

Thursday, 19 May 2022

(10.00 am)

MR FERNANDES: Welcome to Day 6 of evidential hearings at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. My name is Neil Fernandes and I'm the hearings manager. There is no fire alarm testing expected today, so if the fire alarm does go off, please follow the fire exit signs and make your way to the muster point, which is the Hard Rock Hotel, Great Cumberland Place.

On arrival, please make yourself known to a fire marshal, who will be wearing a high visibility jacket and will be keeping a register of all attendees.

I now hand over to the Chairman, Sir John Mitting, to formally start today's proceedings.

Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. As always, I begin with a message to those in the public area. You may use any handheld electronic device that you have to communicate what you see and hear in the hearing room, but only once ten minutes have elapsed since the event that you are describing. You may not use them for the purpose of recording what is going on here, or photographing.

Ms Campbell.

Summary of the evidence of HN368

MS CAMPBELL: Thank you, sir.

1 This morning I'll be presenting the summary of
2 the evidence of HN368, Richard James Walker.
3 Richard Walker was a detective sergeant in the SDS back
4 office from September 1974 to April 1978. He provided
5 a witness statement to the Inquiry dated
6 5 November 2020, which may be summarised as follows.

7 Richard Walker joined the Metropolitan Police
8 Service as a junior cadet in 1954 and became a full
9 constable in 1956. He joined Special Branch in 1966 and
10 served in various positions prior to the SDS, including
11 dealing with enquiries and intelligence-gathering in
12 relation to extreme left wing matters, for which he
13 received a commendation.

14 He worked on security vetting and held one role
15 dealing with extremist groups in the Indian and
16 Pakistani communities in London, which consisted of
17 intelligence-gathering and liaison with A8 in relation
18 to demonstrations.

19 He joined the SDS in September 1974. He was asked
20 to join by DI Derek Brice, whom Walker knew from
21 a previous posting. He did not know much about the SDS
22 before joining as there were a strict "need to know"
23 policy in Special Branch. He cannot remember being
24 given a handover when he started, but believes that he
25 would have had one. He did not receive any specific

1 training for the role.

2 Richard Walker describes himself as effectively
3 the "quartermaster of the SDS". He would help source
4 and administer vehicles, assist in arrangements for
5 accommodation for UCOs, ran the petty cash book and paid
6 various bills. He had no involvement in the creation of
7 cover identities, procurement of cover documents or
8 procurement of cover accommodation.

9 Richard Walker would attend the weekly meetings at
10 the safe houses with the undercover officers. He
11 recalls that detective chief inspectors, detective
12 inspectors and more junior ranked officers in the SDS
13 office would also attend weekly and the superintendent
14 and chief superintendent would go less often.

15 At the meetings, UCOs would submit their diaries and
16 expenses and provide reports. Management would check in
17 with the UCOs to see how they were. Walker states:

18 "... there would be general chat, we would ask about
19 their problems (if there were any) and make sure that
20 they were happy in their work. The UCOs were working in
21 difficult conditions and with some unpleasant people,
22 and when I was in the office the welfare aspect of our
23 role was important."

24 He does not recall any officer spending time in
25 the back office in advance of their deployment or after

1 their withdrawal from the field. He was not aware of
2 any unhappy working relationships in the SDS.

3 Richard Walker did have a role in compiling
4 the reporting from undercover officers. Officers would
5 give report updates in writing and orally at meetings
6 and may have occasionally called the office to give
7 information over the phone. He notes:

8 "There was no filter on what they were meant to do
9 or say in terms of reporting."

10 Walker states that he would look at the manuscript
11 reports and would make suggested changes to the language
12 to make it more formal or grammatically correct. He did
13 not change the substance of the reports. He notes that
14 Special Branch had exacting standards of written English
15 and they were aware that reporting was likely to go to
16 the Home Office and Security Service, so high standards
17 were applied.

18 Walker recalls that contact with the UCOs was at
19 least once a week face-to-face and that officers could
20 ask for one-to-one meetings with managers if they
21 wished. He considered himself to have a role in
22 the welfare of the undercover officers, ensuring the
23 smooth running of some of the administration connected
24 to their duties:

25 "All of the back-office SDS staff had a role in

1 making sure the UCOs could cope emotionally with
2 the work they were doing. This was done by talking to
3 them. If they had any problems, they would be seen and
4 spoken to. We tried to do the best we could to keep in
5 touch with people who were doing a difficult job. I am
6 still proud of the work that we did, and I thought that
7 we had done what we could do to provide support to
8 the UCOs."

9 Richard Walker denies playing any role in directing
10 or steering the reporting of undercover officers and
11 indeed was not aware of any SDS officer directing or
12 steering UCO reporting while he was in the unit. When
13 asked about his signature on several intelligence
14 reports, he explains that he may have signed as
15 the person submitting those particular pieces of
16 information for typing rather than as the source of
17 the intelligence.

18 Richard Walker describes the arrangements in place
19 for the storage and retention of intelligence reports.
20 He explains that Special Branch had an enormous registry
21 of files, but there were also safes in every office for
22 the temporary storage of documents:

23 "We would keep files in the SDS if they were topical
24 at the time, so there may have been files - including
25 SDS reporting - which were locked in the office for

1 a period. For example, if there was an officer in the
2 Troops Out Movement, there would be a file which SDS
3 would maintain, and once it was not current, it would go
4 to the Registry."

5 He does not know how long records were maintained
6 for.

7 He states that he had no role in the dissemination
8 of the reporting. However, he was aware that reports
9 would have gone to other parts of Special Branch, the
10 Security Service, A8 or other agencies. He expects that
11 there may have been some modification of reports
12 depending on who the ultimate recipient was. For
13 example, reports sent to A8 may not have included PF and
14 RF reference numbers.

15 Richard Walker states that he had no general contact
16 with the Security Service at the time. When asked about
17 his name appearing on a guest list of Special Branch
18 members invited to a Security Service party in
19 February 1978, Walker speculates that Special Branch may
20 have been asked to put forward a number of officers to
21 attend, as he does not know any other reason why he was
22 included. He recalls the party as:

23 "... being somewhat awkward as the Security Service
24 had obviously typecast the group of Special Branch
25 officers as being beer-drinking policemen, so I felt we

1 had been stereotyped."

2 Richard Walker was involved in the payment of
3 overtime to officers. He was not responsible for
4 authorising overtime, but would check officer diaries to
5 ensure their claims were accurate and submit them to
6 the payment department. He notes that the keeping of
7 overtime diaries was a force-wide obligation below
8 a certain rank and not particular to the SDS. Although
9 he thought that the benefits of overtime may have caused
10 officers to want to remain in the SDS, he notes that it
11 would not be up to the officers to decide if they
12 remained past the normal deployment length. He does not
13 believe the amount of overtime influenced any officer to
14 paint an overly optimistic picture of their
15 achievements.

16 During his time in the SDS, Richard Walker travelled
17 on more than one occasion to accompany UCOs attending
18 events outside of London. This included a trip to
19 Blackburn for an Action Against Racism demonstration in
20 1976 for which he and DI McIntosh received a letter of
21 thanks from Lancashire Police. He states:

22 "Managers and administrative staff would travel to
23 the same part of the country as a UCO in limited
24 circumstances. As far as I recall, it would have been
25 in circumstances where there could have been a risk to

1 them - whether in terms of a risk to violence, or a risk
2 of arrest - in the course of their duties."

3 The number of SDS officers involved may have also
4 been a factor in assessing where support was needed.
5 Walker notes that staff were present for the safety and
6 welfare of the UCOs and to be on hand in case there was
7 any action against them by local police. The UCOs would
8 have been aware of the presence of the accompanying
9 staff. Such trips may also have required liaison with
10 the local force or constabulary.

11 Richard Walker signed the transport reports present
12 in the 1976 and 1977 SDS annual reports, but does not
13 believe that he was involved in compiling the annual
14 reports beyond this aspect. He does believe the
15 contents of those reports to be an honest reflection of
16 the work of the SDS. He agrees with comments made in
17 the 1978 annual report that undercover deployments did
18 not seem to have any deleterious effect on the health of
19 UCOs. Walker notes that the officers did get very tired
20 due to the hours they worked, but he cannot recall any
21 mental or physical health problems.

22 In terms of issues that arose with contemporaneous
23 undercover officers, Walker accepts that he would have
24 probably known at the time about the first arrest of
25 HN13, cover name "Desmond Barry Loader", but was not

1 involved in any way with dealing with it. He has no
2 recollection of the possible compromises relating to
3 HN126, cover name "Paul Gray", but notes that:

4 "The UCOs had to handle risks like this, we trusted
5 them to manage them appropriately. If a UCO felt
6 worried about compromise, we would have pulled them out
7 in a manner which was safe for them but which did not
8 arouse suspicion."

9 He was not aware of any officers engaging in sexual
10 activity while in their cover identity, including HN21,
11 HN354, Vince Harvey, and HN297, Richard Clark. Walker
12 was not aware of any colleagues or managers knowing of
13 any sexual relationships and expects that if they did,
14 he would have heard about it in the office. He was not
15 aware of any manager giving UCOs orders, instructions,
16 advice or guidance about sexual conduct whilst operating
17 undercover.

18 When asked to comment on the evidence of HN304,
19 cover name "Graham Coates", that managers "appeared to
20 turn a blind eye to bits of banter and innuendo" and
21 that they "must have known it", meaning sexual activity,
22 "was almost bound to happen with certain individuals who
23 had a predilection for chasing women". He says:

24 "I think there was an expectation that the UCOs
25 would behave, rather than an expectation that they would

1 misbehave. There was very little banter as I recall,
2 and I certainly would not have turned a blind eye to
3 anything that I thought had a ring of truth to it ...
4 I categorically do not agree with the comment on
5 predilection. I certainly had not judged anyone on that
6 basis - men who say things about women don't always mean
7 it or follow through with what they say."

8 He confirms that had he known about sexual activity
9 with activists, he would not have condoned it.

10 To his knowledge, none of his contemporaries
11 provoked or encouraged a third party to commit
12 a criminal offence, engaged in sexual activity whilst in
13 their undercover identity, were involved in incidents of
14 public order or violence, reported on any legally
15 privileged information or reported on the activities of
16 elected politicians. Aside from HN13, he did not know
17 of any officers who were arrested, tried or convicted in
18 their cover identity.

19 He believes that the activities of trade unions
20 would only have been reported on if trade union members
21 were part of the group that the UCO had infiltrated and
22 the information was relevant to that group.

23 Richard Walker was aware of deceased children's
24 identities being used at the time, but cannot comment on
25 the origin of the practice or any consideration given to

1 its use. He comments:

2 "I can say that it obviously wasn't thought through,
3 and I can understand how the parents of the dead
4 children are upset. I think the SDS did not think
5 the families would find out."

6 When asked to comment on why certain information was
7 reported by undercover officers, Richard Walker notes
8 that:

9 "... the SDS was a conduit, and actioned requests
10 for information. The SDS recorded information, and did
11 not filter the information gathered as the SDS were not
12 gathering it for our own purposes. We acted on behalf
13 of other persons, with no oversight of the broader
14 purpose of the information."

15 In terms of what the SDS achieved for the benefit of
16 policing, Richard Walker states:

17 "... I can say that it obtained all of the requests
18 for intelligence on public order and national security
19 that were requested of it when I was involved ...
20 I would not have known that everything we were asked to
21 get was later directed to, so it is hard for me to
22 quantify the benefit. It was very much a case that
23 the SDS did what we were asked to do, and didn't
24 question it. If the SDS was given a target, the order
25 was not queried. It was actioned. Personally, I felt

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr McIntosh, I understand you want to be
2 sworn.
3 A. Oh, right, yes, thank you, sir.
4 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Fernandes will administer the oath to you.
5 HN244 (Angus McIntosh) (sworn)
6 Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE
7 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Hummerstone.
8 MS HUMMERSTONE: Can you give us your full name, please.
9 A. Angus Bryan McIntosh.
10 Q. You have provided a witness statement dated
11 16 February 2021. Can you confirm that the contents of
12 that statement are true and accurate to the best of your
13 knowledge and belief?
14 A. I can.
15 Q. You joined the SDS in April 1976, you tell us in your
16 witness statement, at the rank of detective inspector
17 and you were second in command at the SDS; is that
18 right?
19 A. That is correct.
20 Q. Prior to joining the SDS, you joined Special Branch in
21 1964; is that right?
22 A. I believe so, yes.
23 Q. So by the time you joined the SDS, you were
24 an experienced Special Branch officer.
25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. You spent some time on C Squad prior to your time in
2 the SDS; is that right?
- 3 A. My initial period in Special Branch, yes.
- 4 Q. After your initial period in C Squad, did you spend any
5 more time in C Squad in that time --
- 6 A. No.
- 7 Q. -- before you joined the SDS?
- 8 A. No.
- 9 Q. Thank you, because you go into other squads that you
10 joined in that intervening period.
- 11 During your time in Special Branch prior to your
12 time in the SDS, did you have any knowing interaction
13 with the SDS?
- 14 A. None at all.
- 15 Q. And were you aware of any traffic of information from
16 the SDS to any squad you were serving with, or the other
17 direction, requests going out?
- 18 A. I didn't see any.
- 19 Q. Now, you tell us in your witness statement that your
20 Special Branch experience gave you a knowledge of
21 the organisations that the UCOs would be dealing with
22 and the reporting structure in Special Branch and the
23 likely pitfalls that UCOs might come across during
24 the course of their deployment; is that right?
- 25 A. That's correct.

- 1 Q. And is that the extent of the ways in which your
2 Special Branch experience assisted you with your SDS
3 role?
- 4 A. You're asking me how it did? Sorry.
- 5 Q. Sorry. Is it -- your knowledge of the organisations,
6 the reporting structure and also likely pitfalls for
7 UCOs, are those the three things that you learned prior
8 to coming to the SDS --
- 9 A. That is quite correct.
- 10 Q. -- which were the three things that assisted you in your
11 SDS role?
- 12 A. Yes.
- 13 Q. Just a few questions, please, about police training.
14 You were trained, presumably, on basic police powers
15 of entry, search and seizure when you became a police
16 officer; would that be right?
- 17 A. That's true. We had a 13-week course when you first
18 joined, and then throughout your service you had various
19 courses, including CID courses and promotion courses.
- 20 Q. Was there any further training given on that topic,
21 powers of entry, search and seizure, when you joined
22 Special Branch; can you remember?
- 23 A. Not that I can recall.
- 24 Q. When you joined Special Branch in 1964, did you then
25 have further training for that role?

1 A. In Branch, yes, but it was mainly done through a mentor.

2 Q. Right, thank you.

3 I wonder if we can just have up on the screen very
4 briefly, please, {UCPI/34702/1}, please. This is
5 a document from 1979, so not at the time when you first
6 joined Special Branch. This is said to be initial
7 training for Special Branch officers. Did you go
8 through initial training for Special Branch officers
9 that you can recall?

10 A. No. In fact, that course started just after I'd left
11 the SDS. There was -- prior to that, there were no
12 special courses, as far as I'm aware.

13 Q. Okay, thank you. Thank you very much. I think we can
14 then take that document down, because I don't think
15 you're going to be able to assist me with its contents.

16 We know that you undertook some training at
17 Bramshill during the course of your time at the SDS.
18 You had two periods at Bramshill. Was that
19 Special Branch training that you undertook there?

20 A. No.

21 Q. No.

22 A. General police training.

23 Q. Thank you very much.

24 Can you assist us with what sort of thing it
25 covered, that training, if you can recall?

1 A. Not really. It catered for people of inspector rank and
2 possible higher rank in due course, and it was a general
3 training -- general training course in -- both on
4 the legal side and also on the social latitudes of the
5 time.

6 Q. Right.

7 Did it cover anything to do with undercover work, or
8 supervising undercover work?

9 A. Nothing at all.

10 Q. Did you have any understanding of how basic police
11 officers' powers of entry, search and seizure applied to
12 officers working undercover?

13 A. Well, it was felt that working undercover, providing
14 they were there and invited into the premises, there
15 wasn't a problem. They were going with whatever group
16 or comrades they were with at the time. And it couldn't
17 be constructed any other way purely because they
18 couldn't stop at a door and suddenly turn around and
19 say, "I can't go in there", and it would have
20 jeopardised their cover.

21 Q. Was that something that was actively considered then,
22 that people gave some sort of scrutiny to the idea as to
23 how that difficulty would be overcome by UCOs during
24 your time there; do you recall?

25 A. No, I don't recall any special ...

1 Q. And so you say that that was the prevailing opinion,
2 that so long as consent was given --

3 A. Well, that was a general policing rule.

4 Q. Right. Thank you very much.

5 By the Inquiry's calculation, when you first joined
6 the SDS, the unit was headed up by Geoffrey Craft, and
7 we understand you have no memory of serving at the same
8 time as him; is that right?

9 A. That's correct, yes.

10 Q. Although it would appear that there are documents that
11 indicate he's signing off matters to do with you. For
12 example, I think it's he that signs the document seeking
13 permission for you and Detective Sergeant Walker to
14 accompany some SDS officers to Blackburn. Can you
15 remember something as to Blackburn?

16 A. Yes, I do. I remember going there, and I really can't
17 understand why I can't recall working with Mr Craft.
18 I can only presume that the major incidents which may
19 have occurred during that time was during a period I was
20 on other courses. Being a newly promoted inspector, you
21 were obliged to attend a six-week promotion course and
22 there was also a six-week general duties CID course.
23 Now, I can't tell the committee -- the Inquiry exactly
24 when I went on that, but I presume, as a newly promoted
25 officer, I would have done during that period.

- 1 Q. And are these separate courses from the courses at
2 Bramshill --
- 3 A. Complete --
- 4 Q. -- for which we've got those dates?
- 5 A. Completely independent, run by the Metropolitan Police.
6 I think they were all at Hendon.
- 7 Q. So you had at least, you think, probably 12 weeks of
8 training in that first period when you were first
9 promoted to a detective inspector?
- 10 A. Yes, I believe I must have done. I certainly did those
11 courses, but I can't be exact on the dates.
- 12 Q. Thank you.
- 13 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me, that's in addition to the 13-week
14 course at Bramshill?
- 15 A. Absolutely, sir.
- 16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.
- 17 MS HUMMERSTONE: To your recollection, was Mike Ferguson the
18 DCI at the SDS throughout your period there, then, or
19 can you recall a period when he may not have been?
- 20 A. Well, there must have been a period when he wasn't.
- 21 Q. Yes.
- 22 A. But I wasn't able to say -- say that when I made
23 a statement, because I didn't remember working with
24 Geoff Craft.
- 25 Q. Right, thank you.

1 Moving on to duties that you carried out. You said
2 you received informal guidance from Mike Ferguson on
3 administrative duties, how cover identities were created
4 and the methods of introducing new officers and
5 undercover officers -- sorry, meetings with undercover
6 officers, and you say that training was ad hoc. As
7 the problem or issue arose, you were then -- learned how
8 to deal with it. Is that a fair assessment?

9 A. Basically that's correct. The -- I mean, it didn't all
10 come from Michael Ferguson, because it was carried
11 through from previous management and -- so when I joined
12 the squad, many of the practices were already in hand.

13 Q. Did you have any sort of handover from the person who
14 had had your role previously, can you recall?

15 A. I'm pretty certain, no. It wasn't the normal thing in
16 those days. You didn't have handover; you were just
17 told to take up a job on Monday, whatever.

18 Q. Right.

19 Were you given any guidance as to how you should
20 advise the undercover officers as to their conduct in
21 that role, how they should conduct themselves?

22 A. I wasn't given specific guidance, but my guidance which
23 I -- I gave to the officers was, "You are police
24 officers. You are subject to the regulations and
25 therefore, your behaviour has to be appropriate to those

1 regulations."

2 Q. Right. I'm going to ask you a little bit more about
3 that in a little while.

4 Did Mike Ferguson share with you how to identify
5 the risks associated with undercover policing, for
6 example the risks of compromise or arrests or
7 relationships with activists or other welfare
8 considerations, the sort of things you needed to look
9 out for and safeguard against?

10 A. He made me very aware of those things and the high risk
11 of the occupation.

12 Q. And was any reference made to any past difficulties
13 encountered, officers being arrested or any welfare
14 difficulties in the past, any sort of collective
15 knowledge of difficulties in the past passed on to you?

16 A. Not specific, because whatever the difficulties were in
17 the past had been catered for within ongoing operations
18 and recruitment of our own officers to go out.

19 Q. We have heard from an officer who gave evidence in
20 closed session about a black folder in the SDS back
21 office containing notes from previous officers about
22 tradecraft. Can you recall any such black folder in
23 the back office during your time at the SDS?

24 A. I think there was such a folder. I can't remember
25 specific contents. However, it -- it would make sense

1 that officers leaving the squad would actually leave
2 record of any advice to new undercover officers. So
3 I -- I would think what happened, that the folder was
4 kept by the -- the sergeants who were handling all
5 the admin problems, and during their time, the new
6 members' time in the back office, they would refer to
7 that folder.

8 Q. Can you recall looking at the folder yourself?

9 A. I can't, no.

10 Q. Can you assist us with what -- any more particularly
11 about what the contents might have been?

12 A. Well, I can't be specific, but I presume it would be
13 tradecraft advice, what your possible difficulties or
14 experiences would be.

15 Q. Do you think that UCOs were advised to look at that
16 folder and review the advice given in that folder?

17 A. I -- I feel almost certain that everyone looked at it
18 once it was created, because it was full of good advice
19 for the new officers.

20 Q. Was there any -- you say you weren't -- wasn't aware
21 specifically of the contents of that folder. Would
22 there have been, do you think, any sort of managerial
23 oversight of the contents of that folder?

24 A. I can't answer that.

25 Q. No. To ensure that best practices were passed down?

- 1 A. No. I -- you say "oversight". The -- management
2 certainly wouldn't have put in their own views.
- 3 Q. No.
- 4 A. No.
- 5 Q. If there was something in that folder which was -- may
6 have caused -- may have been bad advice, do you think
7 that might be picked up by --
- 8 A. Oh, yes.
- 9 Q. -- senior managers?
- 10 A. I'm certain that when they were debriefed, the
11 management would hear what the problems were and would
12 be aware of the -- the type of information the officer
13 would have put into that folder. I -- I mean, the
14 difficulties experienced by officers needed to be shared
15 with other officers so that they didn't fall into the
16 same trap.
- 17 Q. Yes.
- 18 Mike Ferguson, of course, had previously been
19 deployed. He was an experienced undercover officer, and
20 you say that he would take the lead on providing
21 instructions on tactics and the practicalities of being
22 undercover. The impression given from your witness
23 statement is that he built on his own experience as
24 a former SDS officer. Is that a fair assessment?
- 25 A. Absolutely. That's the only way you could do it,

1 really.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 I just want to ask a little more detail about the
4 guidance that was given to undercover officers about
5 their conduct when they were deployed undercover.

6 Were officers given any specific advice about
7 drinking alcohol in their undercover roles?

8 A. Other than the need to be aware of the dangers of drink
9 and driving, it wouldn't be -- it wouldn't be likely
10 specific, and the reason for that is that they were
11 police officers. They've all come up through the
12 training system, disciplinary system and that, and they
13 knew quite well, because you have examinations all the
14 time. There's no reason to suggest that they didn't
15 know that the disciplinary result of any misbehaviour
16 would be very serious.

17 Q. Was there any recognition, though, that this was a very
18 different role that they were undertaking where their
19 whole life had become their work and that alcohol may
20 cause difficulty for them in undertaking that work
21 responsibly?

22 A. I think they knew that, and you're quite right; it was
23 a very difficult thing to have a double life and -- and
24 certainly to keep in with the crowd, the crowd they were
25 interested in.

1 As far as the consumption of alcohol was concerned,
2 the -- the major problem was drink and driving. Each
3 officer had a vehicle and the laws of drinking and
4 driving -- drink and driving existed in those days and
5 they couldn't afford to get into trouble and lose their
6 licence; lose their licence and they had no job.

7 As far as the formal discipline would be concerned,
8 it would be up to the chief officer to take into account
9 what the job was.

10 Q. So the main anxiety was about drinking and driving
11 rather than the disinhibiting effects of alcohol --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- in a close-knit social group, because we've heard
14 that alcohol has played its part --

15 A. Well, I'm sure it has, yes.

16 Q. -- in the sexual encounters undertaken by UCOs, but that
17 wasn't something that you bore in mind at the time?

18 A. No. It's a very difficult problem. You're asking them
19 to do a job which basically is quite alien to their
20 training. You also have to appreciate that they are
21 working in an environment or having to work in
22 an environment where that environment have their own
23 standards, and to be successful in that environment, you
24 have to join them. But, as an undercover officer, you
25 have this additional problem of knowing that you --

1 there's certain things you can't do.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 How about any guidance on the conduct of personal
4 relationships and the limits of those relationships and
5 perhaps the guarding against building up too close
6 a connection with people they came across in their
7 undercover roles?

8 A. No, I don't think there was official guidance. That was
9 the type of thing that the chief inspector I was working
10 with, or myself, if it was brought up in discussion, we
11 would advise them of the -- the difficulties and the
12 problems which it might entail.

13 Q. So that formed the basis of some informal guidance, if
14 it came up in an individual deployment; is that ...

15 A. It would be informal or personal guidance, rather than
16 a laid down regulation.

17 Q. But it didn't form any basis of any kind of introductory
18 guidance when the UCO joined the unit?

19 A. I can't answer that, because certainly the period
20 I recall with Mike Ferguson, because of his experience,
21 he did most of the briefing for new officers.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Sexual liaisons. In your witness statement, you say
24 that you considered that a sexual liaison with any
25 individual whilst on duty would have been contrary to

1 police regulations. What police regulations do you have
2 in mind there? Are those police regulations that cover
3 discipline?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So bringing discredit on the reputation --

6 A. Force.

7 Q. -- of the force?

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. And were all the officers in the SDS during your time
10 aware that any sexual liaison in their undercover role
11 would have been -- would come under those police
12 regulations?

13 A. Well, certainly all the officers I spoke to were aware
14 of that.

15 Q. You also say in your witness statement you didn't give
16 specific guidance to officers about sexual conduct --
17 contact other than a reminder of the police regulations
18 that -- and the guidance for all serving officers was
19 that it would be an offence under the police regulations
20 to have a sexual liaison on duty. Was that something
21 that you told officers in terms?

22 A. I -- I can't honestly say whether I told everyone that.
23 I must admit that I, being rather old-fashioned,
24 presumed that people knew the police regulations,
25 particularly all those officers, I would think, had

1 five years police service or -- or even more -- well,
2 a lot more, and -- and that -- those were the rules
3 throughout the time. So, no, I most probably didn't
4 specifically say, "Now, look here, chaps", or whoever,
5 "Remember police regulations, don't have sexual
6 relationships".

7 Q. We know that during the course of your service with
8 the SDS, at least eight officers were deployed
9 undercover. I'm not going to -- you may want to refer
10 to the -- have you got a --

11 A. I have.

12 Q. -- list in front of you? I'm not going to ask you for
13 any names. I just want to -- so that you're aware of
14 who I'm speaking about. HN304, HN354, HN80, HN126 --

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Pause a moment. He's --

16 MS HUMMERSTONE: Sorry.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: You're having a look.

18 MS HUMMERSTONE: So sorry. I'm so sorry. That's my fault
19 entirely.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Do it a bit more slowly.

21 A. I was going to -- no --

22 MS HUMMERSTONE: My fault entirely. So sorry.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: Start again.

24 MS HUMMERSTONE: HN304, I think, was deployed undercover
25 during your period.

1 A. Yes, yes.

2 Q. HN354, in January 1977 he was deployed.

3 A. Oh, yes.

4 Q. HN80?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. HN126?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. HN356?

9 A. Oh, yes, yes.

10 Q. HN96?

11 A. Sorry, I didn't get the last ...

12 Q. 96.

13 A. Oh, 96. I beg your pardon.

14 Oh, yes, yes.

15 Q. HN106?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And HN155?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Of those, we know that HN354, that we now know as

20 Vince Harvey --

21 A. Oh, right, yes.

22 Q. -- had sexual relations with four women in his

23 undercover role, and HN155 may have done so.

24 You say in your witness statement that you

25 weren't -- because you weren't aware of any officer

1 having sexual contact with any person whilst operating
2 undercover, you had no reason to think that the guidance
3 needed to be made stronger or expressed any differently.

4 HN354 has told this Inquiry that stricter guidance
5 would have caused him to make different decisions.

6 Whatever guidance you gave about sexual contact
7 undercover, do you accept it was not particularly
8 strict?

9 A. No, I don't suspect that at all. I -- I was quite --
10 well, always have been strong on police discipline, and
11 I would have thought that if they were having a problem
12 with this particular aspect, they would approach either
13 myself or the DCI to discuss the problem and the way
14 forward.

15 Q. Thank you. We're going to come on to talk about that in
16 a moment.

17 Just dealing with other aspects of guidance to
18 undercover officers, the commission of criminal
19 offences. You say that you gave advice that the
20 commission of criminal offences was not permitted and it
21 was made abundantly clear that you would -- that they --
22 that undercover officers should not indulge in criminal
23 activity, excluding peaceful protests, activities such
24 as billposting or leafletting.

25 Can you recall when advice of that nature was given

1 to undercover officers? Would that have been at the
2 beginning of their deployment or ad hoc during the
3 course of their deployment?

4 A. Throughout their employment.

5 Q. Was that advice formal or informal; can you remember?

6 A. Can you sort of enlarge on what you term as "formal" and
7 "informal"?

8 Q. Well, was this a question of, you know, sitting
9 the officers down in a room and sort of delivering
10 an edict, as it were, from management figures, or was it
11 simply something that came up during conversations with
12 them during the course of their deployments?

13 A. Initially, they would have been given that advice.
14 Although I didn't do it, I'm quite sure that
15 Mike Ferguson would have done. But the informal stuff
16 would be normally at a meeting or -- not necessarily
17 a group meeting, but we used to meet them individually,
18 and that was the opportunity to actually get -- seek any
19 problems they were facing and also to advise them on
20 the way forward.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Can I very briefly, please, have on the screen
23 {UCPI/28810/1}. This is a Security Services note for
24 file about a meeting that you attended with
25 Mike Ferguson and Trevor Butler right at the end of your

1 time with the SDS.

2 Can we just, please, go to the second page of this
3 document {UCPI/28810/2} and to paragraph 3 at the
4 bottom, please. It says there:

5 "In general conversation we touched on the problems
6 of agents being involved in actions of varying degrees
7 of illegality. Ferguson remarked that certainly for
8 the more trivial offences this was no real hindrance to
9 their operation since they were often able to insulate
10 their sources even though this sometimes meant not
11 prosecuting other offenders."

12 You were asked about that, and your response was you
13 had no idea if that was an approach or an opinion
14 prevalent with others in the SDS, is that right, and
15 beyond?

16 A. All I can say at the moment is I believe that's the
17 first time I've ever seen that paragraph.

18 Q. Ah. I believe you commented on it in your witness
19 statement.

20 A. Right.

21 Q. But it's perhaps of no great moment, because you say
22 that you don't recall that being said, in your witness
23 statement, and you've got no idea whether others felt as
24 Mike Ferguson felt, whether that was a view prevalent.

25 You say that your approach was that you would not

1 authorise any conduct beyond peaceful protest; is that
2 right?

3 A. Yes, and leafletting, I think you mentioned, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. We can take that document down now, please.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: So you would have drawn the line at
6 billposting?

7 A. Not necessarily, sir. It would depend on the
8 circumstances the officer found them in. But no, I --
9 I would say I most probably would say billposting was
10 all right.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

12 MS HUMMERSTONE: Positions of responsibility. You say in
13 your statement no specific guidance was given about
14 officers taking on positions of responsibility, no
15 permission was required, but there would have been
16 a discussion between the undercover officer and their
17 management, you and Mike Smith [sic]; is that right?
18 And you say there was some benefit to a UCO taking on
19 a position of responsibility within their target group
20 because it enhanced intelligence-gathering.

21 Can you recall whether Mike Ferguson expressed views
22 on undercover officers taking on active roles in groups?
23 Was that something that he actively encouraged; can you
24 recall?

25 A. Well, certainly it wouldn't have been discouraged if it

1 was a role like treasurer or something, but if it was
2 a role which obviously involved future activities,
3 conspiracy or whatever, we wouldn't advise them. In
4 fact, we would go against them going into that.

5 Q. Thank you very much.

6 Prior to your joining the SDS, you say in your
7 witness statement you had a very limited understanding
8 of it or what its purpose was or what it did.

9 A. Absolutely true, yes.

10 Q. When you joined the SDS, was there any sort of briefing
11 you were given about what its purpose was and what its
12 methods were, or was it simply the informal guidance you
13 were given by Mike Ferguson again?

14 A. Or Geoffrey Craft, you tell me.

15 Q. Or Geoffrey Craft.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You say that the role of the SDS in your witness
18 statement was to supply information to the agency or
19 agencies who had asked for information or assistance,
20 and:

21 "... this included A8 and the Security Services
22 although it is certainly possible that other parts of
23 Special Branch asked the SDS for intelligence."

24 Did you understand there to be any sort of limit on
25 the types of intelligence that were gathered?

1 A. No, the -- the answer has to be no, inasmuch as when
2 you're dealing with intelligence, you have to group in
3 as much as you can to ascertain whether or not the
4 intelligence, the overall intelligence, is valid or not.
5 So I'd say no, there wasn't any boundaries.

6 Q. Was it simply a question of hoovering everything up and
7 passing it on for assessment by others? Was that the
8 approach that was taken, do you believe?

9 A. Well, to some extent, I suppose it -- it was, but then
10 it's -- it's difficult to know exactly what is going to
11 be useful in due course, so ...

12 Q. When you say "to some extent", do you mean that there
13 might have been some sort of filtering of information,
14 or you don't know?

15 A. Well, no, the end result would be the -- the
16 organisation which wanted the information, not the SDS.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 Did you understand the purposes of the gathering of
19 the intelligence? Were you told by the, for want of
20 a better word, customers of the SDS what the purpose
21 was?

22 A. No, not specifically. It was all part of your
23 Special Branch training. You knew roughly what's going
24 to happen to it and why it was being collected.

25 Q. And would that -- would the undercover officers have had

1 a similar understanding of the purposes, that it was
2 something that they knew from their Special Branch
3 training in a general sort of way, do you think?

4 A. Absolutely. I'm not aware of undercover officers being
5 inexperienced SB officers. There might have been,
6 but ...

7 Q. You say you didn't make any decisions on targeting or
8 tasking. Those were made by other police and government
9 departments.

10 A. That's true.

11 Q. Dealing with the police departments first, which squads
12 did you understand were making decisions on targeting or
13 tasking for the SDS?

14 A. If it was internal, the very senior management of the
15 sections concerned.

16 Q. And so are we talking S Squad, C Squad?

17 A. Yes, yes --

18 Q. Yes. So those are the squads we're talking about.

19 A. -- the chief superintendent. Hm.

20 Q. And it's at that rank; chief superintendents were making
21 those decisions, to you --

22 A. Well, he had the overall responsibility for those
23 decisions.

24 Q. By "government departments", do you mean the
25 Security Services?

- 1 A. I do.
- 2 Q. And the Home Office, were they making any decisions on
3 targets or tasking that you recall?
- 4 A. Certainly I'm not aware of it.
- 5 Q. The targeting or tasking that came into the SDS, was
6 that written instruction? Did you receive written
7 instructions about targeting and tasking?
- 8 A. I can't recall. I should think it was a mixture. If it
9 was internal, it would be on some document.
- 10 Q. Right. But was it also delivered to you verbally?
- 11 A. Possible, before demonstrations or something.
- 12 Q. And that would come from A8, would it?
- 13 A. No, I don't recall ever being given a target from A8.
- 14 Q. Right.
- 15 A. We fed them, they didn't feed us.
- 16 Q. Right, thank you. I might ask you about that a little
17 bit more in a moment.
- 18 A number of officers deployed into the SWP during
19 your time at the SDS. We know, for example, that HN354
20 went into the Walthamstow branch of the SWP. Does the
21 fact that he infiltrated the Walthamstow branch indicate
22 anything of any particular significance about that
23 branch, or was it simply that there was a geographical
24 spread of SWP deployments around London; can you recall?
- 25 A. Yes, it would be the latter reason.

1 Q. So just a geographical spread?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. The extreme right wing. You say in your witness
4 statement that it was not infiltrated, but that the SDS
5 had it in mind that it might be in due course, and you
6 say that your recollection was that:

7 "... this was a high level policy decision, [but]
8 I was ... too junior to be part of [that]."

9 Can you assist us with why there was a high level
10 policy decision in the 70s not to infiltrate the extreme
11 right wing?

12 A. Not really. I had ideas. It -- it was a very violent
13 section and it was often involved in crime, so to put
14 an undercover officer into that would be very, very,
15 very difficult. Also, it was felt that a lot of
16 information about the right wing activities was actually
17 available through the left wing, because they were
18 particularly interested in what the right wing were
19 doing.

20 Q. Right, thank you.

21 Specific tasking requests. In your witness
22 statement, you deal with the channels through which
23 specific requests for intelligence were communicated,
24 and you said they would come through internal channels
25 via senior officers, then into the SDS and you would act

1 accordingly, and by "internal channels", you mean
2 a senior SDS officer or, in exceptional circumstances,
3 to you.

4 Requests from the Security Services you say received
5 by at least a superintendent. A superintendent in which
6 squad? Do you mean in S Squad?

7 A. No. I -- I'm not -- I can't recall any requests from
8 the Security Service going direct to us in SDS. If --
9 if there was direct -- an immediate request, it would
10 have gone through the -- the squad concerned. So most
11 of our business was with C Squad, so I would expect it
12 to come through the superintendent of C Squad.

13 Q. And how was that information then fed into the SDS? So
14 the superintendent of C Squad receives the tasking --
15 the specific tasking from the Security Services, and
16 then how was that fed into the SDS?

17 A. I suspect verbally, and it would be noted on the minute
18 sheet that so and so was informed and action was taken.

19 Q. And to whom would that request come? To you, or to
20 Mike Ferguson, or to both of you?

21 A. Whoever was there, yes.

22 Q. Right.

23 Can you recall how frequently the Security Services
24 sent in requests for -- tasking requests?

25 A. A specific one? I can't, no.

- 1 Q. Was it sort of a number of times a week, or --
- 2 A. I really can't tell, because they dealt with C Squad
3 chief superintendent, not with SDS.
- 4 Q. Right.
- 5 A. I mean, we were cut off, really.
- 6 Q. Were you aware when you received tasking requests of who
7 the ultimate customer was? If it came through that
8 channel, through C Squad, would you have known whether
9 that was a C Squad request or a Security Service
10 request?
- 11 A. Most probably, yes.
- 12 Q. Right, thank you.
- 13 Requests from other police departments. What was
14 the route into the SDS, please? So, for example, if you
15 had a request from C Squad --
- 16 A. Mm-hm.
- 17 Q. -- so a police request, what rank of officer would be
18 doing the requesting? Would that be the superintendent
19 also?
- 20 A. You say a police request, what, outside Special Branch,
21 or ...
- 22 Q. No, sorry, I mean Special Branch requests. Would that
23 be at the rank of a superintendent that would make the
24 tasking request?
- 25 A. Certainly, or even the chief.

1 Q. And thereafter, did it follow the same pattern, that it
2 would be communicated to -- either to you or to
3 Mike Ferguson, verbally or written?

4 A. Well, we -- we had meetings with our own superintendent,
5 and every day, and chief superintendent, and those sort
6 of things would be discussed, and I -- I should think
7 nearly all of them were verbal, because we're talking in
8 general about where we can locate our officers rather
9 than dealing with a specific request. So there would be
10 general discussions on what's going on, what -- what is
11 the flavour of the month and take it from there. So
12 a lot of it wouldn't be a formal minute from the --
13 the superintendent.

14 Q. You had daily meetings, you say, with your
15 superintendents. That's the superintendents of S Squad,
16 is it?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And during those daily meetings, tasking requests and
19 things of that nature were discussed between you; is
20 that right?

21 A. Oh, absolutely.

22 Q. And you say that there would be a conversation about
23 what was the flavour of the month and how to service
24 those requests; is that right?

25 A. Whether we could or not, yes.

- 1 Q. Does it follow that there was a discretion to decline
2 a tasking request at the SDS level if you weren't able
3 to service it?
- 4 A. Oh, absolutely, and very often we didn't have anyone who
5 could help in that situation.
- 6 Q. A8 and the uniform public order unit. You say you
7 didn't receive tasking requests from them; is that
8 right?
- 9 A. As far as I'm aware, yes.
- 10 Q. But you supplied information to A8?
- 11 A. Yes, but via the -- the squad.
- 12 Q. Right.
- 13 A. So it went to C Squad normally.
- 14 Q. Right, thank you.
- 15 And was that about specific events that you --
- 16 A. Yes.
- 17 Q. -- the sort of information you supplied to them?
- 18 A. I mean, occasionally we would have direct contact with
19 A8 if it -- if we got information about numbers for
20 a particular demonstration in the immediate future; in
21 other words, it had to be quickly communicated so that
22 the local police or whatever could be prepared for
23 the situation.
- 24 Q. And was that -- did you use the telephone for
25 communicating that sort of thing?

1 A. Yes, it would be done by phone.

2 Q. Right, thank you.

3 Overall SDS supervision. You had the daily meetings
4 with your superintendent that took place in the SDS
5 office; is that right? They would come to you. And you
6 say that was to discuss problems or progress.

7 How long did those meetings typically last; can you
8 recall?

9 A. It would depend on what was happening. I mean, the --
10 a lot of the conversation would be generalities, because
11 you're always looking to the future. Targeting was
12 never done instantly. It had to be plotted and planned,
13 and the feasibility had to be examined. So, in these
14 daily conversations, it would cover all sorts of
15 topics/subjects.

16 Q. You -- during its course of those meetings, did you
17 provide feedback about the activities of the UCOs in
18 the SDS to the superintendent?

19 A. Only if it was significant.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. I mean, it's not a daily report saying, "Joe Bloggs is
22 very well, thank you".

23 Q. Right.

24 And if there was something significant, would that
25 be likely to be an oral report, or would he put that

- 1 into writing?
- 2 A. It would be a discussion, initially.
- 3 Q. Yes.
- 4 A. And if -- if it was something serious, it would be put
5 on paper.
- 6 Q. If there were difficulties encountered with
7 an undercover officer, were you required to run that by
8 the senior managers, the superintendents?
- 9 A. No.
- 10 Q. No. So that was something you could deal with
11 internally?
- 12 A. True.
- 13 Q. Progress reports. You said you would discuss problems
14 or progress. What do you mean by "progress"?
- 15 A. I'm not sure what I meant. Can you ...
- 16 Q. What you say is -- let me just find the paragraph and
17 I'll read it to you. It's your paragraph 102
18 {MPS/747578/36}:
- 19 "The Superintendent and/or the Chief Superintendent
20 would be in the SDS office daily to see me and/or the
21 Detective Chief Inspector to discuss problems or
22 progress."
- 23 A. Well, exactly what I've just said to you. We would
24 discuss the current situation and into the future.
- 25 Q. Right, thank you very much.

1 Would you have characterised SDS supervision by your
2 superintendent as close supervision or not?

3 A. As far as the direction of the squad was concerned, yes,
4 I would say it was close, but actually, on day-to-day
5 dealings with the individuals, no, it wasn't. That was
6 down to the chief inspector and myself.

7 Q. Right, thank you.

8 Authorisations from senior managers. I want to just
9 talk about the limits of your -- sort of your autonomy.
10 If a UCO was to be withdrawn from the field, did that
11 require the authorisation of any senior manager outside
12 the SDS?

13 A. Well, it would do. It -- well, the -- the process would
14 go through senior management.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. The actual -- the reasons may not be given to senior
17 management in full --

18 Q. Right.

19 A. -- because there was a very strong need to know policy
20 during my time.

21 Q. So the SDS could make the decision, but the process that
22 had to be followed then had to be sent up the chain; is
23 that -- have I understood that right?

24 A. Yes, because SDS was part of S Squad and S Squad had
25 a superintendent and also a chief superintendent. So it

1 would go via them.

2 Q. How about recruitment of a new undercover officer?

3 Would that have required authorisation from the senior
4 managers?

5 A. Well, yes, to -- to get a posting to a different squad,
6 it had to go through a process.

7 Q. How about the deployment direction of a new UCO? I just
8 want to just understand what influence the SDS may have
9 had on where an officer was deployed.

10 We know, for example, that HN96 began his service
11 in -- during your time at the SDS in October 1978 and he
12 was deployed into the SWP, and he's said to have been
13 replacing another officer who was being withdrawn from
14 the SWP. That sort of deployment decision where
15 somebody is replacing another officer, is that the sort
16 of deployment decision which would have required any
17 sort of sign-off by senior management, or is that
18 something that you would have --

19 A. No.

20 Q. -- had the autonomy to do yourself?

21 A. No, it would -- senior management would know that so and
22 so is going into a particular area, and that would have
23 been discussed with us, as I said, in our daily
24 meetings. No, they -- they would accept the advice of
25 the chief inspector.

- 1 Q. HN106, in case you just need to --
- 2 A. Can I?
- 3 Q. -- check. Can you remember who he is? Don't say
- 4 the name, but I just want you to --
- 5 A. Yes.
- 6 Q. -- recollect who he was.
- 7 He says in his witness statement he wasn't directed
- 8 to any particular group, but was told to focus generally
- 9 on the far left and find another group other than
- 10 the SWP which was worth targeting. Was that
- 11 an instruction that would have been simply issued by SDS
- 12 managers, or --
- 13 A. Yes, yes.
- 14 Q. -- would that have come further up the chain?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. Okay.
- 17 A. That would be us.
- 18 Q. Thank you.
- 19 Travelling outside the Metropolitan Police area, we
- 20 know that you travelled with Detective Sergeant
- 21 Richard Walker to Blackburn to accompany four SDS
- 22 officers to a demonstration there. Is that the sort of
- 23 thing that would have required authorisation by senior
- 24 managers?
- 25 A. Oh, very much so, because the chief constable of the

1 force concerned would have to be informed.

2 Q. Whilst we're on this topic, I want to just ask you
3 a couple of questions about it.

4 Can we have up on the screen, please {MPS/730728/1}.
5 The initial note from Geoffrey Craft says:

6 "At least four of our SDS field officers are under
7 heavy pressure from their organisations to take part in
8 a demonstration in Blackburn and refusal on their part
9 would undoubtedly put their cover at risk. It is
10 proposed, therefore, that they be instructed to join
11 their 'colleagues' in the day's activities and that
12 DI McIntosh and DS Walker travel to Blackburn on the
13 Saturday morning to be on hand should any difficulty
14 arise."

15 The purpose of your travelling to Blackburn appears
16 to be to safeguard those officers so that you could step
17 in should any difficulty come up during the course of
18 that demonstration; is that right?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. What would local police be told about your presence, or
21 would they be told anything at all about your presence
22 there?

23 A. Well, as I say, the chief constable or his deputy would
24 have been informed, and we liaised with their
25 Special Branch. Blackburn would be Lancashire,

1 I suppose.

2 Q. Right.

3 You can take that down now, please, and can we have
4 up on the screen {MPS/730729/1}. This is a letter of
5 thanks from the Lancashire Police headquarters.

6 The second paragraph:

7 "The demonstration was concluded without any serious
8 incident and the assistance of your Detective Inspector
9 McIntosh and Detective Sergeant Walker ... is very much
10 appreciated."

11 What sort of assistance would you have given to
12 the --

13 A. That, in my mind, is just a very polite letter. In
14 fact, our presence was sitting in an office hoping that
15 the right wing hadn't attacked the left wing and injured
16 any of our officers --

17 Q. Right.

18 A. -- and that was basically it.

19 Q. Right. So that looks as if it's simply a form of words
20 that's used to acknowledge your presence.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you very much.

23 You can take that down.

24 Recruitment. You say that you were involved in
25 the recruitment of undercover officers and you list

1 the particular qualities you were looking for when you
2 made that decision. You say that you had a preference
3 for stable, reliable, mentally relaxed and dependable
4 UCOs, amateur dramatic enthusiasts, because essentially
5 you were asking them to be actors in their role.

6 Recommendations, you said, would often come through
7 the back office sergeants. Is it through people that
8 they had known during the course of their previous
9 police career in the Special Branch?

10 A. Yes. It -- I expect an understanding most probably came
11 through at that level, because they are officers who
12 actually knew the young new officers, whereas, I mean,
13 I -- I'd been in Special Branch something like 12 years
14 by the time I was a DI and I didn't know many of
15 the individuals, particularly as part of my time had
16 been away from London anyhow.

17 Q. And did you -- once you received a name or a tip off
18 about somebody who might be a suitable candidate, did
19 you then ask around about that person generally in
20 Special Branch?

21 A. Yes, we did.

22 Q. You say in your witness statement you would have asked
23 their superior officers about them. Did you also speak
24 to their contemporaries?

25 A. No. We couldn't, really. I mean, if they're

1 contemporaries, you've got -- the problem is -- in
2 Special Branch is, or was, it was a very small
3 department and therefore you had lots of little cliques,
4 and to find out about a particular individual anything
5 of real value, you couldn't afford to go into that
6 clique because it wouldn't be a good assessment, whereas
7 the other officers in the back office could because they
8 knew colleagues of that era.

9 Q. So that was something that was sort of informally
10 delegated, was it --

11 A. Oh, absolutely --

12 Q. -- to the back office staff?

13 A. -- because in general in Special Branch at that time,
14 no one outside SDS knew what exactly they were doing.
15 They knew that people disappeared for a number of years
16 and on very odd occasions were brought into the yard,
17 because they had to be seen in the yard, and they all
18 were very scruffy.

19 Q. I think you say in your witness statement that
20 Special Branch was like a family. You repeated it's
21 sort of a small --

22 A. As -- as I say, yes.

23 Q. Was it -- did reputation sort of travel round
24 Special Branch? You could find out about somebody's
25 reputation relatively easily?

1 A. Well, to some extent, but it depends on the individual
2 and how prepared they are to talk about their private
3 lives.

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. So you only got a reputation maybe as seen from
6 a professional eye.

7 Q. If we've heard that various officers had reputations in
8 Special Branch for being womanisers, is that the sort of
9 reputation which would have affected your view as to
10 their suitability during your enquiries?

11 A. It would, but it would depend exactly what the
12 reputation -- the basis of the reputation. I mean, to
13 be quite frank, a lot of -- there was a lot of banter.
14 It's a band of men, or it was in those days, and in any
15 institution where it's all male, there is always banter,
16 and I dare say there may be similar banter amongst
17 women, I don't know. And where you've got banter, you
18 often had people, rather like the social media, saying
19 things in fact they hadn't done or wouldn't do, but were
20 keeping in with the crowd. So you had to be very
21 careful of making an assessment purely on banter.

22 Q. So that wasn't necessarily something that you would have
23 taken terribly seriously?

24 A. Well, in one way we would, because you don't want
25 an individual who you knew was likely to behave in such

1 a manner in close contact with women. Yes, it would be
2 an important feature.

3 Q. HN155. If you need to refer to the list that you've
4 got, then do.

5 A. I think I know --

6 Q. Thank you.

7 A. -- who you're talking about.

8 Q. He describes Mike Ferguson firing questions at him prior
9 to his deployment to ensure that he was prepared for it.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Was that something common? Did Mike Ferguson tend to do
12 that with UCOs when they first started?

13 A. Geoff Craft as well. I mean, that was -- part of the
14 job was to make sure they're prepared to go out and test
15 their cover story and all the aspects with it, yes.

16 Q. And would that have touched on, do you think, the risk
17 of engaging in any sort of sexual relationship sort
18 of --

19 A. I've no idea.

20 Q. No idea.

21 A. I mean, he was an experienced field officer at one time.

22 Q. A major factor in their suitability, you say in your
23 witness statement, was the marital status of the
24 undercover officer or potential undercover officer,
25 because there was an appreciation that undercover life

1 was a difficult one and domestic stability was very
2 important. You say that you spoke -- always spoke to
3 the spouse or the partner of an undercover officer to
4 assess how acceptable a new way of life would be in
5 respect of their domestic life. How would you assess
6 that?

7 A. Well, we spoke -- on the occasions we did meet the
8 officer's wife, it was prior to them going out. So one
9 of the main purposes of these meetings was actually to
10 introduce ourselves to the lady, make it abundantly
11 clear that we were available at all times should they
12 have any problem, and -- and that was the main objective
13 of meeting them.

14 Q. How would you assess whether the pressured and difficult
15 role of the UCO would be one that their domestic life
16 could withstand?

17 A. You couldn't really. You had to accept what the good
18 lady was saying to you. I mean, you can -- you can only
19 enquire about domestic situations. We certainly didn't
20 investigate them.

21 Q. What did you say to the spouse or the partner about the
22 life that their partner was going to undertake? What
23 were you able to say to them about it?

24 A. Well, basically that they would be working long hours
25 and a lot of it would be evening work and, "You wouldn't

- 1 be seeing your husband for very long periods".
- 2 Q. So it was largely about the absences from the --
- 3 A. Yes.
- 4 Q. -- domestic house?
- 5 A. General welfare, really, (a) acquainting them with what
- 6 the circumstances may involve and (b) to reassure them
- 7 that they had two -- two numbers, two officers to
- 8 approach, and hopefully we came over as understanding
- 9 and caring individuals to give them confidence to
- 10 contact us.
- 11 Q. And did you give them any sort of indication of the
- 12 sorts of risks that there might be involved --
- 13 A. No.
- 14 Q. -- in their husbands' deployments?
- 15 A. No.
- 16 Q. And did you assist them with how to raise a concern if
- 17 they were worried about something with their husbands
- 18 and the sort of things that might have been of concern?
- 19 A. Other than introducing ourselves and saying we were open
- 20 24 hours a day for any problem.
- 21 Q. You say in your witness statement you wanted to gain
- 22 their trust. What was the purpose of that for you?
- 23 A. Whose trust?
- 24 Q. The spouse. You wanted to gain the trust of the spouse.
- 25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. What was the purpose of gaining their trust?
- 2 A. As I said, welfare reasons. If they had problems, they
3 could contact us and we could sort it out.
- 4 Q. You also say that a stable domestic life or their
5 marital -- it was likely to reduce the temptations of
6 any sexual liaison whilst undercover. Was that
7 a reason -- one of the other reasons why you would have
8 a preference for a married officer?
- 9 A. Absolutely.
- 10 Q. So the temptation of a sexual liaison undercover was
11 a risk that was actively considered; is that right?
- 12 A. Of course, facts of life.
- 13 Q. Was that explained to the undercover officer or to their
14 spouse when they were recruited, that anxiety?
- 15 A. Certainly not to the spouse. We wouldn't say to her,
16 "You realise that there's an opportunity that he might
17 have a sexual relationship", no.
- 18 Q. Did you have any ongoing contact with the spouse during
19 the course of the undercover officer's deployment?
- 20 A. I can't recall it. I can't recall it.
- 21 Q. So it wasn't a question of checking in with them
22 occasionally?
- 23 A. Oh, far from -- no, definitely not.
- 24 Q. Simply that they could phone you --
- 25 A. Yeah.

1 Q. -- were anything to arise?

2 A. Open door policy.

3 Q. We understand that HN354, Vince Harvey's --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- longstanding relationship broke down during the

6 course of his deployment. Was that something that you

7 or Mike Ferguson were aware of?

8 A. I can't speak for Mike Ferguson, but I certainly wasn't.

9 In fact, when I learned of this Inquiry and his

10 behaviour, I was amazed.

11 Q. If you had learned of that, would that have concerned

12 you, that he was no -- that he was a single man --

13 A. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. Security risk.

14 Q. And what would you have done about it, do you think?

15 A. Well, I -- I would have expected the chief inspector to

16 have him withdrawn and the matter certainly would have

17 been taken up to the superintendent/chief superintendent

18 level --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- without a doubt.

21 MS HUMMERSTONE: Right, thank you very much.

22 Sir, I wonder if that's a suitable moment at which

23 to have a break.

24 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly it would be.

25 We will now have a quarter of an hour's break. If

1 known about his -- the relationship his -- long term
2 relationship breakdown when he was deployed, would that
3 in and of itself have been something that concerned you?

4 A. It would have done, but -- well, it certainly would have
5 done, because I firmly believed it was better to recruit
6 married men and Vince Harvey was a single man --

7 Q. And -- sorry.

8 A. -- but someone considered that he would be an exception.

9 Q. Had you known about the breakdown of that relationship,
10 would it have -- what would you have done about it?

11 A. I'm not certain. It's -- it's hard to go back, to some
12 extent. I'd most probably have looked at it from
13 a welfare point of view completely, because it was
14 nothing to do -- indirectly it was to do with his --
15 most probably, his working duties. On the other hand,
16 it was purely a domestic matter and it was too late to
17 withdraw him from the field because he wasn't married.
18 No, I would only have dealt with it as a welfare matter
19 to see if I could assist either party.

20 Q. Was the fact that he was not married and single, albeit
21 in a long term relationship, something that concerned
22 you when he was coming into the unit?

23 A. Yes, because I personally thought married men were
24 better, a better risk.

25 Q. And was that something that you expressed openly, your

1 reservations?

2 A. Oh, it wouldn't have been a secret, particularly with my
3 chief inspector, because general chitchat, you know. No
4 secrets professionally.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 Moving on now, please, to cover identities. You
7 said that you did not have any role in the inventing,
8 developing or assessing of cover identities, but you did
9 have an advisory role in the building of cover
10 identities. What do you mean by "advisory"; can you
11 recall?

12 A. Well, I -- I certainly believed in the system of getting
13 the birth certificates of very young children who had
14 died.

15 Q. And why did you believe in that system?

16 A. Why? Well, I'd heard of the system. It -- it wasn't
17 a secret system at all. It was in the public eye, if
18 you read books and stuff like that. It seemed a good
19 system from the point of view it gave them a definite
20 date of birth and a birth certificate for the casual
21 look. Nothing was computerised in those days.

22 I didn't think it had -- well, and I've been proved
23 wrong, but I didn't think it had any risk of exposure.
24 The chances were so long that, to me, it wasn't a risk
25 and therefore, I didn't think it could cause any

1 embarrassment to the deceased's parents/relatives.

2 Q. Does it follow at the time you didn't consider any
3 ethical implications of using the identity of a --

4 A. No, I didn't.

5 Q. -- child who had died?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Can you recall any active consideration of the ethics of
8 that --

9 A. No, none at all.

10 Q. -- tactic?

11 Of course, the families are now aware that the
12 identities of their children have been used. Does it
13 cause you now to question the ethics of using that
14 tactic?

15 A. No, I don't go back at all on -- on my views. I think
16 it's most unfortunate that this Inquiry has enabled the
17 poor families and relatives to realise that this has
18 happened. In normal circumstances, it wouldn't have
19 happened. I mean, it's extraordinary.

20 Q. HN80, in his witness statement, he said that using the
21 full details of a real child caused him distress and so
22 whilst he did obtain a birth certificate of a real
23 child, he changed the first name. Were you aware of
24 that?

25 A. No. Can I see who the person was? HN80?

- 1 Q. HN80, yes, of course.
- 2 A. No, I certainly wasn't aware of that, no.
- 3 Q. Thank you.
- 4 HN297, Rick Clark --
- 5 A. Oh, yes.
- 6 Q. -- whose name is open. Your period of deployment
7 overlapped with him for a certain period. I think he
8 came out in September 1976. Can you recall him being
9 withdrawn from the SDS?
- 10 A. No, I can't, actually, and I don't know why, because
11 it's an event of great significance operationally. I do
12 recall being present outside the pub with a surveillance
13 team and that because we knew that this particular
14 officer had been uncovered --
- 15 Q. So you think --
- 16 A. -- and -- and -- oh, sorry, that's my foot -- and we
17 feared that as a result, this follow-up meeting, there
18 could be violence or whatever, and that's all I knew.
19 I didn't know any details of it, so I presumed that
20 Geoff Craft had dealt with it with another back room
21 staff, which accounts -- as I said at the beginning of
22 the -- my interview, I don't recall working with Geoff.
- 23 Q. Yes, but you were aware of a potential compromise in
24 Rick Clark's case?
- 25 A. Oh, absolutely, yes.

1 Q. And were you aware that that potential compromise was
2 the birth certificate and the death certificate that he
3 was presented with?

4 A. I'm not sure whether I was, but I'm certainly aware now.

5 Q. Did that, as you understood it, potential compromise
6 prompt any kind of review or re-thinking of the practice
7 of using identities of children who'd died that you can
8 recall?

9 A. I don't -- as I say, I don't recall it, but I'm sure it
10 did, it -- and particularly how -- how it occurred.

11 I mean, what were the circumstances? We did know that
12 there were certain organisations which had very severe
13 security checks, hence the reason why, for all
14 undercover officers, we had strong background stories.

15 How or why the organisation felt or knew, I --
16 I don't know, but to be able to do that, they must have
17 gone up to Somerset House or St Catherine's House, or
18 whichever was holding the records, and done all the
19 searches to prove this. Very strange, in my mind.

20 So, in answer to your question, without doubt we
21 would have been very concerned and looked at the whole
22 practice as to the way forward.

23 Q. But it's not something -- his compromise was not
24 something that you think you were told about?

25 A. I'm sure I wasn't told about it, other than he had been

1 exposed.

2 Q. I'll deal with it now because we're dealing with 297.
3 One of the officers, undercover officers, indicates that
4 he had heard from Rick Clark that the reason for his
5 compromise was his sexual dalliances. Did you hear
6 anything like that --

7 A. No.

8 Q. -- or were you aware of anything like that?

9 A. I didn't. I wasn't aware of his dalliances.

10 Q. Right. I'll deal with that a little later in a bit more
11 detail.

12 Supervision of the undercover officers. You
13 describe --

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me for interrupting, but if you're
15 moving from the exposure of Rick Clark, HN297, there's
16 a question I would like to ask at this stage.

17 MS HUMMERSTONE: Oh, please do.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: You remember going to a pub --

19 A. Yes.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and in effect performing a surveillance
21 and, if necessary, protection role for Rick Clark --

22 A. Yes.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: -- who was inside the pub.

24 A. Yes, meeting colleagues.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. You understood him to be meeting

1 people --

2 A. Yes.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: -- who were going to confront him?

4 A. Well, or take the issue on. Presumably, he'd -- he had

5 been confronted at some time, otherwise we wouldn't have

6 known he had been exposed.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: So you knew he had been exposed?

8 A. No, I'm sorry, Chairman. I'm saying that we wouldn't be

9 keeping surveillance on this meeting unless we knew that

10 he had been exposed --

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

12 A. -- and because of that, we feared for his safety.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: So you did know he had been exposed?

14 A. I -- yes, I had been told that.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: By members of a group or one of the groups

16 that he'd infiltrated?

17 A. I'm sorry, I -- I was told that presumably by a member

18 of the office --

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

20 A. -- not by the group.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: No, no, of course not, but he had been

22 exposed by someone in a group that he had something to

23 do with.

24 A. I beg your pardon. Absolutely, yes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Did you attend outside the pub alone or with

1 other people?

2 A. No, we were -- there were several of -- of us, including
3 members of the surveillance -- the Special Branch
4 surveillance team.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

6 Anyone else from the SDS?

7 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. Well, other than the back --
8 the chief inspector or -- or maybe someone in the back
9 office.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: So your recollection is that the chief
11 inspector or someone in the back office was with you?

12 A. Well, someone told me that this meeting was going to
13 take place and it was decided, because we feared that
14 the officer was in danger or could be in danger, that
15 surveillance and our presence was around there.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

17 Yesterday I was told by Geoff Craft that he had been
18 outside the pub with Derek Kneale.

19 A. I -- I can't comment on that, sir, because --

20 THE CHAIRMAN: No.

21 A. -- I don't recall. I personally don't recall being out
22 on an operation with Derek Kneale.

23 THE CHAIRMAN: No.

24 A. He was the superintendent, I think, at the time.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: It may be that the truth, although neither of

1 you remember it, is that you and Geoff Craft were there.

2 A. If you had asked earlier on, sir, that would have been

3 my answer.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Right.

5 A. Yes.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: So as best as you can remember --

7 A. Best I can remember.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: -- it was you and Geoff Craft.

9 A. Yes. I certainly can't recall being out with the

10 superintendent.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

12 MS HUMMERSTONE: Your primary concern as the DI at the SDS

13 was that -- you say the morale and safety of

14 the individual officers and their day-to-day running and

15 welfare, and I just want to explore what that meant in

16 practice and how closely officers were monitored or

17 supervised.

18 You say in your witness statement you had weekly

19 meetings. We've heard in fact they were twice-weekly

20 meetings --

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. -- is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And also there were -- were there daily telephone

25 conversations from the officers?

- 1 A. They phoned in every day, yes.
- 2 Q. I just want to deal with the telephone conversations
3 first. What was their purpose? What was the reason for
4 the daily telephone conversation?
- 5 A. To -- to know they were still with us.
- 6 Q. Right. So was there -- was an update on their -- it was
7 a welfare check, was it?
- 8 A. Well, it's a mixture of -- in the police force, we used
9 to have to check in every day and check off every day.
10 In these circumstances, they didn't phone to check off
11 because of their job.
- 12 Q. Over the telephone call, would you receive an update on
13 their -- the daily activity of the undercover officer or
14 not?
- 15 A. No, not necessarily, no.
- 16 Q. And would you ask them for any sort of progress report
17 about what they'd been doing or --
- 18 A. No, no. I'd be interested in their welfare, that they
19 were okay and everything was ticking over.
- 20 Q. And so the day-to-day -- their day-to-day activities,
21 would you have been aware of them; where they were
22 going, what they were doing?
- 23 A. Not in detail, no.
- 24 Q. The twice-weekly meetings, those took place at the safe
25 house, we understand.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And those were meetings that you attended with

3 Mike Ferguson --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- is that right?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Did you meet all the officers together at some stage?

8 A. Yes. The safe houses had more than one room and very

9 often Mike Ferguson would go into the room where all the

10 officers were writing up their notes or doing whatever,

11 and I would be in a separate room, because we had to

12 keep diaries. We had to vet their expenses and stuff

13 like that, so I would be doing that side of the job and

14 Mike Ferguson was normally -- would normally be there

15 for general chat, or taking individuals aside to deal

16 with whatever was current.

17 Q. Were you present during the general chat that you can

18 recall?

19 A. Very, very seldom. Very seldom.

20 Q. So you were dealing with the sort of admin paperwork,

21 were you --

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. -- in a side room?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Mike Ferguson would be in the main sitting area with

- 1 the officers?
- 2 A. Yes, he'd be in and out according to the day's
- 3 requirements.
- 4 Q. You also -- or Mike Ferguson spoke to them individually.
- 5 Did you speak to them individually?
- 6 A. On occasions, yes.
- 7 Q. And during those individual conversations, did you take
- 8 an account of their activities, what they'd been doing
- 9 over the past few days since you'd last had
- 10 a face-to-face meeting with them?
- 11 A. Yes, which would normally daytime be looking after that
- 12 are cover story; in other words, place of work and
- 13 activities and that, and then their involvement at other
- 14 times in the evenings.
- 15 Q. And would they tell you then which demonstrations they
- 16 had been to or which meetings they had been to or
- 17 matters of that nature?
- 18 A. Yeah, they would report -- actually, they would draft it
- 19 out and the draft would be turned into a report.
- 20 Q. And so at those meetings, they had already drafted, had
- 21 they?
- 22 A. Well, it depended on the individual. Some had already
- 23 done it, others did it during the meeting, or aside of
- 24 the meeting.
- 25 Q. And you took their notes or their reports from them,

1 did you, to process back in the back office?

2 A. They were collected, yeah.

3 Q. Was it at the safe house during these meetings that

4 individual officers were given their tasking? If

5 a request had come in for a particular brand of

6 intelligence or intelligence on a particular group --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- or event --

9 A. It would be done -- they would be given it at the safe

10 house.

11 Q. And would that be a verbal instruction from you,

12 a verbal --

13 A. Yes. Yes, it would.

14 Q. And both you and Mike Ferguson involved in that process,

15 or just Mike Ferguson?

16 A. Mainly Mike.

17 Q. Would you and Mike Ferguson have had a general awareness

18 of the day-to-day activities of the undercover officers

19 that you were looking after?

20 A. Well, only a general. We -- we didn't go out spying on

21 them.

22 Q. Overtime claims.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. Is that something that you had to deal with?

25 A. Yes.

- 1 Q. From their overtime claims, could you have built up
2 an idea of the hours that officers were working?
- 3 A. Oh, yes.
- 4 Q. And was lengthy hours -- if someone was working lengthy
5 hours, would that have been of some concern?
- 6 A. Well, it was of concern for two reasons. One -- one was
7 welfare and the other reason was the cost.
- 8 Q. Right.
- 9 HN354 has, I think, told us that he was working
10 seven days a week, 14 hours a day --
- 11 A. Mm-hm.
- 12 Q. -- and rarely took a day off.
- 13 Would you have offered any sort of words of advice
14 about those sorts of lengthy hours to the officer
15 concerned; can you recall?
- 16 A. Well, constantly, because there was tremendous pressure
17 at the time from the -- from Scotland Yard as a whole on
18 overtime, and so the -- the pressure was passed down
19 through the management line and everyone was required to
20 try and curtail overtime. This particular job, it was
21 virtually impossible to curtail it.
- 22 Q. So the sort of overarching management concern was
23 the money, but your concern was also the welfare of
24 the officers; is that right?
- 25 A. Oh, absolutely right, and I have to stress that the --

1 there was tremendous pressure from outside to reduce it
2 because of the cost and, in my mind, it didn't consider
3 the job being done. But personally, I -- I was very
4 concerned of the long hours, but I couldn't see a way of
5 actually reducing it without jeopardising their cover.

6 Q. What were your concerns about them working long hours?
7 What sort of welfare concerns did you have?

8 A. Well, it meant that they weren't ever getting home and
9 being with their wives and children.

10 Q. Was there any concern that they were becoming too close
11 to the individuals in their target group? Was that
12 something that occurred to you?

13 A. It -- it -- no, it wasn't one voiced, I have to say.
14 There's always a risk of that and it's very hard to
15 actually control, because if you're not there or got
16 witness of what people were doing, it's very hard to
17 actually say, other than where's the evidence that
18 they're not doing what they say they're doing.

19 Q. Did you build up a close relationship with the officers
20 in the SDS during your time there?

21 A. I like to feel that I did.

22 Q. And did you feel the relationship was such that it would
23 encourage any disclosure of any concerns they might have
24 had, the officers, to you? Was it that sort of
25 relationship? They could discuss problems that they

1 had.

2 A. Yes, it was, but we have to acknowledge that some of the
3 problems they might have, which may -- may have been
4 self-induced, they wouldn't tell a senior officer.
5 I mean, although they're undercover officers, they are
6 police officers, and there is, or was then, a very
7 strict discipline and respect for rank, and the SDS was
8 exceptional. I say "exceptional", but maybe
9 Special Branch was different to the main police force,
10 but outside, you never referred to anyone of rank above
11 you by their first name.

12 In the SDS, that rule wasn't enforced because we
13 wanted to gain their confidence so that we would be told
14 what any problem was. But if -- I wouldn't expect them
15 to say, "I'm having a problem, I'm sleeping with
16 a member of the group".

17 Q. That was not something you would have expected them to
18 say to you?

19 A. Certainly not, because I think they would feel, and
20 I would agree with them in principle, it could
21 jeopardise their whole career.

22 Q. How about Mike Ferguson? Was he the sort -- did he
23 build up a close relationship with --

24 A. Oh, he did exactly the same, yes.

25 Q. And was he the sort of man who could be confided in

1 about difficulties that were being encountered, with the
2 caveat that sexual relationships, you think, were off
3 the table?

4 A. Absolutely. I have absolutely no doubt about that.
5 He -- he was a man's man.

6 Q. Thank you.

7 And did they come to you with problems, the
8 undercover officers, that you can recall? I don't need
9 to know the details of them, but ...

10 A. Well, yes, yes. But I have to say, I don't remember
11 many domestic problems.

12 Q. It's clear from your witness statement that you were
13 aware of the risk that undercover officers might engage
14 in sexual contact in their undercover identities, and
15 one of the steps you took to mitigate that risk was
16 the preference for officers that were married; would
17 that be fair?

18 A. That would be fair, yes.

19 Q. Was that risk -- was that a serious concern for the SDS,
20 do you think?

21 A. Yes, but from the security angle of the whole operation.

22 Q. That was going to be my next question. Why was it
23 considered to be a serious risk?

24 A. Why?

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. Because if you've got that close sort of relationship,
2 you might let slip something, and I guess, you having
3 said that Rick Clark had been involved with women, that
4 most probably was how it came out. I don't know.

5 Q. So it was the -- the anxiety for the SDS, you say, was
6 the -- was that this could jeopardise the operation --

7 A. The whole security of the operation.

8 Q. Did you also consider that an officer engaging in sexual
9 activity in those circumstances was abusing his position
10 and his power at that time?

11 A. Not at all, no. I -- I would have viewed it as, if you
12 take away the discipline side, of something which is
13 between male and female, or of whatever sex, and things
14 happen, and the mental track of that is down to the
15 individual.

16 Q. You say in your witness statement that there were
17 discussions about the issue of girlfriends for these
18 undercover officers who were posing as single men in
19 their target groups, because it made it difficult for
20 them when dealing with female members of their group.
21 Was that something that the undercover officers brought
22 up with you at the safe house, can you remember?

23 A. Oh, yes, yes.

24 Q. And was that something that Mike Ferguson would also
25 have been aware of? Were other officers present?

- 1 A. Yes, yes.
- 2 Q. And was that something that was shared outside the SDS
3 with any -- going into superintendent ranks?
- 4 A. It wouldn't have gone to higher level, because we were
5 looking for ways of solving the problem, but it was felt
6 impractical to -- or, yes, operationally impractical --
- 7 Q. Thank you.
- 8 A. -- to bring in our own.
- 9 Q. Thank you.
- 10 Risk factors that may have increased the risk of
11 sexual activity being undertaken. We've mentioned also
12 the long hours work. Was alcohol -- we've mentioned
13 also alcohol.
- 14 Personal relationship with activists, was that
15 considered to be a risk factor when trying to identify
16 when people might succumb to a sexual relationship if
17 they were building up close relationships with members
18 of their target group?
- 19 A. Well, it's difficult to answer, because we're talking
20 about human relations and yes, there is a risk. There's
21 a risk of this sort of behaviour in any circumstances
22 and in any large group, institution, whatever.
- 23 Q. And was that something that you tried to monitor through
24 your conversations with the undercover officers?
- 25 A. We tried to sense that, but it's not something they

1 would talk about, to be quite honest.

2 Q. And how about social activities that they might be
3 undertaking with members of their target group? Was
4 that something that you tried to get a sense of through
5 your conversations with the undercover officers in the
6 safe house?

7 A. Well, not from a sexual point of view, no. The
8 participation in social activities was all necessary as
9 part of their cover and it -- very strange to have
10 a member who doesn't partake in all the functions of
11 the organisation.

12 Q. And how about the period of time that an undercover
13 officer was deployed? You say in your witness statement
14 there was a four-year maximum during your period.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Was that something that you felt quite strongly about,
17 that it should be four years?

18 A. I did. I actually -- I know it's four years, but that
19 includes the period in the back office learning the art,
20 etc, and I used to think three years was maximum. But,
21 of course, there are always circumstances and pressures
22 one way or the other where rules are bent, I guess.

23 Q. And you say in your witness statement that that would
24 avoid -- that that absolute maximum would avoid the
25 possibility of officers going rogue. What did you mean

- 1 by "going rogue"?
- 2 A. Well, forgetting that they are actually police officers
3 and therefore not acting as they should do.
- 4 Q. And did you mean engaging in sexual activity with --
- 5 A. I meant across the board.
- 6 Q. Thank you.
- 7 In his evidence, HN354, Vince Harvey, told us that
8 he spoke to, he thought, Geoff Craft about an activist
9 who'd expressed a sexual interest in him and asked his
10 advice as to how to respond to that. Was that something
11 that you were aware of?
- 12 A. No, certainly not.
- 13 Q. Did you consider that there might have been incentives
14 for undercover officers to engage in sexual activity,
15 for example to enhance their cover, that that might have
16 been a difficulty?
- 17 A. Definitely not. None at all.
- 18 Q. Did you believe it would have enhanced their cover or
19 not?
- 20 A. It would in practice, but we would never recommend that
21 or encourage it, no.
- 22 Q. And how about enhancing their intelligence-gathering
23 capabilities, that there might have been pressure on
24 an officer to enhance that by the use of sexual
25 activity?

1 A. Well, in fact, that may well be true, but we didn't at
2 any stage encourage or suggest it.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 It's understood that the meetings at the safe house
5 had a dual purpose. Part of it was admin and tasking
6 and matters of that nature, but there was also a social
7 purpose --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- of it to keep the undercover officer sort of grounded
10 in his real life and have an opportunity to relax with
11 like-minded individuals --

12 A. With colleagues.

13 Q. -- going through the same sorts of things and have a bit
14 of time off effectively, and I want to ask you a little
15 bit about that now.

16 Was that something you were a supporter of, that
17 period of time when they could just simply relax and be
18 themselves?

19 A. Absolutely, yes.

20 Q. And was that -- once the sort of business side of the
21 meetings was over, was it a relaxed and informal sort of
22 atmosphere at the safe house, as we've heard?

23 A. Yes, yes.

24 Q. And you've told us, and it's been endorsed by officers
25 that we've heard from, that the usual police hierarchies

- 1 weren't so evident in the SDS. And did you feel
2 the undercover officers were able to relax and be
3 themselves with you --
- 4 A. We did.
- 5 Q. -- and Mike Ferguson present?
- 6 A. We did. It was an important part, I -- I think, to see
7 how they were behaving, and as you rightly point out, to
8 give them an opportunity and an occasion where they --
9 they could talk to colleagues and remind themselves that
10 they're still in the job, which was very, very
11 important.
- 12 Q. Would somebody make lunch for you all?
- 13 A. Yes, they would -- most probably interns would do their
14 own cooking and present a meal.
- 15 Q. HN304 has described those lunches as "long and moist",
16 indicating that officers had a drink or two. Can you
17 remember that? Do you recognise that description of
18 those lunches?
- 19 A. "Long and ..." Well, "long" I wouldn't deny. "Moist"?
20 I mean, what exactly does "moist" mean? Yes, there was
21 drinks, I guess, but there was never -- and they
22 couldn't afford to have any excessive drinking, because
23 all of them had cars or vans or whatever.
- 24 Q. He also said it might be followed by a trip to the pub
25 afterwards. Can you remember that?

1 A. Well, I wasn't part and parcel of that. It certainly
2 wasn't with the back office management.

3 Q. Right.

4 You've described that the culture of Special Branch
5 at the time was very much a sort of -- these were men
6 together -- sorry, SDS; men together --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- exchanging banter --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. -- jokes, things of that nature.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And you've also said that very often there would be sort
13 of idle boasts about sexual prowess and things of that
14 nature; would that be right?

15 A. That would be quite right, yes.

16 Q. Was that the atmosphere at the safe house with these
17 12 men going through this --

18 A. Well --

19 Q. -- sort of experience?

20 A. -- there would be 12 men laughing and joking. Exactly
21 what the content was would depend, I suppose, you know.

22 Q. HN304 has told us that often activists in the target
23 groups would be the butt of some of that sort of banter.
24 Can you remember that sort of --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- laughing and joking about activists or their groups?

2 A. No. I didn't -- I wasn't present for -- most of

3 the banter went in the group. I was dealing much more

4 with the admin in a different room. If -- and on

5 occasions I did join the -- the meal, the lunch or

6 whatever. That sort of individual banter wasn't there.

7 It was general -- just general banter. There's no other

8 word for it, really.

9 Q. He also described that there were often jokes of

10 a sexual nature, which I think you accept that that was

11 the sort of thing that would go on; is that right?

12 A. Yes, I -- I couldn't deny that. There most probably

13 was.

14 Q. Can you recall anything said about activists in that

15 regard?

16 A. No, I certainly can't.

17 Q. Sexual banter in front of you. Was that something you

18 were perfectly happy to --

19 A. It was something I'd been brought up with within the

20 job, not outside the job.

21 Q. Right. Right.

22 In particular, we have heard that there were jokes

23 about the sexual prowess of HN297, Rick Clark. HN304

24 has said that there were managers present during

25 conversations about Rick Clark and that managers

- 1 couldn't have failed to have understood that HN297,
2 Rick Clark, was engaging in sexual activity in his
3 undercover role. What's your reaction to that?
- 4 A. Well, his perception is completely wrong. Completely
5 wrong.
- 6 Q. Were you aware that he'd engaged in sexual activity in
7 his undercover role?
- 8 A. No, I certainly wasn't.
- 9 Q. And can you remember any sort of banter that might have
10 suggested that there was any sexual activity --
- 11 A. No.
- 12 Q. -- with him going on?
- 13 A. No.
- 14 Q. We have been told that HN297 had a reputation as
15 a womaniser. Does that surprise you, a description of
16 him like that? I think a "carnivore" is how he has been
17 described.
- 18 A. He -- he was a very confident, outgoing person, and to
19 me, he was the type who would brag about anything. He
20 may well have been a womaniser, but I had no indication
21 at all that he was indulging in such behaviour whilst on
22 duty.
- 23 Q. The sort of person who would have bragged about sexual
24 conquests --
- 25 A. Oh, yes.

1 Q. -- was he that type?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Does it surprise you to know now that he had sex with at
4 least four women whilst he was undercover in the SDS?

5 A. Does it surprise me? I don't know really whether it
6 does surprise me or not. I'm so used to, being in the
7 police for nearly 40-odd years, hearing about people
8 involved with sexual encounters that, no, I don't
9 suppose I was surprised. I was shocked, yes, because,
10 to me, he had let not only the SDS down, he had let
11 everyone down, and the end result is now this Inquiry,
12 and I think it's a great pity.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me a moment. You talk as if you now
14 remember him letting everyone down; is that right?

15 A. That he -- his behaviour has let everyone down.
16 I'm saying, Chairman, that, as a result of his
17 behaviour, an Inquiry has been set up which is delving
18 into the whole operational practices of the SDS 50 years
19 ago and it's a great shame, because one of the proud
20 things of Special Branch was that the SDS was run
21 without the general knowledge of the Branch, let alone
22 the police force or anyone else. Now the whole thing's
23 been exposed, unravelled, and that's why I -- I think
24 it's a great shame that his behaviour -- well,
25 I'm ashamed of his behaviour, full stop.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: I think we're at cross-purposes. I had
2 understood you to say that at the time, you thought he
3 had let everybody down.

4 A. No, at the -- Chairman, I didn't know he had been
5 involved until this Inquiry was started.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I well understand that that was what
7 you say in your witness statement and what you've said
8 in evidence.

9 A. Sorry, if --

10 THE CHAIRMAN: If I misunderstood what you said, thank you
11 for clarifying it.

12 A. Thank you.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Forgive me.

14 MS HUMMERSTONE: HN300. I don't know whether you need to
15 remind yourself of who --

16 A. No, I do -- I do know.

17 Q. -- that is. Thank you very much.

18 Were you aware of any reputation he had as
19 a womaniser?

20 A. I wasn't initially when he -- in fact, I -- I don't
21 recall when he actually joined the SDS, whether I --
22 I was there at that time or not.

23 Q. You weren't, I think.

24 A. I was?

25 Q. You weren't, not when he initially joined the SDS.

1 A. No. So there he was and I --

2 Q. Did you become aware of it?

3 A. Yes. He was a strange character.

4 Q. And did you become aware of it during the course of his

5 SDS deployment?

6 A. I suspect so, yes; later on in his -- towards the end of

7 his stint.

8 Q. He's been described by one of the officers in closed

9 session as a "sexual predator". Does that assessment

10 accord with your memory of him?

11 A. I certainly would never put it into that category, but

12 that's an individual opinion, isn't it?

13 Q. You say you became aware of the fact that he was

14 a womaniser, or that sort of thing --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- during the course of the latter stages of his --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- SDS deployment.

19 He was withdrawn, we think, in November 1976, so

20 about five or six or seven months after you had joined

21 the SDS.

22 A. Mm.

23 Q. And we understand that he was withdrawn as a result of

24 his falling in love with an activist. Can you recall

25 that?

- 1 A. No, I certainly can't. I didn't know anything about
2 that until the Inquiry started.
- 3 Q. What was it that you became aware of then during the
4 course of his SDS deployment that caused you to think
5 that there may be difficulties with him?
- 6 A. I think it was right at the end, general chitchat, I --
7 I think. If I recall correctly, he'd -- he'd been
8 married a couple of times and his -- I think his
9 marriage was said to be on the rocks.
- 10 Q. So is that the anxiety, his marriage was on the rocks,
11 or that he was engaged in other sexual --
- 12 A. No. Well, actually I thought --
- 13 Q. -- matters?
- 14 A. -- he was being withdrawn because his time was up.
- 15 Q. I wanted to ask you about that, please. The Inquiry has
16 been told by an officer giving evidence in closed
17 session that he was -- HN300 confessed to him that he'd
18 fallen in love with an activist and that officer, that
19 closed officer, arranged a meeting with the SDS
20 management in a pub, told them about it, then HN300 was
21 then withdrawn, and the officer recalls that it was you
22 that was spoken to about HN300.
- 23 A. Yes.
- 24 Q. Can you recall --
- 25 A. No.

- 1 Q. -- being informed about that?
- 2 A. Definitely not, and all I can say is I don't remember
3 any of those circumstances, and I've read the transcript
4 of the officer concerned and he didn't know the name of
5 the person he told in the pub until my name was
6 suggested, so ...
- 7 Q. I think he mentioned "the officer with the Scottish
8 name". I think that was as far as he could recall.
- 9 A. Exactly, but whether it's a Scottish name or not, it
10 wasn't me.
- 11 Q. Right.
- 12 A. I mean, the circumstances he -- he enlarges on it and
13 the period of time 300 was with him, etc. So the
14 circumstances are such I couldn't fail but remember.
15 I mean, it's extraordinary.
- 16 Q. Had you been told that an officer had fallen in love
17 with an activist, what would you have done?
- 18 A. Well, it would have to be reported all the way up. He
19 would have to come out. I mean, it -- it would be
20 a very serious position, and it was.
- 21 Q. Would any disciplinary action have been taken against
22 him, do you think?
- 23 A. I have no idea. It would have gone right up top. It
24 wouldn't be anything an inspector would have a say in.
- 25 Q. But it wouldn't be just contained to the SDS then.

1 A decision would be taken at much higher level and have
2 to be reported up.

3 A. The discussions would go up the tree.

4 Q. Might you have expected any further monitoring of him to
5 ensure that he didn't continue with any sort of
6 relationship with an activist outside his deployment?

7 A. Again, that wouldn't be my decision.

8 Q. We understand that he subsequently married this
9 activist. Was that something that you were aware of at
10 the time?

11 A. No, not until I was told.

12 Q. And what is your reaction to that?

13 A. I find it amazing and I find it amazing that rumour
14 control kept that secret.

15 Q. Would you have expected that to have resulted in any
16 particular action taken by your superior officers?

17 A. I would think he would have to move out of
18 Special Branch for a start. I mean, there's strong
19 vetting and he wouldn't meet the vetting criteria.

20 Q. We also know that HN354 and HN21 engaged in sexual
21 relationships, but didn't disclose them to SDS managers,
22 they say.

23 Had they disclosed those relationships to you, is it
24 likely they would have been subject to disciplinary
25 proceedings?

1 A. Well, all of the circumstances would have to be
2 considered and it -- it could have happened. The senior
3 management may have felt the circumstances were such
4 that it wouldn't be a discipline.

5 Q. HN126. I don't know whether you need to look at
6 the list --

7 A. Yes, please.

8 Q. -- to understand who that officer is.

9 (Pause)

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Do you have any recollection of hearing that he had
12 become close to a member of his target group?

13 A. No.

14 Q. No.

15 HN155.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Again, do you want to just check that you know who that
18 is?

19 A. Yes, I do know that one.

20 Q. I think you overlapped for a very brief period of time.
21 Two things, HN155.

22 Did you have any knowledge of HN155 getting stoned
23 with activists, smoking marijuana?

24 A. No.

25 Q. No.

1 A. H1 -- that particular officer, I don't think he actually
2 went into the field during my time.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. He was in the back office.

5 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you very much. Thank you.

6 Sir, I'm just about to move to another topic.

7 I don't have a great deal left, but I wonder whether
8 that might be an appropriate moment to draw stumps
9 until -- and I can finish off after lunch.

10 THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly. It will give me a minute or two
11 to ask about a topic you have asked about, which is
12 troubling me.

13 The officer who described how HN300 came out of the
14 field gave very clear evidence about what he had been
15 told by HN300 and what he did to deal with the matter --

16 A. Yes.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: -- by reporting it to one or other of
18 the managers; in other words, the detective inspector or
19 the detective chief inspector --

20 A. Yes.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: -- in the SDS.

22 As a matter of dates, that is you and Geoff Craft.

23 We know when these events occurred --

24 A. Yes.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and you were in fact the

1 detective inspector then and Geoff Craft was the
2 detective chief inspector then.

3 A. Yes.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: And one of the puzzles is that neither of
5 you remembers clearly being in those positions together,
6 simultaneously.

7 A. That's correct, yes.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm wondering whether, now you've read, as
9 you have, what the closed officer had to say and
10 reflected on it, you have any explanation which might
11 enable me to work out what happened.

12 A. Well, I -- I can only presume, but I -- I can't actually
13 produce any evidence to support this, Chairman.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: No.

15 A. There's clearly, in 1976, long periods when I wasn't
16 actually working in the office due to, as
17 I've mentioned, various courses.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

19 A. And this event happened whilst I was away, and I say
20 that because it's such a big event, such a serious
21 event, that it would have stuck in my mind and I'm sure
22 it would have stuck in Geoff Craft's mind if I'd been
23 with him.

24 I wonder if there was an acting inspector, possibly
25 Les Willingale, who was actually with Geoff Craft on

1 that occasion. It certainly wasn't me. Well, I can't
2 imagine that it's a sort of incident that I could
3 honestly claim I can't recall.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. So an explanation might be --

5 A. Might be.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: -- that it was someone standing in your shoes
7 temporarily --

8 A. Yes.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: -- and it might have been Les Willingale.

10 A. That -- that's the only possibility I can come forward
11 with.

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for that.

13 We will resume at 2.00, and you have roughly how
14 long left?

15 MS HUMMERSTONE: Only about 20 minutes, I think.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Ms Hummerstone will have 20 minutes of
17 her own questions and then we have a break of 20 minutes
18 so that anybody else may raise topics with
19 Ms Hummerstone for her to ask you, and then you may be
20 re-examined by your counsel.

21 A. Thank you very much.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: But that will give you, I hope, some
23 indication that your evidence may be finished by about
24 3 o'clock.

25 A. Thank you.

1 (12.59 pm)

2 (The short adjournment)

3 (2.01 pm)

4 MS HUMMERSTONE: Three final topics from me at this stage,
5 Mr McIntosh.

6 The first one, the relationship with the
7 Security Services during the time that you were a DI at
8 the SDS. You say in your statement that you were too
9 junior in rank at that stage to have a great deal of
10 contact with the SDS, although you were aware that they
11 were one of the agencies that were making tasking
12 requests of the SDS; is that right?

13 A. I was well aware, yes.

14 Q. Can I ask, please, for document {UCPI/30893/1}, please,
15 to be put on the screen. This is a summary document
16 dated 17 August 1979 of the contact between the
17 Security Services and the SDS in the year-to-date. It
18 indicates that there was a meeting on 22 February. It's
19 the third line down. There appears to have been
20 a meeting that Mike Ferguson and you attended on
21 22 February 1979.

22 Can we just scroll down, please, to the
23 second paragraph.

24 I'm extremely sorry, I've left my hard copy bundle
25 back in my room which has got my highlighting on it.

1 I wonder if we could just briefly pause and I can ask
2 Ms Smith to go and collect that. I'm sorry. Otherwise,
3 it's going to take rather too long for me to scroll down
4 by eye.

5 Awfully sorry, Mr McIntosh.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: We'll pause a moment while your hard copy
7 bundle is rescued.

8 MS HUMMERSTONE: I'm grateful. I'm grateful, thank you.

9 (Pause)

10 Thank you very much. I'm sorry about that.

11 Paragraph 1 -- so just scroll back up the page,
12 please -- about two-thirds of the way down that
13 paragraph, or probably three-quarters of the way down
14 that paragraph:

15 "We agreed ..."

16 At the far right-hand corner:

17 "... to hold regular meetings at approximately
18 monthly intervals ..."

19 That's meetings between the SDS and the
20 Security Services.

21 Can you recall that from 22 -- from February,
22 meetings were held roughly monthly? Can you recall
23 that?

24 A. No, because it says SDS was reluctant to hold regular
25 meetings.

1 Q. Thank you very much.

2 Can we move on, please, to paragraph 2. It says
3 there that:

4 "SDS are ... ready to accept [regular] briefs from
5 F7, both on organisations and individuals, to attend
6 specific meetings where F6 ..."

7 Something redacted:

8 "... and to respond to specific feedback from
9 reports. We agreed that briefings would be passed on
10 unheaded, unattributable paper direct to the [Head
11 of] SDS, or by word of mouth."

12 Now, it seems that from roughly this period, the
13 chain of tasking was to come directly to the SDS rather
14 than through the superintendents. Can you recall
15 anything like that taking place?

16 A. No. I'm quite surprised, to be honest.

17 Q. It also indicates, the rest of this report, that
18 meetings were also being held with the -- with S Squad.

19 You indicate in your statement that, in your
20 opinion, the relationship with the Security Services was
21 a good one. Between the SDS and the Security Services,
22 it was a cordial relationship.

23 A. It was, as far as I knew, yes.

24 Q. Sorry, can you just take that document down, please.

25 Can we have another one up, please, very, very

1 quickly. {UCPI/28810/1}. This is a note of a meeting
2 on 2 October:

3 "... an opportunity to say farewell to
4 DI Angus MacIntosh and to meet his successor
5 Trevor Butler. After lunch at the Waterloo dispatch in
6 Adams Row we returned to CSH for discussions."

7 Was it common that, in your experience, SDS officers
8 would have lunch with the Security Services? Was that
9 something that happened regularly?

10 A. No, but from the previous minute, it looks as though
11 there was going to be a closer association.

12 Q. Right.

13 A. This is the -- as it says, apparently, and I certainly
14 don't deny it, that I went there with, I presume,
15 Mike Ferguson and Trevor Butler to say goodbye and for
16 them to meet Trevor Butler.

17 Q. Sorry, you can take that document down now, please.

18 Did the SDS, to your knowledge, keep any record of
19 communications with the Security Services, do you
20 remember?

21 A. No, I don't recall any, other than on documents; I mean,
22 minute sheets. There were loads of minute sheets for
23 every piece of paper, it seemed.

24 Q. Thank you very much.

25 Next disparate topic, please. You say in your

1 witness statement that reporting for public order
2 purposes was ordinarily -- was undertaken normally by
3 way of a written report which would have been compiled
4 by Dick Scully from information provided by the UCOs.
5 So this is specifically about public order matters. Is
6 that a reference to a threat assessment, do you think?
7 Is that what you mean?

8 A. Well, yes, it -- no, it's part -- it's a report from
9 which threat assessments would be considered by the
10 branch producing the assessment. So it would normally
11 go to C Squad and they'd do the assessment.

12 Q. Can you help us at all about how C Squad prepared threat
13 assessments?

14 A. No idea, no.

15 Q. Do you know who received threat assessments?

16 A. Well, it would be the body requiring it. So if it was
17 the uniformed police, it would go to A8.

18 Q. Right, so it was just directed to the body that would be
19 dealing with that particular issue?

20 A. As far as I'm aware, yes.

21 Q. You say in your witness statement that urgent
22 information was relayed by phone about public order
23 matters. What do you mean by "urgent information"?
24 What sort of information would you have --

25 A. Well, it could be within the 24 hours of the

1 demonstration. If one of our sources had information on
2 numbers likely to attend, change of plans, any
3 aggravation expected, that's what I would call urgent
4 information.

5 Q. And how frequently do you think that occurred, that sort
6 of --

7 A. You'd have to go back to the history of demonstrations.
8 I mean, there were an awful lot of demonstrations during
9 my time, but to actually state, you know, number of
10 days, I couldn't tell you.

11 Q. Did you feel you were frequently having to undertake
12 those kind of telephone calls, or was it something that
13 was quite rare?

14 A. No, I felt it was most probably some of the most
15 important public order information we could pass on. So
16 we were always stressing to our officers that any new
17 information concerning a demonstration, no matter
18 where -- I mean, it didn't just have to be in the Met.
19 If it concerned Midlands or something, we'd phone it up
20 to Special Branch in the Midlands that information had
21 been received.

22 Q. And was it quite rare that you'd have to make those
23 telephone conversations, or was that relatively common?

24 A. It wasn't rare, but it certainly wasn't every day.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 Did the SDS ever receive feedback from any of
2 the SDS customers?

3 A. As far as I can recall, only in a general sense.

4 I mean, they were considered a very valuable source --

5 Q. And was there -- sorry, I don't want to cut across you.

6 A. Sorry, and senior officers from various sections of the
7 squad, and even top brass from the Yard, yeah.

8 Q. Did the SDS, to your knowledge, ever receive any
9 critical feedback from any quarter?

10 A. I'm certainly not aware of that, no.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 Final topic at this stage. One of the officers who
13 the Inquiry heard from in closed session was present at
14 the demonstration in Southall at which Blair Peach
15 received a fatal injury. That was on, I think,
16 23 April 1979. He said that he was warned by SDS
17 managers not to attend the demonstration that day
18 because the uniformed branch were going to clamp down on
19 the demonstration.

20 Were you the manager that warned this officer not to
21 go to that demonstration, do you think?

22 A. No, I wasn't, but I can understand that warning, yes.

23 But I didn't, no.

24 Q. Why do you think that warning would have been given?

25 A. Well, we don't want our officers arrested. We don't

1 want our officers involved in violence. It's as simple
2 as that. So if we had -- if we had, and it's very
3 unusual -- it's a fairly unusual statement, actually.
4 It sounds quite aggressive. I can't recall one like
5 that, to be honest.

6 Q. Can you recollect knowing that the uniformed branch were
7 going to clamp down more heavily on this demonstration
8 than others? Can you recall that?

9 A. No. As I said, I haven't heard of that type of message.

10 Q. This officer also states that SDS management arranged
11 for him to be smuggled into Scotland Yard later on to
12 make a statement about the demonstration, which he did
13 attend notwithstanding advice not to attend.

14 Can you recall arranging for an officer to be taken
15 to Scotland Yard to make a statement?

16 A. Not on this occasion. We used to smuggle in
17 occasionally for various reasons.

18 Q. Can you recall any pressure brought to bear on the SDS
19 to provide evidence favourable to the police in respect
20 of the Southall demonstration?

21 A. No, I certainly can't, no.

22 Q. Another officer who gave evidence in closed session said
23 that he was asked to attend Blair Peach's funeral by one
24 of his managers and, in fact, a report was then produced
25 with a list of names of other attendees.

1 Can you recall, was that you who asked him to attend
2 the funeral, do you think?

3 A. I don't know either who told him or -- or who he is.

4 I can understand the request by the management to ask
5 the officer to attend, yes.

6 Q. Why would the management have wanted an officer to
7 attend that event?

8 A. To attend?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. In case -- anything to early identify disorder and also
11 as normal coverage of an event, which was of interest
12 because of the whole -- the whole reason of the -- the
13 funeral was to -- for a person involved in extreme left
14 wing politics and demonstration, that's all. And most
15 probably, I -- I don't know which officer went or who
16 asked him to go. It most probably fitted in well with
17 his colleagues.

18 Q. You say in your witness statement that reporting on
19 those attending events in connection with Blair Peach,
20 you say, was due to their status as activists rather
21 than as individuals who sought to discredit or criticise
22 the police; is that right? That was why these events
23 were reported on, not about -- not because they were
24 trying to discredit or criticise the police, but because
25 they were simply activists engaged in -- going to --

1 attending events --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- and that's why they were reported on?

4 A. Yes, because --

5 Q. Is that your view?

6 A. Yes, anti-police.

7 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you very much, Mr McIntosh. I've got
8 no further questions for you at this time.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Just one question before we break for
10 20 minutes. Many people might think it is distasteful
11 for a police officer, whether undercover or not, to
12 attend the funeral of someone who has died in the
13 circumstances we now know and record the names of all of
14 those capable of being identified who have attended it.

15 Do you have any observation to make about that?

16 A. Well, I can understand some people being upset by it,
17 particularly people close to the person's funeral.
18 However, in public disorder -- and I know I'm quoting
19 Northern Ireland, for instance -- funerals were often
20 a hotbed of problems. And it wasn't the true friends
21 and relatives of the -- the person whose funeral it was;
22 it was because there was an opportunity of demonstrating
23 against whatever they got in mind, but it would be
24 anti-police in one way or the other, or it could even be
25 the opposition, the National Front in this case, having

1 A. No.

2 Q. Dealing now with reporting on individuals in connection
3 with the death of Blair Peach. I don't know whether it
4 will assist you, but if it does, HN21, the person who
5 attended Blair Peach's funeral, and HN41, who attended
6 the demonstration at which he received a fatal injury,
7 are on your cipher list. If you want to just refer to
8 them. Don't refer to them by name, but if you want to
9 just check that you understand who those officers are.

10 (Pause)

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 I just want to clarify an answer you gave right at
14 the end of your evidence about the reason for reporting
15 on events that had a connection to the death of
16 Blair Peach. In your witness statement, what you have
17 said is that you do not believe that activists involved
18 in events connected with the death of Blair Peach were
19 reported on because they sought to discredit or
20 criticise the police.

21 That's what you said in your witness statement and
22 I just want to clarify, because you seemed to give
23 an answer at one point about people being reported on
24 for being anti-police, and I just wanted to make sure
25 that you understood that.

1 What was your understanding as to why people
2 reported on, for example, attending the funeral or any
3 other matter in connection with Blair Peach? Why, to
4 your mind, would those people have been reported on?

5 A. Well, if -- if someone's been deputed to cover any form
6 of meeting and demonstration, it is their duty, if they
7 identified people, to report their presence. It's not
8 for them to decide. It's for the people who want the
9 reports to decide whether they are of interest or not.
10 So whether they are activists or -- or not, I don't
11 think that was relevant to the officers. They may well
12 have just identified activists because they're the only
13 people they knew.

14 Q. Why was it, though, do you think that people were
15 reported on who attended, for example, the funeral of
16 Blair Peach? What would be the justification for that?

17 A. I suspect it was thought that the ones identified, in
18 other words reported on, were connected with the
19 organisation or the -- the purpose of the demonstration
20 where I think Blair Peach was killed. I -- to be quite
21 honest, I don't recall the full details of the death of
22 Blair Peach, sorry.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 Just one more question about reporting on
25 Blair Peach's funeral. HN21 has given evidence and he

1 said that he did not believe that the funeral would have
2 represented any public order risk, and I think your
3 answer in respect of the justification for that
4 reporting, or for attendance at the funeral, was that it
5 might have done.

6 Does his assessment, that it would not have raised
7 a public order risk, does that change your mind? What's
8 your reaction to that?

9 A. Not really, because it's a subjective conclusion. He,
10 because he was present and therefore saw what was going
11 on, could well have reached that conclusion and be
12 100% right. From my point of view, if I had been the
13 officer who had asked him to go, until I know who was
14 there, I can't come to that conclusion.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 Another topic now. You were asked by the Chairman
17 as to where you would set the limit on the commission of
18 criminal offences by --

19 A. Oh, right.

20 Q. -- undercover officers. In your witness statement,
21 I think you said you would set that limit at billposting
22 and leafletting.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. But when asked directly, I think you said you wouldn't
25 necessarily always put it there, and I just wanted to

1 understand where your boundary might have been for the
2 conduct of your undercover officers.

3 A. No, when I answered the Chairman's question, I had --
4 the initial question, I thought it had included
5 billposting. I -- I muddled up leafletting, thinking
6 sticking leaflets --

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. -- on walls, but -- but those are the two areas which
9 I -- I would term as very minor misdemeanours and
10 therefore not an embarrassment to law enforcement.

11 Q. How about the commission of public order offences?

12 A. Well --

13 Q. Would that have been beyond the scope?

14 A. Well, it would be, but one has to accept there would be
15 circumstances where you can't get out of it,
16 particularly where you've got groups fighting each other
17 and you may be the unlucky one who feels the hand of
18 the law, because a lot of people never do.

19 Q. And how about obstructing police officers in carrying
20 out their duties? Would that fall outside the line?

21 A. Well, again, you'd have to look at the circumstances.
22 If it's a group of people doing that, there's no way --
23 I mean, he's going to be included in that group
24 causing -- committing that offence. I'd certainly draw
25 a line on it if he was on his own and he did that.

1 It was completely unacceptable.

2 Q. In your witness statement you refer to officers sailing
3 close to the wind. Is that what you mean by that, that
4 in the moment --

5 A. Can you give me the full sentence?

6 Q. Yes, of course, sorry. Sorry, yes. I'm sorry, let me
7 just find the full reference for you. It's at
8 paragraph -- paragraph 163, you're dealing with the
9 commission of offences by undercover officers. You say:

10 "There seems to have been some acceptance that UCOs
11 would necessarily have to sail close to the wind in
12 terms of conduct connected to their deployment. Conduct
13 unconnected to their deployment - such as drug dealing
14 or murder - would not have been sanctioned or
15 tolerated."

16 And you go on to deal with HN13, who was prosecuted
17 for conduct in connection with his deployment.

18 Perhaps I should have started earlier in the
19 sentence. This is your paragraph dealing with
20 commission of criminal offences whilst undercover. You
21 gave advice, you say, that the commission of offences
22 was not permitted:

23 "It was made abundantly clear that they could not
24 indulge in criminal activity, excluding peaceful protest
25 activities ..."

1 You would have expected them to use their initiative
2 as to what conduct fell within an acceptable tolerance
3 range and you then say:

4 "There seems to have been some acceptance that UCOs
5 would necessarily have to sail close to the wind ..."

6 Is that what you -- is that what you're referring to
7 when you say an officer on his own acting you couldn't
8 have sanctioned, but in a group --

9 A. Quite, yes. I'm sorry, I didn't appreciate --

10 Q. No.

11 A. -- where you were coming from.

12 Q. I suspect it's my poor questioning. Thank you very
13 much.

14 Given that that was a risk and an area of some
15 difficulty for an undercover officer, was there any sort
16 of -- was there any definitive guidance given to them
17 about it, or was that something that would simply have
18 been impossible?

19 A. Well, quite right, it would have been impossible, and
20 you had to rely on the officers' judgment, which of
21 course, in hindsight, could be said to be wrong.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 Please can we have another entirely separate topic,
24 {UCPI/30893/1}. This is simply to see if you can assist
25 with a turn of phrase. I accept this is not a document

1 drafted by you, but it reports a meeting attended by you
2 and Mike Ferguson with the Security Services.

3 In the first paragraph, about just over half the way
4 down, there is a sentence beginning:

5 "It was suggested that in some cases, particularly
6 with the Anarchist groups, it might prove necessary to
7 indoctrinate the desks. This SDS are reluctant to do in
8 principle, but will look at each case on its merits."

9 I'm asked to ask you do you know what's meant
10 by "indoctrinate the desks"?

11 A. I presume the desks of the Security Service dealing with
12 that particular problem.

13 Q. And "indoctrinate"?

14 A. Well, "indoctrinate" is -- to me, it's a level of
15 security which is very, very high. Vetting.

16 Q. Thank you very much. We can take that document down.

17 Another topic now, please, dealing with the wives
18 and partners of the undercover officers. You told us
19 that telephone numbers were provided to the wives and
20 the girlfriends of the undercover officers so that they
21 could contact you or Mike Ferguson if they had any
22 concerns.

23 Can you recall that any ever did contact you during
24 the time that you were there?

25 A. No, I can't, no.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 I asked you about what was said to the wives about
3 what their husbands were doing that required them to be
4 away from the marital home for long periods of time.
5 Was any explanation provided for their change of
6 appearance? We understand that they often grew their
7 hair long, were much less smart than they might have
8 been in their ordinary course of their work.

9 A. No. I'm pretty sure about this, because the change of
10 their experience happened to their wives' knowledge and
11 one, rightly or wrongly, presumed that they must have
12 told their wives or partners exactly why they wanted to
13 do it, and we wouldn't interfere with whatever reason
14 they had given -- given to their -- their loved ones.

15 Q. What was said to the wives or the girlfriends about what
16 their husbands were doing, what this change of job was
17 that required senior officers to come and visit them?
18 Can you recall?

19 A. Well, we would -- we would tell them that they were
20 doing a special job which is undercover and that it
21 could involve long hours, and if they had any concerns
22 about what was happening re domestic arrangements, they
23 were -- they were encouraged to contact us.

24 Q. Okay, thank you.

25 It would appear that the families of undercover

1 officers performed a very important function for the SDS
2 to ensure the welfare of the officers concerned and that
3 they took on that very important role without much
4 understanding of the risks that were --

5 A. I think you're absolutely right --

6 Q. -- involved.

7 A. -- yes.

8 Q. Was there any concern within the management of the SDS
9 for the families rather than for the welfare of the
10 officers? Was there any concern about the welfare of
11 the families themselves?

12 A. Well, there most probably was, but I say that because
13 the -- certainly with Mike Ferguson, he knew exactly
14 what the stress and strains was on -- on the family.
15 I didn't, because I hadn't been out. There was the
16 difficulty that if you are dealing with something which
17 was considered not only important but must be kept
18 secret, how much you could actually tell the partner.
19 However, we didn't actually say to the officer, "You
20 mustn't say anything to your partner". We left that
21 very much to them, rightly or wrongly, to deal with that
22 situation.

23 Q. Right, thank you.

24 Dealing now, please, with guidance on sexual
25 contact. In your evidence, you said that the officers

1 that you spoke to would have been aware that sexual
2 contact in their undercover role was a breach of the
3 police regulations.

4 A. Definitely.

5 Q. The officers you spoke to, which officers would they be,
6 or would they simply be all the officers under your
7 command?

8 A. All of them would -- would be told or reminded. I mean,
9 they would know that. They've been in the police for
10 several years and it was -- I mean, it was no secret
11 that it was an offence, because there were unfortunately
12 often scandals which we read about.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 It's clear that the SDS and you in particular
15 appreciated the risk of sexual contact with officers and
16 civilians in an undercover role. During the course of
17 your meetings with the undercover officers, did you ever
18 directly ask them about the nature of their
19 relationships with activists?

20 A. No, I didn't ask if they were having any affairs, no.

21 Q. So that was never sort of probed --

22 A. No, it wasn't probed and, in a way, I would have thought
23 it pointless, because I wouldn't expect any of them to
24 actually turn round to a supervising officer and say,
25 "Yes, I'm doing it".

1 Q. I suppose the purpose it might have served would be to
2 remind them of the prohibition on that sort of
3 behaviour. Was that ever considered?

4 A. No. We're not talking about children, we're talking
5 about grown men, and -- and they know what the risk
6 of -- of life is.

7 Q. You said in your evidence in relation to a question by
8 me -- I asked you to consider whether an officer having
9 sexual contact in his undercover role, whether you
10 considered that to be an abuse of his police power or
11 his position, and I think your answer was effectively
12 that you didn't think that because this was sexual
13 contact between consenting adults and that wasn't
14 something that you would have --

15 A. That's right, from --

16 Q. -- thought about.

17 A. -- from that angle, but it was an offence within the
18 organisation. So I'm not giving him the green light at
19 all.

20 Q. No.

21 Sexual contact with somebody whilst the officer is
22 undercover necessarily involves a deceit because it's in
23 an undercover -- they're in an undercover role. Does
24 that change your view as to whether that would
25 constitute an abuse of his police power or his position,

1 because anybody engaging in sex with an undercover
2 officer doesn't know he's an undercover officer and
3 thinks he's a member of their group?

4 A. I can't really answer that, because I can't say does
5 everyone say before they have a sexual encounter, "What
6 is your occupation"? And if it's a certain one, do they
7 say, "Definitely not, because you are a policeman or
8 because you're a postman"? So no.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 You said that the issue of girlfriends was a topic
11 that came up at the safe house and Mike Ferguson would
12 have been well aware of conversations about that and the
13 difficulties that the undercover officers brought to
14 your attention.

15 Craft. It's not entirely clear to me whether you
16 can recall serving with him or you can't. I know that
17 you recall attending the public house to -- with him --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- in respect of HN297.

20 A. Yes, Mm-hm.

21 Q. Does it follow that you can to some extent remember
22 serving with him, or can you just remember that detail?

23 A. I know I served with him. You produced papers signed by
24 him which involves me. Strangely enough, maybe it was
25 quieter during that period. I don't know, but

- 1 I certainly recall serving with Michael Ferguson.
- 2 Q. Were -- complaints about the issue of girlfriends, was
3 that an issue that was raised throughout your time at
4 the SDS, or did it just come up at a particular time?
- 5 A. No. No, I think it was throughout, and we looked to see
6 how we could cope with it.
- 7 Q. You said that Mike Ferguson was certainly aware that
8 that was a difficulty. Does it follow then that Craft
9 would have been aware that that was a difficulty or not,
10 you can't say?
- 11 A. It certainly wouldn't necessarily follow, because you --
12 you dealt with the crisis at the time and this subject
13 would come up at -- on occasions where someone was
14 having to go to a social occasion. It's the third or
15 fourth time he's been there and he's running out of
16 excuses or -- for not going there because he's seeing
17 his girlfriend and then someone has said, "Well, bring
18 your girlfriend along". And so the pressure was
19 building up there, and they were coming to us saying,
20 "This is the --" I say "they", individuals would come up
21 and say, "I'm in a situation here. Is there any way
22 I could produce a lady?"
- 23 Q. Okay, thank you.
- 24 HN300 now, please. You said you became aware of his
25 reputation during the course of his time at the SDS.

1 Now, I think you overlapped for about seven or
2 eight months.

3 Did you do anything about that? When you became
4 aware that he had a certain reputation, did you do
5 anything about that?

6 A. Well, he was coming to the end -- he was coming out of
7 it, so no, I didn't do any specific thing about it.

8 Q. We have been -- one of the officers that gave evidence
9 in closed session, I think, indicated that HN300 was
10 an alcoholic. Was that something that you knew about?

11 A. No. I knew he drank, but most -- most of them did.

12 Q. On a related topic: alcohol. Did the undercover
13 officers turn in expense forms for their food and things
14 of that nature? Were they able to reclaim?

15 A. They could, but it was extremely limited.

16 Q. Would they be able to claim for alcohol purchased, for
17 example?

18 A. Not for themselves, no, or at least I don't think they
19 were allowed.

20 Q. You say --

21 A. We're talking a long time ago, you know.

22 Q. I appreciate this is a very detailed question. You say
23 "not for themselves". Would they be able to claim for
24 somebody else then? What do you mean by that?

25 A. There could be circumstances, yes, where it would be

1 legitimate.

2 Q. To claim for alcohol for somebody else?

3 A. Refreshments for other people.

4 Q. Right, thank you.

5 Final topic now, please. We know that HN13, during
6 the course of the demonstration that he was arrested
7 during, was beaten up, it seems, by a police officer and
8 required, I think, an X-ray as a result.

9 Were SDS officers to witness any sort of police
10 misconduct, what was done about that? Was that ever
11 taken any further or reported up the chain?

12 A. Well, it was reported on in -- in general terms, like
13 the press.

14 Q. So if they were able to identify, for example,
15 an officer behaving badly, would anything have been done
16 about that?

17 A. Well, it's extremely unlikely that he could identify
18 them. I suppose if he had and it was accepted by senior
19 officers to disclose this chap's identity, the
20 undercover officer's identity, and it was
21 sufficiently -- the evidence was sufficiently strong to
22 take the officer -- the assaulting officer to court, it
23 would be done, but it would be a high powered decision,
24 not mine.

25 MS HUMMERSTONE: Thank you very much. I don't think

1 I've got any further questions for you. Thank you.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any re-examination?

3 MR SANDERS: No, thank you, sir.

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Rather later than I had thought,
5 that is now the end of your evidence.

6 A. I'm sorry.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you for coming in and giving it.

8 A. Thank you.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: We'll resume at 10.00 tomorrow.

10 (3.27 pm)

11 (The hearing adjourned until 10.00 am on Friday,
12 20 June 2022)

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Summary of the evidence of HN3681

HN244 (Angus McIntosh) (sworn)13

Questions by MS HUMMERSTONE13

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