

Monday, 16 May 2022

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Welcome to Day 3 of evidential hearings at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager. There is no fire alarm testing expected today, so if the fire alarm goes off, please follow the fire exit signs and make your way to the muster point, which is the Hard Rock Hotel, Great Cumberland Place.

On arrival at the muster point, please make yourself known to a fire marshal, who will be wearing a high visibility jacket and who will be keeping a register of all attendees. The fire marshals will also be responsible for letting everyone know when it is safe to return in liaison with representatives from the Thistle Hotel.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start today's proceedings. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Those in the public area will know what I'm about to say. I apologise to you if you've heard it before, but it's important that everybody there understands. Anyone who has brought a mobile device into the hearing room is perfectly free to use it to communicate silently with the outside world what they are seeing and hearing in the hearing room,

1 but only after ten minutes have elapsed since the event
2 that you are describing, and those devices may not be
3 used to record or photograph what is going on here.

4 Thank you.

5 Ms Campbell.

6 Summary of evidence of HN3095

7 MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, sir. This morning I will be
8 summarising the evidence of HN3095,
9 William Anthony Furner.

10 William Furner, known as Bill Furner, worked in
11 the back office management of the SDS as a detective
12 constable from its formation in 1968 to late 1970. He
13 has provided two witness statements to the Inquiry.
14 The first, dated 1 October 2019, served to exhibit
15 15 photographs provided by Bill Furner to the Inquiry of
16 former members of the SDS. These pictures were believed
17 to have been taken at a Christmas party held in
18 November 1968 and Bill Furner has assisted in
19 identifying the people pictured.

20 The second statement is dated 18 September 2020 and
21 can be summarised as follows: Bill Furner joined
22 the Metropolitan Police in 1964, moving to
23 Special Branch at the start of 1968. He was part of
24 the first group of officers brought on to assist the SDS
25 at its inception, joining at the rank of detective

1 constable. He states that he was told to report to
2 Conrad Dixon, who explained that the SDS was to
3 infiltrate left wing organisations who were involved in
4 the Vietnam War protests and to obtain information about
5 their activities and intentions. There was no selection
6 process for the SDS, nor was his involvement a matter of
7 choice:

8 "They told me I was a member of the team and that
9 was it. I accepted it as normal routine."

10 He also confirms that there was no training for
11 the role.

12 Bill Furner's role was administrative, working from
13 the back office in Scotland Yard and dealing with
14 the paperwork that came in. He describes his
15 responsibilities as checking rent books, checking and
16 submitting officers' diaries and ensuring that expenses
17 were paid. He states that he did not play any part in
18 tasking or steering undercover officers, procuring or
19 administering the safe houses or obtaining cover
20 documents, accommodation or vehicles for the deployed
21 officers.

22 With regard to expenses, Furner explains that he
23 would check undercover officers' diaries and ensure
24 the accuracy of the sums before submitting them. There
25 was no set routine whereby officers had to submit

1 diaries on a particular day, but he recalls being given
2 them weekly, whether at the SDS flat or if officers came
3 to Scotland Yard. He notes that the diary system was
4 common throughout CID.

5 Bill Furner was based in Scotland Yard, but would
6 attend the safe house in west London for regular
7 meetings. He states that there was no set pattern as to
8 when these meetings were to be held, but, "If something
9 cropped up that everyone had to be involved in, we met
10 up at the flat". Officers would hand in their reporting
11 at these meetings and there would be general discussion
12 about who would attend specific meetings and
13 demonstrations based on the intelligence provided.
14 The undercover officers would occasionally come to
15 Scotland Yard.

16 On average, Furner states that he would see
17 the officers about once a week, but this became less
18 frequent towards the end of his time in the SDS because
19 the risks of being seen coming into the yard were
20 considered greater as deployments were underway.

21 He states:

22 "I only interacted with the undercover officers
23 insofar as they would hand me their diaries and we would
24 talk. I knew from their records and from talking to
25 them the organisations and personalities they were

1 involved with, but they never discussed with me in any
2 detail what they were doing or who they met."

3 Bill Furner affirms in his witness statement that he
4 was not involved in filing or writing up intelligence
5 reports from undercover officers and states that it
6 would have been HN1251, Phil Saunders, who dealt with
7 the paper intelligence. To his knowledge, officers
8 would provide both written and verbal reports during
9 their regular safe house meetings, which would be
10 brought back to Scotland Yard. He believes the reports
11 were written up before being passed on to Conrad Dixon,
12 who he presumes would pass them on to
13 Chief Superintendent Arthur Cunningham and the Assistant
14 Commissioner of Crime. He is only able to speculate on
15 where the reports were disseminated, but states that he
16 understood that the reports went as high as
17 the Home Office.

18 Bill Furner recalls his direct line managers as
19 being Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon, the head of the SDS,
20 and DI Phil Saunders, the second in command, with
21 DI Riby Wilson also holding a management position. He
22 states that all three joined organisations, though
23 Furner cannot remember what they were.

24 Phil Saunders spent the most time in the back office
25 and contributed toward the administration of the SDS

1 alongside Bill Furner and DS Roy Creamer. Furner
2 describes the SDS as "hardly a rank conscious
3 organisation" and confirms that he had a lot of personal
4 interactions with Conrad Dixon. His closest working
5 colleagues were DI Saunders and DS Creamer as they were
6 all posted in the office together.

7 Bill Furner states that he had done no undercover
8 policing or used a cover identity prior to joining
9 the SDS. Although his role was administrative, there
10 were occasions where he did attend meetings or
11 demonstrations and reported back. He states that he
12 attended very few activists meetings, but can remember
13 attending several large demonstrations, for example at
14 Trafalgar Square and at Twickenham. These would be
15 occasions where he was told to attend. He states that
16 he did not use a cover name and only attended as
17 a member of the audience to take notes or to mingle with
18 the crowd at a demonstration. He would wear "a scruffy
19 coat", but would not otherwise change his appearance.
20 He did not join any organisations.

21 Bill Furner states that a major part of his job was
22 reading information from the Security Service. It was
23 his responsibility to go through information provided by
24 the Security Service on groups of common interest
25 between them and the SDS and extract relevant details

1 and file them. Despite this, he states that he had no
2 direct contact or dealings with the Security Service
3 while in the SDS. He believes that the Security Service
4 would have made requests for intelligence, but did not
5 deal with that personally.

6 Furner recalls that officers would have spent time
7 preparing for their deployments, but he did not know
8 what they would do or how long they would have had spent
9 preparing. He knew they were being briefed and told
10 what to look out for before being sent out of the main
11 office to join a group. He did not know beforehand
12 which groups were to be infiltrated as it was not
13 a topic that was discussed openly. He cannot comment as
14 to whether officers spent time in the back office
15 following their withdrawals.

16 Bill Furner states that he was not aware of any
17 unhappy working relationships between members of the SDS
18 and considered it a well run squad. To his knowledge,
19 none of his contemporaries provoked or encouraged
20 a third party to commit a criminal offence, engaged in
21 sexual activity whilst in their cover identity, were
22 arrested, tried or convicted in their cover identity,
23 were involved in incidents of public order or violence,
24 reported on any legally privileged information, or
25 reported on the activities of elected politicians. He

1 recalls one instance where a member of the SDS may have
2 been involved in committing a criminal offence, but the
3 matter did not go to court and the officer was not
4 charged with any offence.

5 When asked about what the SDS achieved for policing,
6 Bill Furner notes that the squad was able to provide
7 uniformed police with threat assessments or other
8 forecasts in relation to the likely numbers or moods of
9 those attending upcoming public events. He states that
10 the undercover deployments "meant that we had the people
11 under observation and different organisations completely
12 and utterly tapped. They did not make a move that we
13 did not know about."

14 He recalls one particular incident where it was
15 discovered that a group intended to chain themselves to
16 the rugby posts at Twickenham and the uniformed police
17 were forewarned to turn up with bolt cutters, which
18 avoided any significant disruption.

19 With regards to senior management, Bill Furner
20 remembers one time where the Assistant Chief
21 Commissioner of Crime visited the SDS before the
22 1968 October demonstration and spoke to
23 undercover officers about the work being done. On this
24 occasion, Furner recalls driving the Assistant Chief
25 Commissioner to and from the SDS safe house for

1 the meeting. He also recalls that Conrad Dixon did have
2 an interview with Jim Callaghan, the then
3 Home Secretary, at least once.

4 Bill Furner left the Metropolitan Police in
5 September 1970 to take up a job at
6 the Ministry of Defence. The SDS was his final posting.

7 Sir, that concludes the summary of the statements of
8 Bill Furner. The documents related to that officer will
9 be published on the Inquiry's website today, along with
10 documents for four other individuals. They are HN325,
11 Conrad Dixon, who was the head of the SDS from July 1968
12 to July 1969. PN1748, Riby Wilson, who was detective
13 inspector of the SDS from July 1968 to May 1970.
14 HN1251, Phil Saunders, who was detective inspector and
15 second in command of the SDS from July 1968 and head of
16 the SDS between November 1969 and August 1971; and
17 finally for HN474, Wilf Knight, who was involved in
18 the documentary "True Spies".

19 Thank you, sir.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. And all of these four individuals have
21 died and so all we have of theirs is their documents?

22 MS CAMPBELL: I believe that's correct, sir.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: We are now going to hear from a live witness,
24 are we not, and we will need ten minutes, I think, to
25 get everything set up to permit that to happen. Thank

1 you.

2 (10.14 am)

3 (A short break)

4 (10.26 am)

5 HN103 (David Smith)

6 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand that you wish to be sworn.

7 A. I do. Yes, sir.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Fernandes.

9 (Witness sworn)

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

11 Mr Warner.

12 Questions by MR WARNER

13 MR WARNER: Mr Smith, I think it's right that you gave
14 the Inquiry a witness statement already --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- dated 2 December 2020. Can I ask you firstly,
17 please, to confirm that that witness statement is true
18 to the best of your knowledge and belief?

19 A. It is indeed, yes.

20 Q. Now, Mr Smith, you have told us that you were
21 a back office Sergeant within the SDS from about
22 October 1970 to October 1974; is that right?

23 A. That's about right, yes.

24 Q. The first topic I'd like to ask you about, please, is
25 training, and the first aspect of that is the training

1 that you personally were given when you joined the SDS.
2 You told us in your statement that not very much
3 specific to the SDS was given to you and that to some
4 extent, it was -- your Special Branch training was
5 relevant to that role; is that correct?

6 A. That is correct, yes.

7 Q. We'll come on to Special Branch training in just
8 a moment, but just in terms of when you started on
9 the SDS, are you able to recall whether you were given
10 an induction of any kind?

11 A. Obviously I would have been told about the structure of
12 the squad and who was on it and what we did and what
13 I was being expected to do. Essentially, I was told to
14 process the information that was being brought and put
15 it into a format which was -- would then go back into
16 the system.

17 But as a -- having been in Special Branch then for
18 eight years, I was well versed in the reports and the
19 things that we did, and the nature of the reports that
20 were coming through from the officers was no different
21 in -- in practice to what other officers would be doing
22 when they were doing things overtly. It was day, date,
23 time and place and that was it, you know.

24 Q. I see.

25 A. So that wasn't difficult in any shape or form.

1 Q. So is it fair to say that most of the guidance you would
2 have given would have been on practical things and about
3 how to do your job?

4 A. Well, simply the guidance was who was out on the squad
5 and what they were doing, but no actual -- I didn't need
6 any guidance, as I saw it or as I perceived it, on
7 dealing with the paperwork. I knew where it had to go
8 instinctively, because I'd been in -- as I say, in
9 the branch for eight years at that stage. It wasn't as
10 if I was a rookie sort of coming in totally blind.

11 Q. Right. We'll come to that aspect in just a moment.

12 Is it likely that Phil Saunders was the person that
13 introduced you --

14 A. Yes, he is the one who in fact approached me to join.

15 Q. I see.

16 And in terms of your position on the squad, is it
17 right that any other guidance or training you were given
18 was on the job as issues arose?

19 A. Yes. I mean, one of the good things was -- was that
20 there was the chief inspector, the inspector, myself and
21 a DC or someone who was on the point of going into
22 the squad or coming off the squad were in the office,
23 and we were all in the same office together. It wasn't
24 as if we were separated into -- to a couple of offices.
25 So if you had a problem or you had a question, you just

1 simply could ask them and say, "Look, what about this,
2 what about that". I mean -- so it was -- it was very
3 easy in that respect.

4 Q. And is that something you did while you were on the SDS?

5 A. I would have done that, yes. I don't specifically
6 remember an instance of saying, "What about this or what
7 about that", but logic and common sense dictates I would
8 have done that.

9 Q. I see.

10 Can I ask you, please, just a bit more generally
11 about your Special Branch training. Now, you told us
12 you, I think, joined Special Branch about eight years or
13 so before moving on to the SDS.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Presumably you would have been given some training when
16 you joined Special Branch.

17 A. Yes. Again, it's sort of all linked into really, when
18 one starts as a PC, you learn this as I call, day, date
19 time and place type of writing reports, and when
20 I started, I started on the naturalisation section where
21 basically you were interviewing people for -- who wanted
22 to become British and who were, in the main, people from
23 Poland, Hungary, that sort of neck of the woods, and the
24 people around you in the office gave you advice and
25 said, "Look ..." -- and they told you the format of

1 the report and the things you needed to cover, and then
2 I suppose to some extent it was experience and trial and
3 error. I mean -- but you -- you did these reports and
4 that was it. And then I did that for a year or so and
5 then I went on to mainstream SB work.

6 Q. If I can just ask you a little bit more specifically.
7 When you actually joined Special Branch, do you remember
8 an overall training course being given to you?

9 A. No.

10 Q. You just joined the squad?

11 A. No, no, just joined the squad and then someone would
12 have given me some sort of briefing, at probably chief
13 inspector level, as to what it was expected of me.

14 Q. When you joined Special Branch, do you remember --
15 either on the squad or more generally, do you remember
16 any training being given to you on the legal limits of
17 police powers?

18 A. No, not -- no. It was -- I suppose common sense was
19 the -- was the best thing that I could say that,
20 you know, you followed. You knew what was illegal and
21 what wasn't illegal.

22 Q. Did you have any training perhaps on that topic when you
23 joined the police as a constable, something like that?

24 A. There would have been, I suppose, but as I say, that's,
25 what, 60 years ago now --

1 Q. I appreciate I'm asking you to remember a long time ago.

2 A. -- or would have been. I went to detective training
3 school as a -- whilst I was in Special Branch, and
4 obviously that would have covered aspects of that at
5 that time. That was a -- I think a -- about
6 a three-month course or so.

7 Q. I see.

8 So you would have presumably been aware of things
9 like limits on the police powers to enter and search
10 property, things like that?

11 A. Oh, yes, search warrants.

12 Q. Search warrants and things like that.

13 Now, when you were on the SDS, was any consideration
14 and conversation about those legal limits applied to
15 the SDS's work, do you remember?

16 A. Well, I can remember vividly that the thing that was
17 hammered home was not to act as agent provocateur.
18 That's for the officers.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. I think probably it may help to sort of explain that one
21 of the -- the nature of the job was to be on
22 demonstrations and obviously get information which would
23 help us to police things much better, but the trouble
24 is, if you're going out on demonstrations, with the best
25 will in the world, there's going to be a small risk that

1 you may get arrested for obstruction, for example,
2 because you're with everyone else, because if you didn't
3 go out on the demonstrations, then what was the point of
4 being undercover anyway?

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. And so it was part and parcel, albeit a small risk, that
7 once in a blue moon someone might find themselves
8 arrested for obstruction, but that was -- that was about
9 the limit of things.

10 Q. I understand that. We'll come on to that --

11 A. Oh, sure.

12 Q. -- in a bit more detail in a moment.

13 I just, before we do, wanted to ask you whether
14 specifically the police's powers to enter property,
15 whether that was thought about on the --

16 A. I can't remember that being mentioned at all.

17 Q. Okay.

18 And equally, there were, of course, police
19 disciplinary regulations that applied to all police
20 officers at the time, weren't there?

21 A. Yes, indeed, yes.

22 Q. I think you mention them in your statement as a "large
23 tome".

24 A. Yes, well, it was very --

25 Q. Large.

- 1 A. It was very big, yes.
- 2 Q. And presumably you were aware that things like
3 discreditable conduct were covered in --
- 4 A. Yes, it was all -- all straightforward. I don't think
5 there was anything complicated about it.
- 6 Q. And you were aware presumably that things like that
7 would have applied to SDS officers' activities; do you
8 agree?
- 9 A. Yes, yes, they had to have used their common sense in
10 terms of what was possible and what -- and if they had
11 a problem, then one would expect them to tell their
12 supervising officers.
- 13 Q. I see.
- 14 Now, do you ever recall having conversations with
15 any of the deployed officers about things like
16 discreditable conduct or anything like that, or did you
17 just expect them to use their training?
- 18 A. No, I -- I didn't have direct conversations with them
19 about that. It was very much the domain of the chief
20 inspector and the inspector. But obviously the lad who
21 was in the office with me, who quite often was the one
22 who was about to go out into the field, then I would
23 have shown him the reports that were coming in so he
24 gets a feel of it all.
- 25 Q. Yes.

- 1 A. So there was an element of talk about that, yes.
- 2 Q. But not necessarily about --
- 3 A. Not about how they should behave, no.
- 4 Q. Finally on this point, Mr Smith, was legal advice ever
5 available to you when you were on the SDS?
- 6 A. I suppose it was available. I never had occasion to
7 take advantage of it.
- 8 Q. Thank you.
- 9 I'd like to move on to the training that officers
10 were given, and you've mentioned a little about it
11 before, and you've told us in your statement that
12 really, agent provocateur was quite an important part --
- 13 A. That was the major thrust of it, yes.
- 14 Q. And was this training or guidance, if I can put it that
15 way, that you would have given to new recruits to
16 the SDS?
- 17 A. I may have mentioned it, but I wouldn't have -- I'd have
18 just mentioned it rather than being the one to actually
19 give them that advice, if you follow me.
- 20 Q. I see.
- 21 A. There's a difference between sort of saying, "Well,
22 you know ..." -- just -- just a casual comment, as it
23 were, but actual advice was given by the two, the chief
24 inspector and the inspector.
- 25 Q. So is it fair to say you would have taken your lead from

1 the detective inspector --

2 A. Yes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It was common knowledge that
3 that was the -- the main thing is that basically they --
4 we wanted them to be a fly on the wall, not to be taking
5 a leading part in things.

6 Q. And why was it such a concern, this aspect of them
7 taking a leading role? Why was it --

8 A. Because obviously that would have been improper, I mean,
9 because then you -- if people suddenly start getting
10 arrested and police officers were in fact the ones that
11 had instigated the problem, then that would create all
12 sorts of complications and would have been, you know,
13 illegal and, you know, wrong, just pure and simple.

14 Q. Can I ask you to look at a document, please, and it will
15 come up on the screen in front of you --

16 A. Oh, yeah.

17 Q. -- so you don't need to do anything. It's
18 {MPS/727104/1}.

19 This is a document, Mr Smith, which was issued by
20 the Home Office on this very topic just 18 months or so
21 before you joined the SDS.

22 A. Yes, yes.

23 Q. Is this a document that you were familiar with?

24 A. No. I haven't seen it before, to my knowledge.

25 Q. Haven't seen it before, I see.

1 Can we scroll down to the bottom of the first page,
2 please. Thank you.

3 Really, the guidance is, as you will see by
4 number 3(a):

5 "No member of a police force, and no police
6 informant, should counsel, incite or procure
7 the commission of a crime."

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Is that in a nutshell --

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. -- what you were --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- aware of?

14 Thank you, that can come down now, please.

15 Just before we move on, you've mentioned police
16 officers encouraging crime being a real concern. What
17 about police officers becoming involved in criminal
18 acts? Was that a concern too?

19 A. Not at that stage. I think the nature of
20 the demonstrations in those early days was mainly --
21 I think it's when things like animal rights came in
22 where it was a much more anarchistic, dare I say, set
23 up. But in the formal set ups of the organisations that
24 were there in that period, '70 to '74, then you had
25 the leadership of the organisation, which was defined,

1 and therefore the rank and file would, dare I say it,
2 turn up at a meeting on a Wednesday or Thursday and be
3 told that, "This weekend we've got a three-line whip on
4 a demonstration" or, "We're going to do this", or,
5 "We're going to do that, we want as many to support this
6 as possible". And, of course, it was that -- the giving
7 of that information which was then put into the system
8 which enabled our -- ultimately our uniformed colleagues
9 to be better placed to deal with the situation.

10 Q. The other aspect of guidance that you mentioned within
11 your statement is that officers shouldn't get too
12 involved with individuals in the groups that they were
13 deployed on. You mention that in your statement.

14 A. Yes, yes.

15 Q. I just wanted to explore, what was the thinking -- your
16 thinking behind that guidance?

17 A. Well, I think the trouble is the more you become
18 involved and the more close you become to someone, then
19 there's a greater risk of you letting slip something or
20 being lulled into a false sense of security and saying
21 something which could lead to your -- dare I say it,
22 your exposure as -- as a police officer.

23 Q. So is it fair to say it's a risk of compromise?

24 A. Indeed, yes, and it's a balance. You have to,
25 obviously, join in, be a part of things, but you have to

1 be disciplined in how far things go because, as I say,
2 the deeper the relationship becomes, then the more
3 difficult it becomes.

4 Q. Was any concern behind this in terms of officers
5 developing close relationships with the people they were
6 reporting on?

7 A. I don't remember it specifically being in that sense.
8 I mean, it was just -- at that stage, I mean, I wasn't
9 aware of, dare I say it, the things that emerged later.
10 That aspect wasn't -- I wasn't aware of at all. It was
11 never mentioned. But it was just common sense that you
12 didn't get too deeply involved, as -- and I'm talking of
13 friendship with people, you know.

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. You'd have a mate and it would be fine, but the nature
16 of the work was you didn't want to divulge too much
17 about yourself, but had to have sufficient to be
18 credible, and you didn't ask questions. But the beauty
19 was that if you weren't asking questions of people, they
20 weren't asking questions of you because it's a natural
21 thing. If people are open with you, you will be open
22 with them, and it's a vice versa thing.

23 Q. As you've mentioned it, you also mention in your
24 statement that you consider that it was obvious that
25 this guidance would have extended to intimate

1 relationships.

2 A. Oh, yes, by implication. I mean, common sense, yes.

3 Q. Well, that's not my question, really.

4 A. Sorry.

5 Q. Was this implied or was it ever expressly said?

6 A. Never express, no. I never heard a problem being

7 mentioned about that aspect of -- of the job, of that

8 undercover work. In fact, casting my mind back, I think

9 it's true to say -- I mean, later on, it would have

10 changed. But in those days, the numbers of women, dare

11 I say it, who were involved in extremist activity was

12 very small. There were -- there were women involved in

13 the Women's Liberation thing, and that was almost

14 exclusively, if not exclusively, women. But the numbers

15 of women involved in demonstrations were -- were much

16 less in those days. I suppose -- I don't know why, but

17 that was just a fact of life.

18 Q. The fact that the implication that this guidance would

19 also have included relationships --

20 A. Oh, yes.

21 Q. -- is that something you thought at the time --

22 A. No, it didn't occur to me about that. It was simply

23 just, you know, you've got to be careful. That was --

24 it's a bit like telling a police officer not to commit

25 crime or not to assault people or whatever. It's

1 a common sense thing that you -- it's a risk obviously
2 to themselves and indeed to the whole existence of
3 the squad.

4 Q. Do you think it's fair to say that management on the SDS
5 when you were involved in it were aware that there must
6 have been very close personal relationships, not
7 necessarily sexual, but certainly close personal
8 relationships, being formed between the UCOs and those
9 they were reporting on?

10 A. It's possible. I mean, it was inevitable that something
11 along those lines would have happened, but the idea was
12 to keep that thing to a minimum, I would say. But
13 I wasn't -- I wasn't involved in that side of
14 the conversation with the individuals in the way that
15 the inspector and the chief inspector was. All
16 I was got -- was getting peripheral bits. I was
17 interested in the information that the lads were
18 providing to me, so I could then process it and put it
19 into the system.

20 Q. Well, we will come on to that.

21 A. Surely, yes.

22 Q. Just before we do, the guidance on both agent
23 provocateur and not getting too involved with those in
24 the groups, would that have been given to everyone that
25 came --

- 1 A. Oh, yes. I'm sure it was, yes.
- 2 Q. Was there any training, or guidance rather, given to new
3 UCOs on how to perhaps limit their involvement in other
4 people's --
- 5 A. I'm not aware particularly of that, no, no. I mean,
6 I think it was more -- the conversations would have been
7 more at a sort of common sense level rather than
8 training per se, you know. They'd have had a chat about
9 what they've got to do, what they shouldn't do. And of
10 course the officers, most of them would have been in
11 Special Branch for three or four years beforehand, so
12 a lot of the sort of awareness of these things would
13 have already been assimilated by then. So it wasn't as
14 if you were sort of teaching young rookies off
15 the street, as it were, what to do and how to do it.
- 16 Q. I see.
- 17 Positions of responsibility.
- 18 A. Mm-hm.
- 19 Q. A number of the officers, certainly after you were
20 involved in the unit, obtained positions of
21 responsibility within the groups that they were
22 reporting on.
- 23 A. Yes, yes.
- 24 Q. Was there any concern that you recall amongst
25 the management of the unit about officers doing that?

1 A. No, I can't remember anyone having positions of
2 responsibility, to be honest. As I said, I think when
3 the organisations were more clearly defined and had
4 a structure, it was fine. The problem arose, I suspect,
5 was when you were getting into what I call the more
6 anarchistic set ups where you -- everybody was
7 an individual and a law unto themselves, in a sense. So
8 that made, dare I say it, the job of getting
9 the intelligence more difficult. But I don't -- I don't
10 remember anyone being secretary or chairman or whatever
11 of any group, no.

12 Q. Can we take it from that then that there was no guidance
13 given to the officers about --

14 A. I don't know.

15 Q. -- what they should or shouldn't do?

16 A. I don't know. I can't say it was or wasn't, but --
17 because, as I said, I wasn't involved in that side of
18 things.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 The back office --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- which you have already mentioned. You've told us
23 that new UCOs would tend to spend four to six weeks --

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. -- in the office and meet some of the deployed officers

1 as well and read their reports.

2 Was this the method that the SDS was using when you
3 joined in 1970?

4 A. It was, yes, yes. The -- it was only after about two or
5 three years that we started to get a permanent DC from
6 elsewhere within the branch who hadn't been out in
7 the field or who wasn't about to go in the field doing
8 that role. That happened about 1973, I suppose. But
9 I -- dates and that, I'm -- I'm not too sure on.

10 Q. No, I understand.

11 You've mentioned in your statement that the purpose
12 really of this was to learn about targets --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. -- and methodology.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Now, if I can deal with targets first, what sort of
17 thing were they taught about targets, can you remember?

18 A. Well, by "targets", I mean what sort of organisations
19 were there. I mean, that was decided really by
20 the inspector and the chief inspector on advice, dare
21 I say it, from the rest of the branch, because these
22 things aren't static. I mean, you had certain
23 organisations which were common pretty well throughout,
24 but others sort of came and went a bit, and so what you
25 did was you adjusted, dare I say it, our coverage of

1 these things accordingly. It was -- that was the way it
2 was. It was -- it was something that just naturally
3 evolved.

4 Q. Was this process supervised by you?

5 A. The process of ...?

6 Q. Learning about targets.

7 A. No, no, that was just -- it wasn't supervised by me.

8 I was aware of, obviously, who the targets were.

9 I suppose the better way I can describe it is that when
10 I was a chief inspector, I was aware of right wing
11 elements and the need perhaps for the SDS to cover that,
12 because they hadn't posed a problem before. But I said,
13 "Look, I think there's an argument", and I put up
14 an argument, and ultimately that's what happened. So
15 what happens is that when events happen and
16 organisations come to the fore, then you say, "Hey,
17 should we be covering these and is it appropriate we
18 cover these for the SDS", and then that paper would get
19 put up through to chief superintendent or commander
20 level and they would go across to the squad and say,
21 "Yes, we'll -- this is what we'll do", or not -- well,
22 they would do it, obviously.

23 Q. Just focusing on what new officers would have been told
24 about targets --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- at this point. Do you remember what sort of thing
2 they might have been told about the groups that those
3 above you or perhaps you wanted them to target?

4 A. Yeah, I think it's true to say that having been in
5 Special Branch, most of them, as I said, three or
6 four years, they would have had a fair idea themselves
7 of the organisation we're talking about, and they would
8 have been told the organisation which, dare I say it,
9 they were being earmarked for, because what you had was
10 like a rolling programme. As one man went off of
11 an organisation, someone else would be coming in, as it
12 were, or they may overlap for a short time.

13 So -- and then, of course, the man who was coming
14 off could give them very valuable information and
15 probably the most valuable information about that
16 organisation, and of course, in the interim, the lad
17 would see the reports that were coming in from that
18 source to assist them in what -- what needed to be done.

19 But it wasn't complicated stuff. I mean, basically
20 it was just saying, "Well, what we wanted to do was to
21 find out what was the strength of the organisation, what
22 were they planning to do and when were they planning to
23 do it", and that was fairly straightforward. It wasn't
24 some sort of rocket science thing, dare I say. It was
25 straightforward, and they were well used to reporting

1 that sort of thing previously, so it wasn't a great
2 steep learning curve.

3 The best thing was the advice they were getting from
4 the inspector and the chief inspector about what to do,
5 how to do it, and from, dare I say it, their colleagues
6 on the squad, who told them, dare I say it, the ring
7 craft --

8 Q. I see.

9 A. -- in fact.

10 Q. We're coming on to that.

11 The other aspect that you mention in your statement
12 is methodology.

13 A. Mm.

14 Q. Now, I don't want you to go into any detail, please, but
15 can we take it from that that you're talking about
16 tradecraft?

17 A. Yes, yeah.

18 Q. About how to sustain their undercover identities.

19 A. Yes, what to do and what not to do, more precisely.

20 Q. You've mentioned also seeing -- viewing reporting from
21 those that perhaps they were following into the field or
22 were there already otherwise.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Were the new officers being encouraged to follow
25 the patterns in reporting the sort of things that you've

1 mentioned that might be interested in -- of their
2 predecessors.

3 A. Yes, they would do that naturally. As I said, it
4 followed on from the old -- what I called the day, date,
5 time and place thing. You simply said, "This is what
6 it's about, this is what happened, this is who said
7 that", as a summary. You didn't get absolute chapter
8 and verse, obviously, on things, but what it did was --
9 gave a picture of the organisation at that time.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 Can we move on, please, to Special Branch and where
12 the SDS sat within Special Branch. I'd like you to look
13 at a document, please. It's {MPS/737401/1}. If we
14 could just -- you can see that this is -- thank you --
15 a document entitled "Evaluation of Special Branch", and
16 at the bottom of the page, it's dated July 1973, so it's
17 while you were within the SDS.

18 A. Mm.

19 Q. And if we could scroll to the second page, please
20 {MPS/737401/2}, we can see that the first top half of
21 the page is what -- it is suggested to be the current
22 structure of, I think, C Squad within Special Branch.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And we can see the Special Demonstration Squad sits
25 underneath a chief inspector, who in turn sits

1 underneath a superintendent and a chief superintendent.

2 A. Mm-hm.

3 Q. Is that your recollection around sort of summer of 1973
4 of how the SDS sat within Special Branch?

5 A. Yes. One of the -- I'll just confirm -- at first sight,
6 I sort of think, "Oh, four inspectors", it didn't make
7 sense, but then I realised in -- one of the lads in
8 the field was in fact an inspector, which was unusual,
9 but he was.

10 Q. Well, we don't need to hear anything about that.

11 A. Oh, okay.

12 Q. Let's just focus on where the SDS sat within
13 Special Branch.

14 We know that the SDS became part of C Squad in
15 perhaps late 1972 or 1973.

16 A. Mm.

17 Q. Does that accord with your recollection?

18 A. I can't remember that, to be honest, no.

19 Q. I see.

20 And it later became part of S Squad in about the
21 summer of 1974.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. But this document seems to be suggesting a proposal,
24 whilst it was within S Squad, to change the SDS to sit
25 underneath a superintendent. If you look towards

1 the bottom half of the diagram --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- you can see that the proposal is that the SDS moves
4 to report into a superintendent rather than a chief
5 inspector. Do you recall that ever happening?

6 A. No. To my recollection, at the time I was there, it was
7 always the chief inspector.

8 Q. I see.

9 The other question I wanted to ask you about this
10 document is, on the very far left of both of the
11 proposal and the current structure, you can see what it
12 says "SEC service inspector"; can you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Which we assume may be Security Service inspector, we're
15 not sure. Are you able to help us with who -- sorry,
16 what role that person did?

17 A. It doesn't -- it doesn't ring a bell with me at all,
18 I must confess, no. I assume that the A to CID chief
19 inspector or A to -- might have been on the bomb squad
20 or something like that, but no, I can't. I don't know.

21 "SEC", no.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Now, as I mentioned, in 1974, the SDS moved from
24 C Squad to S Squad. Can you recall that happening?

25 A. No, I don't, no.

1 Q. The reason I ask is there is a suggestion within the SDS
2 annual report for that year that this allowed for
3 greater cooperation within the squads, but presumably
4 you can't help us whether that was right or not?

5 A. No, no. I think it was logical for it to be under
6 C Squad only because -- well, primarily because 80% of
7 the product went to C Squad. It was of their interest.
8 So, I mean, that sort of was logical in that sense.

9 Q. Thank you. This document can come down now.

10 More generally, how much control, if I can put it
11 that way, was there over the SDS by Special Branch when
12 you were in the unit?

13 A. I think it's true to say that the primary control and
14 the major control was at chief inspector and inspector
15 level. Because of the nature of the work, you had to
16 rely upon those two very heavily, because senior
17 officers couldn't be going to see these people all
18 the time, or hardly at all, for security reasons. So
19 there was great emphasis, I think, put upon
20 the selection of the people to do that -- to do that
21 role, because it was so important, because you had to
22 rely upon those two to do the supervision.

23 In parallel with that, however, it was true to say
24 that being 12 people together, there was, dare I say it,
25 a mutual support system there by accident almost. It

1 wasn't necessarily by design, but the fact there were 12
2 of them, there was a great sense of camaraderie amongst
3 them which definitely was beneficial to the squad, and
4 if someone felt there was a problem with one of
5 the lads, he would undoubtedly have said it to
6 the inspector and the chief inspector, if they weren't
7 aware of it.

8 Q. Would you include yourself within that?

9 A. To a degree, yes, but I -- if the inspector and the
10 chief inspector weren't around, then, you know, it would
11 fall to me. I mean, in fact, it did on one occasion,
12 famously, but that's --

13 Q. We'll come on to that.

14 A. -- (overspeaking).

15 Q. You may not be able to help us with this, but if
16 a problem had arisen and the chief inspector or
17 inspector were aware, do you know whether a problem
18 might be escalated to those superior to them?

19 A. Well, no, in the first instance, they would come to me
20 because I was the one person in the office who would
21 then have natural access. I could then go along and
22 see, you know, the appropriate chief superintendent,
23 commander, whatever, and apprise him instantly of what
24 -- what the problem was.

25 Q. I see.

1 Knowledge of the SDS. That's the next topic
2 I'd like to ask you about, please.

3 You told us within your statement that knowledge of
4 the hairies, as they were known --

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. -- was very high within Special Branch.

7 A. Yes, it was, yes.

8 Q. And you've said that you knew that they -- before you
9 joined, I should say, you knew that they were providing
10 intelligence on public order.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Does it follow from that that you knew or suspected
13 which type of groups they were reporting on?

14 A. I would have had a fair idea, because it was
15 unavoidable. One knew -- one knew the people who were
16 demonstrating, because we were covering
17 the demonstrations overtly anyway, prior to the SDS,
18 then the threat assessments, which are so, dare I say
19 it, valuably assisted by the SDS, but prior to that,
20 then it was the lads on the ordinary squads that were
21 doing -- preparing those assessments. So they were well
22 aware of those organisations by nature, by the very
23 nature of things.

24 Q. Would you have been aware, for instance, that most of
25 the groups being reported on were left-wing groups?

1 A. The vast majority, yes, yes.

2 Q. And you would have been aware of that before?

3 A. Oh, yes, yes.

4 Q. And can you assist us perhaps with why, when you joined
5 certainly, there was such a focus on those groups?

6 A. Well, the vast majority of the people who were
7 demonstrating were left wing. As I said, I alluded to
8 the right wing. The National Front at that time was
9 really quite small. I mean, it got a bit of a profile,
10 but it was very small and -- but the right wing --
11 the left wing were the ones who were demonstrating.

12 What had happened was in '68, throughout Europe,
13 there had been this upsurge in extreme left wing
14 demonstrating and everything, and we weren't immune from
15 it and that's what happened. It started, as you know,
16 with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, which was
17 essentially a left wing -- extreme left wing
18 organisation. So that was where the emphasis was,
19 because these were the people who were demonstrating.

20 Q. After you left the unit and returned to
21 Special Branch --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- did you get the impression that the state of
24 knowledge amongst Special Branch officers of the SDS had
25 changed at all? Was it still pretty commonly known

1 about?

2 A. Oh, it was commonly known about, yeah. Oh, yes.

3 There's no question about that.

4 Q. And it would be fair to say that the SDS --
5 the existence of the SDS, though perhaps not specifics,
6 was a pretty open secret within Special Branch?

7 A. Yes, yes.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 Turning to the SDS itself. You've told us in your
10 statement and in fact today that its primary purpose
11 was, as you understood it, to gain intelligence on
12 public order and demonstrations. You joined in 1970,
13 which was about two years or so after it had been set
14 up, maybe a little longer. When you joined the SDS, did
15 you understand it to be a permanent unit?

16 A. Yes -- well, it was subject to annual review, I knew
17 that, but it was a well established unit by then, yes.
18 I mean, I thought, well, this would go on as long as --
19 well, as long as it remained a secret, dare I say.

20 Q. While you were there, did you ever consider that there
21 was a chance it might not continue? Was its existence
22 in jeopardy from those on high?

23 A. Not from those on high, because I think it was true to
24 say that because those on high had been consulted and
25 knew all about it and the Home Office knew about it --

1 I mean, the Commissioner himself had actually visited on
2 one occasion, so it wasn't a question of -- nobody could
3 ever say that.

4 So I think -- and also to the relationship, dare
5 I say it, with our uniformed colleagues in A8, which may
6 be a different number now, was very, very good, and in
7 no small part it was because we were able to give them
8 very good threat assessments on what was happening in
9 respect of demonstrations. So I think that the benefits
10 of the squad were well known and there wasn't --
11 the danger to the squad was if it became known outside,
12 obviously that would make its continued existence much
13 more difficult and problematic.

14 Q. Can we take it from that that you don't recall any
15 conversations happening about the SDS being curtailed,
16 its existence --

17 A. No, no, no. There was an annual report and we'd have
18 been surprised, dare I say it, if we'd have been
19 refused, because it was becoming a regular thing. But
20 things hadn't changed and nothing had happened to cause
21 us to think otherwise.

22 Q. Now, you've mentioned the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign
23 and the October demonstrations in 1968 --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- being the start of --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- the SDS. We know that certainly those deployments
3 didn't involve particularly long term infiltrations of
4 groups.

5 A. No.

6 Q. By the time you had joined the unit about two years
7 later, these longer term deployments had begun.

8 A. Mm.

9 Q. Are you able to help us with why things changed?

10 A. Well, I think the problem initially was that there was
11 to be -- there had been a demonstration in the spring
12 of '68 which was quite nasty and almost involved
13 an invasion of the U.S. Embassy, which would have been
14 disastrous, and there was another one scheduled for
15 the autumn, the October, and it was realised that we
16 needed to get far better intelligence, and so obviously,
17 as a short term thing, well, what we've got to do is
18 infiltrate the VSC or people associated with that, and
19 that led on, I think, naturally to a slightly wider
20 coverage of -- of the groups.

21 And by definition, by the end of '68, nobody had
22 been in the group more than six months, but it then
23 naturally followed on that slowly but surely the sort of
24 tenure of people in groups and all that, it just
25 naturally developed, because there was no rush after

1 that point. There would have been a rush initially to
2 get people in because time was pressing. In six months'
3 time, we were going to get this major demonstration and
4 I suspect the decision to form the squad was a month or
5 so down the line. But as things went on, then obviously
6 you have more time and you can then do things.

7 And people weren't rushed into organisations at all.
8 It would take a month -- two/three months, whatever,
9 even longer, to get established in a group, and that was
10 a very gentle process, because that was less risk to
11 the individual and indeed to the organisation. And so
12 that what you had was a rolling programme of people
13 joining these organisations and then at any one time, 10
14 or 11 would be fully active and one or two would be sort
15 of in the process of coming in perhaps.

16 Q. So is it fair to say you suspect that one thing led to
17 the other naturally?

18 A. Yes, it did, yes. It was obviously proven to be very
19 effective, and if something's proven to be effective,
20 you don't say, "Well, let's get rid of it".

21 Q. Can we move on, please, to an essay that you wrote in
22 1979.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. We'll bring it up on the screen.

25 A. Oh, yes, sure.

1 Q. It's {MPS/747444/1}. Page 2 to start with
2 {MPS/747444/2}. Thank you.

3 This is an essay which you've told us you wrote for
4 a training course you did in 1979.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. It reviews the public order scene, if I can put it that
7 way, and police -- and policing of it in the 1970s.

8 A. Mm.

9 Q. Firstly, can you remember what training course you would
10 have prepared this for?

11 A. It was a Bramshill course. Inspectors Bramshill course.

12 Q. Firstly, the context. How much of a concern were
13 the demonstrations which took place in the 1970s to
14 Special Branch?

15 A. Well, they were of concern, because obviously there was
16 the potential for a public disorder, and there was
17 a disorder from time to time, and one of the primary
18 roles of police is protection of public -- you know,
19 preservation of public order. So it was perfectly
20 natural for us to be concerned with that and how best
21 can we get information on that.

22 Q. Can we look, please, at a small section of it. It's
23 page 5, please {MPS/747444/5} --

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. -- on the bottom of the page.

1 Now, I'm going to read a small section out --

2 A. Oh, yes, surely.

3 Q. -- where you deal with police intelligence on
4 demonstrations at the bottom of the page:

5 "It is a truism that full and prior knowledge of
6 extremist plans for demonstrations is the corner-stone
7 for police success in planning for demonstrations.
8 Fortunately, our liberal democratic system which
9 positively encourages demonstrations, is ultimately our
10 best weapon for obtaining intelligence. Only rarely do
11 the extremists formulate their plans in total secrecy
12 and normally, albeit grudgingly, they will supply to
13 the police the broad outline of their intentions.
14 Additionally, the need to enlist support for any event
15 necessitates publicity, usually by leaflet,
16 advertisements in sympathetic publications and publicity
17 in the newspaper of the organising group. In more
18 authoritarian countries, where the underground system is
19 by necessity more widespread, it is possible to raise
20 significant support in secret, but in this country other
21 than for small 'sit-ins' or pickets it is virtually
22 impossible to do so."

23 Is what you've written there your view now?

24 A. I think, to some extent, what I was trying to do was
25 to -- dare I say it, I realised that I couldn't talk

1 about the SDS and I didn't want to talk about the SDS,
2 so I, dare I say it, downplayed that aspect, because
3 I thought, well, look, it would be very easy -- I could
4 quite easily talk about things which would imply that we
5 had the SDS. I didn't want to do that. But I had to
6 somehow -- in dealing with that subject, I have to get
7 round that problem, dare I say it, if you're going to
8 talk about demonstrations.

9 So -- so -- but the reality is it was the very small
10 ones, the very secret ones, which were the tricky ones
11 in some respects, but what -- what -- the great thing
12 about the SDS was that you were able to -- because you
13 had the extra intelligence, you then had a better grasp
14 of the feel and the strength of the organisations, so
15 that if, for example, you -- prior to 1968, you would
16 turn round and say on a threat assessment, "Well, there
17 will probably be between 1,000 and 2,000 people and
18 whatever, and the possibility of violence exists", sort
19 of, all rather general stuff. With the existence of
20 the SDS, you would say, "Look, intelligence suggests we
21 will have 1,250 on this demonstration, there is a small
22 risk of disorder, but it's not that -- not that high",
23 but you could be far more precise in that.

24 And what it meant, as our uniformed colleagues
25 became far more trusting, dare I say it, and were aware

1 that our threat assessments were on the button, then
2 they could deploy their people far more accurately and
3 indeed not have a lot of wastage of police because they
4 didn't need colossal reserves, and the beauty is, what
5 reserves they did have could have -- would be
6 dispositioned in the right place.

7 So we were both saving money and indeed making
8 a more efficient -- it was making 10/15/20% difference,
9 or whatever it is, so the whole thing was cost effective
10 and effective in public order control terms.

11 Q. We will come on to threat assessments --

12 A. Sorry.

13 Q. -- and it is only right to say you go on later, in
14 the next paragraph, to talk about Special Branch
15 sources, which we'll come to.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. But just before we do, I understand what you say; that
18 you couldn't mention the SDS in this.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. But what I'm interested to explore is, if this much
21 information is available freely, as you mentioned there,
22 why was the SDS a necessity, in your view?

23 A. It just sharpened it up that much more, that was all.

24 I mean, you could get a fair -- when you were well
25 experienced, you could get a fair amount of information.

1 But what we did find, and I think it is true to say, is
2 that whereas a lot of organisations were compliant or,
3 you know, helpful to police and would report what they
4 were going to do, a lot of these extreme organisations
5 that were coming didn't -- weren't as compliant, so we
6 needed to be able to get the information and be more
7 precise.

8 You could come up with a reasonable assessment, but
9 what we wanted to do -- because these assessments --
10 these demonstrations weren't a sort of, "Well, we'll
11 have one here and one there", they were a constant drain
12 on police resources, so it was important that we cover
13 those efficiently as possible.

14 Q. Can I just read a little bit more --

15 A. Surely, yes.

16 Q. -- and then I'll ask you a question or two about it.

17 The next paragraph {MPS/747444/6}:

18 "The more precise plans of extremists are normally
19 supplied by Special Branch who employ rather more
20 discreet and sophisticated means of obtaining
21 information. Occasionally, Special Branch obtains
22 information from highly sensitive sources, disclosure of
23 which would involve considerable risk to informants or
24 seriously jeopardise future operations."

25 Was that a slightly more oblique reference to --

- 1 A. Yes, I used the word "informants" as --
- 2 Q. Yes.
- 3 A. -- because that is people's traditional perception of
4 how things work. I mean, you could get information from
5 three or four different main sources, and that would
6 have all -- dare I say it, was considered back in '68
7 and we came up with the system that we did. But
8 informants is -- is a way of getting information,
9 you know. But "informants" is a broad phrase which is
10 capable of other interpretations.
- 11 Q. Are you able to help us with what other sources of
12 intelligence were available to Special Branch at that
13 time?
- 14 A. There were a few people who were informants, but not
15 many. I think the trouble with informants is that they
16 are -- some are excellent, but the loyalty of all of
17 them isn't guaranteed. And, of course, the trouble is
18 that if their loyalty and their reliability isn't
19 guaranteed, they also pose a risk to the operation as
20 well, by definition, because that's -- you want people
21 you can trust when you're -- especially to get
22 continuity on this sort of thing.
- 23 Q. The SDS was -- would you agree the SDS was a relatively
24 significant departure from traditional --
- 25 A. Oh, yes.

- 1 Q. -- more traditional methods.
- 2 A. Oh, yes. It was a step further. There's no doubt about
3 that, and it was the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign that
4 had initiated that, if that's the right word.
- 5 Q. And the longer deployments that we've mentioned
6 necessarily involved a more significant intrusion into
7 people's lives, didn't they?
- 8 A. Yes, yes. I think one of the things I would say -- and
9 perhaps you're coming onto this -- is that the role of
10 the SDS did widen slightly with, dare I say it, some of
11 the IRA campaign and all that sort of thing.
- 12 Q. The question I really wanted to ask you is, given that
13 these things came along with the SDS's methods and the
14 importance that you've mentioned in the previous
15 paragraph of the liberal democratic system, was there
16 any consideration that you can recall when you were on
17 the SDS of whether the ends justified the means?
- 18 A. I think we almost approached it from the other way round
19 in this sense, but I know what you're saying. But what
20 we felt is that by having the SDS that, in fact,
21 demonstrations were more policeable. Things weren't
22 allowed to get out of control, so it was almost
23 a win-win situation. The extremists would get their
24 publicity through the media. The people who were being
25 demonstrated against weren't having a problem.

1 The police weren't having a problem. The disorder which
2 was -- was less.

3 And so, in a way, that was the whole purpose of it
4 all, was to -- it wasn't a question of, like, typical
5 police undercover work where the idea is to get three or
6 four gangsters up before the Old Bailey, as it were. It
7 was -- the idea was precisely the opposite; not to
8 bring -- be arresting people left, right and centre, but
9 to maintain public tranquility, which by definition
10 meant there would be a fewer arrests. So it wasn't
11 a matter of saying, "Get their plans and then we can
12 arrest them all". It was quite the reverse.

13 Q. I see.

14 There's just one more little passage I'd like to ask
15 you about --

16 A. Surely.

17 Q. -- in assessing and we'll move on. Just continuing from
18 where we stopped:

19 "For example, it may be known that if
20 the International Marxist Group plans to hold a six
21 man 'sit-in' at an Embassy and knowledge of this is
22 confined to a few 'trusted' supporters. Clearly, if
23 police are found to be waiting for the would-be
24 participants it would pose very serious problems for
25 the source. Similarly, if the 'sit-in' is allowed to

1 continue it might prove to be embarrassing politically.
2 A solution is to acquaint uniformed police of the
3 problem and to arrange for sufficient officers to be in
4 the vicinity so they can respond ..."

5 Mr Smith, was things -- demonstrations that were
6 embarrassing politically something that the SDS were
7 concerned with stopping?

8 A. Yes, in the sense that obviously whilst, dare I say it,
9 we would expect the Home Office, the Foreign Office or
10 British institutions to have a thick skin about these
11 things, obviously if there were demonstrations outside
12 foreign embassies and all that, well, you're now getting
13 into more ticklish territory. You have to be a bit more
14 careful. But the problem was, as I highlighted, was
15 that if police were waiting for them when they turn up,
16 then obviously there's a problem. But at the same time,
17 if police aren't aware of it and they turn up 15 minutes
18 later with blue lights, then there's a danger things can
19 go pear-shaped, to use the phrase. So the ideal thing
20 was for them to turn up gently five minutes later and
21 with a bit of luck, that minimised the risk of
22 a problem. The demonstrators would get their publicity
23 because they will probably have tipped off the press
24 beforehand so they got some nice photographs, and
25 everyone was happy.

1 Q. Just in terms of what you remember being of interest
2 when you were on the SDS, would a small sit-in be
3 the sort of thing that would have animated you or those
4 above you?

5 A. No, they weren't particularly. It depends upon
6 the type. I mean, there would have been occasions,
7 I think, when it was so small and so, in a sense,
8 insignificant that we wouldn't have told anybody. We
9 would say, "Look, you know, this one we'll just let
10 drift because it's not that relevant. It's outside,
11 you know, the front door of the Home Office or whatever
12 it is and they're used to it anyway and there's only
13 going to be a few, half a dozen. They're not going to
14 cause obstruction if they're on the pavements. So let's
15 be common sense about this. It then poses less risk to
16 -- to our source", you know.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 If we can take that document down now and move on to
19 tasking.

20 You've told us that before you joined the SDS you'd
21 been involved in C Squad --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. -- certain left wing and public order issues, and you
24 understood the area that the SDS operated in.

25 Can we take it from that that the groups, when you

1 got to the SDS, were very similar, if not identical, to
2 the ones that were of interest to C Squad?

3 A. Very -- well, yes and -- yes, I would have known
4 the main -- because having been in Special Branch,
5 I would have been aware of those groups generally anyway
6 without being on C Squad. In fact, I'd done protection
7 duty prior to that for two and a half years, but even
8 then, we still were aware of these things because you
9 needed to be.

10 Q. Is it fair to say that the main difference really
11 between the SDS and Special Branch more generally was
12 the method being used to obtain the --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- intelligence rather than --

15 A. Absolutely, yes.

16 Q. You told us in your statement that you weren't
17 specifically involved in tasking UCOs, targeting them at
18 groups.

19 A. No.

20 Q. Are you able to help us with where these targets,
21 the groups, would have come from within Special Branch?

22 A. Well, as I indicated, when I was involved in the right
23 wing sections as chief inspector, then I initiated
24 coverage of that for a variety of reasons, and so one
25 imagines that most of the targeting request, is

1 the right word, I suppose, would have come from -- from
2 C Squad, which was the primary area. I mean, Irish
3 elements were also covered as well, and that could have
4 come from another squad.

5 Q. I see. We'll come on to A8 in a moment, because you've
6 given us evidence in your statement that a lot of
7 C Squad's work was being done, in turn, for them.

8 But just to focus in on something you've told us in
9 your statement. You told us that you recall that people
10 from Special Branch would come into the SDS office when
11 you were there and say that they were interested in
12 a particular person and that you'd note down that
13 request.

14 Given that the SDS's interest, as you've told us,
15 was public order, what type of information was being
16 sought in these requests?

17 A. Simply identification of the individual. We would have
18 records on the primary people within these
19 organisations, and also, in parallel with that,
20 the Security Service were interested as well, for
21 obvious reasons. And so a chap would do -- be doing
22 a report simply to sort of check an up to date thing on
23 this person and say, "Look, is he still active? What is
24 he up to?" And if a lad was in that particular
25 organisation, it made sense for them to come to us and

1 say, "Look, can he help with this or not?" You wouldn't
2 ask any questions about this, but there was a very good
3 chance that the man in the field would be able to say,
4 "Yes, I know him, he's still active; no, he doesn't
5 appear", or whatever, and give us different bits and
6 pieces of information about him.

7 Q. How would that assist the SDS in their public order
8 remit?

9 A. It didn't assist the SDS, it's just the SDS were able
10 then to assist the branch in its overall picture of
11 the -- and indeed the Security Service.

12 Q. So it was really a sort of secondary purpose
13 byproduct --

14 A. Oh, yes, it was -- well, they were in the right position
15 to give the information, so why not?

16 Q. Roughly -- I don't expect you to be able to remember
17 specific numbers, but roughly how frequently would
18 requests like this happen?

19 A. Oh, well, couple of times of week, perhaps.

20 Q. What sort of level of officer in terms of rank would be
21 making these requests? Would it be someone senior to
22 you?

23 A. The officer doing the enquiry. It would be inspector,
24 sergeant or constable -- DC, you know, just the one who
25 was doing that particular enquiry.

1 Q. And you would -- would you simply pass these on to
2 the relevant people, or would you send them up?
3 A. Yes, yes, I mean, it would be -- the file would be put
4 in the bag, as we called it, with probably a slip on
5 saying, "Can you help Fred Bloggs on this one at all",
6 and they would know instinctively what they were saying
7 and they'd see the file. In fact, it was -- if a file
8 went out to the officer at the safe flat, then he could
9 then read it and say, "Yeah, that" -- he could see what
10 had changed or hadn't changed in terms of what
11 the individual was about.

12 Q. Photographs of potential targets.

13 How frequently do you remember those being given to
14 UCOs in the field?

15 A. I don't particularly recall that. I -- I know there was
16 fairly significant -- well, there were significant
17 coverage of demonstrations by people, but I can't
18 remember photographs. I suppose it would have happened,
19 but I don't -- that's not something I particularly
20 remember, no.

21 Q. Can you help us with how photographs of people in
22 the UCOs' groups might have assisted them?

23 A. Sorry, the UCOs' groups? I'm not ...

24 Q. Yes. So you've told us in your statement that
25 occasionally you would take photographs down in

1 the bag --

2 A. Oh, I see.

3 Q. -- I think you mentioned, to the officers in the safe

4 flat, and what I'm interested in is to understand how

5 this --

6 A. I think --

7 Q. -- assisted with --

8 A. Yeah, I think what it was was it was just part and

9 parcel of the whole overall package. Because we had

10 a photographic department that would photograph

11 demonstrations, so they'd have a whole album of these

12 things, and obviously it would be quite nice to -- they

13 could look at that -- those photographs and say, "Well,

14 that's Fred, that's Harry, that's Joe", or whatever, and

15 we may or may not have a photograph of that person on

16 file. So you were then able to put a photograph on file

17 of that individual. It just broadened your knowledge

18 about that individual.

19 Q. I see.

20 The Security Service, you mentioned.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can we look at a document, please. It's {UCPI/30066/1}.

23 It's tab 6, sir and it's page -- thank you, it's

24 {UCPI/30066/2} I'm interested in, please.

25 These were minutes of a meeting which was held

1 between the Security Service and a number of your
2 superior officers and you. I think, in fact, you took
3 these minutes. And paragraph 2, in terms of the purpose
4 of the meeting, explains that:

5 "The object of the meeting, as outlined by
6 Commander Rodger ..."

7 That's Matt Rodger:

8 "... was to examine Special Branch and Box 500
9 coverage ... of extreme left-wing groups in London, and
10 to establish where such coverage overlapped and where it
11 should be increased."

12 Do you recall, Mr Smith, whether such meetings ever
13 led to a change in officers' targeting, or a change in
14 where new officers might be targeted?

15 A. I don't recall whether there was any change, but all
16 I can say is that that would have been a natural
17 process. If you're both, as I say, looking at the same
18 field, it made sense that you have some sort of
19 awareness or coordination between you. They might say
20 to us, for example -- I mean, I'm talking hypothetically
21 now, "Oh, we're a bit thin on this ground" or we'd say,
22 "We're a bit thin on that", and just sort of, "We've got
23 that covered".

24 Duplication wasn't a problem. It was when you had
25 no cover. Duplication in fact turned it from 2D into

1 3D, if you know what I mean. So it was just a question
2 of a courtesy thing that would have happened, I imagine,
3 for -- not all the time but fairly regularly, to make
4 sure that our targeting was, you know, appropriate and
5 indeed coordinated.

6 Q. Well, that brings me on to my next question. How
7 frequently do you recall meetings like this happening?

8 A. I -- I don't particularly recall it, but -- but my
9 definition is I would have thought every two or
10 three years or so. Not -- it wouldn't have been a sort
11 of every five minutes job.

12 Q. Two or three years, do you think?

13 A. Two or three, I think, yes. It wouldn't have been --
14 because the nature of these organisations and the nature
15 of the scene changing wasn't that rapid. Things just
16 sort of drifted in. It's like animal rights. I mean,
17 it didn't -- in this period, animal rights wasn't
18 featuring, but by the end of the 70s, it was, and then
19 over a period of time it eventually -- well, not
20 disappeared, but it reduced really because animal rights
21 achieved a lot of the things they wanted to achieve.

22 Q. A question just about the administration of this meeting
23 and perhaps others. We can see that minutes were taken
24 of this meeting that you took. Were meeting minutes
25 such as this always taken and kept by the SDS?

1 A. I was -- you know, I don't remember having that many
2 meetings. I mean, this meeting obviously took place,
3 but beyond that, no, I don't -- I don't recall. There
4 would have been -- there was the annual report, which
5 covered the whole thing, which in a sense gave
6 the people above, the commander and the DAC or whatever,
7 a summary of what was going on and so they were au fait
8 with everything and up to date. But no, I think this
9 was -- this is the only agency that we would have been
10 dealing with. I can't think of any other agency that
11 would have required such -- you know, needed such
12 meetings.

13 Q. I see.

14 And can we take it from that that internal meetings
15 within the SDS not involving outside agencies wouldn't
16 necessarily be minuted, in your memory?

17 A. If it was something important, it would have been
18 minuted, I'm sure, but not -- not necessarily. I mean,
19 it would be discussed. I'm trying to think of --
20 the whole thing ran itself in many respects. I mean,
21 the organisation didn't change that much, and the
22 product was coming through, and there wasn't -- we
23 didn't have chief superintendents knocking on the door
24 saying, "Will you do that, will you do that, will you do
25 the other?" We knew what we had to do. We were

1 covering the organisations and that was it. There
2 wasn't the sort of -- the thing, I wouldn't say ran
3 itself, but in many ways it did, to be honest.

4 Q. Do you recall any element of socialising with MI5 before
5 or after this meetings?

6 A. Not with MI5, no.

7 Q. Can we look, please, on page 3 {UCPI/30066/3} at
8 paragraph 7 of this document.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Thank you.

11 I just want to read it out, and it may be that you
12 may or may not be able to assist us with this:

13 "... Young Liberals and [redacted] were other fields
14 currently being examined by the SOS ..."

15 I think it's OS.

16 A. It is, yes.

17 Q. It's a reference to the SDS:

18 "... for their potential. MI5 expressed interest
19 and offered any assistance from his department."

20 The Young Liberals was a group I wanted to ask you
21 about. Do you recall if this group's initial targeting
22 was encouraged by the Security Service, or, as this
23 document seems to suggest, that they were being informed
24 after it had happened?

25 A. I don't remember the exact timing of it. All I can

1 remember with the Young Liberals was that they were very
2 much -- the Young Liberals per se wasn't of interest,
3 but there were -- elements in it were involved in
4 Anti-Apartheid Movement and that sort of thing. Also,
5 too, the Young Liberals, whilst they weren't anything
6 like as extreme, dare I say it, as the Trotskyists, they
7 were an ideal stepping stone for somebody to have a bit
8 of street cred to then move on to it. It's sort of like
9 joining CND and having CND on your CV and then joining,
10 because you couldn't -- in a sense, it was you're
11 suddenly -- someone who is not interested in politics,
12 suddenly you want to join IMG, whereas if you have a bit
13 of street cred and awareness and you've been in some
14 other organisation, it's a much better stepping stone to
15 do that.

16 So, in part, the Young Liberals will have served
17 that purpose, but also there was this element within
18 the Young Liberals that were engaged in the
19 Anti-Apartheid Movement and some quite interesting
20 demonstrations on that front.

21 Q. You mentioned in your statement -- and we know that
22 an officer, who we know as HN298, and you can refresh
23 your memory of who that is.

24 Could I ask you, Mr Smith, just to put the folder on
25 the side table that you have, please.

1 A. I can do, yes.

2 (Pause)

3 Yes.

4 Q. That officer was deployed for some time into the

5 Young Liberals.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And you've told us in your statement that you recall

8 that he may have used that to move on to other groups

9 thereafter.

10 A. Yes, yeah.

11 Q. And I think we know that he later went on to anarchist

12 groups and Irish support groups and later the

13 Workers' Revolutionary Party. Is that the sort of

14 movement that you are describing?

15 A. Yes, exactly, yes.

16 Q. Finally on this, Mr Smith, was there any concern that

17 you can recall within the SDS about a police officer

18 reporting on the youth wing of a mainstream political

19 party?

20 A. No, I think it was because we were interested in that

21 one element, the element of the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

22 It wasn't the general -- there was no interest

23 whatsoever in -- in the Young Liberals per se. It was

24 just that there was an element of them that were

25 involved in that. It was a transient thing. I think

1 later on -- I mean, the Young Liberals didn't -- weren't
2 so involved with it and so, therefore, we never went
3 back to them, to my knowledge. Well, I can't speak
4 authoritatively, but my -- what knowledge I have, that
5 was the one time when we looked at that.

6 Q. Can we take this document down, please, and replace it
7 with another document {MPS/729093/2}. It's page 2 and
8 that's tab 10 of your bundle, sir.

9 This, Mr Smith, is a -- I think it's called a minute
10 sheet --

11 A. Mm-hm.

12 Q. -- which shows various comments on a report which was
13 produced on the IMG by an officer.

14 Can we scroll down to the second half of the page,
15 please {MPS/729093/2}. You'll see at minute 2 comments
16 by -- I think that's Matt Rodger, the Commander, who
17 says:

18 "You will wish to peruse Detective Constable HN338's
19 report which I regard as quite magnificent, both in
20 relation to content and presentation, for such a junior
21 officer. It will certainly be eagerly grasped by
22 the Security Service and doubtless keep their Trotskyist
23 desk well occupied for months ahead.

24 "At one time, you will recall, IMG was a headache to
25 police in regard to the preservation of public order;

1 invariably they were in the vanguard of any
2 demonstration which bordered on violence and disorder.
3 At present they certainly do not pose any real threat in
4 this area, and the future of the party as an active
5 revolutionary body will depend to quite a considerable
6 extent upon whether the differences existing within
7 the leadership are resolved."

8 That is a comment made in June 1973 when you were in
9 the SDS.

10 Would you agree that that comment tends to suggest,
11 at least, that the report in question was of more use to
12 the Security Service than it was to Special Branch?

13 A. Yes. They were talking about the -- I think there's
14 a thing called tendencies within IMG, and there were two
15 or three or four of these tendencies, and basically they
16 were vying for power within IMG and they were producing
17 quite long documents about their subtle variations of
18 Trotskyism or interpretation thereof, and so -- and that
19 was part and parcel of the power struggle that was
20 taking part within IMG.

21 Now, the politics didn't particularly bother SB, but
22 obviously we passed it on to the security, because it
23 was right, you know, up their alley, as it were. That
24 was what they wanted.

25 Q. These reports, which I don't need to take you to, came

1 towards the end of the officers concerned --

2 A. Indeed, yeah.

3 Q. -- deployments, about three years or so.

4 Do you recall whether officers' deployments were
5 perhaps extended to serve purposes that benefited MI5?

6 A. I don't think -- MI5, to my knowledge, didn't have any
7 input in terms of how long an officer would be deployed.
8 They were aware of the deployment because we were
9 sending them copies of -- of the reports, but that was
10 entirely down to the officer concerned. The length of
11 an officer's deployment was very much he was the lead in
12 that. Typically they were out for -- as you know, for
13 two/three years or whatever, but, no, it was the officer
14 himself that determined that.

15 Q. In your view, do you consider that MI5 influenced SDS
16 tasking -- targeting?

17 A. No. I mean, "influenced" is the wrong word. If they
18 provided information that was valuable to us in
19 targeting, yes, but to influence to say that they said,
20 "Oh, we would like you to do this", no. We -- we made
21 our own judgment. We might help them, obviously, but,
22 no, I think primarily we were interested in public
23 order. It was obviously of interest or our mutual
24 benefit to know what we were doing and how we were doing
25 it, but that -- that was the extent of it all, no.

1 MR WARNER: Sir, might that be an appropriate time for
2 a short break.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it would. We will have a break of
4 a quarter of an hour and then resume.

5 A. Okay, thank you.

6 (11.38 am)

7 (A short break)

8 (11.56 am)

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

10 MR WARNER: Thank you.

11 Mr Smith, can we turn, please, to processing of
12 the reporting and how it left the SDS, if I can put it
13 that way.

14 You told us that your primary duty was to process
15 the handwritten reports which came to you from officers
16 via the DI or the DCI. Other than handwritten reports,
17 were there any other methods used in the SDS for passing
18 intelligence on?

19 A. Sometimes by telephone, of course. If there was
20 something that came through at the last moment, then
21 obviously the passing of a -- of a written report wasn't
22 practicable, so -- but that was not -- it was
23 infrequent, I think, to say that.

24 Q. When you processed these reports, are we right to
25 understand that you didn't play a role in sanitising

- 1 them?
- 2 A. No, I think, no, mainly it was just putting them into
3 the format, tidying them up, as it were, getting them
4 typed up by the typing pool, which was right next door
5 to us. No, I can't think -- nothing comes to mind in
6 that respect, no.
- 7 Q. You didn't play any role in analysing what was in them,
8 the content?
- 9 A. Well, I was aware of what was in them, obviously, and
10 then you -- I'd be aware that -- what needed to be
11 expedited, dare I say it, or was routine. That was
12 self-evident, and so obviously I acted accordingly as to
13 what -- what the information was.
- 14 Q. The sort of more detailed analysis rather than if I --
15 the role that you played, would that happen further up
16 the chain within Special Branch, as you understood it?
- 17 A. Well, mainly the information just -- I put the
18 information into the system and then the system --
19 the information would then go onto file or be something
20 that would contribute towards, obviously, a threat
21 assessment or whatever. The information itself was just
22 like another little brick in the wall. I mean, we were
23 just adding to the wall of our intelligence.
- 24 Q. The batches of reports that came to you, 15 to 20 or so,
25 roughly speaking, how long would it take you to go

1 through a sheathe of documents like that and send them
2 off?

3 A. Well, it depends upon the size of the document itself.
4 I mean, some of them, just a quarter of an hour,
5 20 minutes, I suppose, if that, and then another one,
6 you know, might take a little longer, but there wasn't
7 -- wasn't a great deal of time, no.

8 Q. You've told us that once they came back from the typing
9 pool, they were signed by the chief inspector, generally
10 speaking, and then went to the relevant chief inspector
11 in Special Branch, who would take action as necessary.

12 A. Yes, they would then minute it further, yes.

13 Q. And my first question is how did you know which chief
14 inspector to send it to?

15 A. Oh, it was self -- because you know -- I knew which
16 organisation was covered by which squad, they were all
17 just literally down the corridor from me, one way or
18 the other, and I'd just walk them straight down and give
19 them a batch, usually, and say -- well, tell them --
20 they knew who I was and so they knew exactly what
21 the reports were.

22 Q. What sort of action would you have imagined
23 the receiving chief inspector to take on
24 the intelligence you were passing?

25 A. Well, a lot of it would have been put onto just the --

1 either the individual's file or the group file, as
2 necessary, and in the case of -- stuff relating to
3 specific demonstrations would have been sent to or
4 brought to the attention of the officers who were going
5 to be involved in that demonstration; the man compiling
6 the threat assessment, for example, so they could
7 incorporate that, yes.

8 Q. And the decision about how to send this on, is that
9 the sort of thing that would tend to be included on
10 a minute sheet like the one we saw?

11 A. Yes, exactly, yes. So they would say, "So and so to
12 see, so and so to do whatever", and they would --

13 Q. I see.

14 A. -- sort of ... yeah.

15 Q. A8. You've told us in your statement you possibly
16 remember passing intelligence directly to A8 a dozen or
17 so times --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- a year and that you would somewhat sanitise a report
20 in order to protect its sources --

21 A. Yes, yes.

22 Q. -- if you sent it this way. Are we right to understand
23 that's because the intelligence was leaving
24 Special Branch and going into the police more widely?

25 A. Yes, you had to be, obviously, more careful. You didn't

1 want to do anything that would remotely run the risk of
2 identifying the nature of the source -- well, not the --
3 the identity of the source, but nevertheless you wanted
4 to get that information across.

5 I mean, I'll just give a hypothetical example. If
6 you knew that something was going to happen, that
7 20 people were going to be at a certain place at
8 1 o'clock and they were going to be protesting about
9 a certain thing, you make it -- you may make the numbers
10 less precise, you may make the time less precise, but
11 the broad thrust of what you were saying was there so
12 that they were able to sort of -- the uniformed
13 colleagues were able to keep an eye on things and be in
14 attendance fairly -- at the appropriate time.

15 Q. How did you know to do this? Were you instructed --

16 A. It's just common sense, really. You knew. You could --

17 (a) I knew that A8 obviously needed to be told very
18 quickly, so I would do that, and you've just -- you just
19 instinctively knew. You said, "Well, look ..." -- you
20 knew what would obviously pose a risk to the officer.

21 I mean, it usually would be, obviously, in the form of
22 a telephone message, not a full formal SB report where
23 you've got names and details which would help in
24 identifying where it came from and everything else.

25 Q. You mention in your statement that -- and I don't want

1 you, please, to mention any names --

2 A. No, no.

3 Q. -- at this stage -- that a Special Branch liaison
4 officer was instituted at some point.

5 A. At some point, yeah.

6 Q. Is it right to say that the job of sanitising was
7 effectively taken out of your hands and put into theirs?

8 A. No, I don't think so. I think it was probably what
9 the SB liaison officer was doing, in a sense, was
10 helping A8 to sort of understand exactly what it is we
11 were saying, because he would know, and also to help
12 make sure that they protected our information and that
13 they were briefed accordingly.

14 I mean, what we didn't want was a uniform inspector
15 coming up to a demonstrator and saying, "Oh, you're
16 late", or whatever. Well, it did happen on a few
17 occasions, but, obviously, if we could reduce that to
18 zero or as near to zero as possible, was to our
19 advantage. I mean, it was what we wanted.

20 And so he would have helped in making sure that our
21 interests were -- were served within A8, albeit that
22 I think that the vast majority of the A8 people were
23 aware of that anyway, but we needed a belt and braces
24 approach because of the nature of the work.

25 Q. We know, and you've given evidence in your statement,

1 that C Squad prepared threat assessments --

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. -- for A8, didn't they?

4 A. Mm.

5 Q. Are these -- were these sometimes referred to

6 as "pre-demonstration assessments" that you recall? Is

7 that a term that you recollect?

8 A. No, it would -- obviously the first line would say,

9 "This is a threat assessment regarding a demonstration",

10 or whatever, that was going to take place on so and so,

11 but they were just called threat assessments, as

12 I recall. It may have changed later, but ...

13 Q. I see. It may be that what we're thinking of came

14 slightly after --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- you left the SDS.

17 The Inquiry has also seen a document, an internal

18 document, from Special Branch saying that in around

19 1976 -- so bear in mind that this a couple of years

20 after you left -- that C Squad were preparing between

21 600 and 700 threat assessments a year for A8. That's

22 more than ten a week.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Do you think that sort of figure is accurate, to your

25 recollection?

1 A. Well, all I can remember was that demonstration activity
2 was pretty constant. There wasn't a weekend -- barely
3 a weekend that didn't pass off without a fairly
4 significant demonstration, plus a whole lot of these
5 smaller ones taking place. It was the nature of
6 the political scene at the time.

7 Q. So a number like that perhaps in your time within
8 the SDS might not be wildly exaggerated?

9 A. No, it would be -- something along that order wouldn't
10 surprise me, no.

11 Q. And from your recollection -- again, please, no
12 details -- do you recall whether other Special Branch
13 squads would sometimes feed into these assessments?

14 A. If it was the relevant organisation, yes.

15 Q. And, presumably, SDS intelligence, would you expect that
16 to feed into these assessments?

17 A. Oh, yes, yes. That was woven into it just naturally.
18 I mean, as I said, the officers who were preparing
19 the assessments would have been able to do the basic
20 framework of that assessment and would have that
21 literally written down ready as a draft. But what
22 the SDS were doing were padding out the juicy bits, as
23 it were, and giving us more precision on terms of
24 the numbers and the likelihood of violence, and any
25 little action which was going to be different to

1 the main -- the main plot, as it were.

2 If you were marching from, let's say, Marble Arch
3 down to Trafalgar Square, if there was some target on
4 the way that they were particularly interested in and
5 they were going to have a little sit down or a diversion
6 to it, then that would be woven into the -- into
7 the report.

8 Q. And presumably would you have expected there would be
9 some degree of sanitisation of SDS intelligence for the
10 time it ended up in --

11 A. Yes, there was a natural level of protection and common
12 sense used about that. You didn't give them chapter and
13 verse, but you'd give them sufficient such that they can
14 make an intelligent understanding of what was going on.

15 Q. I see.

16 Moving on to post-demonstration, after
17 demonstration, reports.

18 A. Mm.

19 Q. Was this down internally within the SDS, or was that
20 a function of C Squad?

21 A. That was a function of C Squad, but what the SDS did was
22 to contribute to that in terms of the people who had
23 attended from the various organisations and any other
24 little relevant bits and pieces which might add to
25 the -- sort of the picture of or the report of

1 the demonstration. But primarily, it was the names of
2 the people who had taken part in the demonstration.

3 Q. And when you say SDS -- the SDS would contribute, is
4 that by virtue of written reports or would they meet in
5 person with people from C Squad?

6 A. No, what would happen was that, generally speaking,
7 on -- this was on all the major demonstrations. I would
8 be in the -- I'd go out on the demonstration, see
9 the demonstration, come back just before the end, go
10 back to the office. They would then phone in, the lads
11 who had been out on the demonstration, with their ident
12 as we call it. I would then compile a list of those
13 ident with the organisations that were responsible --
14 they were part of, and that would then be given and it
15 would be part of an appendix attached to the report by
16 C Squad. And, I mean, C Squad would have had a few
17 ident themselves anyway and we would have been adding
18 to that substantially, actually.

19 Q. Do you ever recall a formal debriefing of UCOs,
20 officers, after they had been on demonstrations? Again,
21 no specifics, please.

22 A. Unless -- not -- not particularly, no. I think that on
23 the Monday morning, if there had been a big, big
24 demonstration, and on the Monday afternoon, then it's
25 quite possible that the DCI and the DI would have had

1 a -- they'd have had a group chat about it naturally and
2 say, "Well, that went off all right".

3 But there was -- most of the demonstrations, I have
4 to say, passed off reasonably well. I mean, there would
5 be a few arrests here and there, but nothing -- nothing
6 along the lines -- if you'd had something along
7 the lines of that VSC demonstration -- there was
8 a coffins demonstration, I vaguely remember, in about
9 1980 which was rather -- rather difficult, to put it
10 mildly, and a few others, but --

11 Q. Well, just focusing on when you were within the SDS.

12 A. Yes, within the SDS. No, I can't recall. There would
13 have been, but I can't remember them.

14 Q. There was a demonstration which didn't go off without
15 a problem towards the end of your involvement in the SDS
16 at Red Lion Square in which a demonstrator called
17 Kevin Gately was killed.

18 Now, do you recall whether the SDS would have
19 produced a post-demonstration report in the method -- in
20 the way that you have suggested after that?

21 A. Yes, Red Lion Square rings a bell. That's about as far
22 as I can remember, to be honest.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. But I don't remember.

25 Q. If you can't go into more detail --

- 1 A. I can't. I don't know, no.
- 2 Q. Moving on to the volume more generally of reporting that
3 came out of the SDS during your time, and this may be
4 a very difficult question to answer, are you able to
5 help us with how many reports, roughly speaking, per
6 year or per month would be coming out of the unit when
7 you were processing them?
- 8 A. I suppose in the course of a week, there would have been
9 50 or so. I don't -- difficult to say. I mean,
10 everybody would have been producing three/four reports
11 a week, or perhaps more or less. At least a dozen
12 officers. Yeah, I suppose 50ish, but I'm -- again, I --
13 it -- it's a bit of a guess, to be honest.
- 14 Q. I won't ask you any more about it, in that case.
15 Are you able to say, of a proportion of this, how
16 much of that material went to the Security Service when
17 you were in the --
- 18 A. I would have said somewhere round about 75 to 80%. We
19 didn't send them the Irish stuff because national
20 responsibility was for us in those days and like -- so
21 that would involve just a couple of organisations.
- 22 Q. That's fine, Mr Smith, if that's your recollection.
23 Finally, this, on this topic: feedback. You've told
24 us earlier today that you knew that your intelligence
25 effectively was of assistance.

1 A. Oh, yes.

2 Q. But you mention in your statement that you didn't
3 receive any feedback, either from A8 or the
4 Security Service. How is it that you knew that your
5 intelligence was helping?

6 A. Oh, because of the, dare I say it, the contact that we
7 did have. The Security Service we didn't get any
8 feedback from, that I'm aware of. That doesn't say
9 there wasn't any. But with A8, certainly. I mean, what
10 would happen on a major demonstration is
11 a Special Branch officer would probably be in
12 the control centre anyway on the day, where they're
13 masterminding the demonstration, and the relationship --
14 I can remember we used -- there used to be a security
15 committee which was held at chief
16 inspector/superintendent/chief superintendent sort of
17 level with the commander of A8 in the 80s and I went to
18 those as a superintendent --

19 Q. If we could just focus on when you were within the SDS.

20 A. With the SDS. Well, no, it was just common knowledge
21 that the relationship was great and it was fine.
22 I can't be specific about that.

23 Q. Okay.

24 Management, if I can. The Inquiry -- just
25 generally. The Inquiry has heard evidence from some of

1 the officers who came just before you or in fact
2 overlapped with you that there was, generally speaking,
3 a loose system of management within the SDS. It wasn't
4 particularly hierarchical --

5 A. No.

6 Q. -- as some other parts of Special Branch were.

7 A. No, there would be. No.

8 Q. Would you agree with that?

9 A. Yes. I mean, there was just the chief inspector and the
10 inspector, that was it. And, as I said, a great part of
11 the support mechanism was in fact their colleagues.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. So that, in a sense, was -- was unusual. I mean,
14 obviously colleagues supported one -- one another
15 elsewhere in Special Branch, but in this thing, because
16 of, dare I say it, the ring craft that was vital to
17 them, then that support, and indeed the fact that they
18 were both in the same unique environment, was -- they
19 knew what they were talking about when they were talking
20 to each other.

21 Q. You've told us in your statement that you didn't have
22 a formal pastoral role with the UCOs.

23 A. No.

24 Q. But you consider yourself a colleague of them.

25 A. Oh, yes, yes.

- 1 Q. And you did help out ad hoc with management when
2 required.
- 3 A. Yes, indeed, yes.
- 4 Q. And we'll come on to an example of that in a moment.
5 One of the officers that was on the unit when you
6 were there described you as an officer that we know as
7 HN294's number two in command. Now, can I just ask you
8 to have a look at who HN294 is, please. If you could
9 keep the folder where it is. Thank you.
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And one of the UCOs you managed describes you as his
12 number two. Do you think that's an accurate assessment
13 of what your role was?
- 14 A. Well, I was the next in the chain. I mean, there was
15 only four of us in the office. There was the DCI,
16 the DI, me and then the DC. So it was -- it was a small
17 structure.
- 18 Q. Geoffrey Craft, who came after you, has told the Inquiry
19 in his witness statement that, in his view, the DSs in
20 the back office were part of the management team.
- 21 A. Yes, yes.
- 22 Q. And certainly your successor in the back office has said
23 something similar.
- 24 A. Yeah.
- 25 Q. So would you agree that you considered yourself part of

- 1 the wider management team?
- 2 A. Yes. I mean, I was aware of what was going on and
3 I could contribute, obviously, if necessary, and we were
4 all in the same office, so it was natural we spoke, and
5 there was no sort of "know your place" type of thing.
6 We were all part of the same team. So it was a natural
7 -- a natural event, you know, that we chatted to each
8 other about it. And even the DC would -- you know,
9 everybody would have a bit of input. You know, wisdom
10 isn't unique to the ranks.
- 11 Q. Part of that interaction would have happened at the safe
12 house.
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. And you've told us that you visited about once a month
15 and sometimes a few more times --
- 16 A. Yeah.
- 17 Q. -- a year on top of that, when required, the purpose
18 being to take the bag down, as you've mentioned, but
19 also, I think you said, to socialise with the officers.
- 20 A. That would be it, yeah.
- 21 Q. Now, is this -- this happened on a monthly basis --
- 22 A. Monthly basis.
- 23 Q. -- roughly speaking?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. And this socialising, would it be a drink, a meal,

1 something like that?

2 A. A meal and then followed by some drinks. It was --
3 the chief inspector described it as a vino veritas
4 section -- session. It enabled them to relax, because
5 they weren't able to do that otherwise, as they would
6 have done back in the mainland Special Branch, and if
7 they had something -- you know, with a few drinks, if
8 they had a problem, people tend to be, dare I say it,
9 a little more bold.

10 Q. Well, I think on that point, you've told us that on
11 occasion -- these occasions, officers would sometimes
12 speak their minds --

13 A. Yes, exactly.

14 Q. -- tell you what was going on --

15 A. Yeah, yeah.

16 Q. -- and discuss problems -- any problems they might be
17 having.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Do you recall whether this -- again, no specifics,
20 please, but did this sort of thing happen often?

21 A. I think it was just -- it's part and parcel, yes, of
22 what happened. It was the nature of it. Because I can
23 remember the chief inspector saying something to
24 the effect that, "This is a unique situation, we have to
25 be more tolerant and understand why it is that this is

- 1 so, because this is the only place they can let off
2 steam", and I think it was a very valuable valve for
3 that to happen.
- 4 Q. And would that include what was going on in their
5 deployments or their lives outside of the SDS or both?
- 6 A. I think that probably what was happening in their lives
7 outside SDS was probably more between themselves,
8 although obviously one knew some of these officers --
9 I knew a few -- a few of these officers from before.
10 So, therefore, you knew to some extent their personal
11 circumstances, because it was a -- there was a sort of
12 family sense, dare I say it, about Special Branch as
13 a whole. But primarily, if there was discussion or
14 anything that was -- "interesting" is probably the wrong
15 word, but this was an opportunity, if they had
16 a problem, to say it, and they would. They weren't --
17 they weren't shy, but that's what we wanted.
- 18 Q. And that would include, would it, things going on in
19 their deployments, problems, issues --
- 20 A. Yeah, I would -- yes, yes. If they wanted to, there was
21 someone there. Not necessarily to me or -- but
22 someone -- someone would probably know about it.
- 23 Q. And if you had become aware of a particular issue that
24 you had been told socialising that you thought your
25 superiors needed to be aware of --

- 1 A. Oh, we'd just do it.
- 2 Q. -- would you pass it on?
- 3 A. Oh, of course, yes, yes.
- 4 Q. Geoffrey Craft has also told us in his statement that he
5 doesn't consider that any police officers were more
6 carefully monitored than the SDS --
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. -- the deployed officer. Would you agree with that?
- 9 A. Yes, yes.
- 10 Q. And in practice, was the socialising at the safe
11 house/after the safe house that in action?
- 12 A. That was an integral part of it all, yes. It was part
13 of that process. I mean, what you had was a chief
14 inspector and an inspector pretty well full time looking
15 after these -- these guys, whereas, you know, as a DC on
16 the squad, you may not have quite that same closeness.
17 I mean, obviously there was a closeness, but it was just
18 the nature of the work made it so.
- 19 Q. I'd like to ask you about a couple of specific examples
20 of things that happened while you were in the SDS.
21 The first is the withdrawal of an officer that we know
22 as HN68. So if you'd like to have a look at the book.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Now, we know that this officer was deployed in the
25 Irish field --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- while you were in the SDS, and you've told us in your
3 statement that you recall that he was detained by
4 the police at some point, we suspect probably in around
5 1974, and this all happened while your superior officers
6 were away.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. So do we understand it then that you were effectively
9 holding the fort --

10 A. Yes, yes.

11 Q. -- while they were absent?

12 And you were told about this and you had to take
13 some action --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- in response to it.

16 Was the fact that you were being presented with this
17 issue a surprise to you, or were you expecting to have
18 to deal with any problems that arose?

19 A. Yes, it was just natural. I mean, I'd been there --
20 I'd been in Special Branch then for, what, 14 --
21 15/14 years, so I wasn't a rookie and I knew the squad
22 well, and so when this problem presented itself, I knew
23 it was urgent and I took it -- I thought, "Well, I think
24 we need to do this", went and saw, I think,
25 the appropriate chief superintendent. We then went and

1 saw the commander and we were all agreed and that very
2 day, the officer was withdrawn.

3 Q. If your superiors had been there that day when the issue
4 had arisen, do you think you would have been involved in
5 it or not?

6 A. I may have been aware of it, but they would have dealt
7 with it, and I'm confident they would have dealt with it
8 in exactly the same way.

9 Q. And can you recall whether they were -- when they did
10 return, they were content with how the issue had been --

11 A. Yes, I never had a moment of criticism. The only person
12 who complained was the individual himself, but ten years
13 later, he said it was the best thing that ever happened
14 to him, but that's another story.

15 Q. I see.

16 Another issue I'd like to ask you about is the
17 withdrawal of three officers which took place at the
18 beginning of 1973, and if we could bring up a document,
19 please {MPS/728975/1}. And it's page 5, please
20 {MPS/728975/5}.

21 Now, the top of this, I should explain, Mr Smith, is
22 the annual report for 1973 from the SDS, and
23 paragraph 18 reads:

24 "The unfortunate appearance in the extremist field
25 of a ..."

1 And the gist says:

2 "... member of the public necessitated the immediate
3 withdrawal of two women detective constables.

4 "The loss of knowledge and expertise when
5 a long-serving officer is permanently withdrawn is
6 serious but unavoidable, if the stringent demands of
7 security and the officers best interests are to be
8 served."

9 Now, Mr Smith, we know that that is a reference to
10 an occasion when three officers in fact were withdrawn,
11 and I'll give you the numbers, if you'd like to refresh
12 your memory. It's HN348.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. HN45.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And the third is a name I can tell you. It's
17 Jill Mosdell.

18 A. Yes. Yes, I ...

19 Q. Now, I'd like you, please, to answer my next question
20 just "yes" or "no". Given that you were involved in
21 the SDS at this time, were you aware of those
22 three individuals being withdrawn from the field?

23 A. I might have been, but I don't -- I don't -- I can't
24 recall it.

25 Q. Is it the sort of thing, generally speaking, that you

1 would have been likely to have been aware of at the
2 time?

3 A. I would have thought so, yes.

4 Q. So can I take it from that that you can't help us with
5 the circumstances surrounding it?

6 A. No. The only thing I can say is that two of
7 the individuals were in the same organisation.

8 Q. Yes, well, thank you.

9 Can I also take it then that you can't help us with
10 any visits which may have occurred from very senior
11 officers to one of the people concerned to discuss what
12 had happened?

13 A. No, I can't, no.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 Now, the SDS, you have told us in your statement,
16 left a safe house -- one of the safe houses that was
17 used around 18 months or so after you joined the unit
18 due to a security concern. Now, 18 months or so would
19 take us to around the middle of 1972 --

20 A. Mm-hm.

21 Q. -- roughly speaking, and we know that these officers
22 were withdrawn at the beginning of 1973, so a few months
23 thereafter. And we've also heard from you in your
24 statement, and there is some evidence, that around this
25 time, early 1973 or so, the SDS procured a second safe

1 house.

2 Now, again, a "yes" or "no" answer, please. Are you
3 able to help us with whether these three officers being
4 withdrawn led to a change in the practice --

5 A. No.

6 Q. -- regarding safe houses?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you, generally speaking, remember your views being
9 sought about officers being withdrawn from the field,
10 and no specifics, please.

11 A. No -- no, no.

12 Q. You mentioned a little earlier that you attended
13 demonstrations as part of your job in the back office.

14 A. Mm.

15 Q. Was this for the purpose of intelligence-gathering or
16 was this just to keep an eye on the officers who were
17 there?

18 A. It wasn't necessarily intelligence-gathering, it was
19 simply if you were -- if you saw the demonstration that
20 the lads were involved, then you could get a better
21 understanding of what was happening and what they were
22 saying. It was -- it was just -- just -- it put it into
23 3D, as I would say.

24 Q. Recruitment of officers.

25 One of your successors in the management structure

1 of the SDS, Angus McIntosh, recalls that back office
2 sergeants would play a role in recruitment, making
3 recommendations particularly. Was that something you
4 ever did?

5 A. No, no.

6 Q. Would you ever be asked for your opinion on someone? No
7 specifics, please, but whether --

8 A. No, I can't remember that happening, no. I mean,
9 I probably would have contributed to it, but I can't
10 remember being asked it.

11 Q. We know that two officers were recruited to the SDS just
12 as you were leaving the unit. One is called Rick Clark,
13 was called Rick Clark, and the other was HN300, if you
14 would like to just have a look.

15 A. Yes. Thank you.

16 Q. The Inquiry has heard evidence that both of these
17 persons, in slightly different respects, had reputations
18 within Special Branch, one for womanising. Was that
19 a reputation that you were aware of when they joined --

20 A. Not at that time, no.

21 Q. Did you come to learn about it afterwards?

22 A. Oh, 10/15 years later, yes.

23 Q. If someone had been recruited to the back office with
24 such a reputation, would you have done something
25 about it?

1 A. Yes, I would have said, "I don't think it's advisable".

2 Q. Do you have a view now, or then when you were in
3 the SDS, about what sort of people were or were not
4 suitable for undercover work?

5 A. Yes, I think you needed volunteers, for a start,
6 I think, because then obviously the person was willing
7 to sort of -- if you ask a junior officer to do
8 something, then he may feel he's being coerced, so
9 avoided that. But, yes, because you knew the officers,
10 you knew those that were better than others. One had
11 a view of most officers. Yes, I think so. You --
12 I would have -- I would have certainly said that certain
13 types of individual weren't suitable for it. You needed
14 those with a -- sort of a balanced, calm disposition.

15 Q. Undercover identities, please.

16 You've told us that you don't know how undercover
17 officers created their identities when you were --

18 A. No, that was something that was dealt with by
19 the individual --

20 Q. Well --

21 A. Sorry.

22 Q. I'll just ask a question about it.

23 At the time that you joined the SDS, the evidence
24 the Inquiry has received suggests that undercover
25 officers made up names that they used. However, by

1 the time you left the unit, October 1974, they were --
2 officers were obtaining details of deceased children,
3 normally from Somerset House, to support their
4 undercover identities.

5 Given your role in the back office that you've told
6 us about and your role as colleagues to these people,
7 can you help us with what led to this change?

8 A. No, I can't -- I can't remember, no.

9 Q. Is it right --

10 A. I think --

11 Q. Sorry.

12 A. Sorry. All I could say was I think in -- speaking to
13 just one officer many years later, he said that his
14 problem had been he hadn't got a proper identity and
15 that had led to a problem. So I suspect that he had
16 a problem and that was part of the reason why he had to
17 leave, and that may have been part of the trigger
18 process to go for a more secure system, but I don't know
19 that.

20 Q. You don't recall that --

21 A. I don't know that to be a fact.

22 Q. -- at the time?

23 So can we take it from that that you don't recall
24 any discussions with officers or --

25 A. No, no. That was all dealt with at -- with the

- 1 individual and the chief inspector and the inspector.
- 2 Q. You weren't included with the conversation with
3 the chief inspector or the inspector about --
- 4 A. Yeah, they would give them advice about what to do and
5 what -- and I think that that would have all happened
6 out of -- that obviously happened, and the only people
7 who would have been involved are those two and the
8 individual themselves.
- 9 Q. Do you think, looking back, that it's likely or possible
10 that the decision to change the policy, if I can call it
11 that, would have been taken at the chief inspector level
12 or higher within Special Branch?
- 13 A. I don't know. It's possible. It's -- I don't know.
14 I don't know.
- 15 Q. Were you aware at the time of a criminal case involving
16 a person who had used a deceased person's identity
17 influencing this decision?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. Were you aware of "The Day of the Jackal" book --
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. -- coming out?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. Are you aware -- and the film thereafter.
- 24 Are you aware of that influencing the decision to
25 change the policy?

1 A. Well, at this period of time, I can't be sure. But I do
2 remember "The Day of the Jackal" and that system being
3 sort of mooted. It's a question of which came first,
4 the chicken or the egg, and I can't remember.

5 Q. I'd like to ask you about a specific officer, HN200,
6 please. If I could ask you to have a look.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. HN200 has told the Inquiry that he was told by someone
9 in the back office to go to Somerset House and, in fact,
10 that person went with him to show him what to do.

11 Now, we suspect that HN200 joined the SDS in around
12 April 1974.

13 A. Yeah --

14 Q. So --

15 A. He was one of the later ones, as I recall, yeah.

16 Q. Can you help us whether that person was you or not?

17 A. I can't at all, no, no.

18 Q. Can I ask you whether you recall HN200 mentioning to you
19 or within your earshot that he --

20 A. No, no.

21 Q. -- was upset at the --

22 A. No, no.

23 Q. -- prospect of using a deceased child's identity?

24 A. No, I can't remember anything of that, no.

25 Q. More generally, can I ask you, please, what your

1 attitude was to finding out that undercover officers had
2 used the identities of deceased children?

3 A. Well, I must confess, I -- it's difficult to think of
4 a better system. That was the problem, is that you
5 could -- if you made it up and falsified it, then
6 the trouble is, the people who were -- if they had
7 occasion to check on you would quickly establish that it
8 was false, whereas at least if -- if you had someone who
9 had existed, at least they had a chance of -- of being
10 successful. So I think it was a sort of -- the lesser
11 of two evils, dare I say it.

12 Q. The next topic, please, is sexual relationships.

13 You've told us in your statement that they were
14 wrong and foolish, posed a risk to undercover officers
15 and the squad, and you mention the effect that they
16 would have had on the other party.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is that still your view now?

19 A. Oh, yes, yes, yes.

20 Q. Was that your view when you were within the SDS?

21 A. Well, to be honest, at that time, I hadn't -- nobody
22 had spoke about that as being a potential problem. It
23 was only in hindsight back -- well, 2013 or so, that
24 I became aware of that. But it obviously was a risk,
25 you know.

1 Q. Within your statement, you suggest that there may be
2 a distinction in your mind between a one night stand and
3 between a longer term relationship. Do you consider
4 that one night stands between officers and those they're
5 reporting on would be less problematic?

6 A. There's degrees of culpability or whatever you want to
7 call it, but, I mean, obviously they were both wrong.
8 Some are more wrong than others. It's as simple as
9 that. But I -- frankly, I think criticism would be, you
10 know, levelled at whatever you did in that respect.
11 I mean, it was wrong, full stop.

12 Q. In terms of what the managers' response to finding out
13 if this had happened would be, you suggest that
14 a one night stand would give rise to serious
15 consideration of the deployment being terminated --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- and that longer term relationships would certainly
18 result in a termination of the deployment. The question
19 that flows from that is: is it possible/conceivable in
20 your mind that an officer who had had a one night stand
21 and who his managers had found out about it would have
22 been allowed to continue on his deployment?

23 A. There would have to be wholly exceptional circumstances
24 for that to happen. I mean, I can't -- it's difficult
25 to think. If someone was just on the point of getting

1 some very, very important information, possibly, and it
2 was of a terrorist nature or something, perhaps, but
3 it's difficult to think of anything.

4 Q. But you -- can we take it from that that you would
5 consider the starting point for finding out that any
6 sexual contact had happened between an officer and
7 someone they were reporting on would have been that they
8 were withdrawn?

9 A. I think so, yes, and I'm pretty certain that would have
10 been the case, yes, and I would have supported that
11 view, yes.

12 Q. The Inquiry has heard some evidence that shortly after
13 you left the SDS, there was what's been referred to
14 as "banter" within the safe house amongst officers and
15 some managers about sexual activity between officers and
16 those they were reporting on. Was this something you
17 ever heard when you were in the safe house?

18 A. Never, no. Never heard anything remotely about that
19 sort of thing.

20 Q. Were officers, when you were on the SDS, ever questioned
21 directly about whether they were having sexual contact
22 with --

23 A. No, I don't know anything about that at all. No, no.

24 Q. Do you consider, with hindsight, that they maybe should
25 have been?

1 A. I would have thought it was common sense for them not to
2 do it without having to be told. As I said, we had
3 these sessions monthly when people -- you know,
4 vino veritas, and even in those sessions I never heard
5 it mentioned.

6 Q. Do you think it's possible that those above you within
7 the chain of command, the chief inspector and inspector,
8 might have turned a blind eye to things like this
9 happening when you were on the SDS?

10 A. Well, if they turned a blind eye to it, they never
11 discussed it in the office. That's what -- you know, to
12 -- you know, so -- and since we were in that same office
13 for great lumps of time, you know, a great deal of
14 the time, then it would have been odd if it wasn't
15 mentioned if that had raised its head in some way.

16 Q. Is it the sort of thing you would have expected to have
17 heard about?

18 A. I would have thought they would have said something,
19 yes. I mean, obviously you don't tell everybody
20 absolutely everything, simply because that's the way of
21 life, you know, but I don't think they would have sat on
22 that information. It would have been a part of general
23 chat if that had happened, I would imagine.

24 Q. Final topic, please: arrests of officers.

25 You've told us today that the risks of arrest came

1 up when officers were on demonstrations.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And I think you said in your statement that
4 UCOs/undercover officers knew not to get involved with
5 crime --

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. -- and the document we saw earlier.

8 How much of a concern was it amongst you and the
9 other managers about your officers being arrested and
10 possibly even ending up before courts?

11 A. I think, in practice, it was a question of experience.
12 The numbers of officers -- there was always the risk
13 because of obstruction, but the numbers of officers that
14 were arrested was probably less than the fingers of
15 one hand, or no more than the fingers of one hand in
16 a period of, what, four years that I was there. And
17 bearing in mind the number of demonstrations they went
18 on and everything else, that was -- statistically it's
19 almost inevitable that one or two would have been. But
20 provided it was just obstruction and they were part of
21 a large -- if they had been arrested for obstruction on
22 their own, that might have been a different issue: how
23 come you've been arrested and no one else has? But if
24 they're part of a group of 20 that were just swooped up
25 because they choose to sit across a road or something,

1 then that was part and parcel of the risks of doing
2 the job. You couldn't do the job, dare I say it,
3 without taking that risk.

4 Q. I see.

5 Courts. How much thought, if any, was given to
6 officers appearing before courts in their undercover
7 identity?

8 A. I think it was dealt with on an individual basis after
9 what happened, but if they were just arrested for --
10 I can only think of one particular incident, and on that
11 occasion the idea was that: just plead guilty and leave
12 it at that, type of thing.

13 Q. When these issues arise -- and we will look at
14 an example in a moment -- was the security of the SDS as
15 an operation a concern amongst the managers?

16 A. Oh, yes. I mean, obviously you were -- it was --
17 the potential existed for, dare I say it, a police --
18 a uniformed police officer or someone else to recognise
19 the man as -- you know, as a police officer. It's
20 a minimal risk, but it still existed and therefore you
21 had to be alert to that possibility, because things
22 would then have to happen in a hurry.

23 Q. Would you perhaps suggest that the security of the SDS
24 was considered a paramount concern when officers were
25 arrested?

1 A. Oh, yes. I mean, obviously you have to be -- you have
2 to be very much aware of that. I mean, the individual
3 and -- and the whole unit thing were -- potentially, if
4 things just fell wrong, could create a tremendous
5 problem which caused the collapse of everything.

6 Q. Would that potentially be put above the danger of
7 an officer misleading a court?

8 A. Well, it's on the same level. I would -- I can't see
9 that there's -- an officer wouldn't -- I would hope --
10 oh, misleading a court by having a false identity; I can
11 see what you're saying.

12 Q. Yes.

13 A. I think that was -- to that end, that was inevitable.
14 I mean, if -- if the first time an officer was arrested
15 for obstruction he has to put his hands up and say, "I'm
16 so and so", well, the squad might as well just disband
17 straight away because it -- how could it continue?
18 Because you -- it's a balance and I think that was
19 the way it was.

20 Q. Could we look at an example of that, please.

21 A. Surely, yes.

22 Q. It's in relation to HN298, who you can have a look at,
23 and while you're looking, could we please bring up
24 document MPS/526782. Sorry, the document itself rather
25 than the open ground schedule. The document is

1 {MPS1/526782/13}. It's the -- it's not the open grounds
2 schedule but the document itself. (Pause)

3 It's page 13 we'd like to look at, please. This is
4 a report which you prepared, I think, of a first
5 appearance at a Magistrates' Court in relation to
6 the officer we know as HN298, who used the cover name
7 Michael Peter Scott that we can see within that page.

8 You authored this document, I think. Were you asked
9 to attend the Magistrates' Court by your senior
10 officers?

11 A. Yes, I would have been, yes.

12 Q. Can you recall whether they were particularly concerned
13 about HN298's arrest?

14 A. No, I think it was just a standard procedure. Obviously
15 if -- he was going to appear in court and somebody
16 needed to be there in case something happened at
17 the court which the officer himself wouldn't be in
18 a position to report immediately back. So I was there
19 to see that, dare I say it, if the wheel came off, that
20 we -- we were -- you know, we knew it instantly.

21 Q. Do you remember whether you spoke to HN298 before you
22 attended the court or can you not --

23 A. He may well have been aware that I was going there, but
24 I don't recall speaking to him, no.

25 Q. Was there also an aspect of you being there for moral

- 1 support?
- 2 A. I mean, that would have been incidental, but the primary
3 reason was to find out what happened at court and to be
4 there on the day, but moral support would have been a --
5 a sort of a bonus, dare I say it.
- 6 Q. HN298 appeared in the real name of another person.
- 7 A. Yes.
- 8 Q. Was the fact that he was appearing in a court in another
9 person's name a concern, as you can recall, to
10 the managers of the SDS?
- 11 A. No, I can't remember anybody talking about it.
12 I think -- obviously it was just a hope that the whole
13 thing would -- you know, he'd pay his fine and that
14 would be the end of it, full stop, hopefully without any
15 other complications.
- 16 Q. We can likely infer from at least the court appearance
17 that you attended -- and there were later ones that
18 I don't think you were at -- that HN298 answered
19 the charge in his assumed name.
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. And that it is therefore likely that he was in fact
22 misleading a court as to who he really was. Would you
23 have seen it that way at the time?
- 24 A. No, I didn't, no.
- 25 Q. With hindsight, do you agree that that is problematic?

1 A. Yes, I suppose it is, but as I said, that was
2 the problem with -- with the nature of the squad. If --
3 if -- if -- if that was -- it was inevitable that
4 occasionally an officer would be arrested for
5 obstruction, and therefore, if -- if that was going to
6 happen and we were going to put our hands up straight
7 away, then the squad wouldn't exist. It was as
8 a balance of -- as I say, it was the -- for the greater
9 good, as it were, by far. It wasn't as if -- it was
10 a question of degrees. I mean, there's a difference
11 between someone driving 34 miles an hour in a 30 mile an
12 hour limit and killing someone and going at 150 miles an
13 hour. It's that sort of comparison, I suppose, I'm
14 making. But technically, I agree with what you're
15 saying, it's misleading the court. I don't -- I don't
16 deny that, obviously. One can't.

17 Q. Can I ask you to just look at another section of this
18 document. It's page 8, please {MPS1/526782/8}. This is
19 report that was written by HN294, who was your superior.
20 If you want to look at the list to remind yourself who
21 that person is, please do.

22 A. I think ...

23 Yes.

24 Q. And he wrote this:

25 "The decision on which I should be obliged ..."

1 I think that's a decision for those superior to him:

2 "... for your guidance is whether DC HN298 should
3 continue his attempt to learn more of them. To do this
4 he will probably have to apply, as they are doing, for
5 legal aid and attend meetings with all those arrested to
6 discuss tactics ... Whilst I am reasonably confident
7 that DC HN298 could, with assistance, carry this off,
8 there is, of course the potential of embarrassment to
9 police if his true identity should ever be disclosed.

10 "Alternatively, he could disappear from
11 the political scene.

12 "Both are technically possible but if the latter
13 decision is reached we would lose intelligence coverage
14 of what in the past has been a troublesome area of
15 the public order field."

16 Would you say that sums up the attitude of those
17 within the SDS at the time to incidents like this?

18 A. Well, firstly, I can't remember this particular aspect.

19 Just let me quickly read this again. I'm sorry.

20 (Pause)

21 Yes, I think it's broadly true, yes.

22 Q. Really what this is suggesting is that the primary
23 concern of HN294 was for HN298, the officer, to maintain
24 his cover and, secondly, to avoid any embarrassment to
25 the police. That appears to be what's being suggested.

1 A. But --

2 Q. Would you agree?

3 A. Yes, I think -- I think the choice of the word

4 "embarrassment" is probably -- I may have used

5 a different word or a different phraseology there,

6 but --

7 Q. Yes. Well, you didn't write this, so I'm not --

8 A. I didn't, no.

9 Q. -- asking you to answer for it.

10 Finally this. Would you agree that, certainly in

11 this small extract, there doesn't appear to be much

12 thought given to whether HN298 was being completely

13 honest with the court when he appeared?

14 A. There wasn't, no. Not -- not in the extracts we've

15 seen, no.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 Do you recall whether there was any change in

18 guidance or instruction after the prosecution of HN298?

19 A. No, I don't.

20 Q. And finally this: would you agree that it's fair to say

21 that arrests were considered an occupational hazard

22 really of being --

23 A. Yes. I think I've explained that before. It was --

24 statistically it was going to happen. In many ways, it

25 was remarkable it happened as few times as it did.

1 Q. Thank you, Mr Smith.

2 Now, there are two small matters I've been asked
3 just to clarify with you in your evidence earlier.

4 A. Surely.

5 Q. Then you'll be pleased to know that's likely to be it
6 from me anyway.

7 You have mentioned that there were files that were
8 sometimes taken down to the officers --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- in the safe house by you. Would these be registry
11 files, group files or both?

12 A. To my knowledge, they were all individual files.

13 Q. So those would be registry files?

14 A. Yeah -- oh, registry -- yeah, they would have
15 a reference on them and they would be files. But
16 they're files for the individual rather than
17 an organisation or ... but they were -- all the files
18 were -- were registry files, or SB registry files.

19 Q. And would they be files that were requested by
20 the officers, or would you sort of proactively provide
21 them for possibly relevant people?

22 A. The officer who was dealing with the enquiry into that
23 individual, which was on the squad, that person on
24 the squad would bring the file to me and I'd then put
25 the file in the bag, probably with a note to

1 the relevant officer in the field to say, "Can you
2 assist", and he'd either say "yes" or "no", and that was
3 it.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 And finally this. I asked you questions now
6 a little while ago this morning about the guidance that
7 you gave officers about not getting too involved with
8 individuals within --

9 A. Yeah, yeah.

10 Q. -- the groups.

11 Where, in your mind, did this come from? Did it
12 come from your superiors, or was this simply, as you saw
13 it, sort of common sense?

14 A. I think it was part of ring craft. There were lots of
15 little things that you didn't ask questions, you
16 didn't -- you know, it was part and parcel. You see,
17 the less you volunteer about yourself, the less chance
18 they're going to ask questions, and if you ask
19 questions, you draw attention to yourself. So it's
20 a sort of reciprocal thing which led to -- improved your
21 own protection, as it were.

22 Q. Would you have understood that from those around you or
23 from your superiors?

24 A. I just knew it anyway. I mean, one of the nice things
25 about being a policeman is from the very first day

1 you're given advice. A bit like the very first day
2 I walked out on the beat, a man said, "If you go into
3 a pub, don't go in on your own; wait until the blue
4 van -- lights of the blue van come down the road and
5 then go into the pub". It's that sort of thing you get
6 constantly within the police, and you build up your
7 knowledge and your experience and it's an -- one of the
8 great things about a police officer is that's
9 a continuing process and by then you knew instinctively
10 what to do and what not to do.

11 MR WARNER: Mr Smith, thank you very much. Those are the
12 only questions I have for you.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Smith, because your evidence has taken
14 a little longer than we had timed --

15 A. Sorry.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: -- would it inconvenience you if you were to
17 come back here at 1.50?

18 A. No, not at all.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: You'd be content to do that?

20 A. Of course I can, sir, yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. I'm going to have to
22 improvise here. There may be further questions,
23 obviously, which are fed through our system. We allow
24 20 minutes for a variety of reasons.

25 I'm going to allow that to happen over the lunch

1 break and we will start again at 1.50. We're going to
2 hear from, Mr Creamer, we hope, at 2.00 or, at any rate,
3 very soon after 2.00. Until 10 to.

4 (12.54 pm)

5 (The short adjournment)

6 (1.53 pm)

7 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand there are a number of questions
8 that you've been requested to put.

9 MR WARNER: There are, sir.

10 Mr Smith, in answer to the first question, please,
11 can you simply reply in relation to your period of time
12 in the SDS, okay?

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. Was there a time when you were on the SDS where
15 the unit, the SDS, were writing targeting papers for
16 C Squad?

17 A. I don't remember anything of that, no.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 The next issue is going back to something you said
20 this morning. You said that there was a danger to
21 the squad if it became known outside -- I think
22 Special Branch is what you were referring to.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. I just wanted to explore that a little bit more with
25 you, if I could.

1 Why did you consider it might have been a danger to
2 the squad's existence if they had been found out, if you
3 like?

4 A. Well, quite simply, if they'd been -- if their security
5 had been blown, then their existence would -- could well
6 be jeopardised and they wouldn't exist any more and they
7 wouldn't be able to provide the service to essentially
8 A8 and ourselves in terms of understanding what was
9 happening. It was no more than -- more than that. And
10 obviously that's in respect of the squad. That was --
11 yeah, that was it, yes.

12 Q. Was there a concern about embarrassment that could be
13 caused if its operations had been known outside of
14 Special Branch?

15 A. Embarrassment, no. It's just simply that the squad
16 couldn't have existed. Different entirely to the
17 individual. The individual could have been at risk
18 personally and physically, but that's a different issue.

19 Q. Was there any kind of concern that you knew about that
20 officers were doing things perhaps that they shouldn't
21 do and that was why the squad would be put in danger if
22 they were known about outside of Special Branch?

23 A. No, I can't think of anything. As I say, the only thing
24 that was considered as -- I wouldn't say reasonable, but
25 inevitable, was that once in a blue moon someone would

1 be arrested for obstruction. But other than that, no.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 You referred to extreme left-wing groups this
4 morning.

5 A. Mm-hm.

6 Q. Was that a particular definition, as you understood it,
7 at the time?

8 A. It was a general definition, I think. It was the sort
9 of thing you'd read in the newspapers, or we would know,
10 or anybody would know. It was Trotskyist groups;
11 anarchists, which aren't, I suppose, strictly left, but
12 they're still regarded as extreme; Maoists, for example,
13 groups which were minority groups but nevertheless were
14 very vocal and capable of creating a problem.

15 Q. Was that something you would have been instructed when
16 you were in C Squad before you joined the SDS?

17 A. Not instructed, but just picked up naturally, yes. So
18 you just knew at that time and, as I said, it was common
19 knowledge. It wasn't something confined to -- to
20 Special Branch.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Can I ask you to have a look at a document that you
23 looked at this morning, please. It's {MPS/729093/1} and
24 at page 2 {MPS/729093/2}. Thank you. It's the centre
25 of the page.

1 The question I had is, if you can see number 2 --
2 sorry, by that I mean on the top left-hand side --
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. -- it says:
5 "Room 892 to note."
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Do you see that?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Are you able to help us with what room 892 was in 1973,
10 as you can recall it?
11 A. I can make a -- a stab at it certainly. There was
12 an office which dealt with a sort of summary of
13 SB activity which was manned by an inspector and
14 a sergeant, I think. I can remember the office in
15 the old building, in the old pre-1967 building, and
16 I think it probably existed in -- obviously, again, in
17 this building, so it's possible ... so in other words,
18 it was an office which did summary of SB activity across
19 the board, and so it was just for them to be aware of,
20 perhaps, I don't know, but that's the best I can come up
21 with. I can't think of anything else that that could
22 be.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 We can take that down, please.
25 You told us this morning in answer to some questions

1 about reputations that I asked you, specifically in
2 relation, I think, to Rick Clark, I asked you about --

3 A. Oh yes, yes.

4 Q. -- and another officer whose name we're not using.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You told us you heard 10 to 15 years later after your
7 time in the SDS perhaps about a reputation. Was that in
8 relation to Rick Clark? If not, I can give you the --

9 A. Well, no, it was the other chap.

10 Q. Right. If you --

11 A. Yeah, I remember you saying, yes.

12 Q. You're clear who we're talking about?

13 A. Yes, I know -- I know who you're talking about, yes.

14 Q. Right, and it --

15 A. It was the other man, yes.

16 Q. HN300, we know him.

17 A. Yes. I'll just confirm that.

18 Q. Yes, please do.

19 A. Absolutely. Yes, that's the chap I had in mind, yes.

20 Q. And what was the reputation you heard?

21 A. A womaniser.

22 Q. A womaniser.

23 A. Yes. There was no ambiguity there with him, I'm afraid.
24 He was that way inclined.

25 Q. And did you hear this from another colleague in

- 1 Special Branch or from a --
- 2 A. I heard it from many colleagues, I imagine. It was --
- 3 Q. Don't name them, please, but you heard it from more than
- 4 one person?
- 5 A. Oh yes, yes. Yes, I think it was common knowledge.
- 6 Q. And was there a particular event that had happened to
- 7 him that led you to be talking about him 10 to 15 years
- 8 later, or was this just something that came up in
- 9 conversation?
- 10 A. No, no particular event. It was just common knowledge,
- 11 as I say.
- 12 Q. Thank you.
- 13 Can I ask you to look at another document, please.
- 14 It's {UCPI/35070/1} and page 4 specifically, please
- 15 {UCPI/35070/4}. Maybe in fact page 5, sorry
- 16 {UCPI/35070/5}. Sorry, can we go down one more page,
- 17 please {UCPI/35070/6}. We'll come back to that in
- 18 a moment, if I may. I'm just going to locate
- 19 a reference and then ask you about it.
- 20 You told us that, in answer to my question about
- 21 registry files being taken down to the safe house --
- 22 these files, were they of individuals, as I understood
- 23 your evidence to be?
- 24 A. Yes.
- 25 Q. Were they people that you as managers wanted

- 1 the officers to target, or were they people that
2 the officers had asked?
- 3 A. The people -- not so much target, but what -- did they
4 have any information they could do to add to existing
5 knowledge? It wasn't a question of saying, "Well, could
6 you make them a special target", just, "Can you help?
7 Do you know this chap and can you help fill in anything
8 on him?" It wasn't as if there was some special
9 project.
- 10 Q. And was the purpose of taking these files down to assist
11 the officers with their deployment?
- 12 A. Yes, it was the officer who had brought the file in. If
13 he could find out a bit more through the officer,
14 because there was a reasonable chance that he might know
15 him, then you'd ask him, you know.
- 16 Q. You mean the officers from elsewhere in Special Branch
17 asking --
- 18 A. Yeah, they would come in to our office with the file and
19 we would then put the file into the bag, direct it to
20 the particular officer, or it might be two officers,
21 with a note on it saying, "Can you help with this", and
22 there would probably be a letter or something on
23 the file which indicate what the nature of the enquiry
24 was.
- 25 Q. I see. Thank you.

1 Can we have another go with that document I asked
2 you to look at before, please.

3 A. Sure.

4 Q. It's {UCPI/35070/8} and it's page 8, I'm told, that
5 I'd like to look at, please. Thank you. It's
6 the bottom half of the page.

7 Now, this, Mr Smith, is a registry file history
8 sheet, as we understand it.

9 A. Oh, I know what you mean, yes.

10 Q. You may have been familiar with these when you were in
11 Special Branch, and this is in relation to one of our
12 core participants, Diane Langford.

13 Now, you'll see on the left-hand side by the dates
14 markings that read "SP" and "C". Now, we have received
15 some evidence that these relate to security
16 classifications.

17 A. Mm-hm.

18 Q. So we've been told that "SP" means "secret pink" and "C"
19 means "confidential".

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Does that accord with your --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- recollection at the time?

24 What I'd be interested to know, Mr Smith, is those
25 security classifications, were those classifications

1 that you would put on SDS reports when they left you, or
2 would they be put on by Special Branch?

3 A. We would stamp them secret straight away before they
4 left our office. We didn't use "confidential" because
5 of the source. And secret pink was a nomenclature, if
6 that's the right word, of a particular file. It's
7 a grade of secrecy, and above that there was another --
8 another grade.

9 Q. Yes, we've heard some evidence about that.

10 So would you ever put any security classification
11 other than "secret" on your reports when they left SDS?

12 A. No, I -- no, always -- always "secret".

13 Q. So would it be fair to assume that it is likely that
14 whoever put those markings on this history sheet would
15 have been within Special Branch rather than the SDS?

16 A. They would have been in -- possibly in Special Branch
17 records, I don't know. I think what happened was that
18 the file went over to SB, because I think, on
19 the minuting, it would say "S-- S-- SBR records to
20 index" and "PA", which means "put away", "or RBF", bring
21 back in two years or whatever. It was just the
22 phraseology they used. But I think these were typed in
23 almost certainly by Special Branch records, or someone
24 in there would look at it and do just a -- literally
25 a two-liner of what -- what that reference was -- what

1 that entry was about.

2 Q. So the decision on which level of security

3 classification, if I can put it that way, that would be

4 taken --

5 A. Oh, within the branch.

6 Q. Within the branch?

7 A. Without a shadow of a doubt, yes.

8 Q. Right, thank you. But outside of the SDS?

9 A. No -- sometimes -- I mean, on these other files,

10 whatever it is, "confidential" probably was from

11 somewhere within the branch.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. "SP" we did. Others used "SP". I mean, it wasn't a --

14 it was a common grading that was used throughout

15 the branch.

16 Q. It wasn't the case that just all SDS intelligence was

17 graded "secret pink", for instance?

18 A. Well, it was common that it was all graded "secret".

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. But the file that was put on could have been "secret

21 pink" or it could have been a different secret file.

22 Q. I see.

23 A. So it's just we kicked it off and said, "Look here, this

24 is secret", and then at chief inspector level, when it

25 went to the various squads, they would then put it on

1 the appropriate file as they saw fit.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 If we could take that down, please.

4 Another question, please, Mr Smith. The Inquiry has
5 heard some evidence after you were involved in the unit
6 that there was at times a black folder which was kept
7 within the safe house which had a number of pieces of
8 advice and guidance for UCOs about how to conduct their
9 deployments. Do you ever recall there being a black
10 folder when you were in the SDS?

11 A. No, the first time I heard of a black folder was
12 years -- many, many years later. It might have been at
13 the very end of my service, or it may have been after
14 that, again, at a reunion or something, but I -- or even
15 when I've had just bits after pieces of discussion about
16 the fact this Inquiry was taking place.

17 Q. I see.

18 A. I wasn't aware of it.

19 Q. Next question, please. The term "weary" has been used
20 by some officers to describe the people that they were
21 reporting on, the people in the groups that they were
22 providing intelligence on. Was the term "weary"
23 something you ever heard when you were in the SDS?

24 A. No, never.

25 Q. You've told us that an undercover officer was withdrawn

- 1 due to not having proper identification.
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Now, I don't want you to name that person, but the
- 4 question I wanted to ask you, please, is: is it one of
- 5 the three people that were withdrawn in January 1973?
- 6 And I'll give you their numbers.
- 7 A. No, it wasn't.
- 8 Q. It wasn't. Do you need to recollect who they were or
- 9 are you confident?
- 10 A. I know those three you mentioned. I can recall them,
- 11 yes.
- 12 Q. "The Day of the Jackal". You said that it might have
- 13 been a chicken or egg sort of situation and you remember
- 14 sort of mootings about it, I think you said.
- 15 A. That may have triggered someone saying that that was
- 16 what we should do, or someone then said, "Oh, hang on
- 17 a minute, that's exactly what happened in The Day of
- 18 the Jackal". I can't remember that.
- 19 Q. So were you speculating that it might have been or do
- 20 you recall --
- 21 A. I don't know.
- 22 Q. -- a conversation about it?
- 23 A. It would have been either/or. It could have been
- 24 either/or.
- 25 Q. Next, in relation to the policy change to use deceased

1 children's identities that I mentioned just before
2 lunch, would you, as the back office sergeant, expect to
3 have been informed of that change?

4 A. Which policy was it in particular?

5 Q. The starting of using deceased children's identities
6 from records held at Somerset House. Is that something
7 you would expect to have been told or found out about?

8 A. My problem with that is I can't remember when I became
9 aware of it, but I -- at some point, somewhere along
10 the line, either before or after, I can't -- I just
11 don't know when. I would have thought it would have
12 been mentioned, but not necessarily, because I wasn't
13 involved in establishing that -- that identity. That
14 was very much the province of the inspector, the chief
15 inspector and the sergeant, but it wasn't absolute that
16 I would have been told.

17 Q. Understood.

18 Positions of responsibility. You told us that you
19 would not have expected, during your time on the SDS,
20 officers, deployed officers, to assume particular
21 position of responsibility within groups that they were
22 reporting on.

23 A. Mm.

24 Q. Now, we know that HN298, who we discussed before lunch,
25 and please remind yourself if you need to know who we're

1 talking about?

2 A. I think I'm --

3 Q. Please do check.

4 A. -- I know who you're talking about, but I'll just be

5 sure.

6 Yes.

7 Q. He became the membership secretary of the

8 Young Liberals --

9 A. Ah.

10 Q. -- in January 1972 when you were within the SDS. Are

11 you surprised that a UCO did something like that when

12 you were on the squad?

13 A. Yes, I would have been, I -- but I didn't -- I certainly

14 didn't -- I don't recall it at all. But yes, I would

15 have been surprised, yes, yes.

16 Q. Do you think that's the sort of thing that might have

17 been approved by those above you in the management chain

18 or by you even?

19 A. Well, presumably if they knew of it, they would have

20 approved it. The only thing I can say is being

21 the Young Liberals and because we weren't bothered about

22 the Young Liberals, it was seen as not that of -- a bit

23 of a problem. I mean, had it been IMG, well, yes,

24 definitely a problem, but because it was Young -- it was

25 simply a stepping stone to something else and he was

1 interested anyway in that arm of the -- of
2 the Young Liberals that was into the Anti-Apartheid
3 Movement, and those demonstrations would have -- it
4 wouldn't have been -- it would have been far less
5 heinous, shall I say, if that's the right word.

6 Q. Why would it have been more of a problem if it was
7 a group like the IMG, for instance?

8 A. Because obviously they shouldn't be seen as being
9 anywhere in a situation which could be construed as
10 agent provocateur or having extra influence within
11 the group. The idea was to be, as I said, just a rank
12 and file fly on the wall member of the group.

13 Q. You mentioned the Anti-Apartheid Movement just a moment
14 ago.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Can you help us with why the SDS was interested in
17 the Anti-Apartheid Movement?

18 A. Well, partly -- much to do with things like Stop the
19 Seventy Tour. I don't know if you -- you obviously will
20 have heard of that --

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. -- demonstrations of that nature where they would invade
23 a football pitch or a rugby pitch, more precisely, and
24 do things, so that would have been it.

25 Q. Were you interested in the individuals within

1 the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and what I mean by that is
2 people like Peter Hain, Lord Hain, who was --

3 A. Well, he was the one that was organising a lot of that,
4 yes. Obviously what he was directing and doing, he --
5 he would have been aware of what was happening on -- on
6 that particular front. And yes, to that extent, they
7 would have been interested in him.

8 Q. Mr Smith, finally this. I asked you about arrests just
9 before lunch, and you mentioned that offences like
10 obstruction might be considered the sort of maximum
11 acceptable offence that an officer might be arrested for
12 if -- forgive me, I'm paraphrasing what you said.

13 A. Indeed, indeed.

14 Q. And what I wanted to know is, are you, in that,
15 referring to obstruction just of the highway? Would
16 obstruction of a police officer be considered in
17 a similar way by the SDS?

18 A. I think it's obstruction along the lines of sitting down
19 in the road and blocking the traffic, or something along
20 those lines, not of a police officer, which is a --
21 a more -- it's further down the line, as I would see it,
22 yes.

23 Q. You would have considered it slightly more serious?

24 A. Oh, yes, oh, yes. If you were obstructing a police
25 officer, and provided that was proven, obviously, like

1 anything, but yes.

2 MR WARNER: Mr Smith, thank you very much. Those are
3 the only questions I have for you.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Any re-examination, Mr Sanders?

5 MR SANDERS: No, thank you, sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Smith. I'm sorry your
7 departure has been delayed, but that now is an end of it
8 I'm very grateful for it.

9 I'm now going to rise so as to permit arrangements
10 to be set up for the next witness, Mr Creamer, to give
11 evidence over the live screen.

12 (2.14 pm)

13 (A short break)

14 (2.25 pm)

15 HN3093 (Roy Creamer)

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Creamer.

17 A. Sir, good afternoon.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Sir John Mitting speaking, Chairman of
19 the Undercover Policing Inquiry. I'm very grateful to
20 you for coming to assist us. I realise that,
21 remarkably, I was aged seven when you joined
22 the Metropolitan Police.

23 A. Oh, yes, it was a long time ago now.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: I understand you prefer to be sworn.

25 A. Yes.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Then Mr Fernandes will do the necessary.

2 (Witness sworn)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

4 Questions by MR BARR

5 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

6 Mr Creamer, could we start with your full name,
7 please.

8 A. Roy Creamer. No middle name.

9 Q. You've provided a witness statement dated
10 4 November 2020. Are the contents of your witness
11 statement true and correct to the best of your knowledge
12 and belief?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. You joined the Metropolitan Police in 1954; is that
15 right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you moved to Special Branch in 1958?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And between joining Special Branch in 1958 and joining
20 the SDS in 1968, you spent a fair bit of your time
21 working for C Squad; is that right?

22 A. Yes. Yes, indeed, yeah.

23 Q. And C Squad was the branch of Special Branch which dealt
24 with the far left?

25 A. More or less, but I think it did move to B Squad at

1 the -- at the time when I came back from port, it was
2 B Squad. They took over the far left and left C Squad
3 to do what they normally did.

4 Q. I see, and what was that?

5 A. Look after the Communist Party side of things.

6 Q. And did there come a time when the far left went back to
7 C Squad?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. I see.

10 Can I ask you how deep a knowledge of the far left
11 did you develop whilst working for B and C Squads before
12 you joined the SDS?

13 A. Not a lot. I mean, we drove -- I went to a lot of
14 meetings -- not a lot, but I mean more than I would
15 expect, and mostly of a left wing character, and I was
16 interested to find out about all of the different
17 groups, what they -- how they differed from each other
18 and all that kind of thing, so I was interested as
19 an individual. I wasn't told anything about what to do,
20 simply there, report what you heard, put it down and
21 look for the next opportunity to go out and about.

22 I think in those days the groups that were not
23 communist were hardly thought much of. You know,
24 they -- generally they were small and generally they
25 were quite -- you know, when you went there, quite

1 sincere and genuine, you know, in their beliefs, and
2 I think as time went by, particularly towards '68 and so
3 on, they got stronger and did begin to cause a problem.
4 But for the most part, in the early days, there was no
5 trouble from them at all.

6 Q. Did your interest mean that you developed a good
7 knowledge of the groups?

8 A. It could have been better, but yes, it was fair enough.

9 Q. The Inquiry has been told that the anarchist
10 Stuart Christie described you as -- and I am now quoting
11 -- "the Yard's dialectician of dissent".

12 A. Yes, he may well have done, but the thing is, in those
13 days -- this is before the SDS -- the usual behaviour
14 for a man in my position was to try and meet personally
15 with the leading lights on the other side. There's
16 two reasons for this. One was that, particularly with
17 anarchists, say, who would openly, you know, boast that
18 they would assassinate leaders if they felt like it, we
19 were sent to, say, processions, Royal processions or
20 other big public occasions, and it was important for
21 me to know, or somebody to know, who were
22 the mischievous and likely people to either throw a bomb
23 or whatever it is that anarchists might be up to.

24 So really I had no unease about talking to Christie
25 and for the life of me, I don't -- really didn't mind

1 what he thought, to be honest. I mean, I was always
2 pleasant with him and in many ways, even after,
3 you know, later things when we could have been enemies,
4 I always, you know, got on well with him as somebody -- old
5 acquaintance, basically. It wasn't anything more than
6 that.

7 Q. And how well did you get to know Mr Christie?

8 A. Well, in the way that if he saw me, he would talk to me
9 or I would talk to him, but I never knew anything about
10 his private life. I knew he was married and had
11 children and so on, but -- had a daughter and things
12 like that, but that was incidental. I mean, I didn't
13 ask him about that sort of thing and I didn't really ask
14 him about anarchism or anything.

15 He -- there was a shop in Red Lion Square run by
16 Albert Meltzer. Now, Meltzer was a chap I really got on
17 with because, well, he was an ex-wrestler, a big man,
18 and very courteous and so on and so forth. Christie
19 used to help him, but I went into the shop really to
20 sort through Meltzer's books and find books about
21 anarchism, if there were, that I would possibly be able
22 to buy or read on the spot, but more to the point,
23 really, from a police point of view, to see what notices
24 were in the window, on the counter and that kind of
25 thing, saying things about which groups, anarchists --

1 which anarchist groups were going to hold a meeting or
2 whatever.

3 So it was a -- a useful thing to do, but
4 unfortunately, in a way, Christie used to be in there
5 helping and he -- well, we had this kind of uneasy
6 relationship, really. I wasn't going to hurt him and he
7 wasn't going to hurt me, and there were times, for
8 example, when he would see me at some of these left wing
9 meetings and he'd whisper to his friends, "There is
10 Creamer, you know, from the yard, blah blah blah", but
11 he never did anything about it, and I always felt that
12 even if he'd tried, I'd be -- have the advantage really,
13 because who was more likely to cause trouble at a left
14 wing meeting? An anarchist, not a policeman. They'd
15 just tell me to go home or whatever, but they might be
16 a bit more, you know, fierce with him. So I didn't
17 really mind that kind of situation.

18 Q. How forthcoming were the likes of Mr Meltzer and
19 Mr Christie in response to what I might call your direct
20 approach?

21 A. About themselves, not a thing. I mean, they -- they --
22 and I didn't expect that. But what was useful to me was
23 what was their attitude to other groups? And that
24 way -- I mean, for example, I would say, "What do you
25 think of these Maoists", and so forth, and they would

1 get on their high whatever and say, "Oh, they're a load
2 of rubbish", and, you know, "They've got no support
3 anywhere and we don't like them". Things to that -- in
4 that way were helpful to me to sort of think what other
5 people thought about them -- you know, the groups -- so
6 that I could judge for myself whether they were all that
7 they claimed to be.

8 Q. Did your interactions with people on the far left before
9 you joined the SDS involve you going into private homes
10 at all?

11 A. No. No, no. I think I should make it clear, sir, that
12 in those days, if you were sent to cover a meeting and
13 it was in a private home, you should and you could for
14 example go back to the yard and say, "No, I can't get in
15 there because it's a private house"; not merely could,
16 but you should. And some senior sergeants would,
17 you know, be very annoyed with you if you came back and
18 said, "I couldn't get in". Now, others would say,
19 "Well, you should have tried a bit harder", but the
20 official line was, "No, way, you don't go -- you don't
21 go in", and most of us knew that. But, of course,
22 because it happened so rarely, it kind of got overlooked
23 or, you know, people just didn't think about it.

24 Q. Do you know why the instruction forbade you from
25 entering private houses?

1 A. Not really, but I -- I think, in the ordinary course of
2 police work, you wouldn't go into a person's private
3 house without being invited. Now, this is a problem.
4 They're holding a political meeting in a private house,
5 so there is, by implication, an invitation to anybody to
6 go there; not necessarily anybody, but people that were
7 interested in the subject, so that if you got there and
8 they weren't quite sure who you were, they would welcome
9 you anyway and so you could take advantage of that
10 invitation.

11 But the obverse of that is if they knew that you
12 were a police officer, the invitation wouldn't be --
13 wouldn't be there, would it? So you're in a sort of
14 difficult sort of territory there and I think the best
15 way would be -- to solve it anyway is not to go in.
16 I mean, that's just from a practical point of view. It
17 didn't matter what any other consideration applied. You
18 were there not to cause waves and not to upset people
19 but to do the job in a discreet way. That was
20 the emphasis then.

21 Q. Am I right to understand that the expertise that you
22 developed was mainly in the fields of anarchism and
23 Trotskyism?

24 A. Yeah, later on. Of course, I couldn't be an expert on
25 Trotskyism straight off, because it's complex and

1 I didn't have a lot of time.

2 Anarchism, yes, a bit more, because I was interested
3 in it and I learned a lot from the subsequent experience
4 I had with the Angry Brigade.

5 Q. I'd like to ask you a few more questions now about
6 anarchists. These are on the theme of whether or not
7 they should have been of interest to Special Branch.

8 If we start, perhaps, with an easy example,
9 the Angry Brigade plainly were of interest because they
10 adopted violent means.

11 A. Yes, indeed.

12 Q. What was your view in relation to the Friends of
13 Freedom Press?

14 A. Ah, now, that's interesting, because I was quite relaxed
15 about them for the most part. They were not, in my
16 view, dangerous anarchists or likely to assassinate
17 anyone. They were more friends who got together in
18 the belief that there should be more freedom for
19 everybody to live, but, mainly, they didn't like
20 the communists. The communists and anarchists
21 traditionally had been enemies and whether it was in
22 the French -- in the Spanish Civil War or whatever,
23 the anarchists got a very hard time from the communists
24 when the communists got in in Russia.

25 So there was that background of their -- so I say,

1 their enemy was my enemy so we had a little bit in
2 common. So I could tap quite happily to them if
3 I wanted to, but from a public order point of view, they
4 were a bit difficult to assess because they were -- on
5 the whole, people like that are not physically big and
6 strong. They're usually student and academic, or even
7 small in stature and that kind of thing, and they're
8 anarchists in a sort of -- in a way that some artists
9 believe that anarchism is a good thing. You know, they
10 break traditional rules and all that kind of thing. And
11 so I didn't think they were a force to be reckoned with.
12 They weren't like rugby players or whatever, as --
13 you know, in physique, nor in intention. They didn't
14 really want to fight anybody.

15 So I rather felt -- it's not exactly a waste of time
16 talking to anarchists, but you've got to be quite clear
17 in your mind that they're not, you know, public order
18 targets really. It's -- that is -- we're talking about
19 Freedom Press. I'm not saying that applies to all
20 anarchists.

21 Q. And staying with Freedom Press for the moment, was
22 Freedom Press in any way a threat to the state?

23 A. No. No, no, no, no. I mean, in my estimation, no.
24 I don't want to stick up for them too much, because,
25 you know, they can stick up for themselves, but from my

1 estimation, if there were anarchists at a demonstration,
2 the people that would support Freedom Press and the
3 Federation of Anarchists would watch, and they might
4 even jeer and they might even take part like supporters
5 at a football match would, but they weren't likely to do
6 an awful lot. But the trouble with saying that is that
7 there's another aspect to so-called anarchists which
8 covers a whole different element in demonstrations that
9 don't want to obey anyone. They won't take discipline
10 from the organisers or the police or whatever, and that
11 is called anarchism, but that's not what the
12 Freedom Press are like.

13 Q. Moving away from the Freedom Press and having already
14 dealt with the Angry Brigade, which were the anarchists
15 who, in your experience, were trouble?

16 A. Well, from a public order point of view, any of them
17 could be, but weren't, I don't think. It wasn't in
18 the nature of anarchists to support or enhance the --
19 you know, the activities of any other group. They would
20 -- they would only do what they wanted to do. But there
21 were one or two people in Solidarity and in some groups
22 like that that were difficult.

23 An example of that would be the people who helped
24 the Russian spy to escape from prison and that kind of
25 thing. They were of anarchist tendency. I must be

1 careful because they were found not guilty of anything,
2 but in reality, there was something there that needed to
3 be kept an eye on, and of course it was very difficult,
4 and I don't think we were up to it. You know, they were
5 cleverer than us in many ways.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me for interrupting. Do you mean
7 Blake?

8 A. I do, sir.

9 MR BARR: Your witness describes some of them as "too
10 intellectual". Who did you have in mind as too
11 intellectual?

12 A. Did I say that?

13 Q. Yes. It says:

14 "These were the groups most likely to make trouble.
15 There were some who were probably too intellectual and
16 would welcome people who did not know anything and
17 others were just drinking clubs."

18 A. Oh, you're talking in the context of, you know, putting
19 an undercover officer with them, aren't you? Well,
20 that's true. I mean, if you went there and they started
21 talking to us, as anarchists do, you know, about Akunin
22 and all that kind of thing, you would be -- it would go
23 over your head, and they would sense it did and they
24 wouldn't take you to, really. They wouldn't welcome you
25 in.

1 But in theory, if you went to a left wing group,
2 ideally, you should go as a sort of labourer and
3 a working man, because, I mean, it's all about workers,
4 isn't it, really? It's not intellectuals. And I felt
5 that if they'd tried to get into an anarchist group at
6 that time, (a) it would be difficult, (b) it would be
7 a complete waste of time.

8 Q. And why a waste of time?

9 A. Because they weren't up to much. Put it this way; if
10 they were in a football team, they could sit on
11 the bench and not play -- not play on the field.

12 Q. Right.

13 Can we move now to Trotskyists.

14 A. Mm.

15 Q. What was your view from a policing perspective of
16 the IMG?

17 A. Well, I'll put it as simply as I can, sir. If you -- if
18 you took the whole range of left wing demonstrators, IMG
19 and IS would be like Mayfair and Park Lane in the game
20 of Monopoly. That is to say, they were the most
21 difficult to get in, but if you did get in, you would
22 learn a lot about what they were up to. Now, there was
23 a kind of scale where other groups, say for example the
24 Vietnam Solidarity -- the Vietnam VSC groups that were
25 more like the Old Kent Road classification. That is to

1 say, they're easier to get in and they didn't really
2 know an awful lot, because they were taking all their
3 instructions from elsewhere. And that's roughly what
4 I thought about things, you know, in general at that
5 time.

6 Q. Well, if we stick with the IMG, you say they were
7 difficult to get in.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Were they involved in public order problems?

10 A. It was one of those difficult things in those days that
11 they claimed, and maybe rightly, that they didn't want
12 violence, no, no, no, but they weren't going to do
13 an awful lot to stop it. If you contrast them, say,
14 with Gerry Healy's lot, we'd call it the Socialist
15 Labour League, Healy would have none of it. He'd said,
16 "We're going to have a march which are disciplined and
17 you'll all do as you're told and if the police say, 'Do
18 this, do this', you've got to behave". And I think he
19 did that really to show up the falseness of IMG who were
20 not prepared to discipline (a) because they weren't
21 numerically very strong themselves. If you take
22 the IMG, I doubt if it was more than 100 strong. It
23 might have been 200, but it certainly wasn't enough to
24 provide marshals. Nor were they the types of people
25 that wanted to be marshals and keep discipline. They

1 could be in some other group.

2 So I used to think at the time: how come that
3 the left wing of the Labour Party, which of course are
4 the nearest and closest neighbours to Trotskyists, don't
5 go to them and say, "What are you playing at? If you
6 organise demonstrations that are rowdy and cause a lot
7 of damage and stuff like that, you're not doing an awful
8 lot of good, but you are damaging the Labour Party,
9 because we're in government, we'll get the response,
10 we'll be blamed if things get out of hand. So why don't
11 you kind of calm down?"

12 And I think in the long run, that might have
13 happened, but in the early days, they didn't -- they
14 took notice -- well, they just didn't care. They
15 thought if it's -- I think possibly because they were
16 looking not at the Labour Party's problems but how it
17 would look to, say, the Fourth International and people
18 abroad, if there was a lot of fuss going on in London,
19 good, that's what they wanted. So they didn't want to
20 rein in on any disorder or rows or, you know, fights
21 with the police or anything like that. That -- that
22 was -- I think they stood on the side and said, "It's
23 not our fault, no, no, no. That's not what we wanted.
24 We didn't mean that."

25 So it was a rather false position, I thought, that

1 they were in and the idea that there might be some
2 secret Napoleon-type fellow saying, "This is it, lads,
3 you know, this is the beginning of the revolution", and
4 urging them on to stir up violence, I think, when we
5 came to look at the VSC demonstrations, I knew full well
6 we'd never find such a man. There wasn't one. There
7 wasn't a group even that would do that. I think it was
8 a situation that got out of hand, wasn't -- they did
9 nothing to stop it, and that's the worst you could say
10 of them.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 Going back to the International Socialists.

13 A. Mm.

14 Q. We've heard evidence certainly from the 1970s,
15 particularly the late 70s, that the SWP, as it became,
16 was very easy to join. So I was interested in your
17 answer that suggested the IS might have been difficult
18 to join. Is that really right?

19 A. Well, I had that impression at the time, but I'm not
20 saying -- you know, if it subsequently turns out that
21 you could get in easily, well, I take it back, but --

22 Q. I am conscious that --

23 A. -- I thought that at the time.

24 Q. I'm conscious that I'm asking you about a period of time
25 in the 1960s when IS was a lot smaller.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Have you got a positive recollection one way or
3 the other about IS in that era?

4 A. Well, I knew people who were in it and, you know,
5 I found them -- they were all very reasonable and,
6 you know, they didn't -- but how they would behave on
7 a demonstration is a different -- a different question.
8 I thought if anybody went there in a clumsy way and was
9 a bit, you know, sort of, "These do ask a lot of
10 questions, don't they", and gave the impression that
11 they weren't genuinely socialist, if you know what
12 I mean, they would be caught out much more quickly in
13 IS than in most other groups, because they're quite wide
14 awake people and, you know, they -- they wouldn't be
15 like Healy's lot who were almost paranoid about people
16 coming in and joining them. IS was a lot less like
17 that.

18 So in a way, what you said, that they were easier to
19 get in, is true, but it's true -- true for an ordinary
20 citizen, but for an undercover police officer, it's
21 different, really. It would have been harder.

22 Q. From your experience, were the International Socialists
23 a threat to public order?

24 A. Well, yes and no, I think. They -- they were prepared
25 to organise big demonstrations and, like IMG, were not

1 prepared to discipline them. So in a way, yes, yes, but
2 of course it's a bit harsh to say that, but from
3 a police point of view, which is what matters, that's
4 what I would say, yes.

5 Q. Moving to the Socialist Labour League, you've already
6 made quite plain that you don't think that they were
7 a public order threat. Were they of any policing
8 interest at all?

9 A. Oh, well, they were not a public order threat simply
10 because they were determined to have good demonstrations
11 and were not -- not let strangers or anybody come and
12 join them, you know, so give them credit for that. But
13 they -- their demonstrations too were very good in
14 a way, well handled by the police and well done by
15 the organisers. But the Socialist Labour League
16 never -- can I have some water?

17 Q. Of course.

18 A. The Socialist Labour League was not liked by many other
19 groups. I mean, the discipline that Gerry Healy had was
20 objectionable. I mean, they just -- I remember saying
21 to Conrad at one stage when he was suggesting that we
22 put somebody in the Socialist Labour League that they
23 would have to stand outside the police -- the railway
24 station at Clapham Common and sell newspapers, which,
25 when you think you're going to send a young officer

1 there who might see his friends or other police
2 colleagues or things like that saying, "What are you
3 doing that for?" I mean, it would be a ridiculous thing
4 to do, and dangerous.

5 So I had my feelings about them as a group and also,
6 I think the truth of it was that the
7 Socialist Labour League aimed for support in the trade
8 unions. They wouldn't get it from political
9 demonstrations, and I think that was a closed area to
10 me. I didn't care about the trade -- you know, it
11 wasn't my business to concern myself with trade unions,
12 but I think that's where he drew his strength and
13 support, if he had any, and at times he did, because he
14 did have -- you could number his demonstrations in
15 hundreds, really. So it was a difficult one to assess,
16 that one.

17 Q. When you say the trade unions weren't your business, do
18 you mean they weren't police business?

19 A. Right, yeah.

20 Q. Now, I appreciate this may not be an area where you have
21 quite the same depth of knowledge, but could I just ask
22 you about Maoists. In your experience, did the Maoist
23 groups present a public disorder threat and, if so,
24 which ones?

25 A. I think I did write a report on Manchanda, didn't I?

1 Q. You did. We'll come to that later specifically.
2 A. I was interested in that, of course. And going back to
3 what I chatted to the anarchists about, they were
4 an unknown factor and I got the feeling that, first of
5 all, whatever they said, they were not -- they weren't
6 sponsored by the Chinese embassy or anything like that.
7 They were people, usually from the Far East themselves,
8 who felt very strongly, obviously, about Vietnam
9 especially, I mean, because, you know, it was their
10 patch, and they by -- by tradition of their ways, they
11 would behave differently to us and they would shout and
12 scream and make a lot of fuss, which we wouldn't do as
13 English people, so that you were in a bit of
14 a difficulty to know how far this anger that they seemed
15 to suggest was genuinely, you know, sort of felt from
16 a sense of injustice or whether it was just their
17 natural way.

18 So, you know, I did have difficulties with them
19 in -- and I think the numbers, fortunately, were so
20 small they didn't really matter. A competent group of
21 police officers could handle any kind of Maoist
22 demonstration, and I know when I used to do assessments
23 for Maoist, I generally wrote along the lines that they
24 were noisy and boisterous and that they were this, that
25 and the other, but they were not dangerous.

1 Q. Can I move now to anti-racism campaigners, people like
2 the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Did you have any
3 experience of them?

4 A. No. No, I lost -- I think when I -- I'm not sure what
5 happened, but I certainly didn't have anything to do
6 with them.

7 Q. Did you have anything to do with the far right?

8 A. In the early days, we were always sent to a far right
9 meeting as part of our kind of introduction into the
10 Branch's work, and it had been so discredited by what
11 had happened during the war and that that fascist was
12 absolutely, you know, dead political idea all together.
13 Nobody would take it up because they were wasting their
14 time trying to persuade the public towards their point
15 of view.

16 And I think we used to have to watch Oswald Mosley
17 at Hyde Park Corner and he would make very, you know,
18 well chosen words and good speeches and that kind of
19 thing, but the support for him from round and about was
20 negligible, and to my mind, the -- it was -- you know,
21 from a -- my particular point of view, there was nothing
22 interesting in them -- in them, nothing -- they could be
23 the victims of attacks by the left. That was the big
24 problem. But on their own, they were of no account,
25 really, and I think when they did have demonstrations on

1 their own that weren't attacked by the left wing, nobody
2 would know. I mean, it was so quiet and orderly.

3 Q. What period of time are we talking about here?

4 A. Well, we're talking about before the SDS.

5 Q. Yes, so in that era.

6 A. Oh, yeah.

7 Q. I see, thank you.

8 Can I move now from the individual groups to ask
9 you, in your experience, were, if I call them,
10 traditional Special Branch methods of obtaining
11 intelligence, in your opinion and experience, sufficient
12 to deal with the public order problems that the police
13 faced in London?

14 A. Up to the Vietnam demonstrations in March, would it be,
15 70 -- '67 or '68, I would have said yes, because
16 generally speaking, they were smaller, they were less
17 intense in the fact that the emotions that prompted them
18 to demonstrate were not that heavy, and the police also
19 had a -- how can I put it? They respected more. There
20 was, you know, stories of a man on a white horse holding
21 back a crowd at Wembley and that kind of thing, so they
22 had that confidence and know-how to deal with disorder,
23 because it was small and it wasn't really very vicious.

24 Now, after the March demonstration in London where
25 a number of police were injured, of course it did

1 change, and I think it was inevitable that we would have
2 to increase our surveillance of left-wing groups a lot
3 more. Just how that was to be done is, you know, up to
4 the powers that be, but I realised that we couldn't go
5 on the way we were, because one sergeant and two
6 constables possibly, if he was lucky, would have to make
7 an assessment for a demonstration and, in fact, most
8 officers were reluctant to do it, because they said,
9 "Look, we're not fortune tellers. We're not weather
10 forecasters. What's going to happen is not -- we can't
11 say. I mean, it might be this, it might be that, but we
12 can't forecast what a demonstration is going to be or
13 how many people will be turning up, because we're not
14 equipped to do that or not able to do it or we don't
15 want to do it." And that was a key point; that they
16 didn't want to do it.

17 And those days, we had a Chief Superintendent
18 Gilbert, who sent me out one -- one day, something had
19 happened and people were demonstrating outside the house
20 of the then Home Secretary, who was -- I've forgotten
21 his name now, but a Labour Home Secretary, and there was
22 a small demonstration outside his house, and the officer
23 that went there said to us, "A small demonstration, six
24 or seven people, blah blah blah, and nothing to report,
25 really", which was very -- made Gilbert quite cross

1 because he was asked by the Home Office, "What's all
2 this", you know, "Who were these people",
3 blah blah blah, and he said to me, "You go the next time
4 it happens and I want a full report".

5 So of course I went, and with the help of a lot --
6 you know, like the protection officers and the local
7 police and all the rest of it, I was able to say who
8 they were and what they were protesting about, and
9 I can't remember what it was they were protesting, but
10 it -- I took this back to Gilbert and he's thanked me
11 very much, and he said to me afterwards, "You know, we
12 are not giving A8 much in the way of information about
13 demonstrations and things. I think you ought to,
14 you know, try and 'zhuzh' it up a bit", or words to that
15 effect, and -- well, then I felt I'd got a mission to do
16 that, if you know what I mean. It was kind of not as
17 grand as all that, but I felt that if I did that, then
18 others would then say, "Oh, well, we can beat him at
19 forecasting who was going to come on demonstrations".
20 It would be a kind of -- much more like a competition to
21 get things right, rather than a game. But I went
22 halfway along that road on the subject, yeah.

23 Q. Can you recall when that was?

24 A. That would be immediately before, because I was on

25 B Squad then. If you remember, I said it was B Squad,

1 and I was brought back from port with -- not having been
2 in touch with anything for about three years, so I had
3 a lot of catching up to do, and I was, some of the time,
4 acting -- Vic Gilbert's clerk because his proper clerk
5 was often ill, so he saw a bit of me, and I think that
6 would be '67 or '66, that kind of ...

7 Q. Can you recall whether or not the Home Secretary was
8 James Callaghan?

9 A. Oh, yeah. I -- he was Home Secretary at -- just about
10 the time of the demonstrations, wasn't he?

11 Q. So what I'm asking you is can you remember whether
12 the demonstration was outside James Callaghan's house or
13 was it outside a different minister's house?

14 A. Oh, it's a different minister. Let me think now. This
15 minister was rather domed, shiny hair and -- domed
16 forehead, rather. I was a literary man. He wrote books
17 after he retired. I can't think of his name, to be
18 honest, but if it occurs to me, I'll mention it.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 Sticking with the period before the SDS was formed,
21 did you think that the traditional methods were
22 sufficient to obtain the information that the
23 Security Service wanted from Special Branch about
24 subversion?

25 A. Oh, that's a tall order, sir. I mean, you know,

1 I was -- I would be a sergeant and what the
2 Security Service wanted was a mystery to us. They --
3 they just asked the questions and we'd give them -- they
4 wanted to identify people, basically, and so it was
5 a question of adding clothes to sort of a naked subject.
6 All they had was name or something and you had to put
7 the date of birth and all the rest of it.

8 I think there was some dispute in the branch itself
9 at one time about writing "He is known to me" on the --
10 on the report, and there was a lot of discussion,
11 because to say that "He's known to me" I think was
12 a throwback to the days when people were likely to be
13 arrested, say, in -- if they were suspected of being
14 involved espionage during the war, it was important that
15 the officer who had written about him should be able to
16 identify him.

17 Now, with the people that MI5 were interested in, we
18 weren't particularly. I mean -- and some people felt,
19 quite rightly, no need to put down "He is known to me",
20 because (a) you've got to take a risk getting to know
21 it. How could you say "he is known to me" without going
22 down and having a look at it? And he would, you know,
23 not take kindly to that. Why should you do it?

24 So that -- that was the situation; that they had
25 their -- what they wanted to know and we were obliged to

1 answer them and --

2 Q. Are you --

3 A. -- and I'd -- (overspeaking) --

4 Q. Are you referring to a tension between doing your duty

5 as a police officer and providing information on people

6 who were in no way a threat to law and order?

7 A. I -- you'd have to be very fastidious to do that, no.

8 I mean, if you were told to do something and it seemed

9 reasonable and it came from on high, you couldn't

10 quarrel it with, really. You might if you were bold

11 enough or you were silly enough or you didn't care, but

12 normally nobody in this life wants to make waves about

13 something which is beyond their -- you know, it's beyond

14 them to decide, really.

15 Q. I see.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Can we pause there a moment.

17 Mr Creamer, you've been going for about an hour now.

18 Do you want a break?

19 A. I'd like a -- yeah. Yes. Yes, sir. Just five -- not

20 long. Five minutes will do.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, we have a minimum of ten, so is ten all

22 right?

23 A. Fair enough, sir.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Is the name you were trying to find

25 Roy Jenkins?

1 A. Yes, indeed, indeed. Thank you, sir.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: We'll resume in ten minutes.

3 (3.10 pm)

4 (A short break)

5 (3.23 pm)

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Refreshed?

7 A. Oh, yes, sir, thank you.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Good.

9 Mr Barr.

10 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

11 Mr Creamer, we'll move on then to the SDS. In your
12 witness statement, you said that uniform had complained
13 that they were not getting enough intelligence about
14 what to expect. Are you able to elaborate on that for
15 us, please?

16 A. Well, yes. That was not said to me personally by A8,
17 because I -- you know, too -- too much of a minion for
18 them to talk to me, but the -- I think at the top level,
19 the level of Vic Gilbert and of chief superintendents
20 and maybe in discussions which they must have had with
21 the Commissioner, they felt that it wasn't their fault
22 that the demonstrations were -- the early ones,
23 the march and -- and previous ones had been rowdy and --
24 and caused police injuries, they felt it wasn't their
25 fault, which it wasn't. You know, nobody's arguing

1 about that, but I think they kind of suggested that it
2 would be a bit better if Special Branch weren't so bland
3 and simply write, "The demonstrations will start off at
4 this particular point at this particular time and march
5 to this particular point", because they already knew
6 that.

7 And, in fact, they had the advantage of being able
8 to interview the people that were organising
9 the demonstrations and arrange precisely that, so they
10 didn't want their own information back, but they
11 couldn't quantify or even describe what kind of
12 information they wanted, nor could anybody, really. It
13 was sort of -- I chose the way of -- if, for example,
14 they said -- the organisers said that, "Oh, we are going
15 to bring 3,000 people", I would make it 4,000 if
16 I thought it was going to be lively and horrendously
17 vicious. That wasn't very often, mind you, but I was
18 inclined to sort of exaggerate the numbers, because
19 saying anything in words to the effect that they will be
20 anti-police or whatever, or even to suggest, for
21 example, that provided it's carefully handled, putting
22 sentences like that in would offend them an enormous
23 amount. I mean, they don't want to hear that either.

24 So what is it that they do want? And I found if you
25 put a figure higher than they expected, that would do

1 the trick because you stood -- you stood a chance that
2 if they didn't -- didn't turn up in those numbers, they
3 wouldn't like -- you know, wouldn't take your assessment
4 as being of any value either, but if you got it right
5 then you would establish some kind of understanding
6 between the Branch and A8 that if the Branch said it was
7 going to be big, it would be, and that's as much as you
8 could do really, because there's no way anybody can
9 forecast the future, really. You just have to do
10 the best you can.

11 Q. In what circumstances did you personally come to join
12 the SDS?

13 A. Well, they -- it was -- I was the -- on the desk that
14 were Trotskyists, and although I hadn't been there long,
15 I was supposed to know all about them and -- so I was
16 the one that they would choose. But also, Conrad was
17 looking for people that he knew were enthusiastic about
18 doing the work and that kind of thing, and although
19 I wouldn't say I was a shining star at work, but -- or
20 over-energetic, he sensed that I'd got a lot to offer
21 and so he chose me.

22 But the -- I didn't have any -- I didn't really have
23 a choice. I mean, how could you if you were in that
24 situation? You're the anarchist -- on the Trotskyist
25 desk and they're forming this special squad about

1 Trotskyists, you've got to go. I mean, there was no
2 pressure or anything like that. I just knew I would
3 have to do it.

4 Q. What was your role?

5 A. On the squad?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Well, I've made it clear from the beginning I was not
8 going to be an undercover officer for a start, because
9 it was against my nature. I mean, you know, you can
10 tell that I like to go about openly. Not only that,
11 I wouldn't get away with it for one minute because
12 Christie or somebody would say "Hey, hey, what's he
13 doing here", and so on. So I said I wouldn't do it.

14 And -- but Conrad -- I don't want to be unpleasant
15 -- not unpleasant, but I don't want to put him down in
16 any way, but he took the job because it was
17 an adventure. He had the feeling that it could be done,
18 and if anybody was going to do it, he was going to do
19 it. That is to say, have undercover officers into these
20 difficult areas of left wing extremism. And now, he
21 knew that I was a bit softer than that and I would be
22 there to kind of restrain him from doing anything really
23 stupid. Now, that's what I kind of tacitly agreed with
24 him about.

25 So if I can -- I don't want to make too much of it

1 really, but I would help him with the reports. I would
2 look after the office. I would do this, that and the
3 other, but mainly I would go out and listen to
4 the meetings, the bigger ones in what's the name hall in
5 Red Lion Square and places, so that I had an overall
6 view. So when it came to the day when we have to say --
7 answer the big question, is it going to be as rough as
8 the press and everybody else seem to think or is it not,
9 he would get it right. That's to say, whatever he
10 thought, he would take account of my version of events
11 so that it was reasonably likely to be true. And it
12 wasn't articulated in any way; it's just that I knew
13 what I had to do and he knew what to expect from me.

14 Q. Mr Creamer, can we look at some of the documents in
15 the bundle. I'm going to start with ones, first of all,
16 which do bear your name. Could we start with
17 the document at tab 4, sir, of your bundle, and for
18 the screen {MPS/739495/1}.

19 I don't think it will be your bundle, Mr Creamer.
20 It will be a different document. It will be -- can you
21 see the screen?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Good.

24 This is a report dated 19 September 1968. It's
25 about the Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Movement. If we

1 go to the bottom, it's signed by you -- we've redacted
2 your signature -- and countersigned by Conrad Dixon.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Perhaps if we stay with the bottom paragraph, which
5 reads:

6 "The Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Movement cannot be
7 expected to have much influence on the VSC controlling
8 bodies, but as will be seen from the attached leaflet,
9 its potential for mischief is very high."

10 And the report, at the top, tells us that it's just
11 been formed.

12 So is this the sort of analysis that you provided?

13 A. I'm sorry to say, sir, that isn't -- I -- that is
14 written by an undercover officer.

15 Q. Is it?

16 A. Yeah. I think -- I've thought about this and a lot of
17 documents are of that sort where my name appears, and
18 all I can imagine is that anything that came from the
19 undercover officers had to be kept so secret, even from
20 the registry people, that whenever they got one, they
21 would simply put my name on it because everybody would
22 know that it was from the SDS. But only I would know
23 whether I'd written it or not.

24 And I thought to myself afterwards, well, when
25 I write my own reports, instead of saying, for example,

1 "The following has been received from a reliable
2 source", I should have said "from a trustworthy source".
3 Nobody would notice the difference, but I would and so
4 I would know which reports were mine and which weren't.
5 But that didn't happen and these reports were all filed
6 and put away sometimes without my knowledge. It's not
7 to say I hadn't read them, because obviously I needed to
8 know what was in them, but I would not have read them
9 with my name underneath because, of course, I'd be
10 surprised. I would say, "Well, I haven't written this",
11 but that is the situation, I'm afraid.

12 Q. Well, from our knowledge of SDS reporting in this
13 period, a lot of the reports are signed by the
14 undercover police officers --

15 A. Are they?

16 Q. -- in this era.

17 A. Good.

18 Q. Looking at the bottom paragraph, I think "mischief" is
19 a word that you use quite a lot, isn't it?

20 A. It could be, but I can't --

21 Q. Are you sure it's not yours?

22 A. Well, let's have another look. Let's have a look.

23 (Pause)

24 Well, I have no recollection of it, put it that way,
25 and I -- obviously I wish I had, but, no, no, I can't

1 say that I -- I have written this at all.

2 Q. Don't worry, Mr Creamer, it is a very long time ago.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. We'll take that document down now, please, and if we can

5 have in its place the document at tab 7 of your bundle,

6 sir, which is {MPS/747725/1}. This is a document which

7 is a report dated 6 January 1969 about the VSC working

8 committee. Again, over the page {MPS/747725/2}, it's

9 signed by you and countersigned in this case by either

10 Ray or Riby Wilson.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. If we can go back to the top of the first page, please

13 {MPS/747725/1} --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- it says:

16 "Submitted herewith are copies of the minutes of

17 the two meetings of the Working Committee of the Vietnam

18 Solidarity Campaign, which were held on 5th and

19 12th December, 1968."

20 Now, we've had to redact the content, but can you

21 help us: is getting inside the working committee of

22 the VSC and reporting on what it was doing something

23 that traditional Special Branch methods were likely to

24 have been able to achieve?

25 A. No, they wouldn't -- they would not be able to achieve

1 that, sir.

2 Q. And I know it's difficult when we've had to redact
3 the content, but would the content be likely to have
4 been of use to Special Branch in preparing for
5 the demonstrations that --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- the VSC were organising?

8 A. Oh, indeed, yes.

9 Q. If we could take that document down now, please, and if
10 we could have tab 9 up. It's {UCPI/14320/1}. This is
11 a report dated 22 January 1969. This is a report that
12 runs to several pages. I can tell you that on page --
13 at the bottom of {UCPI/14320/4} we have your signature
14 again countersigned by Conrad Dixon.

15 A. Yes. Well, that is more like my work really, but
16 obviously with the help of an undercover officer, or
17 maybe more than one.

18 Q. That is your analysis, broadly speaking, of those Maoist
19 groups --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- with an emphasis -- those with Mr Manchanda's
22 influence?

23 A. Yes. Yes, you can see -- it would be helpful, but,
24 I mean, my motive in -- in wanting to do that was to be
25 concerned that people understood which groups were doing

1 the mischief, you know. It wasn't my anarchists, so to
2 speak; it was these Maoists. So it was -- I had a kind
3 of personal interest in that and -- but the young man
4 who -- who got the information, I can't remember who he
5 was or anything --

6 Q. No names, please.

7 Okay, if we could go to page 3, please, Mr Creamer,
8 and I'm looking for the penultimate paragraph
9 {UCPI/14320/3}, the one that starts:

10 "Manchanda has one significant advantage ..."

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. About two-thirds of the way down that paragraph, it
13 reads:

14 "To a casual supporter he may appear to offer
15 the ultimate in revolutionary activity, and no-one is
16 likely to be excluded from his groups for aggressiveness
17 or violence on public demonstrations."

18 Was that your understanding of how Mr Manchanda's
19 groups worked?

20 A. Oh, yeah. Yes, indeed. It -- well, that -- yes,
21 exactly that because, in other words, he -- a lot of
22 sounded brass and tinkling cymbal about his methods,
23 but, yeah, I -- it's not kind of a final assessment;
24 it's kind of -- that is what it's like now. What he
25 would turn out to be eventually is probably a waste

1 of -- you know, nobody would have taken any notice of
2 him at all, but at that stage he was the potential to,
3 yeah, offer the ultimate in revolutionary activity and,
4 yeah, that's the way it was. But I had to up the sort
5 of germ of the idea put to -- put to me by
6 the undercover officer.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 Could we now take that down, please.

9 I'm going to move from documents which you signed to
10 some documents which you did not sign, and I would like,
11 though, to know whether you either wrote them or had
12 some input into them. These are in the supplementary
13 bundle that we've put together.

14 The first one is tab 2, sir, of your supplementary
15 bundle. It's {MPS/730061/1} and it's a report dated
16 21 August 1968, and that's very early in the life of
17 the SDS.

18 A. Mm.

19 Q. It's the first of a series of reports summarising, as
20 I understand it, the SDS's understanding of preparations
21 for the October demonstration.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. It's signed by Conrad Dixon.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. It's countersigned by Arthur Cunningham.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And it talks about the internal divisions between
3 the different groups, those in favour of a more violent
4 approach and those in favour of a peaceful approach, as
5 well as the sort of targets that might be chosen
6 en route.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Take as long as you need to familiarise yourself with
9 the contents, Mr Creamer, but is that a report that you
10 wrote for Conrad Dixon?

11 A. No, it's a report that he wrote himself, and he's
12 gone -- he makes that clear by signing it himself and
13 not including anybody else's name in it. And what
14 I think happened there -- what date is it? Yes, this is
15 before the demonstration took place, isn't it?

16 Q. Yes.

17 A. This was the build up to the demonstration, and I feel
18 a bit diffident about having to say this, but that
19 wasn't from an undercover officer either. It was
20 a source that knew what was going on and was prepared to
21 tell us, but he wasn't an informant exactly, and I don't
22 know who he was or anything like to that. And it wasn't
23 Conrad himself who had dealings with him; it was another
24 officer. I could tell you the name -- the name of
25 the other officer, but I'd rather not.

1 And you can see that it's of a much higher standard
2 than any of us could have written. It -- even
3 the vocabulary's different. But the fact that they were
4 closer to the hierarchy of the Vietnam Solidarity
5 Campaign is quite apparent to me anyway, and I don't
6 think Conrad -- for all his talents, he couldn't have
7 written it either.

8 Q. Right.

9 If we look at the next document, the next document
10 at tab 3 is {MPS/730065/1}.

11 A. This one? I can't read it.

12 Q. Can you see it on the screen now?

13 A. No -- ah, yes. Yes.

14 Q. This is another document which is signed by Conrad Dixon
15 and countersigned by Arthur Cunningham.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. It's dated 30 August, so just over a week later.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. It's, again, about the forthcoming Autumn Offensive. It
20 starts with a contextual paragraph about events in
21 Czechoslovakia.

22 A. Mm.

23 Q. And then goes on to say that there has been a change of
24 emphasis within the VSC in that the IMG was retreating
25 from the -- the gist is they were retreating from

1 a violent stance.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. And then it goes on to provide some information about
4 the political leanings of members of the liaison
5 committee and some intelligence about different
6 branches.

7 Our understanding, Mr Creamer, had been that these
8 were documents that were periodic updates --

9 A. Oh, yeah.

10 Q. -- on the state of progress of preparations for the
11 Autumn Offensive. Are we understanding these documents
12 correctly?

13 A. Oh, yes, yes. I think he -- it was kind of a progress
14 report every week, more or less. Anything of this
15 nature and this level wouldn't be my -- he might confide
16 in me and show me, but by and large, that came from him
17 and his -- the sources that were open to us then.

18 Q. So what, if any, input do you think came from you?

19 A. It's difficult to say. I -- I would like to, obviously,
20 have been more au fait with what was going on at the top
21 level of the VSC, but I wasn't. I mean, there's no
22 beating about the bush. It wasn't in -- anything that
23 I was either expected to do or -- you know, or ever did.
24 But, as I say, there was help and if you think
25 about it -- well, if I think about it, the business of

1 IMG, of opting out of this, could well be what one --
2 I might have mentioned earlier; is that some pressure
3 had been brought to bear on them by the ordinary members
4 of the Labour Party, who felt that they'd gone too far
5 and any advantages that they might think of being
6 a light to the Labour Party or whatever like that would
7 go out the window and they would be treated as pariahs
8 and the rest of it. That kind of frightened them
9 a bit -- or not frightened them but concerned them, and
10 they dropped out.

11 But only somebody who was well up in that would --
12 would know, I mean, and it wasn't -- well, I say it
13 wasn't; I hope it was an individual officer, but I can't
14 imagine it -- I don't think anyone was so erudite as to
15 produce such stuff, really.

16 Q. Okay. Can we take that down and can we go to
17 the document at tab 5, which is {MPS/730064/1}, which is
18 again a -- it's a two-page report signed by Conrad Dixon
19 dated 19 September. This one is -- it postdates the
20 National Council's -- the VSC's National Council's
21 meeting on 7 September 1968, which had decided largely
22 on the route and form of the demonstration. It reports
23 that those decisions were being hotly debated within VSC
24 branches across the country, and then relates events at
25 the large meeting held in Conway Hall on 17 September at

1 which, as we understand it, the Maoists had been
2 outvoted by others as to the final route and it had been
3 decided that the route would not go past the US Embassy.

4 It does, though, go on effectively to communicate
5 that there were Maoist-influenced groups, such as
6 the Earls Court and Notting Hill branches of the VSC,
7 that were going to take no notice of the vote and go
8 their own way anyway.

9 Now, we have seen a lot of SDS reporting about
10 the meeting in Conway Hall, about branch meetings
11 discussing events at the National Council, and we know
12 that there were SDS officers in both the Earls Court and
13 Notting Hill branches of the VSC. We understand this to
14 be essentially an amalgamation of intelligence gleaned
15 by the SDS about the forthcoming demonstration.

16 A. Yes --

17 Q. Are you able to help us with whether we're right or
18 wrong about that?

19 A. Yes, you're on steady ground there, sir, yeah, yes.

20 Q. And, again, did you have anything to do with writing
21 this report?

22 A. At this stage I can't remember, but probably, yes.

23 Certainly -- well, if I can put it in simpler terms,
24 really, to explain it to myself more than anything,
25 Conrad was concerned with trying to prove that all this

1 business of undercover work could be done and it was
2 an adventure. I was more concerned that, whatever else,
3 we should not make a song and dance and make anybody
4 more alarmed than they need be. That is to say, I would
5 tone it down.

6 If we said, as often happens in these, that people
7 had said, "Oh, we're going to march on the Ministry of
8 Defence or Mansion House," or whatever it is, I'd say,
9 "No, no, don't bother with that", add something to
10 the effect that it was a lone voice or whatever and
11 didn't mean anything, so that when I looked at
12 the report, apart from anything else, I was kind of in
13 a kind of subeditor role of saying anything that was
14 likely to alarm anyone should either not be put in or
15 toned down or whatever.

16 We had to tread a careful line -- or I did, I mean,
17 because if that was true and so on and they were going
18 to do that, then obviously I couldn't interfere. But if
19 it was unlikely and just kind of thrown into -- because
20 somebody had reported it, I would pressurise Conrad to
21 take it off. So, in a way, that was the kind of area in
22 which I felt I could be useful, but as for getting
23 the information in the first place, that was between
24 Conrad and the staff. I didn't interfere in any of
25 that. I had no idea who'd done what.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 If we can take that down now. I'm just going to
3 show you one last document of this sort for a specific
4 reason. If we could have up tab 6 {MPS/730096/1}.

5 Now, this is another of these updating reports
6 described as a regular weekly report. It's dated
7 3 October 1968. What I'm interested in is the very
8 bottom of this page. Thank you. Subparagraph (c)
9 reads:

10 "Information from Glasgow indicates that about
11 400 demonstrators will be coming from Scotland, of whom
12 160 will be from Glasgow itself. The latter contingent
13 are being advised to wear crash helmets and urged to
14 carry ball-bearings, fireworks, hat pins and banner
15 poles for use as weapons."

16 Can you recall any concerns about violent
17 Glaswegians being expected at the demonstration?

18 A. No, but I know, in the early days, we did not --
19 presumably this came from the Special Branches up in
20 Scotland, and in the early days, we were not -- I don't
21 know, we just didn't contact provincial officers about
22 our demonstrations, because that was the tradition. We
23 had never bothered. But they obviously had a change of
24 heart and wrote to all the Special Branches, I think,
25 and along the lines that, "Anything you can do to help

1 us would be greatly appreciated", and so on. So this
2 has come from them.

3 Now, I can't remember -- I can't remember it in
4 particular, but I think if it would have come to me to
5 have a look at, I would say, "Well, I can't stop you
6 putting it forward, but be sceptical about it", because
7 what people say they're going to do when they're on
8 the bus or whatever is not necessarily what will happen
9 when they get there. They might find they're
10 outnumbered or that they're reluctant or whatever, so
11 that it's not guaranteed this sort of thing will happen.
12 But if we'd been warned that it's going to happen, it's
13 got to be mentioned and A8 ought to know.

14 So in a way, it wouldn't -- I wouldn't interfere and
15 I wouldn't -- any interference from me wouldn't be
16 welcome at all.

17 Q. We'll come back to Glaswegians in a moment.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. If we can take that down now, please.

20 I'm now going to take you to two documents which are
21 dated 27 October 1968, obviously the day of the
22 demonstration itself. They're both telegrams.

23 A. Oh, yes.

24 Q. The first one is tab 1 of the supplementary bundle.

25 A. Mm.

1 Q. That's {MPS/733955/1}. This is the earliest of the two.
2 It's timed at 11.15 in the morning.

3 A. I know the one you mean, yeah, without looking, yeah.

4 Q. This one says it's from you to the chief --

5 A. From me?

6 Q. Yes, have a look --

7 A. Oh, I see, yeah, yeah.

8 Q. It says it's from you to the chief superintendent of
9 Special Branch, and it says:

10 "A group of about 20 Maoists intend to commence
11 leafletting at the Embankment from 11.30am onwards in
12 order to catch the early demonstrators and persuade them
13 to march later to Grosvenor Square."

14 And it's signed by a constable. We can see from
15 what's written below that Cheap Superintendent
16 Cunningham had spoken to Commander Lawless.

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. So this seems to be very much real-time intelligence on
19 the day.

20 A. Yes, yeah.

21 Q. Can you help us with whether you would have been on
22 the Embankment with the Maoists or whether you were in
23 the office sending the telegram as one part of
24 Special Branch to another?

25 A. No, I was in the office, and this is from one of

1 the undercover officers. Well, even there -- well, yes,
2 it may have been an undercover officer, it may have been
3 an ordinary officer that wasn't undercover.

4 Q. I see.

5 Now, if we could go -- take that down, please.

6 A. Could I ask, did the constable sign his name and so on?

7 Q. Yes, we redacted it for privacy reasons.

8 A. Yes, but --

9 Q. But it won't have been an SDS officer, because we would
10 have put the SDS officer's nominal.

11 A. No, but the fact that he signed it, it suggests to me
12 that it was an outside -- somebody outside the SDS who
13 had been detailed to look out, you know, early in
14 the day, to see -- just for that sort of thing.

15 Q. I see.

16 A. They would do that.

17 Q. Good, thank you.

18 If we could have up the document which is in
19 the original bundle at tab 4A. It's {MPS/733954/1}.
20 Now, this is the one that was in your original witness
21 pack. It's, again, the same date, but later in the day,
22 18.45 hours. This one says it's from
23 Detective Inspector Saunders to the --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- chief superintendent Special Branch.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And it's signed by you, and it says:

3 "I am in the vicinity of South Audley Street.

4 "Since about 4pm I have been with a group of some
5 200 anarchists from Liverpool and Glasgow who broke away
6 from the main march at Hyde Park Corner. They have
7 engaged in various sorts of hooliganism in the vicinity
8 of Grosvenor Square.

9 "They led the charge towards the US Embassy along
10 South Audley Street from its inception, for the past two
11 and a half hours they have been confronting police.
12 They have been joined by contingents of the
13 International Marxist Group and various VSC elements
14 from Hyde Park.

15 "They are at present at the head of the column in
16 South Audley Street which is confronting police at
17 the junction of the SW corner of Grosvenor Square.

18 "I will give a full account of their activities in
19 due course."

20 Can you help us with, first of all, what was your
21 role in the generation of this telegram?

22 A. Well, it's a long time ago and I'm not quite sure, but
23 the -- I was in the office for that very purpose; to
24 take messages from whoever was outside. So I must have
25 done that.

1 And as for the content, well, DI Saunders would know
2 more about what Glasgow had told us, so he would be
3 aware of the background and would see the dangers of all
4 this, and all I could do would be -- I think I didn't
5 have to do it. It looks as though -- it says:

6 "Chief superintendent [somebody or other] to
7 see ..."

8 This would be sent instantly to A8, because it was
9 happening. The drawback there, of course, is that it's
10 such a long-winded way of getting information to A8 that
11 it's probably too late. I mean, probably they were
12 there before, but the advantage for A8 would be they're
13 on the spot and they can see it just as well as Saunders
14 could. But to be told by us that -- who they were would
15 be helpful, but, of course, it's -- yeah, it's a good
16 piece of work. I can't argue with it. It's very good.
17 And my part in it was simply to pass on the message.

18 Q. Because presumably you would have remembered if you'd
19 been in Grosvenor Square with 200 violent Liverpudlian
20 and Glaswegian protesters.

21 A. Yes. Yeah, I heard about it afterwards. Yeah, it was
22 violent, apparently. I -- you know, I was a bit
23 disappointed after being put in Scotland Yard and not --
24 not go out and see what was happening, but that's
25 the way it was.

1 Q. On to rather more mundane matters. Do you know whether
2 Conrad Dixon went to the Home Office or met
3 the Home Secretary in relation to the October
4 demonstration?

5 A. No, I don't know. I mean, I didn't need to know a lot
6 about it. If it wasn't -- you know, if you didn't need
7 to know, you wouldn't know.

8 Q. We can take the document down now. Thank you.

9 Do you know whether Conrad Dixon took any legal
10 advice or received any legal advice about how to operate
11 an undercover police unit?

12 A. Well, I'm not sure. Well, I'm pretty certain he didn't,
13 and it wasn't in his nature to do that. He -- he saw
14 this as a challenge and he didn't want to be inhibited
15 by any scruples that other people might have because he
16 trusted himself to be scrupulous as the situation
17 demanded, no more and no less, and to be honest, that's
18 the situation.

19 Q. You've made various observations in your witness
20 statement about what the SDS did and did not do in
21 relation to policing the October demonstration. What is
22 your overall assessment? Did undercover policing make
23 a big difference or not?

24 A. Not quite sure what the question is. Can you just
25 repeat it?

1 Q. In policing the Autumn Offensive --

2 A. Hm.

3 Q. -- did the use of undercover officers make a big
4 difference or not?

5 A. Overall, oh, certainly, yes, but on -- on the day, none.
6 None. They weren't in a position -- they weren't even
7 told what to do. I mean, they could go on it, and
8 obviously if their branch or group went on it, but they
9 had to behave themselves just like anyone else. But
10 overall, the standard of information that A8 received
11 from us was far higher than anything that could have
12 been done before, without a doubt.

13 Q. Now, one of the reasons why I asked you that is there
14 were two comments which were a little doubtful.

15 The first was you said that VSC groups were very
16 badly supported sometimes and there would be hardly
17 anybody there and looking there did not help, but
18 local -- but VSC groups were where a lot of SDS officers
19 were deployed.

20 A. Yeah, that's -- that is the situation, mind you.
21 I mean, it can't be helped. You see, had the situation
22 been such that there was a great deal of interest among,
23 say, the general public in the Vietnam Solidarity
24 Campaign and these groups -- I mean, these individual
25 places like Putney or wherever filled up with people all

1 anxious to get on the demonstration and show how opposed
2 they were to the Americans and to the war, that would be
3 one thing and that would enable you to say, well, look,
4 even at this level, there's a whole lot of interest, so,
5 you know, it's going to be big.

6 Now, if it was the opposite, which is -- was
7 the truth, that hardly anybody went there and those that
8 went there weren't particularly -- well, not the sort to
9 alarm you in any way, that was helpful in kind of
10 reassuring the powers that be that there's not going to
11 -- at least there's no great call for a big violent
12 demonstration. In fact, this -- might just have a call
13 for it -- you know, at all.

14 Now, you couldn't put that down as the very last
15 word, but it was just an indication that had we not gone
16 there and looked at who was going to go, we'd have been
17 missing out. The fact that nobody much went there was
18 helpful, I've no doubt. But extravagant, of course.
19 I mean, you shouldn't have -- that's what I felt at the
20 time. You shouldn't need to have a man of the rank of
21 inspector or chief inspector going to a meeting of six
22 or seven people. That was awful, I mean, in -- in terms
23 of use of officers. But, on the other hand,
24 potentially, it could have been very helpful.

25 As it -- events turned out, it wasn't, but,

1 you know, you -- I don't think you can criticise anybody
2 for it because we had to do everything in a hurry.
3 There was no hope of getting, you know, information from
4 the top. And what undermined the whole situation was,
5 looking for evidence of pre-planning and plots to
6 violence and all that kind of thing, they did not exist,
7 so we were not going to find them anyway and, you know,
8 we had to work against that background, hope, so to
9 speak -- I think I've written somewhere in my statement
10 that -- well -- well, I've forgotten what it was now,
11 but the --

12 Q. You've written something to that effect.

13 A. I've written something to that effect, yes.

14 Q. Right, thank you.

15 Can I move now to fatherly advice.

16 A. Ah, yeah.

17 Q. You say that you gave fatherly advice to the officers
18 about not taking drugs --

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. -- not getting involved in mischief and not getting
21 illnesses.

22 What sort of mischief were you referring to?

23 A. Oh, well, I was really addressing myself to those who
24 were going to do the anarchist -- you know, try and join
25 an anarchist group. Oh, they'd do flyposting, which

1 isn't that mischievous, but they might do objectionable,
2 you know, sort of painting of walls and -- for which
3 they could very well be arrested. That kind of
4 mischief.

5 That's not -- no, not terrible, but better not do
6 it, because then we've got a problem, if they are
7 arrested, as to how to proceed. I mean, you can't go to
8 the police station and say, "Let him go, he's
9 an undercover officer", or at least I felt that. Maybe
10 you could, but I didn't want them to get into that
11 situation at all.

12 And in those days, drugs were fairly novel, but it
13 was quite common among anarchist minded people to smoke
14 pot, without a doubt. And one of the consequences of
15 injecting themselves with heroin, or whatever it is, is
16 that they transmitted -- I can't remember what disease
17 it was, but some sort of disease which would do --
18 injure for them for life, really.

19 So I felt they ought to -- I don't see they needed
20 it, but I say -- they probably knew more about it than
21 I did, but I felt that was the gist of what I ...
22 concerned only with the anarchist lot. I didn't know
23 too much about the others.

24 Q. About not getting illnesses, what --

25 A. That's what I mean; not getting Hepatitis B, is it?

1 Some such thing, which you can get if you mix with drug
2 takers. I mean, you can't order somebody not to get
3 ill, can you? I don't -- that's rather badly put, but
4 that's what I meant.

5 Q. Were you referring at all to sexually transmitted
6 diseases?

7 A. Oh, no, no. To be honest, I never gave that a thought.
8 I'm amazed really that it should ever have come up
9 because it's quite awful really, and I imagine that,
10 you know, you would flirt with people and all sorts of
11 things. You're dealing with fellows who are presentable
12 and attractive in themselves. I mean, they would get
13 attention from women, but it's nonsense to sleep with
14 them. I can't imagine any of the ones that I knew --
15 I knew most of them -- would do such a thing.

16 Q. Can I move on now.

17 After the demonstration, you have written in your
18 witness statement:

19 "I thought the SDS would pack up anyway because we
20 had done our job with the [VSC]."

21 Do you think that the SDS should have packed up?

22 A. Yeah, I do. I'm afraid so, because what we should have
23 done and what the powers that be should have done was to
24 say, "That was well done", because it was, "But it's
25 hedged around with all sorts of difficult problems. Why

1 don't we sit back, take a look at what we've done, pick
2 out the good bits, throw out the bad bits and, if we
3 have to, try again?" But I really feel that we -- the
4 battle had been won, basically.

5 Well, not so much that, not the VSC demonstration,
6 but one of the problems with demonstrations is
7 the police are very reluctant to cancel them. They --
8 they felt that the public wouldn't want them to cancel
9 them, and especially with a thing like Vietnam, there
10 would be more trouble if they tried to prevent them
11 taking place than -- than was worth it. But after
12 the Lewisham business, which was a clash between
13 National Front and the left wing generally,
14 the Commissioner and whoever advises him said, "Right,
15 we're going to be in a position to ban really violent
16 demonstrations".

17 So in a way, that clinched it for me. I thought,
18 well, fine, we don't really need any more undercover
19 officers, and I'm really quite surprised that it
20 continued. But I had nothing to do with it. I mean,
21 really, I went back to my desk and kept out of the hair
22 of the -- well, I just didn't have anything to do with
23 them.

24 I didn't know the people involved, except
25 one occasion when Riby or whatever -- one of the

1 officers told me that they were short and needed
2 somebody, could I kindly look out and see what I thought
3 and find somebody for them, or if I found somebody for
4 them, would I let them know? And did I that once,
5 I think. But by and large, I wasn't an enthusiast
6 for it because, as you can see, it's hedged about with
7 so many problems.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 Operational security. You say in your witness
10 statement that there were verbal briefings by commanders
11 and senior persons in the Branch, for example:

12 "... 'we do not want the SDS to get out', 'do not
13 create trouble' and 'do not make waves'."

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Can you help us with what they meant by that?

16 A. Well, I think the man at the top in those days was
17 Ferguson Smith, and Ferguson Smith had fought during
18 the war and had gone on secret missions over Germany as
19 an RAF navigator. So he had this kind of wartime
20 feeling about security that, you know, dangerous talk
21 and all that sort of thing. So he was of the belief --
22 and said so -- that this should not get out. It will
23 not get out; he would go as far as that, because
24 I remember saying to him one day -- well, you could talk
25 to people in those days, however high the rank was, and

1 I said, "Do you know, we ought to take the view that
2 we'll do nothing that, when it comes -- if it ever comes
3 to light, that the public would not approve of", and he
4 said to me, "It will not come out".

5 And, of course, if you're going to start with that
6 belief, that it will not come out, you're given
7 carte blanche to -- well, whatever you like, and
8 I thought that was not right, but I couldn't really say
9 it. I couldn't argue with him. He was the boss.

10 And on the point that it should not come out,
11 I agreed with him. It shouldn't come out, because,
12 I mean, imagine if it had come out at the time that
13 the police had the undercover officers. There would be
14 a much worse situation, you know, from the left. They
15 would resent it and people who wouldn't normally have
16 gone to a demonstration, they'd go there and say, "We're
17 protesting against police interference in our lives",
18 and so on and so forth.

19 Q. I've got about ten minutes -- ten or 15 minutes more
20 questions for you, Mr Creamer. Are you happy to
21 continue or would you like another break?

22 A. Yes. If I can have a drop of water.

23 Q. Of course you can.

24 A. I must say, sir, I don't want to sound too flippant
25 about all this. I know we're dealing with a very

1 serious subject, but when -- when we were in that squad,
2 it was a lark in many ways, it was an adventure, and
3 there was no ill will towards the people we were
4 penetrating or whatever. It was an experiment to see if
5 it could be done. That was the -- the theme of Conrad's
6 police. So a lot of the seriousness of it has been
7 faded away, I'm afraid.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: May I just explain what we would like to do
9 and you tell me if you're happy to go along with it.
10 Mr Barr says, I think, he has about another quarter of
11 an hour's worth of questions. We would then have
12 a 20-minute break so that anyone who wants him to ask
13 you things that he hasn't already asked can make that
14 suggestion, and he would then ask whatever questions he
15 thinks right arising out of that, and then your counsel
16 will re-examine you, if at all, very briefly.

17 In other words, if we adopt that arrangement, you're
18 likely to be here for, at worst, an hour and possibly
19 a little less. Would you be content with that?

20 A. Me, personally?

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

22 A. Yes, I don't mind. I would like a cup of tea now, of
23 course.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you wait for quarter of an hour for your
25 cup of tea?

1 A. Thank you.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: I mean, can you wait for quarter of an hour
3 to get your cup of tea or --

4 A. Oh, no, I could wait.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Splendid, right. Then we'll ensure you have
6 long enough to have a cup of tea.

7 A. Thank you, sir.

8 MR BARR: Thank you, Mr Creamer.

9 I'm now going to move to your time in Special Branch
10 after the SDS. Did you ever occupy a role where you
11 were compiling the threat assessments for A8?

12 A. Oh, yes, yes, yes. That -- that's what I really liked
13 doing.

14 Q. And when you were doing that, did you have
15 a relationship with the SDS?

16 A. Well, it's a bit thorny really, because they were kind
17 of snooty about it. They would only say, for example,
18 "Oh, we haven't got anybody interested in that". They
19 were in -- I mean, demonstrations come in all sorts of
20 forms, and if it's not IS and if it's not WS-- whatever,
21 IMG or one the groups they were involved in, they
22 couldn't tell you any more than anybody else. So it was
23 a bit disappointing. It was called Special
24 Demonstration Squad, but it didn't do what you would
25 expect a Special Demonstration Squad to do. That is to

1 say, take over the whole business and do the
2 assessments. So they left it to us.

3 Now, it didn't cause any real friction; it just made
4 me feel a bit disappointed really, that had I stayed in
5 SDS myself, that would have been my chief purpose,
6 you know, to make use of it in that way. But I didn't
7 dare -- dare ask what they were up to or who was doing
8 what, and I thought, well, we can imagine without, go
9 back to the old-fashioned methods and be all right. Of
10 course, tricky. I mean, by and large, I was right about
11 most of the things I assessed, but I couldn't say that
12 I was, you know, 100% perfect and -- but I did what
13 I could.

14 Q. Did you ever make requests of the SDS for intelligence
15 about particular forthcoming events or particular feels
16 or --

17 A. No, no, no. No. I mean, the people above me might have
18 done. I dare say they would, but I -- I wasn't
19 obviously in that position, really. I mean, even to go
20 into their office I wouldn't do. I'd left, and they had
21 their own problems and they didn't want -- they didn't
22 want any -- any interference and I didn't want to.

23 Q. Were you able to make an assessment relatively as to how
24 helpful the SDS intelligence was in compiling threat
25 assessments for A8?

1 A. Well, in my time, probably not much, but what happened
2 afterwards, I don't know. I think it got a lot better.
3 I -- I -- I didn't -- well, I had to take notice of
4 the fact when they said, "We're not interested, nobody's
5 coming from IS and then IMG", or whatever, yeah, I had
6 to bear that in mind, but no, I didn't think their --
7 what they had to offer the ordinary squad officer doing
8 an assessment, in those days I thought could have been
9 a lot better, but maybe, you know, the groups that
10 demonstrated weren't necessarily of interest -- well,
11 they wouldn't be of interest to them, but they were of
12 no account, if you know what I mean.

13 Some of the demonstrations that -- they were sort
14 of -- people from what used to be the London Polytechnic
15 would run around the streets for a while and make
16 trouble, but they were so small that the SDS probably
17 didn't even know of them. So one would have to assess
18 that kind of thing without the help of the SDS, but had
19 there been anything larger than that which did involve
20 the people they were interested in, then they would have
21 had a different role.

22 But in my time there, which it wasn't very long, to
23 be honest -- could have been two years or three years or
24 whatever, but I personally ... well, I don't want to
25 knock them in any way. It's just that that's the way it

1 was.

2 Q. Can I show you now two specific reports. The first one

3 is {MPS/728675/1}.

4 Now, this is a minute sheet on the Front.

5 A. I can see it, yes.

6 Q. If we scroll down a little bit, we will see there's

7 a reference to you {MPS/728675/2}, which seems to

8 suggest that you were to see this report; do you see

9 that?

10 A. Oh, yeah. Well, that was a fairly routine thing, sir.

11 Anything to do with Trotskyists or anarchists would --

12 that was in the non-SDS part of the Branch, I would --

13 I would have to see, yes.

14 Q. This report is in fact about the Troops Out Movement.

15 So if we go on, please --

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. -- to the next page {MPS/728675/3} --

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. -- it's dated 4 July 1975.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. It's about the Troops Out Movement, and in particular it

22 is a meeting of supporters of Gerry Lawless; in other

23 words, a meeting of a faction within TOM --

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. -- who were at loggerheads at the time with the

1 Revolutionary Communist Group and Workers Fight.

2 If we scroll down, please, and on to the next page
3 {MPS/728675/4}, "Rick Gibson" at the bottom there was
4 the cover name of an undercover police officer, so there
5 was an SDS UCO at this meeting.

6 If we go on to the next page {MPS/728675/4}, you'll
7 see the signatures, the chief inspector and the chief
8 superintendent. We think that the signature of the
9 chief inspector may have revealed to you that this was
10 SDS intelligence.

11 A. Mm.

12 Q. Would that or any other indicator on this have indicated
13 to you that this was SDS intelligence?

14 A. Yes, (a) because it's signed by a chief inspector and
15 not by a -- a constable. I think that's a JH somebody,
16 and I think when I saw it earlier, or before, I had
17 an idea. We had two people who could fit that. One
18 was -- I can't remember now. JH ...

19 Q. Let me --

20 A. Whether he was on the SDS then, I don't know.

21 Q. Okay. Well, let me take this document down and show you
22 the next one, which dates from March 1976. It's
23 {MPS/728785/1}. It's dated 25 March 1976
24 {MPS/728785/2}. And, again, on the minute sheet,
25 towards the bottom of the screen there, you can see it

1 says "Seen By DI Creamer", amongst other things, and
2 it's got your signature on it. So this report appears
3 to have crossed your desk.

4 If we move down on to the next page, please
5 {MPS/728785/3}, we see the report itself. It's
6 25 March 1976. It's about the London Coordinating
7 Committee of TOM, and if we scroll down further, please,
8 it says -- the paragraph which starts at the top of
9 the screen, if you go to the bottom of that paragraph,
10 it says:

11 "GIBSON was chosen to fill the post of Convenor and
12 [Privacy] to take over from GIBSON as the TOM London
13 Organiser."

14 So you see that this undercover officer is assuming
15 quite significant posts. He's taking on the post of
16 national convenor for this organisation.

17 A. Mm.

18 Q. And if we scroll down to the signature block at the end
19 of the report, please {MPS/728785/4}, it's signed by
20 Geoffrey Craft.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Would you have known at the time that Geoffrey Craft was
23 the detective chief inspector in charge of the SDS?

24 A. Yes, yes, I knew that.

25 Q. So it would have been apparent to you, wouldn't it, that

- 1 you were looking at a report from the SDS?
- 2 A. Yeah, yeah.
- 3 Q. Did you know that "Rick Gibson" was an undercover
4 officer?
- 5 A. No, no.
- 6 Q. I've shown you -- I've shown you these two reports
7 because the first one shows that "Rick Gibson" was
8 involved in factional in-fighting within the group. He
9 was meeting with one of the factions.
- 10 I am understanding your evidence to be that you did
11 not know that he was an undercover police officer.
- 12 A. Yeah. Well, that's so, yes.
- 13 Q. If you had known that, would it have been of concern to
14 you that "Mr Gibson" was taking sides within
15 an organisation he was infiltrating?
- 16 A. Of course it would, yes. Can I just go back a page
17 {MPS/728785/3}. It says "DI Creamer to see", or "has
18 seen", or whatever, and then a chief superintendent --
19 a signature that -- IMS chief superintendent. Now,
20 that's all wrong, isn't it?
- 21 Q. Let's just get that minute sheet back up.
- 22 A. Yeah.
- 23 Q. It will be the first page {MPS/728785/2} -- those cover
24 sheets, I'm afraid, throw us from time to time.
- 25 A. See there --

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. -- where it says "Roy Creamer" and underneath, it says
3 "Chief Superintendent". Well, that's absurd, isn't it?
4 So there's something odd about the whole thing. And at
5 this stage, I can remember clearly that I did not have
6 anything to do with Troops Out Movement and it was
7 the -- it was the concern of other officers, and
8 I personally thought Lawless -- well, I had an opinion
9 of him which I daren't tell you, but the -- I didn't
10 think much of him, to be honest, and I wouldn't be
11 interested in what he was up to, to be honest, either.

12 Q. Okay, thank you.

13 Would you have been concerned if you had known that
14 the person who was calling himself "Rick Gibson" was
15 an undercover police officer that he was also assuming
16 high office?

17 A. In the -- yes, in the Troops Out Movement or whatever.
18 It shouldn't have happened. Back then, let's face it,
19 sir, I couldn't -- even if I'd known, I mean, I wouldn't
20 dare interfere with what the SDS were doing. I mean,
21 apart from anything else, Troops Out Movement is related
22 to Irish matters, isn't it? It's nothing to do with
23 home-grown Trotskyists and anarchists, and maybe
24 the powers that be thought that if they've got to keep
25 tabs on Irish matters, well, you know, the search goes

1 everywhere, so we'll have a look at Troops Out Movement,
2 which they were probably concerned about, but I wasn't
3 and I had no reason to be. I mean, it wasn't in my
4 patch at all, so frankly, even if I saw it, which
5 I doubt -- I don't know why they've put "seen by DI
6 Creamer", because I don't recall it at all, and
7 secondly, I wasn't, at the time, a chief superintendent.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 If we could take that down. Just two more things
10 I want to ask you about.

11 The first is a document which is at tab 18 of
12 the bundle {UCPI/30775/1}. Now, this is a note for file
13 made by the Security Service on 16 March 1978, and it
14 relates to a meeting on 14 March 1978, and as you will
15 see from paragraph 1, it says that:

16 "Supt Ray Wilson and Insp Roy Creamer of
17 [Metropolitan Police Special Branch] discussed various
18 aspects of Anarchism with F7 and me ... it was agreed
19 that ..."

20 "a ..."

21 We've had to redact the next bit:

22 "... and I would discuss the F7 contribution to
23 the National Special Branch Conference (on domestic
24 Anarchists) with 'C' Squad in more detail when we were
25 clear about what we wanted to say. In particular we

1 would seek MPSB clearance for the use of TARGET
2 material. One of the points we needed to put across was
3 that provincial police forces needed to tell us (and did
4 not always do so) about acts of violence committed in
5 their areas with apparent political connections.

6 "b. MPSB would consider the possibility of putting
7 someone alongside [Privacy] and [Privacy] of
8 Revolutionary Struggle."

9 Now, my question to you is: is that reference at
10 b about "putting someone alongside [Privacy] and
11 [Privacy] of Revolutionary Struggle" a reference to
12 inserting an SDS officer into that group? Please, when
13 you answer, don't say anything about any alternative
14 sources.

15 A. Well, frankly, I don't know. I remember going with
16 Ray Wilson, but what we discussed and things like that,
17 I don't know. I think he took me along in case he was
18 asked questions about anarchism and that kind of thing
19 that he couldn't answer for himself, but that part of
20 the conversation, such as it is written down, I've no
21 idea. I didn't follow it. I think we were in
22 a position to say we'll put somebody alongside because
23 we had the SDS. But whether we said it or whatever or
24 not, I don't know.

25 Q. In your experience -- and if you can't speak to this,

1 just say so -- what influence did C Squad have in the
2 tasking of SDS undercover police officers?

3 A. None -- well, it was up to the SDS themselves. I think
4 the most that you could say would be C Squad could have
5 a power of veto, or even sort of put forward what they
6 thought should -- they should be doing, but to the best
7 of my knowledge, they didn't. I think we all kind of
8 kept it at arm's length because none of us were quite
9 sure where it was leading.

10 Q. Are you able to help us with the role or influence that
11 C Squad had in passing on requests from the
12 Security Service to the SDS for intelligence?

13 A. No, I wasn't the admin man on C Squad, so -- no, I was
14 one of the operatives. There was -- that was for
15 Ray Wilson and whoever to deal with that. Anything from
16 the Security Service was treated with great, you know,
17 sort of alacrity. If they wanted it, they were the
18 people that mattered, because they were -- I'm not
19 saying they were our supervisors but they were on
20 a level higher than us and, you know, we should do what
21 they want really.

22 Q. The last topic I want to ask you about, did you ever sit
23 on the industrial desk?

24 A. No. No, never. I didn't want to know that, sir.

25 MR BARR: Thank you.

1 I think, if the chairman agrees, it's tea time.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: It is. Does 20 minutes give you long enough?

3 A. Yes, thank you very much, yeah.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Good, then we'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

5 (4.36 pm)

6 (A short break)

7 (4.57 pm)

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

9 MR BARR: No more questions from me, thank you.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Any re-examination?

11 MR SKELTON: No, thank you.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr Creamer, your evidence is now

13 finished. I'm very grateful to you for illuminating for

14 us as vividly as you have all those events of more than

15 50 years ago. Thank you.

16 A. Thank you.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Then we will adjourn now until tomorrow at

18 10.00. Thank you.

19 (4.58 pm)

20 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Tuesday,

21 17 May 2022)

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