
**Opening statement in Tranche 1
Phase 3 to the Undercover Policing
Inquiry on behalf of:**

**Lindsey German
Richard Chessum
'Mary'**

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INTRODUCTION:

We represent three core-participants in Tranche 1 of this Inquiry.

We addressed the key issues on behalf of Richard Chessum and “Mary” in our Phase 2 opening statement¹.

In this statement our focus is on Lindsey German, who was a member of the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) from 1972 and had roles on the Central Committee of that Party for more than thirty years.

We will demonstrate:

1: That there was no justification for the infiltrations of the Troops Out Movement and the Socialist Workers’ Party, on the grounds of preventing public disorder.

2: That there was no policing justification at all. The true purpose of these infiltrations was political and economic.

3: That neither of those purposes were legally justified and Government knew that to be the case.

4: That Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) intelligence was used to blacklist law-abiding members of the public.

We have a limited time available to us, and so we ask listeners to consider this opening statement alongside the written published version, which is more detailed and fully referenced. Where we refer to the unlawfulness of police activity, we endorse the legal framework provided on behalf of the Category H core-participants.

¹ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf Pages 2 to 3.

PURPOSE OF THE SDS - JUSTIFICATION:

The SDS was created to specifically deal with the potential public order threat of a single demonstration in 1968. Its role was to provide uniformed police with intelligence pertinent to their policing of that demonstration. It should have ended there.²

It quickly became an intelligence trawl of left-wing political groups, growing ever more indiscriminate and ever more intrusive.

Increasingly, the Squad's focus shifted away from anything that could genuinely be described as police work. Suggestions that the SDS were involved in 'law and order' are not borne out by the reports that they generated. References to "disorder" became standardised, annually regurgitated in the SDS reports. It was part of a paper-trail pretence to justify Home Office funding and authorisation.

Even though, in Chief Inspector Craft's words, the SDS Annual reports were an exercise in "*pointing up the value of the SDS in terms of public order*"³ the references to disorder in those reports were ever decreasing⁴ and increasingly contrived.

The 1975 Annual SDS report, made so little reference to disorder⁵, that Commander Rodger of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch commissioned "a complete review of the [SDS]... its activities and objectives"⁶. Rodger noted that "over the past seven

² MPS-0747215/3 Statement of Roy Creamer: "*I thought the SDS would pack up anyway [in 1969] because we had done our job with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign*".

³ MPS-0747446 Statement of Geoff Craft paragraph 68

⁴ MPS-0730099/8: 1975 SDS Annual Report from Chief Inspector Derek Kneale notes, at paragraph 31, that "*there has, over the past years, been a decline in the disorders associated with political demonstrations*" MPS-0728980: (April) 1976 SDS Annual Report from Chief Inspector Geoff Craft (at paragraph 1) "*the threat of serious disorder resulting from major, organised gatherings has diminished.*"

⁵ MPS-0730099 1975 Annual Report: The only significant reference to disorder is in relation to National Front activities, which are dealt with in the section below.

⁶ MPS-0730658: February 1976 Commander Rodger (HN585) tasked Rollo Watts (HN1254), the Chief Superintendent of the SDS, to set up a study group to assist in the forthcoming request for funding from the

years [disorder at demonstrations] has dwindled considerably". The response to the review came from the Chief Superintendent of the SDS, Rollo Watts. Watts accepted the decline⁷ but nevertheless attempted to justify the continuation of the SDS.⁸ He argued that the decline in disorder had been matched by a reduction in the number of undercover officers, from twenty-six down to twelve.⁹ That was not true. There had been no reduction in the number of officers¹⁰ at all. The number had remained consistent, but the lengths of the deployments had increased.

At the same time that public disorder was decreasing, the recipients of SDS intelligence (or "customers" as D.I. Angus McIntosh called them¹¹) were changing.

At the outset, SDS intelligence was destined for uniformed officers, so that they could arguably be better equipped to deal with disorder¹². Even there, as Detective Sergeant Roy Creamer put it, whilst the SDS "were looking for information, there was simply nothing to tell of; it was a case of 'no news is good news'¹³.

Home Office. Watts was asked to undertake a "complete review of the Squad...its activities and objectives" because "over the past 7 years, however, this form of political activity by minority extremist groups has dwindled considerably and with the exception of Red Lion Square conflict in 1974 and possibly one or two other incidents of deliberate confrontation, upsurges in violence on the streets have become less and less frequent".

⁷ MPS-0730745: Rollo Watt's response (in March 1976) conceded that "Certainly, the degree of violence associated with public demonstrations has declined since the formation of the Squad in 1968."

⁸ At MPS-0730745, Chief Superintendent Watts justifies the continued existence of the SDS, by saying that "the popularity of street demonstrations has increased [whilst at the same time conceding that they are not violent], so that public issues like abortion, unemployment, civil liberties etc. have brought very large numbers onto the streets".

⁹ MPS-0730745: paragraph 2: "26 operational officers to the current 12".

¹⁰ 1968: DOC070 notes 12, mainly very short term operational officers: 1969: MPS-0728973/4: 10 operational officers, 1971: MPS-0728971/3: an increase since 1970 to (at most) 12 operational officers, 1972: MPS-0728970/3: 12 active officers, 1973: MPS-0728985/1: (at most) 12 operational officers, 1974: MPS-0730906/8: 12 operational officers, 1975: MPS-0730099/1: 12 operational officers).

¹¹ MPS-0747578 at paragraph 128.

¹² Roy Creamer is clear that at the time of his involvement in SDS (1968-69), intelligence reports would be sent to A8 i.e. uniformed branch (MPS-0747215/16 paragraph 39) and the Home Office (paragraph 43). They would only be sent to the Security Service "if important enough" (paragraph 43).

David Smith: MPS-0747443 at paragraph 19, stated that SDS intelligence would go to A8 (uniformed police) and only to the Home Office and the Security Service "depending on the size of the event".

¹³ MPS-0747215/10 at paragraph 19.

As time went on, the intelligence was increasingly sent elsewhere, to “customers” with little or no involvement in public order issues; other Special Branch departments, MI5, other (generally unnamed) Government Departments,¹⁴ “external agencies”¹⁵ or “liaison partners”¹⁶. Those “customers” also specifically tasked the SDS,¹⁷ i.e. told them what to get and where to get it.

By the end of the 1970s, the SDS management were having regular face to face meetings with MI5¹⁸, including over games of sport (that are redacted for some reason).¹⁹ They were also having monthly meetings over lunch, with the Home Office²⁰ (although the name and specific role of the Home Office representative in question, appear to have been forgotten). Other (un-named) government bodies were not liaised with directly. It was considered more appropriate to keep them at “arm’s length”.²¹

By April 1980 SDS and MI5 were meeting for “drinks” every fortnight²². By August 1980 meetings were described as “routine”.²³

¹⁴ MPS-074758 paragraph 39

¹⁵ MPS-074758 paragraph 39.

¹⁶ MPS-0747658 Detective Chief Inspector Trevor Butler paragraph 42

¹⁷ MPS-0747578: Detective Inspector Angus McIntosh: As at paragraph 39: *As I understand it, decisions as to targeting and tasking were taken by other police departments and government departments.... Tasking from external agencies, such as the Security Service of the Home Office would have come through senior Special Branch officers. Paragraph 52: “specific requests for intelligence were made by police, or other government bodies (such as the Security Service)”.*

¹⁸ MPS-0747658: Paragraph 44: DCI Butler accepts that Security Service documents show that he attended meetings with MI5 “much more frequently” than he thought he had. Paragraph 46: *“The documents show that I had frequent meetings with the Security Service”.*

¹⁹ MPS-0747658 paragraph 46

²⁰ MPS-0747658 paragraph 49.

²¹ MPS-0747658 paragraph 50: *“I do not recall ever liaising with any other government body... As a general rule and given the covert nature of the unit, it was far more appropriate to deal with other organisations at arm’s length through S squad, directly maintain only limited and discreet relationships with key individuals.”*

²² UCPI0000028813 and UCPI0000028814

²³ UCPI0000028816

At the same time, the volume of reports increased exponentially, from 200 information reports in 1969²⁴, to almost ten thousand by November 1971²⁵, with “thousands being produced on an annual basis” thereafter.²⁶

In all of this reporting, there is a remarkable lack of reports on public order issues. The explanation offered for this by the SDS, is that the Metropolitan Police have destroyed or lost their material, and the documents that we are able to examine were sourced from MI5²⁷. It follows, they say, that the reports we can see, are bound to give a skewed impression, because Special Branch did not send their public order reports to MI5.

That is a very convenient, risible, explanation. And it does not fit with the evidence. As public disorder was declining, liaison with other “agencies” was increasing, along with the number of reports generated. Certainly by 1976 “*Most of the information obtained by the SDS ultimately went to the Security Service*”²⁸.

In relation to Lindsey German and Richard Chessum, the SDS were doing nothing in relation to policing at all.

They did not report on law and order.

They had no regard to the law at all.

²⁴ MPS-0728973/3 SDS Annual Report 1969: sub-paragraph (d) “Over 200 information reports have been submitted, and over 1000 minor meetings attended, in addition to the coverage at major demonstrations”

²⁵ See MPS-0735902 cross-referred with MPS-0747797 (Statement of Barry Moss) paragraph 17.

²⁶ MPS-0747578 paragraph 191.

²⁷ MPS-0747658/19: HN307: DI Trevor Butler: paragraph 68: “*The reporting the Inquiry has may appear to demonstrate a greater focus on counter-subversion but this is most likely attributable to these reports being retrieved in large part from the Security Service’s archives. After SDS reports left the office they became the responsibility of S squad and we kept no copies, so I cannot comment on what happened to our public order reporting*”.

²⁸ DI McIntosh MPS-0747578 paragraph 205. See also for example: HN2152: MPS-0747155/14 paragraph 35: “*The Security Service were the main beneficiary of SDS reporting*”.

They were political and economic police, with echoes of the STASI.

THE SOCIALIST WORKERS' PARTY - POLICING THE NATIONAL FRONT:

First we are going to look at the fallacy of a public order justification.

Lindsey German was a member of the Central Committee of the SWP for more than 30 years. During that time the Party was by far the most infiltrated organisation by the SDS. There were at least twenty-four SDS officers that infiltrated them.²⁹ Many of those, we now know, took positions of responsibility of some sort at branch, district or national level³⁰.

²⁹ In addition to the nine officers (listed in the footnote below) who were known, at this stage, to have taken positions of responsibility within the SWP: HN135 'Mike Ferguson', HN339 'Stewart Goodman', HN301 'Bob Stubbs', HN343 'John Clinton', HN353 'Gary Roberts', HN21, HN67 'Alan Bond', HN82 'Nicholas Green', HN33 'Kathryn Lesley "Lee" Bonser', HN95 'Stefan Wesolowski', HN90 'Mark Kerry', HN78 'Anthony Lewis', HN101, HN118 'Simon Wellings', HN304 'Graham Coates'.

³⁰ 'Mike James' (HN96) started his deployment in the *Socialist Workers Party* where he was elected to a position on the Hackney District Committee UCPI0000013376

'Colin Clark' (HN80) dealt with below.

'Phil Cooper' (HN155) dealt with below.

'Roger Harris' (HN200) Contacts Organiser for the Twickenham branch of the *International Socialists* (UCPI000007328), a branch which was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the *Workers' League* (UCPI000009608).

Vincent Harvey, known as 'Vince Miller' (HN354) District Treasurer and on the social committee of the Outer East London District branch

'Geoff Wallace' (HN296) the "Flame" organiser for the Socialist Workers Party (Hammersmith and Kensington branch) (UCPI0000017698) and a Socialist Workers Party Organiser (UCPI0000016921). He attended the London Regional Delegates conference and was one of three organisers of an Anti-Nazi League Carnival (UCPI0000011981).

'Jeff Slater' (HN351) Socialist Worker Newspaper Organiser for the North London District of the International Socialists (UCPI0000012014)

'Bill Biggs' (HN356) Branch Treasurer and *Socialist Worker* Organiser of South West London SWP (UCPI0000011996), chaired meetings (UCPI0000013021), a delegate to an aggregate meeting of the South East District where he voted on a proposal to condemn a Central Committee decision (UCPI0000013229), spoke as a Guest speaker at another branch's meeting (UCPI0000013688) and Branch Treasurer of the Brixton branch (UCPI0000015441)

'Paul Gray' (HN126) *Socialist Worker* Organiser for Cricklewood branch and then the North West District (UCPI0000011354). On the District Committee which had control over all of the branches the District covered (UCPI0000013123). Re-elected in 1979 and 1980 (UCPI0000013536 and UCPI0000013949). In his role as an SWP District Committee member, he was on the Organising Committee of the West Hampstead ANL (UCPI0000011497) and the North-West London ANL Co-ordinating Committee (UCPI0000013135)

They formed relationships with members that lasted for years, tricked them into friendships and sexual relationships.³¹ They entered their homes, betrayed their trust and exploited them for intelligence purposes. We can see the intelligence that they gained in the reports. They reported on, and disseminated, the details of thousands of members; their personal lives³², physical appearances³³, homes³⁴, children³⁵, finances³⁶, jobs³⁷, holiday plans³⁸, weddings³⁹, sexuality⁴⁰, paternity⁴¹, relationship statuses⁴², intelligence level⁴³, trade union affiliations⁴⁴, health⁴⁵, childcare arrangements⁴⁶, vehicles⁴⁷, studies⁴⁸, and opinions. There is a striking lack of reports on criminality, public disorder or violence.

Even in the Annual Reports, where the SDS desperately tried to justify their continued existence, it is difficult to find a rationale.

³¹ HN155 "Phil Cooper": sexual relationships with "groupies". REF: Statement of Brian Lockie, paragraph 7 and Statement of David Reid, paragraph 7.

HN354 Vincent Harvey, known as "Vince Miller". See statement and evidence of "Madeleine".

³² For example: UCPI0000011602, a report on an SWP member, her 10 year old "half caste" daughter, and the fact that there is no "male wage earner supporting them".

³³ UCPI0000011140

³⁴ UCPI0000017515

³⁵ UCPI0000011874, UCPI0000010951,

³⁶ For example: UCPI0000011210 SWP members plans to buy a house, UCPI0000011681 SWP member bank account details and UCPI0000011680 the bank account details of the wife of an SWP member.

³⁷ UCPI0000017518, UCPI0000011532

³⁸ For example: UCPI0000010968 an SWP member's holiday in Portugal, UCPI0000011452 an SWP member's trip to Italy.

³⁹ UCPI0000011809

⁴⁰ For example UCPI0000015431: 'gay' member of Brixton SWP and UCPI0000015145: SWP member who is an "avid reader of Gay News".

⁴¹ For example: UCPI0000010971 report questioning the paternity of an SWP member's two daughters. UCPI0000014174: RCT member "wishes to get pregnant again... not quite sure at the present as to who will sire this latest socialist offspring".

⁴² For example: UCPI0000017523 detail of sexual relationship, UCPI0000013736: personal details of SWP "cartoonist" including his relationship status.

⁴³ UCPI0000016205: SWP member "gives the impression of below average intelligence".

⁴⁴ See for example: UCPI0000011559: 11 SWP signatories to a leaflet supporting the Firemen's strike. FBU, TGWU, ASLEF, NUT, UCATT.

⁴⁵ For example: UCPI0000011924 a member's nervous breakdown, UCPI0000021684, UCPI0000013873

⁴⁶ UCPI0000012021 and UCPI0000012025

⁴⁷ UCPI0000010968

⁴⁸ For example: UCPI0000011972 An SWP member has started a short-hand typing course.

The Right to Work Campaign, and its annual march to the Conservative Party conference was an important, and high-profile demonstration supported by the SWP and endorsed by hundreds of trade unions.

In the 1980 SDS Annual Report⁴⁹, the SDS attempt to claim credit for the suggestion that “small ‘events’” on the route of that march “[were] frustrated by advance information” because the Right to Work Campaign was “so effectively penetrated by the SDS”. In fact, their own internal report⁵⁰ had always indicated that the march itself was ‘not seen as a great threat to public order’. In another internal report the SDS attributed the lack of disorder on the march to the presence of “local and national media”.⁵¹ The SDS infiltration had no impact whatsoever on disorder on that march. But they presented a different picture to the Home Office. Whether that was for their own benefit (to secure funding) or the Home Office’s (to have a policing related explanation to hand, should they ever need one) is not entirely clear.

The SDS also attempt to claim credit for the lack of disorder at the culminating demonstration. Inevitably, there is no reference to the discussions that Lindsey German herself had with the infiltrating officer, (HN80) ‘Colin Clark’, about “taking steps to ensure that no one did get arrested... to ensure the safety of everyone through good stewarding”.⁵² Equally, there is no reference at all to the fact that the SWP took great care in stewarding their events⁵³, and that ‘Clark’ himself was an SWP steward at their National Conferences.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ MPS-0728962/9 paragraph 19

⁵⁰ UCPI0000014264/3 paragraph 9 signed off by DCI Moss.

⁵¹ UCPI0000014610, paragraph 21

⁵² UCPI0000034739 paragraph 216

⁵³ UCPI0000014610/5 paragraph 25 “stewards to enforce council policy on discipline”.

⁵⁴ UCPI0000013228.

The 1981 SDS Annual Report⁵⁵, makes references to “pickets, occupations and marches as protests against unemployment and cuts in public expenditure” and the ‘anti-Tory’ demonstration at the march’s culmination. But it makes no reference to any disorder.

Previous Right to Work Campaign marches did not even feature in the Annual Reports. The only references to genuine disorder were in respect of processions organised by the National Front.

In terms of justification there were clearly better methods of policing that kind of disorder.

1. The infiltration of the SWP does not appear to have generated any intelligence of use. In the thousands of pages of reporting on SWP activity, there is a distinct lack of anything that actually concerns public order. Some officers have been open about the fact that their reporting showed no risk⁵⁶. There is nothing that could not have been sourced using lawful methods of policing.⁵⁷
2. Any confrontations stemmed from documented, historically confirmed, attacks by the far right on minorities and leftists^{58 59 60}. We highlighted some of the

⁵⁵ MPS-0728995/9 paragraph 18

⁵⁶ ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304) (MPS-0742282/44), Roy Creamer (HN3093) (MPS-0747215/39),

⁵⁷ UCPI0000030069/1: It is also noteworthy that in 1973, a communication between MI5 and the SDS noted that there were “to some extent other [redacted] means available” for obtaining intelligence on the SWP.

⁵⁸ Some of which were even the subject of SDS reports: Five coaches of NF attack coach of SWP (UCPI0000017776). Chingford SWP meeting attacked by NF (UCPI0000014208). Petrol bombing of SWP Centre and print-works (UCPI0000010957). See also Lindsey German’s statement UCPI0000034739/60 paragraph 159.

⁵⁹ Vincent Harvey HN354 used NF confronting SWP paper sellers as a means of infiltrating the SWP, by offering to support the sellers: HN354 Transcript page 43.

⁶⁰ The 1979 Annual Special Branch MPS-0727595, at page 126, noted that 20 NF youths armed with bottles and coshes had attacked an SWP meeting in Brixton. Four SWP members had been hospitalised. NF suspects in that incident had then attempted to burn down a resource centre used by left-wing activists.

murders, beatings, arsons and threats in our last statement to the Inquiry⁶¹. In her statement, Lindsey German highlights that in the six years between 1975 and 1981, fifty-one black and Asian people were killed in suspected racist murders.⁶²

One method of preventing disorder, would have been removing the root of the risk. Police resources would have been better spent preventing and solving real politically motivated crime. There were repeated calls, by the SWP and others, for the police to do exactly that.⁶³

But they did not. In the 1979 Special Branch Annual Report⁶⁴ reference is made to the murder, in May 1978, of Altab Ali. The language used by the police to describe that murder, is illuminating. They said: *“This death, although not attributable to any racist attack, was nevertheless used by the extreme left to influence an already deteriorating situation in the Bengali community”*.

Those words were written over a year after Altab Ali’s murder. At the time that they were written, there was no doubt whatsoever that the murder was racially motivated. One of the suspects had told the police *“If we saw a Paki we used to have a go at them...I've beaten up Pakis on at least five occasions.”*⁶⁵

⁶¹ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf Page 25. National Front attacks on Bengalis in Brick Lane, smashing up reggae record shops, graffitiing mosques (UCPI0000011814), burning down Indian restaurants (UCPI0000010947), the murders of Altab Ali and Ishaque Ali in Whitechapel and Hackney (UCPI0000011380), the firebombing that killed 13 young black people in New Cross (UCPI0000016467), Column 88’s threats to burn down the homes of SWP members (UCPI0000011244).

⁶² UCPI0000034739/13 paragraph 30.

⁶³ See for example, SWP demonstration at Deptford Police station to call for police investigation into “the deaths of black youths in a house fire in Deptford” [presumably the New Cross fire] UCPI0000016486.

⁶⁴ MPS-0727595 at page 85

⁶⁵ <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-36191020>

In September of 1978, Altab Ali's former employer, the secretary of the Brick Lane mosque, had published a report. It was called "Blood on the Streets". It detailed the number of racist attacks on the community in Brick Lane in just the first four months of 1978. There were thirty-three. It listed hammer attacks, stabbings, punctured lungs, slashed faces, airgun shot wounds, people beaten with bricks and sticks and knocked unconscious in broad daylight.⁶⁶

But the police denied racial motivation, even when it had been confessed. They then suggested that the terror in local communities was somehow the fault of left-wing activists.

3. If there is going to be infiltration, why were the National Front not infiltrated? There has been a suggestion that Special Branch already had "excellent sources in the far right"⁶⁷. They clearly did not. Any sources that they did have were not doing a very good job of preventing the almost daily disorder and violence that the National Front and their ilk were perpetrating on London's streets.

Certainly in 1975, the SDS knew, that "*Most of the public order problems were concerned with the activities of the National Front*"⁶⁸. Special Branch knew that National Front members were responsible for "*several brutal attacks on members of ethnic minorities*" and they knew that this brutality heightened opposition to them.⁶⁹ SDS officers experienced the National Front violence

⁶⁶ <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/shine-a-light/remembering-altab-ali/>

⁶⁷ Counsel to the Inquiry's Opening Statement Tranche 1 Phase 2 paragraph 80, citing the 1976 SDS Annual Report.

⁶⁸ MPS-0730099: 1975 Annual Report Para 22, authored by CI Craft.

⁶⁹ Special Branch Annual Report 1978 MPS-0747791/3

themselves, although we rarely see it reported. The recent evidence of HN21⁷⁰ emphasis the point. He said *“You would be selling the papers and then suddenly from out of the blue some National Front or National Party people would turn up and try and have a go at you... Physically... I had a fight with someone who was trying to attack me... they were quite big and you know some of us were puny creatures. So, it wasn’t in our interests to confront them physically... From the SWP side, it was mostly shouting. From the Far Right thing, it was mostly physical violence”*.

But there was no infiltration⁷¹. D.I. Angus McIntosh (HN244) recalls that there was a *“high level policy decision”* not to infiltrate the far right.⁷² A policy decision is the only explanation that makes sense. What was that policy?

Far right demonstrations were deliberately provocative of violence by their very nature. They targeted minority areas with as large a show of force as they could muster; the same minority areas they were targeting with extreme levels of politically motivated violence.

There is no justification for the violations of individual rights perpetrated by the SDS. But at least if they were infiltrating a political organisation as criminally violent as the National Front, they might have an argument that their work was in some way connected to policing.

⁷⁰ Transcript of closed evidence: HN21

⁷¹ Other than by accident as an officer who had infiltrated the Workers Revolutionary Party was tasked by them to infiltrate the National Front. MPS-0730099/2 paragraph 4.

⁷² MPS-0747578/31 paragraph 92.

4. Listening to the communities themselves. They were frightened. As well they might be. The National Front was an avowedly Nazi party⁷³. The people of Southall, Lewisham and Wood Green, did not want their community cohesion fractured by fascist demonstrations. They called for bans, or at least re-location. They were ignored.

The SDS Annual Reports of 1981 and 1982 note that confrontations with the far right did not happen in those years. On both occasions the SDS put that down to the Commissioner banning National Front processions, because they were deliberately provocative of disorder and violence⁷⁴. They always had been. The National Front marches in Southall, Lewisham and Wood Green were all deliberately provocative of disorder and violence. Surely, Special Branch's "excellent sources" could have pointed out the inherently obvious. If police had listened to the communities they were supposed to be serving, the disorder at Southall and Lewisham would never have happened. Instead, they are used as excuses for the wholesale infiltration of the SWP.

5. The Metropolitan Police themselves, contributed to or caused public disorder at demonstrations. The only SDS report on the Lewisham disorder was retrospective, and highly critical of policing methods⁷⁵. At Southall, the National

⁷³ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/26.

⁷⁴ MPS-0728985/9 paragraph 19 and MPS-0730904/14 paragraph 29

⁷⁵ MPS-0732886 D.I. Willingdale's report detailed a number of contrary potential improvements/advice including "police should be properly trained and equipped to deal with a riot situation... wedges and trudges are out of date and too many officers charge into demonstrators quite spontaneously and come to grief when isolated", "Despite advance warning that trouble was likely in Lewisham High Street, groups of left-wing supporters and, more importantly, coloured youths were allowed to gather", "There was an apparent lack of leadership and there seemed little police co-ordination", "The National Front march was taken far too close to the main contingent of left-wing supporters". To exemplify both the lack of police understanding of controlling public order and the institutionalised racism of the police, the report also called for a harsher police response and noted "Young blacks, the vast majority of whom have little time for the ultra-left, turned out at Lewisham with the sole intention of attacking the police. It must be realised that the hatred of these people for authority has no bounds and the most insignificant of incidents involving them could spark off major public disorder".

Council of Civil Liberties were also highly critical of policing methods⁷⁶. One undercover officer, HN41⁷⁷ was warned off attending the Southall demonstration by his managers. His explanation for this warning was that “the uniform police were going to clamp down on the demonstrations” and the “dangers” would be “more than normal”⁷⁸. The pre-planned, dangerous “clamp down” would explain the account of, former SWP member, Joan Rudder⁷⁹. She had been helping injured demonstrators when she was ordered out of a house and made to run a gauntlet of police officers, who beat her until her head split open.

At Red Lion Square, Lindsey German witnessed police officers throwing demonstrators over railings onto an underpass⁸⁰.

At both Southall and Red Lion Square, police actions caused the deaths of demonstrators.

The *World in Action* documentary of the Right to Work Campaign March in 1980⁸¹ demonstrates the issue. The marchers travelled the length of the country with a low-key police escort. The exchange between the marchers and that escort was good-natured and even jovial. The SDS report on this march, had listed the time and place of the arrival⁸² in London and made it clear that there were no public order concerns. But when the march arrived in Southall, it was

⁷⁶ See UCPI0000034739/38 Lindsey German’s statement at paragraph 94.

⁷⁷ MPS-0748064/4 HN41 referred to aspects of the police planning at Southall as a “disastrous mistake”.

⁷⁸ MPS-0748064/5

⁷⁹ UCPI0000034746/7

⁸⁰ ECPI0000034739/14 paragraph 32.

⁸¹ (UCPI) DOC071

⁸² UCPI0000014264/7

met by a legion of police⁸³. They flanked the roads, in the same way that they had done, two years before, on the day they killed Blair Peach.

6. Finally, it was understood, that the police were doing nothing about far-right violence and disorder or were complicit in it. That was not paranoid or imagined. It is not just racist language evident in some of the reporting⁸⁴. Or the widespread perception that the Police protected the National Front⁸⁵. Or the massively disproportionate stops and searches of young black people. Or the subsequent findings of institutionalised racism in the police.

One of the most interesting documents to have been disclosed in this phase⁸⁶ deals with the Chief Superintendent of Special Branch directing two senior SDS officers (DI Riby Wilson and HN332) to meet with Lady Jane Birdwood⁸⁷ at her home in 1968. Lady Birdwood was described as “*politically well-informed*” and “*well-known to Special Branch for her anti-communist views and activities*”. The SDS officers “*thanked for her interest*” and asked her to pass on any information that she “*or her friends with similar interests*” may have. Lady Birdwood and her “*friends*” were far-right activists, and well known as such at the time. She was a racist and an antisemite. She became periodically associated with the National Front, the British Movement and the British National Party⁸⁸, stood as

⁸³ A further SDS report on the march UCPI0000014610/6 even concedes the point. At paragraph 30: *On entering London (Southall) the mood of the march altered, becoming far more militant. This can be accounted for by the fact that the marchers were faced with larger numbers of police than they had previously experienced*”

⁸⁴ As outlined in https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf as at page 26. “*jewish*” finance of the *Anti-Nazi League*, a “*negress*” activist¹⁵⁶, an activist with a “*large jewish nose*” and “*coloured hooligans*”.

⁸⁵ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/14 paragraph 33.

⁸⁶ MPS-0738528

⁸⁷ “*Widow of the late Lord Christopher Birdwood M.V.O.*”

⁸⁸ <https://web.archive.org/web/20041212032828/http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/index.php?link=temple&story=80>

a far-right candidate in three elections⁸⁹ and was later convicted for multiple offences of inciting racial hatred. Why infiltrate the far right if you can have tea with your “excellent sources” on their “*lawn*”?

It is apparent that nothing was done about the far-right violence. It was almost as if there was a reason for not doing anything. A divided society is useful to the establishment⁹⁰, even at the expense of public order. Historically, far-right movements prosper at times of economic crisis. Immigrants are blamed for unemployment and that is a distraction from the failing policies of Government.

What is never mentioned in the SDS Annual Reports is the SWP emphasis on positive methods of undermining fascists. Every day, local, activity to protect minorities and themselves. The organisation of estate residents to paint out NF graffiti, set up telephone links for mutual support and warnings against racist attacks,⁹¹ organising a protection rota to protect minority residents⁹². And then, there is Rock Against Racism⁹³, that the SWP had a crucial role in⁹⁴. That did more to unite people and prevent disorder and violence on the streets than the SDS ever did. The joint leader of the National Front admitted that it had been effectively destroyed⁹⁵ by the campaigns of the Anti-Nazi League, again contributed to by the SWP.

⁸⁹ 1983 Bermondsey by-election as an “Independent Patriot”. Fulham in 1986 for the “England Demands Repatriation” Party. Dewsbury in the 1992 General election for the BNP.

⁹⁰ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/33 paragraph 78.

⁹¹ UCPI0000016793

⁹² UCPI0000012924

⁹³ “White Riot” https://www.imdb.com/video/vi3773677849?playlistId=tt8351520&ref=tt_pr_ov_vi

⁹⁴ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/65 paragraphs 172 – 174.

⁹⁵ Witness statement of Peter Hain: UCPI0000034091: paragraph 208.

There was no anti-Government or anti-State disorder. There was nothing that could have been said to have been “violent subversion” or “revolutionary violence”.

PUBLIC ORDER ISSUES AND THE TROOPS OUT MOVEMENT:

We dealt with public disorder issues in respect of Richard Chessum and the Troops Out Movement in our last Opening Statement. Quite simply, there were none. The undercover officers and their management do not even pretend that there were any public order concerns.^{96 97}

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICING - THE REAL RATIONALE:

So, what was the real rationale?

The SDS was a part of Special Branch; their roles and motivations are inseparable.

The role of Special Branch was reviewed in 1970, by what were called ‘Terms of Reference’, described as originating from the Home Office⁹⁸ and prepared “*in collaboration with the Security Service and other interested parties*”.⁹⁹

The ‘Function’¹⁰⁰ of the Special Branch was to gather intelligence, secretly and overtly, for two purposes. The first of those, was easily justifiable from a policing perspective, to assist in preserving public order; which was a police function. The second was assisting the Security Service, in two identified roles:

⁹⁶ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf Pages 3 to 4.

⁹⁷ HN96: Transcript P173: Q: *did the Troops Out Movement ever actively promote violence at demonstrations?*
A: *Did I...did I...no, of course not. Of course not.*

⁹⁸ UCPI0000004459/2 “Home Office ‘Terms of Reference’ for Special Branch April 1970”

⁹⁹ UCPI0000004459/1

¹⁰⁰ UCPI0000004459/2 *Special Branch is responsible for acquiring security intelligence, both secret and overt (a) to assist the Chief Officer in the preservation of public order, (b) as directed by the Chief Officer to assist the Security Service in its task of defending the realm from attempts at espionage and sabotage and from actions of persons and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State.*

(a) in respect of espionage and sabotage, which again were clearly relatable to police functions as both are covered by the criminal law and

(b) more pertinently as far as this Inquiry is concerned, *from actions of persons and organisations which **may** be judged to be **subversive** of the security of the State.*

The specific ‘Tasks’¹⁰¹ of the Branch included “*consultation with the Security Service to collect, process and record information about **subversive** or **potentially subversive** organisations and individuals”.*

The ‘Terms’ were accompanied by an Annexe which clearly instructed senior officers that it was “*important that Special Branches should have a clear idea of what constitutes ‘persons and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State’*”.¹⁰²

However, they then failed to provide those senior officers and their Special Branches with any definitive idea of what “subversive” actually meant.¹⁰³

This may have been the source of some discomfort for Chief Constables¹⁰⁴, because ill-defined MI5 lackey work is not what the police are supposed to be about. However,

¹⁰¹ UCPI0000004459/2 and UCPI0000004459/3: Fourteen specified tasks including:

(a) *To provide the Chief Officer with intelligence affecting public order; and, on behalf of the Chief Officer, the Security Service with intelligence affecting national security.*

(d) *In consultation with the Security Service to collect, process and record information about **subversive** or **potentially subversive** organisations and individuals.*

(e) *To investigate or to assist in investigating offences having as their purpose the achievement of a subversive or political objective especially those relating to sabotage and against the Official Secrets Act, consulting the Security Service as necessary.*

(f) *To investigate any subversive background to demonstrations and breaches of public order and, in consultation with the Security Service, to certain industrial disputes.*

(k) *At Airports and Seaports to make arrests of wanted criminals, to detect offences and to gather **security and criminal intelligence** in collaboration with the Ports Office of the Metropolitan Special Branch.*

¹⁰² UCPI0000004459/4 para. 3

¹⁰³ “**Broadly speaking** these are any organisation or individual whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow of the established democratic order” UCPI0000004459/4 para. 3

¹⁰⁴ Particularly because the Terms of Reference placed responsibility for MI5 related work clearly onto the shoulders of those Chief Constables UCPI0000004459/4 para.1

a good officer, conscious of the principles of policing, could interpret the ‘Terms’ consistently with Special Branch’s pre-existing responsibility, which was “the prevention of **crimes** directed against the state”¹⁰⁵.

That responsibility, preventing **crime**, was also enshrined in the legal definition of “subversion”, widely published, accepted and acknowledged from 1963, when Lord Denning had reported on the roles of MI5 and Special Branch after his Inquiry into the Profumo Affair.¹⁰⁶

*[...] [subversives are those who] would contemplate the **overthrow** of the **Government** by unlawful means.*¹⁰⁷

That definition is clear. It speaks very obviously of the “overthrow” of the body appointed from those **elected** by the mandate of the people. And it poses no difficulty for a police officer because, from a policing perspective, what is “**unlawful**” and what it not, is defined by the Criminal Law.

Applying **that** definition to the ‘Terms’; police officers can still do their work professionally. They can collect and record information about criminal, or potentially criminal, organisations and individuals, or investigate criminal backgrounds to demonstrations or industrial disputes.¹⁰⁸ All of those activities had to be conducted within the limits on police powers imposed by the law.¹⁰⁹ What they cannot do is “*pry*”

¹⁰⁵ See the 1967 “Responsibilities of Special Branch” UCPI0000030040/1 in which “the prevention of **crimes** directed against the State” was an explicit focus.

¹⁰⁶ <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16195994>

¹⁰⁷ As at paragraph 230.

¹⁰⁸ The authority of the Denning Report, in terms of the role of Special Branch is also acknowledged by the Designated lawyers, as at paragraph 3.3.2. of their first opening statement to the Inquiry.

https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20201028-Opening_Statement-DL_Clients.pdf

¹⁰⁹ As set out in the Category H submissions and legal framework.

into political opinions and private conduct, because as Lord Denning said, that would be “*in the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police*”.¹¹⁰

Unfortunately, because the ‘Terms’ were deliberately¹¹¹ opaque, officers were encouraged to be flexible in their interpretation of “subversion”. The Security Service certainly considered themselves to have an unfettered discretion to define it as they wished.¹¹²

And in 1972, MI5 unilaterally re-defined it.¹¹³

“Subversion” became “*activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means*”.

That definition is very different. It prioritises the well-being of the State, which, of course, is not democratically elected. It could arguably encompass any democratic movement, which seeks to amend the basis of democracy or change the established order. But most importantly, from a policing perspective, it no longer makes reference to the **law**. “Violent means” are well covered by the criminal law. But political and industrial means are not.

¹¹⁰ The full context of Denning’s definition of subversion is as follows: “[*Security Service operations*] are not to be used so as to pry into any man’s private conduct, or business affairs; or even into his political opinions, except in so far as they are subversive, that is, they would contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means. This principle was enunciated by Sir Findlater Stewart in his report of 27th November 1945, paragraph 37, which formed the guide for the Service ever since. It was re-stated by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe in a directive of 24th September 1952, and re-affirmed by every Home Secretary since. Most people in this country would, I am sure, wholeheartedly support this principle, for it would be intolerable to us to have anything in the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police, to snoop into all that we do, let alone our morals.”.

¹¹¹ “Broadly speaking” is clearly a deliberate attempt to create a lack of focus.

¹¹² As at Witness statement of “Witness Z” (UCPI0000034350/3) paragraph 11: *The Maxwell Fyfe Directive... There was... an absence of supporting guidance and consequently the interpretation and application of the wording... was a matter for the Director General [of the Security Service].*

¹¹³ Statement of “Witness Z” UCPI00000034250/4 at paragraph 13.

Because the 'Terms' did not include a definition and were not adapted to compensate for the whims of the Security Service, the police were now encouraged to depart entirely from the basic principles that underpin policing. To covertly¹¹⁴ collect information about individuals who were simply **potentially** subversive.¹¹⁵ People who the police knew had no involvement, whatsoever, in any kind of unlawful conduct.

The Security Service have attempted to add some legitimacy to their unilateral re-definition, by referring to it as "*the Harris definition*"¹¹⁶, "*formally adopted by Lord Harris of Greenwich, Minister of State at the Home Office in a debate in the House of Lords on 26 February 1975*".¹¹⁷ What they neglect to mention is that they had briefed Lord Harris with that definition in advance of that debate¹¹⁸. His assertion that this definition was "*generally regarded*"¹¹⁹ as appropriate, actually means nothing more than "This is how MI5 defines it". But MI5 cannot change the law. Having a Lord repeat a briefed definition in a debate, does not change the law.

In fact, Lord Harris had continued his speech, with an implicit endorsement of the Lord Denning definition "*It is fundamental to our democratic traditions that people should be free to join together to express and further their views, whatever others may think of those views, **provided they do not break the law***".¹²⁰ That re-iteration of fundamental policing principles has been comprehensively ignored.

¹¹⁴ UCPI0000004459/2

¹¹⁵ UCPI0000004459/2 at (d).

¹¹⁶ UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 15.

¹¹⁷ UCPI0000034350/4 at paragraph 14.

¹¹⁸ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements> reference: speech of Viscount Coleville of Culross just prior to 4:17 pm. "*I should have been fascinated to have the [Security Service] briefing of the noble Lord [Harris]*".

¹¹⁹ UCPI0000034265/2

¹²⁰ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements> reference: post 9:49 pm.

The clear shift in the activity of the SDS, in terms of their “customers” and reporting, coincided with the introduction of the “MI5 definition” (read alongside the 1970 ‘Terms’) and then the selective false legitimacy of a Lord’s debate. Policing public order became policing the political, like Richard Chessum and the Troops Out Movement. And the political and industrial like Lindsey German and the Socialist Workers’ Party.

The Home Office and Security Service expanded police powers without democratic or electoral scrutiny and without any regard to the law.

It is worth noting that in the course of the Lord’s debate, four of the speaking Lords described themselves as subversive,¹²¹ forcefully pointing out that revolution need not be violent. Almost anybody could be described as “potentially subversive”.

The police could and did, “*pry*” into the political opinions and private conduct of law-abiding citizens, doing away with our freedom of political thought, and association, of free assembly and expression. These were the “Secret Police” that Lord Denning spoke of.

This was the reason why Government was so terrified of the people finding out about the SDS.¹²² The correspondence that accompanies every SDS Annual report,

¹²¹ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements>

As at 4:37pm: Lord Shinwell “*I am a subversive element...I want to change the face of society...*”.

As pre-6:10pm: Lord Soper “*I am an extremist in the Socialist sense. I am for the abolition of the capitalist system, not by violent means, for I am a pacifist, but by democratic means.*”

As at 6:55pm: Lord Wigg: “*I am just as subversive today as I was then...I do not think that the capitalist system works.. If there are extremists and if there are subversive people, they are called that because they mean what they say and they work for a better society not only for themselves but for others. That is a noble ideal and I should be very glad to be both subversive and an extremist...*”.

Pre-8:12pm: Lord Brockway: “*I am far to the Left of Communists. They want one revolution; I want two revolutions. I want revolution in the West which will bring social justice, equality and socialism, and I want revolution in the East which will bring freedom of thought, freedom of expression, the right of dissent and personal human development... the changing of Western capitalist society, the utter transformation of it, to end the injustices and inequalities which now abound, is my purpose as much as it is the purpose of any Communist.*”

¹²² See Opening Statement on behalf of Richard Chessum and “Mary” Tranche 1 Phase 2 pages 26-28.

emphasises the Home Office's constant need for reassurance about "security"¹²³, avoiding "embarrassment"¹²⁴, and the "political sensitivity"¹²⁵ of their continued funding of this Stasi-like unit.

GOVERNMENT KNOWLEDGE:

The Home Office documents provided in this phase of the Inquiry show the extent of their collusion with the Security Service; the hidden cogs of the state manoeuvring, the duplicity, the avoidance of accountability and the creation of a veil of plausible deniability. They encouraged the "considerable increase in the size and responsibilities of Special Branches in the 1970s"¹²⁶. Special Branches that, working with MI5, were "more heavily involved in those aspects of their duties which are *more sensitive politically*"¹²⁷ i.e. spying on innocent people.

They were particularly concerned about criticism from within Parliament and from investigative journalists¹²⁸; that Special Branches were "over-secretive and under accountable", and "interest themselves in, and record the activities of, people who are merely undertaking proper political or industrial activity".¹²⁹

It is interesting that the members of Parliament and journalists that they were concerned about, had no idea of what was really going on. The criticism and public outrage came from incidents such as police taking photographs of demonstrators¹³⁰, or asking an arrested student to be an informant¹³¹, or carrying out checks on Aeroflot

¹²³ MPS-0730718

¹²⁴ MPS-0728981 paragraph 10

¹²⁵ MPS-0728980 paragraph 14 and MPS-0728985 paragraph 7

¹²⁶ Letter and paper prepared by the Home Office on Special Branches UCPI0000004437/2 paragraph 2.

¹²⁷ UCPI0000004437/2 paragraph 3.

¹²⁸ UCPI0000004437/2 paragraph 5

¹²⁹ UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 6

¹³⁰ UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7(ii) and (v)

¹³¹ UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7(i)

passengers¹³². This was nothing compared to what the Home Office were actually funding the SDS to do.

The Home Office's first inclination in response to these legitimate concerns was to lie about it; saying "It may be possible to discount much of this criticism as either misguided or mischievous"¹³³. While knowing that not only was it all true, but they were signing off secret authorities for SDS officers to do far, far worse. We ask the Inquiry to be conscious of this level of duplicity when engaging with Government about their authorisation of the SDS.

A number of senior police officers were distinctly unhappy about what they were being told to do. In 1974 Commander Gilbert was of the view that "... *for the most part work done [for MI5] had little or no relevance to SB's proper charter and... tied up staff, of which he was chronically short... in totally unproductive activity*".¹³⁴

Chief Constables raised concerns that MI5 sought more intelligence from Special Branches than they needed¹³⁵. The work they were doing for MI5 was damaging police relations with the public¹³⁶. Most importantly that the Chief Constables had no idea whether there was even Ministerial approval of, or authority for, the work that they had been doing on behalf of MI5¹³⁷ for the past ten years¹³⁸. They knew that the 'Terms', the "MI5 definition" and the artifice of the 1975 Lords Debate did not constitute lawful authority in a democracy. And they knew that no Minister would be willing to formally put their name to this.

¹³² UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7 (iii)

¹³³ UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7

¹³⁴ UCPI0000030051/1 paragraph 4.

¹³⁵ UCPI0000004719/1 paragraph 2

¹³⁶ UCPI0000004437/4 paragraph 8

¹³⁷ UCPI0000004437/4 paragraph 8(a)

¹³⁸ The Home Office cover letter is dated October 1980, a full ten years after the introduction of the Special Branch Terms of Reference.

When the Home Office concede in internal documents that there is not “a *water-tight basis on which to justify the work of police officers in investigating and recording the activities of subversives*”¹³⁹, what they mean is “It is not lawful”. The Home Office knew that there was no justification. They asked themselves a question:

*“How can the work of police officers (which all members of Special Branches are) in investigating subversion, as currently defined, be justified given that the definition covers some activities which are not, as such, unlawful?”*¹⁴⁰.

But they could not answer it. There was no legal justification.

And of course, they were only referring to what Special Branch was doing; the anti-democratic incursions of the SDS were far more invidious.

The Home Office attempted to retrospectively legitimise Special Branch activity by reformulating the ‘Terms’¹⁴¹, but they failed; ultimately the Security Service blocked any attempt to update or amend them.¹⁴²

A more honest and straightforward way of having police investigate the activities of political and industrial activists would have been to pinpoint the behaviour that Government was concerned about and attempt to legislate to criminalise it as appropriate. But, of course, that could never have happened; fundamentally because the activists were not doing anything wrong. Parliament and the people would not have stood for the criminalisation of their fundamental rights. So, the Government orchestrated the increased police powers, by guile and duplicity, unlawfully and anti-democratically. It is a sad irony that Government activity was far more proximate to

¹³⁹ UCPI0000004437/7 paragraph 21.

¹⁴⁰ UCPI0000004715/4 paragraph 11(a)

¹⁴¹ UCPI0000034701 (Draft Revision to the Terms of Reference for a Special Branch).

¹⁴² UCPI000004437/5 paragraph 14.

Lord Denning's definition of "subversion" than any of the organisations that the SDS infiltrated.

In passing, to suggest that knowledge stopped at the Home Office and went no higher is beyond comprehension.

In our Phase 2 Opening Statement we stressed the links between SDS sign-offs and Ted Heath and Harold Wilson¹⁴³. James Callaghan had been the Home Secretary who presided over the inception of the SDS in 1968. He had personal meetings with Conrad Dixon¹⁴⁴ and was well aware of the SDS remit. One of his last acts as Home Secretary in 1970 was to oversee the introduction of the Terms of Reference.¹⁴⁵ It is not credible to suggest that, when he was Prime Minister between 1976 and 1979, he did not check on the progress of his two creations. Equally it would be stretching credibility to suggest that Prime Ministerial knowledge ended in 1979 with Margaret Thatcher.

Undoubtedly, the civil servants wringing their hands about the illegality of Special Branch activity (such as Sir Robert Armstrong¹⁴⁶, Sir James Waddell¹⁴⁷, RJ Andrew¹⁴⁸ and David Heaton¹⁴⁹) were the same civil servants signing off the funding for the SDS.¹⁵⁰ Firmly reminding the SDS managers of the need for security.

¹⁴³ See Opening Statement on behalf of Richard Chessum and "Mary" Tranche 1 Phase 2 page 26.

¹⁴⁴ MPS-0747104 paragraph 61.

¹⁴⁵ Callaghan was Home Secretary between 30th November 1967 and 19th June 1970. The Terms of Reference were sent to Chief Constables on the 15th of June 1970 (see UCPI0000004459/1).

¹⁴⁶ Repeated references in UCPI0000004437

¹⁴⁷ Signature on UCPI0000034700/4 and UCPI0000034699/4

¹⁴⁸ Recipient of MI5 letter UCPI0000034697, UCPI0000004715/1 and UCPI0000004437/1

¹⁴⁹ UCPI0000004715/5 and UCPI0000004437/1

¹⁵⁰ Sir James Waddell (MPS-0728973/1, MPS-0728971, MPS-0728970/7, MPS-0730906)

Robert Armstrong (MPS-0730742, MPS-0730718)

David Heaton (MPS-073088, MPS-0728964, MPS-0728963, MPS-0731871)

RJ Andrew (MPS-0729963/2, MPS-0730689)

THE IMPACT:

The SWP was an open,¹⁵¹ democratic centralist,¹⁵² organisation that held predominantly open and publicised meetings.¹⁵³ It had an open membership,¹⁵⁴ and a democratically elected structure,¹⁵⁵ with positions of responsibility open to all members.¹⁵⁶ It published its aims, campaigns and political theories in an open way¹⁵⁷. The Metropolitan Police even had subscriptions to the publications¹⁵⁸.

Those theories were socialist, and revolutionary. It is important to set the record straight in respect of a fundamental misconception: the Socialist Workers' Party were not arguing for any kind of "putsch against the state"¹⁵⁹. There was no talk of guillotines or bombing campaigns. The aims of revolutionary socialism are to transform society from within, re-addressing the balance of power away from the minority that holds it, to the majority that should. That process has to be democratic by definition.

They campaigned on issues such as sexual discrimination, racism, low-pay, unsafe working conditions, unemployment and poverty. All of which needed transforming. They focused on building a mass movement and broad-based campaigns¹⁶⁰ with the aim of helping to create a better society¹⁶¹.

¹⁵¹ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/42 paragraph 103, HN 304 Transcript of evidence page 63
https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/20210507-ucpi-t1_p2-evidence_hearings-transcript-AM.pdf

¹⁵² Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/43 paragraph 106

¹⁵³ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/52 paragraph 135

¹⁵⁴ Hence the number of undercover officers that infiltrated it.

¹⁵⁵ Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/44 paragraphs 111 to 114.

¹⁵⁶ Hence the number of undercover officers that took key positions.

¹⁵⁷ *The Socialist Worker, Socialist Review and International Socialism*. Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/84 paragraph 221

¹⁵⁸ UCPI0000015521: The Metropolitan Police Support Headquarters were listed as being subscribers for five copies of *The Socialist Worker*.

¹⁵⁹ UCPI0000034739/32 Lindsey German paragraph 74

¹⁶⁰ As at, for example, UCPI0000034739/79.

¹⁶¹ UCPI0000034739/95.

Transforming society for the benefit of the majority by the majority should not be seen as a threat to the “safety of the well-being of the State”. Using an open, democratic organisation to try to create a broad-based democratic movement should not be seen as an attempt to “undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy”.

But, transforming society on the issues that the SWP were campaigning on, would ultimately have a detrimental impact on the establishment.

And that explains the timing of the 1972 MI5 re-definition of “subversion”.

1972 was the year of three major industrial disputes, Saltley Gate, the Dock Strike and the Building Workers’ Strike¹⁶². All were designed to better the living conditions of the workers, all were examples of unified people power, all were successful and ultimately all impacted negatively on capitalism.

It also explains the obsessive focusing of the SDS on the personal details and employment of trade union affiliation of their targets, and the massive data trawl of leftists (rather than rightists) that the operation had become.

‘Colin Clark’ (HN80) and ‘Phil Cooper’ (HN155):

MI5 had had a long-standing interest in SDS officers rising up the hierarchy to the SWP Headquarters.¹⁶³ They made it clear to the SDS management that their “*ideal would be a permanent well-placed employee in... headquarters, not necessarily too high up in the organisation*”.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/8 – 9. Paragraphs 17-21.

¹⁶³ UCPI 0000030069/1 MI5 expressed an interest in March 1973, as to whether the SDS were planning on deploying officers into SWP Headquarters.

¹⁶⁴ In November 1973. UCPI0000030049 paragraph 2.

The SDS did **exactly** as they were told. ‘Colin Clark’¹⁶⁵ and ‘Phil Cooper’¹⁶⁶, both became the National Treasurers of the Right to Work Campaign and both were close to the Central Committee. In headquarters, but not too high up. The fact that they took those positions in direct succession to each other meant that for six years, between 1978 and 1983, MI5 had their “permanent” source, exactly where they wanted it.¹⁶⁷ This tasking was not a public order related tasking; that is why the SDS struggled, in their Annual reports,¹⁶⁸ to attribute any disorder to the Campaign.

In the words of the SDS themselves, the Campaign was “*an organisation to fight for the rights of Trades Unions, individuals and groups of workers, against the oppression of management and Government, in particular at this time of high unemployment and anti-union legislation*”¹⁶⁹. The aim, again in the SDS’s own words, was for “*pressure [to] be brought to bear against management and... government, when fighting short time working, redundancies and unemployment, or demanding improved pay and/or conditions*”.¹⁷⁰

That description, given by the SDS, is an accurate assessment of the SWP engaging in militant trade unionism.¹⁷¹ Militant trade unionism was an area that neither MI5 nor Special Branch were permitted to investigate. However, the infiltrations into the SWP, targeted as they were, were designed to do exactly that.

¹⁶⁵ MPS-0729027

¹⁶⁶ UCPI Transcript 13 May 2021

¹⁶⁷ UCPI0000028840 and UCPI0000027519: MI5 was kept updated in respect of ‘Clark’s’ eventual withdrawal and ‘Cooper’s’ succession of him.

¹⁶⁸ See above.

¹⁶⁹ UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 7

¹⁷⁰ UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 6

¹⁷¹ “Industrial militancy is defined as readiness to use or threaten the use of strikes, sit-ins and other forms of aggressive action in the furtherance of industrial disputes and an unwillingness to seek or accept compromise solutions through negotiations, conciliation or arbitration” UCPI000004545/2.

'Clark' and 'Cooper's' roles were different to those who had obtained positions of responsibility in the Troops Out Movement¹⁷². 'Rick Gibson' (HN297)¹⁷³ and 'Mike James' (HN96)¹⁷⁴ had left that organisation de-stabilised and ineffective after their successive leaderships.¹⁷⁵

There is some evidence that 'Cooper' was deliberately creating discord within SWP headquarters¹⁷⁶; and was doing so with the connivance of MI5 and SDS senior officers. But the Security Service disclosure is silent on the detail and of course the police do not know where their papers are.

Primarily, 'Clark' and 'Cooper' took their positions to harvest intelligence on the SWP's organisational structure, administration, finances and membership. That is what they did. They used their attendance at almost every National Delegate Conference and Annual Skegness Rally from 1977 to 1983 to speak to hundreds of members and gather personal details. They used their access to the Party Headquarters and computer system to steal the organisation's data, and the data of its members.¹⁷⁷ As ordered by MI5¹⁷⁸. 'Cooper' even ended up in complete control of the Right to Work Campaign bank account.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷² It is perhaps noteworthy that MI5 also had an interest in the Troops Out Movement, including passing on information from the SDS to their own [redacted] "liaison partners" UCPI0000028816/1 paragraph 2(b)

¹⁷³ See Richard Chessum Opening Statement T1P2 pages 6 to 11 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf

¹⁷⁴ See Richard Chessum Opening Statement T1P2 pages 14 to 15 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf

¹⁷⁵ UCPI0000011895: the perception of TOM: "too many splits within that movement... too busy fighting amongst themselves to do any good work on the troops out issue".

¹⁷⁶ A liaison document between MI5 and the SDS notes that 'Cooper' was "brewing a row" at SWP HQ shortly before his exfiltration UCPI0000028728.

¹⁷⁷ UCPI0000027529 SDS (Butler) providing MI5 with "a whole series of photographs taken by one of their hairies inside SWP HQ".

¹⁷⁸ UCPI0000016862

¹⁷⁹ UCPI0000018091 "for all practical purposes Philip Cooper... signs the cheques and controls the account".

The scale and scope of the reporting, and the number of people with files opened on them, is astonishing.

Just by way of a few examples from a mass of reporting:

At the 1980 Annual Easter Rally¹⁸⁰, at Skegness, the SDS listed over a thousand named attendees from across the UK¹⁸¹. Their addresses, and in the majority of cases, their Special Branch file numbers, were noted alongside their names.

On a list of 198 named attendees at a peaceful Blair Peach demonstration,¹⁸² only seven were listed as having “no trace” on Special Branch files.

From the SWP’s National Delegate Conference in 1978¹⁸³, just under 300 names were listed, alongside addresses, trade union membership and file references.

The report on the National Delegate Conference on 1978¹⁸⁴ is 171 pages long. It contains detailed analysis of administration and finance, breakdowns of branch by branch membership nationwide, an extensive list of unions that had SWP members¹⁸⁵, and a full breakdown of educational institutions with SWP members.¹⁸⁶

The report on the 1982 Right to Work Campaign March¹⁸⁷ was more a detailed list of financial contributors than anything else, with pages and pages of photocopied cheques.

¹⁸⁰ UCPI0000014551

¹⁸¹ Attendees with Special Branch file references from for example, Barnsley, Edinburgh, Merseyside, Portsmouth, Southampton, Birmingham, Salford, Sheffield, Gloucester.

¹⁸² UCPI0000013961

¹⁸³ UCPI0000013228.

¹⁸⁴ UCPI0000013228.

¹⁸⁵ UCPI0000013228 pages 114 to 115. 42 unions listed.

¹⁸⁶ UCPI0000013228 pages 132 to 133. 64 universities and colleges with details of the number of members in each.

¹⁸⁷ UCPI0000015888

The SDS reported on people and sent their details to MI5 simply for buying copies of the *Socialist Worker* Newspaper.¹⁸⁸ On one occasion, that we know of, a 15 year old boy had his personal details recorded and sent to MI5 because he read the *Socialist Worker* and had been to anti-Nazi demonstrations.¹⁸⁹

'Clark' and 'Cooper's' reporting covers the same themes as other undercover officers. Their indexes contain more reports on personal details, such as the physical appearances and relationship statuses of female activists¹⁹⁰ ¹⁹¹, than anything remotely disorder related.

But the real focus is on members' employment details and trade union affiliations.¹⁹²

And that brings us to a topic that is of particular importance to Richard Chessum; but plainly impacts on the members of every leftist organisation that was infiltrated by these officers. Blacklisting, where the reports of these officers impacted on the financial well-being, security and prospects of targets and their families, wrecking countless lives.

BLACKLISTING AND THE TRADE UNIONS:

The evidence of the senior officers disclosed in this phase makes repeated reference to SDS reports being used for "vetting"¹⁹³, which was an activity of both MI5 and

¹⁸⁸ See UCPI0000015487

¹⁸⁹ See UCPI0000015483 "[Redacted], born circa 1966, black, of [redacted address] regularly receives the *'Socialist Worker'* newspaper, although he is not a member of the Socialist Workers Party"

¹⁹⁰ UCPI0000017453 (an SWP member's "attractive appearance"), UCPI0000011140 (an SWP member's "very large hips", UCPI0000010970 (an SWP member described as a "Cypriot girl").

¹⁹¹ UCPI0000011602, and UCPI0000016457: an SWP member who is "currently a paramour" of a Central Committee member

¹⁹² For example: UCPI0000017518, UCPI0000017540, UCPI0000017575 UCPI0000011166, UCPI0000011149 UCPI0000011181, UCPI0000011523, UCPI0000011621, UCPI0000011602, UCPI0000011838, UCPI0000011891, UCPI0000012000 etc. etc.

¹⁹³ DCI Craft: MPS-0747446 : paragraph 152: "*The Security Service would have to answer the question of what the SDS did to assist them in its work. I would have thought the far-left intelligence provided them with a huge base of information for their vetting activity*".

Special Branches¹⁹⁴. SDS officers had been answering specific MI5 requests for information on employment since, at least, co-incidentally, 1972.¹⁹⁵

There was a real danger of blacklisting for the SWP membership,¹⁹⁶ with individual members of the SWP losing their jobs for often spurious reasons.¹⁹⁷ At the same time there were reports that the Metropolitan Police often visited the office of the Economic League¹⁹⁸ with files about trade unionists.¹⁹⁹

Richard Chessum gave evidence²⁰⁰ as to how, despite his qualifications and decency, he was repeatedly refused employment.

DI McIntosh: MPS-0747578: : Para 98: RE: UCPI0000021047: The list of attendees at Blair Peach's funeral: *"It was routine for UCOs to report the presence of anyone known to be on record at public events involving their group. Primarily this was to keep records updated concerning those persons' activities.... My understanding was that it was for the Security Service and for vetting, and identification/tracing"*.

DCI Butler: MPS-0747658 : paragraph 32: *"the reports which have been obtained from the Security Service would contain information generally of interest to them, specifically in relation to counter-subversion and vetting matters"*. Paragraph 139: *"I have no direct knowledge of the Security Service used this reporting but I imagine that it influenced their operational decision-making, including the deployment of technical means, as well as feeding into that organisation's role in national security vetting"*.

Superintendent Moss: MPS-0747797 : Paragraph 102: *"Negative reporting is also of use, it may help someone in later life, for example in relation to vetted jobs."*

DS Christopher Skey (HN308): MPS-0747952: paragraph 101: *"My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to... (b) vetting"*. Further, in reference to UCPI0000014184, a report detailing the breakdown of a relationship between two SWP members: *"This may have been relevant information for association or vetting purposes"*.

DS Richard Walker (HN368): MPS-0747527/47: In reference to UCPI000017523 a report detailing a sexual relationship between two SWP members: *"My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to a) their activities and b) vetting."*

¹⁹⁴ Detailed in the 1967 "Responsibilities of Special Branch" (UCPI0000030040/1 "Positive Vetting and Vetting for Government Departments" were listed as responsibilities of "R" squad.)

¹⁹⁵ MPS-0739241: HN45 report, providing details of an individual's employment, at the request of Box 500, in January 1972.

¹⁹⁶ Lindsey German: UCPI0000034739/52-53 paragraphs 133 and 138.

¹⁹⁷ A specific example of an SWP member having her employment "terminated" because of her membership of the Party can be found at UCPI0000029219

¹⁹⁸ The Economic League was an organisation established in 1919 to work for employers as a vetting service of workers for trade union activity, and thus blacklisting.

¹⁹⁹ UCPI0000034739/55 paragraph 142.

²⁰⁰ (T1P2 Day 10 Transcript of evidence page 121) *"I applied for thousands of jobs... I calculated at the time about 1500 jobs over a period of five years in the 80s, applying for absolutely everything, jobs for which I was qualified, jobs for which I was well over qualified, in a desperate attempt to get work, and I just never seemed*

The Inquiry disclosure in phase 3, gives a great deal of insight into the liaison between MI5 and Special Branch on the issue of vetting. An example is a fractious exchange of documents between the two²⁰¹ where MI5 set down a marker, that the passing of information to employers about their employees is the role of MI5, rather than that of Special Branch.²⁰²The document is clearly meant (and taken) as a rebuke. It clearly indicates that Special Branch had been relaying employment intelligence to employers. The Special Branch response²⁰³ is phrased extremely carefully²⁰⁴. It emphasises that there are rules to prevent them passing such information²⁰⁵ and that that provision of intelligence to employers is MI5's job²⁰⁶. However, it then goes on to state that it has its own contacts (predominantly former police officers) with the employers, and a "close and mutually profitable relationship" with them,²⁰⁷ before

able to get an interview for anything. There were other factors at work, and I understand that. But I think the sheer longevity of my unemployment and the fact that it went on for so very long does give rise to suspicion in my mind... I was desperate for any kind of job just to keep in touch with my children... I applied for a job, just as a sorter with the Post Office... I more than excelled in the test. We were told that there would be feedback, to tell us why they weren't employing us... I was told that in my case they couldn't give any. And I said "Why not?" And the man said, "Well, I'm not at liberty to tell you".

²⁰¹ MPS-0735755 and MPS-0735757

²⁰² MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 1: "Over the years a convention has grown up whereby the Security Service is the normal channel for passing security information about their employees to Government departments, certain public corporations (see list at Annex) and List X firms... Although this is common practice, it does not appear to have been the subject of any formal communication and this note is intended to explain the reasoning behind this procedure".

Paragraph 5: "This, of course, in no way inhibits initial enquiries to identify a person or to discover where he is working. But, once it is evident that he is employed in one of the categories specified in paragraph 2 above [i.e. Government departments, Civil Service, public corporations at Annex, List X firms or the armed forces], reference should be made at once to the Security Service".

²⁰³ MPS-0735757

²⁰⁴ MPS-0735757 paragraph 2 "I have taken quite some time in framing my reply following consultation with my senior colleagues in the Branch for the tenor of your paper has considerable importance in regard to future practical operations by Special Branch officers."

²⁰⁵ MPS-0735757/1 paragraph 5: "national Special Branch training centred on Scotland Yard, and the Standing Orders and procedures within the Metropolitan Special Branch, are designed to enforce strictly the rule that no security information is passed to employers about any employee...".

²⁰⁶ MPS-0735757/1 paragraph 5: "Such passing of security information, if it is to occur, is the concern of your Service".

²⁰⁷ MPS-0735757/2 paragraph 6: "As far as the Civil Service, armed forces and other organisations referred to are concerned... this branch has also built up its own contacts in these organisations, most of which have headquarters in London, and there exists generally a close and mutually profitable relationship between SB officers and the contacts which over the years has worked well and without prejudice. This might be because a considerable number of these contacts happen to be retired police officers, and as far as I am concerned these

telling MI5 in no uncertain terms that “any measure tending to restrict or inhibit our enquiry work” is not acceptable to them.²⁰⁸ Stripping away the veil of plausible deniability that is a feature of most of these official documents; Special Branch says that there might be rules, but they have their ways of getting round them, and they are going to continue to do so.

This “enquiry work” between Special Branch and employers is also referred to on the face of the disclosed Home Office documents. In 1974 a number of MPs²⁰⁹ raised concerns in a meeting with the Home Secretary²¹⁰ about the relationship Special Branch had with employers and trade union management; in particular that Special Branch were passing on lists and photographs of those who attended demonstrations and meetings.²¹¹ Interestingly, the note of this meeting was passed on to Sir James Waddell²¹² who was responsible for reminding the SDS of the need for “security”. Waddell’s response, in a letter directly to the Home Secretary,²¹³ is illuminating. Unsurprisingly, it suggests reminding Special Branch of the need for “care and

contacts (former policemen or otherwise) are usually well aware of our function and that of the Security Service”.

²⁰⁸ MPS-0735757/2 paragraph 7: “Summarising, therefore, I would say that whilst we in Metropolitan Special Branch will continue to consult with members of your Service wherever necessary or advisable, any measure tending to restrict or inhibit our enquiry work cannot be acceptable to us”.

²⁰⁹ Gwynoro Jones (Labour, Carmarthen), John Prescott: (Labour, Kingston upon Hull, East), Norman Atkinson (Labour, Haringey), Dennis Skinner (Labour, Bolsover), Brian Sedgemore: (Labour, Luton West) and James Wellbeloved (Labour, Bexley, Erith and Crayford).

²¹⁰ See UCPI0000034700/1

²¹¹ UCPI0000034700/1-4: “[John Prescott] believed there were instances of the Special Branch taking photographs of people at meetings and demonstrations and composing lists of names of those participating, and there were exchanges of information between the Special Branch and employers and between the Special Branch and trade unionists... information was exchanged between trade unionists and the Special Branch which enabled the identification of people from photographs...”.

[Norman Atkinson] “Special Branch activity in the industrial field seemed to have intensified in the last two years [i.e. since 1972]... Basic questions were whether this was the right use for a branch of the police force and whether employers were entitled to information about employees and potential employees from Special Branch sources.”

²¹² UCPI0000034700/6: “c.c. Sir James Waddell”.

²¹³ UCPI0000034699: Addressed to “S of S” or Secretary of State.

discretion”.²¹⁴ On the issue of whether, or not, Special Branch were passing intelligence to employers, he said this:

“We know ourselves that some employers plead to be given warning if known agitators seek or obtain employment with them. The official response has always been refusal, sometimes with a hint that there are unofficial bodies²¹⁵ which might help. But when a Special Branch officer is himself seeking help from an employer, or from a trade union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in one way traffic”.²¹⁶

This is the “close and mutually profitable relationship”²¹⁷ between Special Branch and employers. The passing of intelligence gleaned from SDS operations, for the purpose of blacklisting.

These are the “customers” that so many SDS managers refer to in their statements.²¹⁸

The “employers” referred to include, not just Government Departments and the Civil Service²¹⁹ but also public corporations such as the Bank of England, the BBC, the British Council and, pertinently for Richard Chessum, the Post Office.²²⁰ Most importantly they also included ‘List X firms,’²²¹ which are private corporations, engaged in government security contracts.²²² Of course, those firms were not only involved in government security contracts. Once they had the lists of people who were concerned

²¹⁴ UCPI0000034699/2 sub paragraph (iii)

²¹⁵ For example the Economic League

²¹⁶ UCPI0000034699/2

²¹⁷ MPS-0735757/2 paragraph 6

²¹⁸ See above

²¹⁹ MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 2

²²⁰ Annex to MPS-0735755/4: further public corporations named include the Atomic Energy Authority, British Airports Authority, British Airways, National Research Development Corporation and Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations.

²²¹ MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 2.

²²² <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-requirements-for-list-x-contractors#:~:text=List%20X%20contractors%20are%20companies,premises%20at%20a%20specific%20site.>

enough about their society as to demonstrate in order to change it, they could ensure that those people never worked again.

To give an idea of the scale, between 1970 and 1973, the top fifty firms²²³ that held government defence contracts were all household names. They covered all sectors and included, for example, British Leyland, Rolls Royce, Laird Group, British Steel, Shell, ICI, Weir Group and Standard Telephones.

We do not know how many 'X Firms' there were in total. But once those lists were passed on, there was nothing to stop them being passed on again, and again, amongst federations of employers. Lists that were continually updated by the SDS.

We raised these issues of blacklisting in our first opening statements. We are grateful to the Inquiry for sourcing and disclosing this material that puts SDS and Special Branch involvement in blacklisting beyond doubt.

These lists of demonstrators and meeting attendees were also passed to trade unions.²²⁴

It is important at this stage to put right another misconception. Trade Unions were not founded by people who routinely liaised with police officers to assist them in blacklisting their memberships. Trade Unions were founded by people like Eleanor Marx and Tom Mann²²⁵. Both Marxists. The narrative that organisations like the SWP, "infiltrated" trade unions, as if they were a separate species, is false. It is terminology used by the SDS and the Home Office, (via Sir James Waddell²²⁶) as part of their attempt to justify SDS infiltrations. This is the same Home Office, that when faced with

²²³ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1973-07-04/debates/15a91c0d-9fa1-4a18-a4b3-86deffd6034e/GovernmentContracts>

²²⁴ UCPI0000034699

²²⁵ UCPI0000034739/23 paragraph 51

²²⁶ UCPI0000034699 paragraph (a)(ii) Letter from Sir James Waddell to the Home Secretary 3 June 1974.

MPs concerned about Special Branch infiltrations of unions, told them that there was none, directly or indirectly.²²⁷ That was an outright lie.

We ask that the Inquiry be very careful about adopting that narrative. If anything, the infiltrators were those that betrayed their rank and file by passing their names to employers.²²⁸

The police say there was no direct reporting on trade unions, any reporting was indirect, just a by-product. That is a bending of the truth.

Many trade unions supported the SWP campaigns, and when they did, they were reported on. Five hundred trade union branches sponsored the 1980 Right to Work march and the detail of that support was sent to Box 500 by the SDS.²²⁹

The same process was adopted on every part of the Right to Work Campaign²³⁰. Many trade unionists joined the SWP and when they did they were reported on²³¹. Indeed, if a trade union subscribed to the *Socialist Worker* newspaper, it was reported on²³².

²²⁷ UCPI00000347000/5: Note of a meeting between the Home Secretary and certain Members of Parliament who were alleging Special Branch infiltration of the unions. "He was firmly advised that there was no question of Special Branch infiltration into trade unions **directly or indirectly**".

²²⁸ Unite the Union has recently established its own inquiry into the allegations that trade union officers were involved in blacklisting in collusion with company bosses and Special Branch.

²²⁹ UCPI0000014264 1980 Right to Work Campaign Report

²³⁰ See for example, the pages of photocopies of cheques of TU contributors, their personal and financial details at UCPI0000015888.

²³¹ See for example: UCPI0000011559

²³² UCPI0000015521

These reports are littered with the trade union related intelligence²³³ that MI5 and the Home Office had been seeking since 1972.²³⁴

The bulk of reporting on the SWP membership is related to employment and industrial issues. But this was not to be used for “national security vetting” as the senior officers would try to have us believe. These reports were on probation officers and social workers,²³⁵ hospital workers,²³⁶ teachers,²³⁷ firemen,²³⁸ DHSS staff,²³⁹ workers at Ford and General Motors,²⁴⁰ bank staff,²⁴¹ caterers,²⁴² ambulance staff,²⁴³ British rail staff²⁴⁴, post office staff²⁴⁵, trades people.²⁴⁶ More often than not, these reports detailed nothing other than their name, employment, employer details, and trade union membership.

²³³ See for example UCPI000007920: Report on the SWP Industrial Conference in Manchester.

APEX (the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff), is given the reference 400/73/155. It subsequently became part of what is now the GMB union.

ASTMS (the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs) has the reference 400/73/100. It merged with other unions and ultimately became subsumed into Unite the Union.

AUEW (Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers) has the reference 400/73/194. It too merged with other unions and ultimately became subsumed into Unite the Union.

TGWU (Transport and General Workers Union) has the reference 400/72/67. This is the third union cited which merged with other unions and ultimately became subsumed into Unite the Union.

CPSA (Civil and Public Services Association) (400/72/111) was a union which after mergers was subsumed into what is now PCS (Public and Commercial Services Union).

NALGO (National and Local Government Officers' Association) 400/55/98 is a union which merged to become what is now UNISON.

NUT (National Union of Teachers) 400/73/107 merged to become what is now the NEU (National Education Union).

²³⁴ See UCPI0000031256 MI5 policy file note detailing liaison between MI5 and MPSB re: obtaining information on industrial disputes via penetration of “subversive” groups.

²³⁵ UCPI0000013100, UCPI0000015005.

²³⁶ UCPI0000017789, UCPI0000012378, UCPI0000012378

²³⁷ UCPI0000021635, UCPI0000021636, UCPI0000011379, UCPI0000015483

²³⁸ UCPI0000012869, UCPI0000011565, UCPI0000016207

²³⁹ MPS-0728962

²⁴⁰ UCPI0000011692, UCPI0000013161, UCPI0000021645

²⁴¹ UCPI0000021690

²⁴² UCPI0000021245

²⁴³ UCPI0000013201

²⁴⁴ UCPI0000012000

²⁴⁵ UCPI0000013670 and UCPI0000015145

²⁴⁶ UCPI0000016795

Special Branches were involved in blacklisting nationally. The ‘True Spies’ documentary²⁴⁷ deals with one example of Special Branch collusion with industry. The Ford Motor company made investment decisions on the basis of a “secret assurance... involving MI5 and Special Branch”. That deal meant that Ford would send lists of job applicants to Special Branch who would “strike a line” through names and return them.²⁴⁸ The deal was designed to prevent “strikes”. That is economic policing.

‘Clark’ and ‘Cooper’s’ thousand strong lists of SWP members across the United Kingdom must have been incredibly useful. It is no surprise that ‘Clark’ was officially commended for his work.²⁴⁹ It is also no surprise that SDS Chief Inspector, Trevor Butler, considered the “True Spies” documentary to be *“an earth-shattering breach of the “need to know” principle”*.

in their Phase 1 opening statement, the Designated Lawyers assured the Inquiry that “SDS personnel were not involved in trade union blacklisting”²⁵⁰. The evidence from Phase 3 demonstrates that the SDS did not ask and did not care what use their reports were put to.

It is clear that the SWP members were right to be afraid of being blacklisted. The answer to the problem that Government faced after the successful industrial action of 1972, was to find the workers who were prepared to stand up and take them out of the workforce.

²⁴⁷ UCPI0000031845

²⁴⁸ UCPI0000031845/18

²⁴⁹ HN80 received a DAC commendation for his attendance and full report about the 1979 SWP National Delegate Conference UCPI0000033626/21.

²⁵⁰ Designated Lawyers Opening Statement T1P1 paragraph 8.1.1

CONCLUSION:

The Home Office knew that the intentional vagueness of their 'Terms' and definitions had left officers "uncertain about the proper extent of their role."²⁵¹ But they were not in any hurry to do anything about it²⁵². Equally, MI5, bound as they were by their own public²⁵³ terms of reference²⁵⁴ were doubtless happy to continue "using the SDS to gather information"²⁵⁵

Barry Moss, who was both Chief Inspector and Superintendent of the SDS during the deployments of 'Clark' and 'Cooper' was certainly one of the officers who was uncertain about his role. His definition of subversion²⁵⁶ was so loose, that it is no wonder MI5 looked forward to "*mutually useful co-operation*" with him.

Nothing was ever done to dispel the uncertainty.²⁵⁷

As a result, the SDS continued to just "*hoover up everything*",²⁵⁸ irrespective of the consequences for their targets. Their senior officers encouraged them to do so.²⁵⁹

²⁵¹ UCPI0000004437/4 paragraph 9.

²⁵² UCPI000004719/1 paragraph 7: "At the meeting on 7 December [1978] Sir Robert Armstrong indicated that, although we should be in no hurry to re-open the questions of the existing [Special Branch] terms of reference...".

²⁵³ UCPI0000004715/2 paragraph 7.

²⁵⁴ The Maxwell Fyfe Directive, and the firm direction "You will take care to see that the work of the Security Service is **strictly limited to what is necessary** for the purposes of this task [defending the Realm from subversives] UCPI0000034262/1

²⁵⁵ DI McIntosh MPS-0747578: paragraph 39 "As I understand it, decisions as to targeting and tasking were taken by other police departments and government departments.... Tasking from external agencies, such as the Security Service of the Home Office would have come through senior Special Branch officers.... I was aware that the Security Service was using SDS to gather information."

²⁵⁶ MPS-0747797: Paragraph 104: "I understand subversion to be any attempt to undermine the power or authority of an established system or institution".

²⁵⁷ HN354 Vincent Harvey (who himself went on to become a very senior officer): transcript page 24: "I'm not sure I can actually recall we ever had a defined comprehensive definition of subversion".

²⁵⁸ HN353: "I would hoover up everything, it wasn't my job to analyse it, I would just report it" (T1P2 Day 10 Transcript of evidence page 8)

²⁵⁹ DI McIntosh: MPS-0747578: paragraph 41: "a lot of work at Detective Inspector and Detective Chief Inspector level was done without any real knowledge of 'why'." Paragraph 45: "Put simply, I would ask the UCO's if they were able to report on the information requested rather than assessing the utility of the information they reported." Paragraph 50: Para 50: "Assessment [of reports] was not part of my role. The assessment of the reports would come from the recipients, who are the people who asked for the information

Ironically, it was 'Colin Clark' himself who came closest to an accurate assessment of the SWP. He spent five years deployed at the heart of the organisation, with access to every detail of its aims and activities and was fully de-briefed by MI5 at the end of his deployment.²⁶⁰ He was not operating among subversives, "*[The SWP] were strongly opposed to government policy but were not seeking to subvert the institutions of the state*"²⁶¹

None of these people posed any threat to the security of the nation. Roy Creamer had it right, all the way back at the beginning. "*Whilst we were looking for information, there was simply nothing to tell of... There were no hidden conspiracies anywhere and there was nothing hidden going on*".²⁶²

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25th April 2022

in the first place. I was not in a position to assess the intelligence because the intelligence was not gathered for the SDS, it was obtained for other police or security departments." Paragraph 128: "*There was no intrinsic value of a report to the SDS as the intelligence was not obtained for SDS's purposes. I would have thought that the content of the reports would have been valuable to the SDS's intelligence customers but I was never told of the value or significance of reports to intelligence customers."* Paragraph 189: "*The SDS was a conduit and actioned requests for information. The SDS recorded info and did not filter the info gathered as the SDS was not gathering it for its own purposes. We acted on behalf of other persons, with no oversight of the broader purpose of the information... Special Branch or the Security Service would be better placed to answer it... they would have been the requesting customer*".

²⁶⁰ UCPI0000033626/36 paragraph 124.

²⁶¹ UCPI0000033626/36 paragraph 122.

²⁶² (MPS-0747215/10 paragraph 19)