

COVER SHEET

[REDACTED]

Witness: First Witness Statement of Richard Scully / HN2152

Exhibits Referred to: None

Date Statement Made: 29 September 2020

UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY

Witness: Richard Scully / HN2152

Occupation: Retired

Address: c/o Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services, Empress State Building, London SW6 1TR

1. I have been asked to provide a witness statement for the purpose of assisting the Undercover Policing Inquiry. In preparing this statement I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the Rule 9 request dated 18 June 2020 and first provided to me on 24 August 2020.
2. I have been shown the witness bundle (consisting of one document) provided by the Inquiry for the purpose of making this witness statement, and the list of potential contemporaries provided by the Inquiry in their letter of 25 September 2020. I have not refreshed my memory by looking at any other document.
3. There is no restriction order in place in respect of my real name. I did not use a cover name.

[REDACTED]

Personal details

4. My full name is Richard Reeves Scully. During my service in the Metropolitan Police I called myself Richard Scully. My date of birth is [REDACTED]¹ 1941.

Police career before and after serving with the Special Demonstration Squad ("SDS")

5. My Central Record of Service (Doc 1: MPS-0741675) states that I joined the Metropolitan Police on 28 September 1964. That sounds about right.
6. I think I joined Special Branch in January 1968. I note that under "transfers" on my Central Record of Service it records "SB" and the date "8.1.68". I was a Constable when I joined Special Branch. Initially I was posted to B Squad, the Irish Squad. My rough memory is that I was on B Squad for a couple of years. I note that under "SB" in the "transfers" section of my Central Record of Service it states "1.6.69" and "Port". This may relate to a period of summer relief I undertook at the Port of Harwich. I think the reference to "SB (Port duty)" dated "18.5.70" relates to when I was posted on a full posting at Harwich. It looks as though that lasted until 1974 when I went back London. On my return to London, I must have been posted to C Squad. At some point I was on the Naturalisation Squad as well. It was after I was posted to Harwich, but I cannot remember exactly when this posting was; it could have been before or after I was on C Squad.
7. I was then posted to the SDS. I do not now remember when I started with the SDS, or how long I was with the SDS for. It was sometime in the mid 1970s or approaching the 1980s.

- [REDACTED]
8. After the SDS, I was posted to Heathrow on Ports duty. I wanted a posting like this to get out of the general atmosphere of Special Branch, and that was understood. I made clear I wanted distance. I did not know what would happen going forward, and I was then invited back by Ray Wilson to join the Chief Superintendent's office in B Squad. Anyone would be happy to work with Ray. B Squad was really the number 1 Squad in those days because we had a national responsibility for terrorism. At a guess, I was in this post for 3 years. Thinking back, he must have thought I had something to offer. I enjoyed the role; although it was based in an office, [REDACTED]

2

Information about post-SDS role in B Squad

9. I then ended up in another highly sensitive area which was within S Squad, but totally separate from the SDS. This was down to Dave Golding, who I came across in the Chief Superintendent's office. I was coming to the end of my time there and he asked me where I wanted to go. There were big changes during that period because of the games being played by the Security Service. Because the iron curtain and Russia was changing, the Security Service wanted a new role; they wanted B Squad's role because of its national responsibility, and you got kudos when the fight against Irish terrorism went right. Later they pulled off

[REDACTED]

this transition in role, given their access to government, which we did not have. There was a handover from Special Branch to the Security Service in my final years. It was very unfair. They were looking to us for help in the early stages. We transferred what I was doing into their building. I found it impossible to work with their system. We had been doing the same work, with fewer people, very well; their systems were out of control, and if you missed something you would be to blame. I left before their move to a high-tech building. There was a period we were struggling when we should not have been, all for political reasons. It was disappointing. I thought that despite all our faults in Special Branch, productivity-wise what we produced was first rate.

10. I had not done any undercover policing or work using a cover identity prior to joining the SDS. I was running my own informant – which was a very good form of information based on trust and a good working relationship – and I carried that with me wherever I went. I developed this when I was on C Squad and dealing with the anarchist side of things. This pre-dated my involvement in the SDS.

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[REDACTED]

11. The people who benefitted from this informant was the Metropolitan Police demonstrations side when it came to handling demonstrations, and the Security Service. Having an informant was the gold thing because you could get to know what was going on. It was because of my involvement with this informant that I was aware of Special Branch Squads providing A8 with threat assessments or other forecasts in relation to the likely numbers or mood of those attending upcoming public events. I would usually brief them by phone with the information I received from my source. A8 were very keen to know about numbers. I was not undercover with my informant and there was no agent provocateur stuff. It was quite difficult keeping this up when I was on the SDS because it took a lot of extra time and the area of interest did not coincide with what I was doing in SDS. I did not have any involvement with A8 when I was on the SDS; I assumed their involvement prior to joining the SDS.

12. I almost certainly attended demonstrations and meetings prior to the SDS when I was in Special Branch. We knew the sorts of people we were dealing with.

Selection

13. The way the Branch worked was that we tended to do our own thing and do what we were tasked to do. We did not enquire of what others were doing in any detail. Out of the blue, I was invited to go into the SDS admin office – the heart of the

[REDACTED]

beast – and it was a big surprise to me. I did not know what the SDS did. I was probably invited in based on stuff I had done before. It would have been a Chief Superintendent who introduced me to the SDS, or it was with his approval. It was nice to be trusted with such a delicate thing; I was flattered to be asked.

14. At that time we were experiencing massive public disorder and it was getting out of hand. It started with the Vietnam demonstrations and violence in Grosvenor Square. The purpose of the SDS was to provide assistance to the uniformed branch by to pre-empting this public disorder. It was getting nasty and this was the impetus. It could only be done by learning what would happen as best as possible. It was a question of protecting the public, at a basic level, and keeping the peace. It was not a question of freedom of speech. There was never a thought in my mind that we were doing anything wrong. It was quite the reverse: we were protecting the public and, on a more philosophical higher level, protecting our country and our democracy. It goes to that level because if you do not protect the hard-won freedoms, you will lose them. You have to be alert and be prepared to defend, and not be frightened to do so.

15. In the circumstances, and when facing a situation which might be dangerous for the public, undercover policing was the only way to find out exactly what was going on. Informants were generally fine, but it would depend on the issue because informants like to play both sides and it can be difficult to handle. Undercover policing gets you the goods. Other than the uniformed branch, the Security Service were the great beneficiaries of the undercover approach. Because I thought we were defending ordinary citizens and government, I had

[REDACTED]

no qualms about it. In Special Branch, we were in a difficult position because all of your enquiries were discreet. You could not go in with two big feet and ask direct questions of people to get the information you required. A lot of the information we were required to get came by request from the Security Service, for example they had difficulties getting to the bottom of something so they asked us. If you put a foot wrong, shit hit the fan. The alternative in terms of obtaining information was to get a good two-legged informant, if you were lucky enough to find someone like that. Or, it was the SDS. The problem was becoming very large with violence and the huge number of demonstrators, so we needed something urgent. The odd informant was not enough in the circumstances. Our job was to assess where the problems were, concentrating on those who were dangerous. I was a bit surprised we were allowed to do this with undercover policing, but we had official backing.

16. There was no selection process for the SDS. I am guessing, but for my role they must have looked around and thought we want somebody who can write effectively, do research effectively and would be discreet. I hope it was on my track record and the fact I tended to keep myself to myself. Everyone knew each other in the Branch.
17. I do not remember anything between the initial meeting I have described above and when I started. I think I moved straight into the SDS. I would have had introductions to the guys, but I do not remember this. I would have been introduced to the undercover officers who were in the field at the SDS safe houses. It was their input that I was researching and managing so it was

[REDACTED]

important I had an understanding of them. I was pushing things through the system – from them, to the Security Service and anyone else.

18. It was not a question of choice joining the SDS; you did as you were told. That is how it was done. I did not ask to go there.

My role

19. My role in the SDS was purely administrative. I do not think the role had a name or title, as such. I was dealing with the reports. I was the meat of the game, if you like, overseen by senior officers.
20. I must have replaced someone in the role, but I cannot remember who it was.
21. I remained in this role throughout my time in the SDS.
22. I do not know what rank I was when I was recruited. I do not know if I changed rank whilst I was on the SDS, but it is possible.

Training and guidance in the SDS

23. I did not have any training for my role. It was very much a Branch thing that we were used to – having to be discreet and careful. It was all part of the same thing. It was an administrative role and I was merely doing what I thought was best. Those with the difficulty were those in the field. You either could or could not do

[REDACTED]

the role. I do not know if they had any training, but they had quite a lot of lead up. Apart from their courage, they were all volunteers that were not pressed into doing it. They were carefully assessed to see if they were suitable for the role and then had considerable reading in time before going into the field. They knew what they were up against and could leave at that point if they wanted. It was very carefully thought out. This was not my side of things though.

24. There was no repetition or refreshing of training, advice, guidance or instructions. I did not receive any training on race equality from the Metropolitan Police – not in that day.

Duties

25. In the SDS, I was the processing point for reporting. Somebody would have to bring the reports to me. I do not remember now how that was done, but they would come in in some secure way, on paper. They would come in both typed properly and on scraps of paper; we did not expect the undercover officers to present things neatly, but some did. I do not know how the undercover officers went about writing down intelligence or preparing the reports that were sent to the office. The reports would come to me as a result of an officer doing a routine for that purpose. I cannot remember if I went to the safe houses to collect reports. All intelligence I received was written up. It was all valid and reportable; I would not receive anything that was not. I did not get anything down the telephone: I do not recall telephone reporting happening. I have no memory of undercover officers phoning in to the office; had they rung in, they would not have asked for me and we had enough supervising officers.

- [REDACTED]
26. I would then conduct research, such as checking the names of all persons named by the officer in the report and checking whether the people mentioned were knowns or unknowns from Special Branch records, and then I would write the report up with the Special Branch references if there were any. I do not recall adding anything other than references and whether persons were known or unknown. If a senior officer wanted to follow up enquiries, he could do that. I would alter the report where it was necessary, for example where there were typos, or factual inaccuracies given the report was not going just to the Branch. One or two reports were so high brow that I could not understand them, but they stood alone on the basis of their content. In these cases I was merely correcting the English and putting them in the accepted Special Branch format.
27. As far as I know, ordinary reports that I was dealing with were dealt with in the ordinary Special Branch way: you would not identify the individual sources, but you would qualify the information number with an S so it would indicate S Squad. There would be different qualifications depending on the source of the information. I cannot remember what they were now. For S Squad stuff it was always the same opening regardless of the source of the information.
28. I did not filter the information; I would replicate what I was given. I was a processing machine. I was making sure the facts got through to those who wanted them: my job was to present the factual position, and it was for someone else to interpret it for its significance. It was also the field officers' information and not for me to interfere or play with it. They knew the sort of information to

[REDACTED]

provide. It is possible that reports went back to undercover officers so that they could monitor what I was doing and be happy it was done properly. Some of the information might be rearranged, for example I would put the information provided in a different order, and some officers might object to this.

29. I cannot remember if there was a different process for different types of intelligence, for example that which came from weekend events. The same information was key across the board, such as the people who were present.
30. I was not provided with things like photographs from SDS officers. This would come from the Branch photographic unit. It was important that our information about the persons involved in activities and events was correct and that we were monitoring the people that mattered in terms of sources of disorder. It was all about identifying the person; photographs acted as an aid in that identification, particularly when it came to common names like Jones and Smith. I would imagine that if there was a doubt about identity I might ask the undercover officer to confirm the identity based on a photograph. It would be strange if there was that much doubt. The field officer would know what the person was like, and we would have no doubt at our end it was that person.
31. From memory the volume was such that reports went off to the typing pool to be typed in a standardised manner. It would then come back to me. It would have to be given an information number – a register in the Branch – so we could keep a record of our work output. Then the report would either be forwarded on with an action required, which would not be for me to determine, or it would go into files.

- [REDACTED]
32. Everything was numbered and we had a track of what we were putting in. If it was a simple case, for example somebody we knew about, the report could then be signed off by the Superintendent probably (for example, Geoff Craft) for onward transmission, probably with a minute sheet if there was not a file already, and it would then go to the relevant Squad Chief. I cannot remember if he minuted it up to send a copy, or if we did that in the office. I do not think I had any involvement in minute sheets.
33. We would send reports from S Squad to the operational Squads in the Branch for the heads to determine what to do with it – file it, or take some action. Normally there would be subsections within a Squad specialising in certain areas and it would go to them, marked up “to see” in note, so they were aware of the information coming in to do with their expertise. I do not think I signed or marked up the reports. It would have been signed by the Superintendent or Chief Inspector before it left our office, and the final signature would be the Chief Superintendent of the recipient Squad concerned who would then decide who should see or note its contents. The report would have gone through the Chief Superintendent S Squad's hands. 99% of reports would have had to go on to the head of other squads, but I do not know now due to the passage of time whether it was the Chief Superintendent of S Squad who authorised the sending on of the report or if he simply endorsed the report by putting his signature on it. Geoff Craft would know more about this.
34. I did not really have anything to do with the report after its onward transmission. If the person who was the subject of the report was unknown, it might be that a

[REDACTED]

file would be made up and it could be sent out for enquiry by the Squad Chief if there were no other means of getting details, if it warranted that. If a file was made up and future reports came in, I would be able to see that there was further information about an unknown person and I could let people know.

35. I think S Squad was responsible for dissemination to the Security Service. This is a grey area. It would not have been me personally who did this, but a senior officer. The Security Service were the main beneficiary of SDS reporting. I would not have been party to any requests for intelligence from outside the SDS. However, we did get thanks from the Security Service for information we put in and particular reports.
36. There was only one filing system. We had a records department run by civilians, which was wonderful, and they would put the reports in the relevant place. Everything went to an ordinary Special Branch file, either a file for an individual or an organisation. The governor of the squad would direct a file to be made up and the file number would be appropriate to what politics were in issue. The records department could tell by the file reference where the report had to go. Records would have cards cross referencing mentions of a person or organisation across files. A history sheet at the back of a file would include mentions of relevant matters filed on general files elsewhere. There was no Branch duplication and only ever a single report. I would have thought scrapping the SDS material was very unlikely because we knew the information was reliable. If the information was relevant to C Squad, it would probably be up to Chief Superintendent C Squad to decide what to do with it. We were aware that

[REDACTED]

records would be relevant for vetting, for example. I think files had review dates on them and they would be sent to governors for review to decide what to do with them. The files were constantly monitored. There were grades of files – confidential, secret, and higher – to which access was determined by seniority.

37. I am not the best person to ask about what officers were expected to report. It was pretty self-evident. I did not direct anyone on what to do with their reporting or targeting: that was down to the Superintendent, who would steer or put people in the places we needed them to be. For me, the general thrust was to get information of wrongdoing, violent protest, etcetera. That was the reason for our being. Identity was everything really and so precise, accurate information was required. We always strove to that. I cannot recall going back to someone and asking for more information. My guess is that if ever that situation arose, it would be taken off their hands. If the information was really important another route would be sought to identify the issue.
38. I personally never received feedback on reports. There was feedback from the Security Service, for example if they were particularly pleased with bits, but that would go to the Superintendent or above; it would never be filtered down to me.
39. Annual summaries were not something I was involved in. If it was done, it would have been done by someone like Geoff Craft because he was steering and monitoring.

- [REDACTED]
40. I had no involvement in tasking, instructing or steering undercover officers. Their job was difficult enough and it was not my place to do this. I would have met [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED] HN106 in a safe house and we might have had a general conversation and discussed the group he was with, but I would not have suggested things like tasking. I can only assume tasking came from the Superintendent with the assistance of the Chief Inspector, because that is the only thing that would make sense. There might have been input from the Head of Branch and the Security Service. I was not party to any of this.
41. I did not have any involvement with the production of other SDS paperwork. I did not have anything to do with the procurement or administration of SDS safe houses or cover accommodation. I did not have anything to do with the administration of vehicles used by SDS personnel; this was the remit of Chris Skey and Les Willingale. I had nothing to do with cover documents for undercover officers. I had nothing to do with the processing of overtime claims made by SDS undercover officers. Diaries were more for the expenses side of things and this is likely to have been Less Willingale's remit. I had nothing to do with performance reviews or preparation for promotion exams.
42. There might have been formal policies and procedures for the SDS during my time on the unit, but if so I did not access them and was not aware of them. I did not particularly need to know about them because I was not in the field and I was not managing undercover officers.

Premises

- [REDACTED]
43. As far as I know – and I am not in the know about everything – our main operation was from Scotland Yard. That is where I operated from.
44. We also had a couple of addresses, effectively safe houses, in London. They were big buildings that would not be associated with anything in particular. I do not remember where they were. The only time I went to those flats would have been for the prearranged meetings general office meetings with the field officers. I cannot now remember how frequent these meetings were, but I remember them being regular enough. It was considered important for the field officers to have a meet up, where they could let off steam. Often there would also be a meal, and they would tell us what they thought of us. There might have been discussion at these meetings about deployments, but undercover officers would not have addressed me on them because it was not what I was involved with. I cannot remember taking files to these meetings. I might have taken their notes back to them altered as I wanted to alter them because everything was done in the name of accuracy and I did not want to misrepresent what the officers were trying to say, but I cannot remember. These group meetings were not the only form of meet up. There would have been 1:1 and 1:2 meetings, but I would not have been involved in these; they would have been organised by Mike Ferguson or someone in his role as and when needed.
45. Looking back, these group meetings were vitally important – the undercover officers were so much on their own, in very difficult circumstances. The supervising guys were very, very conscious of emotional wellbeing and all the problems that the undercover officers were exposed to. This was front and centre

[REDACTED]

of what the supervisors were doing. For example, I know one of the field officers

6 was keen on a sport and they would meet in relation to that sport. It was a good idea. From my perspective it was managed very well.

Management

46. I remember there being four people in the office, including me. There would have been changes in personnel, but I cannot remember who came and left and when. I remember being in the office with Geoff Craft, Les Willingale, Dick Walker and Mike Ferguson. Geoff Craft was a senior officer. I think Les Willingale was a Sergeant. I cannot be sure of Dick Walker's rank at the time. I think Mike Ferguson was an Inspector; he was my immediate superior, although I did not think of it like that at the time.
47. In terms of who served in my line of management, I would say Mike Ferguson and Geoff Craft. I do not think the others in the office had a particular oversight of what I was doing. Of the two in my line management, I probably worked more closely with Geoff Craft as Mike Ferguson was more involved in what was going on in the field since he himself had done that with great success prior to me being in the SDS.
48. Dick Walker held an administrative position. I think Les Willingale might have succeeded Dick Walker, or the other way around, in this role. It was a tricky role to do with other issues like transport. He was a great help to me. there would be a link with another part of the Metropolitan Police when it came to vehicles; I did not interfere with that, but Les would help me if I was under pressure with

[REDACTED]

backlogs and the like. I also held an administrative role as I set out above. I was always overseen by a senior officer, who would pass reports on to appropriate Squads who had an interest in the subject of the report. Copies always also went to the Security Service. Geoff Craft would have been in an administrative and operational position. Mike Ferguson would have been hands on operations.

7 [REDACTED]

Individual managers and administrators

49. I did not have much to do with Mike Ferguson on SDS matters. I did not really see what he was doing as it was out in the field. He was the ⁸ sports king. He loved it. I am guessing, but I know he came in to the office having had a good sweat out. I think he was very hands on with individual officers, but I did not witness that. As far as I could see, you would need someone who would do more than the occasional group meetings and he did more than that. If there were problems that came in, on an individual level, I was not privy to that. He did my annual reports as my immediate supervising officer; his eyes were on more important issues than me, and I do not think I was particularly important to him. We did not click. I think he came into the SDS after I was already there. I do not think he was aware of the extra work I was doing handling my informant alongside the SDS. I was not in a position to argue, but he did interfere with this work without realising what I was trying to do with my source. I was working to try and get my source on board with the Security Service, because he would have been better for them long-term. Mike Ferguson did not include me in correspondence about this, and I did not get to meet the Security Service about this; it would have been

[REDACTED]

a reward for my source who had stuck his neck out, and it would have been of great benefit to the Security Service. I was personally disappointed about that. Mike Ferguson did not have a cover name when I was involved with him; he was just an Inspector.

50. I cannot remember Barry Moss running the SDS so I cannot comment on his management style. I do not know if I was there when he was in charge. I remember him in his early days.
51. Angus McIntosh might have been in the SDS office, in which case I may be missing a role above, but he might have been in the Superintendent's office with me after I left the SDS. I cannot be sure what he did. He was extremely clever. Generally speaking, although it did not concern me really, he was very fair and thought everything through very carefully. He was highly professional. He did not have a cover name; he would not have done. We did not have any particular personal interaction that I can remember.
52. I remember Trevor Butler very well, but I do not know if he was in the office. I think he was in the B Squad Chief Superintendent's office as well, so there may be an overlap in my mind. He was similar to Angus McIntosh – a very nice guy, professional and considered everything he did.
53. I think Ken Pryde was Chief Superintendent of S Squad for a while. I do not remember him in my office, so I did not have a close relationship with him if my memory is right. He was a very fair-minded person, and a typical Branch senior

[REDACTED]

officer. I think he sent me on a driving course, just to give me time out of the office. My dealings with him were fairly arms length.

54. As I have said, I think Les Willingale's role involved the administration of vehicles. He was at my level, more or less. We might have been the same rank for a time. He was at least a Sergeant and then rapidly rose after that. He was very friendly and an easy-going guy to get on with. He was willing to help when he need not have done. He did not have a cover name. I would say his role was management, with a touch of operations. You could not ask for a better person in terms of style. He would get anyone's cooperation because that was the kind of person he was. We were in the office together pretty much every day so would interact all the time.

55. I think Derek Kneale was Chief Superintendent of S Squad for a while, perhaps before Ken Pryde. He was extremely clever and you did not want to cross swords with him because he did not suffer fools gladly. I remember I had a very poor annual report from Mike Ferguson because of my personal problems with him, such that it was very unfair, and I did have a word with Derek Kneale out of desperation to explain the work I was doing. He asked for evidence and I put in a quantity of information. I think I overheard him taking Mike Ferguson to task over this, even though I was not asking for that. Derek was fair, provided you gave him reason to be.

9

56. I knew [REDACTED] HN68 [REDACTED] but I do not remember him being in the SDS.

[REDACTED]

57. I cannot particularly remember Paul Croyden on the SDS because we crossed paths elsewhere.

58. Chris Skey may have been in Les Willingale's role prior to Les. I cannot recall. Chris must have been in the office when I first moved into the SDS, which is why my memory is vague. We only had normal interactions in the SDS. He did not have anything to do with what I was doing; we kept our respective roles. I agree with Chris Skey's statement as a general statement of our interaction and my role in the SDS.

Undercover officers

59. I had very little interaction with the undercover officers serving in the SDS at the same time as me. I cannot now remember how often it was, but we would have a meal or get together which would have been put on by the undercover officers in the safe house and the hope was everyone would attend. It was a social get-together. I assume it was attended by senior officers, some of the time anyway. I did not have 1:1 meetings with undercover officers; this was not my remit.

60. Due to the passage of time, I have refreshed my memory from the list of potential contemporaries that has been provided by the Inquiry; the only undercover officer whose name I remember without sight of this list is [REDACTED] ¹⁰ HN304 [REDACTED] I remember serving on the SDS with the following individuals, whose names have been included in the list prepared by the Inquiry:

[REDACTED] ¹¹

[11]

HN200, HN353, HN13, HN296,
HN304, HN354, HN353, HN356,
HN80, HN126, HN96, HN106 and
others

[12]

61.

It is likely I served at the same time as [13] HN20 [14] but I again I cannot be certain.

[14]

[15]

62. I do not remember [14] HN300 [15] I cannot place [15] HN155 [16] and would need to see a photograph of him to jog my memory.

63. Due to the passage of time, I cannot recall the names of any other undercover officers who served on the SDS at the same time as me.

- [REDACTED]
64. I am not aware of any unhappy working relationships between members of the SDS.
65. To my knowledge, none of my contemporaries in the SDS committed a criminal a criminal offence whilst undercover. You had to be very careful about this. From my point of view, the issue never arose. Everyone was very careful not to be considered an agent provocateur. I could not possibly sanction it.
66. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence.
67. I have no knowledge of any of my contemporary undercover police officers engaging in sexual activity with others whilst in their cover identity.
68. I do not know whether any of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, were arrested, charged, tried or convicted in their cover identities. This is a difficult question which I cannot answer either way. One would expect it to have happened when being dragged in, for example, to breach the peace with a group of demonstrators, but it would have been at the lowest level of offending.
69. I have no knowledge of any of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, being involved in incidents of public disorder, violence or other criminal activity.

- [REDACTED]
70. The concept of legal privilege has been explained to me. I am not aware of any of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, reporting any legally privileged information.
71. I cannot say whether any of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, reported on the activities of any elected politicians. If my memory serves me correctly, it would have been rare for this to crop up and if a Member of Parliament was present we would leave it out of the report. I am not sure what the Branch policy was, but I thought it was not to report on politicians. You would have to ask a senior officer. I do not know if the information would be left out when the intelligence was provided to us by officers, or in the office when the report was written up. It would be a sticky situation because the person was elected and the Branch was strictly apolitical.
72. I have been asked what my contemporaries achieved for the benefit of policing. Undercover officers identified real troublemakers – people who were potentially dangerous to the state, to put it in a grand way, and who were promoting violent and dangerous behaviour in the streets to the danger of ordinary citizens. They had the ability to do it in large numbers and such large demonstrations became very difficult for the uniform branch to patrol and police. By being aware of the worst aspects of any proposed demonstration, we were able to contain the worst aspects of what could affect the public and protect them. To some extent, based on intelligence, we could also ensure those responsible were held accountable for it. There were similarities here with what was achieved to assist the Security Service. Their extra interests would be knowing who all these people were; that

[REDACTED]

is their nature. The Security Service would write their own reports, and could assess what direction they were going in. Without our information, they could not do that. It was a way for them to keep their finger on the pulse.

73. I do not know whether it was usual for undercover officers to spend time in the back office or safe houses preparing to deploy. I do not know about preparations by officers for their undercover role. I know they were given time beforehand and they did not go out until they were well-prepared, but I do not know what it involved. I did not have anything to do with it. I have no memory of undercover officers being in the office; as far as I know they never came to the Yard. I never knew what happened after deployments either. A huge readjustment was required and no doubt would have presented some more than others with difficulty.

The Security Service

74. I did not liaise or deal with the Security Service whilst I was in the SDS. It was a key relationship so I expect it would have happened at the Superintendent level and above.
75. I do not recall seeing a "green file" going to S Squad. This would not have been the sort of thing an officer at my level would have been able to see anyway; you would need access via a senior officer as they were highly restricted.

Senior management and oversight bodies

[REDACTED]

76. The only senior officers I recall visiting the SDS were those on S Squad itself, with one great exception: David McNee. He visited the SDS when he was a new Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. He came from Strathclyde. I think it was assumed he should see the SDS because it was so sensitive that it could cause him grief. David McNee was met by Geoff Craft who guided him through SDS operations in the SDS office. He questioned everyone on their role; it was not the easiest experience. I think David McNee also visited the undercover officers in the SDS flat, but I do not know whether this was on the same day as the visit to the office or on a different occasion. I am pretty sure I was not present for his visit to the SDS flat.

77. I do not recall anyone from any outside body with any form of regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing visiting the SDS.

Leaving the SDS

78. I can only guess that I was on the SDS for about 3 years. The incident with Mike Ferguson – receiving a negative annual review and him not recognising my work or bothering to ask me – tipped me. He just decided I was not worth it and it was unfair in terms of the work that I produced. I enjoyed the SDS work and being in the office because I felt it was useful.

Post SDS police career

79. I have set out above the postings I undertook after I left the SDS. As I have said, when I left the SDS I asked to be transferred to get out of the general atmosphere

[REDACTED]

of Special Branch and I ended up at Heathrow. I think my S Squad posting resulted more from my time in B Squad than the SDS.

80. After I left the SDS, I did not have anything to do with SDS intelligence.

81. I retired from the Metropolitan Police in 1994.

Any other matters

82. There is no other evidence that I am able to give from my knowledge and experience which is of relevance to the work of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.

Request for documents

83. I do not have any documents or other information which is potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

Diversity information

84. I am male and white British.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

16

Signed:

Richard Scully

17

Dated:

29.9.2020