

Wednesday, 11 May 2022

(10.00 am)

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Menon?

Mr Menon, good morning.

Opening statement by MR MENON

MR MENON: Thank you.

This opening statement for Tranche 1, Phase 3, is made on behalf of Tariq Ali, Ernie Tate and Piers Corbyn in advance of the evidence to be given by Special Demonstration Squad managers covering the period from 1968 to 1982. It should be read in conjunction with our two earlier opening statements dated 25 October 2020 and 16 April 2021.

Tariq Ali gave evidence during Tranche 1, Phase 1, the first Non-State Core Participant who was spied on by the police to do so; and Piers Corbyn gave evidence during Tranche 1, Phase 2. Ernie Tate was unable to give evidence in person for reasons of ill-health; and his statement was read into evidence during Tranche 1, Phase 1. Sadly, Mr Tate passed away in February 2021.

We have tried to avoid, Sir, as much as possible, any repetition today of the same points that we have previously made. For the avoidance of doubt, we remain deeply concerned, as I'm sure you'll appreciate, about excessive delay and secrecy. We adopt the submissions

1 made about these and other general matters by  
2 the Co-operating Group of Non-State Core Participants  
3 and other Non-State Core Participants.

4 As none of the Non-State Core Participants whom we  
5 represent are giving evidence during this phase, we  
6 limit our remarks today to the following  
7 topics: the Tranche 1, phase 4 closed hearings;  
8 the seven SDS managers giving live evidence in the next  
9 few days; disclosure and redactions; the relationship  
10 between SDS and MI5; the development of SDS in the 1970s  
11 and; the future of the Inquiry.

12 Starting, then, with the closed hearings.

13 There is, in our submission, something fundamentally  
14 wrong and unfair about a public inquiry into undercover  
15 policing departing from the principle of open justice  
16 and conducting closed hearings during which former  
17 undercover officers whose real names, cover names and  
18 witness statements have all been withheld pursuant to  
19 restriction orders, give evidence with police lawyers  
20 present but the Non-State Core Participants, their  
21 lawyers and the public excluded.

22 This is precisely what happened some time in  
23 the autumn of 2021, when five undercover officers, HN21,  
24 41, 109, 302 and 341, were questioned by  
25 Counsel to the Inquiry in what are being called the

1 "Tranche 1, Phase 4, Closed Hearings".

2 In the Tranche 1, Phase 3, hearing bundle,  
3 the Inquiry has disclosed the redacted transcripts of  
4 the evidence in closed session of the five  
5 undercover officers and a 70-page document entitled  
6 "Unattributable Excerpts from Closed Officer Evidence".  
7 According to paragraph 11 of Counsel to the Inquiry's  
8 Second Addendum Disclosure Note Regarding Tranche 1,  
9 dated 14 April 2022, around half of the total evidence  
10 received from these five officers has been published in  
11 the redacted transcripts and unattributable excerpts;  
12 which obviously means that around half of the total  
13 evidence has not been published and will remain secret  
14 forever.

15 We have no idea why around half of what these five  
16 officers had to say in evidence during the closed  
17 hearings is being withheld, other than the Inquiry  
18 asserting in its disclosure note that the evidence is  
19 subject to redaction for reasons of public interest.  
20 What does this mean, we ask? What public interest?  
21 Whose public interest? Certainly not the public  
22 interest of those we represent, who were spied upon,  
23 learning the truth about the full nature and extent of  
24 the secret political policing of which they were  
25 victims.

1           Furthermore, we're completely in the dark as to why  
2           the evidence in the unattributable excerpts, some of  
3           which is clearly relevant and significant and of  
4           interest, cannot be attributed. How, in  
5           the circumstances, are the Non-State Core Participants  
6           supposed to participate effectively and equally in at  
7           least this part of the Inquiry in circumstances where  
8           the witness statements are withheld, the opportunity to  
9           ask questions is denied and some of the evidence has not  
10          been attributed?

11          On any sensible view, we submit, closed hearings  
12          should have no place in a public inquiry into secret  
13          political policing, particularly when the evidence  
14          concerns events that took place 40 or more years ago.  
15          Why are anonymity and screens not sufficient safeguards?

16          Furthermore, all evidence in a public inquiry should  
17          be attributed. How else can there be any  
18          accountability? How else can the evidence be put into  
19          context by the Non-State Core Participants, and  
20          understood in relation to the overall evidential  
21          picture?

22          Turning, then, to the closed officer evidence  
23          itself, we find it incredible that HN21, an officer who  
24          was perfectly willing 20 years ago to speak openly about  
25          his undercover role in the BBC documentary True Lies is

1           unable to give evidence in open session.

2           HN21 was a married officer who became a local  
3           organiser in the Socialist Workers Party. He admits to  
4           a sexual relationship with a woman who he met in  
5           a Marxist study class, a woman who he disingenuously  
6           categorises as "apolitical", as if to distance himself  
7           from the inevitable accusation that he was sleeping with  
8           a political target. What is the relevance of the woman  
9           being apolitical? Does HN21 believe that the woman  
10          being apolitical somehow renders his violation of her  
11          more palatable?

12          HN21 also observes the following:

13          "From the SWP side, it was mostly shouting. From  
14          the Far Right thing, it was mostly physical violence."

15          Yet we will learn during the Tranche 1, Phase 3  
16          evidential hearings that there was apparently  
17          a high-level policy decision not to use SDS to  
18          infiltrate the far right. Now, given HN21's cogent  
19          observation, why did SDS target the left and not  
20          the right? We trust this will be explored in more depth  
21          during the live evidence.

22          HN41, another of the five officers, was an  
23          SDS officer in the 1970s and 1980s. He is of great  
24          importance to what happened at Southall on  
25          23 April 1979, when Blair Peach was killed by a police

1 officer and Tariq Ali and many others were severely  
2 beaten by police officers. HN41 says that he was warned  
3 by senior Special Branch officers not to go to Southall  
4 with his target group because the uniformed police were  
5 going to clamp down on the demonstrations and management  
6 considered the dangers were more than normal.

7 Two important points arise. Firstly, in  
8 the transcript of HN41's evidence in closed session, all  
9 the names of the target groups that he infiltrated have  
10 been redacted. Why? Why are the names of groups which  
11 were infiltrated by him some 43 years ago so sensitive  
12 that they cannot be publicly revealed even now?

13 Secondly -- and this is particularly important --  
14 this is the first time we've heard a police witness  
15 acknowledge openly the true nature of public order  
16 pre-planning by the uniformed A8 branch, the special  
17 operational unit that had been set up after the Vietnam  
18 Solidarity Campaign demonstration against  
19 the Vietnam War in March 1968.

20 Given HN41's evidence, and given what we now know  
21 about the violence meted out by the uniformed police on  
22 23 April 1979 against anti-fascists demonstrating  
23 against the National Front marching through Southall,  
24 can there really be any doubt that the uniformed police,  
25 particularly the notorious Special Patrol Group,

1 a mobile unit under the direct control of  
2 the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir David McNee,  
3 were under secret orders to use violence against  
4 anti-fascist demonstrators?

5 Far from SDS providing intelligence to A8 to allow  
6 the latter to plan and steward a peaceful demonstration,  
7 the effect of the SDS intelligence reports was merely to  
8 heighten the view within the police as a whole that all  
9 anti-fascist demonstrators were subversives and fair  
10 game for police truncheons. This explains HN41's  
11 plaintiff comment that A8 "weren't perhaps as receptive  
12 to some of our ideas as we thought they might have  
13 been".

14 While HN41 rightly castigates A8 for their  
15 disastrous mistake to shut down a part of Southall. He  
16 still, to this day, fails to understand the mentality of  
17 the senior police hierarchy who saw left-wing protesters  
18 as subversives, as the enemy within.

19 Indeed, as HN41 himself says, the Security Service  
20 saw left wing protesters as "potential Fifth  
21 Columnists", echoing the language of the Second World  
22 War. This is, we submit, the proper context in which  
23 the killing of Blair Peach, the severe beating of  
24 Tariq Ali and many others by police officers and the  
25 subsequent institutional cover-up by the police must be

1 considered. It is no surprise that the Special Branch  
2 report into the killing of Blair Peach has mysteriously  
3 gone missing, despite Special Branch having its own  
4 archives. It has either been buried or destroyed.

5 There are questions that we would have wanted to ask  
6 HN41 on behalf of Tariq Ali, given the 11-page redacted  
7 transcript of his evidence in closed session that has  
8 been disclosed. This leaves a lingering sense of  
9 injustice about an opportunity wasted, and represents  
10 the inevitable cost of having closed hearings from which  
11 the Non-State Core Participants and their lawyers are  
12 excluded.

13 Now, before we leave the topic of the closed  
14 hearings, we want to add one other point that was  
15 highlighted by another officer, HN109, who was  
16 undercover in the 1970s and a manager in the 1980s.

17 He says that the Metropolitan Police  
18 Commissioner visited the SDS safe house annually, as did  
19 other senior officers. Additionally, he mentions SDS  
20 receiving congratulations on more than one occasion from  
21 10 Downing Street for its supposed "success in combating  
22 public disorder", commenting that he "was stunned that  
23 somebody at that level would have an awareness" of this  
24 secret unit.

25 As we said in our first opening statement, Sir, SDS



1 was a unit that was thoroughly integrated into  
2 the security apparatus of the British state, and was  
3 known to all leading state actors, from the Prime  
4 Minister, to the Cabinet, to the Home Office, and down  
5 the chain of command within the Security Service and the  
6 Metropolitan Police Service.

7 In respect of the supposed success of SDS in  
8 combating public disorder and its provision of useful  
9 intelligence to A8, all of which happens to have gone  
10 missing, we say nothing could be further from the truth,  
11 unless success is being measured by the degree of chaos  
12 caused by the police on the streets of London.

13 Starting with the October 1968 VSC demonstration  
14 against the Vietnam War, this was a peaceful  
15 demonstration not because of any intelligence from SDS,  
16 but because it was well stewarded by the Vietnam  
17 Solidarity Campaign. The small breakaway demonstration  
18 was entirely foreseeable from routine intelligence, and  
19 was effectively policed by uniformed officers using  
20 a thick static cordon. Undercover policing did not make  
21 a blind bit of difference to the absence of any serious  
22 violence on the day. The Special Operations Squad, as  
23 SDS was then called, should have been shut down after  
24 this demonstration, but it wasn't.

25 At many of the large demonstrations of the 1970s,

1 the police invariably failed to keep the peace  
2 notwithstanding SDS intelligence. We suspect this was  
3 because the left wing and anarchist groups being spied  
4 on and infiltrated by the undercover officers posed  
5 little real public order threat. SDS should have been  
6 focused, but were not, on the far right, who were  
7 the real public order threat.

8 Furthermore, there is abundant evidence in  
9 the public domain that the uniformed police were at  
10 times looking for confrontation, and not just  
11 the uniformed officers but those more senior, too.

12 In June 1974, whilst the police were protecting  
13 a National Front meeting in Red Lion Square,  
14 Kevin Gately, an anti-fascist student, was killed.

15 In June 1977, the police used violence against  
16 striking Grunwick workers and their supporters at a mass  
17 picket.

18 In August 1977, the Home Secretary and the  
19 Metropolitan Police Commissioner allowed  
20 the National Front to march through Lewisham,  
21 a multi-racial community, with their racist banners and  
22 slogans. When confronted by an anti-fascist counter  
23 protest, the police brought out riot shields for  
24 the first time on the British mainland, and baton  
25 charges and mounted police were used against the crowd.

1           The Battle of Lewisham, as it came to be called, ended  
2           in chaos.

3           And we've already highlighted the police killing of  
4           Blair Peach and the police attack on many other  
5           anti-fascists in Southall in April 1979, who were  
6           peacefully demonstrating against another provocative  
7           National Front march through a multi-racial community.

8           Are Red Lion Square, Grunwick, Lewisham and Southall  
9           supposed to be police successes? If so, perhaps this  
10          gives the measure of what the police were trying to  
11          achieve at the time.

12          I turn now to the evidence that you're about to hear  
13          in the next few days, live evidence to be given by  
14          former SDS managers or administrators, namely  
15          Barry Moss, David Smith, Roy Creamer, Derek Brice,  
16          Geoffrey Craft, Angus McIntosh and Trevor Butler.

17          Other Non-State Core Participants --

18          THE CHAIRMAN: It appears to have gone slightly wrong with  
19          the transmission. Let's pause while it's put right.

20          MR MENON: Yes, I think somebody's not muted.

21          THE CHAIRMAN: Try again, and if we get the same  
22          interruption, then by all means pause.

23          MR MENON: Thank you.

24          I just identified the seven witnesses who are going  
25          to be giving evidence in the hearings to follow

1 the opening statements.

2 Other Non-State Core Participants have already  
3 highlighted the contradiction between senior officers on  
4 the one hand claiming that they robustly managed rank  
5 and file undercover officers and on the other hand  
6 professing ignorance about abhorrent practices that  
7 occurred on their watch. We trust that this will be  
8 fully explored during the evidential hearings, and that  
9 the senior officers will be held to account for their  
10 managerial failings.

11 On a separate note, we are pleased that the Inquiry  
12 has decided to call former Detective Inspector  
13 Roy Creamer, an SDS officers who was described by  
14 Stuart Christie, perhaps Britain's best known anarchist,  
15 who sadly passed away in 2020, as "the Yard's  
16 dialectician of dissent".

17 Detective Inspector Creamer was one of the first in  
18 the queue at Collet's bookshop in Charing Cross Road to  
19 buy a copy of Stuart Christie and Albert Meltzer's  
20 seminal book, *The Floodgates of Anarchy*, when it was  
21 first published in 1970; and was, in Stuart Christie's  
22 words, "the acknowledged Special Branch expert on  
23 anarchists and anarchism", who was "called in to brief  
24 everyone from the Home Secretary and the Police  
25 Commissioner downwards".

1           Detective Inspector Creamer said Stuart Christie did  
2 not dislike anarchists, but was curious as to what make  
3 them trick. He was what we might call the "direct  
4 approach", as opposed to the "oblique approach"  
5 developed by Detective Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon and  
6 the Special Demonstration Squad. Detective Inspector  
7 Creamer tried to establish friendly and sympathetic  
8 relationships with people targeted by Special Branch,  
9 and to this end would regularly pop in unannounced to an  
10 antiques shop in Camden High Street to play chess with  
11 the old Hungarian anarchist John Rety. Detective  
12 Inspector Creamer would visit Stuart Christie, and over  
13 a pint chat about forthcoming events or visits,  
14 effectively marking his card with a gentle warning as to  
15 the fact Special Branch had him under surveillance.

16           We suggest that the direct approach, as exemplified  
17 by Detective Inspector Creamer, was a proportionate  
18 approach to the gathering of intelligence. By contrast,  
19 the oblique approach -- to sweep wide, using Detective  
20 Chief Inspector Dixon's parlance -- was replete with  
21 obvious dangers.

22           In any event, the gathering of intelligence for  
23 public order purposes could largely be done from  
24 open-source intelligence, monitoring the left wing and  
25 anarchist press, attending public meetings and speaking

1 to people.

2 I return now, Sir, to the vexed topic of disclosure  
3 and redactions that has plagued the Inquiry from  
4 the outset.

5 In June 2021, you will recall, we took the lead and  
6 made detailed submissions on what we submitted was  
7 the unfairness the Inquiry's protocol dated 22 July 2020  
8 for challenging the Inquiry's redactions. We addressed  
9 the open grounds for restriction and asked you to  
10 reconsider several hundred redactions in the SDS annual  
11 reports from 1969 to 1984. We highlighted the very real  
12 and chilling effect of continuing to keep secret  
13 the names of so many groups who were spied on and  
14 infiltrated by the SDS some 40 or more years ago. We  
15 called for greater openness and transparency given  
16 the machinations of the secret state. And we met with  
17 some, but sadly only minimal, success. You unredacted  
18 the names of about ten groups that were spied on and  
19 infiltrated by the SDS but not the full list that we  
20 requested.

21 We ask, with respect, that at least once a year for  
22 the duration of this Inquiry, there is a further fresh  
23 review of all SDS annual report redactions, and that  
24 before the Inquiry eventually comes to an end, there is  
25 a final review. Most restrictions have clearly been

1           made to protect the anonymity of former  
2           undercover officers. It may well be that some or all of  
3           these restrictions may no longer be applicable or  
4           necessary in the future. It is hoped that before  
5           the Inquiry papers go into the National Archives,  
6           the names of all groups spied on and infiltrated by SDS  
7           can be disclosed to the general public.

8           We ask for a similar approach to be taken in respect  
9           of the Special Branch annual reports from 1970 to 1983,  
10          and any further reports in future tranches which have  
11          been disclosed during this hearing bundle.

12          Finally, we still await the Security Service annual  
13          threat assessments. It's a point we keep on raising.  
14          We submit they're plainly relevant to the Inquiry's  
15          terms of reference.

16          I turn now to the relationship between SDS and MI5.

17          This is a key issue that continues to develop as we  
18          learn more and more from the evidence about  
19          the relationship.

20          Several Special Branch detectives who were involved  
21          in what was called the "Special Operations Squad" in  
22          1968 expected the squad to be wound up after the October  
23          1968 Vietnam Solidarity Campaign demonstration, the job  
24          having been done, so to speak. But the senior  
25          Metropolitan Police hierarchy and, more importantly,

1 MI5, wanted the squad to become permanent. The police,  
2 with a brief to keep the peace, could only justify  
3 the continued existence of the squad on one ground,  
4 namely success in the field of public order  
5 intelligence. However, MI5 immediately recognised  
6 the value of this squad as a long-term intelligence  
7 gathering operation against all those it deemed  
8 subversive. Given MI5's wide interpretation of  
9 the term "subversive", it could literally apply to  
10 hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of British  
11 citizens, all of whom would then become subject to MI5  
12 vetting procedures.

13 In 1968, with the rise of what has come to be  
14 called the "New Left", the operations of MI5 and  
15 Special Branch, which targeted the trade unions and the  
16 Communist Party of Great Britain primarily, appeared  
17 somewhat outdated. There was a realisation that  
18 the secret state had not paid sufficient attention to  
19 these new groups. MI5 were overjoyed when Detective  
20 Chief Inspector Dixon came up with the idea of a squad  
21 of Special Branch officers spying on and infiltrating  
22 these groups. They could hardly contain their  
23 enthusiasm for the squad continuing, so long as  
24 the product of the undercover officers was provided to  
25 them as a matter of routine.



1           Consequently, for MI5, SDS served only one  
2 purpose: to gather intelligence on the New Left and  
3 anarchists. They had no interest in public order,  
4 except insofar as it was a fig leaf to cover-up  
5 the obvious role of SDS as intelligence gatherers for  
6 MI5.

7           It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the purse  
8 strings were firmly in the hands of the Home Office and  
9 the Treasury. It is significant that SDS were not  
10 funded within the MPS, Metropolitan Police, budget. It  
11 should be noted that Sir James Waddell, who received  
12 the SDS annual reports, was cabinet secretary  
13 responsible for liaison with MI5.

14           In our view, MI5 were the organ grinders and SDS  
15 were the monkeys. Only the monkeys did not know to  
16 whose tune they were really dancing. Even  
17 Geoffrey Craft, who became chief superintendent of  
18 F squad in about 1981, with responsibility for SDS, says  
19 that "the branch were the legs of the Security Service  
20 ... SDS was only a development of that". Trevor Butler  
21 says that there were frequent meetings between MI5 and  
22 Special Branch senior management.

23           Interestingly -- and I'm sure you have noted this  
24 already, Sir -- many of the SDS managers deny any  
25 involvement in tasking, and say this came from higher

1 up. It did, it came from MI5, through to  
2 the Special Branch commander of operations or chief  
3 superintendent, and was then filtered down.  
4 The detective chief inspectors and detective inspectors  
5 in the office would then look at their current  
6 deployments and move undercover officers around or  
7 deploy new undercover officers. That is why it was  
8 useful for undercover officers to float around a little  
9 and "sweep wide", as this allowed them to be more  
10 effectively moved, if need be.

11 As MI5 were interested in individuals and not  
12 groups, their requests of SDS were specific.  
13 Geoffrey Craft says that SDS gave MI5 a huge base of  
14 information for their vetting activity. It's  
15 interesting that Special Branch had their own security  
16 concerns about MI5 knowing the names of SDS officers,  
17 because they were worried, understandably perhaps, that  
18 MI5 informers in the same groups could discover their  
19 identities and compromise them.

20 We ask the Inquiry, once again, to revisit its  
21 decision only to consider MI5 in respect of its  
22 interaction with SDS as revealed by the documents.  
23 Allowing MI5 largely to escape scrutiny will inevitably  
24 result, Sir, in, at best, a partial picture of secret  
25 political policing in Britain.

1 I turn next to the development of SDS in the 1970s.

2 It was in 1972, the year that Conrad Dixon became  
3 chief superintendent of C Squad, that  
4 the Metropolitan Police changed the name of the Special  
5 Operations Squad to the Special Demonstration Squad, to  
6 give further cover to the idea that the squad was about  
7 demonstrations and public order.

8 Once again, this was plausible deniability, we  
9 submit, to cover up what the SDS really was: an  
10 intelligence-gathering operation of those deemed  
11 subversive. We have no C Squad weekly reports to A8  
12 throughout this whole period dealing with public order  
13 threats. We will see if they are forthcoming for future  
14 years.

15 David Smith, one of the witnesses you're going to  
16 hear from, says that he does "not recall A8 ever saying  
17 thank you", and that they largely ignored any  
18 intelligence supplied. We suggest this is entirely  
19 accurate and unsurprising.

20 In around 1979, David Smith wrote a 12-page essay on  
21 policing, crowd control and public disorder. This, you  
22 may agree, is an interesting document. In his opinion,  
23 the risk of violence on demonstrations is greatest some  
24 five to seven days after an emotive initiating event.  
25 He says that:

1           "Only rarely into the extremists formulate their  
2 plans in secrecy and normally, albeit grudgingly, they  
3 will supply to police the broad outline of their  
4 intentions."

5           He suggests that large demonstrations tended to be  
6 more moderate and peaceful, as there was a dilution of  
7 more militant elements, while small protests could be  
8 handled by the uniformed branch relatively easily.  
9 The problem often arose with militant protests, he says,  
10 of about 2,000 demonstrators turning violent. What use,  
11 we say, then, was SDS in combating public disorder?

12           Ultimately, however, even David Smith, despite that  
13 analysis, cannot detach him from the mantra that  
14 undercover officers profoundly influenced  
15 the Metropolitan Police's ability to maintain public  
16 order. We profoundly disagree, it will hardly surprise  
17 you. We say all evidence points to the contrary.

18           Lastly, in relation to public order, we suggest that  
19 when the authorities allow a far right group like  
20 the National Front, with its overtly racist and fascist  
21 membership, to march through an urban area with a large  
22 ethnic minority community, as the police did in Lewisham  
23 in 1977 and Southall in 1979, and when the police then  
24 protect the fascists and deploy all their resources  
25 against the anti-fascist counter demonstrators, it is

1 fairly obvious that there will be trouble. You don't  
2 need the SDS to tell you that.

3 According to Angus McIntosh, who was posted to SDS  
4 between 1976 and 1979, although SDS were ready to  
5 infiltrate extreme right-wing groups if needed, there  
6 was a high-level policy decision during his time in SDS  
7 not to allow or order such infiltration. We know that  
8 E Squad was meant to monitor such groups, but the far  
9 right was never subject to anything resembling  
10 the degree of intrusive surveillance and infiltration to  
11 which the left and anarchist groups were subject,  
12 despite the fact that racists and fascists were well  
13 known to all, including the police, for their violence,  
14 and were in reality the real public order threat.

15 This further suggests, we submit, that the primary  
16 focus of SDS was gathering intelligence on groups and  
17 individuals of a left-wing or anarchist persuasion, as  
18 opposed to preventing public disorder. The political  
19 persuasions -- and this is important -- of many senior  
20 police officers, many of an ex-service background, were  
21 very much on the right of the political spectrum, as is  
22 clear from their witness statements.

23 For example, the comments of Geoffrey Craft about  
24 "mob rule", "lefties", "scruffy, hairy so-and-sos", they  
25 speak for themselves. This is classic "Reds under

1 the Bed" stuff, with a dose of McCarthyism thrown in for  
2 good measure.

3 The final justification for the SDS, negative  
4 reporting. Simply put, it means that if SDS discovers  
5 that a group poses no threat to public order, this is  
6 nevertheless useful and of benefit to the police. But  
7 surely this begs the obvious question as to why  
8 the group needed to be infiltrated in the first place.  
9 We say this is scraping the barrel of disingenuous  
10 ex post facto justification.

11 Turning then, finally, Sir, to the future of  
12 the Inquiry.

13 We understand that the Tranche 2 hearings covering  
14 the period from 1983 to 1992 are unlikely to commence  
15 before the spring of 2024, and that subsequent hearings  
16 covering spying in the 1990s and 2000s will take place  
17 in the months and years thereafter.

18 We ask rhetorically, and I'm sure you understand  
19 why, how many more undercover officers,  
20 Non-State Core Participants and other relevant witnesses  
21 will have passed away or have become unavailable to  
22 participate in the Inquiry for reasons of ill-health by  
23 then is anyone's guess. We appreciate, of course, that  
24 the material being processed by the Inquiry is  
25 voluminous and that the State core participants are

1           insisting that every word on every page is potentially  
2           subject to restriction and redaction. These things take  
3           time; we get it. However, the Inquiry at present has no  
4           end in sight, and this is obviously a matter of great  
5           concern and disappointment to the Non-State  
6           Core Participants.

7           On a more positive note -- and I think it is  
8           important to say this -- we welcome the indication that  
9           you've given in the last few days that the legal  
10          framework for the conduct of undercover police  
11          operations must be determined and cannot be shirked,  
12          Sir, to use your words.

13          Finally, Sir, I know I'm more or less at the end of  
14          my time, if I could be forgiven just to say a few words  
15          on behalf of three our Non-State Core Participants who  
16          I represent, two of whom were targeted in the 1970s --  
17          and I'll be very brief -- namely Ken Livingstone,  
18          the Friends of Freedom Press and Duwayne Brooks.

19          You know, Sir, that it's clear from the material  
20          disclosed thus in relation to Ken Livingstone that  
21          the secret state began spying on him in the 1970s.  
22          Nevertheless, his name only features in a handful of  
23          intelligence reports disclosed thus far. And we say  
24          that's odd for two reasons, primarily.

25          Firstly, Mr Livingstone, as you know, was active on

1 multiple fronts during the 1970s, notably on the left of  
2 the Labour Party but also on Ireland and on anti-racism.

3 Secondly, after being elected leader of the Greater  
4 London Council in May 1981, which is within our period  
5 of time, he was denounced by the then prime minister,  
6 Margaret Thatcher, as wanting to impose upon the nation  
7 a tyranny which the peoples of Eastern Europe yearn to  
8 cast aside, and by the right wing press as "Red Ken" and  
9 a left-wing extremist. And so we say it's inconceivable  
10 that he did not become a prime target of the secret  
11 state at that stage at least.

12 So why is there such a paucity of material on him?  
13 We know that some of the campaigns he supported, like  
14 the Troops Out Movement, were infiltrated. Does  
15 the tiny number of SDS reports on him suggest that he  
16 wasn't being spied on by the SDS? Was it MI5 who was  
17 spying on him? What role did SDS play? What was  
18 the nature of the spying? Surely, we ask, one or more  
19 of the managers who you're going to hear from in  
20 the next few days may be able to give cogent evidence  
21 and shed some light on these important questions.

22 Freedom Press, including the Freedom Collective, was  
23 also an SDS target in the 1970s. The Freedom Collective  
24 is mentioned as a target for the first time in the 1974  
25 SDS annual report, and Roger Pearce, who -- you will



1 know this of course -- went on to become head of SDS and  
2 later head of Special Branch, he was spying on  
3 the Freedom Collective between 1978 and 1984, using  
4 the cover name of Roger Thorley and writing articles for  
5 its paper.

6 Again, we ask, why is there such a paucity of  
7 material on the Freedom Press and the Freedom  
8 Collective? Where are Roger Pearce's SDS reports?

9 And, finally, Duwayne Brooks -- and I mention him  
10 for one reason only, because obviously he features in  
11 much later tranches.

12 Barry Moss, an SDS manager in the 1980s who later  
13 became a commander in Special Branch in the 1990s, is  
14 your first police witness this Friday. He gave evidence  
15 to Mark Ellison's 2014 review into corruption and  
16 undercover policing in the Stephen Lawrence case. He  
17 doesn't address this in the witness statement that  
18 the Inquiry has thus far taken. And all we are urging  
19 the Inquiry to do -- we're not suggesting that he can be  
20 asked any questions about this, because his statement  
21 doesn't cover it. We understand that. But we do urge  
22 the Inquiry to take a further witness statement from him  
23 as soon as possible, given his age; a statement that  
24 covers his knowledge about undercover policing on  
25 Mr Brooks and the Lawrence family.

1                   My apologies, Sir, for going slightly over. Those  
2                   are my submissions for Tranche 1, Phase 3.

3       THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

4                   I don't propose to enter into a public debate with  
5                   you about your statement and propositions, but can  
6                   I offer some reassurance about Roger Pearce's reports.  
7                   They are going to be dealt with in Tranche 2. They have  
8                   been collated; they will be disclosed.

9       MR MENON: I'm grateful.

10      THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

11      MR MENON: Thank you.

12      THE CHAIRMAN: We will now resume in approximately  
13                  ten minutes' time.

14      (10.36 am)

15    (A short break)

16      (10.45 am)

17      THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Morris.

18    Opening statement by MR MORRIS

19      MR MORRIS: Thank you.

20                   I speak as a core participant in this Inquiry, and  
21                   one who was targeted by police spies from the mid-1970s  
22                   onwards, both personally and as a member of targeted  
23                   political and campaigning groups.

24                   I have already contributed to the Inquiry a witness  
25                   statement and two detailed opening statements for

1 previous hearings.

2 I have slightly amended and expanded on my written  
3 statement submitted in April.

4 On Monday, you, as the Chair of the Inquiry,  
5 indicated you had welcomed Tariq Ali when he gave  
6 evidence in 2020 in helpfully explaining Trotskyist  
7 ideas to you. In the light of police misconceptions  
8 about anarchists in various disclosed documents,  
9 including annual reports, I will try to explain  
10 the predominant motivations, aims and activities of  
11 anarchists and the anarchist movement as I see it.

12 Standing up for the public interest against the rich  
13 and powerful.

14 As already outlined in my previous statements,  
15 I have been involved since 1974 in a range of groups and  
16 campaigns trying to encourage the public to support one  
17 another and empower themselves where they live and work  
18 to challenge injustice, oppression and damage to  
19 the environment, and to make the world a better place  
20 for everyone.

21 The various groups I have been involved in over  
22 the decades have been open and collectively run, and  
23 engaged in the kind of public activities which  
24 the public are invited to join in or to replicate for  
25 themselves, and which are essential if humanity is to

1 progress and survive in the future.

2 Such groups, as we all should, question and  
3 challenge those institutions which wield power over  
4 people's lives and control the world's resources and  
5 decision-making. These include governments,  
6 transnational corporations, military organisations and  
7 financial institutions. Such powerful institutions are  
8 generally tightly controlled by a small, self-serving  
9 elite, continually obsessed with power and profit, and  
10 are ruthless and unaccountable. In fact, as I outlined  
11 in more detail in my April 2021 statement, they are  
12 subversive of society and people's real needs. They are  
13 the real subversives that need to be investigated.  
14 Indeed, they are also the inevitable cause of most of  
15 what the SDS would define as "public disorder" in  
16 response to injustice.

17 Unsurprisingly, such institutions have made  
18 a shocking mess of the world for centuries, causing mass  
19 hardship and poverty, disempowerment, discrimination and  
20 oppression, exploitation of workers and resources,  
21 horrific wars and large-scale environmental destruction.  
22 They have brought humanity to the brink of nuclear  
23 annihilation, and have been systematically exploiting  
24 and destroying the natural environment upon which human  
25 society depends for our survival. As a result, our

1 species now faces a catastrophic and possibly terminal  
2 future.

3 Many of the groups I have been involved with believe  
4 that the evidence of history demonstrates that such  
5 aforementioned institutions can't be successfully  
6 reformed and turned into benevolent, useful public  
7 bodies. However, history also demonstrate that  
8 grassroots movements for change, if large enough and  
9 determined enough, can shift the balance of power and  
10 win concessions and victories for the public along  
11 the way.

12 The groups I have been involved in have tried their  
13 best to support efforts to build single issue and other  
14 campaigns and movements to improve things in the here  
15 and now. Some of those groups logically also call for  
16 the hierarchical and authoritarian institutions which  
17 are causing the shocking problems humanity unfortunately  
18 has to face to be replaced in the long term by  
19 a genuinely democratic way of running society, one in  
20 which people all over the world collectively manage  
21 their own neighbourhoods, workplaces and lives, and  
22 ensure that all the resources are shared fairly and all  
23 decision-making is for the public good. This is  
24 libertarian socialism, or anarchism.

25 On Monday, you requested suggestions for key

1 relevant reading materials, hence I recommend  
2 the following books. "On Anarchism", by Noam Chomsky;  
3 "Anarchism: A very Short Introduction", by Colin Ward;  
4 and "Demanding the impossible: A History of Anarchism",  
5 by Peter Marshall. If you enjoy science fiction, I also  
6 recommend "The Dispossessed", by Ursula Le Guin.

7 I am proud of the many groups and campaigns I have  
8 been involved in, and believe that such efforts should  
9 be supported, not undermined. Similar to points made by  
10 other Non-State Core Participants in this week's opening  
11 statements, as an active anarchist in the Tranche 1  
12 period, I do not recognise the ignorant, derogatory and  
13 misleading SDS and Special Branch annual reports,  
14 official characterisations about the ideals and  
15 activities of anarchists during that period.

16 The evidence of undercover officer "Graham Coates",  
17 as the only undercover officer spying on anarchists we  
18 have relevant evidence from at this stage, as far as I'm  
19 aware, amply demonstrates the reality.

20 For two years or more, he personally targeted me and  
21 the groups I was involved with, especially  
22 the Anarchy Magazine collective, and concluded:

23 "The anarchists I've reported on posed a minimal  
24 challenge to public order. I do not think either ...  
25 [the International Socialists] or the anarchist movement

1           was subversive in terms of their actions. I do not  
2           believe any info I provided ... was particularly  
3           significant. I do not think it would have made any  
4           difference to public order if I had not worked for  
5           the SDS."

6           Anarchist groups, just like pretty much all of  
7           the left wing and campaign groups targeted, were full of  
8           well meaning and idealistic people with a sense of  
9           justice, engaged in spreading progressive ideas for  
10          a better society.

11          They were: helping run newspapers, bookshops and  
12          other cooperative projects; taking part in open or  
13          public meetings and social and cultural events;  
14          encouraging people to think and speak up for themselves  
15          and support each other and their needs where they live  
16          and work and; encouraging people to empower themselves  
17          to be in control of their lives, rather than just be  
18          loyal subjects, passive consumers, and forced to obey  
19          those with power over them, for example landlords,  
20          employers, politicians and police.

21          They were participating in a range of essential  
22          protests on the issues of the time, and constructively  
23          supporting movements against injustice and inequality  
24          and for positive change.

25          Yet, the biased and self-serving official annual

1 reports, extracts of which were quoted so eruditely by  
2 the Counsel to the Inquiry in his opening statement on  
3 Monday, deliberately fail to acknowledge and outline  
4 these basic facts. If they had have done, they would  
5 have had to have admitted that their infiltration  
6 operations were indeed totally unacceptable.

7 SDS targeting in the 1970s and further important  
8 evidence awaited.

9 In the Tranche 1 period, the main groups I was  
10 involved in included the London Workers Group, which  
11 supported workers challenging exploitation at work,  
12 the Union of Postal Workers and rank and file "Post  
13 Office Worker" magazine, which were fellow postal  
14 workers to myself supporting each other,  
15 Anarchy Magazine, spreading anti-authoritarian ideas and  
16 news, and the Persons Unknown Support Group, a campaign  
17 in defence of activists arrested, found at trial to be  
18 not guilty, and finally the Torness Alliance, opposition  
19 to the development of nuclear energy.

20 I've already referred to Anarchy Magazine.

21 The London Workers Group was infiltrated by  
22 undercover officer "Tony Williams", who was a spy from  
23 1978 to 1982. His statement has so far been withheld  
24 from me, as for some reason he has been allocated to  
25 Tranche 2. It is therefore impossible to comment or ask



1 questions of his managers about the extent of this  
2 unlawful and disgusting infiltration of what was an open  
3 group, and about the other groups he targeted. However,  
4 we know from two of the disclosed documents that he  
5 became, firstly, the treasurer of  
6 the London Workers Group and then the secretary, giving  
7 him full access to personal information on the group's  
8 supporters; no doubt to be passed on to MI5 for  
9 blacklisting purposes.

10 Interestingly, another document from MI5, dated  
11 30 July 1982, states that when "Tony Williams" was due  
12 to be withdrawn from the SDS in 1982, the MI5 F6 manager  
13 had met with HN68, from the SDS, who considered it  
14 was "no great loss" as "Tony William's work had not been  
15 'particularly productive'".

16 I have given the Inquiry a photo I took of "Tony  
17 Williams" in 1980.

18 Regarding the Torness Alliance, this was a UK-wide  
19 campaign to oppose the building of a new nuclear power  
20 station in Scotland. The main objections were, firstly,  
21 the threat of catastrophic nuclear accidents, as had  
22 almost happened in 1979 at Three Mile Island in the US,  
23 and in 1986 actually happened at Chernobyl in Ukraine,  
24 resulting subsequently in an estimated 9,000 to 16,000  
25 deaths from air pollution throughout Europe.

1           The second concern was the lack of safe disposal of  
2 nuclear waste, which would be dangerously radioactive  
3 for thousands of years. 10,000 people protested at  
4 Torness in 1979, and there were some follow-up protests  
5 in the year afterwards. I was involved in this  
6 campaign. London Greenpeace were heavily involved in  
7 this movement, and I later got involved with that group  
8 around 1982. London Greenpeace was infiltrated by  
9 the SDS for many years, as we will come to in Tranche 2.

10           According to their witness statements for T1 P3,  
11 a number of SDS undercover officers were infiltrating  
12 the anti-nuclear movement, and at least four managers  
13 visited the Torness site. However, we are unfortunately  
14 expecting most of the evidence and documentation  
15 relevant to this movement and London Greenpeace to not  
16 be disclosed until Tranche 2.

17           The 1979 Special Branch annual report is disclosed  
18 in full and contains a huge wealth of evidence about or  
19 relevant to the SDS and its spying operation. It  
20 includes three explicit references to myself in  
21 the monthly sections, and many other references to  
22 groups and events I was involved with, with  
23 a month-by-month chronology and very helpful index  
24 cross-referencing the names of over 200 targeted groups  
25 and over 100 targeted individuals in that year alone.

1           The other Special Branch annual reports disclosed by  
2 the Inquiry have been massively cut; they are thin and  
3 vague in comparison.

4           The full reports for all the relevant years,  
5 including for the forthcoming tranches, should be  
6 disclosed as soon as possible. This will help identify  
7 many of the list of the 1,000 groups targeted by  
8 the SDS, for which we have been waiting for years.

9           Due to the many delays during the Inquiry and the  
10 further delays expected, all the witness statements  
11 already taken from undercover officers should be  
12 disclosed as soon as possible. This is essential so  
13 that core participants can begin to prepare their  
14 responses, including seeking out others from groups and  
15 events affected by the spying operation over the life of  
16 the SDS, and later the NPOIU; rather than having to wait  
17 for years until the last minute, when it is generally  
18 too late to trace victims and prepare evidence  
19 effectively.

20           A key question for managers.

21           Why did the police never consider the welfare, as  
22 well as the human and legal rights, of those members of  
23 the public they targeted -- the victims? Surely they  
24 had a duty of care whilst invading and influencing  
25 people's lives? Surely any normal human being would do

1 so anyway, duty of care or not?

2 After seven years of the Inquiry, many thousands of  
3 people in groups targeted, whether those groups have  
4 already been revealed or so far are still concealed,  
5 remain in the dark about who spied on them, what  
6 information was collected and what was done with it.  
7 They are understandably angry, as well as being confused  
8 and suspicious about which individuals from their past  
9 may have been police spies and events from their life  
10 which may have been secretly invaded and manipulated by  
11 state agents cynically masquerading as their friends and  
12 colleagues. This delay is unacceptable and we need  
13 the full truth.

14 In contrast, the inquiry, at the behest of  
15 the police, is strongly applying privacy and human  
16 rights concerns to protect the identity and welfare of  
17 undercover officers. This sudden police conversion to  
18 such rights, not previously of any concern of their  
19 secret units during their four or five decades of  
20 operations, is surely staggering hypocrisy. It would be  
21 seen as ironic if it wasn't so serious. Many might  
22 think that those who secretly invaded and abused  
23 people's lives should have vacated their own privacy  
24 rights. Furthermore, in most core participants'  
25 opinion, the current privacy strategy of the police and

1 inquiry is the key cause of the massive problems, costs  
2 and delays in the Inquiry.

3 The public would expect that such privacy protection  
4 criteria applied to the undercover officers be applied  
5 a hundred times more strongly when evaluating  
6 the unlawfulness of the SDS and the rights of those  
7 victims who were seeking a better society who were  
8 thereby secretly targeted, lied to, abused, manipulated,  
9 and reported on to the police and secret services.

10 Conclusion.

11 I have read and support the impressive detailed  
12 opening statements made on behalf of the category H  
13 core participants and on behalf of  
14 the Co-operating Group of core participants, and indeed  
15 those for the other Non-State Core Participants.

16 These statements clearly demonstrate beyond doubt  
17 that the entire secret SDS operation was unacceptable  
18 and unlawful, as well as being worthless. It  
19 demonstrates that the police were institutionally  
20 anti-democratic, as well as being institutionally  
21 sexist, racist and anti-working class.

22 The infiltration of left-wing and progressive groups  
23 and campaigns and the invasion of their members' lives  
24 should never have been allowed to happen. Managers, and  
25 those higher up the chain, all the way to police chiefs

1           and government ministers, must apologise and be held  
2           responsible and accountable.

3           Thank you very much.

4           THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. May I ask just one  
5           question of you? You have taken up the implied  
6           invitation to suggest a reading list to me. If I have  
7           time for any one of your factual books, which should it  
8           be?

9           MR MORRIS: Well, I would actually recommend the "Demanding  
10          the Impossible" by Peter Marshall. However, it's  
11          a weighty tome, so you may need to select which chapters  
12          that you would prefer to engage with.

13          THE CHAIRMAN: But that's the one you recommend. Certainly  
14          I don't mind reading weighty tomes, I'm quite happy with  
15          that, but three on the same topic may be too much.

16          MR MORRIS: Okay.

17          THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

18          MR MORRIS: Thank you very much.

19          THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

20                 We will adjourn now for about a quarter of an hour,  
21                 perhaps a little longer -- I don't know the precise  
22                 timings. Thank you.

23                 (11.05 am)

24   (A short break)

25                 (11.20 am)

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Heaven.

2 MS HEAVEN: Morning, Sir. Thank you. Are we ready to  
3 start, Sir?

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Please do. Forgive me. I didn't think  
5 I needed formally to invite you to make your opening  
6 statement, but please do.

7 Opening statement by MS HEAVEN

8 MS HEAVEN: So, this opening statement is made on behalf of  
9 all the cooperating non-police, Non-State Core  
10 Participants, which I will refer to as the "non-state  
11 co-operating group". It supplements the statements that  
12 have been made directly on behalf of individuals and  
13 groups by their instructed lawyers, and the first and  
14 second opening statements made by the non-state  
15 co-operating group at the start of the evidence in  
16 Tranche 1, Phase 1, and Tranche 1, Phase 2.

17 The non-state co-operating group once again express  
18 their concern in relation to the significant delay to  
19 the progress of this public inquiry. There has been  
20 a gap of 12 months since the T1 P2 hearings, and the  
21 non-state co-operating group understand that Tranche 2  
22 will not take place before 2024. The Inquiry has still  
23 not set out a clear timetable for future hearings.

24 The undercover police officers are of advancing age;  
25 and this is particularly so in relation to the managers

1           who are to be heard in Tranche 1, Phase 3, some of whom  
2           will also have evidence to give in later tranches.  
3           Further delay will result in crucial evidence being  
4           lost. The non-state co-operating group deserve clarity  
5           on the future progression of this Inquiry, and so demand  
6           that the Inquiry publishes a timetable for all future  
7           hearings as a matter of urgency.

8           I will now make some comments on the evidence on  
9           behalf of the non-state co-operating group.

10          As the Inquiry moves into T1 P3, the period 1968 to  
11          1982, it will focus on the activities of the managers  
12          and administrators from the Special Demonstration Squad.

13          In T1 P2, the Inquiry heard truly shocking evidence  
14          about undercover officers operating an unjustifiable,  
15          unlawful and profoundly anti-democratic system of  
16          surveillance that was fundamentally flawed. We've had  
17          a glimpse into a system that obviously violated  
18          fundamental rights and the common law, as has been set  
19          out in detail in Category H T1, P3 opening statement.

20          The managers are now in the spotlight. The witness  
21          statements disclosed in this Inquiry contain a litany of  
22          denials, and an apparent unwillingness to accept  
23          responsibility or admit knowledge on key decision-making  
24          and events. The managers appear reluctant to give  
25          a full and honest explanation of why things went so



1 badly wrong within the SDS in this T1 era and beyond.

2 Why on earth, in 2022, would witnesses to this  
3 public inquiry not be willing to tell the full,  
4 unvarnished truth, the non-state co-operating group ask?  
5 Are the managers seeking to protect their professional  
6 reputation, or do they feel a sense of misguided loyalty  
7 to the Metropolitan Police Service, reinforced by their  
8 decades of experience of not breaking rank and  
9 protecting the institution at all costs? If this is  
10 the case, it is a deeply misplaced sentiment.

11 As the witnesses in T1 P3 will no doubt be aware,  
12 the last 12 months have seen the public once again  
13 demanding answers from the MPS following the exposure of  
14 appalling acts of racism, misogyny and corruption. This  
15 is an institution which has been found to be  
16 institutionally racist, institutionally corrupt and  
17 marred by a culture of toxic masculinity, misogyny and  
18 sexual harassment.

19 The public and the non-state co-operating group are  
20 still demanding and expecting answers. The group can  
21 see, from the T1 P2 and P3 disclosure, that the SDS  
22 managers always emphasised their robust management of  
23 undercover officers when seeking a renewal of funding  
24 from the Home Office. If this is correct, the managers,  
25 as former senior police officers appointed to serve

1 the public, have a duty to explain in a full and honest  
2 manner why it was that abhorrent practices went on under  
3 their watch.

4 These practices echo the behaviour exposed in  
5 the MPS in the last 12 months. Why was it that managers  
6 presided over an unlawful system of policing that so  
7 obviously violated fundamental rights? Did the managers  
8 conceal these practices from their political masters, or  
9 was it, as the non-state co-operating group suspect,  
10 that the cover-up went on at the highest political  
11 level?

12 It is therefore central to the Inquiry's remit to  
13 obtain an understanding of the political knowledge of  
14 the SDS and the extent to which direction and targeting  
15 came from outside the SDS.

16 There is a wealth of evidence demonstrating that  
17 senior Home Office officials knew about the SDS. After  
18 all, they approved the funding and often acted as  
19 the communications link between the Security Services  
20 and the Home Office. However, the yearly decision to  
21 allow the SDS to continue to operate would clearly not  
22 have been theirs alone. These were political decisions.  
23 This Inquiry must establish who in the senior political  
24 hierarchy was controlling and directing SDS targeting,  
25 and who beyond the Home Office civil servants ultimately

1 signed off the funding for the SDS and for what purpose.  
2 What motivated the alliances formed by the SDS with  
3 its "customers"? And why, for example, did the funding  
4 for the SDS increase rapidly during this era at a time  
5 when public disorder was on the wane?

6 The Inquiry should not forget the admission by  
7 Witness Z on behalf of the Security Services that  
8 the pressure to investigate so-called subversive  
9 organisations "often came from the Prime Minister and  
10 Whitehall".

11 Sir, I now want to make a few brief comments about  
12 terms of reference, regulation and the impact of  
13 secrecy.

14 Uncovering the true nature of the shadowy political  
15 oversight of the SDS by the Metropolitan Police,  
16 Special Branch, the Home Office and  
17 the Security Services is crucial.

18 The evidence disclosed in Tranche 1 reveals that  
19 the Home Office knew at the time that SDS activities,  
20 for example for the Security Services, were unlawful.  
21 They also knew that if the SDS were exposed, it would  
22 result in a political scandal and significant  
23 embarrassment.

24 As a result, from the outset, the political elite  
25 and senior Metropolitan Police Special Branch police

1 officers deliberately shrouded the SDS in secrecy, and  
2 did everything they could to insulate it from external  
3 oversight. Undercover operations were conducted without  
4 clear guidance and robust terms of reference, and there  
5 was no code of conduct or formal training.

6 It was this secrecy that allowed the SDS managers in  
7 T1 to operate with such apparent complacency. And,  
8 ultimately, it was this secrecy that allowed  
9 the abhorrent and unlawful practices of  
10 the undercover officers to flourish and thrive in the T1  
11 era and beyond.

12 In terms of guidance to the Metropolitan Police  
13 Special Branch and in particular the SDS, between 1969  
14 and 1982, we can see that the only official high-level  
15 instructions were to be found in the 1969  
16 "Responsibilities of Special Branch", and the 1970  
17 "Home Office Terms of Reference for Special Branch".  
18 However, the 1970 terms of reference was known by  
19 the Home Office and the MPS to be a woefully inadequate  
20 and vague document, with a problematic definition  
21 of "subversion" and no clear role assigned to  
22 the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.

23 The 1972 definition of "subversion" did not contain  
24 the reference to unlawful activity that featured in  
25 Lord Denning's 1969 definition. And this has been set

1 out in much more detail in the T1 P3 opening statement  
2 made on behalf of Lindsey German, Richard Chessum and  
3 "Mary".

4 The Metropolitan Police Service 1970 Terms of  
5 Reference never contained that reference to "unlawful".  
6 And in 1978, Robin Cook MP commented in Parliament on  
7 the 1972 amendments, stating:

8 "[Lord Harris'] definition of subversion does not  
9 turn on any reference to unlawful. It is in no way  
10 restricted to unlawful activities. It is, therefore, an  
11 invitation to the police forces that police this concept  
12 of subversion to stick their nose into any form of  
13 political or industrial activity."

14 In the latest T1 P3 disclosure, there is a clear  
15 paper trail, which shows that, as early as 1974,  
16 concerns were being raised at the highest political  
17 levels about the politicisation of the police and the  
18 illegitimate surveillance activities of  
19 the Metropolitan Police Special Branch. Members of  
20 Parliament actively raised concerns with  
21 the Home Secretary, and demanded better public scrutiny  
22 of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch covert  
23 surveillance activities. However, these MPs appeared to  
24 know nothing about the activities of the SDS.

25 The paper trail then continues. The Robin Cook

1 MP debates of 1977 to 1978 forced the Home Office to  
2 begin the slow process of revising the terms of  
3 reference. As part of this process, Her Majesty's Chief  
4 Inspectorate of Constabulary raised concerns to  
5 the Home Office that:

6 "... the Security Service sought more information  
7 from Special Branches than they really needed."

8 The Home Office also knew that some senior police  
9 officers in the MPS had been questioning whether there  
10 was any lawful justification for their work for  
11 the Security Services. As early as 1974,  
12 Commander Gilbert told the Security Services that:

13 "... the SDS did a tremendous amount of work for  
14 the [Security Services] and ... that for the most  
15 part work done ... had little or no relevance to  
16 [Special Branch's] proper charter and as far as he was  
17 concerned it tied up staff, of which he was chronically  
18 short anyway, in totally unproductive activity."

19 Now, Sir, you will recall that some officers in T1  
20 P2, such as HN126 "Paul Gray", spent significant amounts  
21 of his time reporting the intimate personal details of  
22 schoolchildren. It now appears this information was  
23 most likely collected for the Security Services, who, in  
24 1975, specifically asked the Metropolitan Police  
25 Special Branch to look out for extensive data on

1 schoolchildren, teachers and members of governing bodies  
2 promoting subversion. It seems that Commander Gilbert's  
3 concerns were not heeded by the policing and  
4 security establishment.

5 The lengths to which the SDS would go to conduct  
6 unlawful surveillance work for the Security Services is  
7 typified by their targeting of  
8 the Workers Revolutionary Party. The WRP was  
9 a political party that sought to bring about radical  
10 economic reform. It stood candidates in the 1974  
11 general election, and the Inquiry has been provided with  
12 that manifesto.

13 The WRP was well recognised by the SDS as not using  
14 violence and not a threat to public order. It was  
15 clearly not a subversive organisation. However, it was  
16 nevertheless targeted by HN298, "Mike Scott", who  
17 attended the WRP education centre, White Meadows,  
18 contrary to the wishes of DAC Gilbert.

19 Despite the lack of public order threat and lawful  
20 activity, the SDS were nonetheless prepared to continue  
21 to target the WRP on behalf of the Security Services.  
22 And we can see, in 1979, that DCI Mike Ferguson, who was  
23 then a senior SDS officer, stated in response to  
24 a Security Services request for coverage of the WRP  
25 that:

1            "... although the WRP was not considered to be a law  
2            and order problem, nevertheless he was ready to put  
3            a source into the WRP if this would legitimately act as  
4            a stepping stone for penetration of an SDS target."

5            The lack of lawful justification for this type of  
6            SDS work for the Security Services was well understood  
7            by the Home Office, who can be seen commenting, in 1980,  
8            that the 1970 terms of reference did not:

9            "... provide Ministers or chief officers with  
10           a watertight basis on which to justify the work of  
11           police officers in investigating and recording  
12           the activities of subversives."

13           However, despite knowing that they were presiding  
14           over a system of unlawful state surveillance, it appears  
15           that in 1979 to 1980, on the recommendation of the head  
16           of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch Deputy  
17           Assistant Commissioner Robert P Bryan, an early draft of  
18           the terms of reference was shelved on the grounds that:

19           "... it might stimulate more questions than it  
20           answered."

21           The Inquiry is presented with clear evidence of  
22           senior members of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch  
23           seeking to cover up and perpetuate the unlawful  
24           activities of the branch which was typified by the SDS.

25           In terms of external oversight of the SDS,



1 Home Office communications to Sir Brian Cubbon, the then  
2 Permanent Undersecretary of State at the Home Office,  
3 noted that:

4 "[Her Majesty's Chief Inspectorate of Constabulary]  
5 proposed that there should be a systematic, planned  
6 inspection of all headquarters, Special Branch units and  
7 selected port units. However, on further consideration,  
8 it was thought that some chief officers might resist  
9 such an approach."

10 It now seems that there was never any external  
11 oversight of the SDS or Metropolitan Police  
12 Special Branch during this era and beyond. And it would  
13 appear that this was a decision known about and  
14 sanctioned at the highest political level within  
15 the Home Office. The Inquiry is here presented with  
16 clear evidence of Home Office complicity in covering up  
17 and insulating from external scrutiny the unlawful  
18 activities of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, as  
19 typified by the SDS.

20 The non-state co-operating group ask the Inquiry to  
21 investigate whether Her Majesty's Chief Inspectorate of  
22 Constabulary ever came to learn about the existence of  
23 the SDS, and if not, why not?

24 Who else was controlling and influencing  
25 the oversight and regulation of the Metropolitan Police

1 Special Branch and the SDS, the group ask?

2 Evidence has also emerged that in 1980, it was  
3 the Security Services that had a decisive hand in  
4 preventing the publication of a new branch terms of  
5 reference. This gives the Inquiry an insight into  
6 the extent to which the Security Services exercised  
7 control over the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.  
8 However, the decisive factor, it seems, in closing  
9 the door on any form of regulatory framework or revised  
10 terms of reference appears to have been the election of  
11 Margaret Thatcher in 1979. Mrs Thatcher is noted as not  
12 sharing her "predecessors' disquiet about the work of  
13 Special Branches".

14 Sir, I'm now going to say a few words about SDS  
15 rules and training.

16 It was not just the political elite and the  
17 Metropolitan Police Special Branch hierarchy that  
18 resisted clear rules and guidance on undercover policing  
19 and surveillance. Whilst the architect of the SDS,  
20 Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon, authored the first  
21 guidance on the SDS in his "Penetration of Extremist  
22 Groups", dated 26 November 1968, this document seemingly  
23 remained buried. This paper ran almost in parallel with  
24 the Home Office Circular 97/1969 entitled "Informants  
25 who take part in crime".

1           One would think that these documents would provide  
2           early important guidance to the SDS. It seems, however,  
3           that they were ignored. Most importantly, these  
4           documents suggested that deployments should last no  
5           longer than 12 months, in recognition of the stresses of  
6           undercover life, unless there were special  
7           circumstances.

8           Dixon also directed that members should not "take  
9           office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak  
10          in public or initiate activity". However, these  
11          apparent rules were immediately broken, including by  
12          Dixon himself. Dixon, along with his fellow  
13          undercover officers, not only voted in meetings, but  
14          either Dixon or HN329 also penned an article for "Red  
15          Camden".

16          The administrator, HN3095, William Furner, who,  
17          significantly, is not being called to give evidence in  
18          T1, P3, characterises Dixon as having a "very loose  
19          reign [sic]", whilst another manager, Riby Wilson,  
20          describes him as being "very free and easy". Did this  
21          approach become the blueprint for the SDS, the non-state  
22          co-operating group ask?

23          Even in the early days, the deployments lasted  
24          significantly longer than Dixon himself considered  
25          appropriate. We can see that HN68, "Sean Lynch", was in

1 the field from 1968 to 1973, and by the mid-1970s,  
2 HN200, "Roger Harris", was deployed from 1974 to '77,  
3 commenting:

4 "I was not told how long I would be in the SDS ...  
5 I feel that the first year you find your feet,  
6 the middle year is most effective, and in the third year  
7 there is a danger you could become careless or  
8 overconfident. For example, when I was nearing the end  
9 of my deployment, I signed one of my personal cheques in  
10 my cover name. I knew the person serving me at the bank  
11 and so it was not a problem, but it made me think it was  
12 time to stop working undercover."

13 By the mid-1970s, the accepted duration became  
14 a standardised four years. We see HN304, "Graham  
15 Coates", 76 to 79, we see HN354, Vincent Harvey, 76 to  
16 79, HN80, "Colin Clark", 77 to 1982, we see HN106,  
17 "Barry Tompkins", 79 to 83, and we see HN155,  
18 "Phil Cooper", 1979 to 1984.

19 All of these undercover officers have indicated that  
20 they were told or expected their deployment to last  
21 around four years. In the words of HN80, to get  
22 the return on the investment.

23 According to HN304:

24 "I was told that my deployment would be 4 years.  
25 I was told that this was the perfect length because it

1 would take 12 months to become properly efficient, but  
2 if the deployment was more than 4 years I would either  
3 burn out or become so stressed that I would be  
4 ineffective."

5 The four-year deployment remained in place into  
6 the 1980s, with the 1982 SDS annual report also noting  
7 that a tour of duty in the SDS was "normally a maximum  
8 of four years".

9 The non-state co-operating group want to understand  
10 whether there was a positive and considered managerial  
11 decision to extend all deployments well beyond  
12 12 months, and if so, by whom?

13 Were any risks taken into consideration, or were  
14 the undercover officers simply allowed to drift on  
15 without robust management and clear guidance?

16 The length of deployments is a significant  
17 consideration. It is not rocket science that the longer  
18 an undercover officer is deployed, the greater chance  
19 there is of collateral intrusion, the development of  
20 close personal ties, sexual and intimate relationships,  
21 misconduct and abuse of power and trust.

22 The extent to which managers knew about the risk of  
23 undercover officers engaging in sexual relationships  
24 when undercover is both highly sensitive and  
25 contentious.

1 Roy Creamer says in his witness statement that:

2 "I would give them fatherly advice like not taking  
3 drugs, not getting involved with mischief and, not  
4 getting illnesses."

5 "Mischief" and "illnesses" are, curiously, not  
6 defined.

7 Managers clearly decided that married  
8 undercover officers were preferable for deployments.  
9 Very few are willing to admit, however, that this was an  
10 attempt to guard against sexual activity when  
11 undercover.

12 It is of note that David Bicknell, a manager who  
13 oversaw the SDS move to S squad in 1974, he states, is  
14 quoted as staying:

15 "The reason married men were favoured is because it  
16 was considered that there would be less temptation for  
17 them to enter into inappropriate relationships with  
18 women. The maximum that an officer was allowed to be  
19 a 'hairy' was two years, this was considered an absolute  
20 rule."

21 If there was an absolute two-year rule, why was it  
22 so blatantly broken? Did the managers simply ignore  
23 the obviously risks, knowing what the inevitable  
24 consequences might be, particularly regarding  
25 inappropriate relationships?

1           In terms of training, the undercover officers who  
2           gave evidence in T1 P1 and P2 have told this Inquiry  
3           that the early guidance documents referred to above were  
4           not shown to them by managers, but some did seem to know  
5           from their basic police training that they should not  
6           commit crimes or have relationships when undercover. In  
7           the very early years of the SDS, Roy Creamer and  
8           Conrad Dixon had significant knowledge of left-wing  
9           politics, and would provide political briefings.  
10          However, apart from some time in the back office,  
11          undercover officers reported having no, or very scant,  
12          training. There was certainly no trainings for  
13          undercover officers about not actively participating in  
14          groups, what intelligence to collect and privacy  
15          concerns.

16          Now, some officers have given evidence in closed  
17          hearings in Tranche 1, phase 4; T1 P4. These officers  
18          have reported the existence of a large, possibly black  
19          loose-leaf folder with notations from previous officers  
20          on tradecraft. Why have all the undercover officers who  
21          have already given evidence in the open hearings not  
22          referred to this folder, the non-state  
23          co-operating group ask?

24          This Inquiry must, we say, look at the basic police  
25          training given to all undercover officers whilst

1 attending police staff college at Bramshill. Police  
2 officers must surely have received basic training on  
3 legal principles and professional conduct, such as the  
4 lawfulness of entering a property without a search  
5 warrant, engaging in sexual relationships whilst on duty  
6 and participating in crimes.

7 If so, how did undercover officers, and indeed any  
8 of the managers, reconcile this training with  
9 the undemocratic and illegitimate system of undercover  
10 policing that they encountered when they joined the SDS?

11 It is also important for the Inquiry to explore how  
12 managers themselves were trained. All the witness  
13 statements to date note that managers did not receive  
14 any training other than learning on the job, however,  
15 some managers previously worked in either B Squad or  
16 C Squad.

17 It will be important for the Inquiry to understand  
18 how prior management and police experience in the wider  
19 Metropolitan Police Special Branch influenced policing  
20 tactics developed by the SDS.

21 Separately, how did inexperienced managers, such as  
22 Derek Brice and Geoffrey Craft, neither of whom had  
23 either worked undercover in the SDS, learn about  
24 tradecraft? Did they also read the black loose-leaf  
25 folder in the back office?



1           The evidence to be heard from managers in T1 P3 on  
2 training and the evolution of tradecraft is of  
3 particular importance to the bereaved families of  
4 deceased children, whose identities were used by  
5 the SDS. This is the period when the practice began,  
6 and the evidence from the managers is highly relevant to  
7 how that practice became normalised within the SDS,  
8 leading to its adoption as a tactic by the National  
9 Public Order Intelligence Unit.

10           The theft of the identities of deceased children was  
11 an immoral and unlawful practice that set the tone for  
12 a unit that operated outside the usual legal and moral  
13 strictures of policing.

14           I am now going to make some comments on the topic of  
15 empire building, funding and justification for the SDS.

16           The non-state co-operating group do not accept that  
17 the MPS's public order explanation could ever justify  
18 and render lawful the activities of the SDS. Without  
19 prejudice to that view, it is, however, clear that  
20 the public order justifications put forward on behalf of  
21 the MPS, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and SDS  
22 simply do not stand up to scrutiny.

23           The figures punished by Stephen Taylor QC in  
24 January 2015 show the SDS budget allocation from  
25 the Home Office rose significantly, from £3,000 in 1969

1 to £8,600 in 1975 to 1976, and to 30,000 in 1982 to  
2 1983. However, within the vast quantity of undercover  
3 reporting before this Inquiry there is very little  
4 evidence of reporting relevant to public disorder,  
5 the apparent raison d'être of the SDS. The overwhelming  
6 majority of undercover surveillance or reporting  
7 disclosed to date focused on organisations that had  
8 absolutely no ability to be genuinely subversive, and,  
9 as already established, this surveillance was known to  
10 be unlawful.

11 Certain managers in T1 P3 seek to explain the lack  
12 of public order reporting by focusing on the fact that  
13 disclosure for this Inquiry was largely obtained from  
14 the Security Services, and that there are  
15 apparently significant amounts of missing documents on  
16 SDS public order policing. This is simply not credible.  
17 There is little evidence within the T1 disclosure to  
18 support managers' assertions that the SDS was in fact  
19 successful in public order policing.

20 The documents disclosed for T1 show that, for a  
21 large part of the era under consideration by this  
22 Inquiry, public disorder was on the wane.

23 The memorandum of 19 March 1976, prepared for the 1975  
24 SDS annual report by Chief Inspector Derek Kneale notes  
25 that:

1           "There has, over the past years, been a decline in  
2 the disorders associated with political demonstrations."

3           This annual report states that the biggest  
4 demonstration in 1975 had been organised by the National  
5 Abortion Campaign, which attracted 15,000 to 20,000  
6 supporters, but it was noted that:

7           "Although this was a very emotive issue, there was  
8 no disorder."

9           The 1976 annual report, authored by Chief Inspector  
10 Geoffrey Craft, seeks to justify the continuation of  
11 the SDS, not because it predicted and prevented  
12 significant public disorder in the previous year, but  
13 rather the exact opposite. The SDS had saved police  
14 time and numbers by showing that there was no threat to  
15 public disorder from planned demonstrations.

16 Geoffrey Craft even boasts to the Home Office that this  
17 proved that "demonstration assessment has been tuned  
18 into a fine art".

19           Establishing that there was no risk of public  
20 disorder to save police resources does not justify  
21 the gross and unlawful infringement of rights and the  
22 invasion of privacy perpetuated by the SDS.

23           The targeting of the Workers Revolutionary Party by  
24 the SDS provides another perfect example of how far  
25 the SDS had drifted further into unlawful and shadowy

1 work that posed to threat to public order.

2 How can managers giving evidence to this Inquiry be  
3 so sure that the SDS was making a positive and important  
4 contribution to public order policing during this T1  
5 era? Is there any evidence that they were qualitatively  
6 assessing the usefulness of SDS reporting from a public  
7 order perspective? Is there any evidence that they  
8 sought and obtained feedback from their "clients" in  
9 public order divisions? The answer can only be no.

10 It is clear from the managers' evidence to date that  
11 they are seeking to distance themselves from having any  
12 responsibility for assessing or questioning  
13 the qualitative value of undercover reporting.

14 In terms of feedback, David Smith, the first officer  
15 manager in the SDS between October 1970 and  
16 October 1974, does not recall ever getting feedback from  
17 the recipients of the intelligence.

18 There is, however, a rare document in the T1  
19 disclosure from 1978, which is a memorandum from  
20 the then newly appointed detective chief inspector of  
21 the SDS, HN135, "Michael Ferguson", to the detective  
22 chief superintendent of S Branch. This material is  
23 a defensive response to criticism apparently made by  
24 a department's deputy assistant commissioner about  
25 the accuracy of SDS intelligence from an ANL rally.

1 The usefulness of the SDS to public order policing is  
2 best summarised by Roy Creamer, when he states that:

3 "The idea that the SDS would find out and reveal  
4 plans was wishful thinking, I think."

5 In terms of Metropolitan Police Special Branch  
6 institutional analysis of the SDS contribution to public  
7 order policing, the most significant attempt at a review  
8 in the T1 era occurred on 24 February 1976. This is  
9 when Commander Matt Roger tasked chief inspector of  
10 S squad, Rollo Watts, to set up a study group to assist  
11 in the forthcoming request for funding from  
12 the Home Office. Watts was asked to undertake  
13 a "complete review of the squad" in light of the fact  
14 that:

15 "Over the past 7 years, however, this form of  
16 political activity by minority extremist groups has  
17 dwindled considerably and with the exception  
18 of Red Lion Square conflict in 1974 and possibly one or  
19 two other incidents of deliberate confrontation,  
20 upsurges in violence on the streets have become less and  
21 less frequent".

22 Now, three questions were posed, one of which was:

23 "What proportion of the overall intelligence  
24 gathered is of primary benefit towards assisting uniform  
25 police officers to control public meetings and

1           demonstrations, and that which is of interest mainly to  
2           the Security Service?"

3           Chief Superintendent R Wilson, HN332, and Chief  
4           Inspector Derek Kneale, and Detective Inspector  
5           Geoffrey Craft were all part of the group under Watts.  
6           In his report back, Watts vigorously made the case for  
7           the continuation of the SDS. However, what is notable  
8           is that his report does not answer the question posed  
9           above on how much SDS work was dominated by  
10          the Security Services. What is both clear and  
11          significant, however, is an emphasis by Watts on  
12          the importance of the SDS intelligence for  
13          the Security Services. Watts dodged the public order  
14          question, because no doubt he well understood that  
15          the vast majority of what the SDS were doing was deeply  
16          problematic and unjustifiable surveillance for  
17          the Security Services.

18          This was clearly a loss opportunity for senior  
19          managers to give an honest appraisal of the utility,  
20          justification and indeed lawfulness of the SDS, and to  
21          face up to the precise extent to which their role had  
22          become dominated by intelligence collection for  
23          the Security Services.

24          Now, the SDS managers insist that the SDS benefited  
25          and improved the Metropolitan Police Special Branch's

1 attitude to public order policing. However, this does  
2 not stand up to scrutiny. The significant public order  
3 events of this era, namely Red Lion Square, Southall and  
4 Lewisham, were not preempted or policed successfully  
5 because of the work conducted by the SDS.

6 The demonstration at Southall was undoubtedly  
7 a catastrophic failure of Metropolitan Police  
8 Special Branch policing, which resulted in the death of  
9 a teacher, Blair Peach.

10 HN41, who gave evidence in the secret hearings in T1  
11 P4, spoke of "disastrous mistakes" in the public order  
12 planning for Southall, and that:

13 "There was a perception that the public order branch  
14 weren't perhaps as receptive to some of our ideas as we  
15 thought they might have been. That was the impression  
16 I got from the management because the Met with [redact]  
17 and then with Southall, had had sort of significant  
18 problems that perhaps they needn't have had."

19 The left wing and campaign groups that the SDS  
20 targeted were an inevitable reaction to the injustices  
21 in society not the cause of public disorder.

22 The failure of the SDS operations at Red Lion Square,  
23 Southall and Lewisham was the failure to recognise that  
24 the fundamental cause of public disorder at such events  
25 was public revulsion against fascist mobilisations and

1 the police being seen to protect them.

2 The managers were ultimately responsible for  
3 the quality, accuracy and relevance of the reporting  
4 being produced by their undercover officers whom they  
5 managed. There is evidence to suggest that some  
6 managers were aware of this, and either tailored  
7 the reporting or turned a blind eye to irrelevant  
8 reporting.

9 Roy Creamer comments in his witness statement that:

10 "Conrad Dixon and I would discuss the information  
11 and I would then draft what I thought we should say in  
12 the report. I would put into words what I knew he ought  
13 to be saying. I was like Radar from M\*A\*S\*H."

14 The reference to Radar from M\*A\*S\*H is both  
15 significant and telling.

16 Derek Butler commented that this type of SDS  
17 deployment resulted in undercover officers becoming  
18 embedded for long periods when there was no scope for  
19 public order reporting and hence:

20 "Subconsciously at least they felt obliged to 'earn  
21 their keep' by turning in reports on membership, start  
22 points for further enquiries and the internal dynamics  
23 of their group. This may have occasionally included  
24 gossip or irrelevance."

25 Despite appreciating that undercover officers were



1 reporting gossip and irrelevance, the managers giving  
2 evidence in T1 did not, by their own admission,  
3 undertake robust qualitative analysis of SDS reporting.  
4 They did not assess its value and usefulness in  
5 the public order field, or indeed in countering  
6 subversion. They did not see the threat assessments  
7 produced, if indeed any were produced, from SDS  
8 reporting. And they did not obtain regular feedback.

9 This underscores a significant and systemic flaw at  
10 the heart of the SDS. Managers did not conduct  
11 a detailed cost-benefit analysis weighing up  
12 the collateral damage that might be caused against  
13 the true value of the intelligence being obtained. As  
14 a result, they failed to consider the threat to freedom  
15 of speech and democratic principles posed by the SDS.  
16 These were obvious matters that were being raised in  
17 public, in Parliament, and went to the heart of  
18 the lawfulness and justification of the activities of  
19 the SDS.

20 The non-state co-operating group want to know why  
21 these issues were not considered at the time. Why  
22 was there such a fundamental lack of critical thinking?

23 These were important questions, because it was  
24 the duty of managers to write in an honest way to  
25 the Home Secretary to request an extension of funding

1 for the continuation of the SDS. As Geoffrey Craft  
2 states:

3 "The Annual Reports were directed to the Home Office  
4 and pointing out the value of the SDS in terms of public  
5 order and seeking continuation for another year."

6 In signing off the annual reports and the  
7 accompanying memoranda, a manager, as a senior police  
8 officer, must have known that they were confirming  
9 the contents as accurate. The suggestion by  
10 Trevor Butler that his role was merely "editorial" is  
11 not only a staggering admission of managerial failure,  
12 but also a blatant attempt to create distance from  
13 documents that are obviously flawed and misleading.

14 I now turn to targeting and justification.

15 The Inquiry is tasked to answer several fundamental  
16 questions on the targeting of infiltrated groups. This  
17 is vital to understanding what went wrong and why. On  
18 the face of existing evidence, these were unlawful,  
19 ideologically motivated and profoundly undemocratic  
20 political policing operations. There was no reasonable  
21 policing purpose proportionate to the level of intrusion  
22 involved.

23 The answers to the above questions on targeting  
24 should have formed the bedrock of any possible  
25 justification of the lawfulness or necessity of these

1 operations. Vague or non-existent answers are therefore  
2 damning in themselves; and only serve to confirm what  
3 the evidence already suggests: that these operations  
4 were unjustified and unjustifiable violations of  
5 people's privacy and political rights, and that they  
6 were unlawful and unnecessary in a democratic society.

7 The evidence from undercover officers paints a mixed  
8 picture on targeting. As the SDS evolved following  
9 the Grosvenor Square demonstrations, some  
10 undercover officers stated that they were tasked to  
11 infiltrate specific groups, whilst others described  
12 largely having a free rein and often drifting around  
13 left-wing or anarchist groups, reporting on whatever or  
14 whoever they came across.

15 In terms of public order, the managers suggest that  
16 they were not fully responsible for targeting decisions.  
17 Both Barry Moss and Geoffrey Craft suggest that  
18 targeting came from C Squad, with references to daily  
19 discussions between the commander of operations and his  
20 operational chief superintendents.

21 The managers within the SDS did influence and  
22 control targeting to some extent. For example,  
23 Barry Moss admits that on his arrival he considered  
24 that:

25 "[The] unit was a bit heavy on the [Socialist

1 Workers Party] and so when HN19 was recruited he was  
2 deployed to RCP and the Communist Party of Great Britain  
3 Marxist-Leninist."

4 However, what the managers are unified on is that  
5 direction to the SDS on targeting was coming from much  
6 more senior levels within the Metropolitan Police  
7 Special Branch and the Metropolitan Police Service.  
8 The managers must now explain what they know about  
9 the political direction in SDS targeting decisions.  
10 This is particularly important to category E, trade  
11 unions and trade union members.

12 In terms of the targeting of so-called  
13 "subversives", we can see that this targeting direction  
14 clearly came from the Security Services. The non-state  
15 co-operating group invite the Inquiry to explore with  
16 managers whether they shared the concerns of  
17 Commander Gilbert. Did managers query whether it was in  
18 fact lawful and appropriate in a democratic society for  
19 police officers to target groups and individuals engaged  
20 in lawful activities?

21 We know that Barry Moss, for example, accepts that  
22 whilst he was undercover, he did not ever witness  
23 anything that was subversive. This echoes the evidence  
24 of many of the undercover officers who have already  
25 given evidence to this Inquiry. It then begs

1 the obvious question as to why the SDS continued in its  
2 unlawful surveillance of lawful, democratic activities  
3 and why more questions weren't asked.

4 I'm now going to turn to welfare and supervision.

5 As this Inquiry has already heard, the T1 era marks  
6 the emergence of inappropriate and abhorrent behaviour  
7 by undercover officers whilst they were being actively  
8 managed and where managers were visiting the safe houses  
9 approximately twice a week.

10 It is shocking to the non-state Co-operating Group  
11 that all of the managers who are due to give oral  
12 evidence in T1 P3, and those who provided witness  
13 statements for this phase, deny having any knowledge of  
14 both inappropriate sexual relationships and any of  
15 the deeply sexist and misogynistic banter that it is now  
16 clear took place in the safe house when managers were  
17 present.

18 This is particularly so in light of the evidence  
19 that has recently emerged from the T1 P4 secret  
20 hearings, where undercover officers also talk about  
21 sexist banter and joking about sexual conquests while  
22 undercover. Unfortunately, the non-state  
23 co-operating group could not explore this evidence  
24 further, as it was given in secret.

25 The managers are at pains to point out that their

1 primary duty was the welfare of undercover officers.  
2 This was recognised as a vital function given the unique  
3 stress of undercover work. Almost every SDS annual  
4 report to the Home Office emphasises the close  
5 supervision of officers and managerial attention to  
6 welfare.

7 It is therefore shocking for the non-state  
8 co-operating group that despite the evidence this  
9 Inquiry has already heard, Geoffrey Craft still  
10 maintains in his witness statement that:

11 "I do not think any police officers were more  
12 carefully monitored than this lot."

13 Despite this bold assertion, Geoffrey Craft and  
14 Angus McIntosh both deny knowing that HN297, Rick Clark,  
15 and HN300, "Jim Pickford", engaged in  
16 sexual relationships with activists, with the latter  
17 falling in love and leaving his wife. We know from  
18 the gisted evidence disclosed in preparation for  
19 the secret hearings in T1 P4 that an undercover officer  
20 reports Geoffrey Craft specifically advising against  
21 sexual relationships, stating, "it would be beyond  
22 stupid, and cause all sorts of problems".

23 This Inquiry must get to the bottom of the managers'  
24 attitudes to sexual relationships, and pin down exactly  
25 what is meant by "all sorts of problems".

1           The judgment of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in  
2           the case of Kate Wilson v Commissioner of the Metropolis  
3           and National Police Chiefs Council of 2021 specifically  
4           concluded that violations of Article 3 of the European  
5           Convention on Human Rights, and miscarriages of justice,  
6           were ignored because managers put first the maintaining  
7           of secrecy of the undercover operation and ensuring  
8           a continuation of funding.

9           The non-state co-operating group have also recently  
10          learnt that Rick Clark had a reputation for being "a bit  
11          of a lad", which included "womanising". However, again,  
12          the non-state co-operating group discover in the gisted  
13          material from the secret hearings in T1 P4 that HN300  
14          was "a sexual predator", and "was confined to the office  
15          because he was an alcoholic".

16          An undercover officer in these secret hearings in T1  
17          P4 also clearly states that it was Angus McIntosh who  
18          dealt with HN300 falling in love when undercover. This  
19          is conspicuously absent from Angus McIntosh's witness  
20          statement.

21          Geoffrey Craft continues to claim no knowledge of  
22          the activities of HN13, "Barry Desmond Loader", who was  
23          arrested twice, in 1977 and 1978. The documents  
24          disclosed to date highlight other managers interfering  
25          in the court process, with an update even being given to

1 the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. It is  
2 simply inexplicable to suggest that such matters would  
3 be hidden from Geoffrey Craft, who was a detective  
4 chief inspector in the SDS.

5 This Inquiry must press the managers to explain  
6 these glaring contradictions in the evidence. Were  
7 managers deliberately overstating their monitoring and  
8 supervision of undercover officers, or did they know  
9 what was going on and wilfully turn a blind eye? Or  
10 was it the case that they positively sanctioned such  
11 conduct, to maximise the product for their "customers"?

12 Finally, a glaring omission in relation to welfare  
13 in the annual reports and witness evidence is any  
14 suggestion that efforts were made to check and protect  
15 the welfare of those targeted and reported on, including  
16 any consideration for the welfare of the families of  
17 the deceased children whose identities were being used.  
18 As we can see from the T1 P4 secret hearings,  
19 undercover officers attended weddings and funerals of  
20 those being targeted, spent time in their private homes,  
21 and even babysat young children when undercover.

22 I now turn to make a few comments about the SDS  
23 annual reports.

24 In terms of significant management failures and the  
25 accuracy and honesty of the SDS annual reports, certain



1           undercover officers and deployments stand out. HN155,  
2           "Phil Cooper", was deployed between 1979 and  
3           January 1984, when the following managers were in  
4           post: Barry Moss, Mike Ferguson, Trevor Butler, Nigel  
5           David Short, HN68 "Sean Lynch" and HN45 "Dave  
6           Robertson".

7           HN155 infiltrated the Waltham Forest Anti-Nuclear  
8           Campaign, the Socialist Workers Party and the Right to  
9           Work Campaign. He gained two notable positions of  
10          responsibility: as a treasurer in the Waltham Forest  
11          Anti-Nuclear Campaign, and then in the Right to Work  
12          Campaign. Reporting signed off by the manager  
13          Dave Short notes that in the Right to Work Campaign,  
14          Ernie Roberts MP was nominally the treasurer, while  
15          HN155 signed the cheques and controlled the account --  
16          a significant position of responsibility and control.

17          Now, there came a time when managers realised that  
18          HN155 was a problematic officer.

19          On 29 June 1982, it is recorded by  
20          the Security Services that the managers HN68  
21          "Sean Lynch" and Dave Short reported that there were  
22          serious doubts about the performance of HN155 and that  
23          his "days were numbered" due to other "misdemeanours",  
24          and that he was soon to be withdrawn.

25          Incidentally, it is in the same note that reference

1 is made to HN106 "Barry Tompkins" have bedded "blank"  
2 and been warned off by his bosses.

3 On 13 July 1982 HN68 "Sean Lynch" told  
4 the Security Services that:

5 "Despite his misdemeanours, Cooper has not been  
6 withdrawn as an SDS source."

7 There is a further reference in this document to  
8 the manager HN68 being:

9 "... slightly worried by the case because Cooper's  
10 position in the Right to Work Movement gives him regular  
11 access to Ernie Roberts MP and meetings at the House of  
12 Commons."

13 It is clear that HN68 "Sean Lynch" was in fact  
14 really concerned about the lawfulness of HN155's  
15 actions. It seems that he understood the potential  
16 scandal that would erupt in Parliament if it ever came  
17 to light that the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and  
18 SDS were conducting covert surveillance in close  
19 proximity to, and quite possibly on, a sitting Member of  
20 Parliament and in Parliament itself.

21 The security services, however, didn't appear to raise  
22 an eyebrow. HN155 remained in post.

23 HN155 initially admitted to a risk assessor that he  
24 had engaged in two, three or possibly more  
25 sexual relationships when undercover, but he later then

1 denied this. Julia Poynter, a witness to this Inquiry,  
2 met HN155 in the Waltham Forest Anti-Nuclear Campaign.  
3 Julia refers to HN155 regularly getting stoned, and on  
4 one occasion being so inebriated he fell off his chair  
5 and broke it. HN155 said in a risk assessment that  
6 he "lived a full [and] alternative life".

7 In a medical interview on 12 November 2020, HN155  
8 admitted that he was a "heavy drinker during  
9 [undercover] deployment years with occasional drug  
10 taking as 'part of the scene'".

11 Undercover officer drug-taking is also referenced in  
12 the T1 P4 closed officer gist, and it is a topic that  
13 will feature in Tranche 2.

14 Trevor Butler was the manager who signed off  
15 the 1979 and the 1981 annual reports to the Home Office.  
16 And in both reports he was at great pains to emphasise  
17 the close supervision that he and his fellow managers  
18 exercised over all undercover officers, stating in the  
19 1979 annual report that:

20 "The nature of the delicate and difficult duty  
21 performed by SDS operational officers renders it  
22 imperative that close supervision and attention to  
23 welfare are continuously maintained."

24 The 1981 annual report, written in 1982 by  
25 Trevor Butler, also stressed on the issue of welfare

1 that "the close supervision exercised is essential".

2 But, curiously, the Right to Work march occupies  
3 seven lines in the 1981 SDS annual report, and is  
4 described as the Socialist Workers Party's "notable  
5 adventure". There is no reference to public disorder;  
6 and indeed we know that the march itself, in which HN155  
7 played a key role, was not even considered a public  
8 order risk by manager Barry Moss.

9 The events were of such limited importance that they  
10 did not even feature in the 1981 Metropolitan Police  
11 Special Branch annual report. What is conspicuous by  
12 its absence in this 1981 SDS annual report is any  
13 mention of HN155 acting as a treasurer alongside an  
14 elected MP, that HN155 was drinking to excess,  
15 drug-taking and having sexual relationships while  
16 undercover. There is also no mention that HN106 was  
17 bedding a woman, which was tarnishing his intelligence.

18 Why is it that the Home Office was not being told  
19 about this undercover officer activity by Trevor Butler?  
20 Was it because Trevor Butler knew that he was the one  
21 who placed HN155 in the Right to Work Campaign?

22 I'm going to make some comments about racism.

23 In the T1 era and beyond, the SDS and the  
24 Metropolitan Police Special Branch were fixed in their  
25 own deeply politicised racist and misogynistic

1 narratives, which saw public order as inextricably  
2 linked to organised groups on the left.

3 The Metropolitan Police Special Branch and the SDS  
4 seemed incapable of appreciating that in a democratic  
5 society citizens could campaign against injustice and  
6 demand social change on matters of social and public  
7 importance such as racism without being subversive.

8 This is classically exemplified by the comments of  
9 Rollo Watts recorded on 15 October 1976, where he told  
10 the Security Services:

11 "... there has been a build up of racial tension in  
12 Brixton and the [Metropolitan Police Special Branch] are  
13 undertaking a study of the problem to commence in  
14 Brixton and one of its most important aspects was to  
15 discover to what extent left-wing extremists were  
16 influencing the coloured population in this idea."

17 The review section of the 1981 annual report clearly  
18 shows that 1981 was a deeply unsuccessful year for  
19 the SDS. They were focused on peaceful marches and  
20 rallies on wage poverty and the Campaign for Nuclear  
21 Disarmament. The Brixton riots in April 1981 were  
22 amongst the most significant public order events of  
23 the period. They were not caused by the left-wing  
24 campaign groups, but were spontaneous and uncoordinated  
25 uprisings against racist policing. This was simply not

1 understood or honestly reflected upon by the SDS in  
2 the 1981 annual report, despite the findings of  
3 the Scarman inquiry. The SDS seemed incapable of  
4 honestly appraising the roots and cause of public  
5 disorder in the T1 era.

6 I'm going to make some comments now in relation to  
7 misogyny.

8 In the same way that racism and political bias  
9 undermined the Metropolitan Police Special Branch and  
10 the SDS response to popular protests in Brixton, there  
11 were parallels in the way in which women were perceived  
12 and treated. It is clear that a pernicious culture of  
13 misogyny contributed to highly inappropriate policing  
14 decisions affecting women.

15 The non-state co-operating group know that the SDS  
16 considered it was appropriate to target women  
17 campaigning around reproductive rights and fair pay, as  
18 they were deemed to be subversive. Managers thought  
19 nothing of belittling these women in sexist and  
20 derogatory ways, such as the comment that:

21 "500 women, many patently emotionally unstable and  
22 quite paranoically opposed to men ..."

23 Attended the Women's Liberation spring conference.

24 Throughout this time, there is strong evidence to  
25 suggest that managers repeatedly either condoned or

1 turned a blind eye to increasingly frequent incidents of  
2 inappropriate sexual behaviour by their officers, as  
3 well as misogynistic banter. The fact that such banter  
4 was considered harmless and not worthy of managerial  
5 challenge is evidence itself of deep-seated  
6 institutional misogyny.

7 This managerial attitude is perfectly illustrated by  
8 the following comment in the witness statement of HN368,  
9 Richard walker, who, on sexist safe house banter said:

10 "Men who say things about women don't always mean  
11 it, or follow through with what they say."

12 Ironically, managers and indeed the Metropolitan  
13 Police Special Branch hierarchy were more than willing  
14 to keep an extremely close eye on some  
15 undercover officer relationships with women, but only  
16 when it suited their interests.

17 When the Metropolitan Police Special Branch received  
18 an anonymous letter about undercover officer HN126 "Paul  
19 Gray" having a sexual relationship with another police  
20 officer in police accommodation, Barry Moss paid a visit  
21 to the wife of HN126 "Paul Gray". Barry Moss  
22 subsequently described the wife as a "strong woman and  
23 not in need of any welfare support", which may give  
24 the Inquiry an indication of the tone of meeting.

25 The wife's handwriting was obtained and sent for

1 analysis, and this outcome, which was that she probably  
2 wrote the anonymous letter, was presented to her by  
3 Barry Moss. Presumably, the objective was to intimidate  
4 her into remaining silent about the concerns she had  
5 about the sexual activity of her husband HN126 "Paul  
6 Gray". Concerns which, it seems, were not investigated.

7 It is telling that managers and the Metropolitan  
8 Police Special Branch senior hierarchy thought that it  
9 was appropriate and lawful to use police resources in  
10 such an illegitimate and corrupt manner to cover up  
11 potential undercover officer misdeeds, rather than  
12 consider the substance of the allegations that were  
13 being made, in other words serious police misconduct.  
14 It seems that protecting the SDS took precedence over  
15 all considerations, and it seems that no action was off  
16 limits no matter how unlawful.

17 The non-state co-operating group draw a parallel  
18 here been the unlawful use of police resources against  
19 an innocent woman to protect the SDS and the approach  
20 taken by the SDS management to justice campaigns, also  
21 considered to pose a threat, such as the Friends  
22 of Blair Peach Committee and the Stephen Lawrence  
23 campaign.

24 Managers justified the use of identities of deceased  
25 children with reference to the fact that they thought



1           that the families of such children would never find out  
2           or know. This is another illustrative example of  
3           a pervasive belief within the SDS that no one would ever  
4           find out about their operations. It gave  
5           undercover officers a licence to act unchecked and  
6           outside the parameters of the law.

7           Now, Sir, just some short comments on blacklisting.

8           The Chair will recall the comments made on behalf of  
9           the Metropolitan Police Service in their opening  
10          statement for T1 P2 on so-called blacklisting  
11          organisations, and the upset that this caused amongst  
12          the non-state co-operating group, who have suffered so  
13          acutely as a result of blacklisting.

14          The latest disclosure in T1 P3 sheds more light on  
15          blacklisting by the Security Services, in government  
16          departments and certain public corporations, including  
17          the BBC and firms which have not been disclosed.

18          The documents show the tension between  
19          the Security Services and the Metropolitan Police  
20          Special Branch on who controls the passing of  
21          intelligence and vetting, with the Security Services  
22          indicating that:

23                 "Security Service is the normal channel for passing  
24                 security information."

25          In an emphatic response to the Security Services

1           dated 10 November 1975, the Metropolitan Police  
2           Special Branch makes clear that they will continue to  
3           pass security information, as the Metropolitan Police  
4           Special Branch has built up contacts in the civil  
5           service, armed forces and other organisations which  
6           employ former police officers, and with whom there  
7           exists a "close and mutually profitable relationship".

8           The Metropolitan Police Special Branch were clear  
9           that they were going to continue facilitating  
10          blacklisting. The managers of the SDS now need to  
11          explain which of their intelligence was collected or  
12          used for this abhorrent and devastating purpose.

13          In terms of specific examples of blacklisting, we  
14          know that the SDS were tasked to spy on  
15          the Workers Revolutionary Party, and in particular  
16          Roy Battersby. That intelligence was provided to  
17          the Security Services, who were expressly given the task  
18          of collating files in order to vet those seeking posts  
19          in sensitive government bodies, including, as I've  
20          mentioned, the BBC. Indeed, the BBC have confirmed and  
21          described this process. As is clear from  
22          Roy Battersby's statement, there is clear evidence that  
23          as a BAFTA winner, he is one of those who was  
24          blacklisted. He was by no means the only one. This  
25          creates a very clear paper trail of blacklisting

1 directly implicating the SDS.

2 As Roy Battersby makes clear in his own statement,  
3 this practice was an attack on the democratic process,  
4 elections, privacy and freedom of political and artistic  
5 expression, and in particular the plurality of voices  
6 and standpoints of our national broadcaster, the BBC.

7 Sir, I'll now turn to some very brief points on  
8 procedural issues.

9 The non-state co-operating group has raised a number  
10 of important procedural matters in the written opening  
11 statement, but given the limited time, I will not deal  
12 with these matters today.

13 I do, however, want to make four short points.  
14 The first relates to delay. And as I've already stated  
15 at the outset, the non-state co-operating group does  
16 remain extremely concerned about the progress of this  
17 Inquiry, and I want to again reiterate the request for  
18 a clear timetable for the Inquiry's ongoing work.

19 The second point relates to your intention, Sir, to  
20 publish an interim report, as set out by  
21 Counsel to the Inquiry, Mr Barr QC, in his opening  
22 statement for Tranche 1, Phase 3.

23 In due course, the non-state co-operating group will  
24 seek to address this issue, and ask that a timetable for  
25 submissions is set down to allow this to happen.

1           The third point I wish to address relates to  
2           the further investigations that are being made by this  
3           Inquiry to gather evidence relevant to the SDS from  
4           the wider Metropolitan Police Special Branch.

5           The non-state co-operating group has always  
6           maintained that investigating the SDS cannot take place  
7           in a vacuum. It is now clear from the managers who are  
8           soon to give evidence that in some of the T1 era,  
9           targeting was being directed and influenced from outside  
10          the SDS by the Security Services and others.

11          SDS interaction with the Security Services is a key  
12          component in the preliminary draft Module 2(b) issues  
13          list. The non-state co-operating group intends to  
14          address the Inquiry on the scope of its investigations  
15          relating to the Security Services after T1 P3, and in  
16          the first instance as part of this consultation on  
17          Module 2(b) issues list.

18          The fourth point, Sir, relates to future hearings.  
19          Given the length of time between the T1 P3 hearings and  
20          T2, the non-state co-operating group requests that  
21          the Chair, Sir, you, schedule regular public inquiry  
22          management hearings in advance of T2. There are now  
23          a range of important matters, such as, for example,  
24          the interim report, the scope of investigations by  
25          Security Services, and of course the legal framework,

1 which should be considered after formal written and oral  
2 submissions from all core participants.

3 It is also essential that these important matters  
4 are raised and considered in public hearings, so that  
5 the public and core participants can see the process by  
6 which decisions are made.

7 The non-state co-operating group suggests that  
8 formal hearings are often the most productive forum in  
9 which to seek to resolve matters in a way that best  
10 assists the Inquiry.

11 Now, Sir, just some very short concluding  
12 observations.

13 The wrongdoing engaged in by the SDS was not an  
14 exception to an otherwise lawful and justified policing  
15 operation. Rather, the SDS was, from its very  
16 inception, unlawful and in contravention of basic  
17 policing principles and a threat to democracy.

18 However, this was no accident. Mark Ellison QC and  
19 Operation Herne were right to suggest that the failures  
20 of SDS management were in part caused by secrecy and a  
21 lack of external scrutiny. The SDS was not simply  
22 a rogue unit operating in hiding and insulated from  
23 internal Metropolitan Police Special Branch and  
24 Home Office scrutiny. The SDS was specifically designed  
25 to remain a secret from the public and from Parliament.

1           It was only by remaining under a cloak of secrecy that  
2           the SDS could carry out the type of surveillance  
3           activities that were not and are not permitted in  
4           a democratic society. Other than a select few, many in  
5           the Home Office were simply not aware. Those in power  
6           who did know sanctioned the evolution of the SDS and  
7           took every opportunity on behalf of the governments of  
8           the day to ensure the SDS remained a secret.

9           The judgment of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in  
10          Wilson that I've already mentioned puts beyond doubt  
11          that undercover policing operations of the SDS and later  
12          units violated fundamental human rights. The non-state  
13          co-operating group endorse and adopts the opening  
14          statement made by Charlotte Kilroy QC on behalf of  
15          the category H core participants.

16          Many of the managers giving evidence in T1 P3 make  
17          reference to the fact that the SDS practices went on  
18          over 50 years ago, and should be considered in their  
19          historical context.

20          However, this is simply not correct.

21          The illegitimate surveillance, political policing and  
22          abhorrent and unlawful tradecraft and misogyny which was  
23          allowed to become embedded in T1, 1968 to 1982, set  
24          the course for all of the future undercover policing  
25          operations. These abhorrent practices survived and even

1 flourished following legal reforms, such as those  
2 introduced by the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act  
3 2000. This will be explored in later tranches.

4 A fundamental purpose of this Inquiry is to identify  
5 where there was such a catastrophic failure of policing  
6 at the heart of British democracy, and such  
7 identification must be rigorously pursued during the T1  
8 P3 hearings.

9 The non-state co-operating group and the public are  
10 demanding answers. These can only be obtained by  
11 a thorough and effective investigation in public and  
12 with full disclosure. This Inquiry should not cut  
13 corners for reasons of political or financial  
14 expediency. This is the only way that the victims of  
15 unlawful state surveillance can achieve truth and  
16 justice, and the only way to ensure that these  
17 fundamental breaches of human rights will never happen  
18 again.

19 Thank you, Sir.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed.

21 We will now break for, I think, ten minutes, until  
22 we have the next stage, which will be a reading of  
23 summaries of the evidence of two non-state witnesses,  
24 which will then conclude proceedings for today.

25 Thank you.

1 (12.20 pm)

2 (A short break)

3 (12.40 pm)

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Malcolm.

5 MS MALCOLM: I'm grateful, Sir. I shall be reading

6 the summaries of two witness statements from non-state

7 witnesses. I shall start with the summary of

8 "Madeleine".

9 Summary of evidence of "Madeleine" by MS MALCOLM

10 This is the summary of the second witness statement

11 of core participant "Madeleine", dated 16 March 2022.

12 The full witness statement will be published on

13 the Inquiry's website later on today. This is

14 a supplemental witness statement to her first witness

15 statement, which is dated 18 February 2021.

16 "Madeleine" gave evidence in May 2021 during

17 the Tranche 1 Phase 2 or T1 P2 hearings that she was

18 deceived into a relationship with HN354, known by

19 the cover name "Vince Miller", during the period of

20 the summer, and into early autumn, of 1979.

21 This second witness statement addresses three

22 issues:

23 1. A postcard that she received from "Vince Miller"

24 at the end of his deployment;

25 2. The revocation of the restriction order over



1 "Vince Miller's" real name and disclosure of his real  
2 name, Vincent James Harvey, and;

3 3. A report which had previously not been disclosed  
4 to her, and which relates to an event which she believes  
5 she was present at.

6 Issue 1.

7 On the first issue, "Madeleine" states that after  
8 the UCPI hearings in May 2021, she decided to look at  
9 a box containing letters and cards of emotional  
10 significance from old boyfriends and close friends. At  
11 the bottom of this box, she found a postcard from  
12 "Vince Miller" dated January 1980 with a United States  
13 Air Mail stamp addressed to "'Madeleine', Dave and Co".  
14 This is now "Madeleine's" exhibit 3. It reads as  
15 follows:

16 "Didn't stay long in New York, not my kind of place.  
17 Have bussed and driven hire cars down here for  
18 the winter. Lost my address book so can only write to  
19 people whose addresses I can remember, and these might  
20 not be right. Music and people really better than  
21 I expected. All in all, a lot better than  
22 [Walthamstow]. Having a bit of trouble getting enough  
23 money for everything I want to do so travelling and  
24 living in an old VW wreck -- nothing new. Good luck to  
25 everybody, Vince."

1           "Madeleine" states that it is written in  
2           the handwriting of "Vince Miller". She estimates that  
3           it arrived three months after he had disappeared saying  
4           that he was going to America. She says that she had  
5           forgotten its existence but does now vaguely recall  
6           receiving it and being pleasantly surprised and hopeful  
7           that his keeping in touch meant that she would see him  
8           again. She had put it in the box because it had meant  
9           something to her.

10           "Madeleine" also recalls that a friend of hers from  
11           the SWP had visited "Vince Miller's" flat around  
12           Christmas 1979 to check if he was "okay" because he had  
13           not been seen in some time. The friend told "Madeleine"  
14           that the door had been answered by "two dodgy looking  
15           men", who asked him a lot of questions and told him that  
16           "Vince" had gone to America. "Madeleine" states that  
17           she was surprised by this information because  
18           "Vince Miller" had told her he lived alone in a bedsit  
19           and there had been no answer on each occasion that she  
20           had visited the flat. It is "Madeleine's" belief that  
21           this postcard would have been received shortly after her  
22           friend's visit to the flat, and she questions whether it  
23           was sent in order to divert any suspicions that could  
24           have arisen from the friend's visit.

25           "Madeleine" also notes that Vincent Harvey had said

1 in his witness statement that he left "Vince Miller" and  
2 his deployment behind him when he left the field and had  
3 not thought of or talked about his former targets at all  
4 until his first interview with a risk assessor in 2018.  
5 He made no mention of this postcard sent by him  
6 three months after the deployment.

7 Issue 2.

8 In Vincent Harvey's supplementary impact statement  
9 of 9 March 2021 which addressed the reasons he believed  
10 the restriction order over his real name should not be  
11 revoked, he stated that he had always been honest and  
12 open with the Inquiry. One particular concern that he  
13 raised was that publication of his real name prior to  
14 his giving evidence "risked having a seriously adverse  
15 impact on an immediate family member".

16 In March 2021, "Madeleine" was told that although  
17 the restriction order would ultimately be revoked, it  
18 was imperative that nothing was done to cause  
19 difficulties to the aforementioned family member, and  
20 she was given a choice: she could find out "Vince  
21 Miller's" real name prior to them both giving evidence  
22 while still subject to the restriction order prohibiting  
23 wider disclosure, or she could await revocation of  
24 the restriction order. "Madeleine" states she weighed  
25 up the issues and while she did not "believe there was

1 any real risk to the immediate family member", she did  
2 have sympathy for this family member and she did not  
3 want to cause this individual anxiety by publication of  
4 "Vince Miller's" real name. She also wished to avoid  
5 being caused extra stress from being in receipt of  
6 information that she could not share. She therefore  
7 decided to wait to learn his real name until  
8 the restriction order had been revoked.

9 On 21 September 2021, the restriction order was  
10 revoked and "Madeleine" learnt that "Vince Miller's"  
11 real name was Vincent James Harvey. This led to  
12 discovery of more information about him and his career  
13 trajectory, some of which she found shocking. This, she  
14 states, casts him, and the evidence he had given, in  
15 a different light.

16 She had previously understood from the evidence  
17 disclosed who her that following his deployment in  
18 the Special Demonstration Squad, Vincent Harvey had been  
19 assured that he would only be in non-public facing roles  
20 with the result that he spent 30 years being careful  
21 about his security and which would be blown away if his  
22 real name was released. She had also understood that he  
23 had risen to the rank of Detective Chief Inspector in  
24 Special Branch and then left  
25 the Metropolitan Police Service to join another force.

1 "Madeleine" states that she was therefore extremely  
2 disturbed to learn that Vincent Harvey had gone on to  
3 perform very senior and high profile roles within  
4 the police, and that his real name and image were in  
5 the public domain through multiple media appearances.

6 "Madeleine" states that she was:

7 "Chilled to learn that he had been promoted to  
8 the rank of Superintendent in the police service before  
9 becoming National Director of the National Criminal  
10 Intelligence Service [or NCIS]."

11 She questions why someone who had risen to such  
12 a senior rank in the police and in such a public-facing  
13 role was granted a restriction order over their real  
14 name and why this was not revoked before he gave  
15 evidence at the hearings. It is "Madeleine's" belief  
16 that if his real name had been known at the time he gave  
17 evidence, and it had been known that he was a former  
18 director of the NCIS and a highly public figure, there  
19 would have been greater public scrutiny and press  
20 interest, which may have led to new witnesses,  
21 including, possibly, other deceived women, coming  
22 forward to the Inquiry.

23 The discovery that he was not only a police officer,  
24 but a senior one, has had a significant further adverse  
25 impact on her and led to her feeling as she did when she

1 was first contacted by the Inquiry in 2020. She also  
2 feels that she was:

3 "Emotionally manipulated by Vincent Harvey in his  
4 reliance on privacy concerns arising out of  
5 the potential adverse impact on a family member without  
6 corresponding honesty (at least in the material given to  
7 me) about how he had conducted his career."

8 "Madeleine" states that if she had known of his  
9 career trajectory in March 2021, it would have changed  
10 the outcome of the balancing exercise that she  
11 undertook.

12 "Madeleine" notes that no other former officers gave  
13 evidence to the Inquiry about Vincent Harvey's  
14 relationships and she queries if this was as a result of  
15 his seniority as an officer. The lack of knowledge of  
16 his real identity at the time of the hearings meant that  
17 her legal team could not propose questions to the other  
18 officers in order to explore if his role and profile  
19 within the force motivated their reluctance to give  
20 evidence on his behaviour. She states that this denied  
21 opportunity is of great concern to her.

22 Issue 3.

23 In relation to the third issue, "Madeleine"  
24 reiterates the concern that she raised in her first  
25 witness statement. In that statement she indicated that

1 she thought it extremely unlikely that the 23 documents  
2 which she had received in her witness pack were the only  
3 documents held by the Inquiry which related to her  
4 contact with Vincent Harvey. She was particularly  
5 concerned that she'd not been provided with any document  
6 which covered the period of the relationship.

7 "Madeleine" has subsequently come across a further  
8 intelligence report containing information obtained by  
9 Vincent Harvey which was disclosed in the T1 P2-bundle  
10 but which was not in her witness pack. It is a report  
11 dated 25 September 1979 at a time towards the end of her  
12 relationship with Vincent Harvey and relates to  
13 a Waltham Forest District meeting which took place in  
14 her home. "Madeleine" states that she generally  
15 attended most branch and district meetings  
16 and "certainly almost all of those that took place in my  
17 house".

18 Whilst "Madeleine" states that she cannot be  
19 absolutely certain that she was present at this meeting,  
20 as the report records a fairly mundane meeting and at  
21 which nothing memorable took place, she thinks it  
22 extremely likely that she would have been present, given  
23 that it took place at her home. Despite this, she is  
24 not listed as an attendee. It is her belief that  
25 Vincent Harvey purposely omitted her name, and, because

1 this report had been omitted from her witness pack, he  
2 could not be questioned on a potential tactic of  
3 undercover officers omitting the names of the women they  
4 deceived from their reports.

5 "Madeleine" is also concerned that a report included  
6 in the T1 P2 bundle included her full address at the  
7 time and which she believes had the potential to  
8 undermine her anonymity order via a mosaic effect.

9 It is "Madeleine's" understanding from  
10 the Designated Lawyers opening statement for T1 P2 that  
11 although 65 reports thought to have been authored by  
12 Vincent Harvey were disclosed in the T1 P2 hearing  
13 bundle, there are a further 175 reports which  
14 the Inquiry attributes to him but which have not been  
15 disclosed to Non-State Core Participants. "Madeleine"  
16 suggests that these 175 reports could relate to other  
17 events that she attended with Vincent Harvey but is not  
18 listed on the report as having attended.

19 "Madeleine" explains that as a woman deceived into  
20 a relationship, she experienced the gravest violation of  
21 her privacy, and that in order for the Inquiry and the  
22 public to discover the truth about that violation, she  
23 had to stand up and recount details of her most intimate  
24 life, which she found excruciating. She further  
25 explains the impact on her of giving oral evidence to



1 the Inquiry and recalls how difficult and stressful she  
2 found the questioning. "Madeleine" states:

3 "It was also upsetting and insulting to hear Harvey  
4 claim that he could not remember our relationship and to  
5 suggest to the Chair that I may have been lying about it  
6 in order to discredit the police."

7 "Madeleine" states that as a result of press  
8 coverage of her oral evidence, her son found out that  
9 her first marriage had been abusive, which was  
10 distressing for him. His distress has also impacted on  
11 her.

12 That's the end of the first summary, Sir.

13 Summary of evidence of JULIA POYNTER by MS MALCOLM

14 I turn to the second summary.

15 This is a summary of the witness statement of  
16 Julia Poynter, dated 11 March 2022, which has been  
17 voluntarily provided to the Undercover Policing Inquiry  
18 after Ms Poynter's discovery that the men she knew as  
19 "Vince Miller" and "Phil Cooper" were undercover  
20 officers, respectively, HN354, whose real name is  
21 Vincent Harvey, and HN155, whose real name is subject to  
22 a restriction order.

23 The full statement will be published on  
24 the Inquiry's website today with the accompanying  
25 exists.

1           Julia Poynter states that she was shocked and  
2           angered when she was provided with 62 intelligence  
3           reports in which she was named which revealed  
4           the extensive invasion of her privacy by  
5           undercover officers. Her witness statement provides  
6           evidence about the two undercover officers she knew, and  
7           in particular about the deceitful sexual relationship  
8           between "Vince Miller" and her friend "Madeleine". She  
9           states that she wishes to place the reporting of these  
10          officers in its true context.

11          By way of background Julia Poynter states she first  
12          became politically active whilst at school joining  
13          the Labour Party with whom she soon became  
14          disillusioned. She came across  
15          the Socialist Workers Party, or SWP, then known as  
16          the International Socialists, towards the end of her  
17          sixth form and she was drawn to their version of  
18          socialism. She became a member in 1975 and remained  
19          a member for five years. She was initially active in  
20          the Walthamstow branch and then the Leytonstone branch  
21          when she moved some time in 1978. Her main focus from  
22          1977 onwards was her anti-racism work through her  
23          involvement with the Anti-Nazi League, which was closely  
24          affiliated with the SWP at that time.

25          She explains that the late 1970s was a time of high

1 unemployment and that the National Front were very  
2 active, particularly in East London where she lived. In  
3 1980, she began studying at college where, for a short  
4 period, she attended socialist meetings before deciding  
5 that student politics did not suit her. She remained  
6 active with the Anti-Nazi League until 1981 but left  
7 the SWP in 1980, losing touch with most of her former  
8 contacts.

9 Julia Poynter remained involved in politics  
10 subsequently, spending many years working in local  
11 government and being active in trade unions. It was  
12 through her involvement with union work that she became  
13 aware of the Inquiry. She attended a union-backed  
14 conference in November 2019 on undercover policing and  
15 trade unions, and then attended a talk arranged by  
16 Unite, given by one of the women deceived by an  
17 undercover officer. Julia Poynter was then sufficiently  
18 interested to listen to the UCPI hearings in May 2021  
19 where she heard evidence being given about events in  
20 groups that she'd been involved in. She eventually  
21 deduced that the witness she was listening to was  
22 "Madeleine" and that she was describing the "Vince" from  
23 Walthamstow that she had known. She was shocked to hear  
24 that "Vince" claimed to have a "one-night stand with  
25 'Madeleine'".

1           Ms Poynter states that not long after the hearings,  
2           and purely by chance, she bumped into "Madeleine", who  
3           she had not seen in over 30 years. "Madeleine"  
4           confirmed that "Vince" was an undercover officer with  
5           the name "Vince Miller". "Madeleine" also told her that  
6           a male she knew as "Phil", and who had been a regular  
7           visitor at her home, was also an undercover officer.  
8           Ms Poynter states that she knew "Vince's" claim about  
9           the nature of his relationship with "Madeleine" was  
10          untrue and this is why she has offered to give evidence  
11          to the Inquiry.

12                 "Vince Miller".

13          Julia Poynter first met "Vince" when he started  
14          coming to Walthamstow's SWP branch meetings around 1977.  
15          Weekly meetings were held in the Rose and Crown pub in  
16          Walthamstow with an average of 12 to 15 attendees. It  
17          was a close-knit, friendly group and "Vince" quickly  
18          made friends and became popular in the group.  
19          Ms Poynter explains that people not only attended  
20          demonstrations but socialised together, and would often  
21          have a drink in the pub after meetings and then go back  
22          to the shared house in which "Madeleine" lived, which  
23          was a "social hub". "Vince" was also one of the few  
24          members of the group who had a vehicle, and he used his  
25          van to help deliver the SWP papers or to help people,

1           such as by moving furniture. He was considered to be  
2           trustworthy and reliable and he came across as a kind  
3           and considerate person, and until her discovery as to  
4           his real identity, she had thought him as one of  
5           the loveliest people that she had ever met.

6           Julia Poynter records that when "Vince" told her in  
7           the autumn of 1979 that he was leaving for America. She  
8           and her then boyfriend held a leaving party for him in  
9           her flat. Her boyfriend was also active in  
10          the Walthamstow branch of the SWP, and he was a chef and  
11          put a lot of effort into the meal for the leaving party.  
12          They both liked "Vince" and were sad to see him leave.

13          Julia Poynter denies the claim made by  
14          "Vince Miller", both in his risk assessment for his  
15          anonymity application and in his oral evidence to  
16          the Inquiry at the hearings in May 2021, that she had  
17          wanted to have a relationship with him and that she had  
18          made this clear to him but that he had not reciprocated  
19          because it was contrary to SDS directions and because he  
20          was told that it would not be a good idea. It is  
21          Ms Poynter's belief that what he has said on these two  
22          occasions shows that he knew that he should not have  
23          been engaging in any sexual relationships.

24          "Madeleine's" relationship with "Vince Miller".

25          Julia Poynter met "Madeleine" within a year of

1 joining the SWP and they all got on well and became  
2 close friends, spending time together at meetings,  
3 social events and going on holiday together on a couple  
4 of occasions. Julia states that they confided in each  
5 other about their personal lives, and she remembers  
6 "Madeleine" discussing her relationship with "Vince",  
7 which she knew was a sexual relationship. It was clear  
8 that "Madeleine" liked him.

9 Ms Poynter recalls "Madeleine" telling her that  
10 "Vince" would always leave her flat in the middle of  
11 the night, and that both she and "Madeleine" thought  
12 that this was odd. "Madeleine" told her that "Vince"  
13 had grown up in care and that this had affected him.

14 Julia Poynter spent time with both "Madeleine" and  
15 "Vince" at branch social activities during the few  
16 months that they were together, and whilst she knew that  
17 they were an item, this would not necessarily have been  
18 obvious to lots of other people. She recalls how  
19 disappointed "Madeleine" was when "Vince" ended  
20 the relationship after a few months and that she seemed  
21 very sad following the break-up. Julia also remembers  
22 "Madeleine" being shocked and upset at the news that  
23 "Vince" had left for America.

24 "Phil Cooper".

25 Ms Poynter met "Phil Cooper" through Waltham Forest

1 Anti-Nuclear Campaign, or the WFANC, around 1980. Her  
2 boyfriend at the time had been active in its set-up  
3 alongside "Phil". For a time, she thinks that her  
4 boyfriend as secretary of the group and "Phil"  
5 a treasurer. "Phil" attended WFANC meetings at their  
6 house and also came to their house for drinking sessions  
7 with her boyfriend and another a friend. Ms Poynter got  
8 annoyed to find them all there when she got home from  
9 a night shift. She has recently got back in touch with  
10 that friend and he reminded her that after she had  
11 "kicked the three of them out of the flat", they started  
12 going to the friend's house where "Phil" regularly  
13 good "stoned"

14 Julia Poynter and her boyfriend went away with  
15 "Phil" for a several days in September 1980 for  
16 the fringe meeting organised by the Anti-Nuclear  
17 campaign at the TUC conference. She and her boyfriend  
18 are listed as being present in the SDS report of this  
19 event. Ms Poynter states that they spent their time  
20 leafletting delegates at the conference to come to  
21 the fringe meeting, and they stayed in a camp site, and  
22 she produces a photograph of herself and "Phil" from  
23 this event as her exhibit 1.

24 Julia Poynter also recalls going with "Phil" and  
25 others from the SWP branch to an Anti-Nazi League

1 demonstration held to counter the National Front  
2 presence among West Ham supporters on 8 April 1981.  
3 "Phil" took them in his van. Ms Poynter has been  
4 provided with an intelligence report from this event  
5 which claims that the actions of the uniformed police on  
6 that day had the prevented clashes between the rival  
7 groups and that the police had allowed  
8 the anti-National Front protesters to reassemble after  
9 being split up. Ms Poynter's recollection of that event  
10 differs to that of the author of the report and she  
11 records that they were not split up, no help was  
12 provided by the police and that public disorder was  
13 prevented by the quality of the organising by  
14 the Anti-Nazi League.

15 Ms Poynter recalls that "Phil" talked of having  
16 a girlfriend who was a single parent and that he often  
17 went away to stay with her. He said he worked as  
18 a delivery driver for a firm supplying marble, and  
19 although she never saw him work, he did turn up one day  
20 with a large slab of marble, and she still has it and  
21 has supplied a photograph of it as her exhibit 2.

22 Julia Poynter lost touch with "Phil" after she and  
23 her boyfriend split up in 1981.

24 The SWP.

25 Ms Poynter states that her involvement with the SWP



1 was limited to branch activity and that she was not  
2 active in the wider organisation. The activities she  
3 took part in were mostly different forms of outreach,  
4 selling the Socialist Worker Newspaper every Saturday,  
5 and putting on lots of public meetings to attract people  
6 to listen to their ideas about creating a fairer and  
7 more just society. She describes attending various  
8 picket lines in order to show support and solidarity to  
9 striking workers. She disputes the claims made by  
10 "Phil" that those who attempted to cross the picket line  
11 and return to work were threatened with violence, and  
12 states that the SWP chose to support those on picket  
13 lines by providing support to striking workers and  
14 sought to dissuade those who tried to cross the picket  
15 line by explaining the purpose of the picket. She also  
16 disputes the claims made in the witness statements of  
17 both "Vince Miller" and "Phil Cooper" that the SWP was  
18 subversive and that spying on them was justified.

19 The Anti-Nazi League.

20 Julia Poynter explains that much of her involvement  
21 in the Walthamstow SWP from late 1977 until 1981 was  
22 through her involvement in the Anti-Nazi League which  
23 had formed in response to the rise of the far right.

24 She recalls that on 13 August 1977, she and comrades  
25 from the branch attended a counter-protest to show

1 solidarity with the people of Lewisham in response to  
2 the National Front march through New Cross, an event  
3 later known as the "Battle of Lewisham". Ms Poynter  
4 cannot specifically recall "Vince" being present on  
5 the counter-protest but does remember vividly the chaos  
6 of the day. She notes the claims that "Vince" makes in  
7 his witness statement that the night before  
8 the demonstration, he and others from the SWP hid bricks  
9 along the route, and she states that this does not ring  
10 true and is not something that the SWP would have done.  
11 The SWP never took weapons to demonstrations. She says:

12 "Violence was simply not what we were about."

13 The SWP relied on large numbers rather than violence  
14 to discourage the National Front from attacking.

15 The Inquiry has provided Julia Poynter with 62  
16 intelligence reports. Most of the reports are of  
17 the Walthamstow branch or Outer East London District SWP  
18 meetings, which she is listed as attending, or lists of  
19 attendees of specific demonstrations of which she is  
20 one. She states that due to the passage of time, she  
21 cannot recall all of the individual events, but she  
22 provides her recollection on those that she can  
23 remember. Julia Poynter observes that the earliest  
24 intelligence report in her witness pack is one from  
25 a branch meeting on 11 May 1977 in which her name is

1 listed as an attendee with the accompanying note,  
2 "Mentioned re anti-fascist demonstration at  
3 Duckett's Common on 23.4.1977", a demonstration that she  
4 had attended. By this time "Vince Miller" had been  
5 infiltrating the branch for around five months. She  
6 states that she would have expected to have featured in  
7 reports from before May 1977 and to have been provided  
8 with a report in relation to the Duckett's Common  
9 demonstration.

10 Ms Poynter expresses surprise at the way that  
11 "Vince Miller" characterises the SWP in his reports  
12 which in her view suggests, "An underlying agenda in how  
13 he presents the Walthamstow branch".

14 She has this reaction to claims made in the reports  
15 from 1977 about SWP meetings and talk of armed  
16 revolution:

17 "The reporting is laughable and I do not recognise  
18 it as remotely accurate or representative of what we  
19 were about. Our objective was to build a mass party by  
20 talking to people and getting on with daily organising."

21 Ms Poynter notes in the report dated 27 January 1978  
22 of an SWP district meeting that she is no longer listed  
23 with the reference "mentions re SWP" but with  
24 a reference to her own Special Branch registry file.  
25 She states that there is nothing that she has seen in

1 the reports that she has been provided with which would  
2 justify the creation of a personal file and that she is  
3 angry that such detailed information on her personal  
4 life has been recorded.

5 She comments upon further reports from  
6 September 1980 which record not only personal details  
7 but also her future education plans. She states that  
8 there could be no good reason why this information was  
9 recorded and shared with the police and possibly  
10 the Security Services.

11 In relation to another report containing personal  
12 information, she states:

13 "I find it disturbing that I was subject to such  
14 detailed profiling and investigation by Special Branch  
15 at the time. I was not someone engaged in subversion or  
16 who posed a public order risk, and I have never been  
17 arrested or convicted of any offence. I get the feeling  
18 that the reason that I am being profiled in this way is  
19 simply for being active on left-wing issues."

20 Other reports from this time record details about  
21 her then boyfriend, including his employment details and  
22 their domestic arrangements, and she states that this  
23 information was so personal that it feels deeply  
24 invasive to have been observed and recorded by  
25 the police. One particular report reports that her

1 former boyfriend failed to obtain a job, in part because  
2 he was colour-blind. This was not information known to  
3 her previously and which indicates just how deeply  
4 "Phil" had deceived her boyfriend into trusting him with  
5 intimate details about his life and demonstrates how  
6 close they were as friends.

7 Ms Poynter states that she is surprised that there  
8 was such a focus of police resources on a small branch  
9 of the SWP in North London whilst no undercover officers  
10 appear to have been sent into the National Front, at  
11 a time when National Front members were a source of  
12 serious violence and public disorder. Julia Poynter  
13 expresses concern that the details of 15-year old and  
14 a 16-year old schoolchildren were recorded in  
15 intelligence reports simply for attending SWP meetings  
16 and for being politically active.

17 A report from July 1978 about the SWP district  
18 meeting refers to "Vince Miller" taking on leadership of  
19 the Industrial Group. Ms Poynter observes that, in  
20 taking this role, not only was "Vince Miller" reporting  
21 on the SWP but he would be influencing its work and  
22 direction, which she views as "obviously inappropriate".

23 Julia Poynter also recalls that "Vince" was branch  
24 treasurer, a role that gave him access to the bank  
25 details of members and access to the membership lists.

1 Members' bank details, including hers, were included in  
2 a report dated 15 August 1978, and she states:

3 "I am really shocked that the police recorded their  
4 bank details. I can't see any justification for this  
5 further serious invasion of their privacy and of their  
6 legitimate expectation of confidentiality."

7 She also comments on a report from April 1978 in  
8 which it is noted that it was intended to elect  
9 "Vince Miller" as the new treasurer at the following  
10 week's meeting, which indicates that he was aware of  
11 this but did not take steps to avoid being elected.

12 Her reaction to finding out that "Vince" and "Phil"  
13 were undercover officers.

14 Her first reaction to learning that "Vince" and  
15 "Phil" were undercover officers was one of upset and  
16 which later became anger -- anger at the betrayal of  
17 trust and friendship. This feeling was particularly  
18 acute in respect of "Vince", who she considered to be a  
19 close friend. She finds it hurtful to think that she  
20 had trusted him enough to open up and share things with  
21 him over the three years of their friendship.

22 Ms Poynter is also very angry about  
23 "Vince's" decision to deceive "Madeleine" into  
24 a sexual relationship, and she is deeply concerned to  
25 learn that notwithstanding a deceit of this nature, he

1 ended up in a position of power and authority as  
2 National Director of the NCIS.

3 By way of conclusion, she states:

4 "Overall if the intrusion into people's personal  
5 lives, and the resulting damage to them were not so  
6 serious, I would feel like the undercover police were  
7 a bit of a joke. I am astounded by the sheer volume of  
8 reporting and how trivial much of it was. I cannot see  
9 why such intrusive reporting was necessary ... they  
10 spent years infiltrating a group because of its  
11 political ideology rather than any realistic or  
12 practical threat of serious violence."

13 Sir, that concludes the summary for Julia Poynter  
14 and the evidence for today.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, and that indeed  
16 concludes our proceedings for today.

17 We will resume tomorrow at 10 o'clock when we will  
18 hear our first live evidence from Lindsey German. Thank  
19 you.

20 (1.11 pm)

21 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Thursday,

22 12 May 2022)

23

24

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