

# Cover Sheet

Date signed: 5<sup>th</sup> January 2021

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

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I, Richard Walker, c/o Designated Lawyers, PO Box 73779, London WC1A 9NL,  
WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 05 November 2020. It provides my full recollection of my posting within the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
2. I am known in this Public Inquiry by the nominal HN368. When I was part of the SDS, my rank was Detective Sergeant, and when I retired from the MPS it was Detective Superintendent.

**Personal details**

3. My full name is Richard James Walker, and my date of birth is [REDACTED] 1937.



## **Police career before and after serving with the Special Demonstration Squad**

4. I first joined the MPS as a junior cadet in 1954, and I became a Police Constable in December 1956. My first MPS post was to Fulham Police Station. I had 9 to 10 years in uniform, and joined Special Branch in 1966. From 1966-1968, I was dealing with enquiries and intelligence gathering in relation to extreme left-wing matters. I received a commendation at the time for my work. From 1968-1969, I was on security vetting duties for other government departments, and the armed services. In January 1969 (MPS-0746794) I was promoted to Detective Sergeant and was back working in intelligence on the extreme left-wing until 1970.
5. From 1970-1971, I was dealing with enquiries regarding the extremist groups which existed within the Indian and Pakistani communities in London; my work consisted of intelligence gathering and liaison with A8 (the uniformed public order unit) in relation to demonstrations. From 1971-1974, I was stationed at Gatwick Airport, intercepting the movement of wanted or travelling criminals and compiling research on security matters of national interest. Special Branch were posted to airports and ports at that time as we were in a good position to monitor people. An example of the work we were doing is that we would monitor people who were known to be extreme left-wing, and were travelling to 'Iron Curtain' countries. We would not necessarily take action, but we would note their movements. In 1974 I was returned to the unit working with intelligence gathering on the extreme left-wing. On 16 September 1974, I joined the SDS (as a Detective Sergeant). I remained as part of the SDS until 17 April 1978. I would describe the role of the SDS when I was there as having responsibilities

[REDACTED]

regarding the provision of information to uniformed, and other, departments of intelligence relating to extreme elements of society, in particular activist groups, and their threat to public order.

6. I left the SDS on 17 April 1978, and until 13 October 1980 I was on protection duties for the Right Honourable Sir Edward Heath. I was promoted to Detective Inspector in October 1980, and until 11 January 1983 I was on a squad dealing with Irish Republican Terrorist affairs (Special Branch had a national responsibility for this). I was in charge of a section dealing with provisional Sinn Fein and Provisional Irish Republican Army matters. From 1983-1984, I was a Detective Chief Inspector in charge of the naturalisation squad; we were dealing with individuals who had come to the UK as refugees during the Second World War. In 1984, I returned to the Irish extremism squad where I was one of two Detective Chief Inspectors in charge of Irish operations until 1986. My last posting, until December 1987 when I retired from the MPS, was as a Detective Superintendent helping run the protection squad. protecting diplomats (whether resident or visiting).

#### **Selection for the Special Demonstration Squad**

7. I do not know how I was selected for the SDS. I was asked if I wanted to join by Detective Inspector Derek Brice before he retired, so I think I had been pre-selected. We knew each other from my time at Fulham police station, so I suspect that he recommended me for the role.



- [REDACTED]
8. I knew very little about the SDS before I joined. At the time, there was a very strict 'need to know' policy at Special Branch – and indeed across the MPS. If you didn't know something, it was because you didn't need to know about it. People didn't ask questions about things they didn't 'need to know'. In general terms, I think that we all knew there was something secret, and we called it 'the Hairies', but I had no idea how it worked, and I knew nothing of the logistics or of anything beyond that. If 'the Hairies' were seen in the street, in their undercover identity, no one would acknowledge them.
  9. For really big demonstrations, people from the SDS back-office would sometimes attend and therefore we would sometimes see UCOs in their undercover personas; this obviously happened after I joined the SDS, rather than before.
  10. I had never had an undercover policing role before I joined the SDS, and I did not have one after. Special Branch was a plain clothes organisation. In a way, the Special Branch was an undercover agency which sat between the uniformed division, the CID and the Security Service. In plain clothes, I might have gone with a group to, for example, the Swiss Cottage Communist Group meeting, but the chair of the meeting would welcome Special Branch. I was therefore not involved in the most subtle of plain clothes roles.

#### **Your role**

11. I was recruited as a Detective Sergeant, and I was not promoted whilst I was part of the SDS. Even though it was not described as such, my job was really the quartermaster of the SDS. I helped to source appropriate cars, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I would help with the arrangements for their bedsitting room accommodation once the UCO had found something suitable. <sup>2</sup> [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I also ran the petty cash book and paid various bills.

12. Within Special Branch at that time, the structure was very hierarchical; the organisation was very top-heavy from the rank of Superintendent upwards. Within the organisation, they needed Detective Sergeants to run things, even though we would not necessarily have anything like a full picture of what was going on due to the 'need to know' and that was the way it went. In general terms, as a Detective Sergeant I would not know, or expect to know, what other people were doing. People within Special Branch did not talk about what they were doing much.

13. I cannot remember who I replaced in the SDS when I started. I cannot remember having a handover when I joined, although I know I would have had one.

#### **Dates of Service**

14. As set out above, I served in the SDS between 16 September 1974, and 17 April 1978.

15. I note that an information report dated 08 October 1975 (UCPI0000009219) is signed by me, as are the SDS transport reports from 1976 and 1977 (MPS-

[REDACTED]

0746816 and MPS0728981-18). These were signed in the currency of my service in the SDS.

16. I believe that the SDS Annual Report 1978 (MPS-0728964-9) reference to the *"Detective Sergeant with special responsibility for transport and finance being replaced in April"* is me, given the date I left.

### **Training and guidance in the Special Demonstration Squad**

17. I did not have any training for my role in the SDS. Training in Special Branch more generally was fairly limited; we had to go on the CID courses, which were 13 weeks long. There were various courses but I cannot remember them particularly. In the Branch, the longer you were in, the better at the job you became.

18. I do not recall there being any training materials, or manuals, at the time of my service. It follows that I do not believe I would have been shown or provided with any such documents.

19. As I did not receive formal training, there was nothing to repeat or refresh.

20. I did not receive any training on race equality from the Metropolitan Police Service either prior to or during my time with the SDS. No one did.

21. I did not receive any training on sex equality from the Metropolitan Police Service either prior to or during my time with the SDS. No one did.



## Duties

22. I have set out my broad duties in paragraph 11 above. As part of my duties in the back-office of the SDS, I went to the weekly meetings at the safe flats. The team from the Chief Superintendent downwards would go to these meetings, if possible. My recollection is that Detective Chief Inspectors, Detective Inspectors and more junior ranked officers in the SDS office would go weekly, and the Superintendent and Chief Superintendent would go less often (I cannot be precise as to how often). At the meetings, the UCOs would submit diaries and expenses, as well as providing written reports and any oral updates. We would check to see how they were generally – that is to say there would be general chat, we would ask about their problems (if there were any) and make sure that they were happy in their work. The UCOs were working in difficult conditions and with some unpleasant people, and when I was in the office the welfare aspect of our role was important.

23. I had no role in the invention, development or assessment of the SDS UCOs' cover identities.

3

[REDACTED]

24. I had no role in the obtaining of passports for the UCOs in their cover identities.

I do not recall having a role in relation to their driving licences [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED]

I should add that the SDS would have made sure that the UCOs were genuinely able to drive, so that they were safe to be on the road.

25. The SDS had safe-flats for meetings which already existed when I joined. I was therefore not involved in the procurement of these. I do not recall being involved in the procurement of cover accommodation; this would be down to the UCOs because of their individual needs, including their personal requirements. It is, however, likely that I would have had a role to play in relation to making payments associated with the cover accommodation.

26. I have been asked about my role in the procurement and administration of vehicles for use by the SDS. In relation to this, I have been asked to look at two transport reports (MPS-0746816 and MPS-0728981). It is correct that the SDS had cars for each of the field officers, and two others for supervisory purposes. I had the use of one supervisory car as part of my role in the back-office. [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The UCOs cars would have been registered to the UCO in their undercover identity, at their undercover address; I cannot recall who would

[REDACTED]

have been responsible for registration, but I do not believe it was me. The transport report at MPS-0746816 does sum up the unit's transport needs pretty well. [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

27. In order to facilitate the SDS's transport needs, it is likely that I would have spoken to the individuals set out in each of the transport reports – Transport, G9 and Inspector <sup>7</sup> [REDACTED]. I am afraid that I cannot recall particular discussions, or the frequency of such discussions. I am asked whether consultation with other branches of the MPS and senior managers was part of the regular duties of a Detective Sergeant in the SDS. I do not recall it being part of my regular duties. I may have spoken to more senior officers on occasion, but it was not something I would have thought happened routinely. It would have been administrative, given my role as 'quartermaster', such as the liaison with other branches to organise transport for the unit.

28. I have been asked what role I had in the production of other SDS paperwork. In my role, I had very little to do with the production of paperwork as I carried out a practical and administrative function. One of the things that I did was to look at the reporting produced in manuscript by the officers, and make suggested changes to the language to make it more formal, or grammatically correct. In my experience, Special Branch was exacting in the standards of written English, and people were openly critical of the language in memoranda and reports. We were told that reporting was likely to go to the Home Office and the Security Service. This was an issue I had experienced earlier in my



[REDACTED]

Special Branch career, so it was no surprise to me that the same considerations applied to SDS reporting. We would therefore get the UCO's handwritten reports and tidy them up before they would be sent on for typing. Other than that, and the paperwork that I would have processed in my role as quartermaster, I have no recollection of specific paperwork duties.

29. I had a role in the management of the UCOs. Contact with the UCOs when they were deployed was at least once a week face-to-face. Sometimes the UCOs would ask for one-to-one meetings if they wanted to see someone about anything. These requests would not always be if there was a problem. On occasion they could be about work, but they also could be for social contact. I can't recall how often there were telephone calls – I am sure that they must have called the office on occasion, but I don't remember specific instances.

30. I had a role in relation to the welfare management of UCOs. Part of my function as 'quartermaster' was to facilitate the smooth-running of some of the administration connected to their duties. All of the back-office SDS staff had a role in making sure the UCOs could cope emotionally with the work they were doing. This was done by talking to them. If they had any problems, they would be seen and spoken to. We tried to do the best we could to keep in touch with people who were doing a difficult job. I am still proud of the work that we did, and I thought that we had done what we could do to provide support to the UCOs.

[REDACTED]

31. I have been asked about my role in the writing up of SDS intelligence reports, which I have already touched on briefly above. UCOs were expected to report on the activities of the groups that they were in, and the persons within those groups. There was no filter on what they were meant to do or say in terms of reporting. My understanding was that someone in Special Branch – although I am not sure at what level, or from which department – would have decided which groups were likely to cause or attract trouble, and those were the groups that were targeted. An example of this would be the Troops Out Movement, because of the public risks at the time due to its links with Irish groups. We would have received the UCOs' updates both in writing and orally at the meetings, and the UCOs might have called to say something on the phone. The better and more specific the information we had from the UCOs, the more careful we had to be about its distribution and use as there would have been a risk that it would have given too much away.

32. I do not recall at any stage directing or steering an officer's reporting, indeed that was not part of my job. I do not believe that I was aware of any SDS officer directing or steering the reporting of any UCO in my time with the unit.

33. As noted in paragraph 28 above, my role in relation to the reporting was limited. I tidied up the language, but did not change the substance of the intelligence supplied. I should add that the handwritten reports which we received from the UCOs bore limited relation to the reports which were ultimately submitted to Special Branch records, or sent to the Security Service (Box 500). For example, the reporting which we received from the officers, and which was sent



[REDACTED]

for typing, would not have had the PF (Security Service) and RF (Special Branch) numbers within it. These would have been added on subsequent to the basic information being received by the SDS back-office from the UCOs. I would not have typed these reports. I think that they went to the typing pool.

34. I cannot recall adding or removing anything from the UCO's reporting. I can say with certainty that I would not have added or removed facts, but I would have added in or removed single words if the sentence clarity needed to be improved. I can't think of any specific examples.

35. My understanding is that the finalised reports would come back to the office and were then sent to whomever needed to see them. I did not decide who they went to, but like anyone else in the SDS office I could sign off the typed reports when they were completed and before they were sent on. I cannot recall who was responsible for directing where the reports went.

36. I would not have expected to get feedback from other divisions in Special Branch, A8, the Security Service or any other potential customer of the SDS on the quality of the reporting, nor on the content of the reports. My understanding was that we were giving the MPS, and other government agencies, material that they were interested in. Indeed, if it had not been of interest or relevance to them I believe that they would have asked for different information, or for the information to stop. I would have thought that if the SDS's customers had spoken to someone in the SDS about reporting it would have – I think – been to the Detective Chief Inspector, rather than to someone at my level. I say this

[REDACTED]

on the basis of my later experience in Special Branch and my knowledge of the hierarchies within the MPS.

37. I cannot recall what proportion of intelligence was written, and what was communicated orally. There may have been some types of information which was urgent and could not await typing up or which could not be committed to writing – an example of which might be if very specific information was supplied, and the information had to be communicated in more oblique terms to protect the officer. I do not have a specific recollection of this happening, but it is certainly possible. Equally, urgent information might have been communicated onwards orally. If it was in relation to a huge demonstration, it would probably have communicated by liaison between more senior persons. I may have spoken to someone in A8 on occasion, but I cannot be specific at this distance of time.

38. I have been asked what arrangements were in place for the storage and retention of intelligence reports. I know that Special Branch had an enormous Registry of files. There were also safes in every office for the temporary storage of secret documents and secure bins for disposing of secret documents. Every office was checked nightly. We would keep files in the SDS if they were topical at the time, so there may have been files – including SDS reporting – which were locked in the office for a period. For example, if there was an officer in the Troops Out Movement, there would be a file which SDS would maintain, and once it was not current it would go to the Registry. The security in relation



[REDACTED]

to the storage of intelligence reporting was tight. I do not know how long records were maintained for.

39. The arrangement was that reports would have gone to other parts of Special Branch, the Security Service, A8, or other agencies. There would have been administrative arrangements for how the reports got to them, which I cannot recall the precise details of. There must have been some modification depending on who the reporting was going to. For example, I would not have thought that the reporting to A8 had the PF and RF numbers which are on the reports in the Rule 9 document pack. The reports which would go to A8 would be things that uniform branch needed to act on. The general reports, such as the one at UCPI0000017776-1 would have been of no interest to A8, and someone would have decided that it was to go to Special Branch. It is a general report on the experience of a UCO, and because it was retrospective it would have been no use to the uniformed unit.

40. I have been asked about my role in relation to the payment of UCOs, including the payment of overtime. The UCOs were paid as serving police officers, in the same way as any police officer would be paid. They were also paid overtime. I was not responsible for authorising the overtime, but I would check that the contents of their diaries and their overtime claims matched up. The overtime request would then be submitted to the payment department who would pay the UCO's overtime. I should add that we all had to keep diaries which were checked on a weekly basis, and I cannot recall at what rank this practice stopped. It was a force wide obligation, not one which was peculiar to UCOs.

[REDACTED]

41. I do not think I had a particular role in relation to liaising or otherwise dealing with Special Branch or MPS personnel who were not members of the SDS. If a need arose, I would be comfortable speaking to A8, or to the Detective Chief Inspector in the Transport unit, but it was not a routine event.


42. I have been asked whether I had a role in relation to liaising or otherwise dealing with the Security Service – I do not believe that I spoke to them on behalf of the SDS when I was part of the unit. I have seen the document at MPS-0735795-3. This is a list, attached to correspondence from the Security Service, inviting me, and thirty other Special Branch officers, to a party. The correspondence from the Security Service is dated 30 January 1978, and the event was to be held at the Security Service premises on 22 February 1978 (MPS-0735795-2). I recall the event in February 1978, but I do not know how it was I came to be invited. I had not seen the correspondence, with the attached list, until I was provided with it by the Inquiry as part of my Rule 9 bundle. From memory, I think that list at MPS-0735795-3 names most of the Commanders and Detective Chief Superintendents in Special Branch at that time, and the remaining names are a mixture of ranks across the various departments in Special Branch. I do not think that I was included in this list because of any specific role with the Security Service. As I had no general contact with the Security Service, I do not know how my name would have come to be on that list. I would guess that Special Branch must have been asked to put forward a number of officers to attend. I can see no other reason for me being included on this list.

[REDACTED]

43. I had no liaison role with the Home Office, although I must have had some dealings with them as that is where everything was run from. I can't recall any liaison with the Home office, but the SDS was funded by the Home Office. I presume that they funded the unit because they thought that it was necessary.

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44.



#### *SDS Reports*

45. I have been asked about the SDS reports UCPI0000012800, UCPI0000009219, and UCPI0000017554.

- a. I am named on, but did not sign, UCPI0000012800, but I am the Sergeant R Walker who did sign UCPI0000009219, and UCPI0000017554 2. I was a serving SDS officer at the time these reports are dated.
- b. I think I must have happened to be the person who had submitted those particular pieces of information for typing. I would have therefore added



[REDACTED]

my signature to those reports after they had been typed up. In so far as anyone in Special Branch was concerned, that would be the information that I was providing on that day. The source of the information would have been the UCO, therefore it would not have been signed off by them. I should think that was quite common to find SDS staff members' names on intelligence reporting in this way. I do not know how many I would have signed. There were lots of reports generated by the SDS and those in the bundle represent a handful of the reporting which would have taken place in the time I was in the SDS. It is not me signing off on the intelligence as being correct and complete, and it is not me approving the contents in any way, it was simply a means of saying to Special Branch "here is some information".

#### *Attendance at Demonstrations*

46. I have been shown MPS-0730728, MPS-0730729, MPS0730703, MPS-0730702 and MPS-0730698 and asked about attendance of SDS officers and managers at demonstrations outside the MPS district.

- a. Managers and administrative staff would travel to the same part of the country as a UCO in limited circumstances. As far as I recall, it would have been in circumstances where there could have been a risk to them – whether in terms of a risk of violence, or a risk of arrest – in the course of their duties. SDS office staff attendance at demonstrations would depend on the size and the tenor of the demonstration – by that I mean the risk of aggressive or disorderly behaviour. The number of SDS



[REDACTED]

officers involved in the demonstration may have been a factor too, but I really cannot recall any instances where there was more than one UCO present. I do not remember travelling to Blackburn, but I do remember Oldham. However, as MPS0730728 and MPS0730729 refer to me travelling there with Detective Inspector McIntosh I accept that I did travel to Blackburn as part of my duties in the SDS.

- b. SDS staff were present so that if anything happened to affect the safety of officers, or if there was action towards them by local police, we were on hand to deal with it.
- c. Welfare was one of the roles we were there for. Welfare sums up a huge range of factors, and the UCOs well-being was important. The UCOs would have been aware of the presence of managers and other SDS staff.
- d. I have seen MPS-0730729, which is a letter from Police HQ Lancashire where thanks are expressed to me and Detective Inspector McIntosh for assistance provided at an Action Against Racism demonstration in Blackburn. It is nice to know that we were thanked, but I do not know at this distance of time what we were being thanked for. In truth, I do not remember Angus McIntosh being in the SDS at the same time as me.
- e. As my best guess, I would think reporting after SDS staff attendance at an event would have been completed by the senior officer attending. I

[REDACTED]

may have contributed to the reporting. I therefore think Angus McIntosh would have reported if we had both gone, but I do not recall having a role in this event at all.

- f. Liaison with another force/constabulary would depend on what the SDS UCO's activity in the other force's area was. If we were concerned for their safety in connection with their duties, then there would have been contact. If they were travelling to the other force's area unconnected to their duties as a UCO, we would not have contacted the force. If there was a big demonstration, the local force would be contacted. If it was for a small demonstration, it is possible that a senior officer may have mentioned this to someone locally but I think that it would have been risk-assessed. I do not know who would have conducted the risk assessment, but it would not have been something I would be involved in.
- g. When there was no question of a public order situation, and a UCO's travel outside of the Metropolitan Police District was merely for travel compatible with his group's behaviour (e.g. leafleting) the external force would not be notified that a SDS officer was travelling to their area. I do not have a specific recollection to give by way of example, but there would have been occasions. We would not tell the other force if we felt there was no risk to the officer and it was compatible with the UCO's duties. We did not want to advertise the existence of the SDS in general, so would not raise its presence unless it was necessary to do so.

[REDACTED]

### **Premises and meetings with other SDS undercover officers**

47. At this distance of time, I cannot be exact on the locations of safe houses. One of the safe houses was in West London. There was one in South London.

48. When I was part of the SDS, the office was in the tower block at Scotland Yard. I think we were based on the 18<sup>th</sup> floor. The SDS moved to Vincent Square after I left.

49. I am told that a number of officers have told the Inquiry that they attended twice-weekly meetings with other undercover officers, and what I understand has been described as "management". In this context, I understand the term "management" refers to the SDS officers who were not UCOs – those in administrative roles, or of senior rank, based in the office. I have been asked a number of questions in relation to these meetings:

- a. I did attend these meetings.
- b. My role during these meetings was to speak officers, check their expenses claims, pay any expenses from previous weeks, check their diaries against their overtime claims, and check on their welfare.
- c. More senior managers attended these meetings regularly. The Detective Inspector and Detective Chief Inspector were always present.



[REDACTED]

Ranks above that (Detective Superintendent and Detective Chief Superintendent) were occasionally present.

- d. The weekly meetings were used as an opportunity for officers to provide managers with information, to allow officers to complete notebooks and paperwork, and to raise any welfare issues that had arisen. I cannot recall specific welfare issues arising which caused me concern at the time. I recall an incident – but not the officer – where [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a group [REDACTED] had intimated to a UCO that they would have to work over Christmas, and the UCO's spouse was not happy about it. As far as we were concerned, the UCO's family and life outside the SDS were very important. That UCO would have been advised that they would be supported whichever decision they took. They would have been supported in making a judgement call between their family life, as against any potential risk of his compromise to his cover identity should he returning home for Christmas. I do not recall which decision this UCO reached. I would not have spoken to UCOs spouses, and I don't recall that any of the UCO spouses contacted the office whilst I was at the SDS.

- e. Expenses claims were dealt with at the weekly meetings. I would be told what the expenses were, and given evidence of the expenditure (for example, receipts). I would then process the expenses claims in the office and the UCO would get the money the next week, or the week after depending on how quickly I was able to process the claims.

[REDACTED]

f. I think that the Detective Inspector and I would have dealt with expenses claims.

g. Intelligence reports were provided in longhand at these meetings, but reports were not typed up. There may have been some conversation on the content of reports, and in all likelihood there was, but I cannot remember what this was.

### **SDS Management Structure**

50. At this distance of time, I am unclear as to who was in what senior role during my time at the SDS. I think that Derek Kneale was a Detective Chief Superintendent, Geoff Craft I think was a Detective Chief Superintendent or Detective Superintendent. I had not recalled Angus McIntosh being in the SDS but I do note from MPS-0730729 that he was a Detective Inspector when I was in the SDS. I do not remember if Ken Pryde, Mike Ferguson or Les Willingale were in the SDS at the same time as me.

### **Individual Managers and Administrators**

51. I have been asked a number of questions in relation to managers, and their management style. I have attempted to answer these questions to the best of my ability, but I do not recall some of these people being in roles at the SDS with me.

[REDACTED]

*Derek Kneale*

52. As far as I know Derek Kneale did not adopt a cover name, as he had no need to. As I recall, he dealt with things well, and I felt that he was particularly good in a welfare role. He was the type of man who would have had a lot of contact with all persons in the SDS, and this accords with my memory of how he was in the office.

*Michael Ferguson*

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53. I do not recall Mike Ferguson as a manager. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

*Geoff Craft*

54. Geoff Craft was a good manager, he didn't have the same touch as Derek Kneale but he was efficient and well-liked. He did not have a cover name. I would have had a good deal of interaction with him on all my tasks. It was a small team and there was therefore good interaction between the ranks, particularly for those who were physically in the SDS office.

*Ken Pryde*

55. I do not recall working with Ken Pryde, although I do remember him from Special Branch.



[REDACTED]

*Angus MacIntosh*

56. I don't recall working with Angus MacIntosh in the SDS. Angus was a very nice man, who I knew and liked very much from being in Special Branch together. He would not have adopted a cover name, like all members of the SDS who were not UCOs

*Les Willingale*

57. I do not recall Les Willingale being in the SDS at the same time as me.

*Dick Scully*

58. Dick Scully had a purely administrative role but I do not know exactly what it was. I do recall that there was always plenty for us to do. Like me, Dick Scully did not have a cover name. We did not have cover names as we were not UCOs. I worked in the same office as Dick Scully so there was daily personal contact.

*Paul Croyden*

59. I know Paul Croyden, but I do not recall him in being in the SDS at the same time as me.

[REDACTED]

Chris Skey

60. I know that Chris Skey was on the protection team for the Right Honourable Sir Edward Heath, but I cannot recall serving with him in the SDS. I would guess that he would not have adopted a cover name as he was not a UCO. I liked him very much when I knew him in Special Branch – he was a smashing chap.

### **The Chain of Command**

61. I am asked about the chain of command within the MPS, but above the SDS. As far as I recall, it was: Superintendent; Chief Superintendent; Commander Special Branch; Deputy Assistant Commissioner; Assistant Commissioner; Deputy Commissioner; Commissioner.

62. I believe the Commissioners in my chain of command whilst I served in the SDS were Sir Robert Mark and then Sir David McNee. I recall that Sir Robert Mark did good work, particularly in respect of rooting out corruption and I remember Sir David McNee was well-liked.

63. I cannot recall who the Deputy Commissioners in my chain of command were whilst I served in the SDS.

64. I recall John Wilson being Assistant Chief Commissioner at the time I served in the SDS, and I see the letter to Robert Armstrong dated 06 April 1976 is signed 'J.S. Wilson Assistant Commissioner (Crime)' (MPS-0728980-12). I do recall



[REDACTED]

Gilbert Kelland CBE QPM, but not in connection with Special Branch at the time I was at the SDS.

65. I cannot recall who the Deputy Assistant Commissioners at my time would have been – this is 40 years ago, so I cannot be clear.

66. I have no independent recollection of who the Commanders of Special Branch in my chain of command were whilst I served in the SDS. I remembered the names Rollo Watts and Phil Saunders, but without the papers provided to me by the Inquiry I could not be clear on why I knew them. I note that correspondence is addressed to 'Commander R Watts' from the Security Service (Box 500) on 30 January 1978 (MPS0735795-2), therefore he must have been a Commander whilst I was in the SDS. Equally, the list of names attached to the correspondence names P Saunders as another Commander (MPS0735795-3).

67. I believe the Detective Chief Superintendents in my chain of command whilst in the SDS were Geoff Craft and Derek Kneale.

68. I recall Geoff Craft. I do not know if this was as Detective Chief Superintendent or as the Detective Superintendent in my chain of command whilst I was in the SDS. I do not recall Messrs Bicknell or Pryde in this role.

### **Senior managers in the chain of command**

69. I have been asked whether any senior managers (Superintendent or above) visited the SDS during my time within that unit. I recall they did, frequently. Geoff Craft, certainly did. My recollection is that if Derek Kneale was available he would have visited.

70. I have been asked whether anyone from any outside body with any form of regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing visited the SDS during my time within that unit. I do not believe this happened on any occasion, and I would have been surprised if it had given the strict 'need to know' policies around the SDS.

71. I have been asked what involvement the Superintendent had in the running or supervision of the SDS, in particular how frequently they were involved and on what basis. At 40 years' distance, my best recollection is that they came to the supervisory meetings as often as they could and they talked to the people who were there. I thought at the time that they were carrying out their function as a proper supervising officer should, and that remains my belief. I should also add that the supervisory relationship was more informal in the SDS than in other facets of Special Branch work, for obvious reasons, given the unusual conditions in which the UCOs worked.

72. I have been asked what involvement the Chief Superintendent had in the running or supervision of the SDS, in particular how frequently they were involved and on what basis. At 40 years' distance, my best recollection is as I

[REDACTED]

have said for the Superintendent, but perhaps to a lesser extent. My recollection is that they would go out to the meetings as often as they could.

73. I have been asked about the involvement of the Commander Special Branch, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner had in the running and/or supervision of the SDS. In particular, I am asked how frequently each of those ranking officers were involved and on what business, and how they each discharged their roles.


74. I was not involved with officers of this rank given my relatively junior role, and the hierarchies within Special Branch and the MPS. I cannot recall specific instances where I interacted with them in the course of my duties as a Detective Sergeant in the SDS. They plainly would have had a watching brief over the SDS given its importance at the time, but I cannot assist with the specifics of this. Even as a Detective Chief Inspector I would not have interacted with the Commander of Special Branch and more senior ranking officers.

#### **Undercover officers**

75. I have been provided with a list of surnames, cover surnames, and Inquiry ciphers of former SDS UCOs, and asked whether I served with any of the officers mentioned.

76. I served in the SDS at the same time as:

[11]



11

HN298, HN299/342,  
HN301, HN303,  
HN200, Clark,  
HN300, HN819,  
HN13, HN304,  
HN354, HN80,  
HN353, HN356/124,  
HN126 and others

77. I do not recall serving with

12

HN106,  
HN96,  
HN155



[REDACTED]

78. I do not believe I served with any UCOs in addition to those listed at paragraph 76.

79. I have been asked to what extent I interacted with the UCOs serving in the SDS at the same time as me. I have set this out elsewhere in the statement – I would describe it, in brief, as regular weekly interaction.

80. I have been asked whether it was usual for SDS officers to spend time in the back-office, or safe houses, preparing to deploy. As far as I recall, SDS officers did not spend time in the back-office when waiting to deploy. They may have been in the safe houses earlier. I do not remember how or where UCOs prepared for deployment, as I was not involved with selection for the SDS, the preparation of their undercover identities or the timing of their deployment.

81. I have been asked whether it was usual for SDS officers to spend time in the back-office, or safe houses, after withdrawing from their undercover deployments. UCOs would not have been in safe houses after they were withdrawn from their undercover deployments, and I do not remember them being in the SDS office after they had withdrawn. My recollection is that they would take time off, and some UCOs had built up a lot of 'time off in lieu' from their overtime so would take a long break before returning to other Special Branch duties.

[REDACTED]

82. I was not aware of any unhappy working relationships between members of the SDS. Officers' personalities were sometimes very different, but I do not remember anyone falling out.

### **Special Demonstration Squad – Role & Annual Reports**

83. The role of the SDS, when I was there, was to supply information to the agency or agencies who had asked for information or assistance. As far as I was aware, given my junior role, this included A8 and the Security Service, and it is certainly possible that other parts of Special Branch asked the SDS for intelligence. To best answer this question, I refer to paragraph 2 of what has been described as the 1975 Annual Report (MPS-0730099-1): *"Since 1968, the SDS has concentrated on gathering intelligence about the activities of those extremists whose political views are to the left of the Communist Party of Great Britain, generally describes as the 'ultra-left', and the anarchist and libertarian movements. The primary aim has been to give warning of impending demonstrations and to obtain information, not available from any other source, regarding the number of persons taking part and the degree of planned or likely public disorder. This information enables 'A' Department to assess the required police coverage to ensure adequate control. In pursuance of this aim, valuable information is also obtained regarding subversive organisations which is passed to other Special Branch Squads and to the Security Service".* I did not draft these words, but they accord with my understanding.



[REDACTED]

84. I have been asked about the 1975-1978 Annual Reports (MPS0730099, MPS-0728980, MPS0728981, MPS0728964). Specifically:

- a. Why and for whom the reports were written? In particular, whether, as stated at 1(i) of the 1978 Annual Report, they were the basis for asking Home Office approval for the continued existence of the SDS? I was not instrumental in asking for or drafting the report, so I cannot say for whom it was written, and I had never seen the reports until I was shown the papers which the Inquiry supplied with my Rule 9 request. The report appears also to have been submitted as the basis for asking for Home Office funding for the continued existence of the SDS (see the letter at MPS-0728980-12). It is my understanding that the SDS would not have operated without the funding from the Home Office.
- b. I have been asked if I played a role in the compilation of the annual reports, and if so what that was. I have no independent recollection of playing any role in the compilation of the annual reports. However, I see from e.g. MPS0728981-17 that I played a limited role in the compilation of annual reporting by submitting a summary of the SDS transport expenditure to the Chief Superintendent of Special Branch S Squad (the SDS was a unit within S Squad). I cannot imagine that I would have been involved beyond commenting on transport.
- c. I have been asked if the reports paint a fair and accurate picture of what the SDS was doing at the time, or if they were given a slant or gloss for

[REDACTED]

the audience they were written for? Having not seen them before, and reading them 40 years later, I think that the reports are honest. I have no reason to think that there was anything to gloss over. In my opinion the field officers did difficult and dangerous work, and the fruits of their labour are, to the best of my recollection, fairly reported. The inquiry will be able to see from some of the intelligence reports which were included in my Rule 9 papers (e.g. UCPI0000017776-1) that the officers were involved in unpleasant altercations with rival groups as part of their undercover duties – their experiences in these hostile environments enabled them to report back on disorder to the benefit of the public.

85. I have been asked about paragraph 16 on p.6 of the 1976 Annual Report (MPS-0728980), and the reported phasing out of an experimental policy of allowing two officers to share a flat. I suspect that I was aware of the policy at the time, but I was not involved in the implementation or phasing out of this policy. I therefore cannot assist the Inquiry with the reasons behind it, beyond those which appear in the Annual Report. I did not even recall the policy set out at paragraph 16 until I was shown the Annual Report in my Rule 9 bundle.

86. I have been referred to paragraph 18 in the 1977 Annual Report (MPS-0728981), detailing the industrial dispute at Grunwick and "The Battle of Lewisham". I recall the events described in general terms. I cannot recall the SDS's role in relation to them. I believe that the account given of the SDS's involvement in relation to these events is probably accurate. At this distance of time, it is hard to be specific in the manner I am asked to be, or to add detail to



[REDACTED]

the account. I can see from the report that it shows how helpful the information was in controlling a potentially explosive public order situation. I would have thought that contemporaneous reporting or evidence from other parts of Special Branch or A8 would better assist the Inquiry in corroborating the account in the Annual Report.

87. I have also been referred to paragraph 4 in the 1978 Annual Report (MPS-0728964). The document indicates that the long hours and demanding work in which SDS UCOs were involved "does not have a deleterious effect upon their health". In my experience, UCOs' health was not affected by their undercover work. They did get very tired, but I do not recall any particular mental or physical health problems. They were understandably tired because of the hours they worked. I left the SDS in April 1978, so would not have known if there were specific issues which arose later in the year in relation to this topic.

#### Questions about Specific Undercover Officers

[13]

HN13 [REDACTED] (deceased)

[14]

88. It has been suggested to me that [REDACTED] HN13 served in the SDS between 1974 and 1978, and infiltrated groups associated with communist ideology. I do recall that he was involved with the most difficult group of all, which was the Communist Party of England (Marxist-Leninist).

89. I had no involvement at all in either of **HN13's** arrests. I must have been aware of the first arrest, but I note that his second arrest was in April 1978 – only a short while before I left the SDS. Whilst I believe that I must have been aware of the first arrest, which I see from the papers was in September 1977, I was not involved in any way with dealing with it. I left the SDS two days after his second arrest.

90. I think that I knew about the first arrest, because I think that it would have been general knowledge amongst those who were in the SDS office at the time he was arrested. I do not think that I heard about this arrest through more recent conversations.

91. I have been asked a series of questions in relation to my involvement with the criminal proceedings arising from the arrests, what the court or the parties were told, and the rationale behind that. I cannot help at all with what the court, or any person involved, were told in relation to his status as a UCO or his real/cover name as I have no idea about it. I do not know if he gave evidence in either set of proceedings, as I was not involved. I see from the papers that Geoff Craft and Ken Pryde appear to have had conduct of the matter on behalf of the SDS.

92. I am asked if the documents suggest that one of the SDS concerns was to ensure that the UCO was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and if this was for welfare reasons or because it would interrupt his reporting. I was not aware of this situation at the time, as I was not involved, but I would speculate

[REDACTED]

that welfare reasons would have been the most important reason to ensure the UCO was not imprisoned.

93. I was not aware that there was a concern that one of the arresting officers may have known the UCO (from serving with him previously). However, given the potential risks to the UCO if he had been recognised by a police officer, I can see that it may have been a justifiable concern.

94. I do not know if there were any further concerns arising from the arrests. I was not involved in the management of the first arrest, and I was not at the SDS following the second arrest. I have checked a 1978 calendar, and the date of <sup>16</sup> [REDACTED] HN13's second arrest was a Saturday, and I commenced new duties on the Monday.

<sup>17</sup> HN126 [REDACTED]

<sup>18</sup> 95. It has been suggested to me that [REDACTED] HN126 served in the SDS between 1977 and 1982, and infiltrated the Socialist Workers Party.

<sup>19</sup> 96. I have no recollection of the [REDACTED] possible compromise of HN126 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This may have post-dated my departure from the SDS. I suspect that the SDS management would have been worried, but it sounds to me like that incident was dealt with.



[REDACTED]

20

97. I was not involved in managing [REDACTED] another possible compromise of HN126 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I have no recollection at all, and it may have post-dated my departure from the SDS. [REDACTED]

20

[REDACTED] Even though I only learned about this incident from the Rule 9 documents provided by the Inquiry, it sounds to me like that incident was dealt with appropriately and creatively by the UCO.

98. I have been asked about management attitudes to risk. The UCOs had to handle risks like this, we trusted them to manage them appropriately. If a UCO felt worried about compromise, we would have pulled them out in a manner which was safe for them but which did not arouse suspicion. I do not recall anyone being pulled out, or asking to be pulled out, from their undercover deployment whilst I was at the SDS.

99. I do not recall the incident so cannot assist with whether or not there was a risk assessment and how that risk assessment took shape. I have already said that it may have been after my time given this UCO's dates of service.

21

HN21 [REDACTED]

21

100. It has been suggested to me that [REDACTED] HN21 [REDACTED] served in the SDS

21(i)

[REDACTED] in the late 1970s and early 1980s and reported principally on two groups and had involvement in others [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
21(ii)

101. I was not aware that [REDACTED] HN21 [REDACTED] had kissed and fondled a named woman, and had sex twice with an unnamed woman who he met at [REDACTED] 21(iii) an evening class that he attended for the purposes of building his cover. I did not know of this at all at the time. I was first aware of this when I saw the Inquiry papers provided to me for the purpose of compiling my Rule 9 statement (from which the above summary has been drawn).

*HN354 Vincent Harvey*

102. It has been suggested to me that Vincent Harvey served in the SDS between 1977 and 1979. I am told that he recalls that I was involved in the SDS at the time of his deployment. I am also told that he recalls engaging in sexual activity on four occasions with members of his target group during the course of his deployment. He did not inform me of any of these incidents at the time, and the first I was aware of them was when I saw the Inquiry papers provided to me for the purpose of compiling my Rule 9 statement.

*HN297 Richard Clark*

103. I did not know of Richard Clark having any sexual relationships in the course of his deployment. I have been told that Richard Clark's deployment came to an end in 1976, and therefore we only overlapped in the SDS for a relatively short time.

104. I knew nothing of this UCO's relationship with an activist at the time of his deployment, and only found out about it from the papers which I was

[REDACTED]

provided with when asked to make a statement in these proceedings. I did not do anything about it at the time, as I was not aware of it.

105. I do not know if my colleagues or managers knew about any sexual relationship; if they did, I didn't hear about it from them. If senior managers had been aware of it, I think I would have heard about it in the office. I don't know what they did about it, if they knew about it. If they had known about it, I suspect that they would have said something about it.

106. If I had known about it, I would certainly have told more senior officers. That sort of behaviour would have been a worry as he could have been exposed, and it could have had a negative impact on the person the UCO was in a relationship with.

107. As far as I was aware, there was no understanding, or common knowledge, within the SDS that Richard Clarke had had sexual relations with a woman whilst undercover.

108. I was not aware of Richard Clark having had sexual activity with a woman whilst undercover, therefore it cannot have affected my thinking about the issue of sexual relationships during undercover deployments.



[REDACTED]

24

[REDACTED]

109.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24

110.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25

[REDACTED]

111. [REDACTED]

26

**Questions about specific issues**

112. <sup>27</sup> Apart from **HN13** who has been the subject of separate questions, I am not aware of any contemporary of mine in the SDS committing a criminal offence whilst undercover.

113. To my knowledge, no contemporary of mine in the SDS provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence.

114. <sup>28</sup> Apart from **HN13** who has been the subject of separate questions, I am not aware of any contemporary of mine in the SDS being arrested, charged, tried or convicted in their undercover identity.

[REDACTED]

115. To my knowledge, no contemporary of mine in the SDS was involved in violence or other criminal activity whilst deployed undercover. The UCOs were necessarily peripherally involved in public disorder as they were members of groups involved in public disorder. To the best of my knowledge, none of them were involved in public disorder to the extent that they were arrested, cautioned, or similar in connection with that behaviour. I would expect that the UCOs had enough common sense to recognise where the line was between enthusiastic support for their group's cause, and not participating in criminality. They would have to be like their group (so as to maintain their cover) but not go too far.

116. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary UCOs reported legally privileged information.

117. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary UCOs reported on the activities of elected politicians.

118. To my knowledge, UCOs who were deployed whilst I was at the SDS only reported on the activities of Trade Unions if Trade Union members were part of the groups they had infiltrated, and the information was relevant to the groups they had infiltrated.

119. To my knowledge, none of my contemporary UCOs engaged in sexual activity with others whilst in their cover identity.



[REDACTED]

120. I am not aware of any manager giving UCOs orders, instructions, advice or guidance about sexual contact whilst operating undercover.

121. I have been asked whether I agree with the following statement, which I am given to understand that <sup>29</sup> [REDACTED] HN304 [REDACTED] has reported to the Inquiry:

"No one encouraged the UCOs to engage in sexual activity while undercover, but the managers appeared to turn a blind eye to the bits of banter and innuendo I heard. I do not know what they thought of such matters, what they knew of the details or how much of it was even true. I think they probably assumed that each UCO was capable of managing any situation they got themselves into. However, they must have known it was almost bound to happen with certain individuals who had a predilection for chasing women (before, during and after their time in the SDS)."

122. I do not agree with all of this account. It is certainly correct that no one encouraged UCOs to engage in this, but I do not know what advice was given on how to behave. I think there was an expectation that the UCOs would behave, rather than an expectation that they would misbehave. There was very little banter as I recall, and I certainly would not have turned a blind eye to anything I thought had a ring of truth to it. I never assumed that there was or would be any sexual activity by the UCOs in their undercover identities. As someone in the office, I did not know that any of the sexual activity, which I have now been told about, was going on. I would, by and large, have thought UCOs could handle situations – but I had not factored sexual relationships with

[REDACTED]

activists as a situation which they may have got themselves involved in and therefore needed to handle. I categorically do not agree with the comment on predilection. I certainly had not judged anyone on that basis – men who say things about women don't always mean it, or follow through with what they say.

123. I do not recall sexual activity with those the UCOs were reporting on being discussed in the office, or in the safe flats, or in any private conversations with a UCO. It follows that I do not agree that I, the other administrative staff, or the managers in the SDS office, turned a blind eye to this conduct.


124. I did not consider that the UCOs were almost bound to end up having sexual relationships during their deployments. Most of them, if not almost all of them, were married and I had not considered it to be a risk.

125. I wasn't aware of sexual activity between UCOs and civilians who they met in their undercover identities, and I would not have condoned it had I known about it. I have been asked for the reason why I would not have condoned it. The reason is twofold: it would have put the UCO, and other UCOs at risk, and it equally would have interfered with the well-being of the other person involved.

#### **Use of deceased children's identities**

126. I have been told that the Inquiry is aware that the majority of officers deployed as UCOs in the SDS adopted the names of deceased children as part of their legend. I have been asked some questions about this, and respond as follows:



- 
- a. I am not aware of when this tactic began. I think that people were already doing this at the time I started in the SDS.
  - b. I do not know who devised this tactic. It is something that seems to have featured in fiction for centuries, and more recently in The Day of the Jackal.
  - c. I do not know who authorised the use of deceased children's details.
  - d. As I was not involved in the devising of this approach, I do not know what consideration, if any, was given by the SDS to the impact on surviving families of those deceased children whose names and dates of birth were used. I can say that it obviously wasn't thought through, and I can understand how the parents of the dead children are upset. I think the SDS did not think the families would find out.

### **Reporting on Individuals**

127. I have been asked why certain types of information was recorded in relation to certain persons. As I have previously stated, the SDS was a conduit, and actioned requests for information. The SDS recorded information, and did not filter the information gathered as the SDS were not gathering it for our own purposes. We acted on behalf of other persons, with no oversight of the broader purpose of the information. I would not have known who decided what



[REDACTED]

to ask the SDS for – as identified earlier in this statement, I think communication of this kind was likely to have been at Chief Superintendent level at least. All information which was obtained was provided in reports or orally. I have tried to answer the queries to the best of my ability, and with the benefit of hindsight and the documents themselves, but the purpose of intelligence reports is known by the requesting or receiving individual rather than the entity acting as a conduit:

- a. UCPI0000010719 – this report from 1976 updated a file on a person

29(i)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A known person's health was relevant as adverse health may cause a person's activities to cease. Equally, when a person died their file would be closed.

30

- b. [REDACTED] – this report on a person of interest to Special Branch would have been to update his reference file. He was of interest because of his membership of the group, not because of his membership of a Trade Union. The information in relation to the Trade Union may have been relevant as he appears to have been asked to join as a result of a request by [REDACTED] their target group.

- c. UCPI000017523 – this report is on persons known to Special Branch,

30(i)

[REDACTED] Special Branch and the Security Service would have been interested in this person because they were a member of the Socialist Workers Party, and

[REDACTED]

therefore any information is likely to have been of interest. My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to a) their activities, and b) vetting.

30(ii) d. UCPI000010971 – this report has an RF [REDACTED] number so this was a person of interest to Special Branch [REDACTED] 30(ii) I can only guess that the fact the person has children may be relevant to identification.

e. UCPI0000010996 – the subject of this report has a Special Branch reference number, and was therefore a person of interest to Special Branch. Regrettably, in the late 1970s, a person's sexual orientation was a relevant consideration for vetting purposes as homosexuality was thought to carry a heightened risk of blackmail threats. The fact that the person was a member of the Anarchy Collective is the most relevant aspect of this report.

f. UCPI0000011086 – the subject of this report has a Special Branch 30(iii) reference number [REDACTED] therefore was a 30(iii) person of interest to Special Branch [REDACTED]. I do not know why, specifically, the information on the person of interest's child was included. I cannot see the reason for including the information on the child – it would be sufficient to say, in my view, that the man was married with a child.

[REDACTED]

g. UCPI0000011874 – this is a report on a teenager who has a Special Branch reference number, therefore she was a person of interest to Special Branch. The fact that the individual was young was probably not considered to be as relevant as her interest or involvement in the organisation. My recollection is that people who started in the organisations when they were young tended to stay in the groups, and that some groups used young people for their own ends. I cannot recall this individual.

h. UCPI0000011924 – this is a report which appears to be updating the file of an individual known to Special Branch [REDACTED]. The 30(iv) fact that a person has left a relevant organisation would, I suspect, have been of relevance to the Special Branch 30(iv) [REDACTED] files.

i. UCPI0000011275 – the individual photographed has a Special Branch number, therefore was a person known to Special Branch. The individual, in spite of their relative youth, is noted as being a member of the Socialist Workers Party, and School Kids Against the Nazis. I can speculate that the photo would have been purely to assist identification should it be required.

j. UCPI0000011389 – this report provides an update on banking information on seven people known to Special Branch. [REDACTED] 30(v) [REDACTED] I am unable to speculate as to why this information may have been of interest, save that it was



[REDACTED]

likely updating the files held on all of them. Special Branch and the Security Service would be better placed to comment on why this information was relevant for these individuals, as I have not seen a report with banking details before. I can understand why banking details would be reported as they may be relevant to the funding of activist activities.

### **Reporting for Public Order Purposes**

128. In normal circumstances, reporting for public order purposes was communicated in writing. If it was urgent, the information would have been reported by telephone, and may have been followed up with a written memo.

### **Contribution to policing and counter-subversion**

129. In terms of what the SDS achieved for the benefit of policing, I can say that it obtained all of the requests for intelligence on public order and national security that were requested of it when I was involved. There were never any complaints or suggestions that we were running short on the information that the police and Security Service asked of us. I would not have known what everything we were asked to get was later directed to, so it is hard for me to quantify the benefit. It was very much a case that the SDS did what we were asked to do, and didn't question it. If the SDS was given a target, the order was not queried. It was actioned. Personally, I felt that the SDS achieved the goals that we had been set for the benefit of policing and I certainly thought we were doing the right thing at the right time. To my mind, this resulted in the authorities having full knowledge of upcoming or planned serious disturbances and

[REDACTED]

violence, ignorance of which would have been against the common good. Such incidents, if not properly policed, could have led to more serious conflict or disorder.

130. I believe that the SDS also achieved the goals that we had been set for the benefit of the Security Service (even though I had limited interaction with Security Service) for the same reasons as set out above.

### **Overtime Payments**

131. I am told that a number of former SDS officers have told the Inquiry that their pay was augmented by overtime. I respond to the specific questions I have been asked as follows:

- a. Like all police officers, UCOs were paid overtime. I would sign overtime cards on occasion, having checked the UCOs' diaries.
- b. The UCOs were paid for the work they did. It would have been a component of their pay, but I do not recall it being a significant component.
- c. I thought that the overtime may have caused people to want to remain. However, what the UCO wanted was unlikely to have an impact on their deployment. It would not be up to the officer to decide if they

[REDACTED]

were to remain deployed for longer than 3-4 years, which was the standard period of deployment.

132. I did not get the impression, in relation to any UCO, that the amount of overtime on offer influenced them to paint an overly optimistic picture of what they were achieving whilst deployed. Had they provided exaggerated or inaccurate information, this could have become apparent and I do not believe any of them would have done so.

133. I did not get the impression, in relation to any UCO, that the amount of overtime on offer influenced them to stay in the unit when doing so was not in the officer's best interests from a welfare point of view.

#### **Formal Policies and Procedures**

134. I am not aware of there being any formal SDS policies or procedures, bar the Police Regulations, whilst I was part of the unit.

#### **The Security Service**

135. I have been asked about the contact I would have had with the Security Service in my role as a Detective Sergeant in the SDS. I don't recall having any contact, save for my name potentially being on intelligence reports which were sent to 'Box 500'. I do not recall any liaison with the Security Service as part of my SDS duties, and I think I would have remembered this if it had happened.





- a. I am asked about MPS-0735795. I believe that I was the Detective Sergeant R Walker included on the invitation. I remember the party being somewhat awkward as the Security Service had obviously typecast the group of Special Branch officers as being beer-drinking policemen, so I felt we had been stereotyped.
- b. I was still part of the SDS as the invitation was for an event prior to 17 April 1978.
- c. I would have thought that Special Branch as a whole entity had helped the Security Service a good deal through the provision of information. It would appear that the Security Service were pleased with the "splendid help" (MPS-0735795-2).
- d. The Security Service were not involved in SDS tasking to my knowledge. This may have happened, but I would not have been aware of what it was as I was insufficiently senior.
- e. I do not believe that the relationship between the Security Service and the SDS was close. By contrast, the relationship between the Security Service and Special Branch was close.

[REDACTED]

f. I am asked what the SDS did for the Security Service. To my knowledge, the SDS provided information on groups and persons of interest to the Security Service.

g. I cannot personally recall the Security Service doing anything in particular for the SDS.

### **Leaving the SDS**

136. I left the SDS when I felt that my time was up, and I was ready for other things. I thought I would be there for 3-4 years when I started, and I left to move on after that.

### **Post SDS police career**

137. I have been asked to summarise my police career after leaving the SDS, which I have already provided at paragraph 6 above.

138. I have no idea why I was selected for a particular area in Special Branch. I would imagine I was due for a permanent protection posting, as I had not been in one yet, and so that was why I was moved there.

139. I do not believe that my time at the SDS had a direct influence on subsequent Special Branch postings. However, the SDS was regarded as a difficult and complex posting, so it may have demonstrated that I was able to deal with other officers on a personal basis, and was able to prepare for

[REDACTED]

unexpected events. These skills are likely to have been relevant to my future positions.

140. I am asked about the extent to which I, or those who I managed, sought, received, used or disseminated intelligence emanating from the SDS in my subsequent Special Branch postings. Operationally I was primarily in Irish terrorism after I left the SDS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] I do not believe I had much – if any – contact with information emanating from the SDS. It follows that I do not think that I actively sought received, used or disseminated intelligence emanating from the SDS; it is of course possible that I may have happened upon SDS intelligence without realising it.

141. I have not seen the note, so do not know the context in which I am being asked about my recommending Martin Gray for the SDS. I cannot remember what it was about Martin, but I knew him and thought that he would do a good job in the back office unit. As a matter of correction, the note the Inquiry refer to is wrong; I was not a Detective Superintendent in 1981, I became a Superintendent in 1987.

142. I am asked about a 1981 Annual Report on Detective Sergeant Keith Edmondson who the Inquiry say was dealing with a special aspect of Irish extremism (MPS-0722381-111). At that time, I was a Detective Inspector engaged in work around PIRA. DS Edmondson would have been one of the officers in my section at the time. I suspect that I would have signed off his



[REDACTED]

report, as his supervising officer, but I do not see any link between this and information arising from any previous role as part of the SDS. Detective Chief Superintendent Wilson's notes suggest that Keith had never actually been deployed, seemingly for personal welfare reasons. [REDACTED]

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143. I have seen the application by Detective Inspector Edmondson to attend a course in 1986. I was a Superintendent in charge of Irish Squad Operations then, so would have expected to be signing things like that off for Detective Inspectors within my unit. I see from the form that he was still part of "Special Branch (Irish Matters)" so would have been one of my officers. Special Branch was relatively small, and you may have continued to work with people who you had worked with in other areas.

#### **Any other matters**

144. There is no other evidence which I am able to give from my knowledge and experience which would be of relevance to the work of the Inquiry.

#### **Request for documents**

145. I have no documents or other information potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

146. I am asked whether my memory has been refreshed by any document which is not in my witness bundle but which has been shown to me for the

[REDACTED]

purposes of the Inquiry (e.g. by the risk assessor). My memory has not been refreshed by any document shown to me which is not in my witness pack. I have, however, refreshed my memory of my dates of service from a CV post-dating my retirement from the MPS. I also used a publicly available 1978 calendar to assist with days of the week.

**Diversity information**

147. I am male.

148. My racial origin is 'White British'.

I believe the contents of this statement to be true.

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Signed: ..... **R Walker** .....

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Dated: ..... **5.1.21** .....