statement, particular pieces of advice  
4 that HN296 gave you, and in particular the fact that he  
5 cautioned you against assuming positions with lots of  
6 responsibility, or making yourself too available; is  
7 that right?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Too accessible, I'm sorry.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And I think you said somewhere in the middle before, but  
12 in your statement you describe how he suggested that  
13 somewhere in the middle of the hierarchy would be  
14 appropriate; is that correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. What do you mean by "the middle of the hierarchy"? What  
17 type of role did you understand him to be suggesting you  
18 should take on?

19 A. Well, again, when we had this discussion, I didn't know  
20 what -- what I was going to be -- what I would find when  
21 I was deployed. I don't think I knew at the time where  
22 I was going to be deployed. I don't think that would  
23 have been -- that would have been made clear to me. But  
24 again, I think it was a fairly commonsensical sort of  
25 question, you know? Middle of the road is exactly what



1           it was; it was somebody that wasn't seen to be a leading  
2           light; it wasn't somebody that was -- that was not very  
3           available or not very cooperative. It was just -- it  
4           was just somebody who was -- who was seen to be  
5           a willing hand.

6           Q. A willing hand, did you say?

7           A. Yes.

8           Q. And I think you also have described HN296 suggesting you  
9           should adopt a similar approach to personal  
10           relationships: friendly and helpful, but not getting too  
11           close to members of the group --

12          A. Yes.

13          Q. -- is that right?

14          A. Yes.

15          Q. And you also say that it was your understanding that it  
16           was not permitted to participate in criminal activity?

17          A. Clearly. I was a police officer.

18          Q. Well, why did you think that even when deployed  
19           undercover you were not permitted to participate in  
20           criminal activity? Is that something you were told or  
21           something you assumed?

22          A. I'm -- I'm -- I'm -- I must -- I must think that at some  
23           time I was told that (inaudible), that was something  
24           that would have been said to me -- made clear to me  
25           that, you know -- but also I would have assumed that. I

1 mean, I'd been a -- I'd been a serving officer for some  
2 years, I -- I knew the way police officers were expected  
3 to behave.

4 Q. The guidance that you describe receiving from HN296 is  
5 focused very largely on how you should behave whilst  
6 deployed, in terms of the relationship --  
7 the appropriate parameters of the relationships that you  
8 would develop with groups, with individuals, etc. Did  
9 HN296, or other officers, speak to you about  
10 the mechanics of the job, and in particular what  
11 the purpose of your deployment would be, or how you  
12 would carry it out on a practical level?

13 A. I don't recall in-depth conversations about that.  
14 I mean, I think, you know, I -- I -- I was clearly  
15 drawing my own conclusions about what the objective of  
16 the job was. It was to go out and establish yourself in  
17 an organisation, with a view to trying to understand  
18 what they were getting up to. I think that was quite  
19 apparent. I didn't need to be told that. And if it  
20 came up in conversation, I don't recall it being,  
21 you know, something that we -- that I discussed in  
22 the -- in detail with any -- anybody in particular.

23 Q. In terms of how you should write up reports or what  
24 information you should include, was that something you  
25 just picked up as you went along in the back office?

1 A. Yes, yes. There was no -- there was no -- if you're  
2 looking for me to say there was training, there was no  
3 training in that sense, no.

4 But bearing in mind, again, I'd been report-writing  
5 for a number of years doing other work in -- in  
6 the department, not in this particular unit, so I --  
7 I was -- I was -- I was -- I was -- I knew how to put  
8 a report together. But exactly what -- what was  
9 required, I think it was left to my own judgment, my own  
10 common sense.

11 Does that answer your question?

12 Q. HN96, yes, I'm going to move on. Thank you.

13 For the purposes of your deployment, you adopted an  
14 undercover identity, didn't you? A cover identity?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you used the identity of a deceased child to assist  
17 you with the construction of your cover identity; is  
18 that right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you describe in your witness statement at  
21 paragraph 42 that someone in the office told you to find  
22 the identity of a deceased child?

23 A. Well, this would have been senior management. This was  
24 the practice of -- of the department. This had been  
25 going on for -- for as long as I was aware. So I was

- 1           instructed this was the way that I would start  
2           the process of obtaining a -- an assumed identity.
- 3       Q.   And that was why you were in the back office,  
4           presumably?
- 5       A.   Yes.  This is something that I didn't take on --  
6           I didn't do myself, you know -- I mean, I did it myself  
7           but I -- but I was instructed, I was directed that this  
8           was the -- this was the practice that was -- that was  
9           used.
- 10      Q.   Do you recall who it was who told you to find  
11           the identity of a deceased child?
- 12      A.   It would have been -- it would have been the senior  
13           management.  I can tell you -- I can guess it would have  
14           been either -- and you've used their name, so presumably  
15           I can: it was either McIntosh or Ferguson.
- 16      Q.   Were you given particular instruction as to how to go  
17           about doing that?
- 18      A.   Yes.
- 19      Q.   And what was your understanding about why a real  
20           identity rather than a fictitious identity invented by  
21           you or somebody else was necessary?
- 22      A.   Well, it became apparent over time that clearly it was  
23           better for me to have an assumed identity rather than my  
24           own.  And -- and I -- I mean, I made that conclusion  
25           straight away.  So that was -- you know, it was

1 a practice that I knew was -- was part of the procedure  
2 of becoming an undercover office. It made sense,  
3 you know? It made sense that I was -- that I would be  
4 operating as somebody else.

5 Q. Yes, sorry. My question was, what was your  
6 understanding of why a real identity, ie the identity of  
7 a deceased real person, was considered necessary, rather  
8 than a fictitious or invented identity?

9 A. You know, good question, sir. I -- I -- I didn't ask  
10 myself that question at the time. Clearly that was what  
11 I was being asked to do. I'm assuming -- I'm assuming  
12 it was because of -- and again, I'm not a hundred  
13 per cent certain about this, but the documentation that  
14 I subsequently obtained, I mean, as a -- as -- as this  
15 undercover identity I had, I'm assuming that this was  
16 supplied by the Security Services. So -- so I -- I --  
17 I -- I drew the conclusion this was a practice that was  
18 quite common amongst people doing the sort of work I was  
19 doing.

20 Q. But as you understood it, it was the accepted practice  
21 at the time and you went along with it?

22 A. Exactly.

23 Q. Did you at any point stop to think, if only privately,  
24 about whether or not this was a morally acceptable thing  
25 to be doing at the time?

1       A. Well, I think -- and I'm sure it must have been said by  
2       a lot of officers -- first of all, the individual that  
3       I chose -- whose ID I chose to use, there -- there was  
4       no -- the family concerned knew nothing of this, nobody  
5       had any -- any -- there was no -- there was no attempt  
6       to speak to anybody. So they would have had no idea  
7       about this -- their child's identity being used by, in  
8       my case, myself. So I had no moral -- moral  
9       reservations about this at all, you know? I mean,  
10      I accepted this was the practice that I was being --  
11      I was being asked to -- to -- to deal with. And  
12      I couldn't see why it was -- why it was a moral issue,  
13      because -- because it didn't involve anybody.

14             I mean, the way it was done, if you've not been told  
15      this, is births, marriages and deaths registration is  
16      kept in Central London. You can go -- anybody can go  
17      along there and search those records. And this is --  
18      that's exactly what I did. Found -- found an  
19      appropriate identity which would have been okay for  
20      me to use, and -- and if you're going to ask me further  
21      questions about it, I'll explain what happened then, so  
22      I ...

23      Q. But from your perspective, you didn't consider there to  
24      be any moral issue because -- (overspeaking) --

25      A. Not at all. Not at all. And I think it's -- it's -- in

1 fact, it's immoral to actually suggest that now,  
2 I think. No -- no -- no family were injured or caused  
3 any distress because of this practice.

4 Q. You also describe how the SDS office told you to visit  
5 Blackpool, in case a member of your group ever asked you  
6 about aspects of the identity, presumably?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was that, again, something that you were told to do by  
9 senior management?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Saying -- would it have been the same individuals who  
12 told you to go (inaudible)?

13 A. Very much so. I mean, I was -- I was -- I was a new lad  
14 on a new unit that I wanted to be on. You know,  
15 I worked in a -- in a rank structure organisation, and  
16 if you were given an instruction by a chief inspector,  
17 normally you would -- you would carry that out.

18 So -- so yes, it was -- it was to -- really to -- to  
19 just be -- be assured that -- that if ever -- ever  
20 anything came out about this identity that I took on,  
21 that it would be very difficult for anybody to -- to --  
22 to do any -- any in-depth enquiry about -- about that.

23 Does that -- I mean, have I explained that well  
24 enough?

25 Q. Did you visit Blackpool?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How many times?

3 A. Once.

4 Q. And you describe how you obtained the assistance of  
5 the local Special Branch?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Why did you need their help?

8 A. So, it would have been very difficult for me to go up  
9 there in a day and establish -- what I wanted to  
10 establish was whether the family who was concerned --  
11 whose child that we're talking about were easily  
12 contactable, whether they were still living in the same  
13 area, whether they were -- it was just to reassure  
14 myself that -- that if there were any moves in  
15 the future to try to understand my -- my background,  
16 that -- that would have been -- that would have been  
17 difficult for people to do. So I needed -- I needed  
18 the assistance of an officer up there, that would be  
19 discrete, that would be -- that would -- would keep that  
20 secret. And that was what we did. We were able to  
21 establish very quickly that the family concerned were no  
22 longer living in the area, and were -- and there was no  
23 trace of where they -- where they'd move to. And that  
24 satisfied -- that satisfied my desire to -- for -- to  
25 protect my background.



1 Q. So you sought the assistance of local Special Branch to  
2 find out really what the current whereabouts and  
3 potential activities of the family were in 1978?

4 A. Not so much their activities, not so much -- just to --  
5 if they were still living at the same address that was  
6 recorded on -- in -- in -- on the death certificate.

7 Q. Did you visit the family's former home address?

8 A. No.

9 Q. You didn't go and look at it?

10 A. I didn't, but the other officer did -- did some discrete  
11 background enquiries, and without -- without making  
12 anybody aware of what was -- what he was doing, and  
13 satisfied me that that was the case.

14 Q. And by "the other officer", do you mean the local  
15 Special Branch officer?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. For the purposes of your cover identity, you've also  
18 told us in your witness statement, paragraph 51, that  
19 you told people you had a girlfriend. And there were  
20 two reasons for that: first, in case they saw you with  
21 your wife, and; second, as a reason to rebuff someone's  
22 advances if they showed a romantic interest in you?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. When in your deployment did you start telling people  
25 that you had a girlfriend?

1           A. I rarely did. I mean, one of the things I'd found -- so  
2           I -- I -- I -- I did not divulge much about myself  
3           unless people asked. And I was -- I -- what I found out  
4           was people weren't that curious. Once they got to know  
5           you and found out you were an okay guy, they didn't then  
6           ask you about, you know, who you were married, or are  
7           you married, or who do you live with. So I protected  
8           my -- my background as much as I could, you know? And  
9           I -- I -- I was rarely asked about -- about, you know,  
10          that sort of thing.

11                 So this was something that I had as a -- as a -- if  
12          anybody did ask that question, this is what I was able  
13          to -- that's what I would say. So I -- I had -- I had  
14          a story that I was ready to -- to use if -- if  
15          necessary. But I found it was -- throughout my time,  
16          that -- that that rarely happened.

17          Q. So when you went into your deployment, you had that  
18          information, in effect, up your sleeve in case --

19          A. Well, I was aware, because I know you're going to ask me  
20          these questions, and I know this has been one of  
21          the main reasons why this Inquiry is taking place, about  
22          your involvement with -- with women. So, you know, you  
23          were -- it was -- it was -- it was something that  
24          certainly I was aware of that -- that I would be  
25          meeting, obviously, people from the opposite sex during

1 my deployment. I -- in fact, I -- I was -- I was  
2 friends with -- with -- with some of these people.  
3 Clearly, I -- that was -- you know, that was -- that  
4 would go without saying. But I -- I needed to have --  
5 I needed to have a backup story, as why -- if I turned  
6 up to, for example, a social, I always came by myself,  
7 and I didn't -- I didn't have a lady in tow with me.  
8 And -- does that make -- does that answer the question?  
9 I think ...

10 Q. When you started your deployment then, were you  
11 anticipating that you might need to deal with  
12 the situation where someone showed a romantic interest  
13 in you and how you would deal with that?  
14 A. Well, my humour wants me to say that a romantic interest  
15 would be wishful thinking. But no, I wasn't thinking  
16 like that. I was thinking that I would -- I would need  
17 to be prepared to give reasonable answers to any  
18 questions that might be asked. And I -- I found that  
19 that didn't happen. I found that -- that I was rarely  
20 asked personal questions. I'd like to think my own  
21 personality, the way I conducted myself with people,  
22 helped me become friendly and accepted by the people in  
23 the organisations I looked at. And I -- and I -- and  
24 I didn't -- but in my own mind, I needed to have a story  
25 that would be acceptable if I was -- if I was

1           questioned.

2           And of course, the bit I said about if I was out  
3           with my wife, although geographically we -- we were --  
4           we were far away from where I was operating, there was  
5           always a possibility that I would bump into somebody  
6           that -- that knew me in my assumed life, and so I needed  
7           -- I needed -- but that didn't happen. I needed to  
8           have -- I needed to have that backup.

9           Q. Is it the case that when you started your deployment,  
10           this was something that you -- a piece of information  
11           that you had ready to deploy, because you knew that it  
12           was an issue, or rather there was an issue of concern  
13           around SDS officers having relationships with females?

14           A. No, I didn't see it like that. I saw it that, you know,  
15           I was there as -- I was there as a man mixing in -- in  
16           -- in a society down there. I didn't see it as anything  
17           to do with a sexual issue or my involvement with -- it  
18           was just a story that -- that I felt made sense, if  
19           people were to ask me.

20           I mean, the obvious question is -- and it wasn't  
21           like that -- it never -- it never occurred, is, "We  
22           never see you in company with a girlfriend, Mike,"  
23           you know?

24           Q. And was this -- this was something you did off your own  
25           bat, was it? You weren't given any guidance or

1 instruction about having some sort of --

2 A. No, what I said to you, sir, before, and I regarded  
3 myself as a mature, sensible, reasonable man, that --  
4 that would come -- come to these things, you know, these  
5 conclusions myself. But I suppose over a period of  
6 time, these issues probably came up in general  
7 discussion, and I -- you know, you formulated your mind  
8 around it -- yes, yeah.

9 MR GRAY: Sir, is that a convenient moment for  
10 the mid-morning break?

11 A. Okay, thank you.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it is. We have to have a 15-minute  
13 break for the shorthand writers. Will you come back  
14 after 15 minutes?

15 A. Thank you.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone. We will now take  
18 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
19 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

20 The time is now 11.35 am, so we shall reconvene at  
21 11.50 am. Thank you.

22 (11.34 am)

23 (A short break)

24 (11.50 am)

25 MR FERNANDES: Good morning, everyone, and welcome back.

1 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
2 proceedings.

3 Chairman.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

5 Mr Gray.

6 MR GRAY: Sir, thank you.

7 HN96, can you hear me?

8 A. Yes, good morning again.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 HN96, shortly before we broke, we were discussing  
11 the undercover identity which you adopted, and in  
12 particular your use of a deceased child's identity; and  
13 you explained to us why you didn't have any moral qualms  
14 at the time about that practice.

15 What is your attitude now to having adopted  
16 a deceased child's identity for the purposes of your  
17 undercover identity given what you know now about  
18 the identity becoming revealed?

19 A. Well, I don't have strong views about it, because I --  
20 I -- I -- I dismiss what I see in the press about what  
21 they say about the stress given to families whose  
22 children have been used in this way. And I -- I don't  
23 accept that. I -- as I said to you, from -- from my own  
24 knowledge, that didn't happen. I ...

25 What I would say is -- and you -- you did ask me

1           that question, why -- why did we use a -- a child,  
2           you know? Why did we have to take the -- take  
3           the identity of a child that had passed away? I'm --  
4           I -- I've never asked myself that question. I'm  
5           assuming it was because it enabled -- and again, I'm  
6           making a (inaudible) -- it enabled the Security Service  
7           to give us, you know, some credible identification  
8           and --

9           Q.   HN96, I'm only asking you whether or not you have any  
10           moral issue now with the practice, given you now know  
11           that --

12          A.   I'd like to think that there's a better practice now, if  
13           there is -- if there is -- if that was -- if -- if -- if  
14           there was a requirement for undercover policing ever  
15           again. Yes, I would -- so -- but at the time -- at the  
16           time I didn't have any issues about it, because I knew  
17           that nobody was -- was caused any distress.

18          Q.   I'm going to move on now to your accommodation.

19                   We know that you were deployed initially around  
20           about the end of 1978/early 1979 to East London, to  
21           become involved with the Socialist Workers Party; is  
22           that right?

23          A.   Yes.

24          Q.   You tell us that you initially moved into one bedsit,  
25           moved to a second one after around six months, but then

1           needed to move again because that was on the same road  
2           as two other members of the SWP; is that right?

3           A. Yes.

4           Q. And you went on to look for other properties, and ended  
5           up looking at flats rather than bedsits, and found what  
6           you describe as a "big flat" that you thought might be  
7           suitable.

8           A. So you need me to explain --

9           Q. Sorry, that's correct, is it?

10          A. That's correct, yes.

11          Q. You describe in your witness statement the process by  
12          which you then came to live in that flat with HN106.

13          A. Yes.

14          Q. And --

15          A. I feel you've -- you've jumped the issue a little bit.  
16          Did you want to know the transition of finding  
17          accommodation? Because I think that was something that  
18          I think would lead on quite clearly to why HN106 and  
19          myself shared accommodation.

20          Q. You've explained in your statement the sequence of  
21          events. I'm going to ask you why it was that you  
22          decided that it would be a good idea for you and HN106  
23          to share accommodation. So what is the answer to that?

24          A. Well, in a nutshell, it was -- it was quite a -- quite  
25          a nice sized flat. It was -- it was the best



1 accommodation that -- that was made available if  
2 I wanted it. And my -- so -- so my immediate reaction,  
3 yes, this is the accommodation that I think suits what  
4 people perceived me to be -- you know, people --  
5 people's perception of me. But I was also aware that it  
6 was the sort of accommodation that if it became  
7 generally known -- and again, I was very careful to  
8 protect that -- some -- some of my associates might say,  
9 "Any chance of me coming to stay with you," because,  
10 you know, it had that sort of ...

11 So in discussion with HN106, he and I were operating  
12 in the same geographical area. And so the discussion  
13 was along the lines of -- and he was unhappy with his  
14 accommodation. And I said, "If we -- I would not be  
15 unhappy if we decided to share, if we could persuade our  
16 management that would be okay," and that was exactly  
17 what we did.

18 Q. You tell us that you were already friends with HN106,  
19 and that your wives knew each other?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was that a friendship which therefore involved  
22 socialising outside work?

23 A. Occasionally, yes.

24 Q. And how long had you been friends for, approximately?

25 A. Well, I think our -- I think our friendship started

1 a couple of years, a couple of years. That's the quick  
2 answer, yeah.

3 Q. And you just used the word "persuade", in terms of  
4 needing to persuade SDS management that it made sense  
5 for you to share the flat. How reluctant were they  
6 about two undercover officers sharing a flat at that  
7 time?

8 A. Well, it was unusual. As far as I understood it,  
9 certainly with the -- with the current group of people  
10 that I was operating with, the undercover officers, they  
11 -- that didn't take place; there wasn't any sharing of  
12 accommodation. So this was a new -- a new idea that we  
13 were putting forward.

14 Q. Did you persuade them that there might be operational  
15 benefits to it?

16 A. Yes. I mean, that's -- that's one of the things that  
17 [restricted] HN106 and I discussed. You know, how did  
18 we -- did we feel that it was -- it could be detrimental  
19 to our -- the lives we were leading, our -- all aspects  
20 of our undercover work. And we both felt that -- that  
21 that wouldn't be an issue.

22 Q. From your perspective, was this an arrangement which was  
23 largely for personal convenience and enjoyment and  
24 a social arrangement, or was it a policing reason for  
25 living together?

1       A. Well, I think that's too -- I think, again, you've  
2       worded it too strong, sir. The accommodation that  
3       I first obtained was pretty -- if I may use this word --  
4       I'll be polite, pretty awful, it wasn't very good. And  
5       I -- and -- and that was partly because of the amount of  
6       money that the police would -- would allow you to -- to  
7       rent accommodation. And I felt from the very beginning  
8       that that wouldn't -- that wouldn't look too good to  
9       people that I got to know in this -- in this new life,  
10      if they saw this man who, you know, was -- looked like  
11      he was doing okay financially, I ran a car, I had --  
12      I was -- so I was unhappy about the accommodation, from  
13      all sorts of perspectives.

14             And then I got rid of -- then I persuaded them to  
15      change the accommodation. And bearing in mind -- and  
16      you'll probably -- I'm probably telling you more than  
17      you need to -- than you want to know. I changed  
18      the accommodation because I was unhappy with what  
19      I first acquired, but -- but when we -- when I then  
20      found this flat -- are you going to ask me about  
21      the structure behind that? Because that was why the job  
22      was able to offer me this accommodation, because --

23      Q. No, I'm not HN96. I'm going to move on, if I may.

24      A. Okay, Sir.

25      Q. -- to the fact that, just -- on the basis of what you

1 say in your witness statement, you shared this  
2 accommodation with HN106 for around about three years;  
3 is that right?

4 A. It was certainly for a couple of years. I'm not sure  
5 exactly -- the exact timescale, but yes.

6 Q. And you describe how you stayed at that flat for at  
7 least two nights per week. How common was it for  
8 the two of you to be staying at the flat at the same  
9 time?

10 A. Very uncommon. We had no diary. We would never sort of  
11 -- although we regularly met each other at these --  
12 these -- these office meetings, there was no diary to  
13 say: well, you've got to be there tonight; I've got to  
14 be there tomorrow night. It was very -- it was the fact  
15 that that accommodation was made -- we both had,  
16 obviously, access to that accommodation. We came and --  
17 we came and went as we -- as -- as -- as our respective  
18 lives dictated -- (overspeaking) --

19 So, it wasn't a flat-share in the real sense of --  
20 you know, as people would normally expect of  
21 a flat-share, it was just that it was there available,  
22 and we both felt that it wouldn't -- it wouldn't -- it  
23 was something that we could use.

24 Q. So there was no pattern to the time you spent there  
25 together, but there were occasions and nights presumably

1           when you did stay there at the same time?

2           A. Again, rarely, sir. Rarely.

3           Q. Were you able to relax and unwind together at the flat?

4           A. Sorry?

5           Q. Were you able to relax and unwind together at the flat?

6           A. Well, you paint this -- this idealistic picture which  
7           wasn't the case. It was a case of somewhere to go back  
8           to -- to -- so again, rarely. Rarely.

9           Q. Did you discuss your respective undercover lives whilst  
10          you were sharing accommodation over these two or three  
11          years?

12          A. Again, the answer is no. No. I mean, to say we didn't  
13          have some conversation about our -- what we were -- our  
14          lives, I -- I can see why that would not make --  
15          you know, you would think that that doesn't add up at  
16          all. Yes, we did have conversations, but it was very  
17          limited. I didn't want to know what [restricted] was  
18          doing, and vice versa.

19                 So I knew very little about what he was up to.  
20          I knew he -- what -- I knew one of the organisations  
21          that -- or the main organisation that he was -- he was  
22          -- that he was asked to be responsible for. But we --  
23          we -- there was no in-depth conversation. It was -- as  
24          I said from early on, it was almost an unwritten rule  
25          that you didn't -- you didn't enquire -- and you didn't

1           really want to enquire -- about what other officers were  
2           doing -- (overspeaking) --

3           MR GRAY:   HN96, I'm sorry to interrupt you.  We're going to  
4           need to take a short break.

5           A.   All right, sir.

6           THE CHAIRMAN:  Yes.

7                     No one, please, in the hearing room must communicate  
8           what has occurred in the last ten minutes in the hearing  
9           room by mobile telephone or otherwise, until I say so.

10          MR FERNANDES:  Good morning, everyone.  We will now take  
11          a break.  May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
12          to join your break-out rooms, please.

13                     The time is now 12 pm, so we shall reconvene at  
14          12.10 pm.  Thank you.

15          (12.02 pm)

16                                     (A short break)

17          (12.13 pm)

18          MR FERNANDES:  Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

19                     I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
20          proceedings.

21                     Chairman.

22          THE CHAIRMAN:  Thank you.

23                     As all who are in the hearing room will now realise,  
24          a restriction order has been made in respect of any  
25          mention of names between 11.55 and 12.05 this

1 morning/this early afternoon.

2 Subject to that, anyone may send any message about  
3 anything else that occurred during that time.

4 Mr Gray.

5 MR GRAY: Sir, thank you.

6 HN96, can you hear me?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: May I first of all, before you resume your  
9 questioning, reassure you. These mishaps occur; please  
10 don't worry about it.

11 A. Thank you, Sir.

12 MR GRAY: HN96, I was asking you about whether or not you  
13 and HN106 discussed your undercover lives and your  
14 deployments whilst you were living together. In  
15 paragraph 113 of your witness statement, you say:

16 "The only other UCO who I regularly discussed things  
17 with was HN106. We shared accommodation and we were  
18 friends."

19 And then in paragraph 114:

20 "I do not remember other UCOs discussing their  
21 deployments with me."

22 And the impression that's created is that HN106 was  
23 perhaps one of a very small number, if not the only UCO  
24 with whom you discussed your deployment; is that fair?

25 A. Yes, yes.

1 Q. And you say that:

2 "Managers would be at the meetings at  
3 the safe house, so they would overhear our conversations  
4 then."

5 Was it easier to talk freely in the flat with HN106  
6 because no managers were there to overhear?

7 A. Well, again, I -- it's the way you phrased the question  
8 to me, sir. No disrespect to your question, but there  
9 was no -- in essence, officers rarely discussed what  
10 they were doing in their undercover work. That was --  
11 that was almost -- almost an unwritten rule, because you  
12 didn't -- and I didn't really want to know what other  
13 officers were doing. But clearly, with HN106, because  
14 we saw more of each other, albeit, as I said earlier on,  
15 not that much, occasionally we did discuss, in general  
16 terms, what we might be doing. But I --

17 Q. What might you have discussed? What types of things  
18 -- (overspeaking) --

19 A. Well, I don't recall, because I -- there was no in-depth  
20 conversation about -- about what -- what he was doing  
21 and what I was doing. I suspect the discussion revolved  
22 around our own private lives, because we were able  
23 obviously to do that.

24 Q. Might you have discussed things that stood out as  
25 particularly remarkable or unusual?



1       A.  There was one -- one thing which I recall with HN106,  
2           and I suspect you're going to ask me about that anyway.  
3           But in terms of his deployment with the main  
4           organisation that he was -- he was involved with, we --  
5           we -- we rarely discussed that.  We rarely discussed  
6           that.

7       Q.  For the purposes of giving evidence today, you've been  
8           shown certain paragraphs in HN106's witness statement,  
9           paragraphs 129 to 136; is that right?

10      A.  I was shown some documentations recently, which I'd not  
11         seen before, which was -- which was part of his witness  
12         statement, yes.

13      Q.  And in those paragraphs, HN106 describes, firstly, being  
14         interviewed by Operation Herne regarding a possible  
15         relationship with an activist and; secondly, also goes  
16         on to describe a particular friendship he developed with  
17         a former partner of an associate of his.  Do you recall  
18         that?

19      A.  I recall reading that document, but that's -- that's all  
20         I -- all I can say.

21      Q.  Did HN106 ever discuss those individuals with you during  
22         the course of his deployment?

23      A.  No.

24      Q.  The second individual who's referred to in those  
25         paragraphs is somebody who HN106 describes meeting and

1           developing a relatively close friendship with; is that  
2           fair?

3           A. Well, I don't know, sir, because when I saw that  
4           documentation recently, I had no prior knowledge to any  
5           associations that HN106 had.

6           Q. Were you aware that on a number of occasions, no more  
7           than five or so, according to HN106, HN106 stayed  
8           overnight at this lady's home address?

9           A. Well, I've already said, Sir, that I didn't know  
10          anything about HN106's involvement with anybody in his  
11          undercover life, and there was -- there wasn't -- there  
12          was no attempt to -- so the answer is no, I -- I -- I --  
13          I did not know. And there was no attempt to keep  
14          a record of how often we -- we crossed paths in this  
15          accommodation that we shared.

16          Q. Did he ever not come home when he was supposed to be  
17          staying at your shared cover accommodation?

18          A. No, because -- no, I can't answer that question, because  
19          there was -- there was no -- there was no schedule about  
20          when we would be meeting at this accommodation. And it  
21          was -- it was -- it was -- it was a convenient place to  
22          have, but it was -- it was -- it was just that. It  
23          wasn't somewhere that we would meet on a -- on a regular  
24          basis, or have -- or have any schedule to do so. And --

25          Q. Would you have been surprised to learn that HN106

1           developed a friendship whilst undercover that required  
2           him -- that involved him staying overnight at a female  
3           activist's home address on a number of occasions?

4           A.   In my opinion, HN106 was a professional officer who did  
5           his best to do the job he was required to do in the --  
6           in the most professional way.   So no, I wouldn't be  
7           surprised.

8           Q.   Would you agree that that behaviour appears to be  
9           contrary to HN296's advice or guidance regarding  
10          personal relationships?

11          A.   Well, the way -- the way you put it, yes.   I mean, yes.  
12          I mean, you word it very well, sir, but yes.

13          Q.   Are you surprised that having lived with HN106 for two  
14          to three years, and having been friends before you lived  
15          together, that he never mentioned to you that he was  
16          staying overnight at an activist's address?

17          A.   I am not surprised, but as I said to you a few minutes  
18          ago, it was an unwritten rule that you -- that you --  
19          you didn't enquire, or you didn't have any real interest  
20          in what -- what your colleagues in other fields were --  
21          were getting up to.   I mean, there was a -- I mean  
22          the logic behind that was that if that was to slip out,  
23          if I was meeting with people that I was involved with  
24          and it was to slip out that I was friendly with so and  
25          so, or friendly with -- you know, that -- that may have

1 exposed me. So -- so there was -- there was -- there  
2 was no need for me to know what HN106 was getting up to,  
3 and he didn't share that with me. One or two things  
4 that -- that I can -- I can say he discussed with me,  
5 but certainly not this -- the things that you're  
6 referring to now.

7 Q. Did you ever discuss any relationships that he had with  
8 any females at all?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Were you therefore unaware, from what you have said,  
11 that HN106's relationship with a lady at whose home he  
12 stayed overnight was such that some activists referred  
13 to her as HN106's girlfriend?

14 A. I was unaware of that. I didn't know -- I didn't know  
15 about that.

16 Q. Your deployment, as I've just touched upon in relation  
17 to accommodation, started late 1978, and I think for  
18 approximately the first two years you targeted  
19 the Socialist Workers Party in East London, before then  
20 moving on to focus more significantly on the Troops Out  
21 Movement, until you were -- until you finished your time  
22 in the field; is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. You tell us in your witness statement, paragraph 105,  
25 that you were not provided with intelligence about

1 East London Socialist Workers Party or any other group  
2 before you went into the field. You went and bought  
3 the SWP paper, but essentially you say you went  
4 in "cold"?

5 A. Yes, there was no -- there was no briefing about this  
6 organisation from my office before -- before I then went  
7 to -- to -- to get involved in that area.

8 Q. How much notice were you given of the fact that you were  
9 to be deployed against the Socialist Workers Party?

10 A. As I recollect, sir, not a lot. Not a lot. It was, "We  
11 want you to go and work in this area and get involved  
12 with this organisation." That was --

13 Q. There was no opportunity for you to use the time in  
14 the back office to do background reading or develop an  
15 understanding of what you were going to be involved  
16 with?

17 A. I would say that was the case, yeah. It wasn't an  
18 opportunity to do any further research on ...

19 Q. Having been told that you were going to go and be  
20 deployed against the SWP, were you provided with any  
21 training or guidance, in a general sense, about what  
22 information Special Branch were interested in regarding  
23 the SWP?

24 A. Well, I knew -- I -- I knew why this unit was set up and  
25 the reasoning behind it, and the intention, and so why

1           -- but no, I was not given any -- any instructions, if  
2           you like, about exactly what would be required.

3           Q. Were you given any instruction about what information  
4           about individuals associated with the SWP should be  
5           reported?

6           A. No.

7           Q. No?

8           A. No. But that sounds -- that sounds like it's remiss on  
9           the part of my management. But I've got to come back to  
10          this point about -- so I'm an experienced police  
11          officer, I'm an experienced Special Branch officer; I'm  
12          quite able to make my own decisions and conclusions  
13          about some of these things, and I -- I had an  
14          understanding of what -- what they would be looking for.  
15          And so -- so it didn't need to be underwritten.

16          I didn't need to go on a sort of ten-week training  
17          course to sort of understand that. Without -- without  
18          wishing to be, you know, too impolite to you, sir. But  
19          the answer is no, there was no real training. It was  
20          a case of, you're an experienced officer, you --  
21          you know, you've got every -- the opportunity to find  
22          out is down to you.

23          Q. So using your experience as an experienced  
24          Special Branch officer, and knowing why the unit had  
25          been set up, you would in effect craft your intelligence

- 1           accordingly; is that what you're saying?
- 2           A. Yes, sir.
- 3           Q. And what was your understanding of what the purpose of
- 4           the unit was?
- 5           A. Well, I know the Inquiry knows this, but I'll just
- 6           reiterate. The -- the object of this unit was to gather
- 7           intelligence on activities of, in my case, the SWP, to
- 8           try to provide good background intelligence, background
- 9           information, to assist policing large -- large public
- 10          order demonstrations. That was -- that was the main
- 11          reason for this -- this -- this unit.
- 12          Q. And when you went off to deploy against the SWP, was
- 13          that what -- the primary aspect of its activities?
- 14          A. Yes, yes, yes. I knew from the very beginning that --
- 15          that I would need to establish myself within
- 16          the organisation, and then endeavour to try to obtain
- 17          the information, intelligence that may assist police in
- 18          the future.
- 19                 That -- that is not so easily defined, because you
- 20          -- you know, you relied on being in the right place at
- 21          the right time. And there was no -- there was no clear
- 22          direction about what -- what constitutes the information
- 23          that -- that might -- you know, the information or
- 24          the intelligence that you might acquire.
- 25          Q. During the course of your deployment, were you provided

1 with any specific tasking by the SDS about particular  
2 events or activities upon which you should report, or  
3 were you, for the duration of your deployment, reliant  
4 on your own experience and assessment?

5 A. I -- I -- you -- you relied very much on your own  
6 judgment and your own experience.

7 Q. Were you provided with any tasking about any particular  
8 events by any part of the police during your deployment?

9 A. Not that I recall, no.

10 Q. Were you aware that on occasion, requests were made of  
11 you by the Security Service?

12 A. Not that I recall, no.

13 Q. Could we have up on the screen, please -- Sir, this is  
14 tab 24 -- {UCPI/13647}.

15 This is an SDS intelligence report dated  
16 6 December 1979. Can you see that at the top right?

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. And paragraph 1 reads:

19 "Box 500 letter dated 5.11.79 under reference  
20 [blank] requests assistance in identifying [Privacy]  
21 a member of the Socialist Workers Party, and suggest  
22 that [Privacy], born [Privacy] of [Privacy] may be  
23 identical."

24 Paragraph 2:

25 "Enquiries made through a reliable source strongly



1           indicate that both names refer to the same person. It  
2           is known that [Privacy] was a student at the [Privacy]  
3           Polytechnic in 1977 and that the address of [Privacy] is  
4           leased to that colleague from the [Privacy] Housing  
5           Association."

6           Then the report goes on to provide current address  
7           details.

8           Are you aware that "Box 500" is a reference in that  
9           context to the Security Service?

10          A. Yes.

11          Q. And were there occasions on which you were asked to  
12           provide assistance in identifying individuals by  
13           reference to photographs? We can see on this document,  
14           to the left, there is a photograph which has been  
15           redacted. Were you aware of being asked to provide  
16           assistance as to the identities of individuals whose  
17           photographs were provided to you?

18          A. I -- I don't recall specific enquiries from Box 500 for  
19           me to answer their questions. So I can't say that this  
20           was me responding to their enquiry. I -- I don't --  
21           I don't recall that, sir. I don't -- I can't honestly  
22           say that Box asked me specific questions about any  
23           people that I -- I knew or had been involved with.

24          Q. Can we take that document down, please.

25           You've told us therefore that in terms of what you

1           did report you were aware of the purpose of the unit.  
2           Your primary understanding was that you were concerned  
3           with reporting matters relevant to policing large  
4           protests.

5           A. Yes.

6           Q. But that it was left very much to your experience as  
7           a Special Branch officer to decide what ought to be  
8           reported. Is that a fair summary?

9           A. I think that's a fair comment, sir, but --

10          Q. And in terms of how you therefore wrote up  
11          the information which you wished to report, you describe  
12          in your witness statement, paragraph 86, that you would  
13          write notes as soon as you were at a safe place,  
14          normally your real home, and then write those notes up  
15          into a draft report as soon as possible?

16          A. Yes.

17          Q. And that you would hand in those draft reports the next  
18          time you attended one of the twice-weekly meetings at  
19          the SDS safe house?

20          A. Yes.

21          Q. And thereafter you would then destroy your notes.

22                 Those, I think draft reports, were then taken away,  
23          written up and added to, as appropriate, by the SDS  
24          office?

25          A. Yes.

1 Q. The meetings at which you provided these draft reports  
2 to the SDS office, ie the safe house meetings, took  
3 place, as a matter of routine, twice a week; is that  
4 right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. On average, how often would you attend?

7 A. All the time.

8 Q. And presumably the other officers -- and you don't need  
9 to tell me who they were -- the other officers deployed  
10 at the time would also attend to hand in their draft  
11 intelligence reports; is that fair?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And I think we touched on this in your pre-deployment  
14 phase, but plainly there was an element, from what you  
15 said earlier, of this being a social as well as  
16 a professional meeting and get-together?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And an opportunity to socialise with the officers, at  
19 which some alcohol would be consumed on occasions, you  
20 said?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Given that this was a social -- a partly social occasion  
23 at least, at which the SDS officers could come together  
24 to hand in their intelligence, and in effect provide  
25 the updates as to what had been going on, was it really

1 the case that there was no discussion amongst  
2 the officers about anything that had happened in  
3 the week previous or during the course of  
4 the deployments?

5 A. I -- I don't recall specific conversations, sir.  
6 I mean, it was 40-odd years ago when I was employed  
7 doing this sort of work. So I can't say honestly that  
8 I remember a specific conversation.

9 All I can tell you is that there was a -- a general  
10 consensus that you would not be talking in detail about  
11 what your -- or -- or not enquiring about what your  
12 other colleagues were deployed in or were getting up to.  
13 And so that was -- so -- so I can't honestly give you  
14 a clear answer to the sort of discussions that took  
15 place. It was general, probably about what was  
16 happening within the Metropolitan Police, any  
17 deployments that -- other than exactly what you were  
18 doing in your undercover role.

19 Q. HN304, who was deployed until around about April 1979 --

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. -- had a deployment which obviously overlapped with  
22 yours for a period of some months?

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. He has given evidence to the Inquiry to the effect that  
25 there was fairly free and open discussion about

1           deployments at these meetings, including jokes about  
2           poor organisational skills of left wing groups, for  
3           example, and also remarks being made on a number of  
4           occasions about sexual encounters involving officers.

5           Do you recall anything of that type being discussed  
6           --

7           A. Not -- not -- not in detail. Not in that -- not to  
8           the depth that this -- this officer, HN304, has  
9           expressed.

10          Q. What do you mean "not in detail"?

11          A. Well, in general terms. I mean, what --

12          Q. Do you recall there being any comment whatsoever made  
13           about sexual encounters involving officers at meetings  
14           you attended?

15          A. Not specifics, Sir, no. I mean -- I mean I think --

16          Q. HN96, I'm sorry to interrupt, but what do you mean "not  
17           specifics"? Either there were such comments made, or  
18           there weren't?

19          A. Well, it -- it would be -- the best way to answer it  
20           would be -- it would be unrealistic not to expect  
21           a group of maybe a dozen-plus men getting together and  
22           the conversation at some point not getting around to  
23           the opposite sex. Which may have -- so the conversation  
24           I recall, and not in detail, was not about individuals'  
25           involvement with the opposite sex, it was about

1 the problems that people -- that, as an  
2 undercover officer, you could have if you get too close  
3 to -- ladies were much more interested in who you were,  
4 what you were doing, than -- than -- than some of  
5 the other -- some of the female -- some of the male  
6 people I got involved with.

7 So that was the sort of level of conversation.  
8 I don't remember any specifics about, you know,  
9 Joe Bloggs being involved -- and Joe Bloggs is not one  
10 of the names that you have to -- Joe Bloggs being  
11 involved with Melissa down the road. You know, it  
12 wasn't that -- if [restricted] -- if -- oh, shit. If  
13 HN304 should -- should remember that, then I don't.  
14 I don't remember it being like that. I don't remember  
15 that.

16 Q. HN96, what you have just described is discussion of  
17 a general nature about the risks associated with being  
18 an undercover officer and female advances; is that fair?

19 A. Yes. I would be happy to say that -- that -- that sort  
20 of conversation generally, you know, loosely took place,  
21 yeah.

22 Q. And those conversations took place before you were  
23 displayed at the meetings you attended then?

24 A. I don't remember if they -- if that was the case, but  
25 probably. But I don't remember that.

1 Q. And was that discussion one of the reasons why you had  
2 in your back pocket the explanation about having  
3 a girlfriend that we talked about previously?

4 A. It made -- it made sense -- so I needed to have  
5 a background where there would be -- I didn't want  
6 people -- to be perceived by people I was (inaudible) as  
7 having a tendency the other way. But if I was  
8 constantly attending functions, etc, by myself, there  
9 was a danger that that -- that might become -- you know,  
10 some comment, people might say, "Well, we never see this  
11 man with any -- any ladies." So that was why I wanted  
12 to have that -- you know. But primarily because, as  
13 I said to you earlier on, if I was out walking somewhere  
14 with my wife and I was spotted by somebody and -- then  
15 that would be -- that would be the sort of reason  
16 behind it, that she was the girlfriend that I had.

17 MR GRAY: Thank you, HN96.

18 We're going to need to take a break now.

19 Sir --

20 THE CHAIRMAN: There has been a call on my emergency  
21 telephone. We're going to have to pause momentarily.  
22 Nobody must send a message outside about anything that  
23 has taken place in the hearing room in the last  
24 ten minutes, until I say so.

25 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take

1 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
2 to join your break-out room, please. Thank you.

3 (12.40 pm)

4 (A short break)

5 (12.48 pm)

6 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

7 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
8 proceedings.

9 Chairman.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

11 As those who are in the hearing room will realise,  
12 a restriction order has been made in respect of  
13 the mention of any names between 12.35 and 12.45 in this  
14 afternoon's session. Subject to that, anyone may of  
15 course transmit anything about what has happened in  
16 the hearing room apart from any mention of names.

17 Mr Gray, I think we can resume.

18 MR GRAY: Thank you, Sir.

19 HN96, can you hear me?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. If we move on now to the information that you did choose  
22 to report for the reasons you described.

23 In your witness statement, in paragraph 99, you  
24 explain different reasons, or different purposes for  
25 which reporting on individuals might be used. You



1 describe, firstly that reports on individuals might  
2 assist identification at a later date if the individual  
3 was to be seen at a meeting or another demonstration,  
4 and enable Special Branch to keep track of certain  
5 individuals; is that right?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Why was it considered necessary to keep track of  
8 individuals who attended demonstrations?

9 A. Well, you've got to see that -- that reply in its  
10 context. So special Branch kept records -- it was -- it  
11 was -- Special Branch -- intelligence agency. You know  
12 what Special Branch was. It collated information about  
13 lots and lots and lots of organisations and individuals,  
14 much of which was filed and never used again.

15 So -- but if that individual came to light in  
16 a different context that may have been of interest to  
17 the police, then that was -- that was something that was  
18 -- was retained in -- in Special Branch records. But as  
19 I say, a lot of -- a lot of the reporting was -- was --  
20 was filed and never saw the light of day again.

21 Q. You also describe that information might be used for  
22 particular policing purposes; and you give an example in  
23 your statement of some reporting that led to a raid by  
24 the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan  
25 Police Service; is that right?

1           And you also then go on to describe how  
2           the information the SDS gathered on individuals involved  
3           in what you describe as "extreme political groups" may  
4           also have been used for vetting purposes for government  
5           positions. How did you know that?

6           A. Well, because I was a Special Branch officer and it was  
7           -- it was -- that was -- that was the way that  
8           the system worked. If Special Branch retained  
9           information, it was available to the Security Service,  
10          and vice versa. And it was clear that if anybody was  
11          going for a senior -- for example, I was vetted to  
12          become a member of Special Branch; and they looked at  
13          information that was retained about me within  
14          the system. So that wasn't uncommon. So that's how  
15          I would have known, yes. It was -- it was ...

16          Q. So your understanding of what use in that vetting sense  
17          that SDS reporting might be put to, that understanding  
18          came from your previous work in Special Branch and not  
19          from your work at the SDS; is that right?

20          A. It was an overall understanding that I had as  
21          a Special Branch officer, yes. It wasn't something that  
22          was specifically known because I -- I was part of this  
23          -- this -- this unit.

24          Q. Were you aware of any sort of list of individuals  
25          associated with these groups that you describe being

1 collated for vetting purposes for government positions?  
2 A. No, I -- no, I think you -- again, you've asked  
3 the question in a way that is difficult for me to  
4 answer. There was -- there was clearly -- both -- both  
5 Special Branch and Security Service retained information  
6 on -- that was -- that may or may not have been of  
7 interest at some other date -- some later date. And  
8 that would only have been used -- any information that  
9 may have been retained on -- on an individual would have  
10 only have been looked at if that individual was applying  
11 for a post that required some sort of security  
12 clearance.

13 Q. Can we please have up on the screen -- Sir, this is  
14 tab 5 in the hard copy volume -- {UCPI/13171}.

15 HN96, this is an intelligence report dated  
16 26 February 1979, so relatively soon after you entered  
17 the field. It refers in paragraph 2 to:

18 "[Privacy] are members of the Socialist  
19 Workers Party ..."

20 And then sets out some personal details of who they  
21 are, including their address and which branch of  
22 the party they were members of.

23 Then paragraph 3 says:

24 "[Privacy] is employed as a social worker in  
25 the London Borough of [Privacy]. She is the owner of

1 a yellow ..."

2 A vehicle -- I can't read that, sorry:

3 "... index number [Privacy]."

4 And then paragraph 4:

5 "[Privacy] is employed as a probation officer in  
6 the borough of [Privacy]."

7 What was the purpose of reporting the employment  
8 details of these two members of the SWP?

9 A. To give an overall -- to give a better picture of who  
10 these people were, as I tried to explain in my last few  
11 comments, a lot -- a lot of information was retained  
12 within -- in Special Branch records that -- that were --  
13 that -- that may -- may have never seen the light of day  
14 again.

15 Q. HN96, the fact that it wasn't going to see the light of  
16 day again in your experience is not borne out by  
17 the fact that we're looking at it now, is it?

18 A. No, that's -- that's a very fair comment, yes.

19 Q. I'm asking you why you specifically reported  
20 the employment details of these two members of the SWP.

21 A. I find it difficult to answer that question. They were  
22 -- they were certainly people that -- that I would have  
23 come across. I don't remember who they are. I was --  
24 I didn't know what -- I would have -- I would have had  
25 no knowledge of what other information may have been

1 retained on them in police records. I was just trying  
2 to paint a reasonable picture of -- of these people.  
3 That was part of what I perceived as being part of my  
4 job.

5 Q. If we take this document down, please, and just look at  
6 one other example.

7 It's tab 72, Sir, in the hard copy bundles.  
8 {UCPI/15384}.

9 We move forwards now, HN96, to 9 June 1981. That's  
10 the date on this intelligence report. Paragraph 2 of  
11 which states:

12 "It is now known that [Privacy], a member of  
13 the civil service branch of the Socialist Workers Party  
14 (SWP) is an inspector with the Department of Health and  
15 Social Security, [Privacy], telephone number [Privacy]  
16 [Privacy]."

17 Do you see that?

18 A. I do.

19 Q. The sole purpose of that report appears to be to record  
20 the fact that that member of the SWP was an inspector  
21 with the Department of Health and social security?

22 A. It does.

23 Q. What would have been the purpose of submitting that  
24 draft report dealing solely with that individual's  
25 employment?

1       A. Well, first of all, I'm not sure this is even my report.  
2       I don't recall this -- and I'm looking at the dates,  
3       when I'm not sure I -- I was still involved with  
4       the SWP. But again, I -- I would say it was just  
5       general information. This particular individual was  
6       a member of a far right -- far left wing Trotskyist  
7       party, and is also -- works for the -- in -- in  
8       the Department of Health and Social Security. That was  
9       -- that was -- that was -- but I'm -- I'm not sure this  
10      was even my report. But that would have been the reason  
11      behind it.

12             And again, I would reiterate that that information  
13      could have gone nowhere. It could have been -- could  
14      have been indexed, put away into a file which never saw  
15      the light of day.

16             Unless, of course, there was some concern about this  
17      person's involvement in a far left wing party and  
18      working in health and social security, I don't know.  
19      I don't know. That wasn't for me to decide. I was just  
20      -- if it was me doing it -- and I'm not sure it was --  
21      it was just for this information to become available, in  
22      case it might be useful in another context.

23      Q. Were you specifically asked to report employment details  
24      of any particular description?

25      A. No, sir, there was no -- there was no clear direction on

1           what was acceptable and what wasn't acceptable. So  
2           again, you use your common sense, and again -- and I --  
3           I was an individual who had no control what then  
4           happened to that information, apart from my  
5           understanding that it was -- it was recorded in -- in  
6           the records that Special Branch retained, and was either  
7           never used or was -- was of interest at a later date.

8       Q. You say there was no clear guidance as to what was  
9           appropriate or not to report. Did anybody ever take  
10          issue with any of the contents of the intelligence  
11          reports you submitted?

12       A. No, sir.

13       MR GRAY: Sir, I'm conscious it's 1 o'clock. If acceptable,  
14          it would be helpful to be able to finish this topic in  
15          the course of the next ten minutes or so.

16       THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. We've had unforeseen  
17          interruptions and we will continue for the next  
18          ten minutes.

19       MR GRAY: Thank you.

20                HN96, we've looked there at reporting relating to  
21          employment.

22                Can we have up on the screen, please -- Sir this is  
23          tab 8 in the hard copy bundle -- {UCPI/21293}.

24                This is an intelligence report, HN96, dated  
25          22 May 1979 which concerns a member of the Clapton

1 branch of the Socialist Workers Party and also of  
2 the Hackney branch of Women's Voice.

3 Paragraph 3 of this report reads as follows:

4 "She is a divorced woman and has a daughter, aged  
5 about six years. It is known that [Privacy] -- until  
6 quite recently a full time district organiser for  
7 the SWP but now a student at the North East London  
8 Polytechnic -- is living with her (the location of her  
9 address is not at present known)."

10 Given the reasons you identified for reporting  
11 information about individuals, why would you have  
12 included reference to this lady's marital status and  
13 also the age of her child, and the fact she had a child  
14 indeed?

15 A. Well, again, because it's -- you've showed me this  
16 document, and I presume it's one that I previously said  
17 it was one of my reports, then I -- all I can conclude  
18 is that I was trying to paint a picture of this  
19 individual that -- that may have been used in -- in  
20 the future.

21 Q. Would you have been concerned at all about reporting  
22 information about children?

23 A. Well, all I've said was that she had a daughter of  
24 six years. I mean, I've not gone into any more detail.  
25 I -- I know -- I -- I -- when I -- when this -- when



1 I reported information that came to my attention, I had  
2 no other knowledge about these individuals. I didn't  
3 know whether -- this lady may have been a complete --  
4 may have been of interest to other aspects in the police  
5 service, or even Security Service, I -- I have no idea.  
6 But I -- but I also knew that it would not be used in  
7 a -- in a -- an aggressive or detrimental way if it was  
8 of no interest; it would just be filed. But there was  
9 a need for me -- that was what was -- that was part of  
10 my raison d'etre when I was out there, to -- to report  
11 on what -- the individuals that I came across that were  
12 involved in these organisations that I was looking at.

13 Q. Can we have up on the screen, please -- it's tab 13 --  
14 {UCPI/13300}.

15 This is an intelligence report dated 22 August 1979  
16 about an individual described in paragraph 2 as "now  
17 a member of the Clapton Branch of the SWP", yes?

18 And in paragraph 4, under the -- there is  
19 a description which refers to complexion, hairstyle,  
20 build, height, and also contains reference to the fact  
21 that this individual was born in circa 1963, which means  
22 at the time of this report they would have been under  
23 18.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Again, would you have been concerned at all about

1 reporting -- submitting a police intelligence report  
2 about an individual who was under the age of 18?

3 A. I -- I don't remember the context of this report.  
4 I believe it's my report. Again, I'm not -- I'm  
5 highlighting an individual that was involved in the SWP.  
6 If I recall, REBEL were anti-right wing, were used as --  
7 almost like Storm Troopers on the streets.

8 And the other aspect I've just seen in this is that  
9 the person who recruited -- was this person still at  
10 school?

11 Q. HN96, my question was only this: would you have been  
12 concerned about reporting the activities of someone  
13 under the age of 18?

14 A. Under the age of 18, no. If it was under the age of  
15 sort of 12, yes, but under the age of 18, no. But  
16 I think there is obviously a reason behind me  
17 highlighting this young man, who was recruited from  
18 a school where somebody who I recall was a teacher  
19 there.

20 Q. You actually highlight in paragraph 3 of the report:

21 "[Privacy], who lives with his parents in [Privacy],  
22 is a pupil at Hackney Downs Comprehensive School ..."

23 You've reported the fact of the school that he or  
24 she was at -- he, I think. Would you have had any  
25 concern --

1       A. That's what you're saying, did I have any qualms about  
2       that, the answer is no. It's a long time ago, but I --  
3       but I recall that one of the very active members of  
4       the SWP in that area was also a teacher at the school,  
5       so the implication being that he was attempting to  
6       recruit young school people, 17 or 18, if that's what  
7       was the age, into -- into the -- into this far -- far  
8       left wing organisation. I think that was -- that was  
9       the purpose of my report.

10      Q. So, next, tab 37 in the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/13873},  
11      please.

12                This is an intelligence report dated 1 April 1980.  
13      Now, HN96, to be fair to you, in paragraph 163 of your  
14      witness statement you say this is not your reporting due  
15      to the geographical location of the branch. So just  
16      bearing that in mind, paragraph 2 of this report states:

17                "[Privacy], until recently an active member of  
18      the [Branch] Socialist Workers Party, has just been  
19      discharged from the [Privacy] Hospital, [Privacy], where  
20      she has been receiving treatment for a nervous  
21      breakdown. It is thought that the breakdown was  
22      the result of her worrying about her recent series of  
23      surgical operations for [Private medical details], and  
24      ending of her long lasting friendship with [Privacy],  
25      also and an active member of the SWP."

1 Paragraph 3:

2 "She has been forced to give up her job [Privacy]  
3 [Privacy], and now lives with her parents at [Privacy]  
4 [Privacy]."

5 I recognise and acknowledge that you have said in  
6 your witness statement that you don't believe this to be  
7 your reporting due to the geographical location, but  
8 I would like to ask you if you consider that reporting  
9 information of this type would have served any  
10 legitimate policing purpose, in 1980, about a member of  
11 the SWP?

12 A. So, first of all, thank you for recognising that it's  
13 not my report.

14 Secondly, I would not have written a -- a report --  
15 I may have written about this individual, but I would  
16 have not have written about it in this -- in this  
17 context, highlighting the fact that she had a breakdown,  
18 etc. I -- I would accept that that has got little to do  
19 with police matters.

20 But I -- I would go back to the fact that  
21 highlighting -- identifying individuals involved in  
22 (inaudible) far left wing politics was something that --  
23 that this unit was asked to do. What we weren't asked  
24 to do is analyse how this information would be used. It  
25 was -- it was down to other -- you know, we were a small

1 cog in a big wheel, if that -- if that's a good way of  
2 -- of answering your question.

3 Q. And we don't need to bring up the reports, but there are  
4 examples in your bundle of reports recording the fact  
5 that two people had decided to separate, the reasons for  
6 that, and also the fact of marriage of two members of  
7 the SWP -- in 1981, for example.

8 Why would reporting on the marital status, or  
9 marital situation or relationship situation of members  
10 of the SWP have furthered any legitimate policing  
11 purpose?

12 A. Well, in -- in that -- in isolation, you can argue that  
13 it -- it doesn't make a -- you know, it -- it doesn't  
14 appear to be something that the police should be  
15 interested in. But I keep reiterating, this information  
16 -- I -- I would not know if there are other -- if  
17 there's other interested parties within  
18 the Police Service or within the Security Services of  
19 these individuals. This is something this would be --  
20 Special Branch was a conduit for all this intelligence,  
21 information, whatever you want to call it. It would  
22 come in to this and it would then be -- it would be then  
23 analysed, looked at and may or may not be used in a --  
24 in -- in a more proactive way.

25 I -- officers I worked with felt that they didn't --

1           that it -- it was up to them to feed into this -- into  
2           this intelligence organisation items of interest that  
3           may or may not be of -- of interest to the -- to -- to  
4           police.

5           Q. You've told us what you understood the purpose of  
6           the SDS to be, and you were quite clear that the primary  
7           focus, certainly as far as the SWP was concerned, from  
8           your perspective, was maintaining public order and  
9           policing demonstrations.

10          A. Yes, yes.

11          Q. How do the reports we've just looked at assist  
12          the police in policing demonstrations?

13          A. Because these were the people involved in that  
14          organisation that may have been of some use in  
15          the future. It's a bit like saying -- analysing  
16          the Conservative Party. You know,  
17          the Conservative Party, it's not -- you know, you can't  
18          just say it's the Conservative Party, it's -- it's --  
19          it's a group of individuals that are involved in that  
20          sort of politics.

21                 So these people were involved in the politics of  
22          left wing protest, most of it legitimate, most of it  
23          very -- you know, whatever your viewpoints are,  
24          applaudable. But -- but there was the potential for --  
25          you know, extreme elements within these organisations of

1 causing a fair amount of trouble on the streets of -- of  
2 -- of any city. And that was why they were being looked  
3 at. That was why they were being looked at. You know,  
4 it was individuals that made up the organisation.  
5 Individuals were looked at because they were part of  
6 this organisations.

7 Does that answer the question or not?

8 MR GRAY: Thank you, HN96.

9 Sir, is that a convenient moment, please?

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Because we've had the odd interruption  
11 and things have gone quite slowly, I anticipate you're  
12 going to need a little more time than you had originally  
13 anticipated. Am I right in that?

14 MR GRAY: Yes, sir. And I would be grateful if we could  
15 resume at 2 o'clock, if that's acceptable to those  
16 involved in running the hearing.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: We've got to give everybody sufficient time  
18 to have a bite to eat, and for the shorthand writers to  
19 have, I think, their hour's break. We better resume,  
20 I think, at 2.10, rather than at 2.

21 On that basis, how much longer do you anticipate  
22 being?

23 MR GRAY: Sir, I anticipate I will carry on after  
24 the mid-afternoon break, on that basis.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Then we have a long day.





1 made a number of orders which affect what you may and  
2 may not do in the hearing rooms and after you leave  
3 them. Breach of any of the orders is a serious matter  
4 and may have serious consequences for you.

5 If I am satisfied that a person may have breached an  
6 order, I have the power to certify the matter to  
7 the High Court, which will investigate and deal with it  
8 as if it had been a contempt of that court. If  
9 satisfied that a breach has occurred and merits  
10 the imposition of a penalty, the High Court may impose  
11 a severe sanction on the person in breach, including  
12 a fine, imprisonment for up to two years and  
13 sequestration of their assets.

14 Evidence is going to be given live over screens in  
15 the hearing rooms. It is strictly prohibited to  
16 photograph or record what is shown on the screens, or to  
17 record what is said by a witness or anyone else in  
18 the hearing rooms.

19 You may bring your mobile telephone into the hearing  
20 rooms, but you may not use it for any of those purposes.  
21 You may use it silently for any other purpose. In  
22 particular, you may transmit your account of what you  
23 have seen and heard in a hearing room to any other  
24 person, but only once at least ten minutes have elapsed  
25 since the event which you are describing took place.

1           This restriction has a purpose. In the course of  
2 the Inquiry, I have made orders prohibiting the public  
3 disclosure of information, for example about  
4 the identity of a person, for a variety of reasons.  
5 These orders must be upheld.

6           It is inevitable that, whether by accident or  
7 design, information which I have ordered should not be  
8 publicly disclosed will sometimes be disclosed in  
9 a hearing. If and when that happens, I will immediately  
10 suspend the hearing and make an order prohibiting  
11 further disclosure of the information outside  
12 the hearing rooms. The consequence will be that no  
13 further disclosure of that information may be made by  
14 mobile telephone or other portable electronic device  
15 from within the hearing room, or by any means outside  
16 it.

17           I'm sorry if you find this message alarming. It is  
18 not intended to be. Its purpose is simply to ensure  
19 that everyone knows the rules which must apply if I am  
20 to hear the evidence which I need to enable me to get to  
21 the truth about undercover policing. You, as members of  
22 the public, are entitled to hear the same public  
23 evidence as I will hear, and to reach your own  
24 conclusions about it. The Inquiry team will do their  
25 best to ensure that you can.

1           If you have any doubt about the terms of this  
2           message, or what you may or may not do, you should not  
3           hesitate to ask one of them, and, with my help if  
4           necessary, they will provide you with the answer.

5           Mr Gray.

6           MR GRAY: Thank you, Sir.

7           Sir, I'm just waiting for HN96.

8           HN96, can you hear me?

9           A. Yes, sir.

10          Q. HN96, I want to ask you now, please, about your  
11          infiltration of the SWP. In paragraph 106 of your  
12          witness statement {MPS/745772/21} you state that:

13                 "I was initially tasked to the East London SWP as  
14                 there was a requirement within Special Branch to have  
15                 good intelligence on that group. They were potentially  
16                 the most disruptive group, public order wise, that were  
17                 currently active."

18          First, just to clarify, when you say "they were  
19          potentially the most disruptive group, public order  
20          wise, that were currently active", do you mean the SWP  
21          generally, or East London SWP?

22          A. Generally.

23          Q. Why did you believe that they were potentially the most  
24          disruptive group, public order wise, that were currently  
25          active?

1 A. Well, it wasn't just my -- my opinion that counted in  
2 this time, it was the opinion of obviously  
3 Special Branch and presumably other -- other agencies  
4 that -- that identified this -- this organisation that  
5 had the potential to cause problems to the police,  
6 particularly in relation to public order problems.

7 Q. Was that understanding borne out by your experiences  
8 during your deployment?

9 A. Well, the SW -- the SWP were active then, and had  
10 the ability to -- and -- and the wherewithal to attract  
11 a large member of the public to -- to demonstrate about  
12 various matters that -- that -- that they were -- they  
13 were interested in. So the answer's yes.

14 Q. Because what you say in your witness statement at  
15 paragraph 272 {MPS/745772/56} is that:

16 "I was not present at any demonstrations when there  
17 was any major public disorder during my deployment.  
18 I did however attend many rallies where there were  
19 public order issues. I saw plenty of scuffles with  
20 the police and a few fights with members of  
21 the National Front, though I cannot give specific  
22 examples after so many years."

23 Is that a fair summary of your experiences?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can we please look -- now, it's tab 14 in the hard copy

1 bundle. Can we please have up on the screen  
2 {UCPI/13343}. If we could just make that a little  
3 larger please. Thank you very much.

4 It's an intelligence report dated 7 September 1979.  
5 Paragraph 2 reads:

6 "On Tuesday, 28th August 1979, between 7.30 and  
7 9.30 pm at the Trades and Labour Club, Dalston Lane, E8,  
8 a meeting chaired by [Privacy] took place of  
9 the coordinating committee for the 'Stop the Cuts'  
10 demonstration to be held in Hackney at 12.30 pm on  
11 Thursday, 13th September. Some twelve persons  
12 attended."

13 Paragraph 3:

14 "Nothing of interest arose during the course of  
15 the meeting, apart from the organisers' expectations  
16 that between 500 and 750 people will take part in  
17 the demonstration. However, between 300 and 400 would  
18 be a more realistic estimate of those participating."

19 Paragraph 4:

20 "As far as can be ascertained, this demonstration  
21 should be relatively quiet and peaceful, although  
22 the possibility exists that some of the more extremist  
23 elements within the Socialist Workers Party may decide  
24 to support the demonstration. It is interesting to note  
25 that although this day of action has been arranged under

1 the auspices of local trade union branches, the majority  
2 of the coordinating committee are, as well as being  
3 trade unionists, members of the SWP."

4 Is that summary of what was expected to happen at  
5 the demonstration indicative of your experience  
6 generally, namely that the group was largely intent on  
7 peaceful demonstration, but there may have been some  
8 more extreme elements, to use the words in the report,  
9 more willing to participate in violence?

10 A. Yeah, without doubt. Without doubt. I mean, SWP were  
11 an organisation which I'm pretty sure in my own mind  
12 didn't go out on the streets to protest about whatever  
13 -- ever item they were currently interested in with  
14 the intention of causing trouble for the police. But,  
15 clearly, there was an element that (inaudible) maybe  
16 might even SWP members that were attracted to these  
17 demonstrations, and their intent was to cause problems.  
18 And -- so it was always difficult for -- for -- for  
19 police, I think, to identify -- I'm probably ask -- I'm  
20 probably not answering your question -- to identify what  
21 might take place at -- at a particular demonstration.  
22 And it was hoped that people like people in my position  
23 and other sources of intelligence would help police to  
24 -- to get a clearer picture.

25 But the SWP, they weren't an organisation that went

1 out looking for trouble, but trouble often followed  
2 them.

3 Q. I think you have perhaps answered, in the course of that  
4 long answer, some of the questions I was about to ask,  
5 because the impression that's given through this report,  
6 which you say is indicative of your experience  
7 generally, is that the SWP, and certainly the vast  
8 majority of its membership, were intent upon peaceful  
9 demonstration, but that there were perhaps elements  
10 around the fringes of the organisation, or that would  
11 join in with the demonstrations, who might cause  
12 difficulties. Is that fair, from your experience?

13 A. And there were also individuals within -- within  
14 the movement, sir, that were -- SWP members, that were  
15 -- that were not averse to getting involved in  
16 a punch-up.

17 Q. But if the potential public order issues were likely to  
18 emanate from a minority of SWP membership, or from those  
19 who attached themselves to the demonstration, rather  
20 than being members of the SWP, how did reporting on  
21 the mainstream activity of the SWP assist with policing  
22 those public order incidents?

23 A. I think the best way to answer that is to say obviously  
24 the SWP were one of the organisation -- organisations  
25 that were -- that were involved in what could be

1           perceived as protests that could cause trouble. They --  
2           they weren't a large organisation, but they were well  
3           organised. And so -- so the -- so the -- the thinking  
4           within the Security Services, I think, must have been,  
5           the best way we're going to get a -- a better  
6           understanding of what's likely to happen at these  
7           demonstrations, albeit some of the people -- some of  
8           the problems won't arise from -- from the SWP, is to  
9           keep an eye on that organisation. But you couldn't --  
10          how else could you monitor, you know, so-called  
11          "extremists"? It was -- it was -- it was an  
12          organisation that could be monitored more carefully than  
13          groups of people that, you know, had no -- no cohesive  
14          element to them.

15        Q. You would attend meetings at which there would be  
16          discussions about upcoming events and demonstrations and  
17          report on those; and we see that in the material --

18        A. Yes.

19        Q. -- that's in the hearing bundle.

20                I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong, but there  
21                are no reports in there which report on upcoming events  
22                and demonstrations which include, for example, a section  
23                indicating that certain elements are likely to cause  
24                trouble or are planning to cause trouble at those  
25                events; is that fair?



- 1 A. Sorry, say that -- what was that last bit again, sir?
- 2 Q. There are no reports about upcoming demonstrations which  
3 refer to particular individuals within the organisation  
4 planning to cause trouble, are there?
- 5 A. I can't recall off the top of my head. There were  
6 elements within the SWP that loosely called themselves  
7 "socialists", "Trotskyists", and that did go looking for  
8 trouble. They -- they -- I couldn't -- I couldn't give  
9 you specifics. But yeah, there were -- there were --  
10 the party I don't think encouraged that, but they didn't  
11 discourage it.
- 12 So -- so -- so the answer to your question is there  
13 was always potential for trouble when the SWP were  
14 involved in a campaign. And that was something that  
15 the police had a responsibility to look at.
- 16 Q. That was -- was that a general risk that accompanied all  
17 SWP demonstrations, rather than being something that you  
18 would be able to identify in advance through  
19 intelligence you gathered, that for example violence was  
20 being planned? That's really what I'm driving at.
- 21 A. Well, sometimes you did. So -- so the question you've  
22 asked is something which is -- was crucial to what we  
23 did -- what I did, was that obviously, ultimately, I --  
24 I hoped to get information that was crucial to -- to  
25 police managing a demonstration. And that -- on the odd

1 occasion I was privy to -- I was in the right place at  
2 the right time to -- to get a better -- better view of  
3 what (inaudible) take place.

4 Q. In your experience, did the SWP cooperate with police in  
5 advance of demonstrations, for the purposes of planning  
6 routes?

7 A. I think -- I think -- I don't recall -- I think there  
8 may have been one or two incidents where they  
9 demonstrated where -- where a demonstration had been  
10 banned, or -- you know, the Home Secretary had banned  
11 a demonstration. But in the main, I'm pretty sure that  
12 they -- they co-operated with police. But they couldn't  
13 always control -- once -- once the demonstration was  
14 taking place, they didn't have control over everything  
15 that took place at the demonstration.

16 Q. But if they co-operated with the police in advance of  
17 the demonstration, and, as you say, no one had any  
18 control over how certain people might behave at  
19 a demonstration, how did the information you provided  
20 ahead of the demonstration put your uniformed colleagues  
21 in my better position on the day?

22 A. Well, it wasn't -- as I said to you earlier on, sir, we  
23 were a small cog in a big wheel. So intelligence was  
24 coming in from other -- other areas: from local police;  
25 if -- if the demonstration -- if people were coming from

1 other parts of the country to a London demonstration,  
2 information was being fed down from -- from our forces.

3 So, it was -- it was then up to departments within  
4 Special Branch to -- to -- to draw up a -- information  
5 that would be useful to the uniformed police who were --  
6 who were policing a demonstration.

7 So -- so it wasn't only an input from people in my  
8 unit that -- that had -- that may or may not have been  
9 of use, but it was coming from other -- other forms of  
10 -- of information intelligence.

11 Q. You've told us that there were -- I think you said  
12 elements within the SWP who were more prone to violence.  
13 You've provided some reporting on a group known as  
14 "Red Action"?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you describe them in your statement as a breakaway  
17 group of the SWP in their 20s and 30s, who aimed to get  
18 into violent confrontations with the National Front; is  
19 that right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you would hear, you say in your witness statement,  
22 by word of mouth from other SWP members what they would  
23 get up to?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Can we please have up on the screen -- it's tab 89, Sir,

1 in the hard copy bundle -- {UCPI/17111}.

2 HN96, this is a report dated 22 January 1982.

3 Paragraph 2 reads:

4 "Former members of the ... [paraphrase] (SWP) in  
5 East London who recently were expelled and/or resigned  
6 from that organisation have formed themselves into  
7 a group under the title of 'Red Action'. It is believed  
8 that on formation the group consisted of 15 - 20 persons  
9 and that one of the major differences with the SWP is  
10 that the members of the new group consider  
11 a more 'confrontationist' attitude should be adopted in  
12 the question of anti-racist work."

13 A. Right.

14 Q. Is this an example of elements of the SWP who might have  
15 been more prone to violence being expelled and/or  
16 resigning to form a different group to pursue those  
17 aims, which appear on the face of it to have been  
18 incompatible with the aims of the SWP?

19 A. This was my report. I -- I was familiar with some of  
20 these individuals that were involved in this Red Action.  
21 Their -- their aims were to confront the National Front.  
22 They saw it as their -- anything -- anything which -- to  
23 do with that sort of demonstration, they would be there  
24 looking for trouble, looking to cause trouble.

25 I'm looking at the date there. I -- I -- I wasn't

1 -- I wasn't as involved with the SWP at that time, but  
2 I was obviously -- I was in an area where -- where  
3 I would meet people who I obtained information by,  
4 you know, if I had a chat to somebody in a pub, or I was  
5 at another meeting, these -- these things came up. So  
6 I was aware of -- I was aware of -- of this group called  
7 "Red Action" that were maybe -- maybe, you know, that  
8 age group that I've mentioned, and their main objective  
9 was to -- was to cause trouble.

10 Q. Can we just move on to the next report in the bundle, so  
11 it's tab 90, {UCPI/17144}.

12 If we look at paragraph 2 of the report. Thank you.

13 That reports what was set out in a Red Action  
14 leaflet. And it says:

15 "Red Action is a new name to most people.

16 The majority of our membership left the SWP because of  
17 the SWP's lack of support for the Irish struggle plus  
18 the deliberate undermining by the leadership of  
19 the anti-fascist struggle. Others were expelled on  
20 the trumped-up charge of being 'squadists'. By this  
21 the SWP leadership means any comrades who dare challenge  
22 their soft line on anti-fascism and a retreat from any  
23 street opposite."

24 Do you recall individuals being expelled from  
25 the SWP on the basis that they were what were described

1 as "squadists"?

2 A. I don't have -- I don't have specific knowledge of it,  
3 but I knew this was going on. I mean, again, I have to  
4 say, it was not -- I was not so closely involved with  
5 the SWP in '82, but I was -- I was in -- in an  
6 environment where I came across people that were. And  
7 obviously in conversation -- general conversation with  
8 them, this became apparent, that --

9 Q. Was the SWP keen to distance itself from those --

10 A. No, I can't answer that -- that question for you, sir.  
11 This leaflet, written by presumably one of the people in  
12 Red Action, explains their -- their reasoning for  
13 leaving the SWP. But I -- I don't -- I -- I don't have  
14 any -- any knowledge of that, any personal knowledge of  
15 that. Yes, that's -- that's the -- that's the best  
16 answer I can give you on that, I'm afraid.

17 Q. I want to ask you now about the positions of  
18 responsibility that you held within the SWP, please.

19 And if we can get up, please -- Sir, this is tab 18  
20 in the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/13376}. Thank you.

21 This is a report which relates to a meeting of  
22 the Clapton branch of the Socialist Workers Party on  
23 5 September 1979. The report is dated  
24 19 September 1979. And if we look at paragraph 4:

25 "During the course of a general discussion,

1 [Privacy] [Privacy] reported that sales  
2 of 'Socialist Worker' had improved slightly and now  
3 averaged about forty sales a week. However, Mike James  
4 felt that this figure could be increased with a little  
5 more effort on the part of those who rarely sold  
6 the paper."

7 Pausing there, is that a report about your  
8 involvement in the discussions at this particular  
9 meeting?

10 A. What was the question again, sir, sorry?

11 Q. Is that a report about your involvement in  
12 the discussions -- "Mike James" is that a reference to  
13 you?

14 A. How do I answer that?

15 Q. Well, "yes" or "no"?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Then go on to paragraph 5:

18 "The absence of any member on the District Committee  
19 was discussed and, after some argument, Mike James ..."

20 That was your cover name, wasn't it, that you were  
21 deployed under?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. "... Mike James was nominated for the position.

24 Although somewhat reluctant at first, James eventually  
25 accepted his nomination and was duly elected."

1           Is this the report that details your election to  
2           the Hackney district committee of the SWP in  
3           September 1979?

4       A.   It means that I was put into a position of -- that  
5           I didn't want, but I didn't have a lot of choice,  
6           I don't think, of pushing -- pushing the newspaper.  
7           I think that was -- that was what it was all about.

8           Clearly, I -- I'd been involved in this organisation  
9           for a couple of years by then, and so I was -- I was,  
10          you know, well accepted. I'd like to think respected.  
11          I -- in the main, I -- I -- I found the individuals  
12          involved a decent bunch. But I wasn't -- I wasn't --

13       Q.   This is about nine months after you began your  
14           deployment?

15       A.   Is it nine months, was it? Okay. Well, nine months,  
16           what I've just said still applies.

17       Q.   You said it was a role you didn't really want to do.

18       A.   Yes.

19       Q.   You said in paragraph 150 {MPS/745772/30} of your  
20           witness statement that you remember being concerned that  
21           being on the committee, this committee, might place you  
22           in too much of a position of prominence, so expressed  
23           reluctance to undertake the role. Is that because of  
24           the guidance or advice you'd been given by HN296 about  
25           not putting yourself in such a position of prominence?



1       A. Well, you keep referring back to that, and of course  
2           that was something that I -- I took on board at the  
3           time. But by this time I'd made up my own mind about --  
4           about how -- how I could operate and not be -- and not  
5           make myself available any time that anybody suited to  
6           get in touch with me. That was what I was mainly aware  
7           of. And bearing in mind I was -- I was leading -- I had  
8           two lives to lead, and I felt that if I was -- if I took  
9           on this role, then people would want to be able to get  
10          hold of me a lot more frequently than I -- I -- I wanted  
11          -- I wanted.

12       Q. Because you said you didn't have much choice in it --

13       A. Well --

14       Q. -- but what you say in paragraph 151 of your statement  
15          is:

16                "I was, however, mindful that being on a committee  
17                like this might provide me with an opportunity to learn  
18                more information about the activities that the SWP were  
19                planning to participate in, so I agreed to do it."

20                That rather suggests, doesn't it, that you weighed  
21                up the pros and cons and decided to agree to perform  
22                the role?

23       A. Yes, yes. Your statement does sum up what I was  
24          thinking at the time. I wasn't sure it was going to  
25          necessarily provide me with more useful intelligence or

1           useful information, but I felt that my position at the  
2           time in an organisation which wasn't that strong --  
3           I mean, we're not talking about a branch of -- of  
4           hundreds of people, we're talking about a small --  
5           a small group of people. And without wishing to labour  
6           the point, I felt this was something I could -- I could  
7           offer to do, and it may have been some use to support my  
8           presence there.

9           Q. And role of the district committee, as you recall it,  
10           was that as a conduit, in effect, between the central  
11           committee and the local branches below district level?

12          A. As I remember it, yes, yes. We went there to -- to  
13           plan. We were there to support the centre, yes, yeah.

14          Q. Would -- in the event decisions needed to be taken by  
15           the district committee as to how to proceed, were votes  
16           carried out?

17          A. As I recall, there would have been some form of -- of --  
18           you know, agreement about what was (inaudible). I think  
19           it was -- I can't remember exactly, but there was --  
20           there was -- there was some system whereby people would  
21           agree or not agree to either attend a meeting, or sell  
22           the newspaper, or take part in a demonstration. So yes,  
23           there was -- there was some degree of structure to those  
24           meetings.

25          Q. We're going to look at a report in a moment from

1 February 1980 which refers to the district committee in  
2 the Hackney area comprising six individuals; does that  
3 sound about right?

4 A. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

5 Q. And so the decisions that were to be taken by  
6 the district committee -- you say that some way of  
7 reaching agreement had to be arrived at -- you played  
8 a part in those decision-making processes, did you?

9 A. As I recall, I would have -- I would have -- yes,  
10 I would have -- I mean, I wouldn't have instigated  
11 anything. As I say, most of -- most of what the SWP had  
12 got involved in would have been directed from -- from  
13 the sort of central full time office.

14 Q. Would you accept that by being on a relatively small  
15 committee, which, as you've described, needed to take  
16 decisions about what direction things might move in, you  
17 were necessarily shaping activities of the SWP?

18 A. I didn't see it that way, sir, no. I just -- I mean,  
19 I think the decisions were minor. The decisions we were  
20 making about whether we were -- whether we could get  
21 some of our membership to attend a demonstration, or  
22 whether we could -- as I've said in one of those  
23 reports, whether we could sell more newspapers -- it was  
24 -- it was -- it was pretty low level that we -- you know  
25 that -- in this district -- district group held.

1 Q. Can we now move on, please -- take that document down  
2 and can we please have up tab 32, {UCPI/13803}.

3 Perhaps if we could just start at the top. It's an  
4 intelligence report dated 26 February 1980. Paragraph 2  
5 says it's:

6 "A brief summary of the branch structure and present  
7 membership of the Socialist Workers Party in the Hackney  
8 area ..."

9 And then there's a series of headlines. Number (i):

10 "Membership: the current membership figure for  
11 the Hackney area is between 90 -- 100 people. This  
12 membership is distributed between four geographical  
13 branches and a number of workplace branches."

14 Yes? There's then a description of those branches.  
15 And then (iii):

16 "District committee: the Hackney District Committee  
17 consists of six members who are responsible ..."

18 A. I can't see that.

19 Q. I'm so sorry. Can we please scroll down. Thank you  
20 very much.

21 (iii):

22 "District committee: the Hackney District Committee  
23 consists of six members who are responsible for  
24 coordinating the activities of the branches. These  
25 members, who are elected from the various branches

1 are~..."

2 And then we see five names redacted on privacy  
3 grounds, and then below that "Mike James", your cover  
4 name, yes? And to the right "District Book Organiser".

5 Can you help us with what "District Book Organiser"  
6 involved as a role?

7 A. You know, I can't exactly remember what -- what -- what  
8 that entailed. I mean, when you read that report, it  
9 sounds like this committee was pretty sort of a grand  
10 type of affair, but it was -- it was -- it was small  
11 politics, really.

12 Q. Well, can we take that document -- that document down  
13 then, please, and move to tab 58 in the hard copy  
14 bundle, {UCPI/16207}.

15 This is a report dated 30 January 1981, and we see  
16 paragraph 2:

17 "[Privacy], who recently joined the Stoke Newington  
18 Branch of the Socialist Workers Party, was elected on  
19 14.1.81, to the Hackney District Committee of the SWP."

20 Yes? So reporting on the fact that

21 -- (overspeaking) --

22 A. -- (overspeaking) --

23 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- had been elected to this committee.

24 If it was so insignificant, why might it have been  
25 considered necessary to report the fact that this person

1 had been elected to that role?

2 A. Have I said this is my report? I must have done,  
3 otherwise you wouldn't be producing it.

4 So '81, my involvement was not as great. This is  
5 something I may have picked up by -- by not going to  
6 a meeting but just by talking to people that I -- I was  
7 familiar with from my previous association with the --  
8 with the SWP.

9 Q. Before we move on from -- (overspeaking) --

10 A. -- (overspeaking) -- don't think you should put too much  
11 significance on the fact that he was a member of this  
12 committee. I mean, it was -- it was -- the word -- it  
13 was a very loose association, this committee. I mean,  
14 it was -- it was -- it was an organisation --  
15 organisation trying to look like they were an organised  
16 bunch, but in the main it was not too well organised.

17 Q. Before we leave this report, you can see in paragraph 3  
18 that it was reported that:

19 "He ..."

20 That's the individual the subject of the report:

21 "... continues to be employed as a fireman at the  
22 [Privacy] [Privacy] Fire Station, where he is the Fire  
23 Brigade Union (FBU) representative."

24 Then there is a description about what activities he  
25 was responsible for:

1 "During the recent firemens' pay dispute ..."

2 Yes?

3 A. Yes, I'm reading, yes.

4 I -- the more I look at this, and looking at  
5 the dates, sir, I don't think this is -- this is me.  
6 I don't think my -- it looks like I would have known  
7 this individual quite well, and obviously had an  
8 understanding of what was going on. I -- I don't  
9 recollect my involvement with this organisation to that  
10 extent in '81. So if I -- if I'd said at the time when  
11 I was compiling my statement this was mine, I --  
12 I suspect that I made a mistake.

13 That doesn't answer your question, does it? I don't  
14 think this is my report, sir.

15 Q. Let's move on, please. Can we now have tab 20 in  
16 the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/13468}. This is an  
17 intelligence report dated 10 October 1979.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. It relates to a meeting of the Clapton branch of the SWP  
20 on 3 October 1979, yes?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. If we look at paragraph 3, it says:

23 "The meeting, chaired by Mike James, initially dealt  
24 with business matters of the Branch. The following  
25 items were then discussed ..."

1           And then there's a summary of some of the items that  
2           were discussed, yes?

3           A. Yeah.

4           Q. And I think you've explained that there would be  
5           occasions when you would chair your local branch  
6           meetings; is that right?

7           A. Yeah, yeah.

8           Q. And that, is it right that the reason why you might find  
9           yourself in the position of having to chair these  
10          meetings is because you were on the district committee?

11          A. No, probably the reason was that nobody else wanted to  
12          do it.

13          Q. Surely being on the district committee, one of six in  
14          a membership, we just saw, of something close to --

15          A. You make it sound like it's a very grand title -- I mean  
16          this -- this -- this heightened position of being on  
17          the district committee. It was a case of who was  
18          available at the time to perhaps chair a meeting. I --  
19          I probably -- I would -- I would not have normally  
20          wanted to have done that, but -- so I -- so -- but yes,  
21          it was me who chaired the meeting. What else -- what  
22          else can I tell you? I mean, it -- it was a loose  
23          association of people would attend these meetings, all  
24          members of the SWP; some active and some not so active.

25          Q. Were you at all concerned during 1979 and 1980 about



1 the fact that, through being on the district committee,  
2 and as a result finding yourself chairing meetings of  
3 the local branch, you were in a position of prominence  
4 such that you might have been at greater risk of  
5 compromise?

6 A. Well, that's something I obviously had to consider.  
7 Clearly, I obviously felt more secure because I took  
8 these roles on with a -- but as -- as -- as you said  
9 earlier -- I -- I did step away from the SWP in whatever  
10 it was --

11 Q. We'll come to that shortly.

12 But did you at any point during 1979 and 1980 have  
13 any concerns that you were playing too great a role in  
14 the activities of the SWP -- (overspeaking) --

15 A. No, no, no. What I -- (overspeaking) -- was that any --  
16 any information/intelligence I acquired didn't  
17 necessarily depend on me being in a position of -- of --  
18 a more responsible position, put it like that, which had  
19 the potential to -- to expose my -- my undercover  
20 identity more. Because clearly, you know, if I was more  
21 active, then people would want to be in touch with me  
22 more, they'd want to know where I was, what I was doing,  
23 if -- you know, if I was able to do this, able to do  
24 that. So I was aware of -- of -- of the -- of the --  
25 that it could pose a problem for me, but I felt that it

1           was something that I could -- I could do without that  
2           being an issue really.

3       Q.   If we look at this report that's up on the screen  
4           presently, if you look there, we can see it at  
5           the moment, paragraph 3(a), the first item of business  
6           that was discussed was the "Blair Peach inquest"; can  
7           you see that?

8       A.   Yes.

9       Q.   And we see there that this report states that:

10                   "Comrades were encouraged to take part in a picket  
11           outside Stoke Newington Police Station on the evening of  
12           10th October and also to demonstrate outside Hammersmith  
13           Coroners Court at 9 am on 11th October."

14      A.   Yes.

15      Q.   Blair Peach, as is well known, died as a result of  
16           injuries suffered on 23 April 1979. Do you recall that?

17      A.   Well, I do, yes, now that you've reminded me. I -- yes,  
18           I do, yeah.

19      Q.   That was at a demonstration in Southall on that  
20           particular date. Were you at the demonstration in  
21           Southall on 23 April 1979?

22      A.   No.

23      Q.   Did you ever, during the course of your deployment, meet  
24           Blair Peach prior to that date?

25      A.   No.

1 Q. Did you ever, during the course of your deployment,  
2 either before that date or after that date, meet  
3 Celia Stubbs?

4 A. Meet who?

5 Q. Celia Stubbs?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you recall attending any SDS safe house meetings in  
8 the immediate aftermath of the death of Blair Peach in  
9 April 1979, in particular between 23 April and 28 April,  
10 so at the end of April 1979, immediately after  
11 the demonstration at which he suffered his fatal  
12 injuries?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Do you recall there being any discussion at all at any  
15 SDS safe house meeting of the death of Blair Peach?

16 A. I don't recall, sir, no. No.

17 Q. I'd like us to look, please, behind tab 9 in the hard  
18 copy bundle. It's {UCPI/21297}.

19 Now, before we look at the detail of the report,  
20 HN96, you were asked about this report for the purposes  
21 of producing your witness statement, and what you say  
22 about it is at paragraph 240 {MPS/745772/49} of your  
23 witness statement, which I'll just read to you now:

24 "I have been shown a report dated 30 May 1979 (...  
25 [reference] UCPI... 21297), regarding a leaflet issued

1 by the Friends of Blair Peach Committee. I do not know  
2 if this report is mine, anyone could have submitted this  
3 leaflet. I did not report on this Committee, but  
4 I might have handed in a leaflet I came into possession  
5 of. Lots of things were reported on without there being  
6 pre-existing intelligence on an individual or group."

7 Looking at this report, it's right that paragraph 1  
8 states:

9 "Submitted herewith is a leaflet, which has received  
10 from a reliable source. The leaflet was issued by  
11 the Friends of Blair Peach Committee and seeks to  
12 highlight the circumstances which it maintains led to  
13 the death of Blair Peach at Southall on 23 April 1979,  
14 during an anti-National Front demonstration."

15 Paragraph 2:

16 "It contains a list of activities necessary to widen  
17 the campaign, especially within the trade union  
18 movement, and is mainly the work of [Privacy], who was  
19 with Peach at the time he received the injuries which it  
20 is alleged caused his death."

21 3:

22 "It is, perhaps, of interest to note that [Privacy],  
23 a dedicated member of the Socialist Workers Party and  
24 a close personal friend of Peach, is highly critical of  
25 the way the SWP Central Committee are handling the whole

1 issue and especially of the Party's coverage in  
2 the 'Socialist Worker' newspaper. She has let it be  
3 known that she intends to rectify this situation by  
4 publicising the aims and activities of the Friends of  
5 Blair Peach Committee at every available opportunity."

6 HN96, this intelligence report does more than simply  
7 produce a leaflet produced by the Friends of Blair Peach  
8 Committee; would you agree with that?

9 A. Yes, it reviews what's been said in the leaflet, yeah,  
10 yeah.

11 Q. It does review what's been said in the leaflet, but it  
12 also goes on to identify the fact that this leaflet is  
13 mainly the work of a named person, yes? And identifies  
14 that that named person was somebody who was with Peach  
15 at the time he received the injuries which it is alleged  
16 caused his death, and then goes on to explain in some  
17 detail what that person, who is said to have authored  
18 the leaflet -- what that person's views were of how  
19 the SWP had handled the incident. And note, here, we're  
20 at the end of May 1979, so approximately one month or so  
21 after the events at Southall.

22 In your witness statement you say you "don't know if  
23 the report's mine, anyone could have submitted this  
24 leaflet". Given the report does more than simply  
25 produce the leaflet and identifies the author and

1 appears to demonstrate a relatively good knowledge of  
2 the author and the author's views, does that assist you  
3 with whether or not that's your report?

4 A. Not my report.

5 Q. Sorry?

6 A. No, it's not my report. But, having read it, I suspect  
7 it's the report of one of my colleagues that may have  
8 been closer to the person concerned.

9 Q. Having read this report, you would now say --

10 A. Well, I'm not saying categorically, I'm saying it's  
11 possible that it's -- it's -- it's been -- been  
12 submitted by another undercover officer that would have  
13 known this -- this person -- this -- this "[Privacy]"  
14 person.

15 Does that answer your question?

16 Q. Was any of the information in paragraphs 2 or 3 known to  
17 you at the time, to the best of your recollection?

18 A. No, I mean, I was aware of -- of the Blair Peach  
19 problem. I -- I must say, my recollection is not very  
20 good, and I know that this poor man was -- was -- was  
21 killed in Southall, and it was -- you know, it was -- it  
22 was splashed all over -- all over the papers at the  
23 time. But I had -- I had little to do with it, apart  
24 from that earlier statement that you -- that we read,  
25 saying that the central committee of the SWP were

1 encouraging people to protest about what had taken  
2 place. But I had no -- no direct involvement or any  
3 personal knowledge of -- of the campaign, but I was  
4 aware of it.

5 Q. You were asked, for the purposes of producing your  
6 witness statement, about a report concerning attendance  
7 at Blair Peach's funeral. And you were clear in your  
8 witness statement that the report you were shown was not  
9 your report, and that you did not attend the funeral of  
10 Blair Peach.

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you recall any discussion at the SDS safe house of  
13 any attendance at Blair Peach's funeral or the need to  
14 report who was present?

15 A. I don't, sir, no. As I said to you, my -- my  
16 recollection -- and I'm pretty sure it's fairly clear --  
17 is that there was -- there was little discussion about  
18 what individuals -- what undercover officers  
19 individually were getting involved in and what was --  
20 what was going on. Those discussions would take place  
21 with management. You know, obviously management would  
22 -- would probably want to get a better understanding of  
23 what that officer -- officer was -- was seeing and  
24 hearing about. But there was no -- no -- to my -- to my  
25 recollection, no major discussion about -- about this --

1           about this Blair Peach incident.

2           Q. You say there was "no major discussion"; was there any  
3           discussion at all?

4           A. My language opens up that question for you.

5                     I would say I don't recall. I don't recall.  
6           I suspect there may have been. You know, people would  
7           obviously have been talking about Blair Peach, because  
8           it was -- it was a sad incident at that time. So -- but  
9           I don't recall what those discussions were, or if there  
10          were any discussions, if that helps you? That's --  
11          that's -- that's about the best I can do for you, I'm  
12          afraid.

13          Q. Do you know of any reason why it might have been  
14          considered necessary to produce an intelligence report  
15          detailing who attended his funeral?

16          A. No. No, apart from -- apart from, again, getting  
17          a picture about people that may be involved in any  
18          future demonstrations in support of what took place.  
19          Not -- not -- not in support, but in condemnation of  
20          what took -- of what had happened there. So it would  
21          have been useful to have had a -- an idea who might be  
22          involved in any future protests.

23          Q. If we look, please, at tab 21 in the hard copy bundle,  
24          {UCPI/13505}. This is an intelligence report dated  
25          16 October 1979, which reads:



1           "1. The undermentioned persons were amongst some  
2           100 persons who took part in a picket, organised by  
3           the Socialist Workers Party, outside Stoke Newington  
4           Police Station on Wednesday, 10th October, 1979 between  
5           7.30 pm and 8.30 pm, to protest against the death of  
6           Blair Peach."

7           Yes?

8           And then we don't need to scroll down but, in short,  
9           the rest of the first page is a blocked-out list of  
10          names, for privacy reasons, and that carries on over  
11          the page, to page 2 {UCPI/13505/2}.

12          That is, I think, the picket which -- attendance at  
13          which was being encouraged in one of the reports we  
14          looked at earlier. The report does not -- the report  
15          does not record any episode of public disorder at this  
16          particular picket on 10 October 1979.

17         A. No.

18         Q. Why was it considered necessary or appropriate to record  
19          the names, insofar as it was possible, of people who  
20          took part in this particular picket to protest against  
21          the death of Blair Peach?

22         A. Well, with all due respect, sir, you're reiterating some  
23          of the questions you've asked me previously about  
24          individuals. Why did I report on this individual, why  
25          did I put this -- I -- I -- my answer to your question

1 here is, it was to identify people that were active in  
2 -- in -- in protesting in that campaign that may  
3 potentially cause problems in the future, that -- that  
4 this information was -- was put into a system that was  
5 non-judgmental, unless it had to be. So -- so if that's  
6 my report -- and I think it is -- there would have been  
7 no reason why I would not have highlighted individuals  
8 that were attending that picket.

9 Q. But why the focus -- you've explained why Special Branch  
10 might have been interested in who was a member of  
11 the SWP, and why attendance at SWP demonstrations might  
12 have been of interest, in your view. Why the focus on  
13 who was attending a protest against the death of  
14 Blair Peach?

15 A. Well, probably because most of the people there were SWP  
16 members.

17 Q. Why would you need to -- wouldn't you simply report  
18 the fact that they were members of the SWP, rather than  
19 the fact they took part in this protest?

20 A. Well, again, we come back to this crucial question  
21 about, were individuals of interest to Special Branch.  
22 And answer is, of course they were, because they may  
23 have come to attention -- or they may come to attention  
24 at a later time, in circumstances that would have  
25 required more direct police action. So it would have

1           been remiss of me not to have identified them, just --  
2           just to say it was a number of people there. So that's  
3           why they were identified.

4       Q.   If we just then move forward, tab 40 in the hard copy  
5           bundle, {UCPI/13935}. A report dated 2 May 1980. It  
6           states:

7                 "On Wednesday, 23rd April 1980, between 7.30 pm and  
8           8.45 pm, outside Stoke Newington Police Station  
9           the following members of the SWP took part in a picket  
10          in protest against the death of Blair Peach."

11                Now, this is approximately six months on from  
12          the report we've just looked at. Had there been any  
13          incidents of public order concern that meant that  
14          the police were still seeking to report on the identity  
15          of those who took part in these sorts of protests?

16       A.   Well, I feel like I'm -- I keep reiterating my answer to  
17           your question.

18                To a large extent, it wasn't for me to -- to  
19          appraise, to -- to be careful what I submitted.  
20          The object I felt my role had was to pass information  
21          that came -- that I became aware of, some of which may  
22          be of absolutely no use at all, and some which may prove  
23          to be of value later on. So if it was me putting that  
24          report in, that was why -- it was -- it wasn't saying  
25          that I was concerned -- I was concerned about a public

1           order problem, it was saying these are people that  
2           currently are taking -- have taken part in this  
3           particular picket, they may be of interest in  
4           the future.

5       Q.   So was the focus then, certainly as far as you  
6           understood it, a continued focus on public order?

7       A.   Oh, it was always about public order.  It wasn't about  
8           -- it was never about particular individuals, unless of  
9           course they -- they were -- they -- they were committing  
10          criminal activities.

11                 But, you know, in the main, my association with  
12           the SWP, I came across people that were -- that were  
13           genuine in their politics, that were genuine in their --  
14           in -- in their beliefs of protest.  But it wasn't just  
15           about reporting about them, it was reporting about what  
16           this organisation was doing and the potential that it  
17           had to cause police problems.

18       Q.   Just pausing there then, can we please look at tab 48 in  
19           the hard copy bundle {UCPI/14149}, please.  Thank you  
20           very much.

21                 This is a report dated 28 July 1980.  Paragraph 2  
22           reads as follows:

23                 "The 'Friends of Blair Peach' committee are at  
24           present attempting to form a national coordinating body  
25           with other such committees concerned with the cases

1 of 'State brutality' by the police and prison  
2 authorities. Committees concerned would include,  
3 the 'Richard "Cartoon" Campbell Campaign' and the 'Jimmy  
4 Kelly Campaign'. They feel that such a move would widen  
5 the political arguments behind the alleged 'brutality'  
6 and increase publicity for any new incidents that might  
7 occur."

8 How is that report assisting -- or how did that  
9 report assist the police in managing public order?

10 A. So it's not my report; I'm pretty sure of that.

11 I suppose it was to continue to paint a picture.  
12 I mean, this -- how this -- how this report was dealt  
13 with, if -- your understanding of Special Branch  
14 probably is enough to -- to know that there were --  
15 there were teams of officers that -- that had  
16 responsibility for extreme left wing groups and right  
17 wing groups, etc, that spent their time analysing  
18 intelligence, information, whatever you -- however you  
19 want to -- this is information, isn't it? And -- and  
20 assessing the potential for concern to police. So for  
21 me to say how this would help, it's difficult for me to  
22 say. Would I have put it in? Probably I would have  
23 done, yes. But I -- I don't believe it was my -- my  
24 report.

25 Q. Are you aware of any particular desire on the part of

1 the police to obtain information about the Friends of  
2 Blair Peach Committee because of the fact that it was  
3 a campaign focused on what is described there as "'State  
4 brutality' by the police" --

5 A. Was I aware of more in-depth enquiries; is that what  
6 you're asking me?

7 Q. No.

8 A. (inaudible) -- but the unit I was on, and my role in  
9 particular, was to feed in -- and I keep saying this,  
10 with intelligence, because we were an intelligence  
11 organisation, but this information, feeding information  
12 into a system that then had -- had to assess how that  
13 information could be of use to helping police.

14 And I -- I would have to admit that a lot of it  
15 would probably be of no particular interest. But it  
16 wasn't for the undercover officers to make that  
17 decision, it was really a case of, this is what we're --  
18 we're hearing, this is what's coming across and -- and  
19 submitting it in -- in that way.

20 Q. HN96, just finally on this particular area, in terms of  
21 the Blair Peach information, can we please have up on  
22 the screen -- it's tab 62 in the hard copy bundle --  
23 {MPS/730184}. Thank you. It's the second page, please,  
24 {MPS/730184/2}.

25 Now, this is a report dated 19 March 1981. I think,

1           just for context, HN96, it's right, isn't it, that you  
2           started to produce reporting largely focused on  
3           the Troops Out Movement from around about the end of  
4           1980; is that right?

5           A. I believe so, sir. I couldn't be exact, but I suspect  
6           your information is better than mine, but yes, I think  
7           that's about the right date, yes.

8           Q. I want to look at this stage at paragraph 3 of this  
9           report, which reads as follows:

10                   "The TOM [Troops Out Movement] is further planning  
11                   to support the proposed Blair Peach Commemorative  
12                   Demonstration planned for 23rd April 1981. It has been  
13                   proposed that this be a 'major mobilisation' as it is  
14                   believed that the National Front are planning a counter  
15                   demonstration."

16                   Now, by this stage the report is focused on  
17                   the Troops Out Movement.

18           A. Okay.

19           Q. But nevertheless there is the reference included there  
20           to the fact that the TOM was planning to support  
21           the proposed commemorative demonstration planned for  
22           23 April 1981; that's two years after the events at  
23           Southall.

24           A. Okay.

25           Q. Did you consider anything to do with Blair Peach and any

1           demonstrations around celebration or the commemoration  
2           of those anniversaries to be of particular significance?

3       A. No, I mean -- no, I'm not quite sure what you're asking  
4       me to -- to answer here. The Blair Peach campaign was  
5       clearly a focus for a long time for various  
6       organisations, including SWP and TOM. And probably  
7       rightly so.

8           Did I have any -- any real involvement in it?  
9       I don't think so, apart from if it became a matter of  
10       discussion where I was involved, then it was a case of  
11       whether people chose to go along to a mobilisation and  
12       support it. But I had no -- I had no real direct  
13       involvement with anything connected with the Blair Peach  
14       campaign.

15       Q. Can you just help us, just before we leave this  
16       document, with one final point.

17           If you look underneath paragraph 4, "References", it  
18       says, "Blair Peach Commemorative Demonstration", then  
19       there is a reference to the right of that "371/81/17"?

20       A. Yes. What's your question?

21       Q. Is that a registry file reference for that particular  
22       demonstration?

23       A. I would assume so, sir, yes. I -- yes, I think -- yes,  
24       I would say that was probably what it is, yeah.

25       Q. Do you know what, for example, the digits "371" at



1 the beginning denote?

2 A. I can't help you there, I'm afraid. I mean, I'm pretty  
3 sure it's a -- it's a Special Branch registration  
4 number, but I -- I don't know what -- I don't know  
5 exactly what it -- what it signifies.

6 Q. I'd like just to look briefly at two other examples of  
7 reports you produced in connection with the SWP, or  
8 during the time of your deployment into the SWP.

9 Can we look, please, at tab 35 in the hard copy  
10 bundle, which is {UCPI/13868}.

11 This is a report dated 24 March 1980, and it records  
12 the fact that:

13 "On Monday, 17th March 1980 at 7 pm at the Methodist  
14 Central Hall, Westminster ... the Labour Coordinating  
15 Committee held a 'Debate of the decade' on the subject  
16 of 'The Crisis and the Future of the Left', chaired by  
17 Peter Hain. About 2,500 persons were present.  
18 The debate never materialised as a discussion and  
19 comprised six speakers explaining their personal  
20 politics and dissecting the politics of their fellow  
21 speakers."

22 Do you recall attending this event?

23 A. No, sir. I didn't -- I didn't attend this event. Well,  
24 after nearly 40 years I can say that with a degree of  
25 certainty, I didn't attend this report -- this -- this

1 event, no.

2 Q. Because this was a public --

3 A. Yes, yes.

4 Q. -- (inaudible) at which a number of individuals spoke,  
5 including Members of Parliament?

6 A. Is that right? I mean, yes.

7 Q. Well, I think you see on that page there "Persons  
8 identified as being present" included "Tony Benn MP  
9 (Speaker)"?

10 A. Oh yes, I beg your pardon. Yes, I can see that now,  
11 yes, yes.

12 Q. And there's another example further down the page,  
13 another MP, and also now Lord Peter Hain was the Chair  
14 of the event.

15 A. Right.

16 Q. But you don't recall attending this event?

17 A. No, sir.

18 Q. If you look, please, at -- can we have up on the screen  
19 tab 107, {UCPI/18229}, please.

20 I'm sorry, that reference is -- the tab reference is  
21 wrong. I'm sorry about that.

22 Sorry, it's tab 56, sir -- I'm sorry about that --  
23 in the hard copy bundle.

24 It's {UCPI/16192}.

25 HN96, this is a report dated 28 January 1981, which

1 refers to the fact at paragraph 2:

2 "On Saturday 24 January, 1981 at the Hackney Trades  
3 and Labour Club the Anti-Apartheid Movement held  
4 a social in aid of South African trades unions. Some  
5 sixty persons attended.

6 "Amongst those present was [Privacy] of  
7 the Socialist Workers Party who stated that sole purpose  
8 of his attendance was to discover whether  
9 the AAM required assistance to shelter 'draft-dodgers'  
10 from the Republic of South Africa, who were presently  
11 being cared for in the UK by the AAM."

12 Then it says:

13 "4. Persons identified as being present ..."

14 And there are some names blocked out for privacy  
15 reasons.

16 You were asked about this report, and in your  
17 witness statement you say:

18 "I do not remember attending this particular event,  
19 but I may well have attended."

20 That's paragraph 167 {MPS/745772/34} of your witness  
21 statement:

22 "I would often go to the place this social was  
23 held."

24 Paragraph 168:

25 "If I did attend this event, the only reason that

1 I would have done so would have been to maintain my  
2 cover. However, my recollection is that I would not put  
3 in a report on a purely social event unless something of  
4 interest unexpectedly arose."

5 Looking at this report, what of potential interest  
6 to the police can you see contained within this report,  
7 please?

8 A. I'm not -- I'm not sure. It may have been me reported  
9 this, and I may have attended that social because it was  
10 a place I went to, and where I would meet people that  
11 may have been of -- have been able to provide me with  
12 some interesting information. I'm not sure what --  
13 what "draft-dodgers" means. Does it mean people legally  
14 in this country? If it was me putting that in, was  
15 I implying that these were illegals being sheltered from  
16 the Republic of South Africa?

17 If I put this report in, I'm not quite sure why,  
18 apart from -- from that -- that that's what -- you know  
19 what was said in paragraph 3. And whether that was of  
20 some interest to other -- other facets in my -- in my  
21 department, I'm not sure.

22 Q. Would you agree that on the face of it, this report  
23 would not assist with the policing of public order?

24 A. Well, it wasn't only about public order. I -- I've  
25 tried to give you an understanding of that. It was

1 about anything that may be of interest to police and  
2 Security Services. Public order was the prime reason  
3 for this unit to be set up, but of course there were  
4 other -- other aspects, other things that came into --  
5 came into -- became knowledge as a part of -- as  
6 a principle of -- of the job we were doing. That's  
7 the wrong language -- as a consequence of the job we  
8 were doing.

9 Q. That's why I asked the question as I did, HN96, and  
10 I asked you if you could identify anything of potential  
11 interest to the police in the report.

12 A. Sorry, say that again?

13 Q. That's why I asked you if you could identify anything of  
14 potential interest to the police in this report.

15 A. I would have thought so. I would have thought so.  
16 Reading that, if it was me submitting it, then I would  
17 have put it in -- I would have put it in because it  
18 could have been. There may have been issues with  
19 the South African Embassy that was concerned about draft  
20 dodgers being sheltered in the UK. I've no idea, sir.

21 As I say, this was information that was submitted in  
22 -- in good faith, and may have -- may or may not have  
23 been of some interest. But, you know, the South African  
24 authorities may have been quite interested in people  
25 dodging their -- I don't know.

1 Q. Just finally on this topic, tab 135 in the hard copy  
2 bundle, please, which is {UCPI/18700}.

3 This is an intelligence report dated  
4 16 February 1983, so towards the end of your deployment.  
5 Paragraph 2 states:

6 "[Privacy] a member of the Socialist Workers Party  
7 (SWP) recently acted as a steward on a Roach Family  
8 Support Committee demonstration in the Hackney area.

9 "He stated that for the past year he has been  
10 travelling in Africa, working as an electrician, and  
11 hoped to return there soon, but whilst in London would  
12 continue to be active in the SWP."

13 A. This is not my report. What -- what would be your  
14 question, was this a useful report to put into police?  
15 Is that -- or -- it's not my report.

16 Q. If it's not your report, I won't ask you about  
17 the contents, save I'll ask you this: why might  
18 the police have been interested as to whether or not  
19 members of the SWP were involved with family justice  
20 campaigns in the early 1980s?

21 A. Well, we come back to this same question, why were  
22 individuals identified and put into the Special Branch,  
23 you know, intelligence system. And I think I've already  
24 answered that: it's because they may come to light in --  
25 on future occasions. And there would be -- there would

1 be some -- there would be some information about them  
2 already in the system.

3 Didn't answer that very well. But that's the main  
4 reason why individuals and information about individuals  
5 was -- was submitted, that it may prove to be of -- of  
6 some benefit to police or to the Security Service at  
7 a future date. Or it may just be locked away in  
8 a filing system and never seen again.

9 Q. At the end of 1980 we know that the focus of your  
10 deployment shifted from SWP to the Troops Out Movement,  
11 and you've explained the reason for that in your witness  
12 statement.

13 Was you moving to report more on  
14 the Troops Out Movement in any way reflective of  
15 the SWP, in your eyes, or the eyes of the police,  
16 presenting less of a threat than it had done previously?

17 A. The answer's no. I think the police still --  
18 Special Branch and the police generally still perceived  
19 the SWP as having the potential to cause public order  
20 problems, and other problems. The reason I was  
21 encouraged to look at the Troops Out Movement more was  
22 because at that time we had no undercover knowledge of  
23 that organisation.

24 Q. I'm going to move on now to ask you about  
25 the Troops Out Movement and your deployment against

1 the Troops Out Movement. You say in paragraph 188  
2 {MPS/745772/38} of your witness statement:

3 "I believe that the principal reason that  
4 Special Branch was interested in the TOM was public  
5 order concerns, though there was an element of concern  
6 about whether it was providing support for the Irish  
7 Republican groups who may commit acts of terror."

8 A. Sorry, is that a question?

9 Q. Sorry, I'm reading. That's your paragraph 188 of your  
10 witness statement.

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Why did you understand there to be a concern that  
15 the Troops Out Movement might be providing support for  
16 Irish republican groups who may commit acts of terror?

17 A. Well, I don't think there was any -- there was -- there  
18 was a -- there was a -- a concern that -- that activists  
19 who openly supported a republican organisation that  
20 included the IRA could be persuaded at some point to  
21 provide logistic support to an active service unit. So  
22 there was a sort of a double -- a double whammy for  
23 asking somebody like myself to look at this  
24 organisation. One, in a -- in a -- to a lesser extent  
25 in the public order theatre, but also to try to draw



1 conclusions of whether there was a potential for more --  
2 more dangerous support, if you like, for -- for the IRA.

3 Q. Would you agree that the Troops Out Movement had two  
4 primary demands: first, calling for the withdrawal of  
5 British forces from Ireland, and; secondly, admitting  
6 Ireland's right to self-determination?

7 A. That was -- that's what -- what their main -- their main  
8 political objective was, yes.

9 Q. And you've said that "political objective" -- they  
10 considered, certainly in the literature that they've  
11 produced -- and we can turn it up if necessary -- they  
12 considered those to be democratic demands, to quote  
13 the literature.

14 A. Yes, yes. The police never looked at organisations  
15 because they were not democratic. I mean, that was no  
16 -- no concern of -- of the intelligence agencies(?). It  
17 was to uphold the democratic rights of people, but to  
18 stop extremists abusing those rights. I think that was  
19 -- that's -- and you would know that, sir. I mean, I'm  
20 not teaching you to suck eggs. The TOM -- the TOM had  
21 the potential to cause public order issues to police.  
22 They weren't seen to be a major issue because they  
23 weren't a big organisation, and -- but nevertheless they  
24 -- they were -- they were an organisation that warranted  
25 some looking at.

1           But underlying that, was this -- is it possible for  
2           this organisation, or people within that organisation,  
3           or using that as an umbrella, acting as -- you know,  
4           could -- could they be used as a support for PIRA. And  
5           that's certainly something that -- that I think was  
6           generally considered by my people and the  
7           Security Services.

8           Q. So as a result, you gradually moved away from the SWP,  
9           but what you do say in your witness statement is that  
10          you retained social contacts with members of the SWP?

11          A. Yes, I mean, I -- I frequented -- there was a number of  
12          -- this -- this Hackney trades union bar was a good  
13          venue to go and have a beer in. You'd bump into  
14          colleagues that were, for want of a better phrase,  
15          comrades. But I -- I -- I concentrated more on what was  
16          taking place within the TOM, as opposed to SWP. And  
17          that was at the -- at the instigation of my -- my -- my  
18          office -- you know, my department, who felt that that  
19          was a move that I should make, that they felt that there  
20          -- there was some -- that was -- that was -- that would  
21          be a useful move for -- that would be a useful thing for  
22          me to do to, to support the unit.

23          Q. How regularly would you socialise with the SWP members  
24          who you'd got to know?

25          A. Well, fairly frequently. I mean, I wasn't -- I wasn't

1 out on the -- not all the time, because as I said to you  
2 from the very beginning, I -- I -- I was very conscious  
3 of maintaining two lives. I had a family that -- and --  
4 but -- but I did, yeah, I did go to -- I maintained a --  
5 I maintained my -- my activities and my cover as much as  
6 I thought was appropriate and would give me access to  
7 hopefully good intelligence, good information.

8 MR GRAY: Sir, would that be a convenient moment? It's  
9 3.30?

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. So that everyone else knows where  
11 they stand, roughly how much longer?

12 MR GRAY: Sir, I'd say something in the region of 30 to 40  
13 minutes.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Then we'll break for a quarter of an hour.

15 MR GRAY: Sir, I think -- yes. I understood the revised  
16 timetable to involve a ten-minute break at this stage,  
17 but ...

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Oh, did it? If that's okay by the shorthand  
19 writers, then we'll break for ten minutes, not a quarter  
20 of an hour. Thank you for telling me.

21 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
22 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
23 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

24 The time is 3.30 pm, so we shall reconvene at 3.40 pm.  
25 Thank you.

1 (3.30 pm)

2 (A short break)

3 (3.40 pm)

4 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

5 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
6 proceedings.

7 Chairman.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

9 Mr Gray.

10 MR GRAY: Thank you, sir.

11 HN96, do you hear me?

12 A. Yes, hello.

13 Q. HN96, in your witness statement at paragraph 273  
14 {MPS/745772}, in the context of public order, you  
15 describe how you were involved in a sit-in in a Central  
16 London building during your time in the TOM, and that  
17 that was a protest in support of the IRA hunger strikes,  
18 "though in the end the police just let us get on  
19 with it".

20 Can we please have up on the screen tab 71 in  
21 the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/15367}.

22 This is a report dated 5 June 1981, which details an  
23 occupation of the second floor of the TUC's headquarters  
24 in Great Russell Street, WC1.

25 Paragraph 3 records that:

1           "The protesters barricaded themselves in the room  
2           and draped a 'Support the Hunger Strikers' banner from  
3           a window. Then they proceeded to address the general  
4           public from the window, and, using a megaphone,  
5           [Privacy] [Privacy] and [Privacy] [Privacy], called upon  
6           the TUC to end their silence on the hunger strikers. At  
7           12 noon the barricade was removed and the protesters  
8           were escorted quietly from the building by a few  
9           TU officials."

10           Does that report refer to the events you describe in  
11           paragraph 273 of your witness statement?

12           A. Yes.

13           Q. Did you consider that to be a lawful protest, occupying  
14           the headquarters of the TUC?

15           A. Well, we were trespassing. We weren't looking to break  
16           any law. I understand that I'm justifying my actions.  
17           I was part of that protest. I felt that it was  
18           something that I -- to assist in my, if you like,  
19           credibility in that organisation, I -- and I -- I saw  
20           that as a protest that I could get involved in. So  
21           I didn't see it as breaking the law.

22           Q. Did you have any concerns as a police officer about  
23           involving yourself in the occupation of an  
24           organisation's premises for the purpose of protest?

25           A. Of course, because it could have -- it could have turned

1           nasty, if that's the right way to describe it. But it  
2           didn't. My -- my -- my senior officers were aware that  
3           this was going to take place, and for obvious reasons  
4           decided that they would allow it to take place without  
5           reporting it in advance to police. And it went off as  
6           -- as I described in my report. The protest was made.  
7           The TUC officials, I think, probably had some sympathy  
8           with the -- the protest. I'm surmising all this now,  
9           but we were able to do the protest and leave, and no  
10          further action was taken.

11         Q. Can we just look, please, at tab 118 in the hard copy  
12          bundle. That's {UCPI/18643}.

13                 This is a report dated 22 September 1982,  
14          paragraph 2 of which reads:

15                 "On Wednesday, 27th October, 1982, at 7.30 pm at  
16          the Abeng Centre, Gresham Road, Brixton, the South  
17          London Troops Out Movement ... will hold a public  
18          meeting to protest about the appointment of Sir Kenneth  
19          Newman as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.  
20          Speakers will include Jonathan Rosenhead (British  
21          Society for Social Responsibility in Science) and  
22          a representative of the Brixton Defence Campaign."

23                 What would have been the purpose of reporting  
24          the fact that there was to be a public meeting to  
25          protest about the appointment of the new commissioner of

1 the Metropolitan Police?

2 A. Not my report, so, I can't easily answer your question  
3 off the top of my head. So, I -- I don't have an easy  
4 answer for you, I'm afraid.

5 Q. That's not your report, is that what you're saying?

6 A. Not my report, no.

7 Q. Okay.

8 I want to ask you now about the positions of  
9 responsibility that you took up whilst you were deployed  
10 against the Troops Out Movement.

11 You were nominated for the post of membership and  
12 affiliation secretary at a Hackney Troops Out meeting;  
13 is that right?

14 A. It wasn't as -- it wasn't as comprehensive as that, but  
15 -- but -- but I would say yes, and then you're going to  
16 ask me further questions on that. So we're trying to  
17 get some clarity on that.

18 Q. What you say in your witness statement at paragraph 202  
19 {MPS/745772} is that:

20 "Normally I would have shied away from a position  
21 like that out of concern that it would draw too much  
22 attention to me, but I decided that undertaking the role  
23 would give me a closer insight into the things that  
24 the TOM were doing."

25 Now, we've already looked today at some of the roles

1 that you played with the SWP. Is it the case that  
2 normally you would have shied away from positions like  
3 that, or is it the case that you felt that there might  
4 be a benefit from being involved with those sorts of  
5 committees?

6 A. I think my statement mis -- misrepresents what  
7 the actual role was. The role was more like membership  
8 secretary, not secretary of the TOM. I don't know if  
9 your understanding from what I've said is that I was  
10 the national secretary. I wasn't. I was -- I was --  
11 I was -- let me try to put this into context for you.

12 I was -- I was a member of a very active branch in  
13 East London, probably the most prominent branch of  
14 the TOM in the country. There was -- there was always  
15 a shortage of people willing to do jobs and activities.  
16 And this -- at one particular meeting I was asked would  
17 I -- would I consider being the -- the member secretary  
18 not --

19 Q. HN96, if it helps -- I don't think there's any dispute  
20 about this, but according to your witness statement, you  
21 fulfilled the role of membership and affiliation  
22 secretary for approximately 18 months, until you left  
23 the Troops Out Movement.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. As a result of that, you were a member of



1 the Troops Out Movement national steering committee;  
2 isn't that right?  
3 A. No, because you haven't asked me was I influenced any of  
4 the -- so the answer is, I wasn't really. But that --  
5 my role was -- was not as grand as it sounded. In fact,  
6 I found out very quickly that it was not going to enable  
7 me to achieve much more in the organisation. So I --  
8 I really didn't do a great deal in that position. And  
9 I certainly wasn't -- I certainly didn't sit on any, in  
10 your language, a central committee that was responsible  
11 for making decisions that the -- the TOM would -- would  
12 wish to implement.

13 What I thought --

14 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- can we look, please, at tab 104 in  
15 the hard copy bundle, reference {UCPI/18080}.

16 This is a report dated 12 May 1982, which states,  
17 paragraph 2:

18 "The current National Steering Committee of  
19 the Troops Out Movement ... consists of  
20 the undermentioned persons ... "

21 And we see there, there are nine positions listed on  
22 the national steering committee --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- and against eight of those the names have been  
25 redacted for privacy reasons. And we say "Mike

1 James: Membership and Affiliation Secretary".

2 A. Well, you're -- you're right, that is me. That's my  
3 report. I wish I could be more clear and more precise  
4 to you. I'm not trying to -- to hold anything back from  
5 the committee.

6 I found the role that -- that -- I didn't -- I don't  
7 recall sitting on a central committee at any time and  
8 discussing TOM policy. What I -- what's the role --  
9 what I found the role to be was I would respond to any  
10 -- that I could respond to any particular -- potential  
11 interest from individuals who wanted to become a member  
12 of the TOM. The TOM in their newspaper had a bit where  
13 you could -- you could apply to become a -- I -- and  
14 I thought -- that's what I began to understand was my --  
15 was what was expected of me. It wasn't a role that --  
16 that I found would -- would assist me in -- in having  
17 a better understanding of TOM.

18 So I did -- I did very little in that. I mean,  
19 I retained this title of "membership secretary", but  
20 I don't remember being very active in any -- any proper  
21 sense in an organising committee.

22 Having said that, the TOM in Hackney was a very  
23 active -- and there were definitely very prominent  
24 people in TOM within that grouping. That was -- that  
25 was my recollection. Nothing to do with a national

1 central committee. It was -- it was -- it revolved  
2 around the branch that I was involved in.

3 Does that help you?

4 Q. I think we've established that you were a member of  
5 the national steer committee of the Troops Out Movement  
6 for about 18 months, and you had the role of membership  
7 and affiliation secretary.

8 I'd like you to look, please -- it's tab 111 of  
9 the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/18324}.

10 This is an intelligence report dated 17 June 1982,  
11 which produces with it copies of the minutes of  
12 the Troops Out Movement 1982 annual conference, held in  
13 London on 3-4 April 1982, yes? I'd like, please, to go  
14 to the second page of this document, the first page of  
15 the minutes, {UCPI/18324/2}.

16 If we see there, where it says "Convenor's Report",  
17 the question:

18 "Is TOM now functioning as a national movement?"

19 If we look down to (v):

20 "In the last 6 months the [steering committee] has  
21 been the national movement and branches carry on with  
22 different projects without the political conviction of  
23 a national strategy."

24 Did you understand the steering committee to in  
25 effect be the national Troops Out Movement?

1 A. Well, again, sir, I wish I could honestly say that I --  
2 I sat on this committee and played an active role in  
3 what I'm now reading. I've -- I've -- I've got no  
4 strong recollections of that. And I'm sure I would  
5 have --

6 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- a report as the membership  
7 secretary for the purposes of this conference, do you  
8 recall?

9 A. You know, I don't. I don't. I don't ...

10 Q. You see there there's a heading, "Membership Secretaries  
11 Report", with some questions and answers in the middle  
12 of the page?

13 A. Yes --

14 Q. Do you recall answering questions about a report you  
15 produced for the purposes of the national conference?

16 A. I don't recall it, sir. I honestly don't, no.

17 Q. Can we look, please, at tab 112 of the hard copy bundle  
18 {UCPI/18365}.

19 We see here this is a minutes --

20 A. Yes, yes, I can, yeah, yeah.

21 Q. It's an intelligence report dated 25 June 1982, which  
22 records events at a meeting of the steering committee of  
23 the Troops Out Movement, yes?

24 And we see paragraph 3:

25 "The meeting was chaired by Mike James ..."

1           Do you recall on occasions chairing the steering  
2           committee of the Troops Out Movement?

3       A.   Reading these documents now, it's -- it's obviously --  
4           I'm wracking my brains to try to recall where I was at  
5           and what I was doing at that time.  And my -- the --  
6           the conclusion I've come to is that I was an active  
7           member on the Hackney, Stoke Newington -- east London,  
8           if you like, Troops Out branch.  And that branch was --  
9           I think must have become the -- sort of the --  
10          the prominent organisation within the movement, because  
11          there were some very active people in that branch.  And  
12          I think that's -- that's the best I can give you.

13                I -- I don't recall ever going to national  
14                conferences or -- but I -- there was -- I did have  
15                a role to play, and I -- I -- and clearly that's --  
16                that's the case in this -- this -- this report, which is  
17                my report --

18       Q.   Can we look, please, at tab 122 of the hard copy bundle,  
19            {UCPI/15779}.

20                You'll see it's a report dated 30 September --

21       A.   Yeah.

22       Q.   -- 1982, and it deals with the Troops Out Movement's  
23            national delegate conference, which took place on  
24            11 September 1982.

25       A.   Yeah.

1 Q. I'd like, please, to turn -- or if the person --  
2 technician with responsibility for the document could  
3 please take us down to 15779/9, {UCPI/15779/9}.

4 And I'd like, please, to look at the second section  
5 on that page, which is headed "Continuity of  
6 Leadership":

7 "During the past year TOM has had, at last,  
8 a steering committee that has been 100% dedicated to  
9 building up the organisation. Unfortunately, due to  
10 excessive demands and responsibilities being put on  
11 them, most have felt unable to continue for more than 6  
12 months. Such a rapid and large turnover in the steering  
13 committee membership with the consequent loss of  
14 experience and continuity is likely to weaken  
15 the central organisation and the liaison with  
16 the branches and other organisations (eg, SF, IRSP).  
17 For these reasons, a method must be found for spreading  
18 more broadly the tasks which are at present carried out  
19 exclusively by the steering committee. This means  
20 shifting some of the work from the centre to  
21 the branches."

22 That report, from September 1982, appears to  
23 indicate that being on the steering committee for as  
24 long as you were, approximately 18 months, was  
25 relatively unusual, given most felt unable to continue

1           for more than six months due to the demands. Do you  
2           recall that?

3           A. You're helping me to recall -- I did go to Manchester.  
4           I had forgotten about that. But I come back to what  
5           I said before. It was my branch that I think took on  
6           this role of steering committee, the -- the -- because  
7           they were -- because they were -- prominent members  
8           within TOM had strong views about the TOM supported  
9           the activities of the TOM, that branch became  
10          the steering committee. And as a member of that branch,  
11          I took on this role of -- of membership secretary. This  
12          was a role that really wasn't that significant, as  
13          I found out, and didn't really enable me to progress my  
14          knowledge of the movement much more than I already had.

15          Q. It was membership and affiliation secretary, wasn't it?  
16          You were also responsible for the affiliates,  
17          the organisations that affiliated -- (overspeaking) --

18          A. You keep saying this, sir, but I keep saying this is  
19          language that I don't -- I -- what I found -- what --  
20          what I found out was that -- that -- what I thought when  
21          I was asked to do this job, that it would give me access  
22          to information that I didn't already have, on -- on  
23          membership and on activities of branches. That wasn't  
24          the case. There was no central membership records,  
25          there was -- I had no knowledge of other branch

1 secretaries. That information was really retained by  
2 some of the people that I associated with within my  
3 branch who were very active in the TOM. They trusted me  
4 to do certain things, but I didn't have their  
5 confidence, and I didn't have a close relationship with  
6 any of them really, for -- for me to understand just how  
7 important some of their roles may have been.

8 Q. I mention affiliation because it's part of the title  
9 that you had, but also can we look, please, at tab 117  
10 of the hard copy bundle, {UCPI/18542}.

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. This is an intelligence report dated 24 August 1982,  
13 which states in paragraph 2:

14 "The organisations and groups affiliated to  
15 the Troops Out Movement ... during the year 1981-82 are  
16 listed on Appendix 'A' to this report.

17 "3. Affiliation to the Troops Out Movement  
18 authorises the organisation concerned to send two  
19 delegates to the TOM national conference. A copy of  
20 the affiliation form sent to organisations who express  
21 interest is submitted at Appendix 'B'."

22 Then we see, through that document {UCPI/18542/2},  
23 a list of organisations reported by you to be affiliated  
24 to the Troops Out Movement. Does that help you with  
25 your recollection as to what responsibility you had



1 insofar as affiliation was concerned?

2 A. If this was my report, I don't recall it. I'm just  
3 beginning to think was I still actively involved in  
4 the organisation in late '82.

5 All I can honestly say is that when I was first  
6 asked if I would become membership secretary,  
7 I initially was not inclined to -- to say yes, I would,  
8 but then I -- having given it a bit of thought, I said,  
9 "Okay, I'll take that job on," not really understanding  
10 what it entailed.

11 And I found that it entailed, although it didn't  
12 happen, me communicating with anybody that might have  
13 expressed an interest in joining the TOM. So although,  
14 in -- in theory I retained that title, I did very little  
15 to further the membership of the Troops Out Movement,  
16 but it gave me -- you know, it gave me that credibility  
17 within the organisation.

18 I'll come back to what I said earlier: the main  
19 thrust of the TOM, as I recall, emanated from the --  
20 the branch that I -- where I was a member. And that was  
21 -- that was -- that was where -- but I did not have --  
22 on purpose, I did not have a -- a close relationship  
23 with -- I mean, I knew them, I liked them, they were, in  
24 the main, a decent bunch of people that had their own  
25 views about republican matters. But I didn't get too

1 close to them. And I found that my -- my role -- it  
2 looked good on paper, but in practice it wasn't that  
3 effective.

4 Q. What you say in your witness statement, paragraph 222  
5 {MPS/745772/45} is that:

6 "In none of my roles did I seek to exert control or  
7 influence the direction of the groups that I infiltrated  
8 ... I went along with what the majority decided."

9 How did you manage simply to go along with what  
10 the majority decided if you were one of the longest  
11 serving members of the leadership of TOM?

12 A. I was just probably very good at what I did, sir.

13 Q. I'm not going to dwell on the other roles that you had,  
14 but you also acted as treasurer for an organising  
15 committee for the May 8 demonstration in 1982; is that  
16 right?

17 A. I -- I believe so. Yes, I think I may have -- I don't  
18 quite know how I conducted that role, but I -- I believe  
19 I put a report in to that effect. That was where people  
20 came over from families of people from Northern Ireland,  
21 is that the one? Is that the same -- what we're talking  
22 about?

23 Q. If we look at tab 101 in the hard copy bundle,  
24 {UCPI/18026}, it's a meeting of that committee. It's  
25 a report dated 22 April 1982. It's a meeting of

1 the May 8 demonstration organising committee on  
2 15 April 1982, concerning a discussion about what route  
3 the march should take through the centre of London. And  
4 if you look over the page {UCPI/18026/2}, just below  
5 the route:

6 "The committee agreed that representations to  
7 the police the subject of the route should be made by  
8 someone with sufficient strength of character or public  
9 standing so that desired route could be obtained in  
10 the face of any official objections."

11 I think that says.

12 Did the Troops Out Movement also ordinarily, when it  
13 came to significant public events, engage with  
14 the police in advance?

15 A. Yes, to my knowledge, yes, yes.

16 Q. And then, please, if we look at tab 103 in the bundle,  
17 {UCPI/18042}, it's a report dated 7 May 1982. And we  
18 see paragraph 3:

19 "The object of the meeting was to finalise plans for  
20 the demonstration."

21 Then we see your cover name there listed as one of  
22 the persons attending.

23 And if we go to the next page, please, paragraph 7,  
24 {UCPI/18042/2}:

25 "The committee expected between 2,000 and 3,000

1 people to attend the demonstration and did not expect  
2 any trouble or disorder although some apprehension was  
3 felt in case of right wing opposition."

4 A. Are you expecting me to comment on that, or ...

5 Q. No, I was about to ask you a question, sorry.

6 What was the purpose of you, as an  
7 undercover officer, being a member of an organising  
8 committee for a public demonstration which involved  
9 advance engagement with the police, and at which it was  
10 not anticipated there would be any trouble or disorder?  
11 What useful function were you serving?

12 A. Well, if you -- if you think about it logically, sir,  
13 most of the questions you've -- you've been asking me  
14 about for the last two hours is about why was  
15 I submitting reports about individuals, and -- and I've  
16 tried to explain the reasons behind that.

17 But -- but I also said from the very beginning that  
18 the -- that the main responsibility placed upon this  
19 undercover unit was to try to establish good  
20 intelligence on demonstrations. Now, this -- this was  
21 -- this particular occasion, I was in the right place at  
22 the right time to be able to feed into the police  
23 service the proposed demonstration of this particular  
24 organisation.

25 That isn't to say that there was going to be any

1 trouble, and that wasn't to say it wasn't going to be  
2 done lawfully, but throughout the time I was doing this  
3 work, you'll remember -- I was always looking to have  
4 good intelligence, very good intelligence to assist in  
5 the prime -- primary objective: demonstrations. This  
6 was one occasion when -- where that came to light  
7 -- (overspeaking) --

8 Q. -- (overspeaking) -- did the Troops Out Movement ever  
9 actively promote violence at demonstrations  
10 -- (overspeaking) --

11 A. Did I -- did I -- no, of course not. Of course not.  
12 Again, I'm going back to what I said about  
13 the undercover unit being a small cog in a big wheel.  
14 Well, I was a small cog in this organisation. I was  
15 able to maintain a presence; I was able to obtain  
16 the respect and confidence of people on it. But  
17 I really did not have a role that was significant. In  
18 fact, I'm almost quite pleased with myself to the fact  
19 that where I had this responsibility as -- as membership  
20 secretary, which in essence wasn't really that much of  
21 a -- a title or a responsibility.

22 The Troops Out Movement was a small organisation.  
23 This particular demonstration, if it's the one I'm  
24 thinking of -- I mean, if you're going to go on to that,  
25 was -- was banned from -- from having a demonstration in

1 Central London. Is that something that you've picked up  
2 on and you're going to ask me about, or ...?

3 Q. I'm not going to ask you any more questions about that.

4 A. Right, sir, okay.

5 I hope I've answered that question clearly to you.  
6 I did not have any influence on what was going to take  
7 place, but I did play a role. And I was able to feed  
8 better information back to my -- my department, and it  
9 was used as they saw appropriate.

10 Q. In your witness statement, paragraph 337  
11 {MPS/745772/70}, you say at the end of your deployment  
12 you were not formally debriefed, but you were asked to  
13 prepare a through report on your opinion of  
14 the Troops Out Movement, and whether it could be used by  
15 Republican terrorist groups for logistical support in  
16 the UK. Yes?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can we look, please, at tab 133 in the hard copy bundle  
19 {UCPI/18713}, please.

20 Is this the report that you produced?

21 A. Looking at the first couple of paragraphs, I --  
22 I believe so, sir, yes. My recollection after 45 years  
23 is not so good as it should be, but probably it is, yes,  
24 yeah.

25 Q. What we have, for the benefit of the transcript, is an

1 intelligence report dated 14 February 1983, and it says:

2 "The following information has been received from  
3 a secret and reliable source ..."

4 Then the quotation marks, and:

5 "This is a comprehensive report on the Troops Out  
6 Movement (TOM) detailed under the headings shown  
7 below~..."

8 And the subheadings are "Politics of the TOM",  
9 "Membership and Affiliation", "Finance", "National  
10 Office", "National Steering Committee", "Conferences",  
11 "Publications and Propaganda", "Delegation to  
12 Northern Ireland", "Liaison with the Republican  
13 Movement", and "Main Personalities", yes?

14 A. Sounds quite impressive.

15 Q. You've told us and you've confirmed what's in your  
16 witness statement that your understanding was that  
17 the main reason TOM was of interest to Special Branch  
18 was because there were concerns about whether it would  
19 create public order policing issues when it held  
20 demonstrations?

21 A. Well, I said that was one of the concerns, and clearly  
22 that was something that was -- that was kept an eye on.  
23 But I also did say there was a concern that it may have  
24 been a support group for the more extremist elements of  
25 the republic movement.

1 Q. If we look down under the heading "Politics of the TOM",  
2 we see it says:

3 " 'Troops out of Ireland' and 'Self Determination for  
4 the Irish People as a Whole' are the main demands of  
5 the Movement and it has been campaigning around these  
6 two issues since 1973."

7 Those two, I think, pillars of political views that  
8 we mentioned at the beginning when we were talking about  
9 TOM?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. If we then go over the page, {UCPI/18713/2}. What this  
12 report goes on to summarise in some detail are different  
13 viewpoints expressed by members of TOM, so far as what  
14 its political position should be; is that fair?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you underneath see -- if we could scroll down,  
17 please -- it says:

18 "However, in the final analysis most support was  
19 given to the argument that the TOM should present itself  
20 as a broad based group with policies which called for  
21 the withdrawal of all troops and for self-determination  
22 but not outwardly supporting armed struggle."

23 And then if we look at the paragraph below that:

24 "The TOM nevertheless believes in the need to  
25 maintain principled relations with the Republican



1 Movement and will at all times 'support the justice of  
2 the Republican fight'. Whilst most supporters of  
3 the Movement accept its broad based views, there are,  
4 without doubt, elements which will continue to support  
5 unconditionally the Republican Movement's armed  
6 struggle."

7 In that final sentence, where you say "elements  
8 which will continue to support unconditionally  
9 the Republican movement's armed struggle", is that a  
10 reference to support as a matter of ideology, or  
11 reference to support in logistical and practical terms?

12 A. Well, I'm sure this is my report. It's somewhat  
13 subjective of course, but in my opinion they were --  
14 there was -- there was -- there were -- there was --  
15 the potential -- and I felt that it was -- it was more  
16 likely than unlikely that -- that there were elements  
17 within that movement that, given the -- given the right  
18 circumstances, would -- would support more extremist  
19 elements of the Republican movement.

20 I was asked to put my opinion into that, and that  
21 was my opinion, that having spent a few years with this  
22 organisation, my feelings -- my opinion was that. But  
23 of course, that was my opinion. As far as I understand  
24 it, that was never the case, that the TOM -- nobody in  
25 the TOM ever carried out that role, as far as I know.

1           But I don't -- that may have not been -- but there may  
2           be some information somewhere to suggest that isn't  
3           the case, but I --

4       Q.    -- (overspeaking) --

5       A.    -- I was asked to write a -- write a review of my time  
6           within that movement and my opinion about the support  
7           for PIRA.

8       Q.    It's right, isn't it, that you did not at any point  
9           report any intelligence regarding any support for any  
10          extremist groups in that sense?

11      A.    Sorry, sir, say that again?

12      Q.    You did not report any intelligence relating to any  
13          support being given for --

14      A.    No, no, I didn't, no.  There was some confusion in one  
15          of my -- in my -- in my witness statement, about  
16          the fact they were -- they were members of -- of  
17          a left wing organisation that actually gave logistic  
18          support to PIRA, and I just used that as an example.

19            I think when I was writing this statement, with  
20          the assistance of another -- another person, that was  
21          misunderstood, that they thought that that was my -- my  
22          -- my knowledge of -- of that.  But -- but it was an  
23          example that -- that -- that the Republican Movement  
24          could and would make use of any support they could get  
25          for people who were living and based in the -- in the --

1 on the mainland.

2 Q. To your knowledge, that did not happen with  
3 the Troops Out Movement?

4 A. To my knowledge, that did not involve  
5 the Troops Out Movement, no.

6 Q. Finally, HN96, I just want to ask you, please, about  
7 your knowledge of particular officers whose service  
8 coincided with yours in the SDS. When you answer these  
9 questions, please do not refer to any names of any  
10 individuals.

11 The first officer I'd like to ask you about, please,  
12 is HN354.

13 A. Bear with me.

14 Okay.

15 Q. Now, he was deployed as an SDS officer until around  
16 about the autumn of 1979. He also infiltrated the Outer  
17 East London District of the SWP.

18 A. Okay.

19 Q. Do you recall that officer?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. How would you describe your relationship with him when  
22 you were both SDS officers?

23 A. Well -- how do I describe it? He was a colleague.

24 I met him at the weekly meetings that we had with my  
25 management.

1 Q. Did you ever see him outside the weekly meetings that  
2 you had with management?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Was he one of the field officers you spoke to before you  
5 came to be deployed?

6 A. I don't believe so, no.

7 Q. He has admitted to having had sexual relationships  
8 during the course of his deployment.

9 A. Right.

10 Q. Including with the witness "Madeleine", who has given  
11 evidence to the Inquiry.

12 More than one of those relationships appears to have  
13 happened whilst you were also deployed into  
14 the Socialist Workers Party.

15 A. Okay.

16 Q. Do you have any knowledge of HN354 having engaged in  
17 sexual relationships?

18 A. No. Do you want me to expand on that, or ...?

19 Q. If you don't have any knowledge HN354 --

20 A. No (inaudible) no.

21 Q. Presumably you're saying, therefore, that there was no  
22 discussion of any such matters at the SDS safe house, to  
23 the best of your knowledge?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Have you attended any reunions or any social events

- 1           since your time in the SDS?
- 2       A.   No.
- 3       Q.   Sorry, was that ...?
- 4       A.   No -- well, I'm saying no.  There was one -- only one.
- 5           I was retired.  I think I was retired when this meeting
- 6           took place.  It was organised -- was I retired?  I'm
- 7           sure I was retired.
- 8           So, the answer's yes, I've been to one reunion,
- 9           where in the main it was -- it was -- it was colleagues
- 10          from the time that I was on the unit.  So I would have
- 11          -- I would have known most of them.  I think there were
- 12          one or two colleagues from previous deployments, but --
- 13       Q.   Was there any discussion at that reunion about anything
- 14          that had happened whilst deployed involving
- 15          relationships, or anything of that nature?
- 16       A.   Well, it was a reunion not only officers, but of their
- 17          respective wives, etc, so probably, without wishing to
- 18          -- no.  No, the answer's no.  Or if there was, it was
- 19          not to my knowledge.
- 20       Q.   Secondly, HN21.
- 21       A.   HN ... bear with me, please.  Okay.
- 22       Q.   In respect of HN21 -- sorry, one second.  One second.
- 23           Sorry, I'm not going to ask you about that, HN96.
- 24           The final officer I want to ask you about is HN155.
- 25       A.   Okay.

- 1 Q. If you look at your list, is that an officer who you  
2 recall?
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. His deployment overlapped with yours considerably,  
5 didn't it, from --
- 6 A. Sorry, sir. Say that again?
- 7 Q. His deployment overlapped with yours considerably?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. From late 1979 to, I think, early 1984, HN155 was  
10 deployed.
- 11 A. Okay.
- 12 Q. Also against the SWP.
- 13 I think we heard a description given in the summary  
14 that was read of his deployment this morning from him  
15 that he lived his alter ego life to the full. Does that  
16 accord with your recollection of HN155?
- 17 A. Well, again, the only -- the only meetings I had with  
18 this -- this officer was at these regular meetings that  
19 we had -- we had with our management.
- 20 Q. Did you come to be aware of anything associated with his  
21 behaviour whilst deployed that gave you any cause for  
22 concern?
- 23 A. No -- no -- no. It sounds like I lived in a bubble.  
24 But, no, we met up, we talked, we chatted. I can't  
25 remember any specific conversation I had with this

1 officer. I was sort of vaguely aware, because he was  
2 talking to management, that -- that there were -- and --  
3 and this was only -- this was not that I had any  
4 knowledge of that, it was just something that you felt  
5 was going on, that -- but that there were some issues  
6 there with this officer, but I didn't know what they  
7 were. But he was -- he was a colleague of mine, we --  
8 we -- we got on well, we -- we -- we weren't friends but  
9 we weren't -- you know, we had no -- we were connected  
10 with this -- with this squad.

11 MR GRAY: Thank you HN96. I haven't got any further  
12 questions.

13 A. Right, sir. Thank you very much for your ...

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Almost but not quite upon the last leg. We  
15 now have a quarter of an hour break, during which anyone  
16 who has any questions amongst the -- from the recognised  
17 legal representatives of others may ask Mr Gray to ask  
18 you further questions.

19 You may also be re-examined by your own counsel.

20 Subject to that, you've reached the end.

21 A. Thank you very much.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Back in quarter of an hour, please.

23 A. Thank you.

24 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
25 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room

1 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

2 The time is now 4.25 pm, so we shall reconvene at  
3 4.40 pm. Thank you.

4 (4.25 pm)

5 (A short break)

6 (4.40 pm)

7 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome back.

8 I will now hand over to the Chairman to continue  
9 proceedings.

10 Chairman.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

12 Are there any questions that you're asked to ask?

13 MR GRAY: Sir, there are no further questions to be asked of  
14 this witness.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 Is there any re-examination?

17 MR SANDERS: No, thank you, sir.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

19 Thank you very much for your patience, HN96. This  
20 is now genuinely an end of your participation in  
21 the Inquiry.

22 Thank you.

23 A. Okay, sir. Thank you.

24 (The witness withdrew)

25 THE CHAIRMAN: We are now going to move to David Reid, and



1 places are going to be changed at counsels' table.

2 Can I be told, please, with Ms Smith is in place to  
3 start questioning. I can see her; she is.

4 MR DAVID REID (called)

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Reid, can you hear me?

6 Mr Reid, can you hear me?

7 A. Yes, sir, I can.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Good. Do you wish to be sworn or to affirm?

9 A. To be affirmed, please.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may the words of affirmation be read to  
11 you, please.

12 (Witness affirmed)

13 Thank you.

14 Ms Smith, I'm afraid you've drawn the graveyard  
15 slot, but make the best of it.

16 Questions by MS SMITH

17 MS SMITH: Thank you, sir.

18 Mr Reid, I'll be asking you some questions this  
19 afternoon about the risk assessment of HN155. Is it  
20 correct that you made a statement for the Inquiry which  
21 is dated 3 March 2020?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read that statement  
24 recently?

25 A. Yes, today.

1 Q. And is it true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

2 A. Yes, it is.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr Reid.

4 Can I make a few other preliminary checks. In  
5 making your witness statement, you had regard to  
6 the unredacted risk assessment of 155, the handwritten  
7 notes of the interview with him and the fact check; is  
8 that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Have you had the opportunity to refresh your memory from  
11 those documents recently?

12 A. Yes. I should say, "yes, today", two words, not  
13 "yesterday".

14 Q. Thank you, Mr Reid.

15 Sir, those documents are not in the bundle, but for  
16 your reference, the handwritten notes are {MPS/739805},  
17 and the fact check is {MPS/746269}.

18 Final preliminary question, Mr Reid, is have you  
19 also had sight of a gist concerning the risk assessments  
20 of other Tranche 1 officers with which you were  
21 involved?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Very briefly, may we start, please, considering your  
24 experience in this field. Is it correct that you were  
25 employed by the Metropolitan Police Service as an

1 independent risk assessor from November 2016 to  
2 May 2018?

3 A. That's true.

4 Q. And during that time you completed a number of risk  
5 assessments?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Focusing on the officers in Tranche 1, that is  
8 the tranche we've been dealing with in hearings to date,  
9 there were 49 risk assessments completed. Is it correct  
10 that you acted as the lead assessor in eight of those?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And the peer reviewer in a further eight?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. Moving, please, to deal firstly with the risk assessment  
15 process in general.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Can we start, please, with considering the purpose of  
18 the risk assessment, as you understood it.

19 It's right that the first section on a risk  
20 assessment document is headed "Purpose"; is that  
21 correct?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And I'll read out, if I may, part of what is set out  
24 there, for you to confirm if that's what you understood  
25 as the purpose of the risk assessment. And it reads

1           this:

2                   "The purpose of the document is to provide an  
3           objective assessment of the creation of, or increase in,  
4           risk to an officer and third parties if information is  
5           disclosed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry which  
6           directly or indirectly leads to the identification of  
7           that officer as a former undercover police officer."

8           A.   That's correct.

9           Q.   Is it fair to say then that, essentially, it's an  
10          evaluation of harm that you were assessing?

11          A.   Yes, that's right.

12          Q.   And does it follow that it was important to you as  
13          the risk assessor to provide an accurate, comprehensive  
14          and objective appraisal of the risks to the specific  
15          person that you were appraising?

16          A.   Yes.  If you read elsewhere in that, the risk assessment  
17          document, at the beginning it also says the limitations  
18          that I as the initial risk assessor who effectively  
19          wrote that risk assessment document or the initial  
20          document thought there were with the process, and how we  
21          could best do the process with -- within the timescale,  
22          and with the resources, and with the level of research  
23          that I had available to me.

24          Q.   Thank you.

25                   Those involved in this process, is it right, would

1 be the lead assessor, a second assessor or interviewer,  
2 and then a peer reviewer?

3 A. Yes, the peer reviewer evolved; that wasn't always  
4 the case. And there wasn't always a second risk  
5 assessor with a visit. The ideal would be that two  
6 people would visit the undercover officer, and that  
7 a peer reviewer would then look at the document  
8 afterwards, to see if it made logical sense and if  
9 the conclusions were reasonable in the light of what was  
10 written before.

11 The peer reviewer came some time through  
12 the process, it wasn't there at the beginning, because  
13 at the beginning there was only -- well, initially only  
14 me and then a second risk assessor.

15 Q. You say that the ideal, then, was that a second assessor  
16 was present. Would it just be that if, on the day, an  
17 interview were taking place a second assessor was  
18 available, then one would attend the interview? Or  
19 would it be chosen that that officer would benefit from  
20 having a second interviewer present?

21 A. A second (inaudible) is always good, because when you  
22 are conducting an interview and you are writing at  
23 the same time, bearing in mind this is not an  
24 audio-taped interview in someone's house, it's helpful  
25 to have another person thinking what have you not asked,

1           what other questions could arise from that. The answer  
2           to the question -- it's not just a matter of filling out  
3           a box, you're trying to think what the implications of  
4           the answer are. And sometimes, often, having a second  
5           person there, the second person would ask supplementary  
6           questions at the end, or as you were going through --  
7           may build up an easier rapport with some people -- a lot  
8           were very scared, very nervous, some were very angry.  
9           And sometimes having a second person there could diffuse  
10          that and build a relationship, so you got more  
11          information out of the person, you could therefore make  
12          a more accurate risk assessment.

13        Q. So from that, is it right that it would certainly assist  
14          you if there were two of you present when you were  
15          conducting an interview, to get a fuller picture?

16        A. Yeah, when I was conducting, my preference was that if  
17          I was doing the interview, I would leave the interview  
18          and I would ask the second risk assessor to hold back  
19          with his questions until I had finished that section.  
20          Other people do -- do things differently; that was my  
21          flow. I sometimes liked to leave something then come  
22          back to it myself at a later stage. But my preference  
23          would be to have a second risk assessor present. It  
24          wasn't always practically feasible, because there were  
25          only, at any one time, a maximum of five, and sometimes

1 less than that, of us in total.

2 Q. The peer reviewer, when that role did evolve in this  
3 process, is it right that they would simply check  
4 the format of the risk assessment; rather than  
5 the content itself, it was the presentational style and  
6 the conclusions?

7 A. Yeah, I would say more than format, and I would say more  
8 than presentation. I would say the job of the peer  
9 reviewer was to read it through, yes, to pick out,  
10 you know, "Your spelling's rubbish, David", or whatever,  
11 those kind of things. But also to say, there is  
12 a logical theme that runs through, which is then  
13 expressed in the conclusions, and the conclusion are  
14 reasonable in the light of the rest of the document.

15 And for a person to have a -- some -- ideally  
16 someone maybe who hasn't met the individual concerned,  
17 to look at it and say, "Yes, that is a reasonable  
18 conclusion and a proportional allocation of risk to what  
19 you have written."

20 Sometimes it's easy. The danger is, if you get to  
21 know someone and you (inaudible) them, and you maybe  
22 empathise with them, you may be sympathetic and your  
23 risk might be slightly higher than it should be.  
24 Equally, just by nature -- by nature somebody who is  
25 maybe more robust, or whatever, you may not be as

1 objective as you should be. And so a second pair of  
2 eyes to say, yes, what you have identified as the risks  
3 is -- your conclusion is proportional to what the risk  
4 actually is.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 Is it correct that there was a template by which  
7 each risk assessment would be conducted?

8 A. Yeah. There were two initially. So there was  
9 a template for the interview, and then there was  
10 a template for the risk assessment. The interview  
11 template changed. It kind of morphed as it improved, as  
12 we did more and more risk assessments. And my  
13 preference by the end -- not at the beginning, but by  
14 the end of my time there, was to -- this is maybe a time  
15 thing and trying to be as productive as possible. When  
16 I was doing the research, we would type the research  
17 directly onto the final risk assessment document. We  
18 would then print that off and go to  
19 the undercover officer. Interview them. If something  
20 was right, I'd just pick a tick against it. And then  
21 use that as the template to write my notes that I would  
22 then type up into the document afterwards.

23 Q. So, moving then to the format of the interview, you've  
24 explained, thank you, the template and the research that  
25 you would include on that template.



1           Is it right that it was agreed with the Department  
2           of Legal Services at the beginning of this process that  
3           the interviews would be informal, rather than being  
4           treated like a suspect police interview?

5           A. Yes, using the police analogy, it would be more like  
6           a witness interview than a suspect interview.

7           Q. Are you aware what the purpose was behind that decision?

8           A. You're probably best speaking to the lawyer. There's  
9           a legal definition for it. But my understanding was,  
10          I was not there to look specifically, as Operation Herne  
11          would be, at any criminal offences that may have been  
12          committed by the police officer. And therefore, they  
13          were not under caution, they were not at a police  
14          station, there was not a tape recorder running, and they  
15          didn't have a right to legal advice in -- in the normal  
16          sense. Although, often they would have a lawyer  
17          present; that was their choice. It was there to get to  
18          their account, for their benefit. And if they didn't  
19          want me to do that, that was absolutely fine, I would  
20          walk -- walk away and -- and leave their house, or  
21          wherever they wanted the interview conducted, and write  
22          -- and they wouldn't contribute it. They didn't have to  
23          contribute to it, if that makes sense. That's  
24          essentially the difference.

25          Q. And as part of the decision for the interview to be

1           informal, would you take any measures to put an officer  
2           at ease at the commencement of the interview?

3           A. I think -- I think police officers almost by nature do,  
4           because that's what you do for -- for me for, you know,  
5           30 years of my career. And deliberately, despite some  
6           sort of pushback against it, we had some very easy  
7           questions at the beginning. We were asking people about  
8           their life, their schooling and their education, which  
9           was partly genuinely to see if there was any risk, any  
10          link -- it was unlikely there would be -- to those  
11          times. But also to get somebody speaking about things  
12          that were easy to answer. They could -- you could start  
13          building a relationship, and then you're into  
14          the interview.

15                 It's fairly common practice with witnesses to try  
16                 and speak about non-controversial and the less difficult  
17                 issues first. So that's how we would -- how we would  
18                 deal with it.

19          Q. Would the officers be made aware of the purpose of this  
20          risk assessment, that essentially you weren't there to  
21          form any judgment on whether their actions were right or  
22          wrong?

23          A. Very much so. And that was absolutely central, and  
24          something that we continually did successfully, or  
25          unsuccessfully, to reinforce to all the parties that we

1 met, be it the undercover officers or other police  
2 officers, or -- or whoever, that we were there to assess  
3 the risk. We were not there to sit in moral judgment on  
4 their behaviour; we were purely to look at the risk.

5 Q. In your witness statement, you describe that you would  
6 usually start with an open question, to ascertain  
7 the relevant information, and then, if necessary, follow  
8 up with a more closed question, either to further  
9 the answer or to -- based on the information that you  
10 had gleaned from your research. Is that correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Does it follow from that that you would really give  
13 the officer an opportunity, to start with, to provide  
14 you an answer, and after that you would ask a further  
15 directed question, if needs be?

16 A. Yes, that's right. So we would give them  
17 the opportunity to speak on whichever topic it was.  
18 Often I would have some information about that. So, for  
19 instance, to use a non-controversial one, I would say,  
20 "Where was -- did you have premises? Where were they?"  
21 And they may say, "I can't remember". And if they did  
22 say, "I can't remember," I'd say, "Well, could it  
23 possibly be in the Lewisham area, or the Golders Green  
24 area," or whatever. That would be how we would deal  
25 with it.

1 Q. You've already explained that you would annotate  
2 the template document that you had with you, so if part  
3 of your research was confirmed, you would tick it.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. If an officer disagreed, how would you denote that on  
6 the template?

7 A. I would just write what he said was the truth. I mean  
8 there's -- there's a slight -- a slight, I suppose,  
9 clarification which -- which happened with 155. So,  
10 this applies to the fact check as well. So if he said  
11 something and I thought that's a valid point, as  
12 happened with him, that could be misinterpreted, how  
13 I've written that is not as clear as it may be, I would  
14 then change it, and I would just insert what -- what he  
15 suggested was right, and if -- if I agreed that he was  
16 in fact absolutely right.

17 If, alternatively, someone -- this is not relevant  
18 to him, but if someone said something and I was  
19 satisfied that is what they had said, and then wanted to  
20 change their mind, I would -- I would make it clear that  
21 he was now saying that. I wouldn't necessarily remove  
22 what my initial understanding was.

23 Q. And when you were going through your questions, if  
24 a detailed answer was provided, would you record that in  
25 handwriting, as you've explained, on the template within

- 1 the section that you were dealing with at that time?
- 2 A. I would. I should say, those were my notes to help me  
3 write the -- the final report. And whilst completely  
4 understand that obviously people have access to them,  
5 I would use shorthand that I understand, for my benefit,  
6 because that was the purpose of them. The purpose was  
7 for to know what I -- what I meant by that, if that  
8 makes sense. And that then translated into the risk  
9 assessment that I then took back to  
10 the undercover officer, to check that he was satisfied  
11 that it was an accurate representation of our  
12 conversation what he understood the risks to be.
- 13 Q. You've explained that your preference was that  
14 the second assessor, if present, would wait until you'd  
15 concluded a topic to ask any follow-up questions. Would  
16 you wait until you'd completed a topic before you then  
17 wrote your notes, or would you be making those notes as  
18 you went along, as the officer answered?
- 19 A. It's a bit of both. You want to try and maintain eye  
20 contact; you want -- don't look totally unsociable. At  
21 the same time, you obviously have to keep a record of  
22 what they're saying. You know, there were times when  
23 people -- I would say, "Look, can you just slow down  
24 a minute, this is really important, I need to make sure  
25 I get this right." There were other times people were

1           saying things which bore no -- weren't relevant to  
2           the risk assessment process, and so I could keep up and  
3           -- and sort of make not particularly neat notes at  
4           the same time as -- as continue the conversation.

5       Q.   And is it fair that when making those handwritten notes,  
6           and it's small sections that you have on the template,  
7           that sometimes they would have to go down either side of  
8           the margin, the top and the bottom, or encroach into  
9           other sections, to get down what you wanted to make  
10          a note of?

11       A.   Yeah, or I'd have another sheet of paper and write on  
12          that, or I'd scribble "1" on the template and a "1" on  
13          another sheet of paper and put what I needed to do  
14          there.  Whatever I needed to do to make sure I had what  
15          I needed in my shorthand to write -- write it up in  
16          the next couple of days.

17       Q.   Would you agree that the process that was adopted in  
18          these risk assessments, of not making a verbatim note  
19          but handwriting, as you've explained, is one that could  
20          be open to error, to a mistake being made in the note,  
21          or in the interpretation of the note, at a later stage?

22       A.   In terms of accuracy, it would be far better if we had  
23          a tape recorder running, then you'd get it a hundred per  
24          cent.  You could make a verbatim note of course.

25          A verbatim note is -- what you think a verbatim note

1 is -- it's not necessarily a verbatim note. And  
2 I suppose in the process, it was decided by -- again,  
3 refer back to the DLS to make -- have their opinion, but  
4 you were balancing a number of things. One is to try  
5 and cover an awful lot of area of a person's life within  
6 a reasonable time span, so that you can then translate  
7 that into a meaningful risk assessment, because of  
8 the time pressures that were imposed upon us.

9 I think it was probably -- if I was going to change,  
10 there would be things I would arguably do differently,  
11 if we were sitting and doing things again. That  
12 probably wouldn't be one of them. I think I'm satisfied  
13 that we got the meaning of what they were trying to say,  
14 but I obviously completely agree that, you know,  
15 a recording is obviously more -- is safer in some ways,  
16 is better. That's undoubtedly true.

17 Q. If there is a lengthy time period between the interview  
18 and then you writing up the assessment, would you tend  
19 to rely more on your notes on that occasion than on your  
20 memory, or a bit of both?

21 A. I don't think there ever was in my case. I don't think  
22 so, and I deliberately remember not accepting an  
23 interview date just before going on leave on one  
24 occasion, because I was quite -- quite obsessive that  
25 I liked to type it -- if I couldn't type it up the next

1 day, then it would be the day after, sort of thing.

2 There were very few times when that wasn't the absolute  
3 priority the next day. And I tried never, if I could  
4 avoid it, to put two back to back two days running to  
5 interview.

6 There were exceptions. There were people -- I think  
7 I can say this safely -- people I had to travel some  
8 distance to see, where I wasn't back in the office  
9 the next day because there was a day travelling back to  
10 London. So then, inevitably, there would be a day's  
11 delay. But as -- as best as I could, I would do it  
12 very, very soon afterwards. That was certainly the case  
13 with 155.

14 Q. Yes. And I think in fact it was four days between  
15 the interview and then you having the fact check  
16 meeting, but perhaps we'll come back to that in a short  
17 while.

18 Whilst we're still dealing, please, with the general  
19 risk assessments, can we turn to section 4.12,  
20 "Relationships Entered Into".

21 What did you understand that to mean in terms of  
22 what were you trying to elicit from an officer?

23 A. Well, this is really, really important. I was not  
24 trying to do the same job as you. I was -- or as  
25 the Inquiry. I was trying to understand from



1 the officer what relationships he had entered into -- he  
2 or she had entered into -- that would increase their  
3 risk if their real name or their cover name was  
4 disclosed. So, I'm looking to -- looking at it in  
5 the context of risk. And really only in the context of  
6 risk.

7 So, I would be asking, firstly, whether they'd had  
8 any relationships. The open question would be,  
9 you know, "Did you have any emotional/sexual  
10 relationships while you were deployed?" I would be  
11 looking at those things that I thought could possibly  
12 raise the risk to them. So if they did have  
13 relationships, that in and of itself could. If they'd  
14 had relationships with senior people within  
15 the organisation, that could. If they'd had  
16 relationships with people who were particularly, in  
17 their opinion, violent or aggressive, or where there was  
18 a heightened physical risk, then again, that would be  
19 something which would be relevant.

20 I needed to understand if the -- from a risk  
21 perspective, whether they had the relationship because  
22 they were -- I don't know, a single man living away from  
23 home for five years, and it happened, or whether it was  
24 a -- I won't say a target, but a tactic, but if it was  
25 a deliberate attempt to infiltrate further into

1 the organisation. So I would ask that.

2 What I wouldn't do is I wouldn't do what I would do  
3 as a police officer if I was investigating a sexual  
4 assault. So if you were investigating a sexual assault,  
5 you would need a very detailed chronology of what  
6 happened, who by, when, timescales, from before  
7 the incident to after the incident, including  
8 the details of the sexual act itself. That would be  
9 critical to a police officer's investigation of a sexual  
10 offence. That was not what I was doing. And I tried to  
11 ask the questions that were appropriate to risk and not  
12 be tempted to stray into what could have been  
13 Operation Herne questions or UCPI questions, but stick  
14 with -- strictly to risk assessment questions.

15 Q. And just continuing that point, it could be considered,  
16 couldn't it, that "relationships entered into" has  
17 a wide scope? When you were asking your questions to  
18 get to whether there was risk to this officer, were you  
19 concerned to ensure that you had distinguished in your  
20 questions, and then subsequently in your understanding  
21 of the answer, whether an officer was telling you, for  
22 example, about a close platonic relationship, or  
23 a sexual encounter, or a lengthy sexual relationship?

24 A. Yeah, we would ask that. We would -- we would make  
25 clear that we were talking about either sexual or

1 emotional involvements which were not just friendship.  
2 That was -- that was always made clear. And I --  
3 I should make clear that in -- I don't know  
4 the percentage -- I'm sure you could check it. But the  
5 overwhelming majority the answer was, "No, I didn't,"  
6 and so it wasn't a topic for most investigation -- for  
7 most -- most of the risk assessments I wrote for -- for  
8 the vast majority of undercover officers I spoke to,  
9 they said they had not been involved in any sexual or  
10 physical or emotional relationships.

11 Q. If the answer was no, and you didn't have any  
12 pre-interview research indicating to the contrary, would  
13 you conclude that section there, or would you probe any  
14 further?

15 A. I'd probably probe a little bit further. I would  
16 probably just clarify: well, you know, I'm not  
17 necessarily talking about a full sexual relationship but  
18 I -- "Did you have any -- you know, anyone you kissed?"  
19 You know, that kind of level of conversation. But  
20 I wouldn't probe excessively further. If they're  
21 telling me that, and, as I say, this is not a suspect  
22 interview. If that's what their evidence is, and I've  
23 got nothing to the contrary from any of the research or  
24 any of the other information that I've got, I'd say  
25 I would accept it. I'm not accepting it in the sense

1 I necessarily believe it's true, I'm accepting that is  
2 what they are telling me, and I have no reason to  
3 suggest it's not.

4 Does that -- I hope that makes sense.

5 Q. That.

6 You said earlier that you continually reinforced  
7 that this was an assessment of risk. Did you remind an  
8 officer, when you got to this section about  
9 relationships, of what your purpose was, if it put them  
10 at ease, at that stage, for example?

11 A. Yeah, at the beginning, we went through in some detail  
12 with exactly that. So we would look at, we're looking  
13 at what the risk is in terms of if we release your cover  
14 name, if your real name was identified. We're looking  
15 at stuff around addresses. And I -- I did say that --  
16 I would always say, "The more you can tell me about  
17 the circumstances of your deployment, the fuller  
18 the risk assessment will be, the more accurate the risk  
19 assessment will be", because I was fully aware that  
20 I was not getting access to all the documents that would  
21 have been available back in the 1970s or back in  
22 the 1980s. You know, I -- I knew that. So the best  
23 source of information was often the undercover officer  
24 themselves: "Who did you deploy" -- what  
25 the organisation was. And often we were learning stuff

1 that wasn't necessarily recorded, or if it had been  
2 recorded, it hadn't been retained, and so on.

3 So they were fully aware -- the undercover officers  
4 were fully aware, the more they told me, the more  
5 accurate the risk assessment was.

6 I had to make clear I was -- I'm not on their side.  
7 So it wasn't a case of me saying, "I'm on your side; we  
8 can do you a favour here." It was, "We can make  
9 a matter and more accurate risk assessment if you are  
10 fulsome with the information that you provide."

11 Q. If, then, following from that, an officer was struggling  
12 to answer, would you ever have suggested that you could  
13 quite understand if they had engaged in an intimate  
14 relationship?

15 A. No, I -- I don't recall that. I don't recall ever  
16 saying that. And in any statement in relation to 155,  
17 I've answered that I don't recollect that. But I would  
18 try as much as possible, if someone was either very  
19 angry, as 155 was when we first went to his address, or  
20 if they were struggling with a specific issue, as he  
21 clearly was in being fulsome in relation to  
22 relationships, I would obviously try and get information  
23 back from him. But I don't recollect saying that.

24 Q. Moving towards the conclusion of an interview, would you  
25 and the second interviewer, if they were present, have

1 an opportunity to discuss the interview at its  
2 conclusion?

3 A. Do you mean separate from the officer?

4 Q. Yes. So either when you were -- before you wrote  
5 the assessment or once you'd written it, would you  
6 discuss it with the second interviewer?

7 A. You would certainly discuss the interview. So, yes. So  
8 I can remember on that particular day what happened  
9 afterwards. And, yes -- we sat opposite each other at  
10 a sort of banker desk -- does that make sense? -- so you  
11 would discuss what had happened. And the next day when  
12 you'd go in, the other risk assessors may well ask, "How  
13 did it go with N, whatever, yesterday?" And so we would  
14 discuss -- discuss it.

15 Q. And the process was to write the report, as you've said.  
16 And that was to report on the facts that you had been  
17 told and confirmed, and then, in addition, to draw your  
18 conclusion from all the material you had before you; is  
19 that correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. And the final stage then would be the fact check, that  
22 you would arrange a follow-up appointment with  
23 the officer. Is it fair to say the purpose of the fact  
24 check was exactly that, it was an opportunity to correct  
25 any errors or to raise anything that the officer didn't

1           agree with in that document?

2           A. Yes, that's correct.

3           Q. And I think you said earlier in your evidence that if  
4           there was a denial of a comment, you wouldn't  
5           necessarily remove it but you would make a record and  
6           a note that an officer had challenged it, that you would  
7           put it still in the report if you felt it was accurate?

8           A. Yes, I'm not sure that ever happened, but that would  
9           have been the process. So I would take back a fact  
10          check copy, so I -- I'd go back to the office, say,  
11          the next day, type up the risk assessment, which would  
12          be, if you like, to amend what I'd already started, so  
13          that the risk assessment document was complete, print  
14          a copy of that off, take it back to the officer,  
15          the officer would have the opportunity to read through  
16          it, and say, "These facts are wrong." They would also  
17          get to read the conclusions, but their job was to check  
18          for factual accuracies, not to second judge my opinion  
19          as to what the risk was. So if I had scored, say, that  
20          the risk was very low if their real name was identified,  
21          for instance, and they thought otherwise, that was not  
22          a point really for the fact check, the fact check was  
23          for something like, "That's not my name; you've spelt it  
24          wrong," or, you know, that kind of thing.

25                 So they were -- they were there to check facts.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr Reid. I'm going to move in a moment to  
2 deal with 155's assessment, but can we please deal with  
3 a discrete area first.

4 We've discussed that the process as it was could be  
5 open to error in terms of making some mistakes. And I'd  
6 like to deal, please, with the gist that deals with  
7 officers in this tranche who have raised issue with  
8 the risk assessment.

9 I hope we can deal with this very briefly. Please  
10 can I ask to be put up on the screen document  
11 {UCPI/34397}.

12 Sir, I don't think there's a copy of this in  
13 the hard copy bundle.

14 Mr Reid, what I propose to do is direct your  
15 attention to the part of the gist that I'm going to be  
16 dealing with, and merely ask you to confirm those parts.

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. Please can I ask at this stage that you don't go into  
19 any detail beyond that that is contained in the gist.

20 There are only two officers in here that are  
21 relevant to risk assessments that you were involved in.  
22 The first is 126 and then 347. I hope that we can deal  
23 with 126 very briefly. And simply to confirm this, that  
24 your role was the peer reviewer, is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.



- 1 Q. As the peer reviewer in this assessment, did you take  
2 any part in the interview process at all?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. Did you have any access to the handwritten notes of  
5 interview?
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. And so your own involvement then was to review in  
8 the way that you've described at the end as the peer  
9 reviewer of what you were presented with on the final  
10 assessment?
- 11 A. That's correct.
- 12 Q. Thank you.
- 13 Can I move, please, to HN347. And this is on  
14 the second page of the gist {UCPI/34397/2}. And if we  
15 can just -- thank you.
- 16 You'll see there the paragraphs relevant to 347.  
17 It's right that you were the second assessor for this  
18 assessment and present during interview?
- 19 A. That's correct.
- 20 Q. You made a handwritten note during that interview?
- 21 A. Correct.
- 22 Q. And that your note recorded that HN347 did not use  
23 a deceased child's identity?
- 24 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 25 Q. And subsequently -- and this is at paragraph 19 -- when

1           you were asked by Adrian Baxter, another risk assessor,  
2           that remained your recollection, that he did not use  
3           a deceased child's identity?

4           A. Yeah, it's written in two places. It's quite clear.

5           Q. And, in fact, that accords with HN347's position and  
6           what he states in his witness statement.

7                     Please don't go into any detail, but can you  
8           confirm, as is set out there at paragraph 18 of  
9           the gist, that the risk assessment recorded at  
10          paragraph 4.4 that HN347 researched the identity of  
11          a deceased child with a specific name?

12          A. Researched, yes, correct.

13          Q. It's right that you didn't write this report?

14          A. That's correct.

15          Q. And in fact, what was recorded in the risk assessment  
16          doesn't accord with the handwritten note or with HN347's  
17          position that he did not use a deceased child's  
18          identity?

19          A. That's -- that's partly correct.

20          Q. When you peer-reviewed the written assessment, did you  
21          make any amendment to that section to ensure that it  
22          correctly reflected your handwritten note, from  
23          recollection?

24          A. No, I didn't, and that is an error as -- as you've  
25          alluded to.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr Reid.

2 Let's move back, please, to deal with HN155's risk  
3 assessment. And if that document can be taken down from  
4 the screen.

5 HN155's risk assessment took place on 14 November in  
6 2017; is that right?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And you've confirmed the fact check took place four days  
9 later on 18 November, and the report completed on  
10 23 November of that year?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. You've already explained that your preference would be  
13 that there was a short period between the interview and  
14 then the fact check. So does it follow that it wasn't  
15 unusual that it was a short window between the interview  
16 and the fact check?

17 A. That was often the way. The important thing for me was  
18 me typing up my handwritten notes in a short time. Once  
19 they were typed up, if there was a bit of a longer delay  
20 before the fact check, that was -- that was not such  
21 a problem, it was just important that there wasn't a big  
22 delay between the interview and me making notes and me  
23 typing those notes up.

24 Q. You were the lead assessor, and it was Mr Brian Lockie,  
25 who was the second interviewer, who was present at this

- 1           assessment; is that correct?
- 2           A.   At the assessment.  He wasn't present at the fact check.
- 3           Q.   The assessment took place at 155's home address and
- 4           lasted for about three to four hours; is that right?
- 5           A.   That's correct.
- 6           Q.   Were both you and Mr Lockie present throughout that
- 7           time?
- 8           A.   That's correct, yeah.
- 9           Q.   And perhaps it goes without saying, you've confirmed
- 10          the continual reinforcement of the purpose for the risk
- 11          assessments, and you've said that 155 was angry when you
- 12          first got to his house.  Is that a correct
- 13          understanding?
- 14          A.   Yeah, he was -- he was certainly agitated and stressed
- 15          by the process, I suppose.  Wasn't rude.  Well, I don't
- 16          recall him being rude at all, but he clearly needed to
- 17          -- we needed to get him into a position where we -- we
- 18          could interview him better.  So it took a little bit of
- 19          time to speak to him.  I remember speaking to him.
- 20          I think at one time I remember being in the kitchen and
- 21          trying to build up that rapport, so that we could have
- 22          a meaningful conversation.
- 23          Q.   Taking that time to build up the rapport, once you got
- 24          into the body of the risk assessment, did you feel that
- 25          he was less agitated and in a state to properly engage?

1 A. Yes, I felt he was engaging and answering questions very  
2 reasonably.

3 Q. May I just ask this. Your observations throughout that  
4 three to four-hour period of his body language and  
5 responses, did he appear at any time to be experiencing  
6 other emotional or physical difficulty listening to you  
7 and then responding?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Would you have made a note of that if he had?

10 A. Well, if -- yes, it's a human engagement. If -- if we'd  
11 been speaking for a considerable time, I'd often say,  
12 "Do you want a five-minute break? Do you want a cup of  
13 tea?" Someone who is a smoker, "Do you want a smoke  
14 break? Do you need the loo? Do you want a" -- you know  
15 that would be entirely normal. And often, often, often,  
16 particularly with people who were -- who were  
17 struggling, as was often the case with particularly some  
18 of the older people we were dealing with, we would  
19 interview for a bit, and then we would stop for a bit  
20 and come back. That would be just a normal part of  
21 engagement.

22 Q. And as this interview continued for three to four hours,  
23 is it fair to say that this wasn't an occasion where it  
24 reached a point where the interview, you felt, should be  
25 stopped?

1           A. No, that would be correct. If I felt it was unsafe or  
2           someone was struggling to such an extent that it was  
3           dangerous, or whatever, or the recollections were too  
4           painful or too difficult -- we didn't reach that phase.  
5           You know, it was not unusual -- not with him, not with  
6           him. It was not unusual for people to make -- to take  
7           -- vent their anger at what they thought was  
8           the injustice of what they were being put through at me  
9           or another risk assessor. That was not uncommon. But  
10          this was nothing beyond what was regularly the case.

11                 Others, of course, entirely relaxed about it, but  
12          some -- some people were agitated. Other people,  
13          particularly some elderly people -- I'm thinking of one  
14          in particular -- really quite elderly person -- where he  
15          did take an awful long time, because I didn't think it  
16          was fair or right to proceed for any length of time in  
17          a -- in a formal way, and I needed to change. I didn't  
18          need to do that on this occasion.

19          Q. Thank you.

20                 Dealing, then, with the format of 155's interview.  
21          As you've described earlier, you had the template risk  
22          assessment, but you, is it right, had completed some  
23          research and typed into that risk assessment before you  
24          attended?

25          A. Yes, I should say that the research came back --

1 sometimes came back in, say, dribs and drabs -- didn't  
2 always get it all together. So sometimes we would ask  
3 for -- I would look through the documents that were on  
4 our system on something called -- well, initially on  
5 HOLMES, and then on something called "Relativity". And  
6 I would add the relevant bits in. So I would look for  
7 things like, you know, what's his address, you know,  
8 what car he used. That kind of thing.

9 I was always reliant on further research after I had  
10 done the under -- well, sometimes reliant on further  
11 research after I'd done the interview. So if during  
12 the interview the undercover officer said, "Well,  
13 actually, the person I was closest to and I was  
14 targeting was Fred Smith," and I hadn't seen any  
15 reference to Fred Smith, then I would need to wait for  
16 the research on Fred Smith to be completed before  
17 I could do the fact check, if that makes sense.

18 So I would not necessarily wait for all of  
19 the research to be done before I would do the interview.  
20 I would be pragmatic around that, because a constant  
21 reminder was timescales, we need these very, very  
22 quickly. And that was a reasonable thing to do.

23 Q. As we see, your handwritten document of the assessment,  
24 the typed text that's on that document, is it right that  
25 that would be the research that you had managed to

1 complete prior to going to the interview?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And as you've explained earlier, where you would tick or  
4 you would write "no" -- you can turn up your copy of  
5 the handwritten notes if you -- needs be. But is this  
6 right, that there are areas throughout HN155's  
7 handwritten document where the research is ticked?

8 A. Yes, there are.

9 Q. And there are areas where there is "no" written next to  
10 some of the research?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. So he was agreeing and disagreeing with some of  
13 the research that you had.

14 If there is a question mark next to some of  
15 the typed text, can you explain what that would mean?

16 A. It could -- it could mean that -- I always ask the open  
17 question first. So with a simple question like, "Where  
18 was your flat?", if somebody said, "My flat was in  
19 Hampstead," and that didn't accord with what I had,  
20 I would write "he says Hampstead", or something like  
21 that. I would then follow up with a question like, "Did  
22 you have a flat in Kilburn as well?", if I had got  
23 information from our Relativity that his flat was in  
24 Kilburn, and he would say "yes" or "no" or, "I can't  
25 remember." It would be something like that. That would



- 1           be -- that would be why.
- 2       Q.   And there are other areas in the handwritten notes for  
3           155's interview where there is a quantity of typed text  
4           which would be your research; is that correct?
- 5       A.   Correct.
- 6       Q.   And then next to that within those sections, there is  
7           also a quantity of handwriting; and would that indicate  
8           that 155 had been able to give you a detailed response  
9           in those areas?
- 10      A.   Yes, that's correct.
- 11      Q.   And is it correct that this combination of ticks and nos  
12           and question marks and handwritten material continues  
13           throughout the document through to the conclusions  
14           section, that's section 19?
- 15      A.   That's correct.
- 16      Q.   Can we focus now, please, on section 4.12,  
17           "Relationships Entered Into". Looking at your  
18           handwritten note -- and perhaps if we can have that on  
19           the screen, please. It's reference {MPS/746346}.
- 20           And, sir, that's behind tab 2.
- 21           But in relation to this area, there was no  
22           pre-interview research recorded there.
- 23      A.   I can't answer that, because it's blocked out -- blanked  
24           out, but I don't believe there was.
- 25      Q.   And we have the large section at section 1 and then at

1 section 2 that has been redacted. Would those then be  
2 other sections where you'd completed, either in typed  
3 text or handwritten notes?

4 A. I'm -- I'm sorry, from what I can see, I can see my  
5 handwriting notes, which is the things he would have  
6 told me when we were interviewing him, on top of what is  
7 a blacked out screen, so I don't know what's behind  
8 that. But I presume that would have been either  
9 the questions or previous research. I can't answer that  
10 because it's a blacked out screen.

11 Q. Can I check this, if you can recall. Did you make  
12 the note that we can see there as 155 was answering, or  
13 was it a note at the conclusion of your questions and  
14 answers on this section?

15 A. No, that's as he was talking.

16 Q. Did you begin this section in the usual way that you  
17 described with 155?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you recall what question you'd have asked of him at  
20 the outset?

21 A. At the outset would be a question like, "I need to ask  
22 you about any relationships you had with -- when you  
23 were deployed, did you have any emotional or  
24 sexual relationships with any women?" That would be  
25 the normal starting point.

1 Q. So you'd use the words "emotional" and "sexual" within  
2 that opening question?

3 A. It -- it would probably be those exact words. If it  
4 wasn't, it would be something that would encapsulate  
5 the same thought.

6 Q. What was HN155's reaction to that question?

7 A. As per what I've written down. It was clearly a subject  
8 he took some time to -- to answer, and I -- I can tell  
9 you what I felt. I don't want if you want me to give  
10 you that opinion.

11 Q. Yes, please explain. Can we split it down into his  
12 initial response, if you can help by reference to  
13 the handwritten note, can we deal with that first,  
14 please?

15 A. Yeah, I'm -- is there any possibility -- is there any  
16 possibility the person doing the screen could just move  
17 it across a bit, because unfortunately the pictures down  
18 the right-hand side are just blocking my view of it, or  
19 I could look at the document? But certainly the initial  
20 thing he said was that he lived a full alternative  
21 lifestyle or life.

22 Q. Mr Reid, do you have --

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me for interrupting. Would it be  
24 possible, please, for Mr Reid to read his notes. I'm in  
25 a glass house throwing stones here: my handwriting is

1           very bad. But his is not quite as bad as mine, but  
2           I have some difficulty following it.

3       A. Sir, I can, but the pictures on the screen are blocking  
4           the handwritten note. I could look at it in the binder.

5       THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, if you've got the binder there, look at  
6           it in the binder.

7       A. Okay, under 4.12 it says:

8                 "Lives a full alternative life in all aspects but  
9                 cannot recall specifics. No long or medium-term  
10                relationships and there are groupies who would want to  
11                spend the night with a central committee member."

12               And then --

13       THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, would you mind doing it at  
14           dictation speed, please, for me.

15       A. Sorry:

16                "Lives a full alternative life in all aspects but  
17                cannot recall specifics. No long or medium-term  
18                relationships plus [and that's the sign plus] there were  
19                groupies who would want to spend the night with  
20                a central committee member."

21               Then:

22                "Not a member but close to it, but not going to  
23                disclose further. Would only give first name."

24                "First" is "1" and then "st", "name":

25                "Cannot recall their names 2 or 3 ..."

1           That's numbers 2 or 3:

2           "... plus ? women. Dalliances not all ended in full  
3 sex. Probably drinking."

4           I think it's:

5           "Never purposefully gave surname."

6           And unfortunately this copy, I can't see  
7 the last ... "not". And I can't read that last word. I  
8 think I did interpret it for my statement.

9 MS SMITH: Perhaps if I can assist. It's in paragraph 8 of  
10 your witness statement, the final sentence. You've  
11 written out there is, as you say:

12           "Probably drinking. Never purposefully gave  
13 surname, but not volunteered."

14 A. That's right, it is "volunteered".

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 MS SMITH: If the document can be taken down from  
17 the screen, please.

18           Mr Reid, you were explaining that 155's first  
19 response to your question was as you've recorded there,  
20 that he "lived a full alternative life in all aspects  
21 but couldn't recall specifics". Did he go on to explain  
22 what it was that he meant by that?

23 A. No, not in -- not beyond what I've said to you.

24 Q. So after he'd made that remark and said that he couldn't  
25 recall specifics, the note goes on to record:

1            "No long or medium-term relationships."

2            The section about "groupies wanting to spend  
3            the night with a central committee member", and  
4            then "but not going to discuss further".

5            Did you ask a question of 155 after his initial  
6            response to then come to the next part of that that's in  
7            your record?

8            A. I quite probably did. It was quite -- quite probably  
9            a conversation. I haven't recorded the specific  
10           question I asked.

11           It was quite clear he was uncomfortable speaking  
12           about this area, and didn't particularly want to speak  
13           about this area. And he made clear, and I've even noted  
14           there, at one point say, "I don't want to discuss this  
15           further." But then there was a further discussion after  
16           that, and he did then say as I've said.

17           Q. How did that further discussion come about, do you  
18           remember?

19           A. No, we would -- I would be asking him in exactly  
20           the same way as you were suggesting at the beginning of  
21           the investigation, would I let something die, would I  
22           say, "Did you have any affairs, yes or no?", and then  
23           leave it. I would continue to probe where I thought it  
24           was reasonable to probe. And I felt at this stage that  
25           there was -- he'd given a half answer in terms of

1 alternative lifestyles; I wanted to know what that  
2 meant, and whether that meant included in the sexual  
3 context. And so I would have continued to ask him  
4 questions in relation to that -- "Did you have any  
5 relation -- did you have any relationships?" And that's  
6 when he's answered as he has.

7 Q. So let's, please, look at that section where there's  
8 the record of "dalliances not all ended in full sex".  
9 Was "dalliances" a word that he used during that  
10 interview?

11 A. It was a word that he used in that interview, and -- and  
12 I've noticed, reading the documents today, what when  
13 I wrote the risk assessment, I actually made that point  
14 "his word" or something like that, "word he used" or  
15 something, in the risk assessment.

16 Q. Do you recall in what context that he then spoke about  
17 dalliances?

18 A. Yeah, he was making clear that he had had -- he had  
19 originally said two or three, and said, "Well, it could  
20 have been more." That's why I've written "+?". But he  
21 was -- he was very keen to make clear these were  
22 relationships he'd had with women when he was deployed  
23 and, if you like, during the period of his deployment,  
24 but not to gain a tactical advantage; these are things  
25 that happened because he was deployed. That was

1 the point he was making.

2 And I reflected that, and I've reflected that in  
3 the risk assessment, and I think in the conclusions  
4 (inaudible) the risk assessment, that these were social  
5 encounters, these were not a tactic he used. It wasn't  
6 to become higher up in the central committee, as he'd  
7 already -- he said, you know, "I'm -- I'm not on  
8 the central -- I'm close to the central committee"  
9 there. These were not -- these were not a tool to gain  
10 advancement or intelligence from the SWP, these were  
11 things that just happened because they were -- they were  
12 short-term things that happened, and happened during his  
13 deployment, but not because of his deployment, if that  
14 makes sense.

15 Q. So you say that he wished to make that clear.

16 Did he explicitly say during the interview that he  
17 had engaged in sexual relations with women?

18 A. At no point did he say that he'd had full sex. He made  
19 the point that he had not -- not all had led to full  
20 sex, which was a strange comment. I deliberately didn't  
21 ask him the question that I would have asked him if  
22 I was doing a criminal investigation, which is, "Well,  
23 did you therefore have sex with at least one of these  
24 women?" I -- I -- he didn't say that, and I haven't  
25 recorded that he did. And I deliberately didn't ask



1 him, for the reasons I explained earlier, that question.

2 The inference to me was, he's clearly had  
3 a dalliance you could take as full sex or not full sex.  
4 But whether it was "just" a physical encounter or a full  
5 sexual encounter, he was making clear he had had those  
6 encounters.

7 Q. During the process of him showing the reluctance, you  
8 asking him some follow-up questions, and then him, you  
9 say, giving the account you've recorded here, did you  
10 feel or did he appear to be seeking your opinion or  
11 reassurance on whether he should provide you with more  
12 detail?

13 A. I think it's possible he -- he was. I mean, we had this  
14 -- this was a common theme that people were looking  
15 to us for advice. And we -- we did make clear, "We are  
16 not here to give you advice about what you should or  
17 shouldn't say, we are trying to write a risk assessment  
18 for you; that is our purpose." So, I wouldn't be  
19 surprised if he wanted us to give him -- to steer him,  
20 and that was something which we were very keen not to  
21 do.

22 Q. And you say you were very keen not to do it. Did you or  
23 Mr Lockie steer him in any way, to assist him?

24 A. Well, we were asking questions because, to make the most  
25 accurate risk assessment, I needed honest answers to,

1 "Did you have sexual relationships with any women?" So  
2 if -- if you call that "steering", then in that sense,  
3 yes. I'm not giving him legal advice as to whether it's  
4 a -- a good thing to do or a bad thing to do, and I'm  
5 not sitting in moral judgment on -- on what happened  
6 with those individuals. I'm trying to write a risk  
7 assessment and limit myself to writing the risk  
8 assessment.

9 Q. I'd like to give you an opportunity, if I may, to  
10 consider the points that 155 made in his witness  
11 statement.

12 Please can document {MPS/747546} be put on  
13 the screen at page 32 {MPS/747546/32}, and, Sir, this is  
14 behind tab 2 of HN155's documents.

15 Can you go on to the next page, please in  
16 the document {MPS/747546/33}. Thank you, that's  
17 the correct page.

18 And if we could zoom in there to paragraph 115, and  
19 within that section 10. That's fine, thank you.

20 Mr Reid, I'm going to read some parts from there  
21 section 10, which is the impact statement of 155.  
22 The first point is this -- and it starts four lines  
23 down. It's recorded there that 155 states:

24 "... I recall being quite clear that I did not  
25 engage in any sexual activity while I was undercover."

1           You may already have dealt with this, but can I ask,  
2           for clarity, did 155 tell you positively that he didn't  
3           engage in any sexual activity?

4           A. No.

5           Q. He continues in that paragraph that:

6                     "To the best of my recollection, the risk assessors  
7                     responded that it would have been quite possible and not  
8                     surprising if my deployment had taken such a turn, given  
9                     its length and depth. I accepted this and went on to  
10                    discuss the SWP social scene, the status or cachet  
11                    enjoyed by those within its inner circle, meetings in  
12                    pubs ..."

13                    Can we move to the next page, please,  
14                    {MPS/747546/34}. Thank you:

15                    "... flirtatious chat and the fact that sexual  
16                    activity could have been an option. I did not want to  
17                    appear naive and wanted to be open about the fact that  
18                    I lived my alter ego's life 'to the full'. Indeed,  
19                    I think I may have said this to the risk assessors.  
20                    I can understand how and why they came away thinking  
21                    that I had been talking about myself, but this was not  
22                    my intention and not what I meant."

23                    We've dealt, Mr Reid, with whether you would suggest  
24                    it was quite possible and not surprising, and you've  
25                    said that that wouldn't be what you would say to 155.

1           Can I ask you this, please -- and the document can  
2           be taken down from the screen: having listened to 155's  
3           answers and observed his demeanour, was your  
4           understanding that he was talking about hypothetical  
5           situations, so sexual activity that was an option but  
6           not a reality?

7           A. No, he was speaking about himself.

8           Q. Could he have been talking about another officer's  
9           activities during that answer, rather than his own?

10          A. No, for the specific reasons that we've already covered.  
11          He's talking about "two or three", "might have been  
12          more", "didn't lead to full sex". These were specific  
13          things to specific people. The questioning was -- was  
14          not so ambivalent that we could be mistaken there. He  
15          was reluctantly speaking about himself.

16          Q. From your observations of 155, could it have been  
17          possible that as he was answering this topic, that he  
18          got lost in talking about his role, and was unable to  
19          distinguish between a real and an imagined experience?

20          A. I think that's probably for a psychoanalyst to -- to  
21          answer, rather than me.

22                 He was giving the impression that he was speaking  
23                 about -- well, he was speaking about himself and his  
24                 deployment. I can't say he was telling the truth; that  
25                 would be beyond what I could say, if he's telling me

1           about imaginary sexual experiences. But he was talking  
2           about what he was claiming to be his emotional or sexual  
3           encounters. But I think, otherwise, I'm -- I'm not  
4           qualified to answer whether he -- he could have been  
5           imagining them. That's beyond my expertise.

6           Q. And finally on this topic, did you form an impression  
7           that he started to tell you what he perhaps perceived  
8           you wanted to hear, that he was simply agreeing?

9           A. No, I don't think that's fair, because I think if you  
10          look at the vast majority of undercover officers,  
11          whether they did or didn't have affairs I'm not  
12          qualified to judge, but they clearly answered that they  
13          didn't. I don't think he thought we wanted to hear  
14          that. I didn't want to hear it or not hear it; I wanted  
15          to hear what was the truth. And I think that was made  
16          clear to him.

17                 And he made clear -- albeit that it took some time  
18                 and he was clearly struggling to say it, and at one  
19                 point stopped saying it and then came back to it -- that  
20                 he had had some form of sexual or emotional involvement  
21                 with a number of women, two or three, or probably  
22                 more -- or maybe more -- during that time. His main  
23                 point was, "I wasn't doing this as part of my SWP  
24                 deployment, I was doing this because I met a girl in" --  
25                 in wherever -- "and it happened". That was the main

- 1 point he wanted to get across, which I -- I accept.
- 2 Q. After the interview concluded, do you recall that you  
3 and Mr Lockie discussed the interview at any stage?
- 4 A. We would have done. I don't remember doing so, but we  
5 would have done.
- 6 Q. Did you feel that there had been anything unusual about  
7 the interview?
- 8 A. It was unusual in -- for an undercover officer to say  
9 that they'd had an emotional or sexual relationship.  
10 That was unusual full stop. So it was unusual in that  
11 regard.
- 12 The -- afterwards, the -- 155 wanted to go to  
13 the pub, and he asked us to go. I don't -- I hardly  
14 drink, but went and had an orange juice and left him in  
15 -- perfectly happily, and then I would have seen Brian,  
16 I don't remember when, but probably the next day or the  
17 day after, back in the office.
- 18 Q. Can we move, please, to deal with the fact checking  
19 process.
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. Can you recall whether the date for the fact check was  
22 arranged at the conclusion of the interview or later?
- 23 A. I don't recall.
- 24 Q. Was there any urgency in the date of the fact check?
- 25 A. If there was, it would have been because the -- there

1           was constantly pressure on the risk assessors to get  
2           the risk assessments completed and to yourselves. So we  
3           would constantly have deadlines given to us to -- to get  
4           them to you. So if there was a demand, it would have  
5           been generated by the Inquiry, because they needed it by  
6           the Monday or the Tuesday or whatever.

7           And I know I took it to him on the Saturday, which  
8           I wouldn't ideally have worked, so that I imagine there  
9           was some pressure to get it in to the Inquiry.

10          Q. To your understanding, was it at a time that was  
11          convenient to 155, albeit on a Saturday?

12          A. Yes, as far as I'm aware.

13          Q. Would it have been possible for him to rearrange it if  
14          it really wasn't a suitable time?

15          A. Yeah, I mean, if it wasn't a suitable time, then we  
16          would have had to -- I would have had to explain to DLS  
17          that they would have to tell you that he couldn't do it  
18          on that day. I couldn't -- I couldn't force him to do  
19          it. But I drove down to -- he wanted to meet in a pub,  
20          which -- we went to the pub near where he lives on  
21          the Saturday so that it could be in on the Monday.

22          Q. Was he ever informed or given the impression that  
23          the meeting was simply for him to take a hard copy away  
24          rather than for him to consider at that time?

25          A. No, our directions at the time were that they were to be

1           given a copy to read. This did change and I'll be  
2           careful, because the directions changed, from either  
3           the Inquiry or DLS, I can't remember which, because we  
4           had fact checks that we needed to be doing with people  
5           who we couldn't get to and had to be done remotely, and  
6           therefore they needed to be emailed, and so it was very  
7           hard to hold a position where they couldn't take it  
8           away.

9           My understanding at the time was that he wasn't --  
10          we weren't allowed to keep it; it was for him to read,  
11          to comment on and then for us to bring back.

12         Q. To your recollection, did he have the opportunity to  
13            consider the fact check document --

14         A. Yes.

15         Q. -- in full?

16            Can I -- you may or may not need to refer to it --  
17            direct your attention to the fact check document,  
18            the full document.

19            Sir, this is the document, not in the bundle, but  
20            reference {MPS/746269}.

21            Is it correct that throughout that document there  
22            are a number of areas with a handwritten note or an  
23            asterisk next to the text?

24         A. There are, yes.

25         Q. Are those your notes?



- 1 A. Yes, they are. It's my handwriting.
- 2 Q. When would they have been added to that document?
- 3 A. I presume they would have been added during the fact  
4 check. But the idea of the fact check is I take him  
5 a version of it, he says "that's not right", and I would  
6 then note it, and then I would change it or not change  
7 it, or make an amendment, as we discussed earlier, when  
8 I was back in the office.
- 9 Q. Can we deal with those -- that point then, simply to  
10 confirm that prior to the section 4.12, which is the  
11 "Relationships entered into", that there are four areas  
12 over three pages where there is a handwritten note on  
13 the document?
- 14 A. I accept that.
- 15 Q. And that those notes include an amendment to the text,  
16 a query and the provision of additional information?
- 17 A. I accept what you say, yes.
- 18 Q. We'll come back to 4.12 in a moment, but after  
19 the section concerning relationships, can you confirm  
20 that there are a further three areas over three pages  
21 where there are handwritten notes?
- 22 A. That's correct.
- 23 Q. And again, those notes relate to the provision of  
24 additional information and a note to delete some of  
25 the material?

- 1 A. That's correct.
- 2 Q. So to confirm, as you've explained, those handwritten  
3 notes were a result of points raised by 155 during that  
4 fact check?
- 5 A. I believe they all would have been, but certain --  
6 I specifically remember 4.12. I can remember  
7 the rationale behind that and him saying that.
- 8 Q. Can we deal with that section then, please. Can  
9 the document {MPS/746710} be put on the screen.
- 10 Sir, that's tab 3, and this is the final section  
11 that I intend to deal with, Mr Reid.
- 12 So it's right, is it, that 155 checked this section  
13 and sought to change the final eight words?
- 14 A. Yes -- well, it's seven, isn't it. That's my mistake.  
15 It's seven rather than eight.
- 16 Q. Yes, I -- I wondered that myself, but I --
- 17 A. -- (overspeaking) -- yeah --
- 18 Q. If we put a line through the "and". So, the line  
19 crossing out is --
- 20 A. Exactly.
- 21 Q. -- what reads "and that the encounters would have  
22 followed drink"?
- 23 A. Yes, and eight would be "and".
- 24 Q. And is it correct, and you've referred to this briefly  
25 earlier, that in your witness statement you say that 155

1           sought to change that sentence because he thought it  
2           could be interpreted in a way that suggested sexual  
3           activity when women were drunk; is that right?

4           A. And I 100% agree with him, I had no issues with it,  
5           I thought he was absolutely right, it's badly phrased by  
6           me, and I wasn't trying to infer he was taking advantage  
7           of drunken women. The comment that he made at the time  
8           of the risk assessment interview was that they would  
9           have -- they may have been drinking in the pub or  
10          something like that beforehand. They were social  
11          encounters in a pub that led on, and I didn't want to  
12          infer that he was taking advantage of women who were  
13          drunk, and it would have been unfair to do so, because  
14          he never said that, I have no evidence to suggest that,  
15          and that's why I've asterisked it to cross it out.

16          Q. And were those the words, or the type of words that 155  
17          used when he challenged this section, that it suggested  
18          sexual activity when women were drunk?

19          A. Yeah, I -- I don't remember exactly what his words, but  
20          that was -- that was the argument he was making. It  
21          didn't sound -- it didn't sound fair, it could be  
22          misinterpreted or misunderstood. And I think he's  
23          right.

24          Q. Can we now please have on the screen document  
25          {UCPI/34398}.

1           And, Sir, this is another document that isn't in  
2           the hard copy bundle.

3           Mr Reid, that's an extract from the final risk  
4           assessment dated 23 November. Can we look first,  
5           please, at the section 4.12, and it's right that, as  
6           you've said, those eight words from the fact check  
7           version were deleted and you have then added in  
8           the final sentence there:

9           "N155 clarified during the 'fact check' that these  
10          were purely social encounters, and not done to enhance  
11          his deployment."

12          And it goes on to say:

13          "He did not comment upon whether his supervisors  
14          were aware."

15          A. That's correct. And I think the context of that  
16          paragraph is important to understand that was  
17          a paragraph he had checked, when you look at the --  
18          the sentences above it. But yes, that's correct.

19          Q. And taking then the sentence that you added, could we  
20          look, please, at the conclusions at section 19. Is that  
21          an explanation, a conclusion that you've drawn from  
22          the interview, the fact check and what you've recorded  
23          at 4.12?

24          A. That's correct.

25          Q. And what is recorded there is that:

1            "... 155 admitted he had had a number of sexual  
2            encounters during his deployment with people associated  
3            with his target group, albeit he insists none were long  
4            term."

5            And finally it records this:

6            "He also stressed that these were social encounters  
7            during his deployment, but were not entered into because  
8            of his deployment."

9            A. Correct.

10          Q. Mr Reid, I won't have it put up unless we need to, but  
11          HN155 referred to the fact check in his witness  
12          statement -- and for reference, it's page 33 of his  
13          witness statement, at paragraph 12 on that page -- and  
14          what he says there is this, that:

15          "The risk assessment says I clarified during  
16          the fact check that these were purely social encounters.  
17          I may well have said something along those lines,  
18          because social encounters I had while undercover were  
19          just that: social, informal and personal, but certainly  
20          not sexual."

21          Considering what you have recorded in the document  
22          that we have on the screen, did you understand, after  
23          the fact check, that 155 had made clarification about  
24          purely social encounters because he was telling you that  
25          they were not sexual?

1 A. No.

2 Q. And finally this. Were you of the view, at the end of  
3 the fact check, that 155 had had a full and proper  
4 opportunity to check the contents, in particular of  
5 section 4.12, and make any representations he wished to?

6 A. He had, yes.

7 MS SMITH: Thank you, Mr Reid. If you wait there, there may  
8 be some more questions.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Reid, the process we follow is to have  
10 a break of a quarter of an hour, during which any  
11 questions that anyone may want Ms Smith to ask of you  
12 can be considered by her. Would you come back, please,  
13 in a quarter of an hour?

14 A. Of course, Sir, yes.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

16 MR FERNANDES: Good afternoon, everyone. We will now take  
17 a break. May I remind those in the virtual hearing room  
18 to remember to join your break-out rooms, please.

19 The time is now 5.55 pm, so we shall reconvene at  
20 6.10 pm. Thank you.

21 (5.57 pm)

22 (A short break)

23 (6.10 pm)

24 MR FERNANDES: Good evening, everybody, and welcome back. I  
25 will now hand over to the Chairman to continue

1 proceedings.

2 Chairman.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Smith, are there any further questions?

4 MS SMITH: Sir, yes, there is one topic of questions, I hope  
5 only three questions in all.

6 Mr Reid, you made reference to the presence of  
7 lawyers during some risk assessments. Can I first  
8 please ask you this: do you know the difference between  
9 the Designated Lawyers and the Commissioner's legal  
10 team?

11 A. I do. I should say there are none with 155.

12 Q. Thank you. That was one of the questions.

13 Were, to your recollection, any of the lawyers who  
14 attended the risk assessments instructed by  
15 the Designated Lawyers?

16 A. Not, in my understanding, no.

17 MS SMITH: Thank you, Mr Reid.

18 Those are all the questions that I have, Sir, unless  
19 there's any further.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: No, thank you. I don't see how there can be  
21 any re-examination as you are the person who called  
22 Mr Reid.

23 Mr Reid, thank you very much for your assistance.

24 We're now going to move straight on to Mr Lockie.

25 A. He's just outside the room, Sir, so I need to walk out

1 to let him come in.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Please do.

3 MR BRIAN LOCKIE

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Lockie.

5 A. Good afternoon, Sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon.

7 Do you wish to be sworn or to affirm?

8 A. Sworn, please.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Then I hope there is a Bible nearby.

10 A. I beg your pardon. I would like to be sworn, but  
11 there's no Bible here, so will affirm.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Then may the words of affirmation be read to  
13 you, please.

14 (Witness affirmed)

15 Thank you.

16 Ms Smith.

17 Questions by MS SMITH

18 MS SMITH: Sir.

19 Mr Lockie, is it correct that you made a statement  
20 for the Inquiry which is dated 26 January 2021?

21 A. That's correct, yes.

22 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read that statement  
23 recently?

24 A. I read it today.

25 Q. Is it true to the best of your knowledge and belief?



- 1 A. Yes, I still agree with the contents.
- 2 Q. Before making that statement, is it correct that you had  
3 regard to paragraph 4.12 of the final risk assessment of  
4 HN155 and paragraph 115 of that officer's statement?
- 5 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 6 Q. Can I also check this, please, Mr Lockie. Have you had  
7 sight of a gist concerning the risk assessments of other  
8 Tranche 1 officers?
- 9 A. Yes, I have, yeah.
- 10 Q. Firstly, may I deal with your background of working as  
11 a risk assessor. Is it correct that you were employed  
12 by the Metropolitan Police Service as an independent  
13 risk assessor for about one year, that being between  
14 February 2017 and February 2018?
- 15 A. Yes, that's correct.
- 16 Q. And during that time, it's right that you completed  
17 a number of risk assessments?
- 18 A. Yes, I did, yeah.
- 19 Q. And focusing for a moment on the risk assessments  
20 completed for Tranche 1 officers, the officers that  
21 the hearings have been dealing with to date, there were  
22 49 risk assessments. Is it correct that you were  
23 the lead assessor in ten of those?
- 24 A. I believe that's correct, yeah.
- 25 Q. You were the second interviewer in HN155 that we're

- 1           dealing with today?
- 2           A. That's correct.
- 3           Q. And a peer reviewer in a further three assessments?
- 4           A. That's correct as well.
- 5           Q. May we first deal, please, with risk assessments in
- 6           general.
- 7                     Is your understanding of the purpose of risk
- 8           assessments to provide an objective evaluation of
- 9           the risk of harm should information be disclosed by
- 10          the Inquiry leading to the identification of an officer?
- 11          A. Yeah, that was the basic understanding of
- 12          the assessments.
- 13          Q. I think it's right that in your witness statement you
- 14          describe it in this way, that:
- 15                     "... our job was to try and get the nominal to tell
- 16          us what he or she wanted to tell us ..."
- 17                     You had "no bias either way"?
- 18          A. Yeah, that's correct.
- 19          Q. Can you explain what you mean by you had "no bias either
- 20          way"?
- 21          A. It was just simply it was their opportunity to speak
- 22          to us and tell us what they want to tell us in regards
- 23          to what they felt was the risk to them or their family.
- 24          Q. It's right, is it, that the interview process was to be
- 25          an informal one?

- 1 A. It was designed to be informal, but also to gather as  
2 much accurate information from the individuals.
- 3 Q. And part of it being an informal interview is that there  
4 wasn't a tape recording of the interview or a verbatim  
5 note taken?
- 6 A. Yeah, there was no tape recorded process, and I'm not  
7 sure that a tape recorded process would have worked, to  
8 be honest.
- 9 Q. And is it right that you record in your witness  
10 statement that you weren't there to interrogate, in that  
11 you wouldn't keep going and going until you got an  
12 answer that you wanted?
- 13 A. That would be a fair comment.
- 14 Q. What manner then, please, would you adopt when you went  
15 along to an interview?
- 16 A. As a general rule, you would try to build up a rapport  
17 with the individual, which could, in some cases, take  
18 some time, because some of the officers were quite  
19 nervous and quite apprehensive about meeting you. And  
20 then you would run through a pro forma asking them, if  
21 you can, quite open questions, recording what they said,  
22 checking what they said, and then leave, go back to  
23 MP state(?), check what they had said was true, try to  
24 corroborate what they'd said, compile a document, and  
25 then go back and see the individuals concerned to check

1           that the accuracy of the document was true.

2       Q.   Mr Lockie, I'll break that down a little, if I may, but  
3           thank you for taking us swiftly through the risk  
4           assessment process.

5                    Can I first ask this: would the person you were  
6           interviewing be made aware of the purpose of what you  
7           were doing?

8       A.   Absolutely, yes, they would.

9       Q.   And aware that you, as you say, didn't have a bias or an  
10          agenda either way?

11      A.   There's no bias, no.

12      Q.   Can I focus for a moment, please, on your experience as  
13          a second interviewer.

14                    What, to you, did that role entail?

15      A.   You'd go along as a second pair of eyes, a second pair  
16          of ears.  Sometimes it was good to have another  
17          important in the room to build that rapport.  Sometimes,  
18          if you were recording notes and you were writing, it's  
19          nice to have somewhere else there to continue  
20          the conversation, or -- so it's just nice to have  
21          someone else there.

22      Q.   Did you, as a second interviewer, take any notes  
23          yourself, as a general rule?

24      A.   As a general rule, no.

25      Q.   And is it -- I think you said this in your answer; let

- 1 me just check, that you would play a part at  
2 the conclusion of the interview in checking what  
3 the lead assessor had prepared by way of a written  
4 assessment?
- 5 A. Yeah -- yeah, you would check through what was said, but  
6 I wouldn't say it was always, because it wasn't always  
7 peer reviewed by the second person that was there. So  
8 I wouldn't say that I knew exactly what my colleagues  
9 had put.
- 10 Q. Would that occur, either checking the written assessment  
11 or by way of discussion, if there were areas of  
12 uncertainty following an interview?
- 13 A. That's probably a better question. Yes, it would be, if  
14 there was an area that you were unclear about, you would  
15 have a conversation to check that their remembering of  
16 the facts were the same as yours, or if they weren't, we  
17 would discuss it.
- 18 Q. Given the informal nature of the process and with  
19 the interviewer also making a note during the course of  
20 the interview, is it right that that note was made on,  
21 as you say, the pro forma, and as we can see from  
22 handwritten notes, it was often made all over the page  
23 and wherever you could fit --
- 24 A. Yeah.
- 25 Q. -- in the text?

1           Would you agree that it's fair that that type of  
2           process is one in which errors can occur?

3           A. Yes and no, but you kind of dealt with a process where  
4           you would complete your typed version and then go back  
5           and see the opposite. But yeah, no one's -- no one's  
6           infallible.

7           Q. On that point, can we deal discretely and, I hope,  
8           briefly, please, with the gist which relates to other  
9           officers that you interviewed in the risk assessment  
10          process.

11          Please can the gist be put on the screen. It's  
12          {UCPI/34397}.

13          Mr Lockie, when the document's on the screen, I'll  
14          be referring to the gist and simply invite you to  
15          confirm what is there. I'd ask, please, that you don't  
16          go into any detail beyond what is contained there.

17          May we start with HN340, and that's on the second  
18          page {UCPI/34397/2}. If we can turn to page 2, please.  
19          Thank you.

20          You'll see there that HN340 is dealt with at  
21          paragraphs 12 to 14. Paragraph 14 sets out what is  
22          recorded at paragraph 4.4 of the risk assessment, and  
23          it's this:

24          "... that HN340's accommodation was a bedsit in ...  
25          London."

1           And it later, in the same section, records that  
2           the bedsit was "run by an Irish couple in  
3           Golders Green".

4           If we look up to paragraph 13, it confirms that  
5           HN340 has raised an issue in his witness statement  
6           concerning that section in that the flat wasn't in  
7           Golders Green.

8           Please don't go into detail. Can you now recall  
9           whether any reference was made to Golders Green during  
10          that interview?

11         A. I'm not sure where "Golders Green" comes from, because  
12          I don't think I recorded "Golders Green"; I think  
13          I recorded "North London", and specifically Highgate.

14         Q. Would you accept that an explanation is that an error  
15          may have crept in at some stage, either in the notes or  
16          when you made the final written assessment, as one  
17          explanation for it?

18         A. It could have done. I don't want to say so because  
19          I don't know why -- where "Golders Green" came from.

20         Q. Thank you.

21                 We'll move on if we can, please, to HN80, and that  
22                 is at page 3 of the gist {UCPI/34397/3}.

23                 It's recorded there at paragraph 21 that HN80 "has  
24                 made a formal complaint over both his risk assessment  
25                 and his impact statement".

1           Did you have any involvement with the impact  
2           statement?

3           A. No, I didn't, no.

4           Q. An issue -- perhaps I can summarise it as this -- has  
5           been raised by HN80 relating to the chronology of how he  
6           went about creating his cover name. If we look, please,  
7           to paragraph 22, would you agree, as it's set out there,  
8           that what is recorded in the risk assessment at  
9           paragraph 4.4, "Covert identity adopted", is:

10           "... that HN80 went to Somerset House to find  
11           the identity of a deceased child. He did not find an  
12           identity he was comfortable with and used a hybrid  
13           version."

14           A. Yeah, I'd agree, that's accurate.

15           Q. Then if we look, please, to paragraph 21, that sets out  
16           the process by which HN80 describes he went about his  
17           cover identity, and it's this, that:

18           "... he chose the nickname 'CC' and cover name  
19           'Colin Clark'. He refused to use a deceased child's  
20           identity but to show willing did go out and found  
21           a death certificate in the name of 'Paul Clark'."

22           Having done that:

23           "He made it clear to his superiors that he wanted to  
24           use the name 'Colin Clark' and his own date of birth."

25           Would you agree, looking at those passages there,



1           that the process by which he settled on a cover name  
2           could be incorrectly described in the risk assessment?

3       A. To be honest -- I'm not sure, to be honest. I can't  
4           tell you one way or the other. I know I spent probably  
5           nine/ten hours with this individual and he went through  
6           every single line of my risk assessment and the fact  
7           check, so whatever was in there, he saw it and I have  
8           recorded it.

9       Q. Thank you.

10           Can we move, please, finally in this area, to deal  
11           with HN126 and that is at page 1 {UCPI/34397/1} of  
12           the gist. We see there at paragraph 8 that the issue  
13           raised by HN126 in his witness statement is that  
14           the risk assessment, at section 4.15, he says  
15           incorrectly records him as being the "key organiser in  
16           the demonstrations against Grunwicks in Willesden", and  
17           he states in his witness statement that he had only just  
18           gone into the field at that point.

19           If we look, please -- and it's on to the next page  
20           {UCPI/34397/2}, the final sentence of paragraph 10, that  
21           in the section of the handwritten notes, at 4.15,  
22           "Prominent successes", there is no reference to  
23           Grunwicks. Is that correct, as recorded there?

24       A. Yes, I've -- I read my original notes from that  
25           interview. The interview notes are notes sometimes that

1           overrun the question, so there is a little bit of flex,  
2           the fact that sometimes you overrun the question, which  
3           I think I believe I did in this case and I didn't write  
4           anything next to "prominent success".

5           Q. Can we go back, please, to page 1 of the gist and look  
6           at paragraph 9 {UCPI/34397/1}. That deals with the note  
7           -- handwritten note of the interview at section 4.2,  
8           which is, "Main Group(s) infiltrated", and it records  
9           that within those notes there is written:

10                 "Grunwicks -- SWP were a big part in the protests --  
11           I helped to organise the numbers and which days were  
12           going to have a list of SWP."

13                 Mr Lockie, would you accept that the handwritten  
14           notes, as they're set out in the gist there, do not  
15           record 126 telling you that he was a key organiser in  
16           the demonstrations against Grunwicks?

17           A. He did say that. I'm not sure if they're in another  
18           part of the assessment, but he did say that.

19           Q. May I just finish with this. I take it from what you  
20           say that you don't accept it's a mistake in the final  
21           written assessment?

22           A. No, I remember the -- well, it's quite a long time ago,  
23           but I do remember the conversation about Grunwicks,  
24           because I wasn't aware of Grunwicks and I obviously  
25           looked it up to see what it was, and I do remember him

1 saying that's what he did to assist  
2 the Metropolitan Police in possibly policing Grunwicks,  
3 which I thought was a good bit of work by him, to be  
4 honest.

5 Q. I'll not go any further on that topic at this stage.

6 Please can we go back to 155's risk assessment. And  
7 if the document can be taken down from the page, please.

8 Is it correct, as the second assessor, that you were  
9 not involved in the interview preparation or research?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. And would it be fair to say that prior to the interview  
12 you knew little about 155?

13 A. Yeah, not a lot, no.

14 Q. It's right, isn't it, that the interview took place at  
15 his home address?

16 A. That's correct, yes.

17 Q. It lasted for about three to four hours?

18 A. Yeah, that would be right.

19 Q. Were both you and Mr Reid present throughout  
20 the interview?

21 A. We were, yes.

22 Q. Can you help us, please, with HN155's demeanour at  
23 the outset, when you arrived at his home that day?

24 A. He was quite agitated. I'm not going to use  
25 the word "angry", but he -- he was quite -- he wasn't

1           very welcoming, put it that way, is the best way to  
2           describe it.

3           Q. Did his manner change before you started the interview  
4           or during?

5           A. It's to say that it wasn't unusual. There were one or  
6           two officers who were quite apprehensive and angry that  
7           we were there and didn't understand the process, so we  
8           spent quite a lot of time just trying to build a rapport  
9           and calm them down and explain why we were actually  
10          there, that we were doing an independent risk assessment  
11          of his risk.

12          Q. Did that work with 155?

13          A. I think it did. I think it did.

14          Q. And so when the interview got underway, in the sense of  
15          him appearing to listen and then respond, is your  
16          observation that he was engaged with the process?

17          A. Absolutely, yes.

18          Q. As the interview progressed, did you at any time -- from  
19          your observations of either his body language or his  
20          responses, did he appear to be experiencing emotional or  
21          physical difficulty at listening and responding?

22          A. No.

23          Q. If he had, as the second assessor rather than the lead,  
24          would you have interjected?

25          A. Yes, which did happen at other assessments. You would

1 say, "Look, let's have a break, let's have a coffee".  
2 You can kind of sense that some people are getting  
3 upset, so you kind of just say, "Let's have a break".  
4 And nobody felt that with this nominal.

5 Q. Do you recall that 155 answered questions throughout  
6 the interview, so both before and after the section  
7 dealing with relationships?

8 A. Yes, he did, yeah.

9 Q. And during those answers, do you recall that he was able  
10 to both agree and disagree, and also to provide you with  
11 detail?

12 A. Yeah, he -- he could say what he wanted. It wasn't  
13 a problem.

14 Q. In your witness statement you say that Mr Reid took 95%  
15 of the lead but you do record that it was a three-way  
16 conversation. Were you involved in asking questions of  
17 155?

18 A. Yes, the -- there's a pro forma that we went through,  
19 which the lead assessor, which in this case was  
20 David Reid -- he would lead on the questions. But  
21 I didn't sit there and say nothing during the whole  
22 process, but I obviously can't remember exactly what  
23 I said. But I would have -- I would have engaged in  
24 the process myself. It would be quite rude not to.

25 Q. Do you recall whether any of the times that you were

1           verbally involved were in relation to relationships and  
2           that topic?

3           A. Yeah, I do remember that section. Not word for word,  
4           but I remember most of it.

5           Q. We'll come on to that in just a moment.

6                     You say in your witness statement that, as  
7           the second risk assessor, if Mr Reid missed something or  
8           misunderstood something, you were there to help. How  
9           would you realise if he'd missed something or made  
10          a mistake?

11          A. It could just come up in conversation. Maybe  
12          the nominal would say something, "Oh, you misunderstood  
13          that". Or if we got back and we were discussing it, he  
14          would say, "What do you think of this", or, "What was  
15          actually said", and I would say, "Well, this is what  
16          I think was said". That's kind of just a normal  
17          conversation.

18          Q. Casting your mind back, was anything said by 155 during  
19          the interview that you felt that Mr Reid missed or  
20          misunderstood?

21          A. I would say no. I was quite happy with what David Reid  
22          had written.

23          Q. Can we focus now, please, on the section 4.12,  
24          "Relationships entered into".

25                     Can you recall how Mr Reid approached the topic,

1           what his first question was?

2           A. Not the exact wording, but it would be a simple question  
3           along the lines of, "Did you engage in  
4           sexual relationships with any other parties during your  
5           undercover deployment"?

6           Q. What do you recall HN155's reaction was to that?

7           A. He -- he didn't answer it straight away, "No, I wasn't  
8           involved in any sex relations". He kind of -- I've said  
9           in his statement that he kind of flirted round the idea,  
10          which is probably true. He just wouldn't get tied to  
11          the detail.

12                 I personally felt he wanted to us give him a little  
13          bit of guidance on what he should say. We obviously  
14          said that that wasn't our job, to do that, it was up to  
15          him to say. And again, the suggestion I got was that  
16          there had been some sexual relationships and he was  
17          involved, but he never admitted the specifics.

18          Q. If I can just pause you there for a moment. When you  
19          say he was seeking your opinion on what he should say,  
20          was that before he said anything, or did he give some  
21          sort of answer to the initial question?

22          A. Do you know, I don't want to commit to in what order it  
23          went. I just know that he was not forthcoming with  
24          a straightforward answer, which I would say most  
25          officers straight away said, "No, I did not have any

1 sexual relationships with anybody", and then left it at  
2 that. He wasn't like that.

3 Q. Now, in your witness statement you describe it as you've  
4 said now, that he wouldn't directly answer, and you say  
5 that you recall him describing groupies and  
6 sexual relationships of sorts and you were left, as  
7 you've said, with a strong suggestion.

8 Firstly, please, what do you mean  
9 by "sexual relationships of sorts"?

10 A. I don't know. You need to ask him, to be honest. He --

11 Q. Did he say that phrase to you?

12 A. He said the phrase "groupies" and he said the phrase --  
13 he used the word "dalliances", which is a really unusual  
14 word. It would suggest to me it was very short term,  
15 casual relationships. But he never elaborated on  
16 the detail of the sexual relationships and it would be  
17 wrong -- it would be wrong for me to say any more.

18 Q. Just dealing, please, with "dalliances". Did you or  
19 Mr Reid ask him to explain what he meant by that?

20 A. Yeah, that -- that was -- that would be normal -- that  
21 would be a normal thing, to ask him to clarify his  
22 position, and I think he just kind of said the same  
23 thing, just went round in circles, didn't really give  
24 the detail. And then there's a point we're saying,  
25 "Well, we can't -- we're not going to keep pursuing



- 1           the same line of enquiry", because it was a risk  
2           assessment, it wasn't a criminal process to prove or  
3           disprove.
- 4        Q. Do you recall, during this process, that he gave any  
5           information about the number of people that he may have  
6           had some sort of relationship with or not?
- 7        A. Yeah, it definitely wasn't one. I got the feeling he  
8           was talking about two or three, but I got the feeling it  
9           was kind of very short term, but it could have been  
10          more, I think. But he wouldn't elaborate on the number  
11          or exactly the detail.
- 12       Q. Did either you or Mr Reid, when you were going round in  
13          circles dealing with this topic, suggest to him it would  
14          be quite possible and not surprising if he had engaged  
15          in sexual activity while undercover?
- 16       A. No, that's not a conversation we would have had. We  
17          wouldn't have prompted him, because that would have been  
18          a -- suggesting that it's okay and understandable,  
19          which -- that wasn't -- that wasn't part of -- that  
20          wasn't part of our job, to do that.
- 21       Q. Mr Lockie, in your witness statement, you say that  
22          the final risk assessment that Mr Reid wrote was a very  
23          accurate record of the account given by 155. It's  
24          clear, within that record, that what Mr Reid had  
25          recorded is that 155 admitted to a number of short-lived

1 liaisons, he described them as "dalliances", not all of  
2 which would have led to sex and there might have been  
3 two or three women or more.

4 If you say that that's a very accurate record, how  
5 was it arrived at given the reluctance that you've  
6 described and the lack of any real explanation of what  
7 he meant?

8 A. When someone has a conversation with you, you make an  
9 assumption, and what he was suggesting to us was that he  
10 had been involved in some sexual relationships, but  
11 the detail and depth of the relationship, he didn't  
12 explicitly say what had actually happened. But there  
13 was definitely a strong suggestion that he had.

14 Q. Is it possible, from your observations of 155 during  
15 this time that you were discussing the topic, he started  
16 to either tell you what he perhaps thought you wanted to  
17 hear -- I know you can't say what he thought, but  
18 whether he simply started to agree with suggestions or  
19 say what you wanted to hear?

20 A. No, I don't remember this individual being -- I remember  
21 him being quite strong-willed, and I don't think he  
22 would have been persuaded by myself or David Reid  
23 suggesting something to him.

24 Q. Did you ever suggest something, in the sense of  
25 a confirmatory question saying, "We think this has

1           happened, what do you say"?

2           A. No, that wouldn't be a -- that wouldn't be a line of  
3           question or a type of question I'd ask.

4           Q. Can I please just deal with what HN155 said in his  
5           witness statement.

6                     For your benefit, if we can have it on the screen,  
7           please. It's {MPS/747546/32} at page 32.

8                     And Mr Lockie, I think you have confirmed you've  
9           seen this before.

10                    The next page, please, page 33 {MPS/747546/33}.

11                    And there I'm looking at, within paragraph 115, some  
12           of the impact statement is reproduced, and I'm looking  
13           at, please, at paragraph 10.

14                    The first point I'd like to bring out is, about five  
15           lines down, HN155 states this:

16                             "... I recall being quite clear that I did not  
17           engage in any sexual activity while I was undercover."

18                    Do you recall him being clear in that regard?

19           A. No, I -- I don't remember that conversation, or that  
20           comment even, no.

21           Q. From your experience of risk assessments, would that  
22           type of comment have been recorded?

23           A. Absolutely it would have been, because it answered  
24           the question. If somebody had asked you a question and  
25           he had answered it and said, "I did not have any

1           sexual relationships with anybody", we would have moved  
2           on to another subject.

3           Q. He goes on in that section -- and I won't read it out in  
4           full -- essentially suggesting that what he told you and  
5           Mr Reid was misinterpreted by you both, that he was  
6           talking about the sexual activity being an option as  
7           opposed to a reality.

8                     Can I ask you this. Having listened to his answers  
9           and objected his demeanour, was your understanding that  
10          he could possibly have been talking about hypothetical  
11          situations rather than reality?

12          A. My feeling was he was talking about himself and it  
13          wasn't a hypothetical. Do you know, while -- most  
14          officers just answered the question and said, "No, we  
15          didn't", and that was the end of the conversation. So  
16          I got the feeling he was talking about himself.

17          Q. Was there anything that you observed that he may have  
18          been telling you story and giving himself a status that  
19          wasn't true, from how he answered?

20          A. Yeah -- yeah. He could have said what he wanted to say  
21          really. He could have told a whole pack of lies if he  
22          had wanted to, but it was his chance. This is a risk  
23          assessment for his risk, so it was up to him to make  
24          the decision to tell the truth or not.

25          Q. Mr Lockie, can I move on to deal with the conclusion of

1 the interview.

2 If that document can be taken down, please.

3 In your witness statement you record that you read  
4 through the risk assessment prepared by Mr Reid and that  
5 you recall having a conversation about relationships; is  
6 that right?

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 Q. Why was that?

9 A. It was mainly around -- it wasn't to do with the rest of  
10 the risk assessment, it was mainly around the  
11 sexual relationships, because we wanted to be sure that  
12 we both agreed that that was his thought process and  
13 that's what he'd answered.

14 Q. You describe in your witness statement it would have  
15 been the unusualness and the uncertainty about what he  
16 said about the sexual relationships that prompted  
17 the discussion. What were you still uncertain about at  
18 the end of the interview?

19 A. It wasn't uncertain, because 155 didn't actually  
20 explicitly tell us what had happened; he left it  
21 a little bit in the air what had happened. But I think  
22 both me and Mr Reid would have had a conversation, and  
23 the conversation, I think we both agreed we felt he was  
24 talking about himself, but he didn't go into the detail.

25 Q. And during that conversation, did it become apparent

- 1           that your understanding of what 155 had said was  
2           different to Mr Reid's?
- 3       A. No, we both agreed that -- the position that 155 had  
4           said, and we both agreed the same outcome, that we felt  
5           he'd had -- it was him that had had  
6           sexual relationships, it wasn't a hypothetical.
- 7       Q. And during that discussion, was there any part of either  
8           of your viewpoints that you changed during the course of  
9           the discussion such that you came to that agreed  
10          position?
- 11      A. No, there was nothing. If there had been a dispute,  
12          there's no benefit for either me or Mr Reid to dig our  
13          heels in. We'd have went back and asked him  
14          the question again if we were unsure. It wasn't a kind  
15          of prove/disprove position, it was just a listen to him  
16          position.
- 17      Q. Can I just ask you this. At paragraph 13 of your  
18          witness statement you say that a lot of the risk  
19          assessment was very subjective.
- 20      A. Mm-hm.
- 21      Q. Can you explain what you mean by that?
- 22      A. Well, you try to do your best to be as objective as you  
23          can, but sometimes you'll be listening to someone,  
24          you'll be recording notes. Like you mentioned earlier  
25          about I would say that when the other nominals(?)



1 Chairman.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

3 Ms Smith, are there any further questions?

4 MS SMITH: There are no further questions.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Lockie. Your evidence is now  
6 concluded.

7 A. Thank you very much.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: As indeed is the evidence today.

9 Before we break formally, may I say to those who are  
10 working behind the scenes, in particular the shorthand  
11 writers, who I know have had three very long days, that  
12 I do very much appreciate and am very grateful for your  
13 efforts and I hope that they haven't been too demanding.  
14 Without your help, we couldn't keep these hearings  
15 going. Thank you.

16 MR FERNANDES: Good evening, everyone. The hearings in  
17 Tranche 1 Phase 2 have now concluded. Thank you.

18 (7.01 pm)

19 (The hearing concluded)

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