

COVER SHEET



Witness: First Witness Statement of Geoffrey Theodore Michael Craft / HN34

Exhibits Referred to: None

Date Statement Made: 7 December 2020

UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY

Witness: Geoffrey Theodore Michael Craft / HN34

Occupation: Retired

Address: c/o Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services, Empress State Building, London SW6 1TR

1. I have been asked to provide a witness statement regarding my time in the Special Demonstration Squad ("the SDS") for the purpose of assisting the Undercover Policing Inquiry ("the Inquiry"). In preparing this statement I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the Rule 9 request dated 24 September 2020 and first provided to me on 13 October 2020.
2. I have been shown the witness bundle provided by the Inquiry for the purpose of making this witness statement. I requested my Central Record of Service (Doc 27: MPS-0734949) to refresh my memory, and this has now been added to the witness bundle. I have not refreshed my memory by looking at any other document.
3. I make the following comment at the outset: unless otherwise stated, the matters I set out below are based on my recollection and are true to the best of my

[REDACTED]

knowledge and belief. Due to the passage of time and the inadequacy of records, there are some dates in particular about which I cannot be sure.

4. There is no restriction order in place in respect of my real name. I did not use a cover name.

Personal Details

5. My full name is Geoffrey Theodore Michael Craft. My date of birth is [REDACTED] 1937.

Police career before serving with the SDS

6. I joined the Metropolitan Police as a Constable on [REDACTED] 1956, on my 19th birthday. Prior to that I had trained as a Cadet. The Met was short of officers and at that time they trawled for people who were 18 and could complete their initial training as Cadet, before deferring National Service and becoming a Constable at the age of 19. I think I joined as a Senior Cadet in August or September 1955.
7. When I joined the Metropolitan Police, I went right into the job. I spent about 5 years in uniform, first in H Division for about 18 months and then in Wanstead for 3 and a half years. My Central Record of Service (Doc 27) records that I joined Special Branch as a Temporary Detective Constable on 22 January 1962, which accords with my recollection. This was not a promotion. In those days, vacancies in Special Branch were advertised and you went by examination and selection. You did not have to have a language or shorthand but it was preferable, and education and qualifications were important. I spoke a bit of French in those days.



8. My first posting was to D Squad doing naturalisation enquiries; I was a Temporary Detective Constable and then a Detective Constable in this role. I did that for about a year, I think; I am very hazy on this. I then moved to C Squad to do far-left enquiries and had about 6 months in 1963 at Folkestone on Ports duty. When I came to London, I returned to C Squad and was involved a lot in Official Secrets Act cases. I note that My Central Record of Service (Doc 27) records my promotion to 2nd Class Sergeant in May 1965 and to 1st Class Sergeant in October 1968. I was on B Squad for a while as a 1st Class Sergeant. My Central Record of Service (Doc 27) records Ports duty in March 1970, which would have been a summer posting to Dover. I was still on B Squad, as a Sergeant, in 1972 during the Aldershot bombing. I then spent a year on protection duties with the Home Secretary from 1973 until the Tories lost the election in February 1974. After a couple of weeks on B Squad, I was recruited to the SDS as the No. 2 to Derek Kneale. I was recruited to the SDS as a Detective Inspector. Derek and I were both promoted a little more than a year later. Derek went off, and I stayed as the Chief Inspector in charge of the Unit.
9. I did not have any contact with the SDS prior to joining. I did not know anything about it.
10. I did not do any undercover work or work with a cover identity prior to joining the SDS.

[REDACTED]

Police career after serving with the SDS

11. After the SDS, I moved to A Squad Admin and Protection and I was there at the time of Maggie Thatcher being elected in 1979. I was a Chief Inspector and the No. 2. I was then selected for promotion. I think I was Acting Superintendent of Operations on B Squad. For 3-4 months in 1979 to 1980 I was sick [REDACTED] 3 [REDACTED]. When I came back they could not find me a slot, but I went in on the Training and Security Squad as No. 2.
12. Shortly after, I became Chief Superintendent and took over S Squad. The SDS was my biggest responsibility in that role. I think this was around 1981 until 1983. I did not have SO11 or SO12 under me; they did not exist in those days. They were originally CID intelligence and the Bomb Squad, respectively. I am pretty sure I then had 3 years on B Squad before retiring in 1986 aged 49.

Selection for the SDS

13. I vaguely knew that something called the Hairies existed but I had no idea how or what they did before I joined. I had benefitted from the SDS in 1972 when the official IRA blew up the parachute barracks at Aldershot. I was on the team investigating the bombing and somebody who had been on the SDS, because of the nasty people he was working with, came up with a couple of names of people he thought might have moved into the official IRA. He put his finger on Noel Jenkinson. The intelligence which pointed us in Noel Jenkinson's direction came from the SDS. 4 [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
14. The SDS selection process was informal. I had just come off protection duties and so they were waiting to see what they were going to do with me. Derek Brice, who was Inspector, had retired early and they wanted someone presumably with sufficient background in the Branch to go in to the SDS in that role. Derek and I had worked together before; whether he had a word, I do not know. I received a phone call telling me I was in; I do not remember who this was from. The Branch was a comparatively small place and everyone knew everyone else. I do not know who made the selection decision and why.
 15. As above, I joined the SDS in 1974 as an Inspector. I was posted to the SDS: there was not a reason why I joined. Presumably I was selected for the SDS because of the breadth of my background in Special Branch. I was lucky in terms of the work I had been involved in.

My role

16. I was recruited to be No. 2 of the SDS. There is not a "role description" beyond that. We ran the SDS. Ranks were not important, unlike in the uniformed branch. It was about responsibility and nothing else. If Derek Kneale was away, automatically I moved up and filled the role.
17. When Derek left the SDS, I moved from No. 2 to No. 1. There was no material change in the work I did. I think Barry Moss became my No. 2 immediately. I think Derek's promotion coincided with him leaving the SDS and so my taking over his role and becoming Head of the SDS coincided with my promotion to Chief Inspector.

Dates of service

18. I have been shown the Note for File dated 19 September 1977 (Doc 19: UCPI0000030058). I am told in the Rule 9 Request that the Inquiry's understanding, based on this document, is that I served in the SDS between sometime in 1974 and at least as long as September 1977. This document is 4(i) signed by [REDACTED] from MI5. It could well be that I served in the SDS until September 1977. My recollection is that Ken Pryde came off A Squad and then we switched.

Training and guidance in the SDS

19. I was not given any training for my role in the SDS and there was no refresher training whilst I was in the SDS. It was all on the spot and on the job learning, such as seeing what people were doing, how it was done, and reading old reports.
20. I did not receive any training on race equality or sex equality. This really came in a bit later when the Met was pushing to have more women in senior roles and for wider recruitment. When I was Chief Superintendent and sat on selection boards, we were briefed every time about the Commissioner's policy being to recruit diversely and there was positive discrimination in favour of ethnic minorities. There had been a great push on diversity by that point.

Duties

21. The Inquiry is correct in its understanding that I began my service in the SDS as a Detective Inspector and was then promoted to Detective Chief Inspector. My

[REDACTED]

Central Record of Service (Doc 27) records my promotion to Detective Chief Inspector as being in November 1976. This accords with my recollection. The dates given in the Central Record of Service would be accurate as they would come from the Police Orders.

22. The roles of Chief Inspector and Inspector were interchangeable. The principal aspect of this role was the supervision and care of the people in the field. We were available to them 24/7. The field officers had to call in to the office on a daily basis unless they were on leave. We could deal with any problem on the phone there, if necessary. We also had a meeting of the whole group twice a week in one of the secure properties where we discussed everything, and we kept them up to date on what was happening in the police since they were still part of the force. We would also meet the field officers away from the office if we or they thought it was necessary. One officer would call at my home address late at night with information because he lived nearby. [REDACTED]

We were concerned with both the officer and their family, and we had a posh dinner together in a hotel every December. We dealt with the field officers as police officers and members of the Branch; everything was done on a Christian name basis. Cover names were known in the office but I cannot remember any of them now. It was very much a case of supervision, in the real sense, and care for them. It was important, bearing in mind the stress of the role, that no one was under too much pressure. For example, [REDACTED]

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Describes circumstances in which an officer was withdrawn from the field due to stress

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6

[REDACTED]

HN351

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had only

been in the field for a few months and told me he was stressed and we took him out of the field immediately and found him a new role elsewhere in the Branch. I know this level of supervision continued when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad, because I wanted to know what was happening. Supervision had to be very close.

23. Field officers were not recruited often, but we would discuss who might be suitable. This would be discussed between the Chief Inspector, Inspector and Superintendent in the office and names thrown around the office. In my time, I can only remember a couple of new officers coming in to the SDS because the field officers stayed for a while. In terms of the attributes and personal circumstances that were sought, we were looking for people who had a good reputation within the Branch in terms of the enquiries they did and the way they conducted themselves, who appeared to have a strong character and had a stable home life as far as we could tell (but who really can). A stable home life was important because they had to make a break between the two personalities. We would talk to the undercover officer, explain how difficult it would be and they would spend 4-5 months in the office seeing what happened, talking to other undercover officers and going to meetings before saying they would go into the field. We used the time in the office to see if they were right for the job, and they had to be sure they could cope with it. They would then say yes or no before going into the field. We knew where we would need to put someone in, but it was not always possible to do this straight away. Quite often they would be moved

[REDACTED]

into something like the SWP initially because it was easy – you chat to someone on the street, sell newspapers and take part in demonstrations to talk to others – and then they would move to other areas having gained a reputation. It was a developing process so I cannot say when in the 4-5 months this would be ascertained. By the end of the office period the undercover officer would have a clear idea of where we wanted them to be. There was no particular emphasis placed on whether someone was married or single, but in the 1970s there was a societal expectation that people would be married if they were living as a couple. All of Special Branch had to be vetted and anything out of the ordinary could cause questions with the vetting. In some ways, we were therefore trapped with the nature of a relationship. However, this was changing in the period. Having a stable home life was the issue; for example, we did not want someone going home to an empty house, with nothing, after being undercover. Having kids was good because it was a switch off.

24. There was no formal selection procedure for the SDS with which to be involved with. Selection was based on who was a good idea. Some of the guys in the field might have known them. They would be given a tap on the shoulder and invited to come in and have a look. This was an advantage of a comparatively small Branch. Everyone had a reputation very quickly.
25. In terms of recruitment of back office staff, I think we had two Sergeants and an Inspector who would then be assisted by a trainee. They were picked because they were known to be reliable and trustworthy people. For example, Dick Walker, who was in the back office when I was Inspector, had worked with me

[REDACTED]

before. He was a steady and strong-willed person and got on well with those in the field. The Chief Inspector would have a say as to who came into the back office. Bearing in mind it was top secret, we did not want anyone who would blab, even within the Branch; many in the Branch did not have any idea what was happening. Selection was very personal: you needed to know who the person was and whether they would be good in the job. It was a bit of a tap on the shoulder.

26. There was training for SDS undercover officers in the sense that it was on the job training in the office, out meeting the lads, discussing how they would play things, discussing how their identity would be formed. It was bespoke. I had a hand in that across the board. The Inspector and Chief Inspector would discuss all of these things with the undercover officers. It was not anything formal. There was on the job training for back office too. It was easier for them because they were not under the stress of the field, but if one of the lads wanted to chat with someone in the back office they would do it. We were a team and the back office officers would report back immediately if any problems arose. This was one of the differences between the SDS and the Branch: because rank was not considered vital, people did talk all the time and it was much more open rather than "sir".
27. The SDS was a support service. Our tasking really came from C Squad; it came less from B Squad because the Irish field became too difficult. There would be discussions between senior officers on C Squad and ourselves as to where we are, what we were getting, where the issues were in demonstrations. I was

[REDACTED]

involved in that. In those days the SDS office was in the same building and the same corridor as C Squad, and so we would talk all the time with them. SDS tasking also came from Commander Ops. The Chief Superintendent met with Commander Ops every morning at 10.30 and this sort of issue was discussed. Where there was a new area or target indicated by C Squad or Commander Ops, we in the SDS would look at whether it could be addressed by an undercover officer moving group or field, which was often not easy, or by a new person coming in. The Chief Inspector would then task the officer.

28. The Branch would cover lots of meetings but SDS undercover officers would go in in plain clothes. If there was a specific meeting to attend we would look at the officers and see whose face would fit to get them in. The instruction to attend that meeting would come from the Chief Inspector or Inspector in the office. I would do this when I was in this role. Specific meetings was not a frequent form of tasking because undercover officers were already deployed into their groups. If the meeting was unusual and thought to be dicey, we would act. We did not target individual people; our concern always was public order and the intelligence needed to control the dangerous parts of public disorder.

29. When it came to choosing targets, generally speaking we would have a specific area in mind when someone was put out into the field. You could not just say "anarchists" because there were several anarchist groups. We would have an officer float around to see what was going on and then have them join a specific group based on activity. We needed to know who those were that were involved in the activity, what they were planning, when etc. The intention of anarchist

[REDACTED]

groups was revolution and they would latch onto causes, either to take them over or steer them in a certain direction.

30. I was very much involved in the invention, development and assessment of cover identities and so were the back office staff. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The

undercover officer would sort out their identity themselves. That was the key issue and first matter to be done; after that he could go to find accommodation and ultimately a car. The preferred method for one's cover identity was explained to

officers:

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finding a birth certificate where the child had died shortly after birth because it was one of the most difficult identities for a person to research

[REDACTED] The undercover officer would come back and say what he found and to ask if it was okay. The undercover officer would dream up their legend themselves, in discussion with office. I do not think their story was ever tested. We would also help with their legend. The parents would never be mentioned but a place of birth and date of birth might be, for example if a passport was required. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

We felt fairly secure on birth. I had prosecuted someone who had used this method to create passports for members of the KGB so we knew it was a pretty secure method. I very much oversaw this. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]



31. The back office procured and administered vehicles used by SDS officers. Undercover officers would discuss with them the appropriate vehicle – for example it should not cost lots of money given the group into which the officer was deployed, and the budget – and a Sergeant in the office would review this. The vehicle could be obtained once there was a driving licence in the right name. The undercover officer obtained their vehicle themselves. It was not done through any formal channel. I oversaw this. We also kept a check on the mileage in case undercover officers were using the cars for personal use.

32. I had day-to-day involvement in the deployments of SDS undercover officers. We held 1:1s with officers as and when required and there were twice-weekly group meetings. Undercover officers would also telephone the office daily. Detective Constables and Sergeants also ran promotion seminars for themselves in the SDS flats. It mostly consisted in learning procedure. I think I was involved one year because I was lumbered with setting an exam question regarding CID for the Sergeant to Inspector exam and so I lectured on that. 1:1s were held with some officers more than others, and did not happen with everyone. I would meet

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certain officers

One officer who lived near to me would call in for a coffee and might have given me his reports for me to take into the office the next morning. These informal 1:1 meetings were not recorded. Reports were only written if something required reporting, otherwise the information would be disseminated orally for example if a Sergeant in the office met with an undercover officer he would provide us with an oral update on return. At the twice-weekly meetings everyone would discuss their deployments, who did what with where, and what was developing in certain areas. When we



went to the safe houses, we might have taken files with us but seldom because of the security issues. We would not have taken files with us to individual meetings. I am not sure if the SDS maintained CID diaries, so I am not sure whether we took them with us to the safe houses or not.

33. It was the same for welfare: when things went wrong, I was there to be on hand to discuss where we went. Welfare was always our responsibility as the most senior officers in the SDS. On one occasion Rick Clark thought he had been rumbled and was called to a meeting at a pub; Derek and I both went out and kept observation. That is the only time I remember having had to do that.
34. I was very much involved in the exfiltration of SDS undercover officers. We would discuss with officers how they would come out of the field, what the story would be, how it would be explained, and much more importantly where they would be posted when they came out. Officers were given free choice provided we – the management of SDS, Chief Superintendent S Squad and Commander Ops – could ensure their security in the new role. It was a serious matter. We had said to undercover officers when they went into the field that their names would be protected for the rest of their service. That was a big deal in those days. It was agreed right up to the top they would be put into roles after the SDS which would not cause difficulties with their identities. This was very much controlled in my years and right up to when I left. We had to be careful that the undercover officers would not be in too stressful a role, but an important yet quiet role. Roles undertaken after exfiltration were varied, but certain roles were excluded: for example VIP protection duties, because the press would get pictures of officers,

[REDACTED]

and ports work depending on where it was. There were roles within the Branch, on enquiries, where former undercover officers would not come up against these people. We also did a lot of Security Service work which they could work on, or operational work away from Scotland Yard.

35. I had no involvement in the writing up of SDS intelligence reports. It was mostly the office Sergeants who were involved in this, rather than undercover officers in the back office. Rough information was put into the office. The formal information reports opened with the information being from a "secret and reliable source", which indicated to anyone in the intelligence world that it was a live source. The SDS produced the report; it was then passed to C Squad and they put it into the system. The reports were stamped SDS on the side. The Security Service then knew it was our report and that we had a source somewhere; if they needed something specific, they would then tell us. We had one guy in the back office, Dick Scully, whose job it was to plough through the paper. He would do a rough draft of the report on the typewriter which would then be sent off to the typists and 1 and 3 copies would be made. Those copies would come back to the SDS office and we would pass them to C Squad. C Squad decided what action would be taken; I had no involvement in this. Reports were generally signed by a Chief Inspector of C Squad and not by the SDS, unless there as something specifically to sign. Minute sheets were all done by C Squad. Filing was all dealt with by C Squad. I do not think we kept copies of SDS reports in the office, but I cannot swear to that. I do not think we had enough space for this. We kept an index in the SDS office of the people we were dealing with and who was being reported on. The RF and PF numbers were on there. Whoever was typing up the report



would add that reference. I would only see reports if there was something particularly interesting in them; the routine stuff would go straight through. The office would tell me what people were up to and if something was coming up. If there was a big demonstration, a senior officer and a Sergeant in the office might attend and if something happened they could phone it in and we could send it to the information room. If there was something nasty, we would go out into the street and keep an eye on our people. I did do that, but not often. It was ad hoc and would be when we thought our person might be in difficulties, for example being beaten up. I cannot think that undercover officers were asked or allowed to review the final intelligence report.

36. Intelligence was also telephoned in from time to time. The undercover officer would speak to whoever was in the office. We covered the office over weekends when demonstrations were on.
37. I am not aware of undercover officers having aid memoires or written notes in their cover addresses or homes. It would not have been acceptable for this to happen due to security issues.
38. The assessment of intelligence was done by C Squad. They produced the master assessment for upcoming demonstrations. They would word it as it was to go to the Uniformed Branch (A8). We never sent them, and we did not often see these threat assessments. Similarly, they did not come back to us routinely for information. We had provided the intelligence, so we would know this information anyway. The SDS was the main contributor to the intelligence in these master

[REDACTED]

assessments. Stuff came in and we pushed it through to C Squad. I am not aware of information being withheld where it might compromise an SDS officer; we would simply have been careful with the wording of what we put through.

39. I have been referred to a Special Report dated 23 August 1976 (Doc 8: UCPI0000010824) in relation to the issue of the onward dissemination of intelligence reports. The Inquiry suggests that this document bears my signature, but it does not. I have turned instead to a Special Report dated 23 July 1976 (Doc 7: UCPI0000010719). I would have been Chief Inspector in the SDS at this time. Arthur Smith, who also signs this report, would have been Chief Superintendent C Squad. I have not the faintest idea why I signed this report; whether it was in a hurry or something, I do not know. I suspect the information has come in on a telephone message and I have signed it in a hurry and passed it on. Generally speaking, we did not sign reports. Reports would go to C Squad typed but without any signature.

40. I did not have much communication with the Security Service whilst I was on the SDS. Generally speaking all communication with the Security Service was through C Squad, and between Chief Superintendent C Squad and the Security Service. There was the odd occasion when whoever was the department head at the Security Service wanted to know a bit more about a particular area of subversion and they would ask for a talk. I think on one or two occasions we would permit the field officer to have a conversation with the Security Service; I cannot be more specific than that.



41. In terms of other SDS paperwork that was produced, the main thing was the Annual Report. This was detailed and produced in the office by all of us. For example, the guy who ran the money would do the finance side. We would piece the information together. I remember drafting a lot of the first Annual Report I was involved with in 1974. The Annual Reports bore the signature of the Chief Inspector. If there was a major welfare problem, I would deal with that in the report. Generally there was not much paper on the personnel side.
42. The Chief Inspector would sign off expense sheets and authorise overtime. I think expenses were put in on a Wednesday. It was a strange period when CID officers were not paid overtime but received an allowance in lieu, but if required to work on a scheduled leave day there were other rules. We had to sign all of that off and I had oversight of it all.
43. The procurement of cover accommodation was down to the undercover officer. The administration of cover accommodation, for example through rent books, was down to the Sergeant in the office because he had to supply the money for cover accommodation to be paid. I oversaw this.
44. The SDS safe houses/flats were procured through the office. I was only involved in terms of discussing where they were and how suitable they were.
45. Liaising with Special Branch and/or other Metropolitan Police personnel who were not members of the SDS would fall to me, where necessary. I cannot think of a specific occasion of this. Where the need arose I would do it.

[15]

46. I was not directly involved with the Home Office. My only involvement was on the basis of the Annual Reports. I did not personally liaise with other government bodies whilst on the SDS.

Premises and meetings with other SDS undercover officers

47. The SDS operated from Scotland Yard. I worked from there all the time.

48. When I was Chief Inspector on the SDS, we had one safe house [16] in West London and one in South London. [17] I would attend there for the twice-weekly meetings. As Inspector and Chief Inspector I would attend the twice-weekly meetings every time. Some from the back office would also come, but not everyone; someone would remain behind to man the office. This was part of our supervision of the officers: we were a team and it was important that we maintained this. As Chief Superintendent, I attended occasionally.

49. I know I visited the [18] West London address when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. At that time I would try and go every couple of months, or my deputy would go, to make sure we were dealing with the Squad and not just the Chief Inspector. I took David McNee to the [18] West London safe house, and I also took the Deputy Assistant Commissioner/Head of Uniform and Operations George Rushbrook

[REDACTED]

there. I cannot remember if I took them when I was Chief Inspector or Chief Superintendent S Squad. I think David Short took Ken Newman out to the safe house; I remember the chicken was not cooked properly and there were concerns he would get salmonella. We would often have lunch in the flat and one of the undercover officers would cook.

50. When I was Chief Superintendent S Squad, the SDS office moved to Wilton Street I think. I was still in Scotland Yard as Chief Superintendent S Squad but the SDS office, comprising the Chief Inspector and Sergeants, moved. I would still go over there in person.

SDS management structure

51. I have been asked whether the following persons served in management positions when I was in the SDS:

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- (i) [REDACTED] HN294 I knew him, but he was involved in the SDS before me.
- (ii) Derek Brice: we did not overlap. He left the SDS and I came in; it was his leaving that got me the job. There was no handover.
- (iii) Derek Kneale: I worked with him for a year when I was Detective Inspector to his Chief Inspector. When I was Chief Superintendent S Squad he was Chief Superintendent C Squad, so we worked together then too.
- (iv) Ken Pryde: I knew him very well, but I did not work with him on the SDS. I think he took over from me.



- (v) Les Willingale: he worked in the office, I think in the 1974-1977 period rather than when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. He was either a Sergeant or a Detective Inspector.
 - (vi) Barry Moss: this is confusing for me. I am pretty sure he was my deputy at one point in the SDS, but he was also a Superintendent on S Squad. I am not sure when each of these postings was.
 - (vii) Angus McIntosh: we did not overlap at all on the SDS.
52. I would count Sergeants as managers as they were part of the management team. Dick Scully was a Sergeant who was very much involved in the intelligence reports. Dick Walker was a Sergeant in the office who was involved in supervision. I cannot remember any other Sergeants.
53. When I was Chief Superintendent S Squad, Mike Waller was my Superintendent. He probably had more to do with the SDS than I did at that time because of the other things I was involved in. David Short was Chief Inspector in the SDS when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. I cannot remember now who else was involved then. I think my principal dealings at that time were with the Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector. I would visit the office from time to time and the field officers, but I cannot now remember too much in terms of names.
54. David Smith was in the office as an Inspector, but I am not sure whether that was when I was Chief Inspector SDS or Chief Superintendent S Squad.



The chain of command

55. The chain of command in the Metropolitan Police, above the SDS, was as follows: Superintendent S Squad; Chief Superintendent S Squad; Commander Ops Special Branch; DAC Special Branch; Assistant Commissioner Crime; Deputy Commissioner; Commissioner.
56. I cannot remember Sir Robert Mark being the Commissioner in my chain of command when I served in the SDS. I can only remember David McNee and Ken Newman.
57. I do not know who the Deputy Commissioners in my chain of command were when I served in the SDS. I know Sir James Starritt, but I did not know him in that role. Sir Colin Woods might have been Deputy Commissioner at that time, but he may have been ACC and moved up. I did not meet Patrick Kavanagh CBE QPM.
58. Gilbert Kelland CBE QPM was the Assistant Commissioner Crime in my chain of command when I served in the SDS. John S Wilson was not ACC when I was in the SDS. That is a different person to John Wilson who was Commander Ops later, when I was on S Squad.
59. Gilbert Kelland CBE QPM was the Deputy Assistant Commissioner in my chain of command when I served in the SDS. Ray Anning was way after my time and never involved in Special Branch. Victor Gilbert became DAC Special Branch, not Commander.

[REDACTED]

60. In terms of the Commanders of Special Branch in my chain of command, Matthew Rodger held this role but I cannot remember if it was when I was Chief Inspector SDS or Chief Superintendent S Squad. Rollo Watts took over from Matt, not a person called J Toogood.

61. There were only two Chief Superintendents of S Squad between 1974 and 1977.

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HN332 was the first Chief Superintendent when they set up S Squad, and I think David Bicknell was the second. John Wilson was not Chief Superintendent, but Commander Ops when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. Derek Kneale was not Chief Superintendent S Squad but Chief Superintendent C Squad when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. Derek was also Chief Inspector SDS when I was his Detective Inspector.

Undercover officers

62.

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HN68, he was just leaving the SDS when I came in; HN351; HN298; HN301; HN299/342; HN303; Rick Clark; HN200; HN300; HN353; HN13; HN296; HN356

[REDACTED]

[21]



63. I think I overlapped with the above officers when I was Inspector/Chief Inspector in charge of the SDS, but the overlap with some may have been when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. It is difficult to be sure due to the passage of time.

[22]

[23]

[24]

64. I did not overlap with [HN343] I knew both [HN304] and [HN354] [redacted] how I knew them I cannot now remember. It is possible that we overlapped, but I think that would be when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad and not when I was Inspector.

[25]

65. I overlapped with the following other officers not mentioned by the Inquiry:

Roger Pearce; N155 both when I was Chief Inspector and later; HN80, I think when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad but possibly at the end of my time as Chief Inspector; a person who was in an animal group when I was Chief Superintendent; HN33/98, when I was Chief Superintendent

SDS – role and Annual Reports

66. When I served in the SDS, its key role was that of providing public order intelligence. It was always a support service; it did not organise coverage itself, but largely responded to the requirements of others as I have explained above. In this regard, Chief Superintendents in the Branch needed the SDS. The concern from the SDS was to provide the quality of intelligence which would enable the policing of public order activities to preserve our right to free speech and to demonstrate our views, within the rule of law, based upon parliamentary democracy. That was always the guiding light of what we did.

67. I have been referred to a Memorandum dated 15 March 1976 (Doc J: MPS-0730745). I do not remember the discussion in this document. However, the discussion summarised there is significant in two respects when it comes to the role and purpose of the SDS. First, the penultimate paragraph explains the importance of the SDS in relation to public order generally, for which A Department was responsible. Second, paragraph 2 points up the fact, and it is important to note, that the ultra-left/revolutionary left sought every opportunity to latch on to public order activity for their purposes and causes hence the degree of coverage by the SDS.

[REDACTED]

68. I have been referred to the SDS Annual Reports for 1975 (Doc B: MPS-0730099), 1976 (Doc C: MPS-0728980), 1977 (Doc D: MPS-0728981) and 1978 (Doc E: MPS-0728964). The SDS operated at the request of the Home Office, funded on an annual basis only by the Home Office, and therefore the Annual Reports were directed to the Home Office and pointing up the value of the SDS in terms of public order and seeking continuation for another year. Without that, the SDS would not have operated. We were at the behest of the Home Secretary. The Inspector and Chief Inspector would have been heavily involved in drafting much of what was in the Annual Reports, particularly the text. There was input from the lads in the SDS office too. I would have looked in detail at the ones I was involved in. There was no element of slant and gloss for the audience; the Annual Reports had to be accurate, right down to the financial side. In one of the reports I remember discussing the fact that we had provided some intelligence on more than 365 public order activities in the course of the year. We mentioned that it was vital, not so much in terms of the number of people on the streets but for knowing what they intended to do. The annual trade union march on Mayday probably required fewer policemen because it was stewarded by the TUC and they stuck to the route.

26

[REDACTED]

We were always concerned to have the minimum number of police. There is no National Guard in this country, and whenever a

[REDACTED]

demonstration has to be policed officers have to be taken from elsewhere where they would be required to protect the public. This was important, and indeed is reflected in paragraph 10 of the 1976 Annual Report (Doc C). Unless we got the numbers right for demonstrations, we would be destroying local policing and other efforts to protect the public. We have freedom of speech in this country, regulated by Parliamentary democracy; we do not have mob rule.

69. Commander Ops would have prayers at 10.30am with his operational Chief Superintendents (Chief Superintendents of C, B, E and S Squad) so important things were discussed there. There would be conversation around targeting if one foresaw problems which were known about on the ground but were not known about further up. A few people were scruffy, hairy so-and-so's and were on the periphery of groups and so would find themselves dragged into things which were useful but probably dangerous, ²⁷ [REDACTED] Chief Superintendent C Squad would direct targeting, to be implemented by the SDS. It was a continuing conversation. We only had 12 undercover officers in the SDS and we had to look at how it was played. We could not just move people around; we had to ease them in if things were developing.

70. "Pro Irish" groups were targeted because they were involved in public disorder. The Troops Out Movement was a broad front organisation; some people were purely TOM, but also involved were lefties and Irish Sinn Fein. Infiltrations were useful for public order and identifying Sinn Fein members, which ultimately could be useful because those people could, and did, support IRA-active people who came to the mainland. However, the vast majority of Sinn Fein people were not

[REDACTED]

members of the IRA. [REDACTED]

28

[REDACTED] No intelligence was

obtained by the SDS on the Provisional IRA. Overall the targetting of pro-Irish groups was a moderate success. Our intention was not to obtain intelligence on Irish issues, but on public disorder generally. Our infiltration in this area was easy. TOM was such a broad organisation: you turned up on a demonstration, and if you had a bit of intelligence you would find yourself in very quickly. I cannot remember how TOM per se was infiltrated. [REDACTED]

29

I think Rick Gibson was in TOM, but only because he started there and then moved into SWP

[REDACTED] TOM was quite big because of their numbers on demonstrations, so we needed to know what was happening. These deployments into "pro-Irish" groups did not really contribute to policing crime. They very much contributed to policing public order: we could find out how large demonstrations were going to be, whether any groups were going to splinter and break into buildings etc. This would affect the numbers of police required at a demonstration. The background is these were revolutionary people with intention to do away with Parliamentary democracy, starting with mob rule. In theory "pro-Irish" deployments assisted the Security Service as it was their responsibility to ensure that people who might be a problem were not employed in sensitive organisations. These deployments did not assist any other policing purpose.

71. The SDS did not target the Official or Provisional IRA. [REDACTED]

30

[REDACTED] Gives his opinion as to why these groups were not targeted

[REDACTED] it was far too dangerous

to put a police officer in there. [REDACTED]

31

72. Trotskyists groups were targeted because they were ultra-left and used public disorder and organisations to push their line of revolution. SDS infiltrations of these groups were very successful. We infiltrated through participation in demonstrations, talking to people, being invited to sell newspapers; it was a gradual drawing in because of compatibility with the thinking of the group. These deployments very much contributed to public order: we could find out how large demonstrations were going to be, whether any groups were going to splinter and break into buildings etc. it was also extremely important to know who was going to be at demonstrations to know what activity would take place. This would affect the number of police required, and we could post officers to specific areas or locations based on the information we had received. The deployments contributed to policing crime only which sprang from public disorder, for example attacking buildings and people; they did not contribute to crime independent of public order activities. The Security Service was assisted by these deployments in countering subversion; without the SDS, the Security Service would have had a heck of a job knowing who was involved from their side of the house. This was not new though; C Squad produced work for the Security Service regarding the

[REDACTED]

left-wing. The Branch was the legs of the Security Service in this regard. Special Branch around the country did the same. The SDS was only a development of that. These deployments did not contribute to the fulfilment of any other policing purpose.

73. Maoist groups were targeted for the same reasons as above. It was their intention to destroy our system and follow the thoughts of Mao. Infiltration took the same form as for the Trotskyist groups. In terms of public order, the infiltration was very successful. Maoist groups were smaller and knowing what they were going to do made uniformed policing much easier. Without it, we risked something happening without anyone knowing.

74. Anarchist groups were targeted for the same reasons as above.

32

[REDACTED]

The principal contribution of these deployments was for policing public disorder. We had the same sort of success for anarchists in terms of public order and public order related crime as for the Maoists and Trotskyists. I cannot think of any other policing purpose for these deployments. The anarchist deployments also assisted the Security Service in countering subversion.



75. I cannot remember any race-related groups per se being targeted during my time on the SDS. The SWP had an anti-racist sub-group so we would have been involved in that, but as a result of our targetting the SWP rather than because it was a race-related group. Those sorts of activities would bring the far-right in and that would result in public order concerns. The success of this deployment rests with our infiltration of the far-left. Other than the SWP jumping onto these sorts of issues making it a public order issue, I cannot think of anything specific in terms of its contribution to policing crime or assisting the Security Service; race-related groups were not a huge issue at the time.
76. I have been asked about the targeting of "alternative society" groups. I do not know what these kinds of groups include. Public order was our scene.
77. Big Flame was targeted for the same reasons as the ultra-left. The infiltration came out of our the infiltration of the SWP. As above, the deployment was successful in terms of how it assisted the policing of public disorder. The deployment's contribution to public disorder and to assisting the Security Service was as detailed above. The deployment did not contribute to policing crime. I cannot think of anything that the deployment contributed to the fulfilment of other policing purposes.
78. I think our targetting of anti-fascist groups resulted from our involvement in the SWP and IMG as both would join in with the anti-fascist groups. Again, it was successful in terms of its contribution to policing public order.

79. The SDS did not target anti-nuclear groups during my time in the SDS. The only anti-nuclear group we were specifically involved in was the Greenham Common Women, and this was when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. [REDACTED] HN33/98 [REDACTED] was deployed into this group. The group camped outside the US base for months because they had aircraft there capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and they kept trying to get in. This could have led to things like activists being shot by the guards. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament was huge; they did not do things unexpectedly and large demonstrations simply required protection. The Committee of 100 was an issue which pre-dated the SDS; we did attend a meeting, looking scruffy, when I was in the Branch. It shows how naïve we were. We were not focussed on CND when I was in the SDS because everything was publicised and so we knew what they were going to do. The infiltration into Greenham Common Women was useful, but otherwise we did not infiltrate anti-nuclear groups. This deployment only contributed to the policing of public disorder, and possibly was of assistance to the Security Service in countering subversion but they would have had the reports anyway. The deployment did not contribute to the fulfilment of any other policing purpose.

33

80. Groups were listed in some of the Annual Reports under "other groups" targeted because infiltration of them would have come as a result of targetting other groups and because of their involvement in public disorder. Looking at the "other groups" listed in the 1974 Annual Report, Big Flame was targeted because it was involved in demonstrations and, as I have said above, infiltration of this group came out of our infiltration of the SWP. I do not know who Fight On, Liberation or the Shrewsbury Two Defence Committee were.

[REDACTED]

81. The SDS' subsequent involvement in animal liberation groups was different as the animal liberation groups were involved in crime too, not just public disorder.

82. I have been referred to the 1974 Annual Report (Doc A: MPS-0730906), specifically paragraph 1 which refers to the SDS now being part of the newly created S Squad *"and, as such, now has the added benefit of a Chief Superintendent and Superintendent, thus improving still further the degree of supervision which is so necessary in this delicate field of operations"*. I was not in the SDS prior to it being overseen by S Squad so I cannot comment on whether there were difficulties which arise in the SDS as a result of a lack of supervision prior to the creation of S Squad. In reality, it was a tidying up operation. The SDS had previously been under C Squad and Chief Superintendent C Squad had enough to concern himself with apart from the SDS.

83. I have been referred to paragraph 9 of the 1976 Annual Report (Doc C) which conveys that the SDS was standing ready to infiltrate extreme right-wing groups if needed. What this meant is that C Squad had other sources in the far-right and did not need SDSs coverage of it at that time.

33(i)

[REDACTED]

the Trotskyists were coming up with things like the Anti Nazi League, and we needed immediate information about what was coming up in meetings and demonstrations that night, not a week later when a source came back.

[REDACTED]

[34]

84. The Rule 9 Request states that the Inquiry's understanding is that [REDACTED] HN303 [REDACTED] is the officer referred to in paragraph 9 of the 1976 Annual Report (Doc C) who, in 1975, was required by the Workers Revolutionary Party to infiltrate the National Front, and that [REDACTED] HN298 [REDACTED] infiltrated the WRP in 1975. [REDACTED] HN303 [REDACTED] probably left the SDS at some point around then. [REDACTED] HN298 [REDACTED] infiltrated the WRP, but I do not know about him acting to replace anyone in that group. I do not remember when in 1975 [REDACTED] HN303 [REDACTED] infiltrated the National Front; we would have had him in the WRP and had no say about whether he went into the far-right.

85. I have been referred to paragraph 12 of the 1976 Annual Report (Doc C), which refers to the normal tour of duty with the SDS being 4 years. The thinking behind this was that people took a while to get established in the group into which they were deployed and therefore to be producing what we needed, but at the same time they should not be left too long because the stress on the individual and their family was not a good idea. 4 years was a maximum. It was a welfare issue. It is rather like those who had to work on the porn squad: it was a horrible job and so you should never be left there for too long.

86. I have been referred to the 1977 Annual Report (Doc D), specifically the section from paragraph 18 which concerns the industrial dispute at Grunwick and "The Battle of Lewisham". This is the classic SDS activity of feeding information to uniform to try and get things under control. I would think this description of the SDS' involvement in these events is pretty accurate. The far-left was involved in all of this and so the involvement of the SDS was very important. I am not able to add to this account at this distance.

[REDACTED]

87. I have been referred to paragraph 4 of the 1978 Annual Report (Doc E), which states that the long hours and demanding work in which SDS undercover officers are involved *"does not have a deleterious effect upon their health"*. This Annual Report is signed by Mike Ferguson and the description of welfare/supervision at paragraph 4 would be specific to his time in management. I had left the SDS by 1978. Paragraph 4 refers to individual field officers being seen during the course of the week so that over a period of three weeks each officer will have had an opportunity to discuss privately his work and any personal or professional problems. I do not think we had the three week thing in place. Undercover work only affected the health of one officer when I was in charge of the SDS, and that

[36] was [REDACTED] HN351 [REDACTED] As I have said above, he came to me and told me he was stressed and the SDS was not for him; he was clearly under pressure and we took him straight out of the SDS and found him a new role in the Branch.

[37]

Describes circumstances surrounding the removal of another officer from the field due to stress

Senior managers in the chain of command

88. The Superintendent shared responsibility for the SDS with the Chief Superintendent and would deputise for him when he was missing. All senior officers could be called away to deal with specific enquiries, protections, state visits etc. In my case, I was given the role of running the Papal protection team in 1982. I was involved on and off in the year before that with meetings so I was missing quite a lot. Equally there were times when I was there, and when my

[REDACTED]

deputy was Mike Waller, and he had the task of doing a management enquiry of the Branch. We covered for each other. When both the Superintendent and Chief Superintendent were available it allowed for greater supervision of the various sections. Their involvement in the SDS would be in terms of the supervision and welfare of undercover officers, ensuring the operation was running as it should, and supporting the Chief Inspector and their team if they had problems. There was daily conversation by telephone between Chief Superintendent S Squad and the SDS, and the Chief Superintendent would visit the SDS as and when. Involvement was in terms of oversight rather than day-to-day involvement in decision-making, unless there was a problem. The Superintendents with whom I worked discharged their roles very well. I had to trust them completely.

89. As Chief Superintendent S Squad I was not involved in running the SDS; the Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector were people I knew and I did not have to change anything. S Squad had only just been formed when I was previously on the SDS; I found myself often as Chief Inspector SDS running S Squad anyway. When I was Chief Inspector, my Chief Superintendents were nice people and took their role seriously. I enjoyed being Chief Superintendent S Squad as I knew exactly what the officers were up to. My role included supervision of the SDS and welfare of undercover officers on the SDS, along with other sections. It was much of a muchness what the role entailed before and after I was promoted to this role. Anyone who ran S Squad would have been equally concerned by how the SDS was operating, welfare, and how the officers were employed after they came out of the field.

[REDACTED]

90. The Commander Special Branch had no involvement in the running of the SDS. Their supervision of the SDS was exercised through Chief Superintendent S Squad. The Commander would occasionally visit field officers. The Commander was indirectly involved in the SDS daily through Chief Superintendent S Squad when operations were discussed. Direct involvement by the Commander was rare. Everything was handled by either Chief Superintendent S Squad or the Chief Inspector. As Chief Inspector I had occasional dealings with the Commander, but more often things went through the ranks. The Commanders with whom I worked discharged their roles with concern.

91. The Deputy Assistant Commissioner had no direct involvement in running or supervising the SDS, but was always interested. They very seldom had any direct involvement in the SDS, [REDACTED]

38

[REDACTED]

The DACs with whom I worked discharged their roles very well, certainly during my time as Chief Superintendent S Squad. The three DACs who were involved in the SDS before, during and after my time were all very able people and highly experienced.

92. The Assistant Commissioner did not have any direct involvement in running and/or supervising the SDS. Any involvement was through the Deputy Assistant Commissioner. I am not in a position to say how the Assistant Commissioners with whom I worked discharged their roles. Clearly from the minutes on the Annual Reports they supported the SDS, and certainly supported the DACs in terms of the future and welfare of those leaving the SDS. When Vic Gilbert

[REDACTED]

negotiated the departmental interchange system on promotion, the Assistant Commissioner agreed that SDS officers should not be involved in the immediate period after their SDS involvement.

93. The Commissioner was concerned for the SDS and showed this by visiting the SDS safe house. I remember a visit by David McNee, who I took out there, and I know that Ken Newman went out there and had lunch with the officers. I note that in the fourth paragraph of the Memorandum dated 1 April 1977 (Tab F: MPS-0737456, p.3) there is reference to a visit by the Commissioner accompanied by the Assistant Commissioner Crime, which I was not aware of. Insofar as the Commissioners supported the SDS, they discharged their roles very well.

Questions about specific undercover officers

39

[REDACTED]


94.

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Craft describes the circumstances surrounding the exfiltration of an officer from the field




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95.

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Rick Clark

96. I am told in the Rule 9 Request that the Inquiry understands that Rick Clark had at least one sexual relationship with an activist during his deployment into Troops Out Movement and Big Flame. This suggestion of a sexual relationship is new to me. The first I knew about that was, I think, from the press. I did not know anything about it at the time. If any of us knew anything about it at the time it would have been stopped; to run a relationship was not on. One could not stand for that. It would have placed him, his family, and his future vetting level in jeopardy. We, the team, were so close that I am sure somebody would have picked something up; that is why I am so surprised about there being substantive evidence for this allegation.⁴⁰

I think we would have heard something.

97. I am told in the Rule 9 Request that Rick Clark played a prominent role in the establishment of the South-East London branch of TOM and its activities. I am also told that he went on to hold significant positions of responsibility at London and national level within TOM: at a local level Branch Secretary, Branch Treasurer, Branch delegate to London and national level events; at a national level, London Organiser and Convenor on the National Secretariat. I did not know that he was prominent in establishing the South-East London branch of TOM, nor did I know anything about his positions of responsibility. I would be very surprised if he did play such a senior role in the group, but I could be wrong given the time

since this has happened. I thought Rick was much lower down.

98. I have been referred to a Minute Sheet from September 1975 (Doc I: MPS-0732953) and a Memorandum dated 4 September 1975 (Doc H: MPS-0732954). These concern Rick Clark having been invited to visit Northern Ireland with his group and whether to grant permission for him to do so. I do not remember dealing with this visit to Ireland. Matt Rodger and Vic Gilbert signed the minutes and both were very experienced people. When an SDS officer was being required by his group to travel outside the Metropolitan Police District, our concern for his protection would require that we spoke to a very senior officer in a provincial force (probably at least Assistant Chief Constable) and also the Head of Special Branch in that force to inform them that our officer would be undercover in their area and asking for a telephone number which he could call in difficulty or distress. This liaison happened every time there was travel outside the Metropolitan Police District. There was a general, police-wide rule that a Metropolitan Police officer did not travel outside the Metropolitan Police District without permission of the Chief Constable of the force concerned. We were dealing with a discrete situation. Undercover officers would have to tell us if they were going out of the Metropolitan Police District; we would then seek the relevant permission. What the undercover officer was going out for would depend on what we informed the local force; if it was very secret and would not involve the local force in any way, we would not give them any detail. If it was a public order issue, for example a demonstration which the undercover officer was

[REDACTED]

attending, then we would tell them more and give them the details that the undercover officer had.

99. I can only think that managers would travel to another district when there was some concern about risk to the undercover officer travelling outside the Metropolitan Police District. I have been referred to a Minute Sheet from September 1976 (Doc 9: MPS-0730728) and a letter from Lancashire Police to Vic Gilbert dated 20 September 1976 (Doc 10: MPS-0730729) regarding the attendance of undercover officers at the Action Against Racism demonstration in Blackburn and Detective Inspector Angus McIntosh and Detective Sergeant Dick Walker travelling to Blackburn to be on hand in case any difficulty arises. I do not remember Angus ever being my Inspector. However, this fits with my recollection about the type of situation in which managers would travel to the same part of the country as an undercover officer working outside the Metropolitan Police District.

42

HN13

100. I have been referred to a series of documents relating to two occasions during

43

HN13's

undercover deployment in which he was arrested, charged and appeared as a defendant in a criminal court (Doc K: MPS-0526784). Pages 11 and 12 of this document bear my signature, however I have no recollection of this at all. I note this is the end of my time on the SDS. I do not remember going to

44

court for [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED]. I have no independent memory of this so I cannot provide any additional comment on what happened. The SDS's

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concern to ensure that HN13 was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment would

[REDACTED]

have been welfare-related. The concern to establish whether one of the arresting officers recognised ⁴⁶ [HN13] would have been because of the risk of it breaking his cover.

⁴⁷ [REDACTED]

101. I have been referred to further documents relating to ⁴⁷ [HN13's] arrest (Doc M: MPS-0746717). Since I cannot remember ⁴⁸ [HN13's] arrest, I cannot answer directly whether I shared the view of senior managers, as suggested in this document, ⁴⁹ that [HN13's] arrest would give him additional credibility within his target group. What I can say is that clearly if he had been arrested as one of the group that would tend to confirm his loyalty to the group.

102. I have been referred to a series of documents from early 1977 concerning the interchange scheme and the exceptional retention provisions of Police Order 8(h) of 1975 (Tab F: MPS-0737456). I have also been referred to a list of undercover officers granted exemption from the interchange scheme (Doc L: MPS-0737457). The problem of the interchange scheme was as set out in the minutes: security, being recognised, blowing one's cover. It meant there was no control over one's true identity. The Interchange scheme was the idea of a Commissioner. To improve peoples' experiences, it was considered important that people be moved between Branches, on promotion from Detective Constable to Detective Sergeant and from Detective Sergeant to Detective Inspector. I cannot now remember the specific details. I believed that the exceptional retention provisions offered a solution for the views I set out in the Memorandum. According to the minutes, the SDS and senior officers were very successful dealing with the issue.

[REDACTED]

103. I have been referred to reports following a demonstration on 4 August 1977 known as "The Battle of Lewisham" (Doc 15: UCPI0000011180 and Doc 16: MPS-0732886) and a Minute Sheet which refers to the latter report (Doc 17: MPS-0732885). I was not able to read Doc 15 due to the quality of the print. It is clear from the minutes that the reports were considered to be important because the violence which was displayed and the discussions within far-left groups about the use of petrol bombs would indicate that we were moving into a new era and it was important that the police be prepared to deal with this before there was serious injury to officers and/or the public. I think the signature of the Chief Superintendent in Doc 17 could be Harry Nicholls, but I cannot remember him being involved.

104. I have been referred to a Special Report dated 8 September 1977, which is a list of the details of persons who had attended Progressive Cultural Association concerts and given their particulars with a view to being contacted (Doc 18: UCPI0000010955). I cannot remember the reason for this reporting but I would suggest that we had been told this Association might be of interest to the Security Service or the Branch for some reason. I would think the significance of the document is that there is not anyone of interest here. It must be something we were asked to look at.

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105. I was not aware of [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] having any welfare issues arising from his deployment. My recollection is that he retired from the police and became an accountant.

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HN21

106

Craft describes how he was made aware by the Inquiry that HN21 disclosed that he engaged in sexual activity while deployed

This is the first time I have become aware of this; I was not aware

of this information in whole or in part at the time.

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HN34 quotes from the witness statement of an officer who recalled being visited by HN300 "He tearfully told me that he had fallen in love with a lady associated with his group.... He was beside himself because he wanted to tell her everything including his undercover role which he realised could seriously impact the entire SDS operation." With HN300's agreement, this officer then contacted the SDS office and acted as a conduit between this officer and managers.

[REDACTED]

108. I do not remember being involved in this issue at all and I have no recollection it.

I did not know anything about ⁵⁴ [REDACTED] HN300 falling in love with a woman associated with his group. I did not know that he had married this activist.

⁵⁵ 109.

[REDACTED]

⁵⁶ 110.

[REDACTED]

⁵⁷ 111.

[REDACTED]

⁵⁸

HN354

⁵⁹

112. The Rule 9 Request states that in his witness statement to the Inquiry ⁵⁹ [REDACTED] HN354

[REDACTED] states that about 12 months into his deployment his long-term

[REDACTED]

relationship broke down and thereafter he engaged in sexual activity in his undercover identity on four occasions and he never disclosed this to his managers at the time. I was not aware of his sexual activity. In any event, I think my overlap with ⁶⁰ [HN354] was brief.

113. The breakdown of a long-term relationship during the course of a deployment would cause concern to management because there would be no break between the two personalities, which is important. One would discuss very seriously whether the officer should continue in the field as it would be a very lonely life, one would think. We kept in close contact with the officers, met regularly with them and they met regularly with us; we would spot signs of difficulty. I do not think any police officers were more carefully monitored than this lot.

Questions about specific issues

Positions of responsibility in target groups

114. There was always discussion about assuming a position of responsibility in a particular case. The ACC's consolidated instructions were always in the back of our mind. Undercover officers could not initiate serious crime. Whether an officer was permitted to assume a position of responsibility within their target group really depended on the nature of the group, the quality of intelligence we would get and whether that position of responsibility was justified. Guidance would have been given to undercover officers in general terms based on the ACC's consolidated instructions, and that ideally they would not take on senior roles. The Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector of the SDS would have given this guidance to officers. It was all a matter of general discussion; I do not recall

[REDACTED]

specifically giving this guidance as Chief Inspector. The advantages of a position of responsibility would have been the improved quality of intelligence and early notification of potential public order problems as a result of being in that position. The disadvantage or risk was that the undercover officer suddenly found they would have to be involved in serious crime, in which case they would have to be withdrawn from the field. I cannot recall that any particular posts were thought to be beneficial to the work of an undercover officer on the SDS.

Use of deceased children's identities

115. I do not know when the tactic of using deceased children's identities began. It was the norm when I arrived on the SDS in 1974. I do not know who devised the tactic. I did authorise the use of the practice.

116. The idea of using a deceased children's identities came from Forsyth's 'Day of the Jackal'. As I have said above, I had prosecuted an individual who used this tactic to obtain passports for the KGB. I knew it was a secure method and it was very difficult for someone to get at it. In those days, records were kept physically in large ledgers. Records were held at Somerset House and the connection between birth and death certificates was difficult for the public to ascertain. Added to this, persons we were deploying were all known Special Branch officers who intended to spend their careers in Special Branch, and their vetting coverage was extremely important. It was inconceivable that the bereaved family would become aware. I can be accused of being naïve, but none of us was blessed with 20:20 foresight; the only potential harm of using the deceased child's identity was to renew the grief of bereaved parents that had suffered the worst loss anyone could

[REDACTED]

suffer. Looking back on it, that is the way I see it. I am not aware of what thought was given to the issue by more senior individuals.

Sexual relationships

117. I do not recall giving undercover officers any orders, instructions, advice or guidance about sexual contact whilst operating undercover. It was a period of time when such activity was frowned upon by the Branch in particular, and probably the force overall, and it was assumed that nobody would be so stupid as to risk their career by doing it. Clearly, we were wrong. I do not know if any other managers gave any orders, instructions, advice or guidance on the issue.

118. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about sexual contact whilst they operated undercover. It was not raised. Presumably if they were doing it they were not going to tell me because of the underlying attitude of the police in those days.

119. I was totally against sexual activity between undercover officers on the SDS and civilians whom they met in their undercover identities because of the risk to the individual, their identity and their family, and the risk of operations.

120. I was not aware of any undercover police officers whose service in the SDS overlapped with mine engaging in sexual activity with others whilst in their cover identity. I have addressed above my knowledge of the specific examples of this conduct that the Inquiry has asked me about.



Commission of criminal offences whilst undercover


121. As stated above, guidance would have been given to undercover officers in general terms based on the ACC's consolidated instructions. I would have told officers that they were not permitted to initiate a serious criminal offence or take part in such. This was a general principle in relation to the Branch running informants. I do not know if any other managers gave specific orders, instructions, advice or guidance on the issue.

122. I cannot remember informal conversations about this issue. It was the general view.


123. My attitude to criminal offences being committed by SDS officers whilst undercover reflected the ACC's consolidated instruction. It was accepted that if you attended demonstrations and were involved in punch ups you would probably be arrested. The concern was with serious crime.

124. I can only recall being confronted with this issue once,

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I was the only manager personally involved in this. I am surprised there is not a report somewhere about it. I would have thought I certainly put a report through on the SDS file about this incident. I do not know why there is not anything in the witness bundle about this.

Agent provocateur

125. I cannot remember a specific occasion that I gave any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about whether they could provoke, encourage or cause a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst undercover.

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However, I did make clear to an officer that they would have absolutely no involvement in serious criminality

126. I do not know if any other manager gave any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about whether they could provoke, encourage or cause a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst undercover. It was such a well-known topic; it would have come up in promotion exams, for example.

127. I cannot now remember whether I had any informal conversations with undercover officers about this issue, but I may have done.

[REDACTED]

128. I am not aware of any of my contemporaries in the SDS provoking, encouraging or causing a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst undercover.

Contact with the criminal justice system as the suspect or the defendant

129. I cannot remember giving undercover officers any orders, instructions, advice or guidance about what to do if involved as either the suspect or the defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover. However, in truth, anybody in that situation would have shouted at the office first, reported it and asked what to do. We were a close team.

130. I do not know if any other manager gave any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about what to do if involved as either the suspect or the defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover.

131. I cannot remember whether I had any informal conversations with undercover officers about this issue.

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132. Save for [REDACTED] what I have stated above [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I cannot remember any of my contemporaries in the SDS becoming involved as either the suspect or the defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover.

Violence and public disorder

133. General advice went to all of the undercover officers about the risk of becoming involved in either violence or public disorder whilst operating undercover because



they were in a dangerous situation, either because they might themselves be assaulted or because they might be arrested.


134. Other managers probably did give undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about this issue. The report following the Battle of Lewisham is an example of concern about this sort of thing happening. It was discussed all the time at the weekly meetings with undercover officers.

135. I probably did have informal conversations with undercover officers, for example at the weekly meetings, about the risk of becoming involved in violence or public disorder whilst undercover.

136.

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As a result of providing this witness statement, I am now aware of HN13's involvement in violence or public disorder whilst undercover and I note the contents of the witness bundle. There may have been other undercover officers, but they did not come to notice.



Legally professionally privileged material

137. I did know in broad terms what legally professionally privileged material was when I was on the SDS.

138. I cannot remember giving any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about how to identify and deal with legally privileged information whilst

[REDACTED]

operating undercover. It was something that as police officers we understood, but I cannot think of any reason direct to the SDS.

139. I do not remember any other managers giving undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about how to identify and deal with legally privileged information whilst operating undercover.

140. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about this issue.

141. I have no knowledge of my contemporaries in the SDS coming across or reporting legally privileged information. It would have to be information obtained from a discussion between an activist and their lawyer, and I am not aware of this situation occurring.

Activities of elected politicians

142. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance in relation to interacting with or reporting on elected politicians whilst operating undercover.

143. I am not aware of any other managers giving undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance in relation to interacting with or reporting on elected politicians whilst operating undercover.

[REDACTED]

144. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about this issue. The only time we would become involved with an elected politician is if we went to a meeting and there was an MP present at that meeting; their name would be included in the list of attendees in the report about that meeting. This would simply indicate the meeting would not be involved in anything criminal because an MP would not do that. The general thinking in the office was that you could not hide information; to be accurate, the MP's name had to be included in the list of attendees. There was no question of an MP being targeted: we targeted groups not individuals.

145. I am not aware that any of my contemporaries interacted with or reported on elected politicians whilst undercover.

Reporting on individuals

146. I have been referred to the following reports:

- (i) A report on a medical issue (Doc 7: UCPI0000010719);
- (ii) A report on a pregnancy (Doc 2: UCPI0000012161);
- (iii) A report containing information on a trade union and race (Doc 11: UCPI0000017622);
- (iv) A report on individuals having affairs (Doc 13: UCPI0000017523);
- (v) A report on a man being unfaithful to his girlfriend (Doc 14: UCPI0000017563);
- (vi) A report about a person having children (Doc 20: UCPI00000010971);
- (vii) A report on a schoolgirl (Doc 22: UCPI0000011874);

- [REDACTED]
- (viii) A report on the mental health of an individual (Doc 23: UCPI0000011924);
 - (ix) A report referring to a 16 year old schoolgirl (Doc 5: UCPI0000009417);
 - (x) A report on an individual's banking details (Doc 3: UCPI0000007003).

147. I make the following general comment about these reports. The SDS existed for public order matters. It became involved in, and was largely supportive of, the Security Service's responsibility for subversion and therefore information about individuals was reported for the Security Service. I can only say that if a report went in about an individual we would simply produce it to go to the Security Service. It was not information that the SDS per se was interested in.

Reporting on trade unions

148. I have been referred to a Special Report dated 3 April 1975 which touches upon membership of a trade union (Doc 4: UCPI0000007017). Information about trade unions was of interest to the Security Service. This report concerns a person who was a member of the Workers Revolutionary Party, which was also of interest. In the period of strife, the Security Service responsible for keeping the Government up to date about what was happening. The Workers Revolutionary Party would have been of interest to them and to us. The Security Service was also looking more broadly than we were. Trade unions were not of themselves of interest to the SDS.

Reporting for public order purposes

149. Normally the SDS officer would rough draft a report which would be put into information format and then passed to C Squad usually, for action. If it was

[REDACTED]

urgent, somebody could phone information in, which would then be noted down in a telephone message and the office would turn it into an information report. If the information was provided directly before or in the middle of a demonstration, the telephone message would be passed on verbally to the uniform Ops room, for example the nature of the information, the time, etc.

150. SDS reporting on forthcoming demonstrations was of huge assistance to the Metropolitan Police. It was of huge value to uniformed policing and those responsible for covering demonstrations when it came to identifying the size, route and details of a demonstration and, specifically, any plans to disrupt the demonstration and move it in the direction of criminal activity. It enabled appropriate numbers of uniformed policing, that is to say the fewest number of officers, to preserve the law and parliamentary democracy.

Contribution to policing and counter subversion

151. In the broadest terms, the SDS enabled the policing of public order activity with the fewest number of officers being drawn from other police activities.

152. The Security Service would have to answer the question of what the SDS did to assist them in its work. I would have thought the far-left intelligence provided them with a huge base of information for their vetting activity.

Overtime

153. Overtime pay was quite a useful increment, but it varied in terms of its significance within overall pay because it relied upon compliance with quite

[REDACTED]

complicated directions in terms of CID overtime. It was based largely upon the cancellation of scheduled rest days without notice and the requirement to work on public holidays. I do not remember the detail any further than that.

154. Overtime was something which was watched pretty carefully in the office. If it seemed as if anybody was being unreasonable, it would perhaps be the cause of them not staying too long on the unit. If there was any indication that one's trust was being breached, it would look to an early exit from the field. I believe this did happen on one occasion when I was Chief Superintendent but I am not certain of the details and would not want to name the person involved in relation to any allegation as I do not have sufficient evidence to support it.

155. I never got the impression that the amount of overtime on offer influenced any SDS officer to stay on the unit longer than might otherwise have been the case. I never got the impression that the amount of overtime on offer influenced any SDS officer to paint an overly optimistic picture of what he was achieving whilst deployed. I never got the impression that the amount of overtime on offer influenced any SDS officer to stay in the unit when doing so was not in the officer's best interests from a welfare point of view. Overtime was significant, but it was not that sort of money.

Formal policies and procedures

156. There were no formal written SDS policies and procedures during my time on the SDS.

The Security Service

157. I have been referred to a Note for File dated 18 January 1976 (Doc 6: UCPI0000027451), Note for File dated 19 September 1977 (Doc 19: UCPI0000030058) and Memorandum dated 15 March 1976 (Doc J), however I cannot remember having any contact or dealings with the Security Service.

158. I have been referred to a series of documents which suggest that information was filtered before disclosure to the security service ⁶⁵ [REDACTED] There was very little direct relationship between the SDS and Security Service. It was Chief Superintendent C Squad who liaised with the Security Service regarding the issues with which the Security Service and the SDS were concerned.

159. The SDS provided the Security Service with a great deal of information on individuals that were of concern for their responsibility in vetting. [REDACTED]

⁶⁶ [REDACTED]

Oversight bodies

160. Nobody from any outside body with any form of regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing visited the SDS during my time on the unit.

Leaving the SDS

161. I left the SDS in 1977. It was a straight career move, as Chief Inspector, to A Squad. I later left the post of Chief Superintendent S Squad because they needed

[REDACTED]

a new Chief Superintendent B Squad. I retired from the Metropolitan Police as Chief Superintendent B Squad.

162. Intelligence provided by the SDS was retained within Special Branch records and therefore anybody subsequently dealing with organisations or people to which this intelligence related or was relevant could access these records. We would all have had access to Special Branch records so how far I, or those I managed, sought, received, used or disseminated intelligence emanating from the SDS would have depended on the operations we were running.

Any other matters

163. The only other matter I wish to mention is in respect of the Industrial Squad. It was a small part of C Squad which monitored the effect upon policing requirements brought about by industrial unrest. Derek Kneale ran the Industrial Squad in the late 1960s/early 1970s, prior to when he was on the SDS. I know about his involvement with the Industrial Squad because of my conversations with him then, and my knowledge about the Industrial Squad comes from those conversations. The Industrial Squad liaised with trade unions at the top level about industrial unrest, which was affecting public order. As far as the police was concerned, this was not connected at all to "blacklisting". I believe that was a commercial thing run by an organisation called the Economic League.

164. There is no other evidence which I am able to give from my knowledge and experience which is of relevance to the work of the Inquiry.



Request for documents

165. I do not have any documents or other information which is potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

166. My memory has not been refreshed by any document which is not in my witness bundle but which has been shown to me for the purposes of the Inquiry. About a year ago I did read a Memorandum signed by Conrad Dixon, which related to the early part of the SDS. This document was in the public domain, and I read it online. I cannot now remember what this document was called. It did not relate to my time in the SDS and therefore I do not consider it has refreshed my memory.

Diversity information

167. I am male. I am white British.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

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Signed:

G.T.M. Craft

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Dated:

7-12-2020