

Tuesday, 17 May 2022

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Welcome to Day 4 of evidential hearings at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Neil Fernandes and I am the hearings manager. There is no fire alarm testing expected today, so if the fire alarm goes off, please follow the fire exit signs and make your way to the muster point, which is the Hard Rock Hotel, Great Cumberland Place.

On arrival at the muster point, please make yourself known to a fire marshal who will be wearing a high visibility jacket and who will be keeping a register of all attendees. The fire marshals will also be responsible for letting everyone know when it is safe to return, in liaison with representatives from the Thistle Hotel.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start proceedings. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Those at the back will know what I'm about to say. Apologies, but it's necessary.

You may use any mobile electronic device that you have to transmit silently to the outside world what you have seen and heard in the Inquiry, but only ten minutes after the event that you are describing. Ten minutes

1 must elapse before you do it. You may not use such  
2 a device for recording our proceedings or for taking  
3 photographs.

4 Thank you.

5 Ms Campbell.

6 Summary of the evidence of HN2401 (Anthony Greenslade)

7 MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, sir. This morning I'll be  
8 summarising the evidence of HN2401,  
9 Anthony John Greenslade.

10 Anthony Greenslade assisted the SDS as detective  
11 inspector during a period of about six months from  
12 the summer of 1973 to the end of the year. He provided  
13 a witness statement to the Inquiry dated 27 July 2021,  
14 which may be summarised as follows.

15 Anthony Greenslade joined the Metropolitan Police  
16 Service as a cadet in 1954, becoming a full constable in  
17 1957. He joined Special Branch in 1960 and undertook  
18 various postings, including in C Squad, ports and the  
19 section concerned with Black Power.

20 In 1971, he joined the Bomb Squad conducting  
21 surveillance and enquiry into the actions of the  
22 Angry Brigade. It was during this posting that he also  
23 became involved with the SDS.

24 He states that he did not consider himself in  
25 the SDS. He was formally on the Bomb Squad and he

1 confirms that he continued that work throughout his time  
2 assisting the SDS. He notes that he was running  
3 surveillance in the Bomb Squad with DI Derek Brice, who  
4 was at the time also involved in managing the SDS, and  
5 he believes that he was brought in on Brice's  
6 recommendation.

7 Anthony Greenslade supported the squad in  
8 an administrative capacity and was one of  
9 three detective inspectors serving in management  
10 positions for the SDS at the time. He had had no  
11 previous contact with the SDS and only knew about it  
12 vaguely before becoming involved. He confirms that he  
13 had not previously done any undercover policing and did  
14 not receive any training for the role.

15 Anthony Greenslade indicates that he was put on to  
16 the SDS by Chief Superintendent Rollo Watts in order to  
17 help in the purchase of 12 cars to be used by undercover  
18 officers. Prior to this period, the SDS had been  
19 renting a small number of vehicles for general SDS use,  
20 something which Greenslade notes had been "a bad  
21 experience".

22 He states that he was also tasked to run promotion  
23 classes for members of the SDS as there had been a bad  
24 record of promotional exam success in the squad.  
25 Greenslade did not have experience in training officers

1 in promotion exams prior to this and states that he does  
2 not know why he was picked for this role. He ran weekly  
3 sessions of three to four hours at the SDS safe house.  
4 Six officers chose to take part in these sessions and  
5 Greenslade recalls that three of the six were ultimately  
6 successful.

7 He notes that:

8 "Morale was low at the time, and I was put on to try  
9 and improve morale."

10 Greenslade cannot recall now how he knew morale was  
11 low or what the cause of it was, but confirms that this  
12 was a known issue. He recalls other individuals being  
13 put on the SDS to help address the problem at the same  
14 time.

15 Anthony Greenslade was involved in finding a second  
16 safe house for the SDS. He states that his involvement  
17 was "by accident" due to the fact that HN294 was unwell  
18 at the time and Derek Brice was preparing to leave.

19 He did not have a role in recruiting officers,  
20 though accepts that he may have recommended  
21 one individual who he had previously managed. He states  
22 that he believes officers were recruited "randomly" with  
23 no set procedure. The process would have been largely  
24 under the control of HN294, an individual who Greenslade  
25 describes as the "kingpin" of the SDS. He recalls that

1 HN294:

2 "... virtually ran the SDS as fiefdom. I do not  
3 think he was very good at management."

4 Anthony Greenslade confirms that he was not involved  
5 in training or tasking members of the SDS, choosing  
6 targets, developing cover identities or anything to do  
7 with intelligence reporting, exfiltration, pay or  
8 overtime. He states that he had no role in liaising  
9 with the Security Service or any other outside body.

10 Anthony Greenslade states that he was not involved  
11 in the management of SDS officers, but maintained  
12 contact with them through the promotion classes. He  
13 also recalls playing cricket with the officers a couple  
14 of times as a group.

15 Greenslade states that he had a desk in  
16 Scotland Yard with the Bomb Squad and would attend  
17 the SDS flat, but never worked from the SDS office in  
18 Scotland Yard. He remembers Commander Matt Rodger  
19 visiting the SDS flat, socialising with the undercover  
20 officers and offering support. He does not remember how  
21 often this occurred.

22 He did not have any role in compiling the SDS annual  
23 reports. He states that he did not know why specific  
24 groups were targeted, but expects that the decisions  
25 were largely made by HN294 in consultation with

1 the chief superintendent of C Squad. He cannot comment  
2 on how successful the infiltrations were or how they may  
3 have contributed to policing or assisted the  
4 Security Service, as he was not involved in the  
5 intelligence side of things.

6 Greenslade states that he does not know whether  
7 prior permission was required for undercover officers to  
8 assume positions of responsibility within their groups,  
9 or whether any guidance was given on the issue. He was  
10 also unaware of the use of deceased children's  
11 identities.

12 He confirms that he did not give any guidance or  
13 have any informal discussions with UCOs about sexual  
14 relationships in their cover identities. He states that  
15 his attitude to this issue was that any sexual activity  
16 between undercover officers and civilians would have  
17 been unacceptable. To his knowledge, none of his  
18 contemporaries provoked or encouraged a third party to  
19 commit a criminal offence, engaged in sexual activity  
20 whilst in their cover identity, were arrested, tried or  
21 convicted in their cover identity, were involved in  
22 incidents of public order, crime or violence, reported  
23 on any legally privileged information, or reported on  
24 the activities of elected politicians. He confirms that  
25 he did not give any officer orders, instructions, advice

1 or guidance in relation to any of these issues.

2 When asked to comment on a report concerning  
3 personal details about an individual, Anthony Greenslade  
4 notes that:

5 "This is the sort of report Special Branch was  
6 always creating; it is a normal Special Branch report  
7 into the background of a person with potential extremist  
8 activity. I am not aware of any guidance by the SDS as  
9 to the level of personal detail which was considered  
10 helpful to the reader of the report, but there would not  
11 need to be because it was standard within  
12 Special Branch. Everyone would have the experience of  
13 what to do."

14 When asked about reporting on trade unions,  
15 Anthony Greenslade states that such information would  
16 have been reported because Special Branch or the  
17 Security Service would have been concerned about  
18 disruption to the economy.

19 In terms of the contribution made to policing,  
20 Greenslade states:

21 "The SDS provided advance warning of demonstrations.  
22 That was the whole purpose of it ...

23 "I suppose the SDS assisted the Security Service in  
24 identifying extremists and plans for possible  
25 disruption."

1           He notes that overtime payments were a substantial  
2 part of officer pay on the SDS and recalls that HN155,  
3 cover name "Phil Cooper", was the highest paid  
4 Detective Sergeant in the MPS at the time because of  
5 overtime. Despite this, Greenslade did not get  
6 the impression that this overtime influenced officers to  
7 stay on the unit longer than they might, or influenced  
8 them to paint an overly optimistic picture of what they  
9 were achieving.

10           Anthony Greenslade retired from the  
11 Metropolitan Police in 1987 at the rank of detective  
12 chief superintendent. He concludes his witness  
13 statement by observing that:

14           "The only matter I wish to add is that I disagreed  
15 fundamentally with the principle of undercover policing.  
16 It was damaging to individuals: many suffered from the  
17 work, and some left the police afterwards. I think some  
18 people are psychologically unsuited to that sort of  
19 work, as I am."

20           Sir, that concludes the summary for  
21 Anthony Greenslade.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

23 MS CAMPBELL: Documents related to that officer will be  
24 published by the Inquiry today, as well as documents  
25 related to four other individuals involved with the SDS.





1 A. Good morning, sir.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning. I understand you wish to be  
3 sworn.

4 A. Thank you.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Fernandes will do the necessary.

6 HN3378 (Derek Brice) (sworn)

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Brice, I understand that you would like to  
8 give your evidence in 40-minute stretches with a quarter  
9 of an hour's break in between.

10 A. If that's convenient, sir, yes.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Of course it is.

12 A. Thank you.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: I hope this isn't going to be proof of one of  
14 Parkinson's laws that work expands to fill the time  
15 available, but we have plenty of time to accommodate  
16 your wish.

17 A. Thank you.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Smith.

19 Questions by MS SMITH

20 MS SMITH: Thank you, sir.

21 Can you confirm your full name, please?

22 A. Derek William Fred Brice.

23 Q. And, Mr Brice, it's right that you made a witness  
24 statement to the Inquiry dated 15 September 2021?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Have you had the opportunity to read the statement  
2 before giving evidence today?

3 A. Oh, yes, before -- yes, not today, but before today,  
4 yes.

5 Q. Yes, thank you.

6 Can you confirm, please, that the contents are true  
7 and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

8 A. Yes, they are.

9 Q. May we start briefly with your background in the  
10 Metropolitan Police Force. It's right that you joined  
11 as a 19-year-old senior cadet in late 1957?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And at that point, as all officers do, you had 13 weeks  
14 training at Hendon.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Following that, at the earliest opportunity, two years  
17 on, you joined Special Branch.

18 A. I did.

19 Q. And you remained in Special Branch performing a variety  
20 of roles for approximately 14 years before you left the  
21 police force in October 1974.

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. When you left, it's right you were in the rank of  
24 detective inspector, having been in that rank since  
25 1971?

- 1 A. That's correct.
- 2 Q. Can I please deal in a global sense, if you like, of  
3 that time that you were in the Metropolitan Police Force  
4 with the training that you received. You've confirmed  
5 the initial training at Hendon. Do you recall whether  
6 you received any additional training when you joined  
7 Special Branch?
- 8 A. No, I can't recall any specific training, no.
- 9 Q. So if I were to ask you whether you have any  
10 recollection of a two-week course, that doesn't come to  
11 mind to you?
- 12 A. It doesn't come to mind.
- 13 Q. When you joined the SDS, in and around that time, you  
14 completed, is it right, a four-month course at  
15 Bramshill?
- 16 A. Could you ask me that question again, please?
- 17 Q. Do you recall completing a course at Bramshill in late  
18 1973?
- 19 A. Yes, I do.
- 20 Q. A few more questions, please, if I may, on training.  
21 Whilst you were in the police force, do you recall  
22 training being given to you on the legal limits of  
23 police powers?
- 24 A. I can't remember.
- 25 Q. I'll see if I can help in this way. Were you aware of

1 the limits on a police officer's powers of entry, search  
2 and seizure?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Were you given any instruction at any stage about  
5 whether those powers or -- and limitations on those  
6 powers were the same when you or an officer was acting  
7 in an undercover role?

8 A. I can't remember, sorry.

9 Q. Does it follow with whether you ever addressed your mind  
10 when you joined the SDS as to whether the limitations on  
11 those powers were the same or different?

12 A. I have no comment to make on that, I'm sorry.

13 Q. Perhaps I can use an example that may assist. In your  
14 witness statement, you refer to a force memorandum being  
15 circulated on two occasions during your service on the  
16 subject of agent provocateur. Do you recall that?

17 A. Yes, I do.

18 Q. Are you able to help with whether that was during your  
19 time in Special Branch, on the SDS or both?

20 A. Well, it was in my time in Special Branch. I don't know  
21 whether it was during my time on SDS.

22 Q. Is there any reason that you recall that particular  
23 piece of guidance?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Do you have any recollection of other police orders

- 1           being issued in the same way, by way of a circular?
- 2           A. I think there may have been the police order issued some  
3           time about agent provocateur.
- 4           Q. Okay.
- 5                     If we can have up document, please, {MPS/727104/1}.
- 6                     Mr Brice, I hope that will come up on a screen that  
7           you have. Are you able to see that document, Mr Brice?
- 8           A. Yes, I can, yes.
- 9           Q. You'll see that that's a Home Office circular dated  
10          May 1969 regarding "Informants who take part in crime".
- 11                    If we can scroll down, please, to the second page --  
12          actually, remaining where you were, sorry, the first  
13          page, there, Mr Brice -- and I'll read it out if it  
14          helps -- at paragraph 3(a), it states:
- 15                    "No member of a police force, and no police  
16          informant, should counsel, incite or procure the  
17          commission of a crime."
- 18                    Do you have any recollection whether that is the  
19          memorandum that you received when you were in  
20          Special Branch?
- 21          A. I've never seen that memorandum before. I was offered  
22          it as a piece of exhibit.
- 23          Q. Does what's recorded there fit with your recollection of  
24          what you received in relation to agent provocateur?
- 25          A. Yes, I think that -- the piece that you read out to me,

1 of course, rings a bell, yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 A couple more questions on training and then we'll  
4 move on.

5 During your service in the police force, did you  
6 have in mind that you needed to police in a way which  
7 would maintain the respect of the public and the  
8 public's approval of your actions?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And did you maintain that view whilst you were on  
11 the SDS?

12 A. Well, I was trying to, yes.

13 Q. Similarly, what about police disciplinary regulations?  
14 Do you recall having knowledge of those?

15 A. I'm -- well, of course, yes, I was aware of -- of police  
16 discipline regulations of what we could and should do,  
17 and that's about as far as I can recall.

18 Q. Thank you, Mr Brice. I realise I'm asking you to turn  
19 your mind back some years.

20 I'd like to move, please, to C Squad and your  
21 experience there. Is this fair to say from your witness  
22 statement; that early on in your police career, you were  
23 on C Squad, you went off to do other work and then you  
24 returned to C Squad, and that was a pattern that you  
25 followed?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. And you returned to C Squad in 1971, now as detective  
3 inspector, and remained there until the Bomb Squad was  
4 formed the following year; is that right?
- 5 A. Yes, I believe that to be true, yes.
- 6 Q. Mr Brice, you refer to returning to CO. Was that  
7 the Central Office?
- 8 A. Yes, the Commissioner's Office, yes.
- 9 Q. The Commissioner's Office, forgive me.
- 10 A. Yes.
- 11 Q. And was that based at Scotland Yard?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. Whilst you were on C Squad, it's right that you dealt  
14 with left-wing groups; is that correct?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. Can you help a little, please, as to what your role  
17 entailed in that regard in C Squad?
- 18 A. I would have been supervising the enquiries, probably,  
19 of the DCs and the sergeants.
- 20 Q. And you said that you don't recall any particular  
21 training in Special Branch. How did you come to  
22 understand what sort of information the squad wanted?
- 23 A. I think -- I think we would have gained that knowledge  
24 from learning, as it were, on the job, as it were,  
25 you know, being passed down.



1 Q. Are you able to help us, please, with how material was  
2 collected and retained on C Squad?

3 A. I can't really remember now.

4 Q. Now, we'll come on to the SDS in a short while. You  
5 said in your witness statement that you had no contact  
6 with that squad before becoming involved in it. Whether  
7 or not it came from the SDS, were you aware of  
8 intelligence coming in from other sources to the  
9 assistance of C Squad?

10 A. I wasn't aware, no.

11 Q. And was that throughout your time on C Squad? And  
12 I'm focusing particularly, please, on your final stint  
13 when you came back in 1971 to C Squad. Do you recall  
14 any other intelligence coming in to assist?

15 A. I can't recall anything, no.

16 Q. Perhaps you've already answered this, but let me ask  
17 this. Were you aware of any intelligence or information  
18 coming in for onward dissemination, for example to A8,  
19 public order?

20 A. Yes, I -- well, I -- I would have been aware that  
21 information -- it was gathered, would be passed to them,  
22 because they were in charge of public order, but that's  
23 all I remember.

24 Q. And is that from your knowledge or an assumption that it  
25 would go on to them?

1 A. I think it's an assumption that they would have received  
2 the information that was available for them.

3 Q. Whilst you were working on C Squad, or indeed anywhere  
4 else in Special Branch, did you ever pass requests for  
5 intelligence to other units?

6 A. No.

7 Q. The second element of the work on C Squad that you refer  
8 to in your statement is enquiries for the  
9 Security Service.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Were those enquiries related to groups and individuals  
12 that the Security Service were interested in?

13 A. They could have been groups or -- and/or individuals.

14 Q. And was the interest, to your understanding, of  
15 potentially subversive groups and individuals, or was it  
16 a different reason?

17 A. I can only assume that it was because they were  
18 a subversive element.

19 Q. Were you given any training or guidance on what  
20 subversion meant at that time?

21 A. I can't recall.

22 Q. Okay.

23 Enquiries for the Security Service, were any of  
24 those relating to vetting?

25 A. I can't recall that either.

1 Q. Final question relating to C Squad. You said that you  
2 were a supervisor of some of the officers. Can you give  
3 an idea, please, of how the squad was supervised and  
4 managed during your time?

5 A. It's so long ago, I have a problem in remembering that,  
6 I'm sorry.

7 Q. Okay. Again, I appreciate I'm asking you to turn your  
8 mind back a considerable amount of time.

9 Before we move to the SDS, please, you moved in 1972  
10 to the Bomb Squad, and there you were also a senior  
11 officer on the surveillance unit; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And you said that the head of the Bomb Squad was  
14 Conrad Dixon. Were you --

15 A. Yes, he was one of -- yes.

16 Q. Sorry, continue, please.

17 A. Yeah, he was one of the senior officers, yes.

18 Q. Were you aware that he was the former head of the SDS or  
19 of a covert unit?

20 A. No, I wasn't.

21 Q. Did he give you any training or ethos on the performance  
22 of a covert role?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Let's move now, please, to the SDS. I'd like to begin  
25 with clarifying, if we can, your start date. Your

1 initial recollection when you were asked to make  
2 a witness statement for this Inquiry was that you'd been  
3 on the unit for approximately -- you were on the unit,  
4 sorry, for approximately 20 months. We know that you  
5 left the SDS and the police force in October 1974, so  
6 that would have put your starting date on the SDS in and  
7 around February or March 1973. So it's right that was  
8 your initial recollection, I think, Mr Brice?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Now, it seems, perhaps on receiving the bundle of  
11 documents from the Inquiry for your witness statement,  
12 you then thought your initial recollection was perhaps  
13 incorrect. I'm going to suggest to you that your memory  
14 on that, your recollection, was in fact the right one;  
15 that you came on to the SDS in and around February or  
16 March 1973.

17 Given the time that you've had to reflect since  
18 providing your statement, would you now agree with that?

19 A. Yes, I would.

20 Q. Dealing, please, with your recruitment to the SDS,  
21 I want to clarify, please, something that you put in  
22 your statement at paragraph 14. It doesn't necessarily  
23 need to be brought up at the moment.

24 What you said there was that you asked the  
25 federation rep what Special Branch was before going into

1           it and he said nobody talks about it. Did you mean  
2           there you asked about what the SDS was rather than  
3           Special Branch?

4       A. No, when I asked that question, I was a PC aged 20, when  
5           I was -- when there was an application for members to  
6           join Special Branch, and I asked an old PC what they  
7           were and he -- he said, "Nobody talks about it", so --  
8           so I joined.

9       Q. So, in fact, what's in your statement is correct; that  
10          the response "nobody talks about it" was in relation to  
11          Special Branch rather than to the SDS itself?

12      A. Well, I think both, in some senses, yes. I didn't know.

13      Q. Okay.

14      A. I had no -- I didn't apply to join SDS. Whether you can  
15          say I was invited or not, I'm not sure, but that's where  
16          I ended up.

17      Q. Once you joined the SDS, did that closed approach remain  
18          in that were you able to talk freely, certainly amongst  
19          members of the SDS and the more senior managers, about  
20          what was happening in the squad?

21      A. I can't really answer that question, I'm afraid.  
22          I don't recall.

23      Q. Do you recall whether you were told, when you were  
24          moving to the SDS, to keep it a secret?

25      A. Well, no, I wasn't told it was a secret, but I think we

1           just left it at that, really. I ...

2           Q. Okay.

3                     Now, you've touched on whether or not you were  
4           invited; you didn't apply to join the SDS. In your  
5           witness statement, your recollection is that you in fact  
6           didn't formally join the SDS, but sometimes you would be  
7           back doing Bomb Squad work; is that correct?

8           A. Well, the -- the time is so long ago and I'm --  
9           I'm probably still a bit confused about what I was doing  
10          from time to time, but I'm -- I'm okay with those dates  
11          you gave me earlier on.

12          Q. I wonder, please, if we can look at a document. It may  
13          or may not assist. It's -- can we have first, please,  
14          {MPS/737402/1}.

15                     Sir, that's tab 15 of your bundle, I believe.

16                     This is a fairly difficult document to read,  
17          Mr Brice, as seems to trouble us with the documents.  
18          It's an organisational chart of Metropolitan's  
19          Special Branch and the C Squad.

20          A. Yes.

21          Q. It is dated -- albeit there's no date on this particular  
22          document -- we understand July 1973.

23                     If I can ask you to look in the middle and  
24          the bottom of the document, can you see there, sitting  
25          underneath a chief inspector which reads "HN324", there

1 is the "Special Demo", as it says, and your name is in  
2 the second of those four boxes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Now, I don't know whether this helps you or not as to  
5 whether your recollection that you weren't really on  
6 the squad is correct. It certainly seems as though you  
7 are placed on that organisational chart as an inspector  
8 in the Special Demonstration Squad.

9 A. I can accept that now, yes.

10 Q. Whilst we have this document on the screen, I'd just  
11 like to ask you a couple of supplementary questions,  
12 please, about C Squad.

13 Could you look to the far left of that page and  
14 you'll see a box that says "SEC Service Insp".

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. We think that may refer to "Security Service Inspector".  
17 Are you able to give us any help on what that role was?

18 A. I'm afraid it means nothing to me.

19 Q. Another rather tricky question on numbers, please. Can  
20 you recall approximately how many officers there were in  
21 C Squad ranked either sergeant or constable?

22 A. Above sergeant or constable?

23 Q. Of either the rank of sergeant or constable.

24 A. Well, I -- I'm sorry, I don't know.

25 Q. Okay.

1           If we can take that document down, please.

2           Are you able to recall whether there are any lengthy  
3           periods of time after you joined the SDS when you were  
4           off that squad and doing other work?

5           A. I can't recall.

6           Q. In your witness statement, you make reference to the  
7           connection of you moving over from the  
8           Bomb Squad/surveillance unit to the SDS was perhaps  
9           a relationship between those two squads. And just  
10          a "yes" or "no" answer, please. Were you aware of the  
11          two units being jointly supervised?

12          A. No.

13          Q. Remaining on that connection for a moment, is it a fair  
14          assessment to say that there was no interview, no formal  
15          process for joining, but it was perhaps more of a word  
16          of mouth based on recommendation or reputation that  
17          officers moved over to the SDS?

18          A. I can't answer that really, frankly.

19          Q. Let's just see for a moment if this helps. Do you  
20          recall Anthony Greenslade, another detective inspector?

21          A. Yes.

22          Q. He was on the surveillance unit with you; is that  
23          correct?

24          A. Yes.

25          Q. And for a period of time, he was on the SDS as well; do



1           you recall that?

2       A.   Yes.

3       Q.   And, in fact, I think he was brought on a couple of

4           months after you joined.  He came over in the summer of

5           1973.  He suggests that he thinks he was probably

6           brought on to the unit at your recommendation.  Do you

7           recall whether you did recommend him?

8       A.   It's possible.  I don't recall.

9       Q.   An officer we're hearing from tomorrow, HN34,

10           Geoffrey Craft, in his witness statement considers that

11           he may have been brought on to the SDS as a result of

12           you having a word with the senior managers.  I think he

13           came on at the end of your tenure.  Does that ring true

14           with your memory?

15      A.   No, I don't recall that.

16      Q.   The comment that he makes in his witness statement is

17           that Special Branch was a comparatively small place and

18           everyone knew everyone else.  Is that a fair assessment?

19      A.   Yes.

20      Q.   Another officer, and the final of this recruitment

21           phase, is HN368, Richard Walker, a junior manager that

22           joined once you were leaving.  He states that he was

23           asked to join by you; you'd known each other from

24           a police station years earlier.  Do you have any

25           recollection of that?

- 1 A. I don't recall that, but it's a possibility.
- 2 Q. If and when you were recommending management level  
3 officers come over to the SDS, what characteristics or  
4 personalities did you consider might work well on the  
5 squad that were important?
- 6 A. I think they'd have to be officers that would have  
7 a caring approach to the officers that they were  
8 supervising.
- 9 Q. Can we turn, please, to the handover and/or any training  
10 that you received as a detective inspector on the SDS.  
11 It's fair to say, isn't it, that by the time you  
12 joined, you were an officer of considerable experience  
13 in intelligence-gathering, surveillance and the like?
- 14 A. I'm not sure I would say it that way, but if that's what  
15 somebody's said, well, I must accept it, but ...
- 16 Q. Well, did you feel equipped from your time on C Squad  
17 and other areas of Special Branch for 14 years that you  
18 had an idea of what the Branch were interested in?
- 19 A. Yes.
- 20 Q. And did that influence at all how you expected the SDS  
21 to operate?
- 22 A. No, not really.
- 23 Q. And I think it's right, isn't it, that you say for all  
24 the experience that you had gained, you'd never  
25 performed a role in undercover work before moving to

1           the SDS?

2       A. I had not performed undercover work.

3       Q. And, in fact, you yourself didn't perform any undercover  
4           work whilst you were on the SDS.

5       A. That's correct.

6       Q. Now, you've made it clear in your statement there was no  
7           formal training when you moved over. Does it follow  
8           that you weren't provided with any documents or written  
9           guidance when you joined the SDS?

10      A. I can't recall ever receiving any.

11      Q. Do you recall ever seeing a black loose-leaf folder that  
12           was available to the undercover officers?

13      A. No.

14      Q. What you do say, is this right, Mr Brice, that of  
15           course, you discussed how things were done when you  
16           joined?

17      A. Probably.

18      Q. Do you recall that the chief inspector on the unit was  
19           HN294? And you may wish to look at the document you  
20           have there.

21      A. Yes.

22      Q. The detective sergeant, do you recall, was Dave Smith?

23      A. Yes.

24      Q. And certainly at the time of you joining, there wasn't  
25           a dedicated superintendent; is that right?

- 1 A. Yes, I can't remember that.
- 2 Q. We've spoken about Anthony Greenslade; that for a short  
3 period he was a member of this management team.
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. Do you recall, please, any discussion with HN294 as your  
6 immediate superior about the purpose of the SDS?
- 7 A. No.
- 8 Q. In your witness statement, you say that essentially the  
9 purpose boils down to -- or the justification of "why we  
10 were doing it in the first place", and you make  
11 reference to the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and the  
12 demonstrations in 1968.
- 13 Did you discuss with HN294 why the unit was still  
14 operating in 1973?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. At that point in joining in early 1973, did you gain  
17 an understanding about what the remit was of the SDS, of  
18 what they were interested in?
- 19 A. Gradually, by talking to the officers, yes.
- 20 Q. And does it follow then that any information that you  
21 gleaned on which groups were considered to pose  
22 a threat, which groups that you were interested in, was  
23 from being on the job rather than HN294, as your chief  
24 inspector, informing you of how deployments and why  
25 deployments were as they were?

- 1           A. I would say it's more likely I learned on the job.
- 2           Q. We've touched briefly on A8 in relation to C Squad. In  
3           your witness statement, you refer to perhaps  
4           an assumption, you say, that the information -- the  
5           public order purpose was of interest to A8 and you  
6           assume information went to them from the SDS; is that  
7           right?
- 8           A. I assume it did.
- 9           Q. But does it follow that you're not able to help with how  
10          and when the intelligence was disseminated to that unit,  
11          to A8?
- 12          A. That information would have been disseminated and  
13          decided upon at a level higher than me.
- 14          Q. Would that be a level higher but still within the  
15          management team of the SDS, for example the chief  
16          inspector, or higher than that rank?
- 17          A. Probably higher than that.
- 18          Q. Can I ask you this. When you're discussing public order  
19          purposes in your witness statement -- and this is at  
20          paragraph 100 -- you state:
- 21                 "Some organisations were pacifists and caused no  
22                 problems ..."
- 23                 Is that something you came to learn on the job on  
24                 the SDS?
- 25          A. I can't say, I'm afraid.

1 Q. If you did come to that understanding whilst you were  
2 the detective inspector on the SDS, would you seek to  
3 review a deployment of that particular undercover  
4 officer for its justification?

5 A. I'm not sure I can answer that either, I'm afraid.

6 Q. A couple more questions to finish this topic, Mr Brice,  
7 and then I think we are about time for our break.

8 Did you have any understanding that there was  
9 a direct relationship between the SDS and C Squad?

10 A. Because the -- yes, because the boss -- I think that  
11 chart you showed me earlier, the boss of the whole thing  
12 was -- was in charge of everything on C Squad, which  
13 included that little box at the bottom where my name  
14 was.

15 Q. And I think it's right, at this time, that you were all  
16 on the same corridor in the same building at  
17 Scotland Yard?

18 A. Yes, I'm -- I'm sure we were, yes.

19 Q. Do you recall whether there was regular and open  
20 dialogue between -- if you were in your office and there  
21 was a manager of C Squad in his or her office, that  
22 there would be discussion?

23 A. Well, I don't recall any particular instances, but  
24 there -- there -- there would be an opportunity if one  
25 wanted it.

1 Q. I just want to deal, please, finally before the break  
2 with the role of the SDS in relation to the  
3 Security Service.

4 Did you have any understanding that there was  
5 a relationship between the SDS and the Security Service?

6 A. No.

7 Q. You were provided with a document in the preparation of  
8 your witness statement which related to a meeting in  
9 January 1974 where you attended, along with HN294, at  
10 the Security Service. Now, it's fair you say you have  
11 no recollection of that meeting.

12 A. Yes, I have no recollection of it, but I accept, because  
13 I've seen the document.

14 Q. I just want to spend a few minutes on what HN294  
15 recorded of that meeting in case it assists at all with  
16 the relationship. I wonder, please, if we can have  
17 document {MPS/735753/1}, starting at page 3  
18 {MPS/735753/3}.

19 Sir, this is tab 7 of the bundle.

20 Mr Brice, I'm going to read some parts of that to  
21 you and I'm starting at paragraph 2. This is  
22 a memorandum of HN294, your chief inspector at the time,  
23 dated 15 January 1974. He records in the document at  
24 paragraph 2 that the meeting that you and he attended  
25 was to acquaint you with the intentions of the

1 Security Service to form a new section, and it was  
2 a section to deal with extremist politics to the left of  
3 the Communist Party, and he goes on to say that, in his  
4 assessment, the Security Service wanted to ascertain  
5 two things, and this is at paragraph 3. The first is  
6 whether the SDS would be making their experience  
7 available to the Security Service, and the second was  
8 the attitude of the police if they were to come into  
9 conflict with the law as an accessory to an offence.

10 Moving to page {MPS/735753/4}, the response that  
11 HN294 records that was given at that meeting was that,  
12 yes, the SDS would assist the Security Service and  
13 information would be freely available and, two:

14 "That SDS officers were precluded by Home Office  
15 instructions from any action likely to invite  
16 an accusation of their being 'agent provocateurs' ..."

17 That document can be taken down now, thank you.

18 Mr Brice, do you recall, in January 1974, any  
19 discussion within the unit of the relationship with the  
20 Security Service and the new section that was being  
21 formed?

22 A. None -- none at all.

23 MS SMITH: Sir, if that's a convenient time for a break.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. We'll have a quarter of an hour  
25 break and will you be ready to resume at the end of



1 a quarter of an hour?

2 A. Thank you.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

4 (11.05 am)

5 (A short break)

6 (11.21 am)

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, Ms Smith.

8 MS SMITH: Thank you, sir.

9 Mr Brice, I want to deal, please, with your role as  
10 detective inspector of the SDS now. That was one that  
11 was primarily supervising officers looking after their  
12 safety and their needs; is that correct?

13 A. Yes, I would describe it as a welfare officer, in  
14 a sense, yes.

15 Q. And I think in your statement you say it's akin to  
16 a quartermaster in the army.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Given that was your role, and I appreciate you've said  
19 that, to your recollection, the learning was really on  
20 the job rather than by way of a handover, I want to  
21 spend a few moments more looking at some specific areas  
22 of that -- exercising that supervisory function before  
23 we deal with the day-to-day interaction with the  
24 undercover officers.

25 The first area, please, is compromise -- potential

1           compromise of the undercover officers.

2           Immediately before or at around the time that you  
3           joined the SDS, three officers were unexpectedly  
4           withdrawn from the field. Without going into any  
5           detail, do you have any recollection of a quarter of the  
6           squad being unexpectedly withdrawn?

7           A. No, I don't. No recollection at all.

8           Q. I'll give you their nominals. If you'd like to look at  
9           the document you have, just in case that jogs your  
10          memory.

11          The first is HN45.

12          A. Right.

13          Q. And then a female officer, HN348.

14          A. Yes.

15          Q. And a third officer, and I can give you her name, it's  
16          Jill Mosdell.

17          They, as I say, were all withdrawn unexpectedly and,  
18          in fact, it was an incident that was then referenced in  
19          the annual report of that year. Is your recollection  
20          that your superior, HN294, made no mention of that when  
21          you came on to the squad?

22          A. I was not aware of that and I didn't recall the last  
23          two people being around when I joined.

24          Q. Again, without going into details, please, once you were  
25          in your day-to-day life as the detective inspector on

1           the unit, did you hear or engage in conversations with  
2           the undercover officers about the loss of those  
3           three officers?

4           A. No.

5           Q. Targets and tasking, please.

6                     How were you going to approach your daily  
7           supervisory role, the welfare role, in the absence of  
8           any information about what your officers were doing,  
9           which groups that they were infiltrating?

10          A. Their job was very much one based upon trust that they  
11          were doing the job that they were supposed to do, and  
12          I saw them frequently.

13          Q. Did you understand it to be any part of your role to  
14          conduct a review of their deployments?

15          A. On the basis of being a supervisory officer, yes, but it  
16          was very difficult, because you're not doing their job  
17          to actually make worthwhile comments.

18          Q. Did you -- and we'll come on to the meetings at the safe  
19          house, but did you keep at the forefront of your mind  
20          that you needed to have this appraisal of whether the  
21          groups that they were infiltrating were causing an issue  
22          with public order?

23          A. When you talked about appraisal, I thought you were  
24          talking about the appraisal of the officer concerned,  
25          not the organisations. I didn't have any -- I can't

- 1           recollect anything about the organisations themselves.
- 2       Q.   So, just to clarify that, Mr Brice, when you say that
- 3           really it was on trust but you had to keep on top of
- 4           what your officers were doing, was that in relation to
- 5           assessing the officers rather than making an assessment
- 6           of the groups that they were infiltrating?
- 7       A.   Yes, I think that's true.
- 8       Q.   And what about the officers would you be assessing?
- 9       A.   Well, I mean, one -- one way would be if they ever put
- 10           any intelligence work before -- into the office, as it
- 11           were.
- 12       Q.   Okay.  And so would you be able to monitor that when you
- 13           attended the bi-weekly meetings at the safe house?
- 14       A.   Only that you were the messenger or the carrier of
- 15           possible notes or something being brought forward for
- 16           the back office.  I couldn't vouch for that -- for the
- 17           authenticity of the information, no.
- 18       Q.   So if an officer were handing nothing or very little in,
- 19           would that cause you to speak to the officer as to
- 20           whether there was a problem?
- 21       A.   Well, it might do, but I can't be specific about that
- 22           now.
- 23       Q.   Okay.  We'll come back, when we move to the safe house,
- 24           to any assessment of reporting.
- 25                   Positions of responsibility I'd like to speak to you

1           about. This is something in your witness statement;  
2           that you say there was no SDS policy, to your knowledge,  
3           against undercover officers taking up positions of  
4           responsibility and they didn't need to seek permission  
5           before they did so. Is that correct?

6           A. That's correct. I wasn't aware of that.

7           Q. How did you come to that understanding, or was it simply  
8           the absence of anything to the contrary?

9           A. I think it was the absence of -- I can't remember.

10          Q. In light of the memorandum that you do recall getting on  
11          agent provocateur, did you seek any guidance from your  
12          chief inspector as to whether it was appropriate for  
13          an officer to take a leading control in a group?

14          A. No.

15          Q. Did you form any view in your own mind as to whether  
16          that would be appropriate?

17          A. I can't recall forming any opinion.

18          Q. I'd like to ask you, please, about HN353.

19          A. Yes.

20          Q. That is an officer that you do recall being in the SDS  
21          at the same time as yourself, and in fact we'll come  
22          back to HN353. He was an officer recruited and in the  
23          back office during your tenure in spring 1974. He, in  
24          his witness statement, has told the Inquiry that he was  
25          advised never to take an organisational role, and that

1           was by a manager in the back office.

2           Do you recall that being you?

3       A. No, I don't.

4       Q. And it's right that at this time, the management team  
5           was made up in the back office of yourself and  
6           Dave Smith; is that right?

7       A. Yes.

8       Q. Can we move on, please, to arrest of undercover  
9           officers.

10           When you joined, HN298 was a member of the squad?

11      A. Yes.

12      Q. About a year before you joined, HN298 had been arrested  
13           and subsequently prosecuted and convicted in his cover  
14           name, and that is the name of "Mike Scott". That had  
15           been managed by your chief inspector, HN294, and  
16           Commander Rodger as head of the C Squad and he -- the  
17           decision had been taken for him to engage in that matter  
18           and be convicted in his cover name.

19           Is that something that was brought to your attention  
20           of how an officer may be dealt with if he was arrested?

21      A. No.

22      Q. Do you recall having any type of conversation with any  
23           of the undercover officers about their knowledge of what  
24           happened with HN298?

25      A. No.

1 Q. Mr Brice, we heard yesterday from officer -- from  
2 Dave Smith, and he said that in the back office, there  
3 was yourself and him and your chief inspector, and it  
4 was a case of you being together there and if a problem  
5 arose, you would perhaps discuss it and ask one another.

6 Does that accord with your recollection of how  
7 things were done?

8 A. I think that's a reasonable thing to say, yes. I --  
9 I don't recollect any particular incidents, but -- not  
10 all this time later, but that's a reasonable statement  
11 to make.

12 Q. And is that your recollection; that it was that sort of  
13 reactive approach to any issues rather than having  
14 guidance and a clear path of how you were going to  
15 manage the unit?

16 A. I'm not sure I can comment on that, really.

17 Q. Perhaps let me ask it in this way. When you went to the  
18 back office, went to go and look after the welfare of  
19 your officers, did you have any clear policy or guidance  
20 in your mind in terms of compromise, arrest, positions  
21 of responsibility, of how you would guide and supervise  
22 them?

23 A. I saw them on a twice-weekly basis and -- though I would  
24 like to feel that any issues would -- would have been  
25 brought to my attention, which is why I say it was very

1           much like a welfare function or role.

2           Q. Outside of you performing the welfare role, it's right  
3           that, as and when needed, you stood in as head of the  
4           unit, as acting chief inspector, didn't you?

5           A. Yes.

6           Q. And it's right that that was a role you took on from  
7           time to time throughout your tenure, from  
8           February/March 1973 up to leaving in October 1974; is  
9           that right?

10          A. Yes.

11          Q. Did the absence of any firm policy on being head of  
12          the unit and how you would deal with the officers cause  
13          you concern?

14          A. No.

15          Q. And certainly until the mid-part of 1974, would you  
16          agree that, in the absence of a dedicated  
17          superintendent, if there was a problem and you were  
18          acting chief inspector, effectively the buck stopped  
19          with you; you were making the decisions?

20          A. Well, in any supervisory role, I think the point there  
21          is that had I have required further assistance, I would  
22          have gone to the next person up in rank, which would  
23          probably have been a chief superintendent.

24          Q. And to your memory, would that be somebody who was on  
25          the same corridor at Scotland Yard?



- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Before we move to those meetings, can I spend a moment,  
3 please, on the management style of HN294.
- 4 Anthony Greenslade, your colleague in the  
5 surveillance unit and then fellow detective inspector on  
6 the SDS, has described HN294 as being the "kingpin" of  
7 the SDS and running it as a fiefdom. Does that -- do  
8 you agree with that statement?
- 9 A. Yes, I think it's a fair statement from Mr Greenslade.
- 10 Q. Was your assessment that HN294 would keep his own -- his  
11 decision-making to himself, effectively, rather than  
12 share the role with you?
- 13 A. Yes. This man is dead, but I -- but I think it's a fair  
14 statement.
- 15 Q. Did, at the time, you feel that had any impact on your  
16 ability to perform your own role?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Now, it was not just HN294 who was your chief inspector.  
19 About a year into your service, he was replaced with  
20 Derek Kneale as chief inspector; do you recall that?
- 21 A. Well, I know Derek Kneale, but I don't recall, as it  
22 were, being answerable to him when I was on the SDS.  
23 But it -- it is possible.
- 24 Q. So is your main memory of HN294 in the chief inspector  
25 role?

1 A. Yes, and as you said earlier, I was often doing the  
2 acting role because he was, sadly, I think, a person who  
3 suffered from ill-health, which is why I was acting.

4 Q. It's right, I think, that you recall David Bicknell  
5 becoming the superintendent in and around the time that  
6 the SDS moved to the S Squad. Do you remember him  
7 playing a role in the management?

8 A. Yes, he was the person that I would have been answerable  
9 to when I was acting chief inspector, yes.

10 Q. Did that have any impact on how the SDS was run when  
11 David Bicknell came on board?

12 A. Well, he was a -- an approachable senior officer, and  
13 therefore obviously life would be a little easier. He  
14 was there if we wanted him.

15 Q. Do I take it from that, Mr Brice, that you're drawing  
16 a comparison with how approachable or not HN294 was?

17 A. Possibly, yes. Some people are more approachable than  
18 others.

19 Q. Before we have our next break -- and we've still got  
20 some time -- let's have a little look at your day-to-day  
21 role, please. I want to ask you about procurement of  
22 vehicles.

23 When you joined in February/March 1973, did each  
24 undercover officer have their own vehicle?

25 A. I'm not sure everyone each had one, but I can't really

- 1           be any more certain than that.
- 2       Q.   Were you aware that until early '73, there was a pool of  
3           only three to four vehicles that were hire vehicles that  
4           the operational officers shared?
- 5       A.   Yes, I think that's highly likely.
- 6       Q.   So it's highly likely, but it's something that wasn't in  
7           your direct knowledge; is that ...
- 8       A.   Well, I say that because I wasn't aware that I had many  
9           vehicles to look after, and if they were hired ones,  
10          it -- it wouldn't have been down to me, yeah.
- 11      Q.   I want to move, please, to the back office where you  
12          were, your chief inspector, and HN103, David Smith.
- 13                 If there were any new recruits to the SDS such as  
14                 officers who were going to be deployed in the future,  
15                 it's right, is it, that they would spend time in the  
16                 back office?
- 17      A.   Yes, I think that's probably right. I can't recall any  
18          individual, but I think that's right.
- 19      Q.   And once an officer -- I think this is what your  
20          evidence is in your witness statement -- had been asked  
21          to join the SDS, effectively they were then yours to  
22          look after.
- 23      A.   Not while they were doing their stint in the office.
- 24      Q.   But you would see them on a day-to-day basis in the  
25          office.

1 A. If I was in the office, yes, but very often I was not in  
2 the office.

3 Q. And when you weren't in the office, it's right that  
4 twice a week you were at the safe house, at the  
5 meetings?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And for the remainder of the time -- was this a case of  
8 you worked Monday to Friday in this role?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. If you weren't at the safe house meetings, would you be  
11 in the back office?

12 A. More than likely.

13 Q. Let's deal, please, with new recruits. The officer that  
14 you do recall joining during your tenure is HN300.  
15 I don't know if you'd like to remind yourself of the  
16 name.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In fact, other officers, in addition to HN300, were also  
19 recruited and spent time in the back office in about the  
20 middle of your service there. HN353 was one, and that's  
21 an officer that I think you do recall in your witness  
22 statement.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That officer came into the back office in spring '74 and  
25 appears to have been reporting by about June of that

1           year. Do you recall that officer in the back office?

2       A. No.

3       Q. HN351 was another, and to be fair, Mr Brice, in your

4           witness statement, you do say you don't recall.

5       A. I don't recall him.

6       Q. What about HN200?

7       A. Yes, I recognise him.

8       Q. He was an officer that came into the squad in about

9           April '74. And do you recall this; he remained in the

10          back office until the end of your tenure, essentially,

11          until October of that year.

12       A. I'm not absolutely sure of that. I thought he would

13          have gone from out of the back office while I was still

14          serving, but I can't be certain.

15       Q. And HN297, and I can give you his actual name, it's

16          Richard Clark.

17       A. Yes.

18       Q. He joined you in summer of 1974. Do you remember him?

19       A. I don't remember him at all. I know who it is, but

20          I don't remember him in my time in SDS.

21       Q. We'll come back on to your memory of him in a little

22          while, so we will come back to Richard Clark.

23                These officers that were in the back office -- so to

24          your memory, you do remember HN300 and HN200.

25       A. Yes.

1 Q. But all of the officers that I've mentioned to you used  
2 the identity of a deceased child.

3 A. Sorry, can you ask me that again?

4 Q. The officers that we've just spoken about, all joining  
5 in the middle, if you like, of your tenure, all used the  
6 identity of a deceased child; do you recall that?

7 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

8 Q. I just want to explore for a few moments, please, you  
9 said in your witness statement that when the officers  
10 came to you, they had a cover identity. What the  
11 officers have described either in their witness  
12 statements or in oral evidence is that once on the SDS  
13 and in the back office, they would develop their cover  
14 identity.

15 Let's look at an example, perhaps. HN353, who we've  
16 spoken about, that you recall.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. He, in his witness statement, said he was told to go to  
19 Somerset House to obtain the details to develop his  
20 cover identity. Did you tell him to do that?

21 A. Certainly not.

22 Q. HN200, who you recall, challenged the instruction.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. HN200 challenged the instruction to use a deceased  
25 child's identity as it didn't sit comfortably with him,

1 and that led to a discussion about why he needed a birth  
2 certificate, and that was during his time in the back  
3 office. Do you recall a conversation with him of that  
4 nature?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Do you recall overhearing any such conversation?

7 A. No.

8 Q. David Bicknell, who you say was your superintendent for  
9 a period, addresses the use of such identities in  
10 a witness statement given some years ago to  
11 Operation Herne in 2015. He described, at this time,  
12 with these officers, that it was a practical solution to  
13 a problem that the SDS was facing in creating plausible  
14 identities.

15 Did David Bicknell discuss the need for these  
16 identities with you as head of the unit at that time?

17 A. Never.

18 Q. As acting chief inspector, did you give any  
19 consideration to the importance of knowing how robust or  
20 not your officers' identities were when they were going  
21 out into the field each day?

22 A. Not especially, no.

23 Q. Mr Brice, let's move on from that area, please, to  
24 training of these new recruits, and I'll take this  
25 shortly.

1           The officers, in their witness statements, describe  
2           much of their learning was on the job, as I think you've  
3           described, and collectively say that they would speak to  
4           deployed officers to get some information.

5           Does that accord with how you understood them to be  
6           trained?

7           A. Yes, I think their ability to meet collectively, that  
8           was one of the advantage of it. They could pick each  
9           other's brains, really.

10          Q. On the topic of picking brains, HN200 has stated that he  
11          would --

12          A. Yes.

13          Q. -- go to senior officers if he wanted to pick a person's  
14          brain as to how to go about his role.

15          Do you recall interactions with him about how he  
16          should perform his day-to-day role?

17          A. I don't recall any reaction there, no, at all --  
18          interaction.

19          Q. HN351, 353 and 200, who we've been speaking about, were  
20          all to infiltrate the International Socialists, then to  
21          become known as the Socialist Workers Party.

22          Did you become aware, or were you involved in the  
23          decision to deploy those three officers into that group?

24          A. I was not involved in that deployment.

25          Q. Let's start, if we may, dealing with the bi-weekly



1 meetings.

2 Is your recollection that there were two safe houses  
3 when you joined the SDS?

4 A. Possibly. I -- can I just think on that? I think at  
5 one -- at one point, when I joined, there was only one.

6 Q. Without going into details at this stage, did you come  
7 to understand why there was one and then there was  
8 an additional one, of why that happened?

9 A. I think it made sense to have an alternative, yes.

10 Q. Meetings at the safe house were described in the annual  
11 report for the year when you were in the SDS as having  
12 two purposes, essentially. One was an opportunity to  
13 discuss and identify problems and future targets, and  
14 the other was to afford an opportunity to assess the  
15 behaviour of operational officers so that any pressures,  
16 operational or otherwise, could be diagnosed and  
17 remedied.

18 Is that a fair assessment of the purpose that you  
19 understood them to be for?

20 A. Yeah, that's pretty fair.

21 Q. You've described the undercover role as "a gutsy job",  
22 which was "awful to do" and "scary at times".

23 Focusing on your time in the SDS, how did you come  
24 to form that opinion?

25 A. I think the whole nature of undercover work is -- it

1 needs a few -- a bit of guts to do it and that it can be  
2 risky and it's only possible by certain people.

3 Q. And you give the example in your witness statement that  
4 then it was important that the officers saw their  
5 contemporaries, shared some camaraderie together, and  
6 would it be fair to be able to be relaxed and to be free  
7 in talking to one another?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you help, please, describe how a day would be run or  
10 how the day would go when you went to one of the safe  
11 houses?

12 A. Oh, we would have met probably mid-morning. We would  
13 have somehow eaten together around the lunch period, and  
14 there was an opportunity then for either a one-to-one  
15 chat or meetings with smaller groups of people.

16 Q. And having met mid-morning, would the meeting run for  
17 the remainder of the day?

18 A. Well, I think they would probably have finished round  
19 about 4 o'clock because there may have been work to be  
20 done later on, because most -- a lot of their work  
21 tended to be that sort of start of the day onwards.

22 Q. Were you aware or involved, if there wasn't anywhere  
23 the officers were going at around 4 o'clock, might, from  
24 time to time, they socialise outside of the safe house?

25 A. Well, I didn't particularly socialise outside of the

1 safe house. I am not saying others didn't. I wouldn't  
2 know.

3 Q. Okay.

4 Let's spend a few moments up until the break to deal  
5 with the business side of things, if you like, at the  
6 meetings, and then we'll deal with welfare afterwards.

7 You stated in your witness statement that some  
8 officers wrote down their intelligence at the meetings,  
9 and did others simply hand in a manuscript report to  
10 you?

11 A. Yeah, yeah.

12 Q. Those that wrote their intelligence, their information,  
13 down at the meeting, was there discussion about what  
14 might be included or excluded in what they wrote?

15 A. No. I would have collected, or whoever was with me  
16 collected, the information as it was offered.

17 Q. Do you recall David Smith sometimes coming to those  
18 meetings?

19 A. Well, he -- he might have done. He wasn't -- it wasn't  
20 his regular job, but I'm not saying he didn't turn up  
21 sometimes.

22 Q. Earlier in your evidence you said one way of assessing  
23 the officers was by the quantity of reports that may  
24 come in. Are you able to help with the sort of volume  
25 of reporting that was coming in twice a week at the

1 meetings?

2 A. No, I can't, really.

3 Q. I won't bring it up, but, sir, for reference, the  
4 document is {UCPI/16345/1}.

5 Mr Brice, that is simply an intelligence report that  
6 you signed in August 1974 when you were acting chief  
7 inspector, and that's one example of when  
8 an intelligence report came across your desk.

9 Do you recall from time to time signing intelligence  
10 reports?

11 A. Well, I have seen one or two in the documents, so -- but  
12 I can't recall them individually, of course, but it is  
13 a possibility, and there's one example.

14 Q. And from that example -- I'm not, for now, interested in  
15 the content. It's simply, if it does, to help your  
16 recollection. When that came to you to sign, would you  
17 read it first?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Would you make any assessment of its contents?

20 A. No, I wouldn't necessarily be in a position to question  
21 its content, and therefore my job was to send it further  
22 up the line.

23 Q. What was the purpose in reading it before you signed it?

24 A. Well, I think it would be wise to read it before you  
25 sign anything.

1 Q. And so when you were reading it, if something jumped out  
2 at you, would you then take it up with the individual  
3 officer?

4 A. Well, I -- if it was something particularly outrageous  
5 or something important and -- or I knew something which  
6 maybe wasn't true, then of course I would question it,  
7 but I don't recall any of the -- any of that -- those --  
8 that happening any time.

9 Q. What sort of content would cause you to say, "This is  
10 outrageous, I need to deal with it"?

11 A. I -- I can't think of something at the moment,  
12 I'm afraid.

13 Q. Two examples before we break, if I may. HN343 was  
14 an officer in the squad.

15 A. Oh, yes.

16 Q. Do you recall that officer?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In his witness statement, his evidence is that he  
19 recalls conversations with yourself and the chief  
20 inspector giving an update on the situation in his  
21 group, which was the International Socialists.

22 Do you recall discussions with him specifically?

23 A. I don't recall those discussions, no.

24 Q. HN299/342. I'll just give you a chance to look at that  
25 officer's details.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Do you recall that officer?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. In his witness statement, he recalls that on occasion at  
5 these meetings at the safe house, he was asked to attend  
6 specific meetings or demonstrations, so given some  
7 task -- direct tasking requests. Does that accord with  
8 your recollection?

9 A. Well, that is possible. I don't recall myself  
10 particularly detailing him to go to a particular place,  
11 but it's possible.

12 Q. And finally on this topic before the break, what you do  
13 say is that deployments would be discussed if an officer  
14 was having "a sticky time". Could you help us, please,  
15 with what you meant by "a sticky time"?

16 A. I think it's been mentioned earlier. I was -- I was --  
17 I was always -- I tried to be aware that -- whether they  
18 were comfortable in the job they were doing, and  
19 I'd like to think that you would have been able to  
20 perhaps spot that. And there came a time, or there  
21 would come a time, when people might want not to  
22 continue doing the job they were doing. So, in other  
23 words, I'd describe that as when -- when things got  
24 a bit difficult in terms of maybe they were, I don't  
25 know, apprehensive about being exposed.

1 Q. On that point, in case this assists you, HN343, who we  
2 discussed a moment ago --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- he described in his witness statement that he'd had  
5 enough of life as an undercover officer. As a single  
6 young man, being deployed made it difficult to have  
7 a personal life, and he spoke to management and was  
8 asked to come off the unit and found a supportive  
9 response in that.

10 Is that an example of what you're referring to  
11 as "a sticky time"?

12 A. Yes, I think we can assume that's a reasonable comment  
13 to make, yes.

14 Q. Do you recall having a conversation with that officer  
15 about his wish to leave?

16 A. I don't recall it.

17 MS SMITH: Sir, if that's a convenient point for our next  
18 break.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

20 MS SMITH: Thank you, Mr Brice.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: A 15-minute break, then your evidence will  
22 resume and then we'll have a break for lunch, a rather  
23 longer than 15-minute break. Content with that? Good.

24 A. Thank you.

25 (12.03 pm)

1 (A short break)

2 (12.19 pm)

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Smith.

4 MS SMITH: Mr Brice, before we move on to welfare, I just  
5 want to ask for a clarification from one point in your  
6 witness statement. It's paragraph 29. You say that  
7 Detective Sergeant Smith and the chief inspector had  
8 a direct line of communication that excluded you as  
9 a supervisor. Can you just explain what you meant by  
10 that, please?

11 A. What I meant was that they -- they sat in two adjacent  
12 desks in the same office.

13 Q. Okay. So it was no more than that; it was simply that  
14 they were there --

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. -- and they didn't discuss.

17 A. I didn't have a desk, I didn't need one particularly.  
18 So there, they were side by side in the office.

19 Q. Let's move on then, please, to welfare, and we're going  
20 to come back to this part of your statement in a moment,  
21 but you say that officers wouldn't necessarily tell  
22 their detective inspector everything. Does it follow  
23 from that that an important part of your supervisory and  
24 welfare role was to observe the officers carefully at  
25 the meetings and essentially to keep an ear to the



- 1 ground as to what was happening?
- 2 A. Yes, that would be fair.
- 3 Q. Without giving any names, what were the welfare concerns  
4 of the officers when you were attending the meetings?
- 5 A. I think, as we -- you indicated before the break, if  
6 people were feeling that they were fed up with that sort  
7 of life, I -- I'd be looking for that sort of behaviour  
8 in their usual or unusual mannerisms, as the case may  
9 be, and then invite a situation where, "Do you want to  
10 talk about this", because I think that was probably the  
11 most important thing of all.
- 12 Q. Were there any other welfare concerns secondary to that?
- 13 A. Well, not that I can put my finger on at the moment.  
14 I think that was our main concern; that whether they  
15 felt in their own mind that they were "safe", in  
16 inverts.
- 17 Q. When Anthony Greenslade came on to the SDS in summer of  
18 1973, his evidence in his witness statement is that one  
19 of the reasons for him coming on was that morale was low  
20 amongst the officers. Do you remember that being the  
21 kind of atmosphere at the time?
- 22 A. No, I wasn't.
- 23 Q. Did you have any concerns about the morale of your  
24 officers in --
- 25 A. Well, not that I can recall now, and I'm surprised to

- 1           hear that statement now.
- 2       Q.   You've referred to sharing a meal together, having  
3           drinks and relaxing. Did that include alcoholic drinks  
4           in the afternoon?
- 5       A.   No.
- 6       Q.   Did you ever consume any alcohol at the meetings?
- 7       A.   I was not an encourager of alcoholic drinks, so no.
- 8       Q.   What about the officers, the undercover officers?
- 9       A.   Well, it wasn't -- it wasn't permitted during the --  
10           what I call the official meeting time in the safe house.  
11           We didn't have alcohol. When we broke up -- and you  
12           asked me this before -- what happened after that, then  
13           I had no control over.
- 14      Q.   Is that the period you say when the meeting came to  
15           an end at about 4 o'clock?
- 16      A.   And then we went on our separate ways, yes.
- 17      Q.   Right.
- 18           Now, during your period of time, there were no  
19           female undercover officers on the unit, were there?
- 20      A.   That's true, I think, yes.
- 21      Q.   And so it goes to follow that it was a male dominated  
22           environment for the 20 months or so that you were there?
- 23      A.   Well, I suppose numerically that's a fair statement to  
24           make, yes.
- 25      Q.   HN353, who you recalled --

- 1 A. Oh, yes.
- 2 Q. -- describes there being friendly banter at the  
3 meetings. Is that fair?
- 4 A. Yes, I'm sure that there was.
- 5 Q. Another officer, who joined the SDS shortly after you  
6 left, has described occasion when the friendly banter  
7 would turn to comments on female members of the groups  
8 that were infiltrated, or comments on reputation of the  
9 officers and on sexual interactions of the officers.
- 10 Was that a fair description of the banter that took  
11 place when you were on the SDS?
- 12 A. No, I wasn't aware of that at all, and you're saying  
13 that happened to -- after my time.
- 14 Q. What sort of banter do you recall hearing? Anything  
15 that caused you concern?
- 16 A. Well, I'm not aware of anything that did cause me  
17 concern, really, and certainly I wouldn't have gone  
18 along with the suggestion that that was banter about  
19 females.
- 20 Q. If you'd have heard such type of banter, would you have  
21 dealt with it?
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. The same officer describes that managers would  
24 essentially turn a blind eye to such banter at these  
25 informal meetings. Would that be fair to you or your

1 superior at your time?

2 A. Not in my time, no.

3 Q. Let's go back to your comment that officers wouldn't  
4 necessarily have told their detective inspector what  
5 they were doing. If we can have paragraph -- the  
6 statement is {MPS/747802/35} and paragraph 117, please.  
7 I'm sorry, I don't have a page reference.

8 Mr Brice, this is your witness statement that's  
9 being brought up on to the screen.

10 Thank you.

11 What is it that you thought officers might be  
12 keeping from their managers?

13 A. What I mean there is this; that because the job was so  
14 unique and individual, I wouldn't have an opportunity to  
15 challenge, first of all, its authenticity and whether  
16 there were any omissions or not. If I was supervising,  
17 say, a younger detective on a crime investigation,  
18 I could check back on certain things, but because it was  
19 undercover, that's not possible from a position that  
20 I was holding in SDS. I had to take these things at  
21 face value. So when I say that it is possible that some  
22 of the things that were done were not reported, I stand  
23 by that statement, because I can't prove one way or  
24 the other. I can't go out there and find out for  
25 myself.

1 Q. What things are you referring to, Mr Brice?

2 A. Well, I think -- I'm not quite sure I understand the  
3 question, because people don't necessarily tell  
4 everybody everything, and certainly in a working  
5 environment. That's -- that's what I meant by my  
6 statement. I have to take it at face value, and there  
7 may be things that I wasn't told, of course.

8 Q. If I can just give you an opportunity to read to  
9 yourself paragraph 117 of your statement, which I hope  
10 is on your screen.

11 A. Oh, yes. (Pause)  
12 Yes, I've read that again.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 In that paragraph, you're discussing, aren't you,  
15 the difference, as you see it, in the moral standards  
16 between then and now, discussing that officers -- in  
17 your view, this was their day job, they weren't living  
18 together with activists, and this is where we have  
19 the comment that:  
20 "... they would not necessarily have told the  
21 Detective Inspector what they were doing ..."

22 And it's really then that final part of the sentence  
23 that I'm interested in; is that you follow from your  
24 comment that they wouldn't necessarily have told you  
25 what they were doing that you were pretty confident they

1 all went home eventually. I --

2 A. Yes, I stand by that, because I think life has changed,  
3 certainly as it was though then in the early 70s, and  
4 what I meant there was that the job certainly wasn't 9  
5 to 5, because I said earlier some of the work took place  
6 in the evenings, but I was fairly confident that -- in  
7 that day and age, cohabitation, for example, wasn't  
8 common usage. People weren't identified right, left and  
9 centre by where they were on their mobile phones. In  
10 other words, you took people more on trust and -- so  
11 what I mean is that maybe life was more simple and  
12 straightforward then.

13 And what I -- what I mean is that they were -- as  
14 far as I was concerned, the job they did primarily,  
15 I think, was, I would say, evening activity. Most  
16 meetings, for example, take place in the evenings. So  
17 there would be a tendency to do the work, the undercover  
18 work, and then resume some sort of normal life with  
19 one's normal family, and what I mean is that, in other  
20 words, to go home afterwards and, as far as one can,  
21 pick up normal life again.

22 There perhaps was a clearer distinction between the  
23 undercover work and ordinary life as it was in those  
24 days.

25 Q. Mr Brice, was that any reference to the possibility that

1 an officer might be developing a close relationship with  
2 a member of the group they were infiltrating, whether it  
3 be a friendship or an intimate relationship, one that  
4 they wouldn't tell you about but they would go home from  
5 at some point?

6 A. Of course I have to say that is a possibility, but  
7 I want -- I would just say a possibility. I can't say  
8 any more than that, because I don't know.

9 Q. Was it a possibility that was in your mind back in  
10 the --

11 A. No.

12 Q. -- time you were in the unit?

13 A. No, it wasn't. That possibility is only because what  
14 I've learned in the national press since about SDS.

15 Q. Staying on the topic of relationships and reputation,  
16 I'm going to return, please, to deal with two officers  
17 that we've spoken about, HN300, who you recalled, and --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- and HN297, Richard Clark.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Please can you bring up document {MPS/724152/1} and  
22 scroll, please, to {MPS/724152/3}.

23 Mr Brice, this is a memorandum written by  
24 Chief Inspector Kneale and dated 31 May 1974, so when  
25 you were still on the unit. The first point I want to

1 deal with, please, is married officers. If you look  
2 there, please, at paragraph 2, reference is made to  
3 HN300:

4 "... seen ... indicated his willingness to join ...  
5 [he is] a married man ... he lives with his wife and  
6 child ..."

7 If we then move to paragraph 3, DC Richard Clark,  
8 who is HN297, willing to join:

9 "He is a married man, aged 29, with ...  
10 children ..."

11 So dealing with that point first, if we may. In  
12 your witness statement, you recalled that as you gained  
13 experience on the unit, you understood that those that  
14 were recruiting looked at personal circumstances and  
15 that preference was given to a prospective recruit who  
16 was married; is that right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The officers that we've spoken about who were recruited  
19 during your time were all married. Was that a policy  
20 that you understood to be developed whilst you were on  
21 the SDS?

22 A. It could have been, yes.

23 Q. Now, in your -- well, can you explain what you thought  
24 the purpose and the advantage was of recruiting  
25 a married officer, please?



1       A. I think my concern would be primarily that at the end of  
2       an operation or a day's work or whatever, they would, by  
3       definition, hopefully return to an established home  
4       life, in this case with their wives and possibly their  
5       children. That, to me, meant there was -- it was, in  
6       inverts, "slightly more stable and safer" than the other  
7       possibility.

8       Q. Are you aware whether the families of these officers  
9       were made aware of the role that they were expected to  
10      play to be providing that break, that stable home life?

11     A. Well, I'm not aware that wives were actually ever  
12      interviewed or -- or -- but I think there was  
13      a consideration that must have been given. I -- I was  
14      never really involved in the selection of these people  
15      that -- that appear on these lists. I -- we never sort  
16      of sat down and said, "Who have we got next?" They sort  
17      of emerged from somewhere, probably more senior up the  
18      scale. Maybe it was a recommendation amongst more  
19      senior officers saying, "This person might be suitable  
20      for this type of work", and it would come down the line  
21      rather than go up.

22     Q. And on that point, if an officer arrived to you and your  
23      chief inspector that you had a different opinion about,  
24      would you be able to challenge their suitability for the  
25      unit with your superiors?

1       A. Well, I think I would be expected to if I -- if I had  
2       grounds to do that, and I think I would have a duty to  
3       do that as well if, for some reason, I felt that that  
4       person after all wasn't quite suitable for the job. But  
5       I don't recall this ever happening.

6       Q. David Bicknell, in his witness statement, suggested that  
7       the reason married men were chosen was it was considered  
8       less of a temptation for them to enter into  
9       inappropriate relationships with women. Was that also  
10      a consideration that you understood at the time?

11     A. Well, I didn't say that and -- but I understand what  
12     he's saying. Hopefully I put it in a different way to  
13     your earlier question; that I felt it was a safer and  
14     more stable place to go to when they'd done their job.

15     Q. Can I perhaps ask it like this. By mid-'74, was there  
16     a live issue that there was at least a risk that male  
17     officers infiltrating groups would engage in intimate  
18     relationships?

19     A. Well, I can't answer that question specifically. Of  
20     course -- of course there was always a risk, but  
21     I wasn't aware of that risk during the latter part of my  
22     time, or indeed any of my time on SDS. But then, how  
23     would I have known any rate?

24     Q. Whether the officers were married or not, the job of the  
25     officers were to go into a group, pretend to be single

1 and to befriend people in that group; is that right?

2 A. I think that's an assumption when you start out in this  
3 job, but you say "single". I wasn't aware whether it  
4 ever came up that a person had to admit that they were  
5 single or married or whatever, if they were just going  
6 to do the routine job. I don't think I can expand on  
7 that any further.

8 Q. Let's move then, please, to just one or two questions.

9 The length of service; that David Bicknell, as your  
10 superintendent, in his witness statement, said that  
11 two years was the maximum length that he considered  
12 an officer should be in the role, the reason being that  
13 they didn't forget that they were police officers. Some  
14 of the officers in the squad when you joined were on for  
15 up to five years, so well in excess of that two-year  
16 maximum.

17 Did you have any concerns about long-term  
18 deployments and the risks that they carried?

19 A. I think Bicknell's statement is a reasonable one.  
20 I would have been more concerned about the length of  
21 time that they remained, as it were, safe and secure in  
22 that job.

23 Q. Let's go back, please, to HN300 and 297.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Both of those officers had at some time been on the

1           surveillance unit. Did you know either of them from  
2           your connection with that unit?

3           A. No, I don't.

4           Q. If -- we won't have it back up. The memorandum that  
5           I showed you, someone had spoken to them, it seems, at  
6           the behest of Chief Inspector Kneale.

7                     Do you recall speaking to either of these officers?

8           A. About joining SDS?

9           Q. Yes.

10          A. No.

11          Q. Can we have up, please, document {MPS/741094/1}.

12                     Mr Brice, what's being put up is an appraisal of  
13           HN297. Now, you weren't the person appraising him, but  
14           I want to take a look at the view of that was taken of  
15           him in January 1974. You'll see there that it reads:

16                     "DC Clark has recently shown remarkable abilities  
17           during a period of difficult surveillance work. Among  
18           these are an enthusiastic and intelligent use of  
19           available intelligence to full advantage, and an ability  
20           to work extremely well in a team. He shows qualities of  
21           leadership under pressure which will fit him well for  
22           promotion to sergeant."

23                     It's later then that year, in the summer, that he is  
24           brought on to the SDS.

25                     The question I'd like to ask you as a result of

1           that, and it can be -- Mr Brice, are you still reading  
2           it or ...

3           A. No, I did read it. I think I got to the end.

4           Q. Thank you.

5                     If that can be taken down.

6                     Would an appraisal such as that, what you may  
7           consider a glowing appraisal, weigh in the balance of  
8           whether to recruit an officer to the SDS?

9           A. Yes, I -- I don't quite -- I don't see the connection  
10          quite between the team leadership this required for  
11          surveillance as distinct from work on the SDS, because  
12          the SDS, until we met together twice weekly, was very  
13          much an individual role they played. So I don't see  
14          the connection that one makes it obvious for the other,  
15          if that makes sense.

16          Q. I think what I'm driving at is in the recruitment to  
17          the SDS, a closed secret unit, would a reputation, be it  
18          good or bad, be important on knowing where -- who should  
19          be brought on by those involved in recruiting?

20          A. I don't really -- I can't really answer how this process  
21          of recruitment started up at all in terms of who  
22          discussed what with who, but what I think I said earlier  
23          on was that very often the candidate was presented.

24          I -- I don't have any recollection myself of being  
25          involved at the very early stages of recommending people

1           particularly for SDS work.

2           Q.   We'll return to that in a moment.

3                        HN300, an officer who was in the back office who you  
4           recall being on the SDS, would it be fair to say that  
5           you would have weekly, if not daily, interaction with  
6           that officer?

7           A.   Well, I would have interaction with him if he was in the  
8           back office, yes, but not that frequently.

9           Q.   HN300 has been described during evidence to this Inquiry  
10          as having a reputation for falling in love all over the  
11          place.  Were you aware from your time in  
12          Special Branch -- not just the SDS, but the wider  
13          Special Branch -- of that reputation?

14          A.   I didn't know this man very well and I'm not sure --  
15          I don't think he was ever properly engaged on SDS  
16          operations while I was still there, so I'm not aware  
17          of -- of that reputation, and of course I -- I left  
18          the -- the force at the end of, I think, October '74, so  
19          I don't know about any reputation that he might have  
20          had.

21          Q.   HN297, who, by the time you left in October -- that's  
22          Richard Clark, if I can assist -- had been with the SDS,  
23          albeit in the back office, for three or four months, has  
24          been described as having a reputation -- again, in  
25          Special Branch, not just within SDS -- as being

1 a womaniser and to the degree that an officer has  
2 described him as a "carnivore".

3 Were you aware of his reputation?

4 A. No, I wasn't.

5 Q. From your observations of him during that time, did you  
6 form any such view?

7 A. Well, I don't remember him actually being -- certainly  
8 not on -- on the squad or I can't remember him in  
9 the back office either.

10 Q. I just want to come back to the point of who was  
11 suitable to be on the squad. I understand what you say,  
12 that you had no involvement in recruitment, but you have  
13 said that if you were presented with an officer and  
14 told, "This person's coming to join you", and you felt  
15 that they just weren't suited, it would be a duty to  
16 raise that.

17 What view, if any, would you take if you were  
18 presented with an officer who'd had a good reputation  
19 for the work product and considered to be a strong and  
20 safe pair of hands, was a married officer, an officer  
21 with children, so hence a stable home life, from your  
22 description, but that had a reputation for being  
23 a womaniser? Would that cause you to say this person is  
24 not suitable to infiltrate groups in an undercover role?

25 A. Well, it's not something that happened to me at the

1 time. If I was presented with that situation hitherto,  
2 then it would be something I would want to consider,  
3 I think, greater, because clearly there was a big degree  
4 of trust involved in deploying these people in this sort  
5 of work. I wasn't particularly on the angle of  
6 womanising or whatever, but -- but it was the trust  
7 aspect of it which I think is more important. And --  
8 and maybe when a person has that said about them, that  
9 would, to me, raise a doubt about perhaps the whole  
10 question of integrity.

11 Q. I appreciate I'm asking you to say what you think you  
12 may have done as opposed to being a situation you were  
13 faced with, but would it be a matter of it being  
14 a balancing exercise and seeing where the balance fell,  
15 or would it be a, "This is concerning, we won't have  
16 this sort of person on the SDS"?

17 A. I find that question very difficult to answer, really,  
18 I'm sorry.

19 Q. Final few topics, Mr Brice. I hope we can deal with  
20 them before the lunch break. I just want to spend a few  
21 moments on, as you learned on the job, the views that  
22 you developed.

23 You have said in your witness statement that from  
24 time to time, you would consider how to improve the  
25 unit. Can you expand on that a little, please?



1       A. How to improve it? I can't think of anything specific  
2       in my time, and I'm only speaking from the months or the  
3       year and a bit I spent on it. We -- we might have  
4       benefited from even a more frequent number of meets, and  
5       not that I felt it was wrong at the time. I think what  
6       I'm saying here is that -- that you can't have too many  
7       opportunities to meet people who are dealing with  
8       difficult work situations, whether they are within  
9       a group, as we were in the safe houses, or as  
10      individuals.

11                So maybe we could have had more one-to-one  
12      situations than we actually did, although people were  
13      able to ask for one-to-one situations even when we met  
14      together at safe houses. Sometimes things were  
15      confidential.

16      Q. Do you recall now having any one-to-ones?

17      A. Do I recall?

18      Q. Having any one-to-one meetings --

19      A. Yes.

20      Q. -- that request being made?

21      A. Yes.

22      Q. Again, for the moment, not going into detail, do you  
23      recall what the concern was leading to those one-to-one  
24      meetings?

25      A. People may have -- may have had a problem about feeling,

1           for the time being, a bit less secure than they'd been,  
2           or they might have had a domestic situation which would  
3           cloud their ability to do this difficult work, or they  
4           might want to change their cover operation in terms of  
5           maybe on a job or something, or something like that.

6           So they were the sort of things that we were  
7           available to discuss and they would have been dealt with  
8           on a one-to-one situation, yes.

9       Q.   And so if it was a welfare consideration such as home  
10       life, that would be something that you were equipped to  
11       deal with yourself, would it?

12      A.   Well, not just me, I mean, but I was the first port of  
13       call, in a sense, because I like to feel that in the  
14       time I was there, I had developed a trustworthy  
15       relationship with each of these officers, not just as  
16       a team together, because they didn't work together after  
17       all, but as individuals.  And -- and basically, there  
18       has to be an element of trust there together, and  
19       I would have always thought that I was their first line  
20       of -- not attack; solace in -- in being able to bring  
21       that particular piece of worry they might have to  
22       notice, and we'd take it from there.

23      Q.   Would it be fair; some situations you would deal with  
24       yourself and others you would refer up to your  
25       superiors?

1       A. Yes. I mean, that would be judged entirely on its  
2       merits. I mean, if it was something that I could easily  
3       put right, I mean, yes, of course I would do it --  
4       I would sort it out. And if it was something elsewhere  
5       I needed further counsel as well, then I would take it  
6       further up.

7       Q. Can I ask you this about intelligence. You've said that  
8       you came to understand that if good intelligence was  
9       being produced, the officer might run for a bit longer.  
10      Did you come to understand what constituted good  
11      intelligence?

12      A. It's a very difficult question to answer, and it was  
13      always a difficult situation to know when to withdraw  
14      somebody from this type of work. It wasn't difficult if  
15      there was, say, personal problems or something in the --  
16      in welfare front, because that has to take precedence,  
17      but in the gathering of intelligence, of course there is  
18      a temptation to keep it going whilst things were looking  
19      to be good.

20             I can't quantify that any further at this stage,  
21      because it's so long ago. It's not an issue really  
22      I'd ever come about, but I can understand you might want  
23      to go that extra month or two when -- with the benefit  
24      of hindsight, you might take somebody back out earlier  
25      on. I -- I can't help any further than that.

1 Q. To your knowledge, would an officer be aware that --  
2 would they be given feedback so that they were aware if  
3 they produced good intelligence, they may get a longer  
4 run in the SDS?

5 A. No, I don't think -- I don't think that was ever  
6 a guarantee or an ID of a guarantee, no. I think the  
7 welfare situation was paramount in everybody's mind,  
8 because what you didn't want them to be is to be  
9 compromised.

10 Q. Mr Brice, the final topic I'd like to deal with is the  
11 move to S Squad in July 1974. I wonder, please, could  
12 we have document {MPS/730906/1}.

13 Sir, it's tab 3 of the bundle.

14 At page 3 {MPS/730906/3}.

15 Mr Brice, what is on the screen now is one of the  
16 annual reports that were produced and the letters that  
17 went from those high in Special Branch to the  
18 Home Office --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- to seek the continuation, and this is dated  
21 February 1975.

22 Could we scroll down a little bit, please.

23 I'm looking at the final paragraph on that page, and  
24 this relates to the move to S Squad. It's a letter by  
25 the Assistant Commissioner for Crime, Woods, and it says

1           this:

2                   "The Commissioner and I have continued to take  
3           a close personal interest in the activities of the Squad  
4           and I would stress, as I did last year, that each  
5           officer involved [undertakes] that the maintenance of  
6           the strictest security remains paramount. Every  
7           practical step is taken by close supervision and  
8           intelligent anticipation to prevent exposure and no  
9           complacency is permitted. To this end the operations of  
10          the special Squad were placed in July 1974 directly  
11          under ... day-to-day supervision of a Chief  
12          Superintendent and Superintendent who were re-allocated  
13          from other tasks in order to provide a further degree of  
14          control."

15          A. Yes.

16          Q. Now, we've dealt with the fact that you're aware of this  
17          move to the additional control of being under S Squad by  
18          the arrival of David Bicknell on the SDS as your  
19          superintendent; is that right?

20          A. Yes, I -- from my memory, I think Mr Bicknell became the  
21          chief superintendent, so I think that's what I was  
22          saying in my statement.

23          Q. Were you aware of any review that took place on the  
24          management level of yourself and the chief inspector  
25          that led to the SDS being brought under the control and

1 supervision of S Squad?

2 A. I don't see any major difference between the control as  
3 it was before it went to S Squad and when it went to  
4 S Squad, apart from that slight change in chief  
5 superintendent and superintendent. I think that's my --  
6 my answer.

7 Q. Well, that anticipates my next question. You said that  
8 once David Bicknell was in place, it was a little  
9 easier. He was more approachable. Aside from that, did  
10 you notice any impact on the day-to-day running of the  
11 SDS from July 1974?

12 A. No, because -- I wouldn't have done because, of course,  
13 I was -- I say on the way out. I left in -- I think  
14 on -- fairly early in October or something. So I wasn't  
15 aware of -- of that structural difference making  
16 a difference day-to-day. I wasn't exactly on demob  
17 leave, but in a sense, I was still dealing with  
18 Mr Bicknell at any rate. He may have been a rank  
19 higher, so I didn't have a problem in dealing with him  
20 when he was either a superintendent or a chief  
21 superintendent. But I think by the time we get to the  
22 point in that report, Mr Kneale was in place as well as  
23 the -- as the chief inspector.

24 Q. You said earlier you don't really have any real  
25 recollection of Derek Kneale.

1           By July 1974 then, were you aware that you were  
2 going to leave the police force? I don't need any  
3 detail, but just whether you recall.

4       A. Yes, I probably was, yes.

5       Q. Two final points to deal with.

6           The description that I've just read out from  
7 the letter, would you agree that the supervision on  
8 a day-to-day basis and by senior managers was not so  
9 much concerned with the standards of undercover officers  
10 and a check on the limitations of them trespassing into  
11 the lives of individuals, but the concern was to keep  
12 the activities of the unit secret and secure; that was  
13 the overriding concern?

14       A. I think my answer to that is, of course, I -- I never  
15 saw that letter because it's -- until I was shown it as  
16 an exhibit not long ago, and nor should I have done.  
17 But what I would say is that those comments I would  
18 heartily endorse, and I believe that the point that they  
19 were making about the security of it was as important as  
20 its -- as what it actually achieved in terms -- in terms  
21 of intelligence. There was certainly a dual role here,  
22 and I happen to feel very strongly that, as you would  
23 expect I would, I suppose, that during my time on it, we  
24 had a pretty close hand on what was going on in both of  
25 those contexts. It's the success of it as far as its

1 gathering of information and also the fact that it was  
2 pretty secure overall.

3 So I would endorse the comments of that senior  
4 officer, whoever it was, writing to Mr Waddell at the  
5 Home Office.

6 MS SMITH: Thank you, Mr Brice. For now, those are all  
7 the questions I have for you. I realise we've now  
8 arrived at 1.00 pm.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be sensible for any questions that  
10 you may be requested to be posed to be communicated to  
11 you over the lunch hour, or do you need longer than  
12 that?

13 MS SMITH: I hope over the lunch hour will be sufficient,  
14 sir.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, right.

16 Can you be back ready to recommence at 2.00, when  
17 I think the final leg of your evidence will be  
18 completed?

19 A. Thank you, sir.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

21 A. Thank you.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Right, we'll adjourn until 2.00.

23 (1.02 pm)

24 (The short adjournment)

25 (1.59 pm)



1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

2 MS SMITH: Thank you, sir.

3 Mr Brice, I have a couple of topics, or perhaps more  
4 than a couple, to ask some supplementary questions, if  
5 I may.

6 The first is the safe house. In your evidence  
7 before lunch, you said that it made sense to have  
8 an alternative, to have a second safe house. Can I ask  
9 this, was the thinking behind that to avoid unwelcome  
10 attention when there were frequent visitors, as in the  
11 officers, to those premises?

12 A. Yes, of course. And also, of course, if we had to  
13 vacate, probably because of that reason, we had another  
14 place to go to.

15 Q. Next topic, please, is back to HN294, your chief  
16 inspector when you joined. You drew the contrast with  
17 David Bicknell that -- does it boil down to this --  
18 HN294 wasn't particularly approachable but Mr Bicknell  
19 was?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What about the manner of HN294 and his style of  
22 management made him unapproachable? Can you help us  
23 with that, please.

24 A. Well, I was going to say he was -- he was less  
25 approachable, because within -- I think it was just his

1           personality. He was -- he came across, to me, as  
2           a fairly dour sort of individual who probably kept a lot  
3           to himself. That does sound unfair saying that now  
4           because, sadly, he's passed away, but I think that  
5           was -- in other words, we had a working relationship,  
6           but it wasn't the greatest. But I hope it was --  
7           functioned, anyway.

8           Q. Did you observe an impact, if any, then on how the  
9           officers would be able to interact with him and their  
10          relations?

11          A. Well, I don't know how. They -- they would not directly  
12          interact with him on a regular basis. Where he would  
13          become more involved, if there's something emanated from  
14          one of those officers, perhaps through myself, where  
15          I needed to take him on board as well because of his  
16          rank, I'm not -- I'm not aware that -- I mean, he --  
17          I wasn't aware that he ever came to the safe house,  
18          because that wasn't his particular job.

19          Q. You agreed with Mr Greenslade's assessment in this that  
20          he ran the unit as a fiefdom. Can you explain what it  
21          was about how he ran the unit that it came to be  
22          described in that way?

23          A. Well, yes, I wouldn't exactly use the term "fiefdom",  
24          but I know what Mr Greenslade means. Well, I think  
25          he -- I think the expression is he kept his cards close

1 to his chest. That was just the way he did things, and  
2 some of us operate in an entirely different way, so ...

3 Q. Thank you.

4 Can we move on to HN45, who we spoke about.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Do you have recollection of him being on the SDS when  
7 you were?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You said, much earlier in the questions and answers  
10 today, that you couldn't help with the compromise that  
11 led to HN45 being withdrawn. Does it follow that you  
12 can't help with the timing of when that happened?

13 A. Well, I wasn't aware of -- of a compromise, and so  
14 I don't think I can answer any further that particular  
15 issue.

16 Q. Can we move on, please, to the topic of deceased  
17 children's identities.

18 I want to take you back to when you were on the  
19 Bomb Squad in 1972. Did you use undercover identities  
20 on that squad?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Can you recall whether Geoffrey Craft was on the  
23 Bomb Squad at any point?

24 A. Not in my time.

25 Q. Now, I've asked you many questions today about a period

1 of your life some 50 years ago, and it follows that  
2 recollection is sometimes unclear. What I want to deal  
3 with, please, is when I was asking you questions about  
4 your involvement in any -- if any, with instructing your  
5 officers to go to Somerset House to develop their  
6 undercover identity, your recollection was clear that it  
7 wasn't you and you didn't have any discussion with  
8 Mr Bicknell about the use of deceased children's  
9 identities.

10 Are you able to help with how you can be clear and  
11 confident on that particular topic?

12 A. I was never aware of that actual occurrence taking  
13 place. It wasn't something that was ever in my mind.  
14 I don't recall being asked about, if you're -- if we're  
15 talking about passports particularly, about getting  
16 passports, and --

17 Q. If I --

18 A. -- I have a hunch that this was taking place after  
19 I left SDS. It wasn't something that I was ever  
20 concerned with and ever came across and certainly ever  
21 instructed anybody to do.

22 Q. Thank you, Mr Brice. A couple more questions on this  
23 practice and then we'll move on to the final topic.

24 Were you aware at the time of a criminal case  
25 involving a person who'd used a deceased child's

1 identity being discussed within the SDS?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Do you remember the book "The Day of the Jackal" being  
4 published?

5 A. I think "The Day of the Jackal" is when it first came to  
6 my notice.

7 Q. Can you just expand a little on that, please. What do  
8 you mean "when it first came to my notice"?

9 A. Well, isn't that the book where this -- this false  
10 identity is -- is outlined?

11 Q. Are you aware of that book being discussed in  
12 Special Branch in the SDS?

13 A. Not to my knowledge.

14 Q. Does it follow -- do you recall it having any influence  
15 on how cover identities were to be developed at the  
16 time?

17 A. No, I wasn't aware of it at the time.

18 Q. Mr Brice, can we move on, please, to the final topic and  
19 taking you back to relationships that undercover  
20 officers engaged in.

21 I was dealing with whether there was at least  
22 the appreciation of a risk by mid-1974 that officers may  
23 engage in intimate relationships, and you said, well,  
24 there was always a risk, and certainly -- tell me if  
25 I'm right -- the impression is that a great deal of

1 trust was placed in these officers; is that fair?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. I want to clarify from your evidence, please, did you  
4 appreciate that that risk existed at the time when --

5 A. No.

6 Q. -- you were on the SDS or subsequently?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Sorry, when you say "no", did you appreciate it at the  
9 time back in '73/'74?

10 A. Of -- of what? Of a risk or a rift?

11 Q. A risk, sorry, of -- a risk of officers engaging in  
12 inappropriate and intimate relationships.

13 A. Well, there must be, in human terms, always a risk, but  
14 it wasn't something that occupied my thought processes  
15 when I was on the SDS.

16 Q. Other than married men being recruited, were you aware  
17 of any measures which were put in place to mitigate any  
18 potential risks of officers getting too involved in the  
19 groups that they were infiltrating?

20 A. I wasn't aware of anything, no.

21 Q. Hindsight is perhaps a great thing, but with the benefit  
22 of hindsight, do you think more could have been done at  
23 the time to alleviate such a risk?

24 A. Well, of course, with the benefit of hindsight, one  
25 might be able to come up with something, but I think the

1 fact is that when we were trying to emphasise the fact  
2 that we were recruiting mainly married people with  
3 this -- what I described as a stable and secure  
4 background, that was, maybe inadvertently, a way of  
5 preventing -- nothing's 100% in this world -- of that  
6 sort of occurrence coming to light. So I think we were  
7 doing the best we could at that time. I think that's  
8 the best I can do with that.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 This is the final point and the final question; that  
11 a reputation of an officer as a womaniser would, if  
12 I've understood you correctly, be of relevance to the  
13 issue of integrity and trust of an officer.

14 A. Well, if you had a list of pointers, I think if I saw  
15 that, it would obviously raise questions in my mind  
16 about -- well, I think I was trying to say this before;  
17 about my judgment in recommending him for that type of  
18 work, because there was obviously a -- a bigger risk  
19 than if he wasn't a womaniser, if you follow my track  
20 there, and I think it's as simple as that.

21 It's not something that I would have, as it were,  
22 gone along with or -- or brushed over, really. I think  
23 it's something that would have been quite important to  
24 me in -- in deciding on what -- what would happen.

25 Q. Would your concern have been greater regarding a married

1 officer that had such a reputation or a single officer  
2 with such a reputation or no difference?

3 A. Well, of course, I think, on moral grounds, you would  
4 have to say that you'd take that more seriously if it  
5 was from a married officer, but I don't want  
6 particularly to moralise on this, because that was  
7 just -- that was the way I felt at the time. I think  
8 the fact we were choosing those married officers was  
9 a way of -- well, we wouldn't have chosen them if they'd  
10 have had that reputation anyway, so married or single.

11 MS SMITH: Thank you, Mr Brice. Those are all the questions  
12 that I have.

13 A. Thank you.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any re-examination?

15 MR SKELTON: No, thank you.

16 Questions by THE CHAIRMAN

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Brice, I want to ask you about one topic  
18 that you've not, I think, been asked about so far. Can  
19 I ask you to bear in mind, please, that the documents we  
20 have suggest that HN294 was replaced by Derek Kneale  
21 some time between March and May 1974.

22 A. Yes.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: The documents we have, the last one for HN294  
24 is March, the first for Derek Kneale is May.

25 A. Yes.



1 THE CHAIRMAN: In 1974, there was a particularly striking  
2 and grim event, which occurred on 15 June 1974. Do you  
3 know of what I speak, or would you like me to remind you  
4 further?

5 A. I've not heard of that, sir.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: The disturbance in Red Lion Square which led  
7 to a death, the death of Kevin Gately.

8 A. Yes.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Does that ring a bell?

10 A. I can -- I can recall an incident in Red Lion Square,  
11 but I can only recall it because of your reminding me  
12 now.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but does my reminding you now remind you  
14 that a young man did die in that incident?

15 A. Yes.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: And there was an inquiry by  
17 Lord Justice Scarman into the circumstances of his  
18 death?

19 A. Yes.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: You remember that now, do you?

21 A. Well, I don't remember any -- any more detail than that.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, right.

23 Could I ask that document {MPS/730906/1} is put up  
24 on the screen at page 13 {MPS/730906/13}.

25 Can you see that --

1 A. Yes, I can.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and can I tell you what it is? It is  
3 a document -- the annual report signed by Derek Kneale  
4 dated 4 February 1975, so it covers the year 1974.

5 A. Yes.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: And if you'd read, please, paragraph 20 --  
7 could that be put up -- under "Review". Just read that  
8 to yourself, if you would.

9 (Pause)

10 A. Yes.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: You see the sentence that says:

12 "Fortunately, the SDS gave forewarning of both the  
13 size of the demonstration and the possible disorder  
14 which might occur."

15 A. Yes.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Now, you are the only person who then had  
17 managerial responsibility within the SDS who is still  
18 alive and I was wondering if you could help me about  
19 what was done to forewarn uniformed officers about the  
20 possibility of disorder in Red Lion Square.

21 A. I'm very sorry, sir, but I've never seen that report  
22 until it's been shown to me now and I can't,  
23 regrettably, shed any information on that point at all.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, but forget being shown the report for  
25 the first time now. Does what it says, that "the SDS

1           gave forewarning of both the size of the demonstration  
2           and the possible disorder which might occur", does that  
3           ring any bell?

4       A.   It doesn't ring any bell with that incident, I mean, but  
5           being able to provide the information, that would not  
6           surprise me.

7       THE CHAIRMAN:   The Inquiry has not been able to retrieve any  
8           documents containing that information in advance of the  
9           Red Lion Square incident.  It may be that the documents  
10          have -- did exist and have got lost.  But is there  
11          an alternative possibility that information was  
12          communicated orally?

13      A.   Well, not as far as I know, sir.

14      THE CHAIRMAN:   Your recollection is that intelligence  
15          reports always went or were confirmed in writing?

16      A.   Yes.

17      THE CHAIRMAN:   Thank you.

18                 Does anyone have any questions arising out of that?

19                 No.

20                 Thank you very much, Mr Brice, for coming and giving  
21                 evidence.  Your evidence is now complete.  I'm grateful  
22                 for you for doing so.

23      A.   Thank you very much, sir.

24      THE CHAIRMAN:   Thank you.

25      A.   Thank you, sir.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: That, I think, concludes today's evidence,  
2 does it not? We will have, I anticipate, a rather  
3 fuller day tomorrow, so can everybody please be here on  
4 time to start promptly at 10.00. Thank you.

5 (2.18 pm)

6 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Wednesday,  
7 18 May 2022)

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

INDEX

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

Summary of the evidence of HN2401 .....2

(Anthony Greenslade)

HN3378 (Derek Brice) (sworn) .....10

Questions by MS SMITH .....10

Questions by THE CHAIRMAN .....88

1

2