

Wednesday, 18 May 2022

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Good morning and welcome to Day 5 of evidential hearings at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Neil Fernandes and I am the Hearings Manager. There is no fire alarm testing expected today, so if the fire alarm goes off, please follow the fire exit signs and make your way to the muster point, which is the Hard Rock Hotel, Great Cumberland Place.

On arrival at the muster point, please make yourself known to a fire marshal, who will be wearing a high visibility jacket and who will be keeping a register of all attendees. The fire marshals will also be responsible for letting everyone know when it is safe to return, in liaison with representatives from the Thistle Hotel.

I now hand over to the Chairman.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I note we have a fairly full public gallery today, therefore what I'm about to say may come as news to some members of it.

Any of you may use your mobile handheld electronic devices to communicate to the outside world silently what is going on in this hearing room, what you've heard, the evidence you've heard, what you've seen, but

1 you may not communicate anything until ten minutes have
2 elapsed since the event which you're describing
3 occurred.

4 You may not use those devices for recording what is
5 going on here, or photographing. The formal
6 restrictions are set out in a document which is on,
7 I think, each table in front of you. Please consult it
8 if you are in any doubt.

9 Mr Barr.

10 Forgive me, you wish to be sworn, I think, Mr Craft,
11 do you not?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 HN34 (GEOFFREY CRAFT) (sworn)

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Craft, I'm afraid you're in for quite
15 a long day. We do have regular breaks, but if at any
16 time you feel need for a break, all you need do is say
17 so.

18 A. Thank you, sir.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

20 Questions by MR BARR

21 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

22 Mr Craft, could you tell us your full name, please?

23 A. I am Geoffrey Theodore Michael Craft.

24 Q. You have provided us with two witness statements dated
25 7 December 2020 and 23 February 2022. We understand

1 through your legal team that you wish to make
2 three corrections to the first of those witness
3 statements.

4 We understand that in your first witness statement,
5 at paragraph 70, you used the cover name "Rick Gibson"
6 when you intended to use the real name Rick Clark.

7 At paragraph 100, you stated that you did not recall
8 the officer that we know as HN13 appearing in court.
9 I'll give you a moment to check who that is.

10 A. If I may. Thank you. Yes.

11 Q. You tell us through your legal team that in fact you do
12 recall that.

13 And then at paragraph 116 you stated that the idea
14 of using deceased children's identities came from
15 "The Day of the Jackal", but in fact, we're told you
16 think that the idea was popularised by "The Day
17 of the Jackal". We will go into those aspects in more
18 detail in due course, but subject to those corrections,
19 are the contents of your witness statements true and
20 correct to the best of your knowledge and belief?

21 A. They are.

22 Q. Can I start, please, with your training as a police
23 officer. Were you trained on the powers of entry,
24 search and seizure?

25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. Were you given any further training about
2 the application of the law so far as it applies to
3 powers of entry, search and seizure in the context of
4 undercover policing?
- 5 A. Not in the -- in the context of undercover policing.
- 6 Q. Did you consider that the limitations on a police
7 officer entering a private dwelling applied to the work
8 of the SDS?
- 9 A. No, I did not.
- 10 Q. Did you give it any thought?
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. Would the same apply to powers of search and seizure?
- 13 A. Yes.
- 14 Q. Did you have any training at all during what we call the
15 Tranche 1 era -- that is between about 1968 and about
16 1983 -- on the European Convention on Human Rights?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Did you give that Convention any consideration during
19 that era?
- 20 A. No.
- 21 Q. You've told us that you didn't have any training on
22 discrimination. Did you give discrimination any
23 consideration during the Tranche 1 era?
- 24 A. No.
- 25 Q. Were you trained on the Peelian principles,

1 Sir Robert Peel's principles of policing?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And do you recall that one of those principles is that
4 the ability of the police to perform their duties is
5 dependent upon public approval of police actions?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. During your time with the SDS, did you give any
8 consideration to whether the public would approve of
9 what the SDS was doing?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And what was your conclusion?

12 A. My conclusion was that the public as a whole are happy
13 to live in a parliamentary democracy and that the
14 police, in preserving the law with public
15 demonstrations, which are part of our -- our
16 parliamentary democracy, the police naturally need
17 intelligence to ensure that their policing is
18 appropriate.

19 Q. Did you give any consideration to whether the level of
20 intrusion in people's private and political lives were
21 such that the public would have qualms?

22 A. No.

23 Q. The next principle I would like to put to you is the one
24 which says:

25 "Police must secure the willing cooperation of the

1 public in voluntary observance of the law to be able to
2 secure and maintain the respect of the public."

3 Were you familiar with that principle?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did you consider that what the SDS was doing would
6 command the respect of the public?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Why did you hold that view?

9 A. Because, as I said before, it was supporting the --
10 their -- their lifestyle, their freedom. I think the
11 difficulty is -- here is that one needs intelligence to
12 preserve those freedoms, and that is what I considered.

13 Q. The third and final principle that I'd like to put to
14 you is the one which states:

15 "Police at all times should maintain a relationship
16 with the public that gives reality to the historic
17 tradition that the police are the public and the public
18 are the police, the police being only members of
19 the public who are paid to give full time attention to
20 duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the
21 interests of community welfare and existence."

22 A. I can't say I gave a great deal of thought to that long
23 principle.

24 Q. Righto. I'll move on then.

25 Did you ever serve on the industrial desk in

- 1 C Squad?
- 2 A. No.
- 3 Q. I'm going to try now to anchor your dates of service,
4 first of all with the SDS. We understand that you
5 joined the SDS some time in 1974; is that right?
- 6 A. Yes. I -- my recollection is that I came off protection
7 in February 1974 following the change of government, and
8 I was on another squad very briefly and then I was
9 switched into the SDS when Derek Brice left.
- 10 Q. There may be some uncertainty as to precisely when that
11 was, but would it be possible that it was in the autumn
12 of 1974?
- 13 A. No, it would have been the very early part of 1974.
- 14 Q. And then you took command of the SDS in 1976 when
15 Derek Kneale was promoted; is that right?
- 16 A. That is correct.
- 17 Q. Was that around the spring time of 1976?
- 18 A. I just don't remember.
- 19 Q. According to your central record of service, you were
20 substantively promoted to detective chief inspector in
21 November 1976. Is it right that there was a period
22 before that time where you acted up and were head of
23 the SDS?
- 24 A. That I don't recall. I simply remember that
25 Derek Kneale and I were both promoted about the same

1 time and he moved off and I simply took over the role.

2 Q. You were replaced by Ken Pryde, weren't you?

3 A. So I'm told. I had forgotten that.

4 Q. If you can't remember something, please just say so.

5 We've got a document which shows you going to the
6 Security Service, taking Mr Pryde with you and saying
7 that he was going to be your successor, and that
8 document refers to a meeting on 15 September 1977. Does
9 that sound about right?

10 A. I don't recall anything about it, I'm afraid, sorry.

11 Q. Right.

12 Can I take you back then to the start of your
13 service with the SDS. Did you get a handover?

14 A. No.

15 Q. How did you know what to do?

16 A. I simply moved in there as Derek Kneale's number two.
17 The -- we had worked together before for extensive
18 periods, and on and off, and so, literally, he -- he and
19 I discussed what the role entailed.

20 Q. Presumably that would have covered -- and I don't want
21 you to name any names in this answer, but it would have
22 covered who the undercover officers were?

23 A. Of course.

24 Q. And what the job entailed in basic terms?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did it cover any past or present information about
2 sexual activity as between undercover police officers
3 and members of the public?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Did it cover any discussion about the risk of such
6 activity?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Did it cover the legality of what the SDS was doing and
9 any legal considerations?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Did it cover any ethical questions?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Did it cover what intelligence was being gathered?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And why it was being gathered?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And for whom?
18 A. Well, the basic responsibility of the SDS was to provide
19 intelligence on public order activity, but it had
20 a secondary role. Because of the activities of
21 the SDS officers, they came in contact, obviously, with
22 groups which were considered by the Security Service to
23 be subversive and from C Squad, or through C Squad, we
24 reported as required on those groups. So that was
25 intelligence on subversive activities, but the main

1 purpose was public order.

2 Q. And did Mr Kneale go into detail about the relationship
3 between the SDS and the Security Service?

4 A. I don't think he did. I think we both understood it.

5 Q. From your previous Special Branch work?

6 A. Of course, yes.

7 Q. Did it cover the relationship between the SDS and A8?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And what did Detective Chief Inspector Kneale, as he
10 then was, tell you about that?

11 A. In the sense that the intelligence we were acquiring was
12 vital for A8 in their policing of public order.

13 Q. Did he tell you anything specifically about what it was
14 that they valued?

15 A. No.

16 Q. Did DCI Kneale cover the relationship between the SDS
17 and B and C Squads?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And in outline, what did he tell you about the
20 relationship with C Squad?

21 A. With C Squad?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. Oh, in outline -- and again, how much he told me and how
24 much I already knew, I can't be specific, but in
25 outline, that C Squad had the responsibility for

1 supporting the Security Service in terms of subversion,
2 and that they would request information, they would
3 certainly be the -- the group who would advise on where
4 we should place our people, and everything we did on the
5 subversion -- in fact, everything we did, all the
6 reports, we passed through C Squad for their -- for them
7 to activate.

8 So they would either pass it on to the
9 Security Service or they would be the conduit for
10 passing intelligence on to A8, bearing in mind that
11 C Squad had the responsibility of providing threat
12 assessments on public order for A8 and therefore, they
13 may and did have other sources of information to make up
14 their threat assessments. But the SDS, of course, was
15 a major part.

16 Q. And what was the relationship with B Squad?

17 A. Very little, because, of course, the -- at that stage --
18 and I can't remember exactly when things happened, but
19 the -- the Irish scene was becoming -- in this country,
20 was -- in terms of public order was becoming far less,
21 because the IRA was starting up again, it was operating,
22 and they didn't get involved much in public order.

23 I suppose you could say from the Troops Out Movement
24 point of view, yes, because -- but that was an umbrella
25 organisation, but it was interesting to see from -- from

1 the SDS point of view how far that was affected by Irish
2 Republican groups within Troops Out, which was a small
3 part of Troops Out. The larger part was the normal --
4 what's the word I want? The people involved in -- in --
5 in protest and demonstration.

6 Q. Did DCI Kneale explain to you that undercover police
7 officers were using elements of the identities of
8 deceased children?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did he tell you how that practice had started?

11 A. No, he didn't.

12 Q. Do you know how that practice started?

13 A. No. Sadly, I don't. I appreciate that is of importance
14 to the Inquiry, but I just do not know when it started.

15 Q. And does it follow that you can't help us either with
16 who decided that that practice should be adopted by
17 the SDS?

18 A. No, I'm afraid not. I wish I could.

19 Q. Something you touched on a moment ago: did DCI Kneale
20 talk to you about target selection?

21 A. We discussed it. I can't say whether he briefed me on
22 it. I think we discussed that at the time.

23 Q. Can you recall what he said?

24 A. Largely he said that we needed intelligence on public
25 order, that there were certain groups who were very much

1 involved in public order and those were the areas we --
2 we should cover.

3 Q. Did he identify those groups?

4 A. Well, yes, we did between us, because that was happening
5 in the office at the time.

6 Q. Were you given any instructions or advice to review
7 existing deployments?

8 A. No, I don't think so.

9 Q. Can I move now to the question of how undercover police
10 officers were recruited, and I just want to establish,
11 first of all, who was recruited whilst you were head of
12 the SDS.

13 Was the officer we know as HN297, whose real name is
14 Richard Clark, was he already in the SDS when you
15 started or did you recruit him?

16 A. I believe he had just started, but I'm not certain.

17 Q. Do you have any recollection of recruiting him?

18 A. I didn't recruit him personally, but I -- I was involved
19 assisting his undercover background.

20 Q. Can you recall whether he had a reputation with women?

21 A. I never knew that.

22 Q. He's been described by some of his former colleagues as
23 a womaniser and in one case as a carnivore. Do those
24 descriptions fit with your knowledge and understanding
25 of Richard Clark?

- 1 A. No, certainly not.
- 2 Q. Did you recruit the officer we know as HN300?
- 3 A. May I --
- 4 Q. Yes, of course.
- 5 A. -- please? (Pause)
- 6 No, I don't recall that.
- 7 Q. He's been described by some as a womaniser and by
- 8 others -- I paraphrase -- as a serial romantic. Does
- 9 that description chime with your recollection of him?
- 10 A. No, it doesn't.
- 11 Q. How would you describe, first of all, Richard Clark?
- 12 A. He seemed to be somebody who was affable, social, social
- 13 activity, he seemed to mix well the other people, got
- 14 along well with people. I -- I didn't see anything
- 15 unusual about him, put it that way.
- 16 Q. And HN300?
- 17 A. An interesting character, it seemed to be. Quite
- 18 a funny character to deal with. Looked absolutely
- 19 nothing like a police officer. I can't imagine why he
- 20 was ever a police officer, but the fact remains that,
- 21 from the job that we used him for, he would have slipped
- 22 into any -- any sort of organisation very easily.
- 23 I think nobody would have thought he was a police
- 24 officer.
- 25 Q. Did you regard him as a suitable temperament for

1 undercover policing?

2 A. Well, let's say I -- I didn't know of any reason why he
3 should not have been.

4 Q. And the same question for Richard Clark.

5 A. That would be correct, yes.

6 Q. Now, on the basis of our understanding of the timeline,
7 we think that HN13 -- and I'm going to read a series of
8 names, if you could keep the file to the side, please --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- HN13, HN296, HN304, HN354 and possibly HN80 were all
11 recruited while you were head of the SDS.

12 A. May I ask, could you repeat the last two?

13 Q. Yes, 354, who is -- his real name is no longer
14 restricted. He's Vince Harvey.

15 A. Oh, yes.

16 Q. And HN80.

17 A. HN80. (Pause)

18 Yes, in the total period, I -- all the names I know,
19 but I can't be quite -- I can't clear in my own mind
20 about whether -- how much I was involved in the
21 recruitment.

22 Q. I see. Now --

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, do you recognise them all as
24 being officers in the SDS --

25 A. Yes, sir, I do.

- 1 THE CHAIRMAN: -- when you were in charge of it?
- 2 A. Yes, sir.
- 3 MR BARR: If you can't remember the specifics, I'll zoom out
4 to the general. Now, all of these officers were either
5 married or, in the case of Vince Harvey, in a long term
6 relationship when they were recruited to the SDS. Was
7 that deliberate?
- 8 A. Yes. It was part of the criteria we looked at for
9 recruitment.
- 10 Q. And was one advantage of recruiting officers who were
11 either married or in stable relationships that it
12 reduced the risk of them becoming involved in sexual
13 activity with members of the public in their undercover
14 identities?
- 15 A. I can't say that. The thinking at the time was that
16 they were in a stressful -- a stressful job, they're
17 having to live two lives, and it was very important that
18 they had a stable life to which they could return daily,
19 preferably, to break away from the scene they were in.
20 So it was more about stability, I think.
- 21 Q. More about stability or entirely about stability?
- 22 A. I think, looking at the -- the sexual bit, if I may, it
23 was never discussed when I was there on the SDS, and it
24 wasn't discussed because we were all trained from day 1
25 as probationary policemen that sexual activity on duty

1 was putting oneself on the line for dismissal, and in
2 fact I still remember, in my own case, the instructor
3 producing copies of old-fashioned police orders from
4 I think about 1830 where PC Bloggs had been dismissed
5 having been caught with the hand -- with the housemaid
6 from somewhere. And it was always stressed within the
7 police service that sexual activity on duty was just not
8 on, and that -- that is probably why it was never
9 discussed.

10 Q. Can I move now from recruitment to the construction of
11 cover identities.

12 Now, you've explained to us in your witness
13 statement that it was a bespoke process and that you
14 were involved in it. Can I take an example: HN304.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Can you recall whether you discussed with him adopting
17 not only the name and date of birth of the child in
18 question, but also the locality in which he had been
19 brought up?

20 A. No, I don't recall it.

21 Q. Is that the sort of thing that you might well have done?

22 A. I might, but I -- I cannot remember a specific occasion
23 when I would have done so.

24 Q. Can you recall in relation to any of the officers whose
25 cover identities you assisted with you suggested to them

- 1 that it would be useful to visit the area where the
2 child grew up?
- 3 A. No.
- 4 Q. Are you saying you can't remember or you didn't do it?
- 5 A. I -- I just don't remember doing it at all. I don't
6 think so.
- 7 Q. Can I ask you now; do you know whether or not the
8 Regional Crime Squad ever used this tactic?
- 9 A. No, I don't know.
- 10 Q. Can I ask you now about HN297, Richard Clark. Do you
11 recall whether or not you assisted him to build his
12 cover legend?
- 13 A. No, not specifically.
- 14 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, do you mean you don't recall
15 doing it or you didn't?
- 16 A. I don't recall doing it specifically for him. I ...
- 17 MR BARR: More generally then, did you generally check and
18 test the cover identities generated by the UCOs before
19 they deployed?
- 20 A. Check, no, but almost certainly discussed who --
21 where -- what -- what kind of employment they had, those
22 factors.
- 23 Q. Was that a form of testing their robustness?
- 24 A. It was just a question of discussing.
- 25 Q. For what purpose?

- 1 A. So that we knew how things were and did it make any
2 sense.
- 3 Q. So that you were satisfied that they were safe to be
4 deployed?
- 5 A. Yes, because through the office, and I think it was the
6 sergeants or one of the sergeants who organised this,
7 we -- further details were made available to the chaps
8 who were going into the field, including, of course,
9 driving licences and one other -- one or two other
10 things.
- 11 Q. Did you consider the legality of using this practice?
- 12 A. No, I assumed it was legal.
- 13 Q. Did you consider the ethics?
- 14 A. No, not at the time.
- 15 Q. Can you recall whether any of the officers objected to
16 using this tactic?
- 17 A. No.
- 18 Q. Can you recall HN80 having qualms about it?
- 19 A. HN80. (Pause)
20 No, I can't.
- 21 Q. Does that mean that you can't remember or that he
22 didn't?
- 23 A. He certainly didn't talk to me about it.
- 24 Q. Did you consider the utility of the tactic?
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. And in your view, what was the utility of the tactic?

2 A. It provided a safe base, really, from the -- in building

3 an alter ego, it provided -- it was the basis of that.

4 Q. Was one aspect of the protection it provided that if

5 anybody went to inspect the register of births, they

6 would find a genuine entry --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- at a time when they were recorded in manuscript in

9 a large volume and it was not possible to insert a false

10 one?

11 A. It was not possible to insert a false one, no.

12 Q. Did you consider the risk that the family of one of

13 these children might find out?

14 A. Sadly to say, at the time, I didn't. It didn't occur to

15 me. My views on that obviously have changed, since it

16 did achieve publicity, and that changes one's view

17 completely.

18 Q. And what is your view now?

19 A. My view now is that it is -- the fact that the family of

20 a bereaved -- the bereaved family of a child who has

21 died have suffered enough with that bereavement and that

22 if -- anything we did to exacerbate that I think is very

23 sad. Certainly there was never any intention to do

24 that, and when I look back at it, I think why did I not

25 question it? And the reason, I think you will find in

1 my statement, is that I had seen it used by somebody who
2 was obtaining passports to attack this country and I was
3 involved in the prosecution of that.

4 And also the fact that the people we were putting in
5 the field were Special Branch officers who intended,
6 most of them, I think, to see out their whole career
7 within the Special Branch. They were in a top secret
8 operation and it seemed to be inconceivable that any of
9 those would -- would reveal it, and therefore
10 the parents of a child -- a deceased child should never,
11 in fact, know about it. That is hindsight.

12 Q. As it happened, one of your officers was suspected of
13 not being who he said he was. That was Richard Clark,
14 wasn't it?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Can you tell us, as far as you can recall it, what
17 happened?

18 A. My best recollection -- and I've tried to give a lot of
19 thought to this -- is that he called in and said that
20 they -- he was suspected of not being who he thought --
21 or who he was saying he was, that he was called to
22 a meeting in a public house somewhere in South London,
23 and Derek Kneale and I went out to keep observation on
24 the pub in case he might be physically attacked. We
25 kept observation outside when he came out with, I think,

1 two other people. I may be wrong about that. He gave
2 no indication of any fear of any problem, anything at
3 all, so he carried on.

4 And I -- Derek Kneale briefed him the following day,
5 and I'm pretty sure he said they had discovered that he
6 had used the details of a deceased child, but that he'd
7 got away with it with a story that in fact he'd -- he'd
8 had to do it because he was wanted by police, and he
9 thought that had been accepted.

10 That is the sum total, I'm afraid, of what I can
11 remember.

12 Q. But is it right that he was in fact then withdrawn?

13 A. He was withdrawn, yes.

14 Q. And why was that?

15 A. I think it was felt that he would always be under
16 suspicion and there was little point in leaving him out
17 there.

18 Q. Did he say whether or not there had been any other
19 circumstances which had led to suspicion falling upon
20 him?

21 A. No, he did not.

22 Q. Did he tell you that he had been involved with members
23 of the opposite sex?

24 A. No, certainly not.

25 Q. How was Richard Clark's compromise presented to the

1 other undercover officers by either you or, as I think
2 he then was, Superintendent Kneale?

3 A. No, I -- I simply can't remember, I'm sorry.

4 Q. There are -- we've heard some evidence to the effect
5 that officers were told that he had been confronted with
6 his death certificate. Might that have happened?

7 A. It might well.

8 Q. After that --

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, two questions in that. He might
10 well have been confronted with his death certificate and
11 officers might have been told that.

12 A. I -- I simply can't remember, sir, I'm sorry.

13 MR BARR: That experience showed you, didn't it, that there
14 were limits to the protection afforded by using
15 a deceased child's identity?

16 A. It did, but I have to say, looking back, I find it
17 fascinating that they were able to produce the death
18 certificate, because there is no direct connection.
19 Having been involved in enquiries in another field
20 within the Branch, the death registers were separate,
21 but the only -- if you've got a -- you're looking at
22 a birth. If you want to find a death certificate -- or
23 you did in those days, if you wanted to find a death
24 certificate, you would literally have to go through
25 goodness knows how many books year after year after year

1 and also in the area concerned to discover -- to
2 discover the death certificate, and then -- then you
3 would have -- if you're a member of the public, I think
4 you would have to pay for somebody else, an official, to
5 go down to check the death certificate and also, if you
6 wanted it, to get a copy. So it was not an easy
7 process. It was quite difficult, in fact.

8 Q. Did the compromise of Richard Clark cause you to revisit
9 the utility of this tactic?

10 A. No, it didn't.

11 Q. Did it cause you to revisit the risks that a family
12 might one day find out?

13 A. No, it didn't.

14 Q. Can I move now to training of undercover police
15 officers.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Before you do, may I ask one question about
17 Richard Clark. We have heard from other officers about
18 sexual relationships which he was thought to have had
19 when deployed. You have no recollection of that, of
20 knowing anything about that at the time. If he had told
21 you that part of the reason for his discovery was what
22 he had had a sexual relationship with a woman in his
23 cover name, what would you have done about it?

24 A. I would have removed him from the field immediately.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Anything else?

1 A. Then had to consider what action we could take, because
2 clearly he had put at risk not only himself, his family
3 and the operation, one would have had to consider how --
4 what his future -- what future he had.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: In the police force, you mean?

6 A. Yes.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Putting it in blunter language, he would have
8 been considered for disciplinary action which might have
9 resulted in his removal from the police force?

10 A. Yes. The only caveat on that, sir, is that, bearing in
11 mind his rights, should there be a discipline board,
12 what would he have said, what might have been published.
13 We were operating in a top secret area and I -- I can't
14 honestly say what decision would have been made about
15 that.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

17 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

18 Training of undercover police officers.

19 Can you recall whether or not there was a black
20 folder with advice and guidance for undercover police
21 officers or any other written material to assist them?

22 A. Not that I can recall.

23 Q. Why weren't they given any such guidance?

24 A. We were still at a time believing that on the job
25 training applied, without -- throughout the Branch that

1 was the case, and this was specific, and so the training
2 they received was within the office, talking to the
3 people in the office, but also out in the field. We
4 used to meet twice a week with the field officers.
5 The trainee would come out there and we'd chat. They
6 would chat about how things were done, what the problems
7 might be, how they should play things. So the training
8 was on the job. There was no specific training
9 programme.

10 Q. Can I move now to targeting, and I'm going to start by
11 showing you a document which comes -- it's part of the
12 1983 annual report.

13 Sir, it's at tab 37B of your bundle. It is
14 {MPS/730903/1}.

15 A. I am lacking a bundle, I think.

16 Q. It will come up on your screen.

17 A. Oh, thank you.

18 (Pause)

19 Q. I tell you what, just for this document, I will read it
20 to you. I'm reading from page 10 of the digital
21 reference pagination, paragraph 9. It's a paragraph
22 about security. It says:

23 "To avoid duplication of effort by other sources the
24 initial placing of each officer is arrived at by
25 reference to Squad Chief Superintendents and the

1 Security Service to ensure greater 'customer'
2 satisfaction. However, it remains the final decision of
3 the officer-in-charge of the Unit which groups are
4 infiltrated, bearing in mind the demands and
5 fluctuations of key areas within the public order
6 scene."

7 Does that accord with your recollection of how it
8 was done when you were in charge of the SDS?

9 A. The -- the last part of it, I'm not quite sure.

10 Targeting would have been from chief superintendent
11 C Squad, who would be relaying and supporting the
12 Security Service in their area, but also the public
13 order area. Bear in mind that chief superintendent
14 C Squad was the one who had to produce the assessments
15 on public order. We were simply a support service in
16 that; a major support service, but that's what we were.

17 The decision in terms of exactly where an undercover
18 officer was placed would be effected quite often -- no,
19 not quite often, sometimes, where we had to get his
20 personality right, and it could be that one would put
21 him in somewhere fairly simple where we knew he would be
22 picked up without a problem before he became known as
23 a revolutionary and he could move on elsewhere.

24 So I think that is the only part where
25 chief inspector SDS would have become involved.

- 1 Q. What is your recollection about who had the ultimate
2 decision-making authority?
- 3 A. It would have to be chief inspector SDS, because chief
4 inspector SDS had the responsibility for protecting his
5 people.
- 6 Q. And does it follow from that nevertheless that very
7 considerable consideration would have been given to the
8 views of chief superintendent C Squad?
- 9 A. Oh, absolutely.
- 10 Q. And B Squad?
- 11 A. Yes, but less so B Squad, because it was not really much
12 involved in my time.
- 13 Q. And whatever was coming to the head of the SDS from the
14 Security Service either directly or via more senior
15 exchanges with Metropolitan Police Special Branch?
- 16 A. From the Security Service via chief superintendent
17 C Squad.
- 18 Q. Now, you've described what you've called "prayers"
19 occurring every morning at Special Branch. We're not
20 talking religious prayers, are we?
- 21 A. We are not, sir, no.
- 22 Q. This is the senior officers of Special Branch conferring
23 every morning to talk business briefly; is that right?
- 24 A. It was the senior officers, the operational part of
25 Special Branch, meeting up with -- I'm talking about

1 chief superintendents of the operational squads meeting
2 up with Commander Ops.

3 Q. From your experience of being privy to some of those
4 meetings, was the targeting of SDS officers a topic of
5 conversation?

6 A. Not that I can ever remember.

7 Q. Does that mean it might have been?

8 A. It could have been, but generally speaking, it wouldn't
9 have reached that level because it would have been
10 discussed with chief superintendent C Squad.
11 Commander Ops wouldn't have been particularly concerned,
12 I don't think.

13 Q. Without mentioning any of the deployments of anonymous
14 officers, can you help us with what considerations you
15 took into account when you were deciding how and where
16 to deploy the officers who were recruited on your watch?

17 A. Yes, it would depend -- the first factor would be where
18 we were light on intelligence and, moving on from there,
19 how would one get somebody into that area.

20 Q. And the next consideration?

21 A. I think that was the first -- first and only
22 consideration.

23 Q. First and only consideration.

24 A. Yes, I can't think of anything else.

25 Q. I see. So that might be paraphrased as a decision based

- 1 on need?
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. Did you consider whether there were alternative ways of
4 obtaining sufficient intelligence from a group on which
5 you were light?
- 6 A. Not on S Squad. That would be down to chief
7 superintendent C Squad. If he -- if chief C had
8 alternative sources, and very often had some in
9 a broader sense, but a decision whether we needed
10 detailed intelligence of course would come from him, not
11 from -- not from chief S.
- 12 Q. Was there any consideration of whether the level of
13 intrusion that would be involved was proportionate to
14 the value of the intelligence that would be obtained?
- 15 A. I can't say there was. I think that's difficult to
16 balance. I can't say that there was.
- 17 Q. Once you had deployed somebody, was there any form of
18 review, formal or otherwise, of the deployment?
- 19 A. Well, there was continuing review of every individual
20 deployment. Was it producing? Was there need to
21 continue? Would it be better if that particular person
22 could be elsewhere? But that was a continuing process.
23 There wasn't a specific review.
- 24 Q. And I think you've mentioned in your witness statement
25 it was not necessarily an easy thing to do to move

- 1 somebody once they were deployed.
- 2 A. No, not necessarily, but, again, I come back to what
- 3 I said before, that there were -- one --
- 4 one organisation in particular was quite easy to get
- 5 into and that could produce a persona who -- and that
- 6 way it would make it easier for somebody to move into
- 7 another organisation.
- 8 Q. Are we talking about the Socialist Workers Party?
- 9 A. Yes.
- 10 Q. You mention that not only today but also in your witness
- 11 statement.
- 12 But could I also ask you; is it right that the SDS
- 13 regarded the SWP as a likely source of public disorder?
- 14 A. Yes.
- 15 Q. So it would not be right to characterise deployment into
- 16 the SWP purely as a stepping stone, it was also a target
- 17 in its own right; is that right?
- 18 A. Oh, of course. Of course.
- 19 Q. And in the scale of likelihood of causing public
- 20 disorder compared to other groups, where was the SWP?
- 21 A. Well, they were the largest and they therefore could
- 22 produce more numbers and were effective at infiltrating
- 23 campaigns for their own purposes.
- 24 Q. We've got a note in the bundle of a meeting with the
- 25 Security Service where they have recorded your view that

1 the SWP was most likely to give rise to law and order
2 problems. Have they accurately recorded your view?

3 A. Yes, I think so.

4 Q. Now, we've talked thus far about which group an officer
5 should be deployed into. How often did you get specific
6 requests, once an officer was in a group, to cover
7 specific meetings?

8 A. Seldom.

9 Q. And what was the attitude when you did receive such
10 requests?

11 A. Oh, I think our response would be, "Yes, certainly", if
12 we could.

13 Q. And that would be the same whether it came from C Squad
14 or the Security Service?

15 A. I didn't deal directly with Security Service over that.

16 Q. Now, can I just ask you about how the Cold War
17 influenced the operation of the SDS during your time as
18 head. Would it be fair to say that the Cold War was
19 an important part of the factual matrix?

20 A. I don't really know the answer to that. The -- the
21 Cold War was important in the sense that the
22 Communist Party of Great Britain was busy infiltrating
23 trade unions and that sort of -- to put Soviet influence
24 into what was happening in our political scene. And
25 I don't think the Cold War was particularly -- of

1 particular importance with the -- on the public order
2 front.

3 Q. Was it a relevant consideration that many of the groups
4 on the ultra left did not have the support of foreign
5 powers, unlike the CPGB?

6 A. Unlike -- certainly unlike the CPGB.

7 Q. Can I take it you're agreeing with me in that answer?

8 A. I'm agreeing with you. I'm just -- my smile is simply
9 because we were dealing with one or two interesting
10 so-called Maoist groups who probably felt they were
11 supporting the activities of Chairman Mao or even
12 Enva Hodger who was the leader, the dictator, Albania,
13 would you believe, but ...

14 Q. Albania not quite in the same league as the USSR?

15 A. Not exactly, no.

16 Q. And the Trotskyists, no foreign support at all at nation
17 state level?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Can I move now to your liaison with the
20 Security Service? You've made it quite plain that the
21 normal state of affairs was contact was at a higher
22 level, but it is right, isn't it, that there was some
23 contact between you and the Security Service? We've got
24 some notes of meetings.

25 A. There -- yes, there -- there was some contact, but so

1 far as S Squad was concerned -- so I'm thinking now both
2 as chief superintendent and as chief inspector of SDS --
3 my contact with the Security Service was minimal,
4 I think.

5 Q. Let's just have a look at one example. Could we have
6 up, please, {UCPI/27451/1}, which is tab 8.

7 Now, this is the Security Service's record of
8 a meeting which occurred on 8 January 1976, where you
9 and Detective Chief Inspector Derek Kneale had gone to
10 see the Security Service. The first part of the note
11 seems to deal with a tricky issue of what to do when the
12 Security Service were asking for identifying enquiries
13 to be made of one of your undercover officers.

14 A. Mm-hm.

15 Q. So that was an operational issue directly concerning
16 the SDS.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Was that the sort of thing where you would have direct
19 contact with them?

20 A. Yes, but that -- that's about the only time I can
21 remember that happening.

22 Q. And if we go towards the bottom of the page,
23 paragraphs 5 and 6, there's a slightly different issue
24 which it's convenient to deal with now. Paragraph 5
25 reads:

1 "The question, from Det Insp [redacted] of Sussex
2 was 'Why don't you try to persuade [Chief Constables] to
3 adopt the MPSB system of using young [Special Branch]
4 officers as agents?'"

5 And the Security Service officer is saying:

6 "I had parried the question in open session, but had
7 subsequently taken it up with Det Ch Supt Stanton of
8 Merseyside to see whether this concept was widely known
9 in provincial SBs. He had said that it was, and that in
10 fact the SB course run by MPSB had a whole lecture on
11 the SDS and its successes including the penetration
12 of ..."

13 Then we've had to redact that:

14 "I did not give Neale details but told him I had
15 sidestepped the question and was now merely asking
16 whether MPSB did discuss this concept of agent running
17 with provincial branches. He said it had once been
18 discussed on one course only by ..."

19 I think it says "Detective Constable", but that
20 can't be right:

21 "... Dixon, and that it had been a mistake.
22 The subject was not now mentioned and when raised as
23 a query was sidestepped precisely as we had sidestepped
24 it. He thanked me for letting him know, and hoped we
25 would continue to keep the whole subject as close

1 a secret as possible."

2 It seems from those two paragraphs, Mr Craft, that
3 the cat had got out of the bag as to SDS's existence to
4 regional Special Branches.

5 A. Yes, I -- that is new to me, and clearly I should have
6 known about this. I am surprised and -- because
7 I thought we kept it pretty close.

8 Q. Are you able to help us from your recollection as to the
9 extent to which the cat had got out of the bag?

10 A. No, I'm -- I'm afraid I'm not. I -- I -- I'm surprised.
11 This -- this is the first I knew of it.

12 Q. Did you ever have telephone contact with the
13 Security Service? Would they call you if there was
14 something urgent and would you call them likewise?

15 A. Not on -- not on S Squad, no.

16 Q. In the SDS? Are you including the SDS?

17 A. I'm including, yes. Sorry, yes.

18 Q. The meeting in question that we have just looked at
19 didn't have a reference to drinks afterwards, but some
20 of the minutes we've got do refer to drinks afterwards.
21 Would you sometimes socialise with the Security Service
22 personnel after a meeting?

23 A. I was shown a Security Service minute or a memo relating
24 to a meeting -- a drink in a pub after a meeting.
25 That's the only one I can recall, and I don't remember

1 meeting them in a pub, I'm afraid. I have a problem
2 here because, later on, and also in another life, I was
3 involved rather more often with the Security Service and
4 we did socialise sometimes, but I don't think so on
5 S Squad.

6 Q. When there had been contact between the Security Service
7 and the Special Branch at senior levels and it was fed
8 down to you, were you aware that it had come from the
9 Security Service or was that withheld from you?

10 A. No, I would have been aware.

11 Q. And how common was it for communications from the
12 Security Service to be fed down to you through the chain
13 of command?

14 A. Not very often.

15 Q. And did they tend to be requests for intelligence?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Can I move now, please, to the definition of
18 "subversion".

19 I'm going to start by asking that we have up,
20 please, {UCPI/4459/1}. This is a circular to all chief
21 constables dated 15 June 1970 and it encloses terms of
22 reference for Special Branch. So if we scroll down to
23 the next page, please {UCPI/4459/2}.

24 Do you recall whether or not you were ever shown the
25 1970 terms of reference for Special Branch?

1 A. I was not.

2 Q. If we go, please, to paragraph 3(d), which is a list of
3 tasks, it says:

4 "In consultation with the Security Service to
5 collect, process and record information about subversive
6 or potentially subversive organisations and
7 individuals."

8 Was it your understanding that it was MPSB's task to
9 do that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And what information were you given to help you judge
12 what was a subversive or potentially subversive
13 organisation and individual?

14 A. Well, from the outset in Special Branch we learned what
15 was considered subversive by the Security Service
16 because we were response -- responding to
17 Security Service requests, and so the -- the definition
18 of a subversive organisation was something upon which we
19 relied from the Security Service.

20 Q. If we go in this document to page 4 {UCPI/4459/4},
21 paragraph 3, this is part of the appendix on function.
22 It says:

23 "It is important that Special Branches should have
24 a clear idea of what constitutes 'persons and
25 organisations which may be judged to be subversive of

1 the security of the State'. Broadly speaking these are
2 any organisation or individual whose purpose is the
3 undermining or overthrow of the established democratic
4 order."

5 First of all, was that ever explained to you?

6 A. I'm sure it was, very early on.

7 Q. And, secondly, in the period 1970 to 1974, was this your
8 understanding of what a subversive organisation was?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did that understanding change?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Can we take that down, please.

13 Can we have now {UCPI/4545/1}. This is a -- again,
14 a circular to all chief constables in England and Wales.
15 It's from the Security Service and it's dated May 1974.
16 It is about subversive activities in industrial
17 disputes.

18 Could we have a look, please, towards the bottom of
19 page 2 {UCPI/4545/2}. Paragraph 7:

20 "In this connection, it may be helpful to remind you
21 of the distinction we draw between subversion and
22 militancy in industrial disputes in the following
23 definitions: -

24 "'Subversion is defined as activities threatening
25 the safety or well-being of the State and intended to

1 undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by
2 political, industrial or violent means.'" "

3 Stopping there, do you recall seeing this document?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Do you recall ever having this definition of
6 "subversion" drawn to your attention?

7 A. I can't remember it being drawn to my attention, but
8 I certainly knew -- understood that.

9 Q. Well, there is a difference between the definition
10 I first showed you and this one. In particular, first
11 of all, it talks about threatening the safety or
12 well-being of the state in addition to the intention.
13 Did anybody emphasise to you that before a group could
14 be considered subversive, it had not only to want to
15 overthrow parliamentary democracy, but had also to
16 actually threaten the safety and well-being of the
17 state?

18 A. No, that distinction was never considered.

19 Q. And would it be fair to say it wasn't ever applied in
20 practice?

21 A. I can't think so.

22 Q. It then goes on to say:

23 "'Industrial militancy is defined as readiness to
24 use or threaten the use of strikes, sit-ins and other
25 forms of aggressive action in the furtherance of

1 industrial disputes and an unwillingness to seek or
2 accept compromise solutions through negotiations,
3 conciliation or arbitration.'" "

4 If we can go over the page, please {UCPI/4545/3}:

5 "'Militancy in pursuit of trade union disputes with
6 employers is not subversive unless the motivation and
7 purpose of the militants is primarily political and
8 threatens the parliamentary democratic system.
9 Opposition to industrial policies of the Government of
10 the day is not in itself subversive."

11 Was that distinction made clear to you?

12 A. I certainly understood it.

13 Q. If we could take that down, please, and if we could have
14 up, please {UCPI/13858/1}.

15 Now, this is a report dated 17 March 1980, and if we
16 could scroll down, please, to see who has signed it.
17 Page 4, please {UCPI/13858/4}. It's not signed by you
18 but by Mr Moss.

19 If we go to the top of the document again
20 {UCPI/13858/1}, it's about the TUC's "Rally Against
21 the Cuts" campaign in Central London. So accepting this
22 is not something you're personally involved in, which
23 side of the line would "Rally Against the Cuts"
24 organised by the TUC fall?

25 A. Perfectly -- perfectly legitimate. The interest from

1 the point of view of the SDS was that -- or anybody in
2 the branch was: what is going to happen in terms of
3 public order?

4 Q. Would it make a difference if there were people who
5 would be described as the ultra left trying to
6 infiltrate that campaign?

7 A. It would be very interesting, because maybe that's where
8 the problem would occur. If I may say here that,
9 generally speaking, TUC activity was not a major police
10 problem. 30,000 trade unionists marching through London
11 on May Day was never going to be a problem. I think
12 the only thing police had to worry about was keeping the
13 marchers clear of the traffic, whereas a small
14 organisation with 50 people determined to attack
15 Downing Street could involve about 200 policemen.

16 Q. If you could take that down now, please.

17 If we could have {UCPI/34701/1} up, please. Now,
18 this is a Home Office discussion paper dating from 1980.
19 It's part of a course of correspondence we've found
20 showing that the Home Office were expressing some
21 concerns about Special Branch and its relationship with
22 the Security Service.

23 First of all, were you aware of any concern within
24 the Home Office when you were the chief superintendent
25 of S Squad in the early 80s about Special Branch's

1 relationship with the Security Service?

2 A. No, I was not.

3 Q. My interest for today's purposes is very specific. If
4 we could go to {UCPI/34701/2}, paragraph 4, right at the
5 very bottom. Paragraph 4 proposes a further revision of
6 the definition of "subversion". It reads:

7 "Subversive activities are defined as those which
8 threaten the safety or well being of the state, and
9 which are intended to undermine or overthrow
10 Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or
11 violent means."

12 Stopping there, that's the last definition I showed
13 you. But then it adds {UCPI/34701/3}:

14 "This includes the activities of organisations or
15 individuals which, while operational at present within
16 the law, have as their long term aim the overthrow of
17 Parliamentary democracy."

18 Would that rider have clarified what in fact was
19 being done?

20 A. No, I think we were within that, so that wouldn't have
21 clarified anything, I don't think, for me.

22 Q. Because you were already doing it?

23 A. We -- we were operating that way anyway.

24 Q. Did it cause you any concern as a police officer that
25 you were being asked to report on people who were

1 conducting lawful activities?

2 A. No. It was the fact, again -- I'm coming back down to
3 public order -- if what was happening there was --
4 affected us in terms of public order, that wouldn't have
5 been -- that would certainly have been along our -- in
6 or area of responsibility. Equally, if we were doing it
7 on behalf of the Security Service, we had to rely upon
8 the fact that they were operating within the rules.

9 Q. So it comes back to reliance upon the Security Service?

10 A. It has to be.

11 Q. Did you ever address your mind to whether or not it was
12 appropriate as a police officer to be doing this?

13 A. No, I did not.

14 Q. Could we take that down, please, and can we have up
15 {UCPI/34698/1}. This is another circular, this time
16 from the Security Service to chief constables. It's
17 dated 16 December 1975 and it is entitled "Subversive
18 Activities in Schools".

19 If we could go to page 2, please {UCPI/34698/2},
20 paragraph 2 reads:

21 "We do not ask you to make enquiries in schools on
22 our behalf, but we would welcome any help you could give
23 us on the basis of information which comes your way from
24 the local papers or from members of the public, or by
25 recourse to other sources outside schools which you can

1 use without risk of embarrassment."

2 Do you recall getting any guidance about subversive
3 activities in schools?

4 A. No, I don't. The only time I think we would have been
5 involved at all would be if school kids were involved
6 with one of the organisations that we were monitoring
7 for public order purposes.

8 Q. The Inquiry's received evidence that both the far right
9 and the far left were moving into schools. Does that
10 accord with your recollection?

11 A. I don't remember the far right doing it. I certainly
12 remember a little bit of the far left, but not a great
13 deal. Far -- I don't remember the far right getting
14 involved, not in my time. May have been, but I don't
15 recall it.

16 Q. And we have seen SDS reports about children who were
17 active with groups like School Kids Against the Nazis.
18 On what basis were you as an organisation reporting this
19 sort of thing?

20 A. I can only -- from my -- I have no direct recollection
21 of this, but it would be, because something like
22 an organisation of that name would have been almost
23 certainly SW supported, organised, led, probably.

24 Q. Did you mean SWP?

25 A. I mean SWP. Sorry, Socialist Worker, SWP. Yes, various

1 names.

2 Q. The circular I've just read to you expresses a fear of
3 embarrassment. Did you consider there were any
4 sensitivities about reporting on children?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Are you able to help us with what embarrassment was
7 feared?

8 A. No, I don't recall it arising. We were dealing with
9 public order again.

10 Q. We can take that down now, please.

11 Standing back now on the question of subversion,
12 with hindsight, do you think you were given sufficient
13 training about the definition of "subversion"?

14 A. I don't know. What I would say -- all I can answer
15 there is that I come back to an earlier answer in the
16 sense that a lot of training was on the job and that as
17 a young Special Branch officer on C Squad, I absorbed
18 all that kind of material, and so I was quite
19 comfortable with what was considered subversive and what
20 was not. Later on, of course, when we were looking at
21 the industrial scene, again, I was very clear in my own
22 mind about what was subversive and what was not.

23 Q. And that turned upon whether or not the group had
24 subversive aims?

25 A. Of course, or whether there were groups infiltrating

- 1 an industrial dispute, for example.
- 2 Q. Do you think that the undercover officers were given
3 sufficient training on what was and what was not
4 subversive?
- 5 A. I don't -- I can't answer that, I don't know. I -- they
6 had no specific training on that.
- 7 Q. I'm going to move now to a different topic, and that's
8 the process of reporting. I think you've already
9 covered this to some extent, but was the system such
10 that if something was very urgent, you would telephone
11 A8 or send them a telegram?
- 12 A. It was unusual that SDS would telephone A8. Usually
13 everything passed through C Squad to go to A8. There
14 would be the occasion -- we used to cover the office at
15 weekends when there were demonstrations on and if an SDS
16 officer called in and said, "Look, this or that is going
17 to happen", then, yes, the officer would -- in our
18 office would phone through to a Special Branch liaison
19 in the uniform Ops room to let them know what was
20 happening.
- 21 Q. But for most routine intelligence, it went via
22 C Squad --
- 23 A. Oh, yes.
- 24 Q. -- and they decided who --
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- to disseminate it to.

2 Did you ever have any experience of compiling threat

3 assessments yourself?

4 A. No, not on S Squad.

5 Q. Did you ever have that experience on C Squad?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you know what proportion of SDS intelligence was sent

8 to the Security Service?

9 A. A large proportion. I don't know exactly how it goes,

10 but a large proportion.

11 Q. Do you know what proportion of the intelligence that was

12 used to write A8 threat assessments was derived from SDS

13 reporting and what was derived from other sources?

14 A. I would have thought a great deal of it came from SDS.

15 Q. Now, you say you would have thought, but having not done

16 the job yourself, are you in a position of authority to

17 tell us what the proportion was?

18 A. No, I'm not.

19 Q. And, again, if it's beyond your knowledge, please say

20 so, but would it be right that A8 and C Squad would have

21 been able to consider public order threats using sources

22 such as flyers, the past activity of a group, the nature

23 of an issue, the timing of a proposed demonstration in

24 relation to an incendiary event, or just by talking to

25 the organisers and things like that?

1 A. Oh, I think a lot of it came -- a lot of it came from
2 discussions between C Squad and A8. Yes, clearly, and
3 this would be a C Squad area, knowing -- being fully
4 aware of what was happening in society, what was likely
5 to occur, and of course, in many cases, there would be
6 discussion between A8 and the organisations of
7 activities -- organisers of activities.

8 Q. Are you able to help us with what it was that SDS
9 intelligence brought to the whole picture that would
10 otherwise have been missing?

11 A. Oh, without doubt. The intentions of revolutionary
12 groups so far as a particular public order activity was
13 concerned, and so it might well be that a perfectly
14 straightforward -- and what usually happened --
15 a perfectly straightforward demonstration was not going
16 to create a problem, but the SDS would be able to feed
17 in whether there was going to be any problem from
18 revolutionaries who are infiltrating and determined to
19 become involved and to use it.

20 Q. And to ask perhaps an obvious question, we're talking
21 about groups which did not cooperate with the police.

22 A. Absolutely. A big factor, if I may -- perhaps it helps
23 the Inquiry here -- that it was almost as important to
24 be able to assure the uniformed branch there was not
25 going to be any trouble and so, therefore, the numbers

1 concerned -- numbers of police concerned could be kept
2 to the minimum, as to say, "Yes, there is going to be
3 a problem", or "there is likely to be a problem, and
4 this is where it could happen and these are the people
5 who may do it". So there were two factors there.

6 I think it's very important to remember that we do
7 not in this country have a French CRS, or we don't have
8 a National Guard in America. We don't have a barracks
9 full of policemen we can pull out to deal with public
10 order. But every time we have -- we do public disorder,
11 and that is a police responsibility, these police come
12 from normal policing duties, and of course that affects
13 the protection of the public around London. So that was
14 one of the factors we always had in mind.

15 Q. Was the immediacy with which an SDS undercover officer
16 could report a significant factor?

17 A. Oh, yes.

18 Q. Could you explain?

19 A. Sorry?

20 Q. Could you explain or, using an officer who's not
21 anonymous, give us an example?

22 A. No, I can't give you an example, but there were
23 occasions when somebody who was a part of a group and
24 was going to be involved in a demonstration might
25 somehow better slip away to a telephone box and make

1 a call. Bearing in mind we had no mobile phones in
2 those days. And that's why we manned the office at
3 a week when there was a demonstration going on.

4 Q. Can I move now to reports on individuals. Reports on
5 individuals would have been kept within Special Branch
6 files, wouldn't they?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And, on many occasions, sent to the Security Service as
9 well?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Why did Special Branch want reports on individuals?

12 A. Special Branch wanted reports on individuals largely
13 because the Security Service were interested in them,
14 and what would happen is the Security Service would be
15 in touch continually with C Squad, the branch C Squad,
16 asking for updates on people. And the branch kept files
17 to avoid duplication of effort, really, so that we knew
18 who they were talking about, what the situation was and
19 we could answer the questions, if necessary making
20 further enquiries.

21 Q. Would reports on individuals have been used by
22 Special Branch for its own purposes, for example in
23 compiling threat assessments for A8?

24 A. I -- only in the sense that the individuals concerned
25 were people who were known to behave in certain ways on

- 1 demonstrations. That's the only reason I can think of.
- 2 Q. Would they have been used for vetting?
- 3 A. Not -- not by Special Branch, because the only vetting
- 4 Special Branch was involved with was the Irish
- 5 Republican field, because Special Branch met, harried --
- 6 carried primary responsibility for Irish Republican
- 7 activity in Great Britain and, therefore, any vetting
- 8 enquiries were passed through Special Branch. But in
- 9 terms of subversion, that was Security Service.
- 10 Q. Would they have been used by the industrial desk if they
- 11 involved trade union members or trade union matters?
- 12 A. I don't know. I can't really answer that question.
- 13 Q. We've heard evidence from officers that amount to
- 14 an unfiltered approach to gathering intelligence and
- 15 incorporating it into reports. Is that a fair way to
- 16 describe how intelligence was gathered by SDS undercover
- 17 officers?
- 18 A. Yes. They would report on what they were learning in
- 19 the organisations where they were employed, and they
- 20 fed -- we couldn't stress or even tie down what they
- 21 reported. They reported into the office. The reports
- 22 were, if you like, drafted in the office, typed up and
- 23 then passed on to C Squad for action.
- 24 Q. And it was left for others to assess and analyse?
- 25 A. Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

1 Q. We also know that the unfiltered content tended to be
2 recorded in reports, and we've found it on
3 Special Branch files and Security Service files half
4 a century or so later. So is it fair to say that there
5 wasn't a great deal of filtering going on even within
6 C Squad?

7 A. I think you're probably right, yes.

8 Q. We've put in your bundle a number of reports about
9 deeply personal matters relating to individuals. If you
10 want to be reminded, I can turn them up, but we may be
11 able to do this without doing so.

12 There's one about the pregnancy of a woman, another
13 about a heart attack suffered by one of the Inquiry's
14 core participants. There's a report about a bank
15 account. There's a report about union affiliation,
16 a report about a schoolgirl, a report about somebody's
17 infidelity and a report about a woman's children and
18 another report about the sexuality of an anarchist's
19 partner.

20 Was there any policing value in recording intimate
21 personal details like this?

22 A. I don't think there was any policing value in that.

23 Q. And does it follow from your answer that you think this
24 information was recorded for the Security Service, or do
25 you think it was the product of a lax attitude to what

1 was recorded, or both?

2 A. I think it was recorded for the Security Service, and
3 I think it's something which clearly, 50 years on, we'd
4 have looked at very carefully.

5 MR BARR: Thank you.

6 Would now be a convenient moment to break, sir?

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it would.

8 Before we do, I wonder whether one of the documents
9 that you put up could be put up again. I think it was
10 {UCPI/34701/1}, the Home Office discussion paper in
11 which lawfulness was mentioned.

12 MR BARR: That's right.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Can you remind me of --

14 MR BARR: Bottom of the next page {UCPI/34701/2}.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Bottom of the next page.

16 MR BARR: And that's where -- the bottom of paragraph 4 is
17 where the definition starts.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Could I just ask you to read that again,
19 please, and could it be scrolled down so that you can.

20 MR BARR: "Subversive activities are defined as those which
21 threaten the safety or well being of the state, and
22 which are intended to undermine or overthrow
23 Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or
24 violent means. This includes the activities of
25 organisations or individuals which, while operating at

1 present within the law, have as their long term aim
2 the overthrow of Parliamentary democracy."

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

4 I particularly want to focus on the last sentence.
5 During your time as head of the SDS, or as chief
6 superintendent of S Squad, was there any infiltration of
7 organisations or individuals who were at present
8 operating within the law, but had as their long term aim
9 the overthrow of parliamentary democracy who did not
10 pose a then current risk to public order?

11 A. I don't think so, sir.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: No, thank you.

13 We will break now for a quarter of an hour.

14 (11.27 am)

15 (A short break)

16 (11.46 am)

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

18 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

19 Mr Craft, I'm going to move now in a little bit more
20 detail to public order and I want to consider two -- at
21 this stage two particular events. The first of all is
22 the dispute at the Grunwick Factory.

23 If we could go, please, to tab 28 in the bundle.
24 That's {MPS/728981/1}. This is the SDS annual report
25 for 1977 and if we could go within the document to

1 page 11 {MPS/728981/11}. Paragraph 19, at the bottom of
2 the page, deals with the Grunwick dispute. That -- the
3 paragraph, as it appears on the bottom of this page, is
4 essentially describing a peaceful piece of industrial
5 action, and I will give you a moment to absorb the
6 content.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. If we go over the page {MPS/728981/12} and the story
9 changes. I'll give you a moment to read the rest of
10 that paragraph. And for those who are listening, I had
11 better read it:

12 "Following a poorly attended demonstration in
13 April 1977 the dispute was taken up by the 'ultra left'
14 and throughout June, July and August Trotskyist inspired
15 violence escalated in the streets surrounding the
16 Grunwick factory and especially at the two entrances to
17 Grunwick's where mobs inspired by the 'ultra left'
18 attempted to prevent the employees' coaches from
19 entering the factory."

20 And then, if we go down to paragraph 21:

21 "Throughout this dispute invaluable information was
22 supplied by the SDS of last minute tactics and of the
23 numbers attending and degree of violence anticipated
24 which enabled the Uniform Branch to effectively police
25 one of the most violent and long standing dispute for

1 many years."

2 Then unfortunately, we've had to redact the specific
3 example which is given, and it says:

4 "This information was immediately passed to
5 Commander A8 and the presence of a small number of
6 uniform police at this location prevented
7 an embarrassing and effective tactic."

8 Now, what I would like to know, please, without any
9 details because of the restriction orders, is were the
10 SDS providing intelligence that nobody else could have
11 obtained, or were they obtaining intelligence which
12 could have been obtained from other sources but just
13 doing so more efficiently?

14 A. No, I think they were obtaining intelligence which was
15 not available elsewhere.

16 Q. If we could take that down, please, and move to the
17 "Battle of Lewisham", which you describe in your
18 statement as "a new era".

19 Can we start a document at tab 20, which is
20 {UCPI/11180/1}. Now, this is a report after the
21 demonstration about the Communist Party of England
22 (M-L). And could we look in particular at paragraph 3,
23 which starts:

24 "Details of the Party's strategy for Lewisham had,
25 rather typically, been given to rank and file supporters

1 and contacts at 'the very last minute' on the Saturday
2 morning."

3 And further on down, it describes that they were
4 splitting into two groups, one to do -- one which was
5 going to be:

6 "... stationed at the source (New Cross) to do
7 propaganda work and join any attack emanating from
8 there, and the other to wait in a suitable road (in this
9 case Tanner's Hill ...) to ambush the National Front
10 march from the side."

11 The report goes on to describe the breakdown in
12 communications which the CPE(M-L) experienced on the day
13 and some of the tactics that they were thinking of using
14 in future. It also refers to a tactic they used on the
15 day, which was listening to police radio.

16 Now, what I'd like to explore with you is, in
17 a demonstration situation like this, how valuable was it
18 for the SDS to be able to report on last minute plans
19 such as those which are referred to in this report?

20 A. Oh, I think it was very important.

21 Q. And in terms of tactics such as listening to police
22 radio, presumably that was something that everybody knew
23 activists could do if they wanted to.

24 A. Of course.

25 Q. Can we take that document down, please, and go to

1 tab 28. This is the 1977 annual report again, and this
2 time I'd like to go to page 14. Sorry, that's
3 {MPS/728981/14}. I'm going to show you this document,
4 then I'm going to show you another and I'm going to ask
5 you to compare the two.

6 I'm picking it up about half a dozen lines down,
7 which says:

8 "Amongst the information regarding numbers and
9 tactics obtained from penetrated extremist groups on
10 this occasion was the fact that an empty house at
11 the junction of New Cross Road and Laurie Grove opposite
12 Clifton Rise would be occupied on the night of 12 August
13 by members of the Socialist Workers Party, armed with
14 missiles, intent to attacking the National Front march
15 as it passed that location; as a result this house was
16 searched and cleared by Uniform Police on the morning of
17 13.8.1977 thereby preventing a planned and premeditated
18 act of violence."

19 Clearly very valuable public order intelligence and,
20 would you agree, apparently used well by the uniformed
21 police?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, if we take that down and look at the document at
24 tab 21, which is {MPS/732886/1}. This is a report by
25 Les Willingale containing feedback, as we understand it,

1 from officers who were at Lewisham. It contains some
2 background, and then if we go to page 2 {MPS/732886/2},
3 there were some comments on the policing of the event at
4 Lewisham, which read:

5 "Despite advance warning that trouble was likely in
6 Lewisham High Street, groups of left-wing supporters
7 and, more importantly, coloured youths were allowed to
8 gather.

9 "There was an apparent lack of leadership and there
10 seemed little police co-ordination; properly trained
11 groups of 25-30 officers under the command of a senior
12 officer would appear to be the answer.

13 "The whole area around Clifton Rise should have been
14 sealed off before the left had occupied it in strength.

15 "The National Front march was taken far too close to
16 the main contingent of left-wing supporters.

17 "The mounted police were ineffective and presented
18 an excellent target; left-wing tactics being to throw
19 missiles, break and reform after charges.

20 "There was an obvious lack of officers patrolling
21 potential trouble spots and left-wing supporters were
22 allowed to roam free.

23 "When riot shields were first used a number of
24 officers could have found themselves surrounded. If
25 certain left-wing groups had received more support from

1 their comrades they would have gone between and behind
2 the small groups of officers using the shields."

3 Now, some of those criticisms are criticisms about
4 tactical decisions made on the day and perhaps specific
5 to public order policing, but what I would like to know
6 from you is: was there a sense that the intelligence
7 provided by the SDS ahead of the Lewisham demonstration
8 and during the course of the day could have been used
9 more constructively than it actually was?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And was anything done about that?

12 A. Well, that report, I believe, was passed on, and
13 doubtless A8 didn't love us very much for doing it, but
14 I think it was important that -- that it should be,
15 because clearly the policing had not been as effective
16 as it might have been.

17 Q. I'm going to move now to the question of operational
18 security of the SDS. You've explained in your witness
19 statement a little about this, and we've got some
20 documents on the subject.

21 Would it be fair to say that the operational
22 security of the SDS was regarded as paramount?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And there is a document in particular that I'd like to
25 take you to. It's from the 1976 annual report. It's at

1 tab 1 of the bundle, sir. It's MPS 0728980, at page 5,
2 please. And if we could have paragraph 14, that reads:

3 "The political sensitivity of the SDS operation is
4 fully recognised by all officers concerned and, to
5 protect the ultimate defence line, great care is taken
6 to ensure that penetration of an organisation can be
7 fully justified on the basis of the Commissioner's
8 responsibility for the preservation of public order in
9 the Metropolis."

10 Could you explain, please, what is meant by the
11 phrase "the ultimate defence line"?

12 A. That if the operation was to become public, the
13 Commissioner had a strong defence; that we were --
14 the police were -- acting as police are sworn to act in
15 the preservation of the Queen's Peace.

16 Q. And what was the concern if the fact that the SDS was
17 doing what it was doing had come out? What reaction was
18 feared?

19 A. Oh, the -- the attack upon the police by the media.

20 Q. For doing what?

21 A. For acting undercover to achieve the result.

22 Q. Within political groups?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And was it feared that that would be an embarrassment
25 for the Commissioner? That's a word we've seen in

- 1 several of the documents.
- 2 A. It would be an embarrassment if the Commissioner didn't
3 have the defence, and the defence was quite clear,
4 I think.
- 5 Q. And to what extent did you keep that in mind when you
6 were head of the SDS?
- 7 A. Oh, I was always aware of the SDS responsibilities and
8 the fact that we were all still police constables.
- 9 Q. And how do you square that with taking instructions from
10 the Security Service about subversive groups that were
11 behaving lawfully?
- 12 A. On the basis that the Government had directed that was
13 the way we should operate in support of the
14 Security Service, and ultimately, of course, the
15 Security Service has responsibility for the security of
16 the state internally, and therefore naturally police
17 should support them.
- 18 Q. And in terms of being and always remaining a police
19 officer, how do you square that with doing things such
20 as entering people's homes to attend meetings under
21 a false pretence?
- 22 A. I certainly never saw that as illegal. Now, I'm no
23 lawyer, but I did not see that as illegal.
- 24 Q. I think you told me earlier it wasn't a question to
25 which you addressed your mind at all.

1 A. No, I didn't.

2 Q. Can I move now to the safe house meetings, which were
3 twice weekly, weren't they?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And you had safe houses in the West of London and the
6 South of London.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you've written in your witness statement:
9 "At the twice-weekly meetings, everyone would
10 discuss their deployments, who did what with where and
11 what was developing in certain areas."
12 And was all of that done communally?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How well did you get to know the officers under your
15 command?

16 A. I thought very well. If I could just expand on that,
17 the Special Branch as a whole, but SDS in particular,
18 operated on a team basis. We didn't use surnames; we
19 used Christian names. People could say whatever they
20 wanted to and felt that rank wasn't important in that
21 sense, and therefore we operated, we discussed police
22 matters, we discussed family matters. It all came up in
23 the -- they weren't formal meetings; they were
24 a gathering of people for -- to deal with specific
25 things like expenses and reports and so on, but largely

1 they were about, again, keeping the undercover officers
2 understanding they were still policemen, they were still
3 part of policing, part of a police team.

4 Q. I'm getting the impression that you spoke to them in
5 sufficient detail to know a fair bit about them as
6 people and a great deal about what they were doing
7 undercover.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you were doing that -- one reason being to look
10 after their welfare --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- so you were fully informed, and another reason, to
13 ensure that the unit was being run properly and doing
14 its job properly.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. One of the issues you had to look out for was the
17 stressful nature of the undercover policing, wasn't it?

18 A. Yes, it was.

19 Q. And we don't need to go into the details, but one of
20 your officers, HN351, was withdrawn because of the
21 stress of the job.

22 A. If I may consult. (Pause)

23 Yes.

24 Q. Another officer has described the attitude of management
25 as being such that the concern for wellbeing meant that

1 more latitude was shown to officers than would normally
2 be shown; is that right?

3 A. I don't know what somebody meant by "more latitude",
4 unless they were thinking of relationship between ranks
5 maybe.

6 Q. I'm paraphrasing. In terms of bending over backwards to
7 help.

8 A. Of course.

9 Q. Were these conversations quite relaxed? Did you get to
10 know people well enough?

11 A. Oh, yes.

12 Q. And there was some laughing and joking?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. And did that laughing and joking in front of you ever
15 become of a sexual nature?

16 A. Only in the sense that some of the jokes would be that
17 way inclined.

18 Q. Were there any jokes which might have inferred that
19 members of your unit were attracted to members of their
20 groups sexually?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Did any of the banter and joking suggest that any of
23 them might have been conducting a sexual relationship
24 with --

25 A. No, certainly not.

- 1 Q. -- a member of the public?
- 2 Can you recall one officer joking to another that
- 3 a woman would be "biting the pillow again tonight", or
- 4 anything to that effect?
- 5 A. No, I would not recall that.
- 6 Q. You have said in your witness statement that there was
- 7 no guidance given to officers about sexual
- 8 relationships. Was there any discussion in the safe
- 9 flats about how to put women off if they showed a sexual
- 10 interest in officers?
- 11 A. No, I recall nothing on that basis.
- 12 Q. Can you give me a "yes/no" answer to this question,
- 13 please. Did you give any thought to cover girlfriends?
- 14 A. No.
- 15 Q. Did you consider that there, despite the disciplinary
- 16 prohibition on sexual contact, be a risk that some of
- 17 your officers might be tempted to get involved?
- 18 A. No.
- 19 Q. They were pretending to be single men, weren't they?
- 20 A. Yes.
- 21 Q. And they were mixing with groups of young people.
- 22 A. Yes.
- 23 Q. And many of the groups they were infiltrating had
- 24 sexually permissive attitudes.
- 25 A. Yes.

1 Q. One of the fears your officers might naturally have
2 would be of being detected and punished on the spot by
3 their groups.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Mightn't it have been a temptation to think that "if
6 I form a relationship with a woman, that is the last
7 thing that a police officer ought to be doing and it
8 will make me more secure in my cover"?

9 A. I can't say I ever thought that.

10 Q. Might it have been that if an officer thought, "My job
11 is to get the best possible intelligence for the police,
12 one way of doing that might be to form an intimate
13 relationship with somebody well placed to give me that
14 intelligence" --

15 A. No.

16 Q. You say "no". Why not?

17 A. Because the thought never went through my mind.

18 Q. Looking back now, if you had addressed your mind to
19 those issues, would you accept that there was in fact
20 a risk that officers would break the rules and form
21 sexual relationships?

22 A. Yes, in hindsight, and clearly that was -- one learns as
23 one goes along and that is something that should have
24 been introduced right at the beginning.

25 Q. Do you think that you should have expressly made clear

1 and reminded officers that sexual relations were
2 strictly off limits?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Do you think it would have helped if there had been more
5 discussion of the subject so that officers who were
6 feeling temptation might have been put off before they
7 went too far?

8 A. That is a thought, certainly.

9 Q. Now, you've made very clear this morning that you are
10 totally against sexual activity between police officers
11 and members of the public. If you didn't give your men
12 any instructions, would they have known that?

13 A. I would think so because, as I explained earlier, that
14 was always the rule within the police service.

15 Q. Do you think you might have said or done anything that
16 gave them that impression, that you were
17 a disciplinarian on this issue?

18 A. Not that I know of.

19 Q. At least one witness has told us that they were very
20 clear that that was your attitude. Does that sound
21 credible?

22 A. It sounds credible.

23 Q. Now, in your witness statement, when explaining your
24 opposition to sexual activity between undercover police
25 officers and civilians, you describe the risk to the

1 officer, their identity, their family and the risk to
2 the operations.

3 First of all, what was the risk to their family that
4 you had in mind?

5 A. Well, I think what was going through my mind when I made
6 that statement was the possibility of disease, the
7 effect on the relationship with a -- with a wife, and
8 anything they might -- an individual officer might have
9 come out with in the course of sexual activity which
10 could have damaged the operation.

11 Q. Did you consider they may be under threat from the group
12 that had been infiltrated?

13 A. I don't -- I can't say I considered that at the time.

14 Q. Were the groups that were being infiltrated -- no names,
15 please -- of a kind that might have posed a threat to
16 the family or not?

17 A. Ah, the threat to the family I'm thinking of is more
18 the case of transmissible disease and the break up of
19 a marriage.

20 Q. Sexually transmitted diseases?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Now, the one thing that's missing from your witness
23 statement on this subject is consideration of the woman
24 who is deceived. Why wasn't that mentioned in your
25 witness statement?

1 A. I don't think the question was posed. I -- my
2 statements were made in response to questions and I just
3 gave the answers at the time. So if I didn't mention
4 it, that is why it's not there.

5 Q. And what is your view so far as the activist or member
6 of the public who is deceived into sexual relationships
7 by one of your undercover officers?

8 A. I'm not happy about it, but what is the alternative?
9 Because accepting that rape is not involved, does all
10 sexual activity in terms of modern moral attitudes
11 require a legally endorsed exchange of CVs before sexual
12 activity takes place? And so to the extent to which
13 the man concerned was operating under false colours, is
14 that something which one could prevent? I don't know.
15 That is the way my mind is working. It's wrong, but how
16 does one prevent it?

17 Q. In the light of that answer, might I ask you how would
18 you calibrate the level of contrition?

19 A. I would -- I am very sad that it happened.

20 Q. And what would you say to the women concerned?

21 A. Well, I would apologise if my officers behaved in
22 a certain way.

23 Q. Can we go back now -- I know you were asked a few
24 questions about this by the Chairman earlier this
25 morning, but I want to return to Richard Clark. Now, he

1 deployed into Goldsmiths College, didn't he?

2 A. I think that was the move he made as part of being --

3 I think it was SWP and I think that's how he moved in --

4 in there. That's what I -- as far as I can remember.

5 Q. He becomes active in the Troops Out Movement and is

6 active in setting up the South East London branch of the

7 Troops Out Movement --

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. -- and gets involved with a small number of activists

10 who are students at Goldsmiths College.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Does that refresh your memory?

13 A. Yes, thank you.

14 Q. Now, that that atmosphere, perhaps above all others, is

15 one of young people who may be becoming sexually active

16 early in their adult lives, isn't it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And Mr Clark goes in there, some years older than most

19 students --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- without any instruction as to how to behave.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. We are told by his colleagues that he was a womaniser.

24 Are you sure you didn't pick up on that from your

25 conversations with him in the safe house?

1 A. I'm quite sure.

2 Q. Wasn't there a particular risk putting an older man into
3 a college environment with young women?

4 A. I did not think of that at the time.

5 Q. With hindsight?

6 A. With hindsight, of course.

7 Q. Can I move now to HN300.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Can you recall a time when HN300 was withdrawn from
10 the SDS?

11 A. No.

12 Q. The evidence that we've received is that HN300 explained
13 to one of his colleagues, one of the fully anonymous
14 officers, that he was falling in love with an activist.
15 The officer's evidence is that he relayed that
16 information to the office, and particularly his
17 recollection was to Detective Inspector McIntosh, and
18 then HN300 was removed from the SDS.

19 As the head of the SDS at that time, you must have
20 known about something like that, mustn't you?

21 A. Well, that's where I'm confused, because of course that
22 is something I would have known about, but I didn't and
23 I don't, and I think something -- there is confusion
24 somewhere in evidence because, when I was the
25 chief inspector SDS, I remember my number two as being

1 Leslie Willingale. I thought part of the time also it
2 was Barry Moss, but I have no recollection of working
3 with Angus McIntosh on the SDS, and I've thought
4 about it, because I know that the suggestion is he was
5 there and a timeline had indicated, but without looking
6 at our records of service, I can't -- I just have no
7 recollection at all of being there with Angus McIntosh,
8 and certainly I have no recollection of the withdrawal
9 of that particular undercover officer from the field.
10 I have none whatsoever.

11 Q. I know this is an extremely difficult question, and if
12 it's unfair, just say so, but I'd be interested if you
13 can help us with whether you think this might have
14 happened on your watch and you simply cannot remember it
15 or whether you are saying this did not happen on your
16 watch.

17 A. I'm saying I know nothing whatsoever about it, which
18 throws up a question and I can't answer the question.

19 Q. Can I move on to Vince Harvey.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, you managed him, I think, only in the early part of
22 his deployment, which spanned 1976 to 1979. When he
23 started with the SDS, he was in a long term
24 relationship. That long term relationship came to
25 an end. Can you remember whether it came to an end

1 whilst you were still serving within the SDS?

2 A. No, I cannot.

3 Q. If you had known that his long term relationship had
4 come to an end, would that have been a concern to you?

5 A. It would have been a concern and I would have wanted to
6 discuss it with him, because I would be concerned about
7 whether in fact he was still happy to stay in the role
8 that he was involved in or whether perhaps he should
9 consider coming out of the field.

10 Q. And would you have relied on his judgment on that or
11 not?

12 A. I think so, to a large extent.

13 Q. We know that Vince Harvey slept with two women early in
14 his deployment, from his oral evidence. Did he tell you
15 anything about that?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Did you learn from any source anything about that?

18 A. No. I know nothing about any of these sexual
19 activities, only when the Inquiry opened and I -- I was
20 amazed to learn what I've learned since.

21 Q. Now, there may be a paradox in your evidence that
22 I'd like to ask you about. One is that, so far as the
23 disciplinary regulations relating to sexual misconduct
24 are concerned, you are sure that they continue to apply
25 to your undercover officers --

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. -- whereas the law of trespass in relation to entering
3 private homes is one to which you have told us you
4 didn't even address your mind.
- 5 A. That is correct.
- 6 Q. Why the distinction?
- 7 A. I didn't -- the law of trespass -- I think police
8 training on trespass dealt with the removal of people
9 from premises if they were trespassing, and it was
10 always about having -- as a police officer, dealing with
11 the owner or the occupant of premises asking for
12 somebody to be removed, but trespass itself was not
13 an offence. That's my recollection of police training.
- 14 Q. But it also applies to the circumstances in which
15 a police officer can enter somebody's home, doesn't it,
16 to obtain evidence and things like that?
- 17 A. Obtaining evidence, of course, one needs a warrant.
18 I didn't think of it -- didn't think of it at all in
19 terms of the SDS.
- 20 Q. Can I move now to the assumption of positions of
21 responsibility within groups, and you have told us in
22 your witness statement that it was a matter for
23 discussion.
- 24 A. Yes, we were not keen on people taking positions of
25 responsibility within a group because if that group had

1 decided upon illegal activity, I was -- always had in
2 the back of my mind, and we were constantly reminded of
3 this, that the instructions in what was known as
4 Assistant Commissioner of Crime's consolidated
5 instructions dealing with informants required that,
6 first of all, that no informant could initiate a crime,
7 and, secondly, that no informant could be permitted to
8 take a major part in a crime.

9 And we applied those rules to the SDS so that we had
10 to be in a position where one of our people was not
11 being seen initiating a crime. So being involved at
12 senior level in an organisation could place the police
13 in jeopardy.

14 Q. Some of the organisations which were being infiltrated
15 weren't committing --

16 A. Sorry?

17 Q. Some of the organisations that were being infiltrated
18 weren't committing serious crimes, were they?

19 A. Some were not, but on the other hand, one had to be
20 careful of that.

21 Q. So in a group which wasn't committing serious crime, was
22 there any inhibition on assuming positions of
23 responsibility?

24 A. Not in general terms, but certainly an individual who
25 was in that situation would discuss that with -- with

1 management and probably another solution would have to
2 be found. There was one occasion -- I won't go into
3 details -- [Restricted]

4 If a group isn't involved in serious crime, what
5 factors might tend against assuming a high position of
6 responsibility?

7 A. I think I would have had, in a way, a moral objection,
8 because if they're -- they are directing at all an
9 organisation, then I would feel why were we there. I'd
10 -- I find it quite difficult to follow that one.

11 Q. Well, for a group that is involved in political process,
12 it's anti-democratic, isn't it?

13 A. Yes, and I certainly don't think -- well, not always
14 anti -- not always anti-democratic. I mean, there are
15 plenty of protests which are fully democratic.

16 Q. But if you've got a police officer assuming high office
17 in a political organisation, that risks influencing the
18 freedom of expression and political action of that
19 group, doesn't it?

20 A. I -- I think it's -- there is a danger in that, and
21 that's why we were uncomfortable with it.

22 [Restricted]

23 MR BARR: Sir, there may be an issue that someone wants to
24 talk to me about. May we rise for a moment?

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Am I invited to do anything else?

1 MR BARR: Not yet, sir.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: No. Then we'll rise for a moment and pause,
3 please.

4 (12.30 pm)

5 (A short break)

6 (12.32 pm)

7 MR BARR: Sir, might I ask you to make an interim
8 restriction order prohibiting anyone from disseminating
9 outside this room in any way the evidence that's been
10 given, and Mr Warner is going to give me a page number
11 on the transcript, but for those who don't have access
12 to the transcript, I'm going to suggest the last
13 15 minutes.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly.

15 What I am now about to say is important, and would
16 everybody please listen carefully to what I have to say.
17 Nobody -- that includes everybody in this room -- must
18 transmit by a mobile device or by any other means what
19 they have heard in this room in the last 15 minutes. It
20 is very likely that a formal restriction order will be
21 made which will make clear the consequences of breaching
22 that restriction.

23 May I spell them out. Anybody who breaches
24 the order that I have just made, or the order which is
25 likely to be made and will be set out in writing, will

1 be committing an act which can be referred by
2 the Inquiry to the High Court for it to be treated as
3 a contempt of court with very serious adverse
4 consequences for anybody who commits such an act.

5 I hope that what I have said is clearly understood.
6 If it isn't, please ask a member of the Inquiry staff
7 and I will see that what I have said is repeated to you
8 in a way that can be clearly understood.

9 Am I invited now to rise?

10 MR BARR: Yes, sir.

11 (12.34 pm)

12 (A short break)

13 (12.58 pm)

14 THE CHAIRMAN: I have made and signed a restriction order
15 which is being printed and will be put up at the
16 entrance to the hearing room and distributed to the
17 tables in the public area to the following effect: there
18 shall be no disclosure or publication made of the
19 information stated during the hearing on 18 May 2022,
20 today, between the times 12.23 am and 12.33 am --

21 MR BARR: Pm, sir.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Pm, thank you. 12.23 pm and 12.33 pm.

23 The order does not prevent you from revealing to the
24 outside world that a restriction order has been made in
25 respect of that information.

1 delay.

2 MR BARR: Mr Craft, if you had known that Richard Clark had
3 risen to high office in the Troops Out Movement,
4 including becoming the convenor to the national
5 secretariat, would you have approved?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Moving to HN354, Vince Harvey, he became treasurer of
8 both the branch and the district of the SWP that he
9 infiltrated. He described that in his witness statement
10 as a "fantastic opportunity", and he was referring to
11 the intelligence that those positions gave him access
12 to. Do you agree?

13 A. Yes, clearly it gave him access to all the membership.

14 Q. Can I move now to the question of the prosecution of
15 the officer that we know as HN13.

16 A. If I may just refresh my memory. I think I know who
17 you're talking about. (Pause)

18 Yes, certainly.

19 Q. He, we know, was prosecuted twice. Our understanding is
20 that you were involved in dealing with part of the first
21 of those two prosecutions.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can I start by drawing your attention to a couple of
24 minutes.

25 They are in the document at tab 30, sir. That is

1 {MPS/526784/1} and if we could have, once we've got
2 that, page 12 up {MPS/526784/12}.

3 This is right at the back of this minute sheet, so
4 it's the beginning of the story in time.

5 19 September 1977. This is very much the tail end of
6 your service as head of the SDS. It reads:

7 "As you are aware, the Communist Party of England
8 ([Marxist-Leninist]) under the guise of the East London
9 Peoples' Front, held an anti-fascist march on Saturday
10 morning (17th September) from Ilford to Barking.

11 Outside Barking Police Station a confrontation between
12 one of the marchers and a suspected National Front
13 photographer precipitated a general melee resulting in
14 a number of arrests.

15 "DC HN13, SDS, who had been marching with
16 his 'comrades', was knocked to the ground, whilst trying
17 to shield two young children, and was somewhat battered
18 by police prior to his arrest for Insulting Behaviour
19 under the Public Order Act. He was released on bail
20 later in the day and is due to appear at Barking
21 Magistrates' Court at 10am on Wednesday, 21st September.

22 "3. The case is slightly complicated by the fact
23 that DC HN13 believes the constable who arrested him
24 served with him ... some years ago and, although
25 the latter did not recognise him at the time, there is

1 a possibility that he might do so just before or in
2 the course of the Court hearing. I think it would be
3 wise, subject to your agreement, if I were to see
4 the arresting officer in the presence of his Chief
5 Superintendent with a view to putting him partially in
6 the picture. I would propose doing this along the lines
7 that DC HN13 operation was a 'one off' job."

8 Now, if we can then go to page 11 {MPS/526784/11},
9 that's the next in time. We move from 19 to
10 21 September, and that reads:

11 "DC ... 13 together with his CPE (M-L) 'comrades',
12 appeared at Barking Magistrates' Court this morning and
13 was remanded on bail to appear at the same court on
14 3rd January, 1978, when the cases will be heard.

15 "I had a long conversation at the court with
16 the arresting officer, PC ..."

17 And we've redacted the officer's name:

18 "... and it is clear that his colleague, PC ..."

19 Again, we have redacted the name:

20 "... has said nothing to suggest that he might have
21 recognised HN13."

22 You have signed both of those documents.

23 Can I take it from the second, later document, only
24 two days later, that you did not in fact get the
25 opportunity to talk with the constable in the company of

1 his chief superintendent?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. And that the conversation you had at Barking Magistrates
4 was your first conversation with the arresting officer?

5 A. I believe so.

6 Q. And it seems that the concern at the time was whether
7 HN13 would be recognised by his uniformed colleague.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And that that was -- that fear was allayed as a result
10 of your conversation.

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Can you recall whether or not you put him partially in
13 the picture, as you phrased it, in eliciting that
14 information?

15 A. I can't recall exactly what was said on that occasion,
16 no, I'm sorry. Too long ago.

17 Q. Can you recall whether or not the arresting officers
18 would have known that HN13 was a police officer?

19 A. No, I can't recall that.

20 Q. Presumably it follows from that answer still less can
21 you help us with whether they knew he was an undercover
22 police officer?

23 A. Yes. I -- I don't remember anything to do with that.
24 I do remember, as it's in my statement, that of course
25 I was later involved.

1 Q. Did you speak to the solicitor in the case?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you speak to counsel in the case?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Did you speak to the magistrates clerk?

6 A. And the magistrate.

7 Q. You spoke to them?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And what did you tell them?

10 A. I briefed the magistrate that this was an undercover

11 officer working under his undercover name, that it was

12 a secret operation, that he would maintain that name.

13 My concern also was that because he was arrested with

14 this -- these other people, who liked to make public

15 displays, the chances were that he -- they might try and

16 kick up in the dock and behave badly, that he would be

17 obliged, to maintain his cover, to join in.

18 Q. Was that conversation on the same occasion that you

19 spoke to the constable?

20 A. I don't think so. I think this was when -- the morning

21 he appeared. I seem to remember it was on the morning

22 he appeared.

23 Q. Righto. Well, let's pull the next page up. So can we

24 have back up {MPS/526784/11}, tab 30, sir, and can we go

25 to page 10 {MPS/526784/10}.

1 This is the next in time, 6 January 1978.

2 Paragraph 5 of that says:

3 "Contact has been established with a court official
4 who is aware that one of the defendants (name not given)
5 is an informant whom we would be anxious to safeguard
6 from any prison sentence should this situation arise."

7 So is this appearance on -- their appearances --
8 this document relates to appearances on 3 and 5 January.
9 Is it this occasion you're referring to or another one?

10 A. I -- I remember going. I thought it was on the morning
11 of the hearing and I remember briefing the magistrate
12 and the clerk to the court. Really I can't -- apart
13 from what I've already said, I can't be absolutely sure
14 about on which occasion.

15 Q. Well, we can go to page 9 {MPS/526784/9}, and this is
16 the next in the sequence, 17 April. This deals with the
17 trial, and it says at paragraph 3:

18 "Throughout this trial contact was maintained with
19 a court official whose invaluable assistance and
20 co-operation was given without question and our
21 appreciation for this was expressed at the end of the
22 proceedings."

23 Now, the last two documents I've shown you, those
24 dating from 1978, are signed by Superintendent Pryde --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- and, as we understand it, postdate your time as head
2 of the SDS.

3 A. Yes, it's interesting. As I say, my memory is fixed on
4 going to the court and seeing the magistrate, and the
5 clerk of the court was with her. I can't really go
6 beyond that, to be absolutely accurate. I'm sorry, but
7 that's where my memory goes.

8 Q. If we stick with, first of all, the first two documents
9 I showed you, which date from your tenure as head of
10 the SDS, neither of them refer to speaking to the court.
11 They only refer to the concern about HN13 being
12 recognised. Presumably, if, on either of those
13 occasions, you had spoken to the court, you would have
14 recorded that.

15 A. Yes, I would have thought so.

16 Q. And on -- in the January occasion, you would no longer
17 have been in the SDS, so can you recall whether you
18 attended court after you'd left the SDS?

19 A. No, I can't remember.

20 Q. And the minute doesn't specifically say it was you, and
21 helpfully it doesn't say who it was, but it only goes so
22 far as to say that the court was told that one of the
23 defendants was an informant. It doesn't go so far as to
24 say the court was informed that a specific person was
25 an undercover police officer.

1 A. Yes, I understand the question, but I did actually brief
2 the magistrate on the fact that it was an undercover
3 police officer.

4 Q. How good is your recollection? Could you be, for
5 example, confusing this with HN12, who was prosecuted
6 for flyposting when you were a chief superintendent?

7 If you could hold the file to one side, please.

8 A. Sorry. (Pause)

9 I don't seem to have HN12, unless it's further
10 along. It doesn't seem to be in sequence.

11 Q. HN12 is a Tranche 2 officer. I don't know whether your
12 key goes that far.

13 A. But the fact remains that I was not -- the only occasion
14 on which I went to brief a magistrate was this
15 one occasion at Barking. I don't remember anything
16 else.

17 Q. And are you sure it was Barking?

18 A. Absolutely, yes.

19 Q. Can I move now to the topic of the welfare of the
20 officer and his family, and in particular the officers'
21 wives and, in the case of Vince Harvey, partner.

22 Did you, when you recruited new officers, visit
23 their wives?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Can you recall whether that was invariably the case?

1 A. No, I don't recall that being done when new people were
2 being recruited. My involvement with wives came with
3 one -- one separate case was the annual dinner we had
4 with husbands and wives in a hotel in West London where
5 all the wives came and our own wives came and it was
6 a social occasion. That was the only occasion, apart
7 from once, when I -- I had any involvement with the
8 wives.

9 Q. We've had some evidence that officers were visited by
10 managers from the SDS at the recruitment stage to
11 explain the role, the long hours and the weekend duties.
12 Is that something that you did not do?

13 A. I didn't do that.

14 Q. You've emphasised in your witness statement the
15 importance of stability and home life. Was anything
16 done to monitor the stability of an officer's home life
17 once he had commenced his deployment?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Was anything done to monitor the wellbeing of the
20 officers' wives during deployments?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Were any other concrete steps taken to take care of the
23 wives?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Would you accept that this role asked a lot of the'

1 officer's wife or partner?

2 A. Yes, I would.

3 Q. With hindsight, do you think that the care and attention

4 that was paid to them could have been better?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. Would I be right in thinking that during your tenure,

7 the length of a deployment was typically, absent

8 exceptional circumstances, about four years?

9 A. Yes, although I think it was too long.

10 Q. Was there any concern that the longer the deployment,

11 the greater the risk to the wellbeing of the officer?

12 A. At the time, possibly not, although I can't be

13 absolutely sure what I was thinking at the time.

14 Probably it's more something I've thought of since.

15 Q. Was there any concern at the time that the longer the

16 deployment, the greater the risk to his family life?

17 A. No, I can't say there was.

18 Q. And was there any consideration that the longer the

19 deployment, the greater the risk of transgressions by

20 the officer?

21 A. No.

22 Q. What was the rationale for a deployment of approximately

23 four years?

24 A. That it took a while to get involved and they were

25 productive for a while, but the feeling was that if they

1 were there for too long, they would be detached from the
2 normal work of the Branch and therefore missing out on
3 their career.

4 Q. And at what -- was there any operational concern about
5 how long it took to infiltrate a group and so forth?

6 A. I don't think it was an operational concern. It did
7 take time.

8 Q. You mentioned a moment ago that you did have a concern
9 about the length of deployments. When did that concern
10 occur to you?

11 A. I can't say specifically the time. Obviously it's
12 something we must have discussed between us. It's more
13 in recent times I've thought back and realised that
14 possibly four years was too long.

15 Q. I'd like now to ask you a series of questions based upon
16 annual reports for the SDS during the time in which you
17 were serving in that unit, and I'd like to start with
18 the 1974 report, which is at tab 1 of the bundle, sir.
19 It's {MPS/730906/1}.

20 Now, you said in your witness statement that you
21 remember drafting a lot of this report. Presumably this
22 was the first one you had a hand in. It starts with
23 a covering letter. Did you have a significant role in
24 the drafting of the report itself?

25 A. Ah, this one is dated, the covering letter,

1 22 March '74.

2 Q. Ah, it's just the file. If we can go through until we
3 get the beginning of the report, please.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: That opening letter is, I think, misplaced.

5 MR BARR: It is. {MPS/730906/8}.

6 This is the 1974 report.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Is it right that you played quite an influential role in
9 this report?

10 A. If this is, yes, the one which would have been produced
11 towards the end of '74, then certainly I would have had
12 some input in the drafting, because Derek Kneale and
13 I would have done -- written most of it between us.

14 Q. It was written on 4 February -- well, it's signed on
15 4 February 1975 by Derek Kneale and it --

16 A. Yes. Well, then we would both have been involved in
17 drafting.

18 Q. If we can go to {MPS/730906/13} on the electronic file,
19 please, and to paragraph 20, that reads:

20 "The most traumatic event of the year was the
21 'anti-fascist' demonstration on 15 June 1974, which
22 culminated in the death of Kevin Gately. Having lacked
23 a sufficiently interesting, broad fronted target for
24 some time, the 'ultra-left' eventually decided to combat
25 the re-emerging spectre of fascism, as exemplified by

1 the National Front. The June demonstration provided the
2 opportunity, and urged on by the International Marxist
3 Group and the Communist Party of England
4 (Marxist-Leninist), a violent confrontation between
5 demonstrators and police occurred, with many of those
6 present, armed with large pieces of timber in the shape
7 of flag poles and banners, charging the police lines in
8 an effort to stop the National Front holding their
9 meeting in Conway Hall. Fortunately, the SDS gave
10 forewarning of both the size of the demonstration and
11 the possible disorder which might occur. Gately's death
12 introduced a note of harsh reality; so that subsequent
13 demonstrators, both in the Metropolitan Police District
14 and at Leicester, did not achieve the aims of the
15 militant minority."

16 Now, were you in the SDS when the demonstration took
17 place?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Did you write this part of the report?

20 A. I can't remember. I can't remember if it was --

21 Q. Without referring to any specific individuals, how do
22 you know that the SDS gave forewarning of both the size
23 of the demonstration and the possible disorder?

24 A. Oh, clearly it would have been people who were involved
25 in those organisations. I don't know which ones.

1 I can't, at this stage, say which -- which organisation
2 or which of our officers and in which organisation
3 produced -- I think probably several of them. I --
4 I don't really have the answer to that.

5 Q. Are you able to say whether or not SDS intelligence made
6 a difference to the police response?

7 A. I would think it did, yes.

8 Q. You're thinking it did, but presumably
9 a counter-demonstration on this scale will have been
10 advertised.

11 A. Certainly, but the detail of exactly how this might
12 happen was important in the sense that police could be
13 in the right place at the right time in sufficient
14 numbers, I think is what it amounts to.

15 Q. And is it right to say that it's difficult for you in
16 your role to know precisely what contribution SDS
17 intelligence made as opposed to, say, information openly
18 available?

19 A. No, I think the only person who could answer that one
20 probably would be somebody running C Squad at the time
21 who -- who wrote the threat assessment, but I don't
22 know.

23 Q. Now, we can take that down.

24 Moving on to clashes between the far left and the
25 far right generally, was it something that occurred

1 often in that era?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And was it your impression that it was the far left
4 initiating the trouble, the far right initiating
5 trouble, or a bit of both?

6 A. I would have to say a bit of both.

7 Q. And when the far left sought to disrupt the meetings of
8 the far right, were the far right acting lawfully in
9 conducting these meetings?

10 A. Yes, probably.

11 Q. And vice versa?

12 A. I'm sorry, vice versa in what sense?

13 Q. When the far right interrupt the far left's meetings and
14 try to prevent them from taking place.

15 A. Yes --

16 Q. The far left are acting --

17 A. -- but I have to say that I suspect that on each side
18 there was the opportunity to have a go at the other, so
19 I'm not sure at what point the legal one moved into the
20 illegal one.

21 Q. I see.

22 Can I move now to the Workers' Revolutionary Party,
23 and can we go back to the 1974 report, so that's
24 {MPS/730906/1}, and if we could have page 15, please
25 {MPS/730906/15}, paragraph 28.

1 You write, or you have a hand in a report which
2 includes the paragraph:

3 "The Workers' Revolutionary Party, heartened by its
4 recruiting campaigns during both recent general
5 elections, and by its growing financial support, will
6 clearly be in the van of industrial unrest, but recent
7 internal schisms within the Central Committee may well
8 curtail its ambitions. Being a highly disciplined
9 organisation, expecting immediate obedience from its
10 members, it has not so far caused any undue problems in
11 the field of public order."

12 It's fair to say, isn't it, that the WRP was not
13 a public order problem?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. And is it also right to say that although it had the aim
16 of overthrowing parliamentary democracy, it was going
17 about furthering those aims in lawful ways?

18 A. Largely, although I think they were always interested in
19 infiltrating trade unions and therefore using the power
20 of trade unions. So how far is that legal? I don't
21 know. There's a doubt in my mind always about the
22 extent to which a revolutionary group could influence
23 a legal group like the trade unions, operating perfectly
24 legitimately, using their power, infiltrating the
25 Labour Party, as they did. How far is that illegal?

1 I don't know. I think this is something which is beyond
2 me, really.

3 Q. So the focus from the report appears to be the WRP's
4 role in industry. Can you recall what it was that they
5 were doing in industry that was of concern to the SDS?

6 A. Not now. That report, or the detail that we were
7 producing on the WRP was really for the
8 Security Service, not for the police.

9 Q. Now, in your witness statement -- we can turn the
10 paragraph up if you want to see it again -- you've
11 stated that the WRP was of interest to both
12 Special Branch and the Security Service.

13 A. Yes. That was possibly me thinking with a C Squad hat
14 on, thinking they were going to be asked questions about
15 the WRP by the Security Service and so we were helping
16 the branch, but it was security stuff --
17 Security Service interest, really.

18 Q. Did you ever call into question the infiltration of the
19 WRP by your officers in circumstances where they were
20 not acting criminally and were not a threat to public
21 order?

22 A. No, I didn't, and really that thought's only come to me
23 in recent times, why were we there, and perhaps it was
24 an area where perhaps we were being too kind, or the
25 branch was being too kind to the Security Service.

1 Q. Now, I'm going to move to the 1975 report, and there's
2 a paragraph there -- we can turn it up if necessary, but
3 the gist is that on many occasions, organisers'
4 estimates of attendance at demonstrations were widely
5 inaccurate, or they weren't communicated at all to the
6 police.

7 Can you help us with how the SDS would know that
8 an organiser's estimate was widely inaccurate?

9 A. Well, largely because the SDS officers, the field
10 officers, were in the organisations who were going to be
11 involved with this and therefore had a very clear idea
12 of what -- who was likely to take part and where and
13 how.

14 Q. What I'm driving at is that very often your officers
15 were embedded in a branch and sometimes were a little
16 bit higher up, but very often they were infiltrating at
17 branch level and could provide intelligence about what
18 attendance from that branch would be, but the overall
19 estimate for a large demonstration presumably came from
20 elsewhere?

21 A. Yes, but I think largely the -- we're talking about the
22 SWP. There was communication between the branches.
23 People knew what was going to happen, I think.

24 Q. Did you get feedback from A8?

25 A. There were occasions, yes, when there was feed --

1 a feedback from A8. Largely it was with grateful
2 thanks, I think is the word that is best -- or the term
3 I could best use. There was one occasion -- apart from
4 on paper, there was one occasion certainly when the head
5 of uniform operations came out to see the -- the field
6 officers in one of the safe -- safe flats to say thanks
7 for what was being done to make his life much easier.

8 Q. I'm going to move now to the 1976 report. This is the
9 document at tab 11, sir. It's, if we can have it up,
10 {MPS/728980/1}.

11 This is a report that was signed by you, so
12 presumably you either wrote it or it was written and
13 approved --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- for you and approved by you.

16 I'm interested, on page 1 at paragraph 1, where
17 there is some coverage of, or explanation for,
18 infiltration of anti-racist groups. So I'm picking it
19 up from about two-thirds of the way down paragraph 1,
20 where it reads:

21 "However, the potential for violence amongst
22 revolutionary, ultra-left groupings remains as strong as
23 ever but it is beginning to reveal itself more in
24 comparatively small, local actions against, in
25 particular, the ultra-right National Front and

1 National Party, where those involved hope to catch the
2 police off their guard. To combat this, the SDS has
3 found it necessary to keep a close watch both on the
4 extremist organisations and on local, broad-front
5 anti-racialist groups through which the revolutionaries
6 operate."

7 Were there any other reasons why the SDS kept an eye
8 on anti-racialist groups?

9 A. No.

10 Q. The same report, if we can go to page 4 {MPS/728980/4},
11 paragraph 9, refers to the far right. It reads:

12 "For some months in 1975 an officer from the Squad
13 penetrated the National Front at the behest of his
14 'parent' Trotskyist organisation. The information
15 gained added nothing of real value to that obtainable
16 from already excellent Special Branch sources and since
17 the officer's withdrawal early in 1976 it has not been
18 considered necessary to replace him. If the
19 Metropolitan Police is to keep the peace between the
20 extremes of the political spectrum it is clearly
21 essential that accurate information be readily available
22 from both ends. Should existing sources on the far
23 right show any sign of weakening, the SDS will give
24 immediate consideration to renewed coverage there."

25 Would it be fair to say you were offering the

1 services of the SDS to infiltrate the far right if the
2 powers that be thought it necessary?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And would it be right that an SDS officer in a far right
5 group would have the advantage of -- over, perhaps,
6 alternative sources, of being very immediate and
7 somebody with whom you could have conversations twice
8 a week and therefore would be very interactive?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. There is a suggestion in this paragraph that there were
11 already sources within the far right. I don't want you
12 to go into any detail about what those sources were, but
13 other than that, were there any reasons that you were
14 aware of why the SDS was not tasked to infiltrate the
15 far right?

16 A. No, we were support -- a support service supporting
17 C Squad in this, and if they needed it -- this is why
18 I wrote it in that way. If they needed it, we would
19 organise it.

20 Q. Could we go up one paragraph to para 8, please. This
21 paragraph differentiates between different types of
22 anti-fascist and anti-racist groups. It says:

23 "In the area of anti-fascist/anti-racist committees
24 there is a distinct dividing line between those
25 controlled by members of the Labour Party, and even the

1 Communist Party of Great Britain, and those controlled
2 by elements of Trotskyists, Maoists and anarchists.
3 The former co-operate with police in their street
4 activities and steward demonstrations closely and are
5 therefore of no concern to the Special Demonstration
6 Squad. The second group, however, tend to be used by
7 revolutionaries as a cloak for the organisation of
8 violent confrontations with the ultra-right and the
9 police whom they bracket together as 'fascists and
10 enemies of the working class'."

11 Is this how anti-racist and anti-fascist groups were
12 perceived by the SDS?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And by Special Branch?

15 A. Yes, I believe so. I wrote that and I -- that's how
16 I perceived it.

17 Q. How do you tell the difference between or define when
18 an ultra left group has seized control of an anti-racist
19 group?

20 A. Just by the -- the rhetoric going on within the
21 meetings.

22 Q. Would the personalities who were attending the meetings
23 make any difference?

24 A. Of course.

25 Q. I'd just like to explore whether this distinction was

1 actually observed in practice. We've heard, for
2 example, that the Anti-Apartheid Movement was the
3 subject of reporting, almost entirely before your time,
4 although we've found a report during your time, but it
5 was not controlled by the ultra left, was it?

6 A. No, it was not.

7 Q. So why report on the Anti-Apartheid Movement?

8 A. Because at one time, as I understand it, they were
9 involved in disorder and even criminal damage.

10 Q. Was it really a big threat? Weren't its marches
11 actually very well stewarded?

12 A. Oh, the marches, certainly. I'm thinking more about the
13 activities against South African tours and so on.

14 Q. I was going to come to that. The Stop the Seventy Tour,
15 again --

16 A. Before my time.

17 Q. -- before your time, of course, but that was essentially
18 controlled by a Young Liberal.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And so not the ultra left.

21 A. No.

22 Q. But that was very thoroughly infiltrated --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- by the SDS. So why was that?

25 A. Well, simply because the -- we needed -- the police

1 needed to know what their next move was going to be.

2 Q. Was that for public order purposes?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. I think in your era the Stop All Racialist Tours,
5 although, in the result, I don't think it came to very
6 much.

7 A. I don't think it did. I can't recall too much about
8 that.

9 Q. What was the reason for seeking intelligence about
10 Stop All Racialist Tours?

11 A. I would think a hangover from the previous activity
12 against the South Africans and, therefore, a concern
13 that maybe that would be used by those who wanted to
14 cause disorder.

15 Q. Prior reputation?

16 A. Absolutely. Better put.

17 Q. Could we go to page 3, please, of this file
18 {MPS/728980/3} and to paragraph 3. I'm going to ask you
19 some questions now about specific groups. Paragraph 3
20 is about TOM:

21 "Under present conditions the risk to the lives of
22 the officers concerned would be too great to justify
23 an attempt at district coverage of the Official and
24 Provisional wings of the Irish Republican Movement.
25 Nevertheless, much information has been obtained through

1 involvement with the Troops Out Movement, the so-called
2 Trade Union Committee Against the Prevention of
3 Terrorism Act and Peace Through Freedom Committee which
4 was formed to co-ordinate opposition of the 'Peace
5 People' from Belfast. The Republican organisations,
6 nervous of police activity under the Prevention of
7 Terrorism Act, have shown little appetite for
8 demonstrating their beliefs."

9 The bit I'm interested in is where it says "much
10 useful information has been obtained". Now, TOM wasn't
11 seeking to overthrow the state, was it?

12 A. No.

13 Q. And TOM wasn't much of a public order threat, was it?

14 A. Could be. I'm not sure it was -- it was large at times,
15 it was an umbrella organisation and was infiltrated or
16 manipulated, I think is probably the right word, by
17 the far left. I think our concern always was that maybe
18 it would turn into a problem. And, of course, there
19 were erstwhile known people from the Irish Republican
20 Movement quietly involved there. That was useful to
21 have as well.

22 Q. So the useful information was on harder core Republicans
23 and just in case they become a public order problem.

24 A. Very much so, yes.

25 Q. Was that "just in case" approach a theme that runs

1 through SDS infiltration?

2 A. I think we tried to be ahead of the game, certainly.

3 Q. In terms of the anarchist groups, we've heard some
4 evidence that some anarchists could sometimes be
5 violent; is that fair?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Was there any other reason for infiltrating anarchist
8 groups?

9 A. No, just certainly, in a broader sense, violence --
10 extreme violence, as we'd seen in the past.

11 Q. Bombings?

12 A. Sorry?

13 Q. Bombings?

14 A. Yes. But also they were often people who would, in a --
15 as a small group in the middle of a demonstration,
16 decide that they were going to have a go at the police,
17 or maybe another -- another group, maybe the fascists,
18 I don't know. It was very much a case they were
19 inclined to get involved in disorder.

20 Q. We heard evidence on Monday from a witness called
21 Roy Creamer, who was a sergeant at the material time and
22 an expert in the branch about anarchists. He explained
23 to us that not all anarchists were problematic and he
24 painted a benign picture of the Friends of
25 Freedom Press, or a relatively benign picture of the

1 Friends of Freedom Press.

2 Did you make any attempts to separate and
3 distinguish between anarchist groups?

4 A. I would bow to Roy Creamer's expert knowledge, academic
5 knowledge, on the anarchist side. I think he was the
6 only one in Special Branch who could describe the
7 difference between one group of anarchists and
8 situationists in Germany. Quite beyond me, I'm afraid.

9 Q. Can I take that as a "no"?

10 A. You can, yes.

11 Q. Could we go in this same file to page 4, please, and
12 paragraph 7 {MPS/728980/4}. This is Big Flame.

13 Now, the background to this is this was a year in
14 which Richard Clark had been compromised and he was
15 trying to enter Big Flame, wasn't he, at the time when
16 he was compromised?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. It reads:

19 "The sinister Big Flame organisation, which
20 originated in the North West but soon spread to London,
21 was the subject of close scrutiny until September when,
22 for security reasons, it was decided to withdraw. The
23 organisation comprises a number of hitherto unaligned
24 revolutionaries from the shop floor of industry combined
25 with a clique of well educated individuals, several with

1 'Angry Brigade' associations. Whilst there has been no
2 known illegality in its London activities, it has been
3 responsible for violence in Liverpool and there is
4 little doubt that a large number of its members would be
5 inclined to follow that path given the right
6 circumstances. Whereas the ultra-left as a whole claims
7 to be security conscious, no organisation has shown
8 practical ingenuity in the field of investigation to
9 compare with that of Big Flame. There is little doubt
10 that this organisation has more to hide, and hence more
11 to fear, from the police than some of the others."

12 Now, would it be right to say that the practical
13 ingenuity that you were referring to was finding
14 Richard Clark's death certificate?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you describe the group as "sinister", but at the
17 same time, halfway down that paragraph, it says "there
18 is no known illegality". Was this concern about
19 Big Flame essentially built upon suspicion rather than
20 hard fact?

21 A. Yes, it was.

22 Q. We have heard that it was an organisation which had
23 quite an interest in women's rights; do you recall that?

24 A. No.

25 Q. And you obviously think that they've got something to

1 hide. Did you ever get to the bottom of what it was?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you ever find out whether they were hiding anything?

4 A. No. I'm hesitant talking about that paragraph --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- now.

7 Q. I won't take it any further.

8 I will ask that, on the same page, we go down to
9 paragraph 10. This is a paragraph about product. It
10 says:

11 "The quality and quantity of material submitted by
12 the SDS officers has been maintained at a consistently
13 high level throughout the year under review. Whilst
14 the value of up-to-the-minute information about
15 forthcoming public order matters is easily understood,
16 less obvious is the considerable saving in police time
17 produced by a constant flow of reports about people and
18 organisations involved in extreme political activity.
19 These reports form an essential part of the base of
20 information which enables Special Branch to provide
21 accurate assessments of the strength and threat of
22 demonstrations and to bring into the realms of reason
23 the claims about numbers of participants made by
24 organisers."

25 I will stop there.

1 I've drawn that to your attention, Mr Craft, because
2 reading it suggests that Special Branch found reporting
3 on individuals of value, and when we discussed this
4 issue this morning, you told us that reporting on
5 individuals was essentially for the benefit of the
6 Security Service.

7 A. That is correct, but of course the Branch was working
8 for the Security Service in the area of subversion, the
9 organisations and the people, and what was happening,
10 and had been happening throughout my service and well
11 before that, I believe, that the Security Service would
12 ask the Special Branch, "Please can you identify A,
13 B and C", because they considered them subversive, and
14 somebody would then have to go out on enquiries to
15 discover who these people were. Now, if we were feeding
16 information in in advance, then it saved an awful lot of
17 time.

18 Q. Perhaps if we could go back up the page so we've got
19 the first bit of that paragraph to hand. Thank you.

20 I mean, this does seem to be going beyond that.
21 It's talking about it being a useful base of information
22 enabling Special Branch to provide accurate assessments.
23 We've heard evidence that those who compile the threat
24 assessments took into account not what might be called
25 just immediate intelligence but also background

1 intelligence --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- about groups and individuals. Are you able to help
4 us with whether or not reporting on individuals was used
5 for that purpose?

6 A. No, I can't help with that.

7 Q. And, finally, if we go to page 12 of this file
8 {MPS/728980/12}. Now, this is an unsigned copy of
9 a letter from Assistant Commissioner (Crime) Wilson to
10 R Armstrong Deputy Under Secretary of State at the
11 Home Office, and at page 13 of the file, third paragraph
12 down {MPS/728980/13}, it says:

13 "I would therefore seek authority for the
14 continuation of these activities."

15 That's the continuation of the SDS:

16 "The degree of coverage considered necessary is
17 under constant review and all the Squad's systems and
18 areas of coverage have recently been examined in detail
19 by a working party comprising three Chief
20 Superintendents in Special Branch, in order to ensure
21 the minimising of risk and of unnecessary activity by
22 the Squad. I am pleased to say that the number of
23 officers who are purely operational in this field has
24 gradually been reduced from the original 26 (at 1968) to
25 a current strength of 12. This has to a degree been

1 achieved by more effective use of operational personnel
2 and, under present conditions, is the minimum by which
3 adequate intelligence can be obtained over the wide
4 extremist spectrum."

5 Now, we'll come in a moment to the working party
6 that's referred to, because we understand that you sat
7 on that. But my question at this stage is, as far as
8 you are aware, was that working party the only formal
9 review of what the SDS was doing during your tenure?

10 A. It is the only formal review I can remember.

11 Q. And so where the letter says "the degree of coverage
12 considered necessary is under constant review", is that
13 painting a picture of rather more review than was
14 actually going on?

15 A. I think it's painting a slightly strong picture in the
16 sense that we always -- we kept an eye on it in the
17 sense there was no point in covering something which
18 wasn't -- wasn't of value. Equally, was there something
19 we should be looking at which we weren't?

20 Q. Now, if you will just keep in mind the statistics about
21 the number of officers, I'm going to come back to those
22 later, but if you take note of those.

23 Before we go on to the working party, there are
24 two more documents I'd like to show you from the years
25 1976 and 1977. If we could take this one down, please,

1 and if we could have up next the document at tab 16,
2 which is {MPS/730729/1}.

3 This is a letter of thanks from the
4 Lancashire Police dated 20 September 1976 in relation to
5 the Action Against Racism demonstration in Blackburn,
6 which had taken place on 19 September 1976. It was
7 really thanks not to McIntosh and Walker, but to the
8 underlying undercover officer's coverage of events.

9 A. I would believe so.

10 Q. If we take that down and have up, please, a document
11 which is at tab 18 {MPS/730700/1}. Thank you.

12 This is a letter of thanks addressed to you from the
13 Security Service dated 23 June 1977. It says:

14 "I have been asked by our desk involved with the
15 Socialist Workers Party to convey their gratitude for
16 the flow of information you are sending to us on the
17 activities of the SWP. This is very much appreciated."

18 It's right to say the Security Service were very
19 interested in the SWP, weren't they?

20 A. Yes, just a little.

21 Q. How frequently did you get feedback about the SDS?

22 A. Rarely.

23 Q. And how much of it was positive and how much of it was
24 negative?

25 A. I don't recall anything negative.

1 Q. If we could take that down, please, and if we could have
2 up in its place {MPS/730745/1}, tab 9 of your bundle,
3 sir.

4 This is the -- what I'm going to call the Watts
5 working party, and this is a working party set up to
6 review essentially the utility of the SDS, wasn't it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you are in high ranking company, aren't you?

9 A. Yes, I was obviously the new boy.

10 Q. Chief Superintendent R Wilson, HN332, together with
11 Chief Inspector Kneale and yourself all being chaired by
12 Chief Superintendent Watts.

13 The record describes the conclusions of the working
14 party as unanimous; is that correct?

15 A. Yes, although I should say I don't actually remember any
16 discussions, but I'm sure we would not have disagreed.

17 Q. Well, I was asking you that because the police now and
18 certainly in those days was a very disciplined,
19 hierarchal organisation, wasn't it?

20 A. Yes. The Branch was never really like that.

21 Q. I see.

22 So did you feel you'd had your say?

23 A. Of course, of course.

24 Q. Now, looking at it bit by bit, paragraph 1 essentially
25 is communicating the fact there had been a decline in

1 violent disorder. It reads:

2 "Certainly, the degree of violence associated with
3 public demonstrations has declined since the formation
4 of the Squad in 1968."

5 And was it that decline that had essentially
6 prompted the review?

7 A. Probably.

8 Q. Do you know?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Paragraph 2 says:

11 "With respect to the degree of coverage considered
12 necessary by the SDS, two aspects are of primary
13 importance. Firstly the degree of involvement and
14 manipulation exercised by the 'ultra-left' in all
15 protest organisations, particularly in ad-hoc committees
16 formed to arrange major demonstrations. Secondly,
17 the number of splinter-groups continually being formed,
18 invariably consisting of militant elements. The latter
19 do not recognise the need to liaise with police
20 regarding proposed demonstrations and pickets, many of
21 which are organised at short notice, and coverage
22 within, or access to, these organisations is essential
23 if adequate police arrangements are to be made."

24 So that's plainly making the case, isn't it, for
25 continuing the SDS?

- 1 A. Yes.
- 2 Q. Can I ask you, why was it that the police couldn't
3 simply monitor open sources, talk to the protesters and
4 do without the SDS?
- 5 A. Largely because those involved didn't want to talk to
6 the police, were looking to cause confrontation at
7 times, and the only way we could get the intelligence
8 necessary to police them proportionately was to have
9 people close to the ground.
- 10 Q. Now, accepting that there were some advantages of having
11 an undercover officer, the immediacy we've talked about,
12 the flexibility of instructions and so forth, did it
13 really make all that much difference?
- 14 A. I think it made a -- a considerable difference to
15 policing of public order in the Metropolitan Police.
16 That is my view.
- 17 Q. And it's based on?
- 18 A. Based upon the fact that those who ran the policing
19 side, the uniformed policing side, took that view in my
20 time, and I knew more than one of them.
- 21 Q. You're hinting that you got personal feedback; is that
22 fair?
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Is it a case simply that resources were better allocated
25 because of the SDS, or are you saying that the

1 intelligence provided stopped more serious public
2 disorder occurring?

3 A. I think both. I think it did prevent serious disorder
4 very often -- no, not very often, quite -- from time to
5 time, but also it was of value in terms of police
6 resources.

7 Q. Moving down to the unnumbered paragraph directly under
8 2:

9 "Nevertheless, with the reduction in political
10 public disorders, the strength of the SDS has gradually
11 been reduced from the original 26 operational officers
12 to the current 12 officers engaged in the field. It is
13 agreed that this is the minimum coverage necessary to
14 prove effective and might have to be increased if the
15 situation deteriorated."

16 Where did the figure 26 operational officers come
17 from?

18 A. Oh, that came from the original group set up in 1968
19 when Conrad Dixon was instructed to pull together
20 a group of people, and they used to go mob-handed to
21 meetings, because they hadn't got a clue what was
22 happening, so they went along. They thought if one --
23 more chance if two or three went into one of these
24 meetings, one of them might get in. So yes, they had
25 people.

1 Q. Do you know who your source was? Where did you get
2 that -- where did that number come from?

3 A. I thought it came from the open -- I may be wrong
4 here -- the open source report of Conrad Dixon, and I --
5 which I've read. I found it on -- on the web. But
6 I wouldn't have known that at the time, but I --

7 Q. I'm asking you where the figure came from at that time.

8 A. Oh, I don't know. Whether it was on the -- the original
9 SDS file, I don't know.

10 Q. We haven't been able to find --

11 A. You haven't found it. Oh, well, I'm sorry.

12 Q. -- the time when there were 26 SDS officers.

13 A. I like that, yes. No, I don't know.

14 Q. Is it possible that this was inaccurate, being seven and
15 a half years after the event?

16 A. Always possible, yes, but they did have a lot of people.

17 Q. Moving to paragraph 3:

18 "Bearing in mind that the primary task of the SDS is
19 to provide intelligence in the public order field, it is
20 difficult to proportion their value in this field
21 compared with the 'off-spin' information provided for
22 the Security Service. For example, if an officer covers
23 a meeting called to discuss whether to demonstrate or
24 not, and the latter view prevails, then the only
25 positive result of his attendance is seen in the

1 subsequent report of individuals attending etc which is
2 of interest to Box 500. Nevertheless his reasons for
3 attending are of equal importance from a public order
4 point of view."

5 Do you mean the value of negative reporting there?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, first of all, the Security Service is -- the
8 benefit to them is described as "off-spin". To what
9 extent is this formally observing the ultimate defence
10 line that we looked at earlier and keeping to a mantra
11 that the primary task is public order, or to what extent
12 is it actually a correct reflection of what was
13 happening on the ground?

14 A. The primary object was public order, but clearly it was
15 a great benefit to the Security Service and to the
16 Branch in terms of it saving time in following up on
17 Security Service enquiries. So, although its purpose
18 was public order and there would have been -- if public
19 order had not been -- or public order intelligence had
20 not been essential, then I can't see the SDS should
21 have -- should continue.

22 Q. The next paragraph at the bottom, the very bottom of the
23 page, makes clear that the committee thought that a very
24 considerable benefit had been conferred on the
25 Security Service by the SDS and it had been fully

1 acknowledged. Does that fairly reflect the position?

2 A. I believe so.

3 Q. And then over the page {MPS/730745/2}, it says:

4 "At the conclusion of the working party's
5 deliberations, I spoke with DAC Gibson and
6 Commander Fleming of 'A' Dept ..."

7 Does "I" mean Rollo Watts? It's signed --

8 A. Yes, it's signed off by Rollo Watts, yes.

9 Q. Or, put another way, do you recall speaking to
10 DAC Gibson and Commander Fleming?

11 A. No, I did not. That was Rollo Watts.

12 Q. "I was assured that the information and assessments
13 prepared by Special Branch regarding impending
14 demonstrations is considered to be of extreme importance
15 to the Uniform Branch, not only to assist in providing
16 adequate police coverage but also to avoid over-reaction
17 which could in itself lead to a provocative situation.
18 In this respect, the Chief Superintendents of all
19 operational Squads in the Branch speak most highly of
20 the assistance rendered by the SDS."

21 First of all, is it right that all operational
22 squads benefited from the SDS, because we've heard talk
23 primarily of C Squad with a little bit of B Squad?

24 A. Prime -- I'm sorry. Primarily C Squad. I can
25 imagine -- no, I think -- I'm trying to think. Really

1 for B Squad, it was very little.

2 E Squad, which of course is dealing with
3 international, I'm thinking now of anything -- Grunwick
4 obviously a clear example where the vast majority of
5 those who were protesting about their wages and so on of
6 course were Asian and, therefore, that would have been
7 E Squad, I think, to some extent.

8 But no, C Squad, I think was the -- the one that
9 mattered.

10 Q. And the adjective "extreme", "extreme importance to
11 Uniform Branch", might there be a little hyperbole --

12 A. A little, I think.

13 Q. It's a feature of the documents we've been looking at
14 that very senior officers speak in superlatives about
15 the SDS when seeking funding from the Home Office. Did
16 you get the impression that there was considerable
17 enthusiasm at the senior levels of the
18 Metropolitan Police for the SDS to continue?

19 A. Yes, I did.

20 Q. And why was that?

21 A. I think mainly for public -- well, for public order.
22 I think police in the 1970s and 80s had to learn a lot
23 of lessons in terms of public order, and accurate,
24 timely intelligence was vital in terms of the --
25 proportionate policing and keeping the peace.

1 Q. And in terms of relationship with the Security Service
2 and the Home Office, was it regarded as a good thing?

3 A. I believe so.

4 Q. Can we move now to visits by the Commissioner. In your
5 witness statement, you refer to recalling a visit by
6 Sir David McNee.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was this whilst you were the DCI of the SDS or while you
9 were chief superintendent?

10 A. While I was the DCI.

11 Q. What can you remember about it?

12 A. I can remember he was keen to come and see the field
13 officers; that we had a very pleasant, sociable time.
14 I think we had lunch. He was a very practical
15 policeman, and it was a useful day, good for morale.

16 Q. Now, you will have seen in the bundle some documents
17 which were prepared for a subsequent Commissioner,
18 Kenneth Newman, in 1983, I think it is. Was a pack
19 similar to that prepared for Sir David McNee?

20 A. I don't think it was. I think it was less formal than
21 that. I think he said he was coming. I -- I went with
22 him and I briefed him on what it was all about and, no,
23 I don't think we were quite so formal.

24 Q. Is it fair to say then Sir David McNee would have known
25 which areas were being infiltrated and have met the

- 1 officers concerned?
- 2 A. He would have met them, yes.
- 3 Q. And can you recall how long he stayed?
- 4 A. No, I can't. I would have thought two or three hours,
5 but really I'm guessing.
- 6 Q. And did he have time for conversation with individual
7 undercover police officers?
- 8 A. I think he would have had time. I can't remember
9 whether he did have individual conversations. We didn't
10 hold a meeting. He was chatting to everybody.
- 11 Q. And what feedback did you receive from him?
- 12 A. Nothing formal. I think he said he enjoyed the visit,
13 but that was informal to me.
- 14 Q. Did he express any concerns to you about the SDS?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. Any anxieties; for example, the operational security?
- 17 A. No, none at all.
- 18 Q. Can I move now from the SDS to, first of all, 1979 and
19 the demonstration at Southall at which Blair Peach
20 received fatal injuries. One of our anonymous officers
21 has given evidence that he was instructed to attend
22 Blair Peach's funeral in 1979. He thought that it might
23 have been you who so instructed him. Was it?
- 24 A. I don't recall instructing anybody to go.
- 25 Q. Is it possible?

- 1 A. Oh, it's possible, but I don't recall it.
- 2 Q. What was the police interest in Blair Peach's funeral?
- 3 A. I don't know, is the answer. That's why I'm doubtful
4 about whether it was my instruction. I don't know.
- 5 Q. Was there general concern that Blair Peach's death, the
6 inquest and the justice campaign were bad news for the
7 Metropolitan Police?
- 8 A. Oh, certainly it was bad news for the
9 Metropolitan Police, because the inquest came up with
10 the fact that he was probably killed by a police
11 officer.
- 12 Q. And did the Metropolitan Police want to be ahead of the
13 game in knowing what the justice campaign was going to
14 do?
- 15 A. Not that I'm aware of.
- 16 Q. Are you aware of the SDS taking a special interest in
17 Blair Peach and the justice campaign, or not?
- 18 A. Only to the extent that it would have been wise to be
19 involved in case it was going to turn into -- go beyond
20 the campaign into some sort of disorder.
- 21 Q. Now, we're trying to trace the dates at which you were
22 chief superintendent of S Squad. We think that you may
23 have started as an acting chief superintendent from
24 about February 1981. Does that sound right?
- 25 A. I don't think I ever went there as acting

1 chief superintendent. I think I -- the post became
2 vacant while I was -- when I was promoted chief
3 superintendent, and that was -- that was why I went
4 there.

5 Q. Your substantive promotion, we believe, was May or
6 June 1981. Does that sound about right?

7 A. That's about right, yes.

8 Q. And we think that you stayed in that role until about
9 April or May 1984.

10 A. If it was as late as '84. Might have been end of '83.
11 I don't know. I'm not sure. I can't fix it.

12 Q. And S Squad was a wide remit, wasn't --

13 A. It was.

14 Q. -- all operational support to Special Branch?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And your role vis-à-vis the SDS was oversight, wasn't
17 it?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can you help us with how you oversaw the SDS?

20 A. Yes. Daily telephone contact with chief inspector or
21 inspector SDS, either by myself or the superintendent.
22 Visits occasionally out to see the field officers and at
23 that -- yes, at that time -- no, that time, their office
24 was down the road, but the -- quite often, the chief
25 inspector or the inspector would be over and would come

1 into my office to chat to sort out any problems there
2 might have been. So it was fairly close.

3 Q. What sort of things did you discuss?

4 A. What they were doing, how -- were there any welfare
5 problems, any problems the chief inspector was having,
6 just generally how -- how the unit was operating.

7 Q. And would that have included when a new officer came
8 along?

9 A. Probably. I -- I can't think of any specific occasion.

10 Q. And in consultation with the other chief
11 superintendents, would you put in your opinion as to
12 where it might be useful for an officer to be deployed?

13 A. Probably not, although it might have cropped up. More
14 likely that would be a conversation between the chief
15 inspector SDS and chief superintendent C Squad.

16 Q. We know that in around this era the SDS starts
17 infiltrating some new targets, one of which is CND. Are
18 you able to help us as to why the SDS might have become
19 interested in CND?

20 A. My recollection is that the only time we were really
21 interested in CND was the Greenham Common Women.
22 Clearly we couldn't get male officers into that and
23 we -- we had recruited a lady who would go and join the
24 Greenham Common Women. So we -- that's why we were, if
25 you like, CND involved.

1 Q. You certainly did that, but you also had an officer who
2 we know as HN65 who infiltrated CND itself. Can you
3 recall what the concern was about CND?

4 A. No, I can't. I can't at all, I'm sorry.

5 Q. Can you recall whether there was any pressure from any
6 quarter outside the police to take an interest in CND?

7 A. No, I can't.

8 Q. Was there anything coming from the Home Office or from
9 government?

10 A. Not that I know of.

11 Q. The other field was animal rights --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- activism, which grew. What was the concern there?

14 A. Oh, the concern there was firebombs, attacks on research
15 centres. In other words, quite akin to terrorism, full
16 stop. That's why we were interested in it. It started
17 off in a small way. I think in fact the whole thing
18 started with one policeman in Essex who was keeping
19 an index, and I think the Branch eventually took it on,
20 because it became national, and the whole -- once we
21 started to look at it, we realised that it was quite
22 a dangerous thing to -- developing.

23 Q. Now, we've got a document in the bundle which shows that
24 you, in the role of chief superintendent S Squad, were
25 invited with many others to a party by the

1 Security Service. You know the documents I mean, don't
2 you?

3 A. I know the document. I have absolutely no recollection
4 of that meeting.

5 Q. Why were you invited to that party? Was it because
6 the SDS fell within your remit?

7 A. I would imagine so.

8 Q. And were the Security Service keen to maintain that
9 relationship by schmoozing you?

10 A. I presume so.

11 Q. Can you recall anything of what happened?

12 A. No, I can't. I have no recollection at all. I've seen
13 the piece of paper and I -- none at all.

14 Q. Passage of time or the intensity of the festivities?

15 A. Neither. I just don't -- I don't -- nothing at all.

16 Q. Righto, I shall move on.

17 In your role, did you have any function liaising
18 with bodies outside the police other than the
19 Security Service, for example the Home Office --

20 A. No.

21 Q. -- or Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Annual reports. We won't go through the annual reports
24 from this era in the detail that we looked at those from
25 the 1970s, but at this stage, the annual reports are

- 1 crossing your desk on their way up --
- 2 A. Yes.
- 3 Q. -- the chain of command, aren't they?
- 4 A. Yes.
- 5 Q. You endorse each one of them in glowing terms --
- 6 A. Of course.
- 7 Q. -- don't you?
- 8 A. Yes.
- 9 Q. Vital component, firmly behind the SDS. You talk about
- 10 the contribution to the public order sphere, about
- 11 animal rights targeting being well advanced, about them
- 12 having an excellent year and so forth.
- 13 What was the purpose of endorsing them in such
- 14 glowing terms?
- 15 A. Because it was true.
- 16 Q. And did you understand that these reports were on their
- 17 way to the Home Office to secure continuing funding?
- 18 A. Certainly.
- 19 Q. And so would it be right to say you were fully convinced
- 20 of the ongoing utility of the SDS?
- 21 A. Yes, I was.
- 22 Q. Was your conviction in the utility of the SDS,
- 23 increasing, decreasing or the same as it was when you
- 24 had been in charge?
- 25 A. I would say the same.

1 Q. Now can I move to the second Commissioner's visit, that
2 of Sir Kenneth Newman in 1983. Were you involved in
3 preparations for that visit?

4 A. I don't -- I'm not sure. I've seen the piece of paper
5 where this is referred to. I think I met him at the SDS
6 office, which was not in Scotland Yard, but I think
7 I didn't go with him. I think I left that to
8 David Short, who was the chief inspector.

9 Q. Did you see the briefing paper?

10 A. No.

11 Q. And you've said that you explained the workings of
12 S Squad to the Commissioner. Presumably you wouldn't
13 have lost the opportunity to plug the SDS to him?

14 A. Of course.

15 Q. And what was Sir Kenneth Newman's attitude to the SDS?

16 A. I don't -- I don't recall his attitude. I think he was
17 just interested.

18 Q. Did he know anything of the arrests of officers?

19 A. I doubt it.

20 Q. Of the use of deceased children's identities?

21 A. I don't think so.

22 Q. Of sexual activity between undercover police officers
23 and members of the public?

24 A. No, I wouldn't think so.

25 Q. And of the conviction of some officers in their

1 MR BARR: Thank you, sir.

2 Mr Craft, I'm just going to interject a question
3 that goes back to your time as head of the SDS. We know
4 that the SDS infiltrated the Workers' Revolutionary
5 Party --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- and two officers were involved in doing that. It was
8 on your watch that the infiltration of the Workers'
9 Revolutionary Party came to an end and no further
10 officer was deployed into that group.

11 Can you recall why it was that it was decided that
12 it was no longer necessary to do that?

13 A. I can't recall that specifically, but I assume it was on
14 the basis that we couldn't justify covering it because
15 it wasn't a public order problem.

16 Q. Now, I'm conscious we don't have the cipher key to cover
17 this officer, and if there comes a point in time when
18 it's not fair to you because you don't know who it is
19 we're talking about, say so and we'll deal with this
20 line of questioning after the break.

21 Can we call up, please, the document at tab 37,
22 which is {MPS/526785/1}, and if we -- we see there at
23 page 2 {MPS/526785/2}, that this is January 1984.
24 You're signing it off as chief superintendent. You're
25 sending this to Commander Ops:

1 "This arrest of an SDS field officer will have done
2 no harm to his standing amongst his 'comrades'."

3 And then if we go to page {MPS/526785/3} to see what
4 that was about, it says:

5 "On Friday 13th January, 1984, Detective Constable
6 HN12, a Special Demonstration Squad Officer working
7 under the assumed name of Michael Hartley within the
8 Revolutionary Communist Group ... was arrested by police
9 from Highbury Vale Police Station for illegal bill
10 posting.

11 "The circumstances were that DC HN12 and [Privacy]
12 unemployed of [Privacy] an RCG 'comrade', had been
13 directed by committee members of the RCG 'front'
14 organisation Irish Solidarity Movement, to affix posters
15 on appropriate premises on Holloway Road N19 (a normal
16 activity for a group of this nature) advertising
17 a forthcoming 'Week of Action' concerning informers in
18 Ireland. At 8.30 pm that evening PC 5a and PC 5b, on
19 patrol in a marked police vehicle, apprehended both
20 individuals in the act of affixing posters to a hoarding in
21 Holloway Road ... DC HN12 and [Privacy] were arrested,
22 taken to Highbury Vale Police Station and charged with
23 'that you did on Friday 13th January, 1984, affix
24 a posting bill at Holloway Road N19, without the consent
25 of the owner - contrary to Section 54(10)

1 Metropolitan Police Act, 1839."

2 What I would like know, first of all, is that
3 sufficient to remind you of the incident so that we can
4 continue or would you like to wait until we can tell you
5 who the officer was?

6 A. I don't need to know who the officer was. I don't --
7 I just don't remember the case at all.

8 Q. And was there any -- it may not be worth me asking you
9 any questions, but what I'd like to ask you: was there
10 any consideration of the fairness of the prosecution of
11 HN12's co-accused? Can you help us with that at all?

12 A. No, I can't. I don't remember the case, I'm sorry.

13 Q. Can I move now to some of the officers who were serving
14 at the time, and I am going to have to, I think, put
15 HN12 back until we can tell you who he is.

16 Do you know who I mean by HN67?

17 (Pause)

18 A. No, he's not on my pack, I'm afraid.

19 Q. HN11 is a man who we can tell you was Mike Chitty. Can
20 you remember Mike Chitty?

21 A. Vaguely, yes.

22 Q. What can you tell us of Mr Chitty's character?

23 A. Nothing. The only connection I have, I think, is the
24 organisation he was covering. I think that's about all
25 I can remember.

1 Q. Can you recall HN106?

2 A. Just. Again, knowing very little, I'm afraid.

3 Q. We understand that there was a concern that he was

4 becoming known as a certain woman's boyfriend. Was that

5 ever discussed with you?

6 A. No.

7 Q. And we also understand that there was some management

8 concern within the SDS that he might have been sleeping

9 with another woman. Was that ever raised with you?

10 A. No, it was not.

11 Q. HN126.

12 (Pause)

13 A. Yes, I remember him --

14 Q. Did you --

15 A. -- as a person, not so much on the squad.

16 Q. Did you ever hear anything to the effect that he'd

17 been -- that he had become close to a female activist --

18 A. No.

19 Q. -- or that something sexual might be going on?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Can you help us with HN155?

22 (Pause)

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. What can you tell us about his character in relation to

25 women?

- 1 A. Nothing in relation to women at all.
- 2 Q. I think that's all I'm --
- 3 A. Okay.
- 4 Q. -- interested in at this stage.
- 5 Can I move to assumption of positions of
- 6 responsibility whilst you were chief superintendent.
- 7 There were some officers in the SDS who got into
- 8 significant positions with the Socialist Workers Party.
- 9 In particular, HN155 got into the headquarters of the
- 10 Socialist Workers Party.
- 11 A. Yes.
- 12 Q. Did you know that?
- 13 A. I don't recall that now.
- 14 Q. He was able, from that position, to provide membership
- 15 lists and so forth, lots of information about the inner
- 16 workings of the SWP. Does that jog your memory?
- 17 A. It doesn't, actually. I -- my recollection is that he
- 18 was not the prime source at senior level with SWP.
- 19 Q. Are you able to comment upon what you would have thought
- 20 if you had known that there was a member of the SDS
- 21 within the SWP's headquarters either taking or copying
- 22 its documents?
- 23 A. I would have thought -- I would have thought it was of
- 24 great value to the Security Service.
- 25 Q. Would you have considered it proper or improper?

- 1 A. Proper.
- 2 Q. Would you have considered at all the propriety of taking
3 confidential information as a police officer by
4 deception?
- 5 A. No.
- 6 Q. Was the officer you were thinking about HN80 --
- 7 A. Yes, yes.
- 8 Q. -- who also became quite prominent within the SWP? How
9 aware were you of his prominence?
- 10 A. In detail, at the time, I wasn't. I've learned more
11 since, but I gather he was pretty prominent. I think
12 he -- he was a main source of intelligence.
- 13 Q. And was the institutional view at the time that that was
14 a jolly good thing?
- 15 A. Yes.
- 16 Q. With hindsight, do you still adhere to that view?
- 17 A. I think it's tricky in terms of how much influence he
18 had. I don't think they were involved in anything
19 illegal, but I think somebody that close in could have
20 found himself in a difficult situation.
- 21 Q. I want to ask you now a little bit about vetting. We
22 touched upon this earlier, but if we could have up,
23 please {MPS/727595/27}.
- 24 Now, this should be the 1979 Special Branch annual
25 report, and it contains some statistics about vetting,

1 and it talks about:

2 "Enquiries on individuals and organisations ..."

3 Thank you very much. Could we have the top of
4 the page first, please.

5 Some general statistics on enquiries on individuals
6 and reports in the thousands.

7 Then "Vetting":

8 "Vetting enquiries for Box 500: 2846."

9 Can you help us with what vetting enquiries for
10 Box 500 would be?

11 A. Not from the SDS point of view. I have a vague
12 recollection of being given a vetting enquiry when I was
13 probably a detective constable, or maybe a sergeant on
14 C Squad, trying to discover about an individual -- what
15 was on the background of an individual. I can't tell
16 you more than that. I don't really know what it was.
17 I just remember there were things like vetting
18 enquiries.

19 Q. Would it be right to say that when vetting enquiries
20 came in, one of the places an officer might look would
21 be registry files?

22 A. Oh, yes.

23 Q. And therefore it would follow, would it, that some of
24 the information which might be used would include that
25 that had been gathered by the SDS?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 We will find you the names of the officers I want to
4 ask you about during the 20-minute break, so that those
5 can be put to you, but other than that, that's it from
6 me for the moment.

7 A. Okay, sir.

8 MR BARR: Thank you.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: We will now have a 20-minute break so that
10 any topics that anyone wishes Mr Barr to raise can be
11 put to him and he can decide whether or not to raise
12 them with you.

13 A. Thank you, sir.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: And then, at the end, if there is any
15 re-examination, that will bring your evidence to
16 a conclusion.

17 A. Good.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: I may have been unduly pessimistic, we'll
19 see.

20 (3.52 pm)

21 (A short break)

22 (4.27 pm)

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr.

24 MR BARR: Thank you, sir. There are a number of further
25 matters to ask Mr Craft about.

1 Mr Craft, can we start, first of all, with
2 a document which is at {UCPI/27515/1}. Now, this is
3 a note made by the Security Service of a visit that they
4 made to the SDS in July 1982, and it appears that HN68
5 was the detective inspector speaking on behalf of
6 the SDS at the time, but it obviously falls within
7 the time when you were the chief superintendent.

8 It's paragraph 5 that I'm interested in. It says:

9 "Despite his misdemeanours, Cooper has not been
10 withdrawn as an SDS source."

11 Now, "Cooper" is the cover name for HN155:

12 "He claimed that he was acting on the advice of his
13 solicitors in not making maintenance payments. HN68 is
14 still very worried by the case because Cooper's position
15 in the Right to Work Movement gives him regular access
16 to Ernie Roberts MP and meetings at the House of
17 Commons."

18 First of all, Mr Craft, were you aware that one of
19 the SDS's officers had regular access to a Member of
20 Parliament and meetings at the House of Commons?

21 A. No, I did not.

22 Q. It appears that one reading of this document is there
23 was considerable concern that if, as a result of HN155's
24 marital difficulties, anything was to come out about
25 the fact that Mr Roberts' meetings had been infiltrated

1 by an undercover officer would be embarrassing. Do you
2 recall any concerns arising from HN155's divorce
3 proceedings?

4 A. No, I don't.

5 Q. Would it have been a concern to you if you had known
6 that an SDS undercover officer had regular access to
7 an MP and meetings at the House of Commons?

8 A. Yes, I think I would have been concerned.

9 Q. And what would your concern have been?

10 A. Becoming too close with politics, and that is legitimate
11 politics.

12 Q. Can I ask you now about something completely different.
13 You have given us evidence about the character of HN300
14 and HN297, Richard Clark, or said you didn't know much
15 about them in circumstances where a number of other
16 witnesses have described them in terms which might cast
17 doubt upon how safe they were to be left as undercover
18 officers with members of the opposite sex.

19 Can you help us with any explanation for that
20 difference in take about their characters?

21 A. Yes, I can. I suspect that the behaviour they are
22 reported to have been up to was such that they did not
23 want senior officers to be -- become aware because of
24 the effect it would have had upon their career, and
25 that's why I'm sure that neither my deputy nor I would

1 have known about it.

2 The other factor I would say that -- as far as
3 Richard Clark is concerned, that I'm becoming aware as
4 this Inquiry proceeds that what I knew of Mr Clark is
5 rather different from the fact and I'm now -- I think,
6 perhaps, that I should have been aware. On the other
7 hand, people who are good at putting up a front can
8 sometimes confuse one, and I'll leave it at that,
9 I think. I'm not happy about Mr Clark at all.

10 Q. Now, you accepted in evidence that there was, with the
11 benefit of hindsight, a risk that officers might engage
12 in sexual activity with members of the public
13 undercover. Why was that a risk that you only
14 appreciated with hindsight?

15 A. I have to say, I think I was being naive at the time.
16 We know a lot more now. We learn as we go along, and
17 that is a factor which would have to be considered in
18 the future.

19 Q. You raised, perhaps rhetorically, at one stage "how does
20 one prevent it", meaning that sort of activity. What
21 are your thoughts on "how does one prevent it"?

22 A. I don't know. All I can say is that perhaps one -- it
23 needs to be emphasised regularly with the -- before it
24 starts and also regularly while the operation is
25 continuing, because I don't think there is any way of

1 preventing it because these things happen, but it -- it
2 is a problem.

3 Q. Did you ever take the view that "these things happen"
4 whilst you were leading the SDS?

5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. Can I ask you now a specific question about HN354,
7 Vince Harvey. His evidence was that he came to you to
8 raise a problem that a female member of the group he was
9 infiltrating, the SWP, was taking an interest,
10 an amorous interest, in him. Can you recall that?

11 A. No, I'm sorry, I can't.

12 Q. Did that happen?

13 A. Well, I don't recall it at all.

14 Q. If it had happened, do you think you would have recalled
15 it?

16 A. Oh, yes, I think so.

17 Q. A term which we've heard activists referred to as by the
18 SDS is "wearies". Were you familiar with that term?

19 A. No, not at all.

20 Q. Have you heard about it since?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Have you heard it used elsewhere?

23 A. I don't even know what it means.

24 Q. It's used to mean an activist.

25 A. No.

1 Q. When you were the chief superintendent of S Squad, did
2 you come across Bob Lambert?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Did you meet Bob Lambert at reunions?

5 A. I don't think so. I don't -- I wouldn't recognise the
6 man.

7 Q. What was your reaction when it emerged that Bob Lambert
8 had fathered a child whilst undercover?

9 A. Shock, I think is the best way to put it.

10 Q. Anything more?

11 A. No. One wonders how he had the time to be involved to
12 that extent with somebody, unless of course it was
13 a one-off, but I --

14 Q. It wasn't.

15 A. Hm?

16 Q. It wasn't.

17 A. Well, exactly, and I wonder what supervision was
18 involved, did -- was there more freedom, was it more --
19 more national than London? I don't know. Certainly,
20 yes, shock is the answer.

21 Q. The officer we know as HN298 --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- gave evidence of an incident which culminated with
24 him punching Gery Lawless. Were you aware of that
25 happening at the time?

1 A. No, I wasn't.

2 Q. Do you know about it now?

3 A. No. I just smile because I had dealings with
4 Gery Lawless in other circumstances.

5 Q. If you had known about it at the time, what would you
6 have done about the fact one of your officers had
7 assaulted Gery Lawless?

8 A. Well, I think that that is something that we'd have had
9 a look at and decide should that man be left out in
10 the field, because clearly he's not under control in
11 those circumstances.

12 Q. And in terms of taking any formal action, would the same
13 qualifications that you raised earlier in your evidence
14 about the difficulties of going through formal police
15 disciplinary proceedings --

16 A. Oh, yes.

17 Q. -- apply?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Can I now ask for another document to be put
20 {MPS/728785/1}. We're back to "Rick Gibson". If we
21 could go to paragraph -- to page 3, please
22 {MPS/728785/3}. This is a report dated 25 March 1976
23 and it's the bottom of the third paragraph that
24 I'm interested in. Before we look at that, I think we
25 better go to your signature, which is at the end at

1 {MPS/728785/4}. So you see you've signed this report.

2 A. As the chief inspector, yes.

3 Q. Yes.

4 If we go back to {MPS/728785/3}, paragraph 3,
5 I think really the point is at the end of that
6 paragraph:

7 "Gibson was chosen to fill the post of Convenor and
8 [Privacy] to take over from Gibson as the TOM London
9 Organiser."

10 So it seems from this document that you did know at
11 the material time that Richard Clark had taken the post
12 of convenor. Would it follow from that that at the time
13 you were not concerned about him taking that post?

14 A. Yes, that's interesting, because I don't remember it, of
15 course. But it was concerning. Why I did nothing
16 about it, I don't know. Perhaps it was too late to do
17 anything about it. But certainly it was concerning.

18 Q. Gibson is an officer who essentially helps to form
19 a branch of TOM, rises all the way through the ranks of
20 the organisation and takes a role in some of the
21 factional in-fighting. Why wasn't that stopped?

22 A. I really don't know. I wish I had a better answer, but
23 I just don't know.

24 Q. Can we take that down, please.

25 Can we have up {MPS/740413/2}. Thank you.

1 This is the witness statement of the officer we know
2 as HN353.

3 (Pause)

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. If we could go to page 25, please {MPS/740413/25},
6 paragraph 66, he says:

7 "I joined the student union when I was a student at
8 Thames Polytechnic in my cover identity and became
9 involved in the union's affairs, becoming the vice
10 president. This fitted with my role as a 'good
11 revolutionary' in the IMG and was a necessary part of my
12 cover identity. I was a delegate at national
13 conferences on a couple of occasions."

14 HN353 was an officer who you managed, wasn't he?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did you have any concerns about one of your officers
17 using a position within a national trade union as part
18 of his cover?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Even though, as vice president, plainly he would have
21 some influence in the running of the branch?

22 A. Yes, it was interesting, but I didn't have any fears
23 about it. He was a particularly able officer and he
24 would not have got involved in anything which was
25 illegal.

- 1 Q. But wouldn't it have been more proper and very easy to
2 tell him not to assume any role and just to use his
3 membership?
- 4 A. I think it had happened, so I think we were stuck
5 with it.
- 6 Q. If we could take that down, please.
- 7 HN12. If you use the sticky tab, that will take you
8 to the page which will tell you who HN12 is.
- 9 A. Yes, thank you.
- 10 Q. Can you help us with HN12's character, in particular as
11 far as members of the opposite sex are concerned?
- 12 A. No. He was a very quiet officer. I -- nothing further
13 than that, I think.
- 14 Q. Did anything come to your attention about his sexual
15 behaviour whilst he was undercover?
- 16 A. No.
- 17 Q. HN67.
- 18 (Pause)
- 19 A. Yes, I remember him.
- 20 Q. What can you tell us about his character?
- 21 A. Nothing, really. I didn't know him well.
- 22 Q. Did anything come to your attention about his sexual
23 behaviour undercover?
- 24 A. No.
- 25 Q. In particular did you hear a rumour that he had fathered

1 a child?

2 A. No.

3 MR BARR: You will be delighted to learn, I am sure, that
4 was the last of my questions.

5 A. Thank you.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Any re-examination?

7 MR SANDERS: Thank you, sir, just one topic.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

9 Re-examination by MR SANDERS

10 MR SANDERS: You were asked at the very outset about police
11 powers of entry, search and seizure, so that's powers of
12 a constable to enter premises to search them or to
13 arrest someone, powers of a constable to search
14 an individual or search premises and seize items.

15 Were the SDS undercover officers doing any of those
16 things?

17 A. I don't think so.

18 MR SANDERS: Thank you.

19 That's all, sir.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: I think they did, however, at least copy and
21 perhaps take membership lists and such like.

22 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

23 Questions from THE CHAIRMAN

24 THE CHAIRMAN: One question from me, please, and it's
25 a mystery which you may or may not be able to help me

1 on.

2 Both you and Angus McIntosh, who we're going to hear
3 from tomorrow, recall being in the SDS when
4 Richard Clark, HN297, was there, and yet neither of you
5 recall being in the SDS together.

6 A. I am totally confused about that, sir. I've given a lot
7 of thought to who my number two was on the SDS when
8 I was the chief inspector, and I remember
9 Leslie Willingale. I don't remember ever having
10 Angus McIntosh as my number two. Now, obviously he was,
11 because he was one of those who went to Blackburn,
12 I think, with Rick -- Richard -- oh, I have forgotten
13 the sergeant.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

15 A. Walker, Dick Walker, and I knew about that, but it's
16 amazing, I just -- and I know Angus McIntosh very well,
17 but I have no recollection of working with him.
18 I always had it in my mind that my number two for
19 a while on the SDS was Barry Moss, but that was clearly
20 confusing as well.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: Very well. Well, that's a mystery I don't
22 think we will clear up.

23 A. I'm afraid not, sir. My aging memory does not go that
24 far.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: It's been pretty good so far and I'm very,

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