

# Cover Sheet



Witness: Second Witness Statement of Roy Creamer / HN3093

Exhibits Referred to: None

Date Statement Made: 4 November 2020

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**UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY**

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**Witness:** Roy Creamer / HN3093

**Occupation:** Retired

**Address:** c/o Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services, Empress State Building, London SW6 1TR

1. I have been asked to provide a witness statement for the purpose of assisting the Undercover Policing Inquiry. In preparing this statement I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the Rule 9 request dated 17 September 2020 and first provided to me on 8 October 2020.
2. I have been shown the witness bundle and the list of potential contemporaries provided by the Inquiry for the purpose of making this witness statement. I have not refreshed my memory by looking at any other document.
3. There is no restriction order in place in respect of my real name. I did not use a cover name.

[REDACTED]

## Personal details

4. My full name is Roy Creamer. My date of birth is <sup>1</sup>[REDACTED] 1930.

## Police career before and after serving with the Special Demonstration Squad ("SDS")

5. I joined the Metropolitan Police in approximately October 1954. I underwent training for a few weeks and then was posted to Chelsea on B Division. I was in this post for 2-3, maybe 4, years – 2 years in uniform and 2 years as what was called an aid to CID. I then moved to Special Branch in 1958 as a Police Constable, and became Detective Constable. It was hardly a promotion.
6. Initially I was posted to C Squad and dealt with left-wing matters. I did various enquiries whilst on C Squad but in between you do other things, for example I went to Dover for 6 months to do passport control and I spent a few weeks at Heathrow. From 1962-63 I spent 3 years at the Port of London doing border-related matters. In 1966-67 I returned to C Squad.
7. The SDS was started in 1968. I was in it from when it was first formed. I thought I was out of the SDS by the beginning of 1969, but having seen Appendix B of Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc A: MPS-0724119, p.9) I accept I must have been on the SDS until mid-1969. I do not remember whether I left on promotion or on 31 July 1969 as stated. I thought the SDS would pack up anyway because we had done our job with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign ("VSC").

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8. Once I had left the SDS, I think I returned to C Squad for up to a year before joining a special squad relating to the Angry Brigade, which was set up after Robert Carr's house was bombed. This lasted for a couple of years. I think the Angry Brigade team consisted of some of the SDS team, but once it got going I forgot all about the SDS; I think this was around the time the SDS changed their name and had different people running it to when I was on it. After this squad, I went to C Squad and for the last couple of years of my service, from 1978 to 1980, I worked on the Naturalisation Squad. This was like a rest. I retired from the Metropolitan Police in 1980.
9. I did not do any undercover policing or work using a cover identity prior to joining the SDS. When I was on C Squad I was generally given the anarchists, so I found out information the old-fashioned way, simply by walking up and asking people. I was always open about my seeking information; I would attend meetings anonymously and not say I was a police officer. Activists never asked for a name. If they had I would have had to make up a name, or say that I was a visitor. I did not dress differently, although you could dress how you liked; you could not go into Scotland Yard looking scruffy in those days.

### **SDS – formation**

10. I was not involved in engineering the Squad; it was all done above my rank. A lot of policeman were injured outside the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square following the March 1968 demonstration. This caused the hierarchy of the police a lot of concern and they said that we cannot let this happen again. The complaint was that uniformed police were not getting enough intelligence from Special



[REDACTED]

Branch about what to expect at demonstrations. They were right, in a way, because a lot of the people who came to the demonstrations were not from London and they were coming in from other cities and universities. We were not encouraged to obtain this information prior to the SDS being set up.

11. Ferguson Smith, Head of Special Branch, was in charge. He asked for suggestions as to how we should improve things. I was not involved in any of that; it was mainly Chief Inspectors, Superintendents and above who discussed this. They suggested we have an undercover business. In those early days, there was carte blanche to do this work and there were no specific instructions from the top. Then it came down to my level. As far as I was concerned, we said we could get people to join the various VSC groups in London. There were several, for example in Hampstead, in Earl's Court, etc. Conrad Dixon was in charge and consulted me a bit about this and asked where we should start; I said with the VSC. Conrad joined one group, and various others joined. I did not join any of these groups: I stayed out of it because I was probably so well known to the left-wing because of my previous work in Special Branch that I would not have gotten away with it. On at least one occasion I was officially sent to visit activists to inform them about an upcoming state visit and to invite them not to do anything to disrupt it. The occasion I remember in particular was being sent to see Stuart Christie before De Gaulle visited. I gave him my name, showed him my warrant card and informed him I was in the Branch. The cat would have been out of the bag as to my identity after situations like this. In any event, I said I would not do the undercover work anyway as I did not fancy it.



12. The Squad got some young lads who were keen to do the undercover work, and Conrad Dixon was good and did it himself. Ray Wilson did a bit too, I think. Riby Wilson did not. There were two or three rules: first, that the officers must not be agent provocateurs, be leaders or suggest anything or persuade others to act in a certain way; second, that they would be allowed to work without coming into the Yard, so they could always be scruffy and look like people of no consequences. I think Conrad got away with pretending to be a retired sea captain (that was his hobby) and people improvised and got away with it as part of their cover. As the Vietnam demonstrations were quite a theatrical event and attracted a lot of boisterous students, it was expected that officers would be outrageously dressed and acting slightly clownish because then they would be accepted more easily and there would be less suspicion about their joining in.
  
13. The SDS was confined to the VSC in those days. I think subsequently, and much out of my reach, there were officers who managed to get into other groups. I was aware of it but I did not know the nuts and bolts of this. I did not know who the officers were, what they knew, etc. I assumed they were doing dummy runs for penetrating the Irish groups because the troubles were starting up. If they had asked me about the different left-wing groups I would have had more to say. There were certain groups that were a waste of time to get into. There were some groups who did mischief and others who did not; it was nice to get into those that did. I did not have any say in which groups were targeted. I got reports, but not directly. I did not go to see any undercover officer, only socially maybe. The only kind of advice I would give them was fatherly advice like not taking drugs, not getting involved with mischief, not getting illnesses; it was not to do with the

[REDACTED]

politics really. I did know which groups were which if the undercover officers needed to know. There were animosities between groups which I knew a lot about and I would need to tell them; for example, some groups would be harder than others to get into or the retribution might be worse if they found out about the deployment. I was uneasy about undercover officers getting found out.

14. Articulating the difference between the SDS's role and the Branch's role is very tricky. I think the main reason for the SDS was the belief that there were people around who were planning mischief for the demonstration. The only sounding boxes for that sort of thing would be the VSC. They were new and not politically affiliated in terms of group; persons could come from anywhere and join the VSC. It was quite clear that these VSC groups were very badly supported sometimes, and there would be hardly anybody there; looking there did not help. The other issue was planning. The demonstrations were ad hoc and done on the spur of the moment. I do not think people went with a specific plan. There were exceptions – for example, in Lewisham, where people got tooled up and fought with sticks and weapons. With demonstrations it was a waste of time to look for deep seated plans. Those groups who had political ambitions, for example the Trotskyists, who were behind the VSC, were too cautious to get involved in actual violence themselves. They might like to create a climate or situation where it could take place, and would also be indifferent if it happened. It was difficult to assess all that really. When the Yard expected Special Branch to come up with specific information, it was asking for the moon and this could not be done. The SDS made an effort and did find out a lot of information. However, the idea that the SDS would find out and reveal plans was wishful thinking, I think.



15. At the time the SDS was set up, we had a position called Commander Ops. I cannot remember who held this position, was but I think he was bypassed a bit in the setting up of the SDS. Conrad Dixon was the next person down from the Deputy Assistant Commissioner. My recollection was that he was Superintendent, but I have seen documents in the witness bundle state his rank as Chief Inspector which may be right. Conrad had ambitions, and was keen to get on. He volunteered this business of the SDS. My recollection is that Riby Wilson was Chief Inspector, but if Conrad was Chief Inspector Riby would have been an Inspector. They either put themselves forward or were chosen to form a squad which would be allowed to do undercover work. It was not specified what they should do except for the rules about agent provocateur and things like that. They then handpicked whoever they wanted to be on the squad, and that is how I became involved.
16. I have been shown a Special Branch report dated 25 July 1966 regarding a conference of the then newly formed Britain Vietnam Solidarity Front (Doc 1: MPS-0736497). This report bears my signature so I think I wrote it. In 1966, the VSC was the province of B Squad, where I was a Sergeant. There were so many different groups with which B Squad was concerned that first class Sergeants specialised in a group or area. Persons more junior to me did not specialise in anything much and overall responsibility fell on the Superintendents. I specialised in Trotskyists and Anarchists, so the VSC was my business. However, attendance at VSC meetings was a bit hit and miss; somebody did attend, but it would not usually be me. When a meeting was advertised, somebody would

[REDACTED]

make the decision that the Branch would cover it and then a decision would be made as to who would cover the meeting. The problem was that the Branch administration would decide who covered meetings and they assumed that if you were on B Squad you would be the one to cover it; they did not know, or quite often care, who would cover it because it was considered a routine task. It was often a matter of good fortune if you got the meetings from which there was lots of information. I would get quite annoyed about how the system operated; I felt we should have had a more well-thought out plan to cover meetings, rather than it being so haphazard. Because of the way things operated at the time, different people went to different meetings. As a Sergeant I did not see all of the reports; this was down to the Chief Inspector and Superintendent.

17. I think that for a while I was an administrative officer on B Squad and not doing much except paperwork. It was only later, as it got nearer to when I joined the SDS, that I got more involved in attending meetings. I did not have anything to do with the March 1968 demonstration. I did not do any assessment for it; someone else must have. I knew about the police coverage of the VSC prior to the formation of the SDS, but not the scale of it.
18. Coverage of the VSC did change following the formation of the SDS; the SDS' coverage of the VSC was better than Special Branch's coverage. Young SDS officers joined the various London VSC groups, which I think were based on ordinary London borough boundaries. The VSC was a campaign and the hierarchy of the Branch wanted different areas covered. They felt that we should take advantage of the fact that the VSC was starting local branches in places in



[REDACTED]

London; having officers on the ground meant that we did not just need to rely on what was coming out of publications. It was a no brainer. If there was a conspiracy to do anything, the people that would know would be at a local branch level; we had to cast the net widely because if you did not look for things, it would not be found. Branches were not a big area of recruitment for demonstrations, but this was the only group that was open and it was seen to be easy to get into. To get people onto demonstrations in the thousands, there were three or four sources: involving students, which Tariq Ali did; residents in London, but branch membership was generally low; and through trade unions and through political parties. The VSC did manage to get a big mass of people at demonstrations, but not specifically from branches in London. If you wanted to go on a demonstration but were not a member of a political group, you would hear about them from the branches. People also came in coach loads from outside of London; intelligence about them would not be available to SDS officers. When you are operating within the Metropolitan Police District, you have to stick to your patch.

19. I do not want to downplay the overall importance of the SDS' coverage of the VSC because some of my colleagues think it was pretty good. Whilst we were looking for information, there was simply nothing to tell of; it was a case of 'no news is good news'. There were no hidden conspiracies anywhere and there was nothing hidden going on; there was no suggestion amongst the groups, for example, that they were going to set fire to things or do anything outrageous. This was reassuring.



### **Selection for the SDS**

20. I first heard about the SDS after it was agreed there would be an undercover squad. Originally, it was called something other than the SDS but I cannot now remember what that was. Riby Wilson and Conrad Dixon were my immediate superiors on the SDS. They came to me and said they were starting this squad and they wanted me to be on it. I knew more about Trotskyists and Anarchists than most people because of my role on B Squad. I said yes, but that I did not want to do undercover work. They said they wanted me to be in the office.
21. There was nothing more formal than this conversation with Riby and Conrad. It was all very new and there was not any time to make up any rules.
22. The SDS was set up before the October 1968 demonstration. I joined from the beginning. This was between March and October – probably a couple of months before October for it to have made any sense.
23. I had no choice about joining the SDS. If I said I did not want to, I do not know what would have happened. The role was a challenge but about matters I understood. It was right up my street I suppose.
24. How did they choose the other officers? It was a combination of things. You wanted people who you knew who had the right temperament. However there was also a limited pool of people who could do the job. Everyone had jobs in the Branch already, and people in certain roles, for example in protection duties,

[REDACTED]

were not the sort you wanted for undercover work. Of the available officers who were around at the time, Conrad and Riby between them made a decision as to who would join. They knew everybody's potential and weaknesses and could make fair decisions about who would be suitable. I had nothing to do with recruitment.

### **My role**

25. As I have said above, I was recruited to be in the SDS office. I did not have a job title or specific set of duties. All SDS officers were responsible to Conrad Dixon. He confided in me when he had to and would tell me of things I needed to know, or what he wanted to achieve, that kind of thing. We worked closely together and I helped him as much as I could. I remained in this office role throughout my service in the SDS. I attended meetings too, but not undercover. It was important for me to go. I knew officers were there and they did not have the resources to do reports.
26. I was a Sergeant when I was recruited to the SDS. I was not promoted whilst I was in the SDS.

### **Training**

27. I did not have any formal training for my role in the SDS. I had the experience of having done similar sort of work in the Branch, particularly the assessment of demonstrations and things like that. You had to do that kind of work in the Branch from the word go.



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28. It is difficult to say whether there was any subsequent training, advice, guidance or instructions given. You were at the service of the Superintendent; he would tell you what he wanted and what he did not want. This was roughly all the instructions you got. There was an expression in the Branch: "do your best lad and we will back you up". That is why they tried to choose people for the SDS who had intelligence and initiative, more than the average constable.
29. Race equality was not a subject in those days. There were people who were keen on it, but there was no training.

### **Duties**

30. I had two main jobs as part of my role in the SDS: undertaking research and collating the intelligence gathered by undercover officers and preparing assessments for senior management. I would write reports summarising what we knew so that we had an up to date record.
31. The office was manned by me and Bill Furner and we dealt with any calls that came in and affected the Squad. To be fair, it was a semi-clandestine business and so people did not ring up a lot. Bill was a very competent man. He was probably better at that sort of work than I was.
32. I was not involved in writing intelligence reports as such, although I explain more about this below. I was involved in the summary reports. I was not involved in producing any other SDS paperwork.

[REDACTED]

33. I was not involved in the procurement and administration of SDS safe houses and cover accommodation. That was a closed book to me and the "need to know" principle applied here. I knew there was such a thing, and that was the end of it really. I was not involved in the procurement or administration of vehicles used by SDS officers.

34. I was not involved in cover documents for undercover officers. I was not involved in cover employment either.

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35. I have been shown the following excerpt from [REDACTED] HN326's [REDACTED] witness statement:

*"... part of the role of the administrative staff was to research the information provided by undercover officer in the field in order to provide full, presentable reports. For example, they would look in records and Special Branch files for further information of relevance to include in the reports. Management liked to have a standalone report with all of the information in a single pace so that they did not have to go looking for matters in Special branch files... After attending a meeting or a demonstration, I wrote out by hand or typed out what I had learnt on a bit of paper in the SDS flat. This bit of paper would then be taken over to the Yard ...reports were then collated and typed up in full in the office either by the officers in the office – Bill Furner, Roy Creamer and Dave Smith – or by the typing pool. They typed the reports with the appropriate formatting and alignment on a better typewriter than we had access to in the SDS flat. When writing the reports, those in the office would collate all of the information provided about a particular meeting, demonstration or issue. They would look at the information I provided on the bits of paper alongside other information such as information provided by other officer, information from other intelligence sources and information obtained from more covert sources including listing devices, phone and postal intercepts, civilian informants and the Security Services ...the key recipient of intelligence in the office was Bill Furner. Roy Creamer and Dave Smith were also in the office and involved in the report writing process."*

36. Reports on scribbled bits of paper did not come to me and I was not involved in intelligence reporting or the writing of reports for undercover officers. There were

[REDACTED]

only two of us in the office, so Bill Furner must have dealt with most of the scribbled bits of paper reports. It only needed one person. I was more interested in the overall vantage point. I do not remember Dave Smith being in the office.

Otherwise this is an accurate summary by <sup>1B</sup> [REDACTED] HN326

37. My recollection is that reporting was all done by word of mouth and there was not much formality about it. Conrad Dixon and Riby Wilson met the field officers on an almost on a daily basis to receive oral reports about what we wanted to know. If the officers had anything to report they would tell them and Conrad would then tell me if I needed to know. As far as I recall, nothing was written down; I would have seen it if it had been. This was a much safer arrangement than getting them to write reports. It also had its advantages, for example blokes might have had problems and the report would not have dealt with that. I personally had nothing to do with the reporting received: it was either received verbally to Conrad or Riby, depending on who went to meet the officers. I did not receive reports from officers in the field or see them coming into the office. I was not curious about how reporting by undercover officers was dealt with. How and what undercover officers were expected to report was between them and Conrad and Riby. Conrad and Riby would have been able to filter what information they did and did not want. If undercover officers were asked to obtain or provide information in response to questions or requests from outside the SDS, it would have been channelled through Conrad. I do not know about this.
38. I am surprised at the suggestion that field officers wrote reports. I always assumed reporting was done by word of mouth, but I might be wrong. Written

[REDACTED]

reporting does seem odd to me because it goes against the idea that they would not put things on paper and it would all be done verbally. I cannot imagine I would see a report written by a field officer. All I can imagine is that there must have been a separate file that was kept by Riby or Conrad to cover themselves to say they had men out doing this, that and the other. What was in the reports was something that was duplicated from what we did anyway. If an undercover officer went to a meeting that I went to, I would not be interested in what they said. The safe house must have had a typewriter if undercover officers provided written reports. The forms we had said "SB1" or some initials on it. Whether they had that or plain paper I do not know, but it is risky if they had police paper in the safe house. I am not ruling out that undercover officers wrote reports because I never went to the safe house: I was firmly told not to go there and I did not want to go anyway.

39. If there was anything of major importance coming from the field officers, I would have been told. Conrad Dixon and I would discuss the information and I would then draft what I thought we should say in the report. I would put into words what I knew he ought to be saying. I was like Radar from *M\*A\*S\*H*. Conrad would have the last say. I only had two pages to include a lot of information – how many people, the mood they were in, what was planned – and the report was for A8 for them to decide how many officers to bring to the event and what to do. 'Intelligence' as a description is a bit of a misnomer. A8 were not without sources; they would interview the organisers of demonstrations and they had other ways of obtaining information such as how many buses were coming. They would look at newspapers and things of that nature. What they did not have was the political

[REDACTED]

information that we had. When I did a report with Conrad, I would sign it and submit it, and then he would then sign it and submit it higher up. It would be the report of the Unit. Conrad was the source of a lot of my information for these summary reports. I did not put truly sensitive information in my reports; they consisted of an amalgam of information, most of which was public knowledge even if not widely known. I only included a re-write of what officers had said if it came from Conrad. I do not know if these reports went back to undercover officers for review.

40. The system we had at the time was that if you wrote a report for the Branch you submitted the report, it was signed by you, seen by the Chief Inspector, approved by the Superintendent and then was sent off to whoever. That applied to a formal meeting. I would go to the meeting anyway and so I would see what happened for myself, rather than reading about it in a report. These would be public meetings. I remember going to Earl's Court VSC meetings because they had 50-60 people in attendance, but there was not much point going to the smaller branch meetings. I remember going to one or two big meetings in Red Lion Square. I would write reports for those as well, saying who was there and what they said. None of these reports had anything desperate in them. I would write the report on behalf of all of the officers who attended and I would sign it. It would not mention the undercover officers who attended.
41. I would write reports both in the style of the Special Report and the Routine Meeting Reports. "The following information has been received from a secret and reliable source" might mean you have an informant who has told you the



[REDACTED]

information, it might be a cover for information received from the Security Service by letter or phone call, or it could be a source you do not want to disclose either because it was government information or a private informant. I think most of what I wrote would be from government sources. We all had individual informants but I have never claimed to get information from them and write about it. I did not really have informants. I had people I could talk to in the anarchist field generally but they were not informants as such; they would not be providing information about what might happen for example rallies or demonstrations, and I did not pay them. They were not 'hard informants', but more senior figures around who knew more about left-wing politics than the average person. There were one or two 'hard informants' but I did not deal with them. I remember that at some stage after the VSC demonstration, probably the one in October, one of the SDS officers found a shed in London containing explosives. That kind of information would be reported as being from a "reliable source" too. "Secret and reliable" was a very elastic phrase. People used it as an introduction to a report. I used to use it rather incorrectly really as we were not talking about sources in the individual sense all the time.

42. If you went to a meeting and you could identify people who were present, their Special Branch records had to be identified too. Whoever produced the report would have to find this information. You would give the names to the registry, in a list, and the registry would come back with the information. If the report was written by a field officer, they would have had to get someone else to do this for them as they did not have access to Special Branch records. I do not know

[REDACTED]

whether undercover officers were asked to verify the names or personal details of individuals or identities from photographs.

43. I would never include in a report that I wrote that an undercover officer had been at the meeting. I was writing reports that were really intended for A8, who did uniform at the time. A copy would also go to the Home Office and a copy to the Security Service, if important enough. Everything I said was very guarded. I would not put the nuts and bolts in.
44. It is difficult to say whether the reports I wrote contained information from a single or multiple sources. When it comes to a figure as to attendance, there is no source of information for that anyway; it is a judgement, rather than something which came from an informant. Most of what I wrote was judgement. The numbers would be what A8 had already been told by the organisers who turned up. Normally there was no reason for us to dispute any of that: if that what the organisers said, the police would deal with it. If the organisers said something outrageous which is blatantly not right, then we could correct it to a certain extent. You would exercise your judgement. I got it right most of the time, on all but perhaps two occasions, and you would be trusted because of that. A8 did not necessarily tell us things; we would have to go and ask them, but the information would be freely available within police circles. Information from A8 was reliable, but did not have to be kept secret. It is difficult to say whether the phrase "secret and reliable source" would be used in respect of their information.

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45. I doubt I would have seen my reports after I submitted them. I knew where they would be but I did not need to see them. We were tied to the notion of need-to-know. I could get a file out and read a report on something that I was not involved in, but I would probably be asked why because of the need-to-know basis.
46. The way we did report writing was slap dash, probably inefficient and wrong. I do not know what happened after I left the SDS, but I gather that it improved and became more formal; I was not involved in the nuts and bolts but knew the people involved who were sticklers for formalities. I would have continued with my assumption we did not put anything down in the first place because on the SDS we tended to depart from police practice, which was to write everything down.
47. I do not recall anything specific about feedback on reporting.
48. I did not have any say in the dissemination of reports. That was for Conrad and Riby. I was aware of who was seeing my reports in the most general sense, i.e. A8. Otherwise, reports were filed. The minutes on the file would say "X to see". The Superintendent would minute for the governor higher to see, summarise what was said, draw attention to any actions, and then ask for it to be filed. That was kept in a file which was kept in the Special Branch registry, in a separate part of the building. There were civil staff who stored the files and indexed them, and you would go there if you needed to find a file. Files moved around. If the minutes stated "X to see", the file would have to be taken to them. People were paid to push files around on the trolley. If you wanted a file and had a need for it, you could keep it in your office as long as you liked but it had to go back to



[REDACTED]

Records in the end. The main files would be in the Superintendent's office because once the report reached him it would be filed, and then go to Records.

49. I do not know what happened with the scraps of paper provided by undercover officers; they may have been stored in the SDS office, but I was not of the belief that there were great hoards of paper stashed away. They must have had a way of keeping it. That was how Bill Furner may have been involved.
50. Filing got complicated. I think there was a VSC file opened, which got filled and then another was opened. If the report related to a different group, a copy would go into that group's file. It was up to the registry how they operated the system. All we wanted was to get copies back, if required. In those days photocopying was not very good; this is clear from the witness bundle provided to me.
51. There were different classifications of files and there may have been different rules according to that. A green cover denoted the file was highly secret and a buff colour meant it was not so secret. There was another colour which was in between highly secret and not so secret, but I cannot now remember it. Very secret files were very closely watched and only the chief registry man could let them out. I do not think we had green files in the SDS office.
52. There should not have been copies of a report; I would not have been allowed to take copies and keep them. If reports went through typists, they would negotiate with the boss how many copies would be made. When I wrote reports, there

[REDACTED]

would only be an original. Generally speaking it was just one copy; if others were made it was just by me.

53. I have been shown a report dated 18 September 1968 (Doc 5: MPS-0731633), which concerns a meeting of the IMG. The attending officer appears to be DC <sup>2</sup> **HN321**; I do not recognise that name. My signature does appear at the bottom of the document, however I do not think I was the author of this report. I have not seen the first page before, and I have not seen an SB Form M before. This must have been one of the few times, if ever, where an officer wrote something and I was asked to make other enquiries. I cannot think why this would have been. I think they were trying to find a way around the problem of a Hairy officer writing the report but not signing it. I am surprised it happened. It was not regular for me to write reports of meetings where other officers had attended. I thought this information would go to Bill Furner. I am a bit at a loss as to my signature on this report.

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54. I have been referred to a passage of **HN326's** witness statement, which states as follows:

*"I was not tasked to infiltrate a particular group. Roy Creamer was probably my advisor on the particular anarchist groups to observe. He received information from a range of sources and so was very knowledgeable about the political landscape and activities of the group."*

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55. I would discuss with **HN326** about anarchist groups. I was the expert on these groups and no one else was. These were the groups most likely to make trouble. There were some who were probably too intellectual and would not welcome

[REDACTED]

people who did not know anything and others were just drinking clubs. It was a matter of advising <sup>5</sup> [HN326] which ones to bother with. There was a pub in central London – the Lamb & Flag – which was a hotbed of anarchists, but you could not get in without someone inviting you. <sup>5</sup> [HN326]s right about me talking to him about it. However, I did not allocate, instruct or steer anyone to any specific group. I was happy to discuss the characteristics of any group that an officer wanted to join, if they asked me. I think I told Conrad what should be done, and he tended to agree with me. The only direction as to tasking came from Conrad personally. He was responsible for tasking. The big thing would be to get someone into the IMG and the SWP, but that was a bigger risk. I am not sure if that happened in my time; there must have been something like that because we did get information from them, but I did not know the details. I was concerned that we would not waste our time with the wrong groups. There were some that were not worth getting involved with and which we could leave alone, for example those with Vanessa Redgrave. I had my views about the groups to leave alone and those it would be nice to know about.

56. I have been shown a minute sheet which refers to a Special Branch report on the Open Conference of the Britain Vietnam Solidarity Campaign on 26-27 April 1969 (Doc 11: MPS-0736445). The minute sheet contains the details: *“Credit must also go to D.S. Creamer who briefed and de-briefed these officers and provided the essential ideological interpretation”*. I have been asked to explain my role in the briefing and de-briefing of undercover officers in the field. I am not sure what this minute sheet is referring to. Where undercover officers felt they needed help, I was always there to help them. I would not like to put myself forward and tell them

[REDACTED] -

what to do, because I knew everyone had to play it by ear and improvise. I was the link between the undercover officers and Conrad Dixon. I would absorb what they had to say for the purpose of general knowledge. I do not think these officers had anything to do with Trotskyists or Anarchists, so it would have been an exceptional case for me to be assisting them with the political landscape. My speciality was anarchists and the left-wing. I was also knowledgeable on communists, although we did not know that much about them.

57. I cannot say how much of my role was "briefing" and "de-briefing". I did not have contact with the undercover officers directly, for example I did not go to the safe house. My influence was on Conrad and we would digest between us what information would come up. He relied on my knowledge of the left a bit as it was not his speciality; I think he was a protection officer or bodyguard and had been on E Squad prior to the SDS. If I had discussions with undercover officers like the one referred to in the minute sheet, the officers would have to come into the office. There was a phone in the safe house; I cannot remember if we spoke on the phone. I would rely on Bill to tell me the phone number as I did not have a note of it.

58. I knew there was information about all sorts of groups in the records if we needed to know about it. I had my area and knew it was best to stay within it, where possible. I also built up my knowledge of these groups by reading all the publications and going to as many meetings as I could. Meetings were a bit of chance; you could not insist on going, but the office could make you go.

59. I have been shown a number of reports and have been asked whether I am the author of these reports and, if so, how and why these reports were drafted and for whose benefit:

- (i) Report dated 19 September 1968 regarding the Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Movement (Doc 6: MPS-0739495). I think this relates to the Chinese communists. I probably did write this report as it does sound like my writing: I always made a point of assessing things. The information would have come to me but I cannot remember quite how. I could have been asked to look into it, or someone in the Squad had fed the information back. I also used to read all the literature that was circulating. It looks like a report based on information from a variety of sources. This sort of report was the best way of getting the information undercover officers obtained into the records.
- (ii) Report dated 13 December 1968 regarding Maoist groups associated with Albert Manchanda (Doc 9: UCPI0000026382). I did sign this report, but it looks like it could have been information from a Hairy. I could not have written all of this report based on what I knew – it is too rich for me. I must have dressed up an officer's report in some way because I do not think a word of this is from me.
- (iii) Report dated 6 January 1969 regarding the VSC (Doc 4: MPS-0747725). I did sign the report and I wrote it. I do not know where I got the information from. The Working Committee of the VSC was one of the top echelons of the outlet and so the information must have come from a Hairy. If so, this



[REDACTED]

would be an edited version of a Hairy's report. That we could get this sort of information was the best part of our operation.

- (iv) Report dated 22 January 1969 regarding Maoist organisations which are of interest in a public order context (Doc 10: UCPI0000014320). I think this was written by me based on what an undercover officer has said; the report is so detailed that this is all it could be. CI Gilbert also signed it. He became Head of Special Branch and Chief Constable of Cambridge in due course. He had nothing to do with the Hairies. He told me he was not happy with the level of intelligence that we sent to A8 and he took the view I was the one to put these things right.
- (v) Report dated 16 October 1969 regarding Ultra Leftism in Britain (Doc 12: MPS-0737414). This looks more like something I have written based on information of my own. I imagine I wrote it off the top of my head. The information in the report would be an amalgam of what other people know and what I have read.
- (vi) Report dated 10 November 1969 reviewing a Maoist broadsheet (Doc 14: MPS-0737404). I must have got all of this information from the magazine. It is a precis or digest. It is very likely I wrote this without much help from an undercover officer. The contents of this broadsheet would have been of interest to the Branch.
- (vii) Report dated 31 December 1969 regarding the Communist Federation of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) (Doc 15: MPS-0737443). I must have written this report. A Hairy must have obtained the information and then I wrote the report based on it.

[REDACTED]

(viii) Report dated 13 January 1969 regarding a document entitled "Solidarity with the N.L.F." (Doc 4: MPS-0722099). I wrote this report. The document which is the subject of the report must have been given to me by a Hairy.

60. These are all routine reports written for Special Branch records. It was up to the supervising officers whether they went any further; I cannot say I know what happened with them. I do not think I got much comeback: the Security Service and the Home Office did not say what they thought of our reports. The sorts of reports I would write with analysis were for the file, intended to give a complete picture as to what was happening. At the end of the year there would have to be a summary of what the Branch was doing. The aim was to ensure a record of the work we were doing, but I do not know if any of these featured in the annual report. There was also an internal purpose to our reports in that anyone who was joining the Squad could read up.

61. I have been referred to a report dated 5 March 1971 regarding The Angry Brigade (Doc 17: UCPI0000022118). I must have written this report. This was post-SDS; I was not a member of the SDS in March 1971. At this time I was in a special squad, unconnected to the SDS, which was set up. It was jokingly described as the Bomb Squad; the name was changed to something less jokey, but I cannot now remember what that was. This squad was formed before Irish bombs fell. The squad consisted of Conrad Dixon I think, me and two Chief Inspectors from B Squad because they thought the bombs were to do with Spain, and we joined with CID officers from C1. Bombs had targeted Members of Parliament, Ministers and the Commissioner's house. It was thought there was an anarchist link,

[REDACTED]

although I was not sure about this, but it was thought best for me to look into it. The responsibility for enquiries rested with E Squad who dealt with Spanish and other terrorist groups. The formation of the squad was all above my head, but I know it was proposed to form a special squad to and I was pulled on to it because of my knowledge of anarchists. We were doing it for the best part of a year before catching whoever did it, and then there was a trial at the Old Bailey which lasted months. I cannot remember whether my role was office based or if I was out doing enquiries. My role was a bit like in the Hairies in that I was there to read and take in the literature. The C1 officers did not like me sitting there whilst they were going out, and insisted I go out and do raids with them. Earnie Bond, C1 Commander, and [REDACTED] 6 [REDACTED] were in charge. I was in an office with the CID to make friends with them, allegedly, but I cannot remember who the other Special Branch officers were or what they did other than raids with the CID. I have no idea who would have received this report, and specifically whether it would have been shared with the SDS.

62. I did not have anything to do with overtime claims. I was not an admin man. I had nothing to do with expenses or officers' diaries. I did not attend meetings at the safe houses. I was not involved with annual performance reviews or promotion training.

- [REDACTED] 7 [REDACTED]
63. I have been referred to a passage of [REDACTED] HN333's [REDACTED] witness statement, where he described a management structure in the SDS in which Conrad Dixon and Phil Saunders were supported by *"three or so Detective Sergeants that supported the management. They would be out and about on demonstrations (but not*



[REDACTED]

*associating with any particular group) and they were at SDS meetings. The Detective Sergeants managed us verbally. They were protective of us too. For example, they visited my cover accommodation on a few occasions and they pulled me from the field when I was sick ... I would not have used the expression 'cover officer' but I would have perhaps said 'mentor'. One more senior officer in particular mentored me. Roy Creamer. He and I would chat at the safehouse. He would make sure that I was OK, not feeling threatened, and that I had enough expenses. I would have seen him every week. He would give me an indication of what was going on elsewhere in London."*

8

64. I have no recollection of going to the safe house, but **HN333** could be right. I thought there was a system where we went to an anonymous pub or something like that. I did not have an official pastoral or welfare role, and I was not designated to do any such thing; that was down to the Superintendents. It would be on a more informal, friendly basis because there was a barrier between senior officers and junior officers. Perhaps this is less the case now than it used to be, but I knew my place. Where I did meet with undercover officers, I did not record these meetings or take notes; I was not in a position of authority over them and could not tell them what to do or not to do.
65. I was not aware of any formal measures to safeguard welfare. I do not think it was ever thought necessary. What we relied on were intelligent men, capable of working on their own, using their own initiative. They were given a huge amount of trust. The idea that they might have troubles did not occur to anyone at the time, or to me.

- [REDACTED]
66. As far as I was aware there were no formal written SDS procedures or policies. There were verbal briefings by Commanders and senior persons in the Branch, for example "we do not want the SDS to get out", "do not create trouble", and "do not make waves".
67. In my First Witness Statement dated 17 September 2019 (MPS-0741160) I identified individuals, former members of the SDS, in a number of photographs. These photographs must have been taken on a social occasion but I cannot remember where. I think it is most likely that they were taken somewhere in the Yard, but I cannot be sure as the undercover officers were not allowed into the Yard. I cannot remember when these photographs were taken. I did not really want to have my photograph taken; I thought we were inviting trouble, and it was in breach of security really. I was not in favour of it happening.

### **Attendance at Activists' Meetings**

68. I have been shown a report dated 12 November 1968 regarding a meeting of the VSC after the demonstration on 27 October 1968 (Doc 8: MPS-0730768). I do not think I was at this meeting. My name is not included in the list of officers present; had I been there, my name would have been included in that list. I did attend meetings, but not undercover. I would attend meetings because I needed to know what was being said and what our people were supposed to tell us. These were the days of Tariq Ali, but on the other hand them being firebrands was not really actionable in any way. What he was saying was perfectly legal. Whilst I was on the SDS I attended about 6 or 7 demonstrations. I did not go to anything other than VSC meetings. I do not think I attended the October 1968

[REDACTED]

demonstration. I had to stay back in the Yard, but I do not know why; I assume there were enough people on it. I remember going to a big meeting at Conway Hall, to Earl's Court VSC meetings and some others. If any major figures like Tariq Ali were to be there I would go. Generally you were not asked your name when attending these meetings. If I was asked, I might make one up myself. I would dress to look a bit scruffy but not overdone. I did grow a beard but it was a bit of silliness really. I cannot remember being formally deployed to particular meetings or demonstrations; I think I said I was going and it got approval. It was not like other officers who only went to certain groups all the time.

69. I have been shown a report dated 7 November 1969 regarding a meeting of the IMG (Doc 13: MPS-0738381). I wrote this report. I would have attended the meeting but I do not think I stayed to the end. I think the other officer who attended the meeting and put in a report, DC <sup>9</sup> [REDACTED] (Special Branch), was not very good and got scrubbed. It is too detailed a report for me not to have been there. Prior to joining the Hairies, it would have been routine for me to write a report like this. The Branch would find out a meeting was going on and then order an officer to go. I do not think I was in the SDS when I wrote this report, given the record that I left in mid-1969. The best way to tell is by who signed the report: <sup>10</sup> [REDACTED] <sup>11</sup> and [REDACTED]. This means I was on C Squad. I would have had help with this report but do not know if it was from a Hairy or someone else. There must have been someone from the SDS in attendance, but I do not know.

70. I have been shown a report dated 13 February 1970 regarding a meeting of the IMG (Doc 16: MPS-0738388). This is a Special Branch Special; the SS5 is a

[REDACTED]

much smaller piece of paper, hence the shortness of the report. I cannot remember much about this report. I would have been back on C Squad at this time. The signatures on the report are of C Squad bosses: Lawrenson, who was a Superintendent on C Squad, and I think [REDACTED]

71. I have been shown a Metropolitan Police Telegram dated 7 November 1968 (Doc 4: MPS-0722099, p.214). It looks as though I was still on the Hairies and I have sent a message to the information room and [REDACTED] has taken it. It must be me who sent the message. That is how we did it in those days: there was a Sergeant and Constable in the reserve room at all times; if something cropped up, you would phone them and they would write down the message, put it in the tray and assign it to someone the next day. This was particularly important if it was an out of hours call in because you could not just go down the hall and hand them a bit of paper. I do not remember the circumstances of the message. This would have been a rare occurrence in my role; it must have been something that cropped up at the last minute, but how I knew and who told me the information I do not know.

### **Premises and meetings with other SDS undercover officers**

72. I worked in the SDS office in the Yard.

73. As I have said above, I do not remember going to the safe house. What I knew about the safe house would be hearsay. I think it was somewhere in [REDACTED] **West London** and I have a feeling there was somebody there all the time. It was not my business to know these things. I think the consideration was that I was quite well

[REDACTED]

known to left-wing people and so they did not want me going near the safe house in case I was spotted.

74. I have no idea if the SDS operated from anywhere else, but I would not have thought that was the case.

### **Management structure**

75. Conrad Dixon and Riby Wilson served in management positions during my time in the SDS. As I have said above, if Conrad was the Chief Inspector then Riby would have been an Inspector. Conrad was the boss. Riby was the number three in charge of the SDS, but effectively the number two in operations. Both of them were based mostly in the office, but I think Riby roamed around more than Conrad as I do not remember him having much to do with the office.

76. During my time in the SDS, Bill Furner served in an administrative position.

### **Individual managers and administrators**

77. Conrad Dixon ran the SDS with a light reign. He wanted everyone to be comfortable and knew that they were taking risks. He was supportive. He led by example because he joined a group and did the same as the undercover officers. Conrad may have had a cover name; I think it was Captain Birdseye. He looked a bit like that: he wore a tailor's hat. In terms of our level of personal interaction, we liaised every day; you would not dare miss a thing. However, Conrad was primarily concerned with the welfare of the Squad. Anything to do with the politics of it and how we represented what we did to the hierarchy was left to me in terms



[REDACTED]

of report writing and what we could expect. I think there was one occasion where Conrad was asked directly by the Commissioner how to respond to a demonstration. The Commissioner had two views: either we give them the width of the road and close all the traffic, or we let them have half the road. Conrad, in the spur of the moment, said to give them the whole road. He came back to me and said that was what he had done and that he knew I would like it. At the time, everyone was het up about the Vietnam war and you could not treat people like they were villains. He regarded me as a sort of advisor on that sort of thing. I was nothing to do with nuts and bolts of the deployments.

78. Phil Saunders was nominally second in command of the SDS. We used to be in the same chess team and I was better than him at chess so, although he was senior to me, we were pals. I have no idea what he did in the SDS; I had hardly a thing to do with him on the SDS and I did not ask him about what he was doing. I think he might have been more interested in accommodation than me. He certainly did not want to know about politics. He liked sitting down at the desk and later became Commander A Squad within Special Branch. I think he was a protection officer by inclination. I do not think of him as being in my hierarchy and I did not need to tell him anything. I do not think he did undercover work so I would not think he had a cover name.

79. Riby Wilson was in the SDS whilst I was in the Squad. As I have said above, he was effectively the number two in operations within the SDS. He could be strict and was quite a forceful fellow. He was more of a Sergeant Major than an officer. He did not have a cover name. I had very little personal interaction with Riby. I

[REDACTED]

would only interact with him when Conrad was away. I do not even remember where his office was; it was not the same office as mine. I got to know him better post-SDS. I note Annex B of Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc A) states that his duty was "press and informants". I think this must be poetic licence: he must have done more than that. I agree with the informants aspect of this, but I cannot remember us having any liaison with the press. The rules at the time were that we had no involvement with the press in the Branch and I cannot see why the rules would have been different for the SDS. I do not know the extent of SDS interaction with informants. Such was its secrecy that you did not know who had informants or what they did.

80. Ray Wilson started on the SDS at the same time as me, and I think he finished at the same time as me. He was not management. He joined a group out where he lived in Surrey. I do not know if he used a cover name. At the time I had no personal interaction with him.

- 15
81. I think I would consider [REDACTED] HN332 [REDACTED] to be management. In terms of his management style, he was a strong leader, knew his own mind and was quite prepared to tell people what to do. He was forceful but pleasant enough and did not upset. I have a feeling he was half in a group and half in the office. He might have gone to VSC meetings in Hampstead, but I cannot remember. I think he had a lot to say because he was an ex-CID officer and would have had more experience of undercover work. I am only assuming this because he had nothing to do with my side of the work, that is writing assessments etc. I had no personal interaction with him. I think he had a cover name but do not know what it was. I

[REDACTED]

note Annex B of Penetration of Extremist Groups (Doc A) states that his duty was "poster workshop". I do not know what this is.

16

82. [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] was not on the SDS at the same time as me. I think he was in the team who came afterwards. I knew of him but do not what he was up to at the time I was on the Squad.

83. Bill Furner left the intellectual side to me and did the administrative work, passing on of messages, etc. He had been a Superintendent in the Colonial Police Force so he was a very competent man, but he was very modest. He came late into the Branch and had not been to any political meetings much. He would do any mundane jobs that needed to be done. I do not mean to put him down in this regard: he was later my boss at the Ministry of Defence.

84. I know of Wilf Knight but doubt he was on the SDS at the same time as me.

### **Undercover officers**

85. I did not interact much with the undercover officers. In my time they kept out of the Yard and the general rule was "do not contact me, I will contact you". It was not expected that I would talk to them. If they had a problem, they could come to me if they wanted to but this did not happen much. It was only on the odd occasion when you met them casually and fairly informally that the undercover officers would have anything to say. I do not think I was telephoned by undercover officers directly. They could always talk to Conrad.



[REDACTED]

86. At the initial stage of a deployment, all I could say was that I felt certain people would be better suited to one group rather than another. My word was not taken all that seriously but was borne in mind.

87. I have been assisted by a list of potential contemporaries provided by the Inquiry.

I recall the following people as contemporaries of mine on the SDS: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HN68 Ray Wilson, Helen Crampton, [REDACTED] HN326 Dave Fisher, Joan Hillier, [REDACTED] HN329 [REDACTED] HN330 Mike Ferguson. Joan Hillier was not undercover.

I cannot remember what [REDACTED] HN329 did. Otherwise, all of these officers were undercover. [REDACTED] HN332 and Conrad Dixon also did undercover work, but really they were running the Squad.

88. [REDACTED] HN331 is a familiar name, but I cannot remember what he did or when; he may well have been part of the SDS very early on and then dropped out. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HN336 and [REDACTED] HN340 may have been on the SDS at the same time as me, but I cannot remember. I know [REDACTED] HN333 but cannot remember him being an undercover officer at the time I was on the SDS. I do not remember [REDACTED] HN334 [REDACTED] Barry Moss or Mike Tyrell being on the SDS at the same time as me. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HN294 was not on the Squad in my time; I think he became a manager after I left the SDS.

89. I have no recollection of [REDACTED] HN321 or [REDACTED] HN322. The name [REDACTED] does not mean anything to me.

[REDACTED]

90. I would not know whether undercover officers used cover names and what they were. Helen Crampton and Dave Fisher were undercover officers, so I imagine if they went into groups they had cover names. I do not know whether <sup>32</sup> [REDACTED] HN331 [REDACTED] was undercover and I do not remember Mike Tyrrell being on the SDS at the same time as me.

91. To the best of my knowledge, Joan Hillier did nothing in the SDS. I think she was supposed to stay in the safe house and deal with problems that might arise. There were thoughts that people might have to rush to the safe house if the undercover officers were chased or something like that.

92. I was not aware of any unhappy working relationships between members of the SDS, between undercover officers and/or managers. We all got on very well; it was surprising.

93. To my knowledge, none of my contemporaries in the SDS committed a criminal offence whilst undercover. This was one of the things that we were more fierce on than anything: criminal offences were not to be committed, and undercover officers were not to be involved in anything like that. I think we were warned generally that we would not be exempt from prosecution. I cannot say specifically who said that, but it was the notion.

94. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence. As I have said above, one of the rules was that officers must not be

[REDACTED]

agent provocateurs, leaders or suggest anything or persuade others to act in a certain way.

95. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary undercover police officers engaged in sexual activity with others whilst in their cover identity.
96. I do not think that any of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, were arrested, charged, tried or convicted in their undercover identity.
97. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, were involved in incidents of public disorder, violence or other criminal activity.
98. The concept of legal privilege has been explained to me. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, reported any legally privileged information.
99. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary undercover police officers, whilst deployed, reported on the activities of any elected politicians.
100. I have been asked what my contemporaries achieved for the benefit of policing. In the case of the Vietnam demonstrations, field officers provided reassurance that there was no hidden agenda anywhere. There was no clearly subversive activity found; everything the activists did was open. The suspicion was that violent demonstrations had been planned like those that took place in Paris.

[REDACTED]


Abroad, the people taking part were students and teenagers and they were much more violent. In a way, finding out that there was no clearly subversive activity was a positive result even though people would have preferred that we found out some plot.

101. It is difficult to say what my contemporaries achieved to assist the Security Service. The people in the VSC were not really of special interest to the Security Service; they were not interested in public order as such. However, anyone who was plotting subversion was of interest. There was no clearly subversive activity found. We kept the Security Service informed of salient matters, although they could have found this out themselves I would have thought.

102. I have no idea whether it was usual for undercover officers to spend time in the office or safe house to prepare for their deployment. My guess is they spent some time in the safe house, but I do not know how they conducted themselves. This was not my business. I do not think it was usual for undercover officers to spend time in the back office or safe house after withdrawing from their deployments. I do not think there were rehabilitation sort of measures.

### **Security Service**

103. I cannot remember having any contact or dealings with the Security Service when I was in the SDS. I was not aware of any face-to-face meetings with the Security Service except at the top level, at least of the rank of Inspector. I do not know how often this was, or when. Communication would otherwise be via the telephone.



## **Senior management and oversight bodies**

104. I am not sure if any senior managers (Superintendent or above) visited the SDS.

I cannot remember that they did. I do not think a Commissioner visited us, for example. There was no need for senior Special Branch officers to visit the SDS as they saw us in the corridors at the Yard.

105. No one from any outside body with any form of regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing visited the SDS during my time on the Squad.

## **Leaving the SDS**

106. I left the SDS as I think they wanted new personnel to take over. It was a decision by the hierarchy. I did not ask to come off the SDS but I was quite happy to leave. It was an exhausting sort of job, but at the same time it was only an extension of what I had been doing in the Branch.

## **Post SDS police career**

107. I have set out my post SDS career above. Once I had left the SDS, I had no further dealings with them. They were rivals, in a sense, because they had something to say about demonstrations and so did I. I did not want to get at cross purposes with them and I did not want to make less of anything they said. I was not always told what they had in mind; the SDS would say they have no information or no reason to think things would go wrong. It is hard to say whether I sought, received, used or disseminated intelligence from the SDS after I left. It is possible that I did. If the SDS said anything about a demonstration I would take



[REDACTED]

it into account and tell A8 but I cannot remember anything in particular in this regard.

108. I do not think the SDS influenced my subsequent postings or roles. I had no say in these post SDS postings.

109. I have been referred to a report dated [REDACTED] <sup>32A</sup>  
[REDACTED] (Doc 18: MPS-0739196) and the report of 7 October 1974 (Doc 19: MPS-0737449). I would be the DI Creamer referred to. I had no connection with the SDS in 1974. I really cannot remember this. In those days I was in charge of the desk for left-wing groups such as the anarchists, communists and Maoists and fringe groups. It would have been up to the bosses to decide what information was sent for me to see. At that time I would have been involved in assessing forthcoming demonstrations in London and so any information relevant to those would have been for me to see. However, I note that Doc 18 relates to a demonstration <sup>32B</sup> [REDACTED] out of London and there would have been no need for me to do an assessment in relation to that; that would have fallen outside of my remit.

<sup>33</sup>  
110. I have been shown the following excerpt from [REDACTED] HN304's [REDACTED] witness statement:

*"There was no formal selection process to join the SDS and I was not up against any other candidates as far as I am aware. But prior to joining the SDS, I was approached by DI Creamer and asked if I would be willing to attend an activist meeting at a polytechnic in north central London on a weekend and report back about what was going on. I went along and provided a report. I cannot recall what the meeting was about now, but I do recall that it was fairly dull and there was lots of earnest. I did those without any knowledge of the SDS. I did not have a cover name or legend at that point, and probably just used my first name. DI Creamer was clearly satisfied with my report as I received a phone*

[REDACTED]

*call from him shortly afterwards instructing me to go to room 1818. I went and spoke to someone who asked me if I wanted to join the SDS."*

111. This is all very likely, but I cannot remember it. My recollection is that I did not have a role in recruiting or vetting officers for the SDS.

112. I have been shown a report dated 26 July 1977 regarding a meeting of the North London IMG (Doc 20: UCPI0000011063). I signed this report, but it should not be that I signed for the Chief Superintendent. Geoff Craft was more senior than me, I think, and he was in the SDS at this time. I did not have any involvement with the SDS in July 1977. I suppose it is possible that the senior man was sick and I was the most senior person there to sign it. Unless Geoff Craft was signing for the SDS officer who found this information, I have no idea how I could have signed the report over him.

113. I have been shown the Note for File which is a note of a meeting attended by Superintendent Ray Wilson and me on 14 March 1978 regarding anarchism (Doc 21: UCPI0000030775). I have no recollection of this meeting, so this is a mystery to me. I had no connection with the SDS at this time. I did go to meetings with Ray Wilson on occasion, but I cannot remember this.

**Any other matters**

114. There is no other evidence which I am able to give from my knowledge and experience which is relevant to the work of the Undercover Policing Inquiry.



**Request for documents**

115. I do not have any documents or other information which is potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

**Diversity information**

116. I am a male and white English.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

34

Signed: .....

R Creamer

35

Dated: .....

4th November 2020