

COVER SHEET

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Date signed: 03 December 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

I, Angus McIntosh, c/o Designated Lawyers, PO Box 73779, London WC1A 9NL, WILL
SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 20 August 2020. It provides my full recollection of my time within the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
2. I am known in this Public Inquiry by the nominal HN244. When I was part of the SDS, my rank was Detective Inspector, and when I retired from the MPS in 1998 it was Commander. I retired having been the National Co-ordinator of Ports for 11 years.

Personal details

3. My full name is Angus Bryan McIntosh, and my date of birth is ¹[REDACTED] 1940.

Police career before and after serving with the Special Demonstration Squad

4. I joined the Metropolitan Police as a cadet in 1957. I was not able to be a uniformed officer until I was 19 years old (due to age restrictions in place at the time). When I was 19 I became a Police Constable, I went to the West End Central police station, and was in uniform from 1959 to 1964.
5. In 1964, I became a Detective Constable, initially posted to C Squad. This was my first Special Branch posting. Between 1964 and 1976, I held various roles in special Branch – these included A Squad (Ports), E Squad (Middle East) and D Squad (Naturalisation Enquiries, including a period of time in Anguilla). I was promoted to Detective Sergeant in 1969, and Detective Inspector in early 1976 before I served with the Special Demonstration Squad ('SDS'). I was part of the SDS from 1976 to 1979.
6. I left the SDS in the autumn of 1979, and moved to B Squad (Irish Republican Terrorism). I was promoted to Detective Chief Inspector at this time.
7. My career in the police followed an unconventional trajectory as I did not remain in conventional Special Branch roles. Following my time in B Squad I went to the Anti-Terrorist branch, and then returned to Special Branch where I remained until I was a Detective Chief Superintendent. After that, I worked primarily in Ports. I can therefore assist the Inquiry with the roles of a SDS officer to Detective Inspector level, and Special Branch officers to Detective Chief Inspector level. I have personal knowledge of the ranks of Superintendent and Commander, but not

[REDACTED]

in a context which allows me to comment meaningfully on how these roles would have been carried out in relation to the SDS.

8. I was awarded the Queen's Policing Medal when I was National Coordinator of Ports Policing, shortly before I left the police force.

9. I first heard about the SDS during my time in Special Branch, but I was not fully aware of it before my own posting. I was not aware of the SDS at its inception, but cannot be precise as to exactly when I became aware of it. I knew that there was a discreet or secret squad as some of my colleagues disappeared from their regular duties. There were occasions where I saw former colleagues socially, and they had long hair and were less formally dressed; this was probably the first I was aware of the existence of the unit, but I was not given details of why they looked and dressed the way they did.

10. Mike Ferguson was one of these people, and what knowledge I had of SDS before I joined was probably from him. He visited my flat in [REDACTED]^[2] in his undercover appearance and clothing before I was part of the SDS. He wanted to be in a safe place, and took refuge in my flat. I do not know what it was that he was seeking refuge from, but he wanted to be off the street. My wife did not recognise him initially, but I recognised his voice.^[3] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I did not know for sure that the squad existed at that stage, or what it was called.

- [REDACTED]
11. At that time, the 'need to know' policies in Special Branch were respected. If I was not aware of something, it was because I did not need to know about it, and therefore I did not ask about it.
 12. I had not done any undercover work before joining the SDS, but we were Special Branch officers and therefore some of our activity was covert.
 13. One of the main aims of Special Branch was to find out information discreetly, so Special Branch officers would attend meetings and demonstrations in plain clothes without revealing their identity. This would, for example, mean that people would attend meetings pretending to be interested in the cause, but without giving any information away as to who they were. I attended events in this capacity prior to being a part of the SDS. It was commonplace within Special Branch to do this.

Selection for the Special Demonstration Squad

14. I was posted to the SDS in April 1976. I did not apply for the position, I was simply told that was where I was being deployed.
15. I had not formally heard about the SDS, nor did I have much informal knowledge of the SDS by early 1976. At the time of my posting I knew almost nothing about the SDS, save for the matters set out at paragraph 9 above, and the interaction with Mike Ferguson – arising from my friendship with him – set out at paragraph 10 above.

[REDACTED]

16. Special Branch was a career-long posting in those days, so the Branch was like an extended family. We knew most people that we worked with.

17. I joined the SDS because I was told to. In those days, we were not offered jobs, they were allocated to us. The Inquiry would need to ask senior management why I was selected for the role – I do not know why I was selected.

My role

18. I was recruited to the SDS as a Detective Inspector. Please refer to the sections below under the sub-heading 'Duties' for a fuller description of what this entailed.

19. I remained in this post throughout my time with the SDS. As noted above, I was promoted in my subsequent role after leaving the SDS.

Dates of service

20. I have been asked about my dates of service in the SDS. I joined the SDS in April 1976, and left sometime around the Autumn of 1979. I note that UCPI0000028810, dated 04 October 1979, mentions a "farewell to DI Angus MacIntosh (sic)". I did not serve in the SDS as late as 1981, contrary to the suggestion made in the Rule 9 request.

21. As a Detective Inspector, I was required to undertake training at Bramshill. In the time I was part of the SDS, I was away for two periods of time. The first period I

[REDACTED]

was at Bramshill was from 21 February 1977 to 18 March 1977, and the second was from 22 June 1977 to 23 September 1977.

Training and guidance in the Special Demonstration Squad

22. There was no special course or training when I joined. I had been a Detective Sergeant in Special Branch, and assume that my superiors thought I had the necessary skills for the role.
23. In those days, you were normally taught by someone 'on the job' when you went to a new role. The Detective Chief Inspector at the time would have been my mentor, but I do not remember working with Geoff Craft. I remember that most of the time I was there Mike Ferguson was the Detective Chief Inspector.
24. Mike Ferguson trained me informally when I joined. There was no manual, or training programme – such training as there was took place on an *ad hoc* basis, as issues arose. I received informal guidance from Mike Ferguson on the whole operation of SDS as it then was – from the administration duties, to how cover identities were created to the methods of introducing new officers, and meetings with undercover officers ('UCOs').
25. Experience was the most important training. It was all new for me, and the methodology was not something that there was a set course on. In my time there was no training section at Special Branch dealing with this type of work.

- [REDACTED]
26. My Special Branch training was helpful, but it was not tailored to the SDS. We had up to 12 people in the field at any one time in the SDS, they would have different needs and sensitivities – including different domestic commitments. Special Branch training does not help with that, as my role in SDS involved careful people management.
27. I learned how to perform my role mostly through the application of common sense at the time. My primary concern day to day was the morale and safety of the individual officers – that covers a massive field of factors, and all of these needed to be considered. It was a balancing exercise that I conducted instinctively based on their circumstances, and the changing circumstances of their deployment. My Special Branch experience helped me only insofar as I had knowledge of the organisations the UCOs would be dealing with, the reporting structure of the Metropolitan Police, and of the likely pitfalls UCOs may face.
28. I was not trained with anyone else as there was no formal training, and the SDS was a very small unit.
29. There was no training manual or material. No one knew anything about the job other than the people who were in, or had been in, the SDS.
30. As there was no formal training, there was no repetition of training at any time in my deployment with the SDS.

[REDACTED]

31. I have been asked about race equality training prior to or during my time at the SDS. I did not receive any training on race equality at any time prior to or during my deployment with the SDS.

32. I have been asked about sex equality training prior to or during my time at the SDS. I did not receive any training on sex equality at any time prior to or during my deployment with the SDS.

Duties

33. My primary duty as Detective Inspector was the day to day running and welfare of the UCOs. I did that in conjunction with my Detective Chief Inspector. That would include the formalities of policing – keeping diaries, checking diaries, monitoring overtime, training in relation to their police duties (such as tutoring for their promotion exams, which I introduced to the SDS) – as well as maintaining contact with the officers. Welfare was my primary concern given the difficult position a UCO is in. I would receive requests for intelligence from my superior officer in the SDS, and occasionally directly from other desks within Special Branch, or from other police units such as A8 who were the uniformed public order squad, which would then be passed to the UCOs. I would receive information from the UCOs, which would then either be processed formally by back office staff, or reported informally on the telephone to the person who had requested the information.

[REDACTED]

34. I was involved in the recruitment of officers. Because Special Branch was like a family, it was easy to find out about individuals. People would be recommended or suggested as possible recruits for the SDS, and then when a vacancy came up we would consider the people who had been recommended. There was no vacancy or formal application process when I was at the SDS. You would want stable, reliable people – especially those who were amateur dramatics enthusiasts as effectively we were asking the officers to be actors. Essentially, we were looking for someone mentally relaxed and dependable, but able to be convincing in their role. Nominations would often come through the Detective Sergeants in the back office (Dick Scully and Dick Walker), as they were contemporaries of officers at the ranks we would be looking to recruit.

35. I would be involved with the Detective Chief Inspector in speaking to the people who knew the nominees. We would talk to people who were aware of what the SDS was doing – this meant that we spoke to Superintendents, Detective Chief Inspectors or Detective Inspectors within Special Branch as to a nominee's suitability for the role. In terms of a more general character assessment, you could go to any senior officer and ask "what is 'x' like?".

36. I would always speak to the officer's partner when recruiting. I would do this to find out how acceptable a new way of life would be in respect of their domestic life. We also wanted to gain the trust of the potential UCO's wife or girlfriend. A major factor in recruitment whilst I was at the SDS was the potential UCO's marital status. I think that Mike Ferguson and I only recruited one man who wasn't married. We wanted married men as they had domestic stability, which would

[REDACTED]

provide a constant in their life. Being married was also likely to reduce the temptation of any sexual liaison whilst undercover, of the type I have been asked about in relation to [REDACTED] ⁴ HN21 [REDACTED] (paragraph 132), Richard Clarke (paragraph 143), and generally (paragraph 158). At the time I was unaware of any issues of infidelity with these, or any other, officers. My aim was to protect the officer whilst they were leading two separate lives in two separate spheres. The personal tension a double life was likely to create is why I was concerned about their welfare. To my understanding, it would have been contrary to police regulations to have a sexual liaison with any individual whilst on duty. My belief was that if the individual UCO was anchored in two points – the police force, and at home – they had the best chance of a normal life when they got home, were off duty, or completed their service as a UCO. I also wanted the wives of UCOs to know they had someone to contact if there was an issue with their husband's behaviour which may have been connected with their work.

37. I did do some training of UCOs, in so far as there was any training. There were two aspects to such training as there was; first learning by osmosis, and secondly assisting with practicalities. New UCOs came in to the office, where all officers of all ranks sat together. The new recruit would join the office, and part of his job was to build his new identity. I had an advisory role in that process, and I would tell them they had to get a new name, and new date of birth, for their role. I understood from Mike Ferguson that this process nearly always involved undertaking a search of the register of births and deaths for potential names. The officer would also need to obtain a new occupation for their new identity – ⁵ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Describes the use of cover employment [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I cannot recall who would do this, but I have no specific recollection of doing this myself.

38. I had no role in training or recruiting SDS back office staff. I have no recollection of the back office staff changing during the time I was at the SDS.

39. I did not make decisions on targeting or tasking. As I understand it, decisions as to targeting and tasking were taken by other police departments and government departments. I relayed the instructions on tasking to the UCOs. In my time at the SDS, I would not receive direct tasking from the Security Service, or the Home Office but I would sometimes receive tasking from other Special Branch officers, or from A8. Tasking from external agencies, such as the Security Service or the Home Office, would have come through senior Special Branch officers rather than directly to me. I say this as 1) I did not receive direct tasking, but 2) I was aware that the Security Service was using the SDS to gather information – it follows that the communication must have been through officers of a higher ranking than mine. This would be consistent with the structure of Special Branch (see paragraph 40 below) and my understanding of hierarchical communications from my later career (outside the SDS).

40. It is important for the Inquiry to understand that when I was a serving officer, the Special Branch rank structure was very top heavy. The consequence of this inverted pyramid structure was that a lot of work at Detective Inspector and Detective Chief Inspector level was done without real knowledge of 'why'. Officers

[REDACTED]

of my rank followed directions as that is the way the organisation worked; the police force in the 1970s was formal, hierarchical and slow to accept change.

41. A lot of Special Branch work was connected with the Security Service, but junior ranks were not allowed to mix with the Security Service business. In this context, junior ranks would generally include anyone lower than a Superintendent. It would be highly unusual for anyone lower than a Detective Inspector to have any contact with the Security Service, and even in that capacity it would only be accompanying a more senior officer. For this reason, I can say with confidence that between 1976 and 1979, the Security Service would have liaised with the SDS at a higher level. It follows that because I was not sufficiently senior I cannot provide any detail as to who at the Security Service was in charge of tasking or requesting intelligence.

42. I did not have a role in inventing, developing or assessing undercover identities. I am not aware of these being assessed when I was in the SDS. The officers were instructed to devise their identity. When I was with the SDS, I was lucky to have Mike Ferguson as my supervising officer as he had been in the field. He would take the lead on providing instruction on tactics and the practicalities of being undercover, and I would deal with more logistical matters (such as location and maintenance of the safe houses) and welfare. I was with him most of the time, so I was privy to what he was telling the officers to do, and how to do it – my recollection is that this included things like trusting their instincts, and navigating likely obstacles, as well as searching records of births and deaths for potential identities. The expertise was his and the experience was his, therefore he

[REDACTED]

provided the direction on matters when they arose. I am therefore aware that UCOs were trained whilst on the job, but I was not a part of the training process in this respect.

43. I do not recall having a role in obtaining the cover documents for UCOs. I knew that these things were obtained – for example, the UCOs needed driving licences in their cover names because they had cars in their undercover identities. [REDACTED]

6

Speculates as to the acquisition of identity documents

44. I had an administrative role in relation to vehicles used by UCOs. A UCO might come to me and say they wanted a certain type of car. I would look at it and give advice as to the budget available, and advice on the suitability of the vehicle, but I would not be involved in the hiring or purchasing process. The hiring or purchasing process was dealt with by T6. T6 was a Metropolitan Police unit which dealt with transport. When a UCO identified a vehicle they wanted to use, I advised whether that type of car was or was not consistent with the organisation they would be reporting on.

45. I did not have a role in the deployment of UCOs, other than to see whether or not the requirements of the SDS's clients had been met. Put simply, I would ask the UCO's if they were able to report on the information requested rather than assessing the utility of the information they reported.

[REDACTED]

46. There were weekly meetings with UCOs when deployed, and I would also arrange to meet the UCOs individually. There was no strict time pattern for individual meetings, but I made sure that the UCOs I dealt with knew that we were available to meet them any time – either myself, or Mike Ferguson, or both of us. There were three reasons to meet: 1) they had a practical problem; 2) their welfare; 3) an update on activity. By ‘problem’, there would sometimes be a concern that the group were suspicious of the individual. If that was reported, and I felt there was a security problem or a risk, we would take steps to provide additional safeguarding for the UCO, or help them devise a strategy to assist them or to accommodate. It was possible for us to use ⁸ [REDACTED] protective measures [REDACTED] to afford additional oversight for UCOs attending meetings if they were at risk. I do not have specific or detailed recollections as to when this happened, or who the officer was, but I believe that this did happen on at least one occasion.

47. As I have noted earlier in this statement, the welfare of officers was my primary concern. I had a very active role in this during my time in the SDS. I wanted to make sure that the officers retained a connection to the police, and to their partner – and equally wanted the officer’s partner to have the opportunity to refer concerns to us. I do not recall an instance when I was at the SDS where a UCO’s partner reported concerns to me.

48. In relation to what the Inquiry calls “exfiltration”, the prime consideration I had was for UCOs to do this with the least possible risk of exposure. I do not remember one causing any trouble at all. I think only 3 or 4 officers would have “exfiltrated”

[REDACTED]

in my time at the SDS. It is most likely that they would have "exfiltrated" without needing to lean on me for support, given that I do not remember needing to assist.

49. Dick Scully would write up the reports of information provided during meetings with the UCOs. Information was passed to Dick Scully by me if it came from a meeting with a UCO – he would then draft the information. Information reports, compiled by Dick Scully, would go to Special Branch and often to MI5. However, information could be shared internally by more informal means. If intelligence gathered from a UCO concerned an imminent event or demonstration it could be, and frequently was, passed on by telephone; I would sometimes do that, and Dick Scully would also sometimes do that. If the intelligence related to a Special Branch operation, I would have a telephone conversation with the Superintendent who would then be in a position to deploy staff accordingly. Those instances would only be for internal Special Branch requests for assistance.

50. I have been asked about my role in the assessment and approval of SDS intelligence reports. I understand this to be asking about my role in signing off documentation (approval) and undertaking a qualitative evaluation of the contents of a report (assessment). Dick Scully would prepare the intelligence reports, and I would not assess them but I would sign them off. Assessment was not part of my role. The assessment of the reports would come from the recipients, who are the people who asked for the information in the first place. I was not in a position to assess the intelligence as intelligence was not gathered for the SDS, it was obtained for other police or security departments. I was not, and could not have been, in a position to assess the quality of the information obtained.

[REDACTED]

51. I have no recollection of having a role in the onward dissemination of intelligence reports. I am unable to say which individual or individuals may have facilitated this as I cannot recall who it would have been. I am aware that reports would have been filed within the general Special Branch registry, and some of the reports would also have been sent to the Security Service ("Box 500").

52. When specific requests for intelligence were made by police, or other government bodies (such as the Security Service), I would have a limited role in responding. The requests would come through the internal channels, or via senior officers, to the SDS and we would act accordingly. By internal channels I mean a senior SDS officer, or in exceptional circumstances to me. I think that most requests which I received directly were from an officer of my rank or higher in A8, and these would have been communicated by phone or in person. I do not know what seniority of officer would receive the Security Service requests, but for the reasons at paragraphs 40-41 above, I believe that it would have been at least a Superintendent.

53. The SDS would receive requests for what we already had, and requests for information relating to demonstrations which were coming up. My recollection is that if there were requests for information already held, the response would generally be "if we've not already given it to you we don't have it", but we would say we would see what we could get for the requesting person. If it was for a future event, the relevant UCO or UCOs would be tasked pursuant to the request. I, or Mike Ferguson, would communicate requests to specific officers.

[REDACTED]

54. There wasn't a great deal of additional paperwork beyond what I have already detailed in this statement. There were staff assessments – which I had some involvement in – and I may have been spoken to around the time of the budget. I would make sure that police diaries were kept. If I travelled to be present at an event, such as the one at Blackburn detailed in MPS-0730728-1 and MPS - 0730729-1 for example, I would provide a report. In general terms, there was limited administrative paperwork as the reporting lines were so short given the size of the team.

55. Officers were in receipt of a police salary, and the additional expenditure required by the SDS was funded by the Home Office. I note that there are letters from the Assistant Commissioner to the Deputy Under-Secretary-of-State at e.g. MPS0728980-12 and MPS-0728964-2 in respect of funding. My understanding was that the Home Office funded the unit as it provided a nationwide policing function. I do not recall having seen these letters at any stage prior to being provided with the papers by the Inquiry.

56. UCOs did make applications for, and receive, overtime payments. The UCOs had overtime cards, and I monitored their recorded overtime. Authorisation for payment of overtime was signed off within the SDS, but then went to another department for assessment and payment. I don't have a clear recollection of the exact mechanics of this, but I know that the SDS did not pay it from its own budget.

[REDACTED]

57. I had a role in the procurement and management of safe houses. On some occasions I would carry out the maintenance on the safe houses – such as carrying out electrical works, or fitting a loo. When I was at the SDS, we would run two safe houses at the same time. The rationale for having two was so that they would not draw too much attention to their use – having two meant that there were fewer visits to each. One of the Sergeants in the office would source the safe houses. I believe it was Dick Walker whilst I was there. None of these were laid out as specific duties for me, or more junior officers, but they were part of the job. There was a limited budget for the SDS, which was another reason why I carried out maintenance. If an external individual had to come in, there would have needed to have been some explanation about the premises, or the “need to know” circle would have needed to be widened to accommodate “safe” plumbers and electricians. It therefore made sense for me to do this work rather than risk the safety of the operation.

58. Each UCO had a bed-sitting room, studio or flat that they procured for use in their undercover identity. I did not have a role in the procurement of individual UCO accommodation. One of the Sergeants may have been involved, but I am not sure about this.

59. Liaison within Special Branch was fairly routine. I recall that there were regular conversations with S squad (I would categorise these as ‘daily chats’ rather than anything more formal), and I have referred to A8 earlier in this statement. I have no clear recollection of official liaison with senior officers – if it was official it would have been Chief Superintendent to Chief Superintendent. I would note that this

[REDACTED]

doesn't mean that there were no informal conversations, but I have no specific recollection of them and would likely not have been involved in them given my rank at the relevant time. During my time at the SDS, I remember there were two occasions the Commissioner came to a safe house to meet the UCOs. I can recall Commissioner Robert Mark came to a safe house, and Commissioner David McNee also came out on a visit. I do not recall the precise date of these visits. I think there may have been another occasion where a high ranking officer (perhaps the Assistant Commissioner) came out, but at this distance of time I cannot recall who and when this was.

60. I understood that there was some liaison with the Security Service, but not much by me. I do not recall having been present at meetings beyond those recorded at UCPI000029027-1 and UCPI000028810-1, and without a note would be unable to recollect the specifics of any further meetings (if there were any) save for one unrelated meeting which involved the protection of a high profile individual. Liaison with the Security Service would generally have been by more senior Special Branch personnel for reasons set out at paragraphs 40-41 above. The note at UCPI0000029027 suggests August 1979 was the first year that "regular meetings at approximately monthly intervals" at the SDS level had been contemplated – this accords with my recollection that at the time I was serving there were few meetings. Other than the unrelated meeting, I cannot recollect meetings other than those for which minutes exist.

61. Whilst I met officials at the Home Office during my career at Special Branch, I was not part of any official liaison between that body and the SDS. The SDS budgets

[REDACTED]

were prepared for submission to the Home Office and then approved by them. My understanding at the time was that the payments for the SDS, above the salaries of individual officers, came from a centralised fund as the service provided by the SDS was of national benefit, rather than exclusively for the MPS's benefit.

62. I don't recall any meeting with any other government body, and it is very unlikely that such a meeting would have happened. If it had, I would be likely to recall it as, to my understanding, knowledge of the SDS was tightly guarded.

Premises and meetings with other Special Demonstration Squad undercover officers.

63. At this distance of time, I cannot be exact on the locations of safe houses. One of the safe houses was in west London. There was one ⁹ [REDACTED] in South London [REDACTED]. There was a third one but I cannot now remember where that was.

64. When I was part of the SDS, the office was in Scotland Yard, in the tower block. I think we were based on the 18th floor. The SDS moved to Vincent Square after I left.

SDS Management Structure

65. I served with the following officers, who were in management positions, whilst I was part of the SDS:

- a. Chief Superintendent Derek Kneale;
- b. Superintendent Ken Pryde; and

[REDACTED]

c. Detective Chief Inspector Mike Ferguson.

66. I cannot be certain whether I served with DCI Geoff Craft. DCI Trevor Butler took over my role when I left (see UCPI0000028810). Les Willingale may have been in the office as a DS in my time, but not as a DI. DI ¹⁰ [REDACTED] HN68 [REDACTED] was a former SDS officer, but he was not in the office at the time I was there.

67. My first annual performance review was done by Chief Superintendent Harry Nicholls. I have no recollection of any other managers. I do not know if a written report exists of this review, and I have not been show one for the purposes of making this statement.

The chain of command

68. The chain of command within Special Branch, but above the SDS, was: Superintendent; Chief Superintendent; Commander Special Branch; Deputy Assistant Commissioner; Assistant Commissioner; Deputy Commissioner; Commissioner.

69. I have been asked a number of questions about individuals within the chain of command.

70. The Commissioners in my chain of command whilst I served in the SDS were Sir Robert Mark and then Sir David McNee.

[REDACTED]

71. I recall Sir Colin Woods, but not whilst he was at the SDS. I knew him, but I am not sure if he was a Deputy Commissioner at that time. He was an Inspector when I was at West End Central. I do not recall Patrick Kavanagh CBE QPM being in my chain of command whilst I was at the SDS.

72. I recall John Wilson being Assistant Chief Commissioner at the time I served in the SDS, and I have seen the letter to Robert Armstrong dated 06 April 1976 is signed 'J.S. Wilson Assistant Commissioner (Crime)' (MPS-0728980-12) within my Rule 9 witness pack. I think I recall Gilbert Kelland CBE QPM being Assistant Commissioner at the time I was at the SDS.

73. I believe the Deputy Assistant Commissioners at my time would have been either Colin Hewett or R P Bryan. I think it was Colin Hewett – but this is 40 years ago, so I cannot be clear.

74. I believe that the Commanders of Special Branch in my chain of command whilst I served at the SDS were Rollo Watts, John Wilson, Phil Saunders and David Bicknell. I cannot say in which order, or whether there was any overlap given the length of time which has now passed.

75. I believe the Chief Superintendents in my chain of command whilst in the SDS were Derek Kneale and Harry Nicholls. I knew Ray Wilson and Geoff Craft – but I do not think they were my Chief Superintendents at the time I was at the SDS.

[REDACTED]

76. Ken Pryde was the Superintendent I recall being in my chain of command whilst I was in the SDS. I cannot recall others.


Undercover officers

77. I have been provided with a list of surnames, cover surnames, and Inquiry ciphers of former SDS officers, and asked whether I served with any of the officers mentioned.

78. I served in the SDS at the same time as:

11

HN13, HN20, HN80, Roger Pearce,
HN96, HN106, HN126, HN155, HN200,
HN296, Richard Clark, HN300, HN304,
HN354, HN356/124, HN353 and others



79. I do not believe I served with any of the other officers whose names appear on the list I refer to at paragraph 77 above. These officers are:

12

HN65 and HN298

80. I do not recall if I served with any other UCOs. It seems unlikely given the size of the team, the period I was there, and the low turnover of individuals within the team.

SDS – Role and Annual Reports

81. The role of the SDS, when I was there, was to supply information to the agency or agencies who had asked for information or assistance. As far as I was aware, given my relatively junior role, this included A8 and the Security Service, although it is certainly possible that other parts of Special Branch asked the SDS for intelligence.


[REDACTED]

82. The SDS Annual Reports were written as part of the Special Branch/MPS reporting. I believe it was an internal force requirement. I was not instrumental in asking for or drafting the report, so I cannot say for whom it was written.

83. The SDS Annual Report was also submitted as the basis for asking for the Home Office funding for the continued existence of the SDS. The SDS would not have operated without the funding from the Home Office. I note that the letters to the Home Office are sent in March, which I believe is consistent with civil service annual accounting dates.

84. I would have supplied information that I was asked to by the Detective Chief Inspector for the compilation of the Annual Reports, but I cannot recall specifics. I certainly did not write them, nor did I sign them off. An example of the information I supplied is at MPS-0728964-18, which is the information on the SDS Transport in January 1979. This was my last involvement in the Annual Reports as I left the SDS later in 1979.

85. I think that the Annual Reports which I have seen within my Rule 9 witness pack, and which I have been asked about, are honest. In my opinion the field officers did incredible work, and their work carried risk to their personal security – the fruits of their labour are, to the best of my recollection, fairly reported.



86. The requests for the infiltration of particular groups came through Special Branch senior management. Requests from the Security Service etc would come through at a high level, and then be passed down the ranks to the SDS.

87. I do not know how targeting decisions were made as the targeting decisions were made for us.

88. I have been asked a number of questions about why certain groups were infiltrated, which I answer at 89-90 below. As I have said, decisions on these matters would have been made by individuals considerably more senior than me.

89. To the extent that I can assist, I believe that Pro-Irish groups were targeted as there was a big Irish population in London. It was known that terrorist organisations like PIRA would use relatives who had been resident in this country for years, and were not known to be involved in pro republican activities to provide safe-houses and information. At this distance of time, I cannot recall whether this is something I knew when I was at the SDS, or whether this is something that I know from my posting immediately following the SDS.

a. Troops Out was successfully infiltrated. Over the course of my service in the SDS, a number of individuals – I cannot remember precisely – were at one stage or another part of Pro-Irish organisations.

b. I cannot recall how the groups came to be infiltrated – the officer would have done this themselves, and I would not have had involvement in that.

- [REDACTED]
- c. If and when the deployments did contribute to policing crime, it would have been through the information supplied. Any intelligence on criminality would have been fed back to the tasking division via appropriate channels. I cannot remember, at this distance of time, what information about criminal activity would have been provided.
 - d. The deployments in these organisations contributed to policing public disorder. It enabled uniformed police to arrange suitable coverage of the various events. Particularly where there was a threat of violence or public disorder. In my time, the threat of violence between Left and Right wing was fairly common. I cannot remember, at this distance of time, exactly what information about public disorder would have been provided.
 - e. Only the Security Service could answer as to whether they were assisted by the deployments. I am aware that the Security Service received information, and as far as I knew it was useful as they continued to seek information. If it had not been useful, I would have thought they would have told us to cease providing them with information.
 - f. I do not know if the deployments contributed to the fulfilment of another policing purpose. As far as I was aware, the information was required as the request had come through senior management.
 - g. To target IRA/PIRA you would have needed to travel to Ireland. I believe that it was official policy from high level that we were not tasked to obtain intelligence through UCOs on these groups. I was not party to the decision making on this, but I imagine it would also have carried significant risk to UCOs. I believe that senior RUC personnel knew of

[REDACTED]

the SDS work, but I cannot be certain whether or not this was during my time.

90. Trotskyist groups, Maoist groups, Anarchist groups, Revolutionary Socialist groups, Anti-Fascist groups, Anti-Nuclear groups and the groups listed as "other groups" in the Annual Reports (MPS-0728980, MPS-0728981, MPS-0728964-4, and MPS-0728963-7) were targeted as there was a public order/national security issue arising in connection with those groups at the relevant time.

- a. Over the course of my service in the SDS, a number of individuals – I cannot remember precisely – were at one stage or another part of Trotskyist, Maoist, Anarchist, Revolutionary Socialist, Anti-Fascist, Anti-Nuclear groups and the groups listed as "other groups" in the Annual Reports.
- b. I cannot recall how the groups came to be infiltrated – the officer would have done this themselves, and I would not have had involvement in that.
- c. If and when the deployments did contribute to policing crime, it would have been through the information supplied. Any intelligence on criminality would have been fed back to the tasking division via appropriate channels. I cannot remember, at this distance of time, what information about criminal activity would have been provided.
- d. The deployments in these organisations contributed to policing public disorder. It enabled uniformed police to arrange suitable coverage of the various events. Particularly where there was a threat of violence or public disorder. In my time, the threat of violence between Left and Right

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wing was fairly common. I cannot remember, at this distance of time, what information about public disorder would have been provided.

- e. Only the Security Service could answer as to whether they were assisted by the deployments. I am aware that the Security Service received information, and as far as I knew it was useful as they continued to seek information. If it had not been useful, I would have thought they would have told us to cease providing them with information.
- f. I do not know if the deployments contributed to the fulfilment of another policing purpose. As far as I was aware, the information was required as the request had come through senior management.

91. The 1976 report may have been correct that the SDS were standing ready to infiltrate extreme right wing groups if needed. However, I joined in April 1976 which I think was after the report was drafted so I cannot speak as to the reasons why it was included. I would note that we always had in mind that we may need to infiltrate extreme right wing groups, but such action was never approved or ordered in my time.

92. I believe that one individual was coming out of a right wing organisation when I joined the SDS, but I cannot remember who it was. During my time there was no one in a right wing organisation. I believe this was a policy decision. My recollection is that this was a high level policy decision, and I certainly was too junior to be a part of this. By the time I left, the right wing was a concern in relation to counter-demonstrations.

[REDACTED]

93. I have been asked about paragraph 12 of the 1976 Annual Report (MPS-0728980-5) where "the normal tour of four years on the SDS" is referred to. Four years was an absolute maximum for a UCO to be on active duty. This period of time was identified because a longer period would be a burden on the individual's family life and career progression, and it was a period of time which would avoid the possibility of the officers going rogue. The simple reason for this was that if someone is out of the force for four years, the risk factor was considered to be much higher as they could lose their disciplined background. I do not recall there being a written policy, or rationale. This was my and Mike's policy when I was there. We didn't know what anyone else was doing, or had done, in relation to policies for this type of deployment.

94. On page 11 of the 1977 Annual Report (MPS-0728981-11), there is a detailed account of the industrial dispute at Grunwick, and 'The Battle of Lewisham'. I believe that the account in the report is an accurate account, but I cannot confirm that the numbers of arrests are correct given it was so long ago. During this time there was a lot of confrontation between Right and Left wing groups. At this distance of time, I cannot add to the account. However, because of the Left/Right violence I went to places like Blackburn and Leicester to watch over UCOs' safety during demonstrations. I am sure that there are contemporaneous press reports which could confirm the detail of the Grunwick and Lewisham incidents, or add more detail, if necessary.

95. I have been asked about paragraph 4 of the 1978 Annual Report (MPS-0728964-10) and MPS-0746716. In my experience, undercover work did not affect the

[REDACTED]

13
health of the UCOs I managed. People – like [REDACTED] HN304 – had periods where they lost their drive, and their work was less effective. 13 In [REDACTED] HN304's annual appraisal at MPS-0746716, which I part-completed, I am referring to a loss of drive where I say that there was a fall in his high standards. 13 HN304 was lacking enthusiasm for a reason which appears not to have been specified or identified at the time. I cannot recall any serious domestic grounds, but a lot of people did not discuss their domestic life. The report also notes there were no operational grounds. We gave 13 HN304 a further chance because although you do not want to run an officer who is not performing, you do not want to affect morale by withdrawing someone through lack of productivity. Assessing productivity as required in the assessment was difficult as productivity for a UCO depends on what there is at a particular time and place. Activists would build up for a moment, and after that took place there would be rejoice/lament before a period of quiet until the next move or event was organised. There would therefore logically be lulls in productivity. This is a factor which would also be taken into account when assessing productivity, and is what I am likely to have referred to as operational grounds. I note on the second page that DCS Kneale notes 13 HN304 had recently failed the promotion exam. It may have been the case that this was responsible for a lack of enthusiasm for his duties as reflected in the report. In my experience, police exams were not necessarily designed for academic people (which 13 HN304 was), and academic people were more likely to be adversely affected by exam failure after lengthy periods of study.

96. I have been asked about paragraph 9 of the 1979 Annual Report (MPS-0728963-10). Those who campaigned in relation to the death of Blair Peach were not reported on because they were seeking to discredit and criticise the police. They

[REDACTED]

were reported on because they were people who were or would have been identified by the UCOs as being activist on the public order scene. The police regularly come under criticism, and this would not have been a basis upon which reporting would be made.

97. I do not remember what public order problems arose in connection with the death of Blair Peach. When I saw the papers provided to me by the Inquiry for the purpose of making this statement, I am afraid that I did not recognise the name or recall the individual. I am therefore unable to assist with what public order issues arose, or how serious the issues were. At 40 years distance it is too long to recall these details or to try to do so with any accuracy.

98. I am asked about UCPI0000021047, which is a report which lists some of those who were present at Blair Peach's funeral. It was routine for UCOs to report the presence of anyone known to be on record at public events involving their group. Primarily this was to keep records updated concerning those persons' activities. I would not have known, and do not know, to what specific use the information would have been put. My understanding was that it was for the Security Service, and for vetting, and identification/tracing. I note from the report that some individuals had ^{13A} [REDACTED] an RF number, meaning that they were known to Special ^{13A} Branch [REDACTED]

The report has a 'Box 500' stamp, which means that it was sent to the Security Service. I would not have had the PF or RF numbers to hand, nor would the UCO who was reporting on the event. The numbers would have been added when the report was written up. I cannot recall exactly, but an individual needed to be

[REDACTED]

mentioned a certain number of times in reports to generate a Special Branch number. I do not know what the criteria would have been for a person to become a person of interest, and generate a PF number, for the Security Service.

99. I am asked about UCPI0000013539, which is a report with a photograph taken at Blair Peach's funeral. The report with the photo is dated November 1979 – I was not in the squad then, and therefore I cannot speak to the specifics. However, I can help with the generalities. I do not know who took the photograph, whether it was taken by a UCO or taken with the assistance of Special Branch's photographers. It was routine for UCOs to record the presence of anyone known to be on record at events. Primarily this was to keep records updated concerning those persons' activities. I would not have known, and do not know, to what specific use the information would have been put. I see from the information that it records a person known to Special Branch (she has a RF number) has resigned from an organisation. If the information was required for vetting, and identification/tracing, it may have been important for the Security Service to know what the person of interest looked like. My business was to get hold of information.

100. I am asked about Paragraph 16 of the 1981 Annual Report (MPS-0728985-9), which states that "intelligence gleaned by the SDS confirmed that the [Brixton Riots] were not instigated by known members of subversive organisations...". I was not a part of the SDS at the time of this report, and do not feel able to speculate on the conclusion drawn as I have no knowledge of the intelligence which led to the view expressed.

Senior Managers in the Chain of Command

101. As my career in the SDS was relatively brief, and my career after the SDS did not travel beyond the rank of Commander, I can only answer the questions I have been asked on this topic from general knowledge of how the chain of command worked in Special Branch – and with a degree of speculation.
102. The Superintendent and/or the Chief Superintendent would be in the SDS office daily to see me and/or the Detective Chief Inspector to discuss problems or progress. They were constantly in touch with us concerning the running of the unit. I cannot be more specific as to how they discharged their roles other than by attending the office, speaking to us, and occasionally attending weekly meetings in the safe flats with the UCOs. A Superintendent would be better placed to answer questions as to how the Superintendent or Chief Superintendent discharged their duties. My recollection is that they were always available should I need to seek advice. I cannot recall specific incidents when I needed to seek advice.
103. I presume that the Commanders liaised with the Chief Superintendent and/or the Superintendent. I cannot provide any more detail on what involvement the Commanders had with the SDS as it was several ranks above my level. I do not recall liaising with Commanders, and would not have expected to. With the rank structure being the way it was in Special Branch (as described in paragraphs 40-41), even as an Inspector I was considered a minnow.

[REDACTED]

104. I presume that the Commanders liaised with the Deputy Assistant Commissioners, the Deputy Assistant Commissioners liaised with the Assistant Commissioners, the Assistant Commissioners liaised with the Deputy Commissioners and the Deputy Commissioners liaised with the Commissioner. I cannot provide any more detail on what involvement the Deputy Assistant Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners or Commissioners had with the SDS as it was several ranks above my level. As stated above, I do not recall liaising with anyone senior to a Superintendent/Chief Superintendent, and would not have expected to given the rank structure in Special Branch at that time.

105. I can say that two Commissioners visited UCOs in one of the safe flats on two separate occasions. I remember this interaction with the Commissioners as it was an unusual interaction to have given my rank when I was part of the SDS.

106. If I had a full list of who was in which post, and when, it may be more straightforward to identify who had visited the office or the safe houses. But at over 40 years' distance, it is impossible to recall the finer details of my time in the SDS. Even with the lists of who was in which post, and when, it may still be impossible to identify who it was.

[REDACTED]

Questions about specific Undercover Officers

[14]
HN13 [REDACTED] "Desmond Barry Loader" (deceased)

[14]
107. It has been suggested to me that [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] served in the SDS between 1974 and 1978, and infiltrated groups associated with communist ideology.

108. I have been shown MPS-0730696, which shows there was some liaison with other police forces in relation to SDS activity. Any time there was a likelihood of public disorder, liaison was maintained with the force in the area 'hosting' the event. That liaison would have been through the ACC or a person of comparable rank. For larger forces which had their own large Special Branches, it may have been through the head of Special Branch.

109. When there was no question of a public order situation, and a UCO's travel outside of the Metropolitan Police District was merely for travel compatible with his group's behaviour (i.e. leafleting) the external force would not be notified that a SDS officer was travelling to their area. I do not have a specific recollection to give by way of example, but there would have been occasions. We would not tell the other force if we felt there was no risk to the officer and it was compatible with the UCO's duties. We did not want to advertise the existence of the SDS in general, so would not raise its presence unless it was necessary to do so.

110. I have been asked how common it was for SDS officers to be used in tandem with a photographer to identify persons of interest; that question is posed the wrong way around. The question should be how often did Special Branch

[REDACTED]

photographers cover meetings at which SDS officers were present. As a former Detective Inspector in the SDS, I do not know the answer to the question as to how often Special Branch photographers covered meetings. I do know that if the meeting was of interest to Special Branch, and Special Branch management directed it to be covered by the photographic section, this would be done. Put simply, it was not a decision taken by SDS, it was the decision of the people the SDS were supplying information to.

111. You would need to ask Special Branch and the Security Service how important the identification of persons of interest from photographs was to them. The SDS were the conduit for providing information we were asked to supply, and I never had any feedback as to the use the information was put to. Logically, if, for whatever reason, a person is to be picked up by the police or by the Security Services, they would need to make sure that they identified the right person. I can envisage circumstances where a photograph might be useful. However, I cannot answer for the Security Services or Special Branch more generally.

112. I have been asked about MPS-0730728 and MPS-0730729. Managers would travel to the same part of the country as an undercover officer working outside the Metropolitan Police District on occasion. Typically, this would only be where there were concerns over the safety of the UCO – this issue was especially acute in clashes between Right and Left wing groups.

15

113. I have seen three sets of documents which relate to an incident where HN13
[REDACTED] was arrested, charged and appeared as a defendant in a criminal court. I

[REDACTED]

have no independent recollection of these events, and was first aware of this when I was provided with the papers provided to me by the Inquiry. I was at Bramshill undergoing training between June 1977 and the end of September 1977, and during that time I would have had no active involvement in events at the SDS. The arrest which gave rise to the proceedings in the Barking Magistrates' Court was on 17 September 1977, which was before I returned from Bramshill. I had no involvement with this incident, and can see from MPS-0526784 that DCI Craft was the most junior officer involved. I can only assume that the matter had been escalated prior to my return. I was not involved in the 1978 arrest. I can say that I am certain I was not involved in either set of proceedings as I would have gone to sit in court had I been aware of the arrest. It may be that as the first arrest had been dealt with by officers of a certain level in my absence, they did not refer the second arrest to me.

114. I do not remember ever working with Geoff Craft, which makes me think that I must have been away. I do not recall having been told about the criminal proceedings. I recall ¹⁶ [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] – I knew him very well, and was sad to have heard about his death, but I have no specific recollection of ever being told about this. It is an unusual set of circumstances, and therefore the type of thing I would remember had I have been aware of it. I therefore conclude that I was not told of either of ¹⁶ [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] arrests.

115. It appears from the documents that the clerks of the relevant Magistrates' courts were told that ¹⁷ [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] was an informant. I have no reason to question the

[REDACTED]

content of the documents. I knew nothing about the case so cannot say whether or not this was correct.

18

116. I do not know why the clerks were not told that [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] was a police officer as I was not aware of the case. You would have to ask the officer who spoke to the clerks this question. I suspect that the reason was so that the case was not influenced. As far as I know, I believe that if an officer was arrested and charged the prosecution would proceed for two reasons: 1) to protect the officer within their cover organisation, and 2) to increase his credibility. If the UCO was treated differently to their associates, following arrest for involvement in the same conduct, their safety would be compromised. In my view, if an officer had been arrested for an offence wholly unconnected with Public Order, the SDS would not have intervened with the courts in any way, this is because the officers were instructed not to get involved with serious crime.

19

117. I do not know if any of the magistrates before whom [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] appeared were informed, by the chief clerk or otherwise, that [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] was an informant. I was not involved, therefore you would have to ask the clerk or the magistrates. I understand that Mr Pryde is deceased, and therefore cannot assist.

19

118. I do not know if the defence, prosecutor, or police in the courts before whom [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] appeared were informed that he was a police officer or an informant. I was not involved in managing the UCO during the court process, therefore the only person who may have been able to assist the Inquiry with this question would have been Mr Pryde.

20

[REDACTED]

119. I do not know, as I was not involved, but I would very much doubt the courts were told ²¹ [REDACTED] HN13's real name.

120. I do not know, as I was not involved, but I have no reason to doubt the documents which suggest that ²² [REDACTED] HN13 gave evidence in his cover name at his court appearances.

²³

121. I was not involved in the decision making around ²³ [REDACTED] HN13 and the concern that a sentence of imprisonment should be avoided. I therefore cannot say with any certainty what the decision makers considered when they were addressing this issue and documenting their rationale in the reports. If I was to speculate from my perspective, I would say that primarily the concern would have been the officer's welfare. However, the consequence of imprisonment would have been immediate removal from active duty. There would have been consequent considerations in relation to his fingerprints being taken, and more broader discovery of his true identity arising from that being documented. Put simply, he would have two sets of fingerprints on the police system: one in his police identity, and one in his undercover identity.

122. I note there was a further concern as to whether one of the arresting officers recognised ²⁴ [REDACTED] HN13 (as they had previously served together). This is the type of issue which would have been a concern to the SDS because of nature of undercover operations and active police officers being removed from regular duties to perform undercover roles. If the arresting officer had been directly

[REDACTED]

challenged, this may have aroused suspicion, which in turn leads to a risk of canteen conversations and an inadvertent widening of the "need to know" circle.

I do not know the specific concerns because I was not involved in this incident, but I have no reason to doubt the documents which I have seen.

[25]

123. I am asked if the SDS had any other concerns, arising from [REDACTED] HN13's [REDACTED] arrests, other than the risk of a custodial sentence, or whether he had been recognised by one of the arresting officers. I do not know what the concerns were – if any – because I was not made aware of the specified issues, or any consequent issues arising.

124. I have been asked about document MPS-0746717, and whether it suggests that senior officers took the view that [REDACTED] HN13's [REDACTED] arrest would give him additional credibility within his target group. The document, at page 3, reads: "This is the second occasion that DC [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] has been injured during a demonstration....His morale remains high and he is happy to continue his undercover activities within the CPE(M-L) for the time being and his recent arrest and injuries will have added to his credence with that organisation". I did not share that view as I was not aware of it at the time. Had I been aware of it, I would have agreed that it would have given him credibility amongst his associates.

125. I have been shown MPS-0737456, which relates to the Interchange Scheme and the exceptional retention provisions of Police Order 8(h) of 1975. The Interchange Scheme policy came during Robert Mark's time as Commissioner. At that time there had been a number of serious corruption charges involving the CID,

[REDACTED]

and therefore a policy was put in place whereby officers alternated between uniformed and plain clothes duties. This policy presented specific issues for former UCOs due to the risk that they would be face to face, in uniform, against their former associates.

126. I understand from the documents MPS-0737456 and MPS-0737457 that DCI Craft believed that the exceptional retention provisions offered a solution as it meant that former UCOs did not go out to uniform roles, and therefore the SDS's secrecy, and the secrecy of the UCO's operational role, could be protected. This was also important to the personal security of the UCOs. These are not my words, but I agree with the analysis of the risks that the Interchange Scheme carried, and that former UCOs should therefore have been retained within Special Branch.

127. It appears that the SDS UCOs identified in MPS-0737457 were all granted an exception from the Interchange Scheme. I cannot recall having an active role in this process, but the documentation suggests that the SDS senior officers successfully dealt with the problems caused by the Interchange Scheme by avoiding it for the listed officers.

128. I have been referred to UCPI0000011180 and MPS-0732886, which are reports following a demonstration on 04 August 1977, colloquially known as 'The Battle of Lewisham'. I was at Bramshill at the time, and I cannot therefore personally speak to either of these reports as I was not involved in events surrounding the demonstration. There was no intrinsic value of a report to the SDS as the intelligence was not obtained for the SDS's purposes. I would have thought that

[REDACTED]

the content of the reports would have been valuable to the SDS's intelligence customers, but I was never told of the value or significance of reports to intelligence customers.

129. I have been shown UCPI0000010955, which is a report listing the details of persons who had given their details to the Progressive Cultural Association ('PCA') with a view to being contacted by that organisation. I cannot recall what the PCA was, but they would have been reported on if the organisation was considered to be of interest at the time. Officers would not report on individuals who were carrying out normal day-to-day activities – like going to a shop – so there would have been a reason why the details were submitted for an intelligence report. I cannot recall at this distance of time what the reason would have been. Most of the people listed in the report were not known to Special Branch [REDACTED] ^{26A}
[REDACTED] (PIW means 'possibly identical with').

²⁷
130. I am not aware of [REDACTED] ^{HN13} having any welfare issues in connection with his deployment. My recollection is that he was a very stable officer. I met his wife on several occasions during his deployment and do not recall her having reported any issues.

²⁸
[REDACTED] ^{HN21} [REDACTED]

²⁹
131. [REDACTED] This SDS officer served at the same time as me. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I understand from the Inquiry that he says that he attended Blair Peach's funeral and reported on the Blair Peach Campaign. I was away at the time of the funeral and therefore did not give any

[REDACTED]

instructions or encouragement to report on this. To a large extent, attendance at events would be left to the discretion of the individual. I suspect that it would have been important for him to attend with his comrades in the organisation, otherwise it would have looked suspicious. I am not aware if any other manager provided instruction – I would not expect there was a need to provide an instruction.

30

HN21

132. 31 HN21 served in the SDS whilst I served in the SDS. I do not know when he left as he was still serving when I left. I was not aware that 31 HN21 had kissed and fondled a named woman, and had sex twice with an unnamed woman who he met at 32 an evening class that he attended in his cover identity but not with his target group.

[REDACTED] I did not know of this at all at the time. I was first aware of this when I saw the Inquiry papers provided to me for the purpose of compiling my statement. A liaison on duty would, in my mind, be a disciplinary issue. If a UCO was with their activist contacts then I would interpret that as them being on duty as they would have been working as a UCO.

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133

134. I cannot recall the incident 34 relating to 35 HN300 (deceased) allegedly confessing he had fallen in love and

[REDACTED]

wanting to disclose that he was an undercover officer, and alleging I managed the
[36] issue. [36] I knew HN300. [REDACTED] I note that I am not named in the extract I have

been given in relation to this alleged incident. If what he has reported did happen,
that would have given rise to serious welfare and operational issues. If I had
[36] known about it, I would certainly have recalled it. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[37]
135. To the best of my knowledge, [HN300] was still serving when I left the
SDS. It may be the case that this incident happened late in 1979 after I had left
[38] the unit. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The allegation does not fit with what I knew of [HN300] [39]
[40] [REDACTED]

[41]
136. I do not know whether or not [HN300] married the activist with whom he
had fallen in love. I did not maintain contact with him after I left the SDS.

[42]
137. [REDACTED] there were discussions around the "issue
of girlfriends". At the time, I understood from SDS officer that the issue of
girlfriends to have arisen as a consequence of the social activities of the
organisations they were deployed in. The lack of a girlfriend made it difficult for
officers when dealing with female members of the groups or organisations. The
groups which the UCOs were part of were collectives with a common aim – and in
many respects were social groups. My recollection is that – for example – left-
wing activists tended to partner with other left-wing activists. Sexual partners
within the group seemed to be a part of the life of the group. My recollection is

[REDACTED]

that officers reported that it was difficult for an officer who was in a group for a long time to continue to decline advances without comment. [REDACTED]

43

Describes discussions that took place in the SDS about how to deflect suspicion about UCOs not being in a sexual relationship with a member of the group.

44

138.

Describes discussions that took place in the SDS about how to deflect suspicion about UCOs not being in a sexual relationship with a member of the group.

[REDACTED]

139. [REDACTED] My recollection is that I would have advised UCOs not to become sexually or emotionally involved whilst on duty, as that would have been a disciplinary matter.

140. I don't think that the fact that [REDACTED] an officer's [REDACTED] cover date of birth on his driving licence, and the date of birth of the deceased child, did not correspond was a deliberate tactic. I am unable to explain the discrepancy between the dates.

[REDACTED]

141. HN96 [REDACTED] "Michael James"

141. I am told that [REDACTED] HN96 [REDACTED] served in the SDS from 1978, and I believe he was still a serving officer when I left the unit in Autumn 1979.

142. I would have visited [REDACTED] HN96's [REDACTED] wife before he commenced work in the SDS. I would have offered to see the potential or new recruit's partner so that they

[REDACTED]

would know I was available to be contacted if there were any issues arising in relation to the SDS officer's work. I do not recall being specifically asked to visit

49

[REDACTED] HN96's [REDACTED] wife, as I would have offered the visit anyway. It was important to me for the officer's wife or girlfriend to be able to ask for a visit, and know that myself and the Chief Inspector were willing to help with any domestic issue. A 'domestic issue' in this context would involve anything which is upsetting to his family life which was caused by the job. I believed that such visits were important from a welfare perspective for the reasons set out in this paragraph, and earlier in my statement.

HN297 Richard Clark "Richard Gibson"

143. I did not know of Richard Clark having any sexual relationships in the course of his deployment. Richard Clark's deployment came to an end in 1976, and therefore we only overlapped in the SDS for a relatively short time.

144. I knew nothing of any relationship with an activist at the time of his deployment, and only found out about it from the papers which I was provided with when asked to make a statement in these proceedings. I did not do anything about it at the time, as I was not aware of it.

145. I do not know if my fellow managers knew about any sexual relationship; if they did, I didn't hear about it from them. If senior managers had been aware of it, this is the type of behaviour which I would have expected to have heard about from them. I do not know what they did about it, if they knew about it. If they had known about it, I suspect that they would have done something about it. If I had known

[REDACTED]

about it, I would certainly have advised that there would be complications from such conduct – including the risk of disciplinary proceedings.

146. There was no understanding, or common knowledge, within the SDS that Richard Clark had had sexual relations with a woman whilst undercover.

147. I was not aware of Richard Clark having had sexual activity with a woman whilst undercover, therefore it cannot have affected my thinking about the issue of sexual relationships during undercover deployments.

148. I knew Richard Clark, but I would only have been his manager for no more than eight months (depending on when his deployment ended). He was fully established with the Troops Out Movement by the time I joined the SDS. I did not have any concerns about Richard Clark, or the role that he held at the time that I joined the unit. My understanding of Richard Clark when I was a Detective Inspector in the SDS was that he was a trustworthy police officer, who had a dual role as a trusted person in the organisation he had infiltrated. I had no concerns about him playing an active and prominent role in the life of the branch that he infiltrated.

149. It would be considered beneficial from an intelligence point of view to have someone deployed undercover in the inner circle of an organisation. Logically, the inner circle is where you were likely to get the best information. On a very simplistic level, and not having had a role in Richard Clark taking on prominent positions in the group, there was a benefit to his being in the inner circle.



Questions about Specific Issues

Positions of Responsibility in Target Groups

150. I have been informed by the Inquiry that a number of former SDS officers assumed positions of responsibility in their target groups. It was not the case that prior permission was required before a UCO could assume such a position, nor was it a case of them solely exercising their judgement. As a result of the regular meetings, myself and the Chief Inspector would know the progress of the person in the organisation; we would not give specific authority for a person to take up an appointment, or to put themselves forward for an appointment. The UCO would say "I have been asked to do X" – if it was undesirable, we would tell them they needed to refuse the post. I cannot, at this distance of time, recall an example of an undesirable potential appointment.

151. I do not believe that specific guidance was given to SDS officers on the assumption of positions of responsibility. If there was a risk to safety should a position be assumed, something would have been said – but this was not something which arose during my time in the SDS. Generally, as a manager I was prepared to listen to the reasoning for a UCO's initiative. In my mind, the acceptance of initiative with a UCO by the police is completely different to that of a paid informant. The UCO has a policing role, and understands the requirements of the organisation – he is therefore well-placed, from a position of expected integrity, to determine where his skills are best deployed. The UCO may want to check that their instinct was correct, but unlike an informant he would not be subject to the same prohibition on acting in furtherance of his deployment without specific permission. There would necessarily be restrictions on what a UCO could

[REDACTED]

do, in terms of their role within organisations, but whilst I was in the SDS there were no concerns I can recall in terms of allowing the UCO to exercise their discretion as they knew the organisations they were a part of.

152. As stated in para 149 above, there were advantages to having a UCO in a position of responsibility in a group.

153. The major risk to a UCO who took on a position of responsibility in a target group was the risk of more serious scrutiny of their false background. From memory, we perceived that there was a higher risk in Anarchist/SWP groups when people's profiles increased. At every stage, in every group, there was always a risk that group members would say they didn't believe the UCO's back story, but this was heightened as a UCO progressed through the ranks of the organisation. The guidance given to UCOs was not to be involved in a criminal conspiracy, which was clear (if difficult) given the organisations. To my mind this enabled UCOs to participate in peaceful protests or leafleting, but not in violent disorder or similar.

154. The question as to whether there were particular posts in particular groups which were thought to be beneficial to the work of a UCO is a question that is better directed to the Security Service or A8, as the value of the information produced from particular roles can only be assessed by the department requesting it. On a very simple analysis, a UCO would be in a position to access useful intelligence if they held a role: a driver would find out transport information, a secretary or other record-keeper would have access to membership lists, and a treasurer would know the financial health of the organisation. I do not believe I

[REDACTED]

ever formed the view that any UCO during my tenure rose to a position of responsibility in order to direct the group to activities they would not have ordinarily done. I understood that the UCOs in my time knew the limits of what was permitted (see the sections on the Commission of Criminal Offences Whilst Undercover and Agent Provocateur below).

Use of deceased children's identities

155. I do not know when the practice of adopting the name and date of birth of a deceased child for a UCO's legend began in the SDS. I know that the first time I had heard of it being done was when I read the Day of the Jackal in the early 1970s. It was an established practice by the time I joined, and because I had read it in the book it seemed to make sense. I say this because a UCO with no birth certificate or entry in the register of births would be vulnerable to compromise if a member of their organisation attempted to research their past; compromise or exposure would pose a risk to their safety, their family's safety, and the SDS.

156. I have no idea who devised the tactic, but I would not be surprised if the person who did took the idea from the book. I do not know where the author of the book learned the tactic from.

157. I made no attempt to stop the practice as I did not think that it was wrong. It was not against the law. As far as I was aware, no consideration was given by the management of the SDS to the impact on the surviving family of the deceased child. There was a general feeling that it would not cause damage to the families

[REDACTED]

as in the ordinary course of events no individual would know about the use of deceased person's names. I appreciate that as a result of the Inquiry and related revelations the practice is now known, some of the relatives have been informed, and therefore the impact which was not considered at the time is now being felt.

Sexual relationships in undercover identity

158. I did not give specific guidance to officers about sexual contact whilst operating undercover, other than the reminder of Police Regulations. In simple terms, the guidance for all serving officers was that it would be an offence under the Police Regulations to have a sexual liaison whilst on duty. As I was not made aware of any officer having sexual contact with any person whilst operating undercover, I had no reason to think that the guidance needed to be made stronger, or expressed differently.

159. I cannot recall having any informal conversations about sexual contact whilst operating undercover, and I do not believe that I would have had conversations on this topic informally given the Police Regulations.

160. I cannot answer for whether or not other managers had formal or informal conversations with any UCOs about sexual relationships. However, I was not aware of any managers giving undercover officers orders, instructions advice or guidance about sexual contact whilst operating undercover.

[REDACTED]

161. My attitude to sexual activity between UCOs and civilians they met in their undercover identities was that it should not have happened. In my view, the consequences of human relationships are unpredictable and can be devastating. As I have set out in this statement, I reminded UCOs of the Police Regulations which were rules they ought to have abided by. My view was that if they broke the rules, they would face the consequences. I would not have encouraged any UCO to break the rules.

162. I was not aware of any of the UCOs whom I served with in the SDS having engaged in sexual activity with others whilst in their undercover identity. I note that some members of the SDS have admitted it in the course of information provided to the Inquiry, but I did not know of this at the relevant time. As the UCOs had been reminded of the Police Regulations, it is unlikely that they would have told their manager – who had reminded them of the Regulations – that they were breaking the rules.

Commission of Criminal Offences Whilst Undercover

163. I gave advice that the commission of offences was not permitted whilst deployed as a UCO. It was made abundantly clear that they could not indulge in criminal activity, excluding peaceful protest activities – such as bill posting or leafleting. I would have expected them to use their initiative as to what conduct fell within an acceptable tolerance range. For example, large scale permanent graffiti would not be acceptable (criminal damage), but sticking up posters, or using chalks, would probably be fine. The reason for the tolerance was if UCOs

[REDACTED]

did not engage in any protesting, their comrades would have questioned them. There seems to have been some acceptance that UCOs would necessarily have to sail close to the wind in terms of conduct connected to their deployment. Conduct unconnected to their deployment – such as drug dealing or murder – would not have been sanctioned or tolerated. I note that ⁵⁰ [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] was prosecuted for conduct in connection with his deployment, but have not seen evidence that he was disciplined by police for his actions whilst undercover.

164. I do not recall having informal conversations with UCOs in relation to the commission of offences whilst undercover. If any conversations did happen, informal guidance about their activities would have been consistent with the paragraph above.

165. I do not know if any other manager gave orders, instructions, advice or guidance about the commission of offences whilst undercover. To find this out, you would have to ask the other manager. If any discussions happened between another manager and a UCO, I would expect the guidance to be similar to that which I gave.

166. I note from the Security Service's note at UCPI0000028810-2 that 'Ferguson' "remarked that certainly for the more trivial offences this was no real hinderance (sic) to their operation since they were often able to insulate their sources even though this sometimes meant not prosecuting other offenders". I have no recollection of that being said at the meeting, or of that being an approach or

[REDACTED]

opinion prevalent within the SDS at the time. My understanding, and the advice I gave, is as set out in paragraph 163.

167. I would not have authorised the commission of offences, or conduct beyond peaceful protest, by SDS officers operating undercover. They were not being deployed to commit offences, they were deployed so that they would be able to provide information to A8, the Security Service, or other police departments as the need arose.

168. At the time, I was not aware that anyone serving in the SDS at the same time as me committed a criminal offence whilst undercover. I now know that [REDACTED] 51 [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] committed two offences, as a result of the papers in the Inquiry, but I was not aware of it at the time.

Agent Provocateur

169. As stated in the section above, all officers in the SDS were made aware of the fact that they must not be involved in the commission of crime. This would have extended to any conspiracy, including encouraging another to commit a criminal offence. This is a rule throughout the police force, and therefore the guidance which would have been issued was as per the General Orders (police rules). However, it was recognised that the UCOs would encounter awareness of crime and it was part of their job to inform on it. In that context, they would not have been allowed to encourage the commission of an offence – and during my time as a manager I would not have encouraged an officer on to do this. I would not

[REDACTED]

encourage them to feed ideas in to a group discussion on the commission of an offence – or tell the group what to do in order to commit a crime – but their presence or general enthusiasm for the cause could not always be avoided as part of their role. In short, the position was nuanced but in accordance with police-wide guidance.

170. I do not recall having informal conversations with UCOs in relation to encouraging the commission of offences by others whilst undercover. If any conversations did happen, informal guidance about their activities would have been consistent with the paragraph above.

171. I do not know if any other manager gave orders, instructions, advice or guidance about encouraging the commission of offences by others whilst undercover. To find this out, the Inquiry would have to ask other managers. If any discussions happened between another manager and a UCO, I would expect the guidance to be similar to that which I gave.

172. I am not aware of anyone I served with in the SDS having provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst undercover.

Contact with the Criminal Justice System as the Suspect or the Defendant

173. The matter never arose in my time in the SDS, therefore I did not have cause to give any undercover officers instructions, advice, or guidance (whether formal

[REDACTED]

or informal) about what to do if they were involved as the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings whilst operating undercover:

174. I was not aware of any manager having given any undercover officer instructions, advice, or guidance about what to do if they were involved as the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings whilst operating undercover. The Inquiry would need to obtain this information from the other managers. Whomever dealt with [52] [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] will have necessarily provided guidance, but as I do not recall his arrests, and do not recall having any involvement in his criminal proceedings, I do not know what was suggested or agreed.

[53] [REDACTED]

175. I am not aware of any officer, other than [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] (in relation to whom I have been asked separate questions), who became involved as the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings.

Violence and Public Disorder

176. I will have given UCOs guidance about the risk of becoming involved in either violence or public disorder whilst operating undercover. The advice I gave will have been consistent with the content of paragraphs 164 and 170 above.

177. I do not recall having informal conversations with UCOs in relation to becoming involved in either violence or public disorder whilst undercover. If any conversations did happen, informal guidance about their activities would have been consistent with the paragraph above.

[REDACTED]

178. I do not know if any other manager gave orders, instructions, advice or guidance about becoming involved in either violence or public disorder. To find this out, the Inquiry would have to ask other managers. If any discussions happened between another manager and a UCO, I would expect the guidance to be similar to that which I gave.

179. It was part of the UCO's duty to be with their organisation. I recall that individuals were involved in incidents as part of the groups they infiltrated, but do not recall any specific incidents leading to arrests. At the time, I was not aware of any of the officers I managed having been involved in anything where police took action against them. As far as I was concerned, the UCOs were correctly carrying out their duties as SDS officers within their organisation without committing criminal offences. Presence at demonstrations was expected, and no misconduct was reported by them or by others. I therefore assumed that there was no involvement in violence or disorder. Accordingly, there was no action that I needed to take as a manager in respect of the UCOs under my care. There were no complaints from outside parties about the conduct of my officers whilst I was at the SDS. I would presume that I would have been made aware of any issues had they arisen.

Legally Professionally Privileged Material

180. As a junior police officer, I knew what Legal Professional Privilege ('LPP') was. It follows that I was aware of it at the time I was in the SDS.

[REDACTED]

181. I did not give UCOs orders, instructions, advice, or guidance as to how to identify and deal with LPP material. The matter never arose in my time at the SDS, but I would most certainly expect a police officer to be aware of LPP material and how to deal with it.

182. I did not have any informal conversations about LPP material.

183. I do not know if any other manager gave orders, instructions, advice or guidance about LPP material. To find this out, the Inquiry would have to ask other managers.

184. I am not aware of any SDS officer I served with having come across, or reported on, LPP material whilst undercover. I should add that in the preparation of my statement I have only been provided with a small number of intelligence reports from that era by the Inquiry, and no LPP issue has been apparent from any of them.

Activities of Elected Politicians

185. Questions in relation to the activities of elected politicians and their interaction with UCOs would need to be directed to someone significantly senior to me. I was loosely aware that there was a Special Branch policy on this, in that Special Branch files and reports would not focus directly on elected politicians, but I do not know who the decision makers were or what the rationale was behind this. I do not know if any elected politicians were ever targeted or mentioned in reports in

[REDACTED]

my time at the SDS. I have seen no references to elected politicians in the small number of intelligence reports from the era I have been shown by the Inquiry in order to assist the preparation of this statement. I do not believe that I gave UCOs orders, instructions, advice or guidance on interacting with, or reporting on, elected politicians. If a UCO went to a meeting, they would report on the attendees at that meeting which would include any politicians. I do not recall an issue on how to handle this ever being specifically raised, or an elected politician being named to me in the course of a meeting or debrief with a UCO.

186. I do not believe that I gave UCOs informal guidance on interacting with, or reporting on, elected politicians.

187. I do not know if any other manager gave orders, instructions, advice or guidance about interacting with, or reporting on, elected politicians. To find this out, the Inquiry would have to ask other managers.

188. I am not aware of any contemporaries of mine in the SDS having interacted with, or reported on, elected politicians.

Reporting on individuals

189. I have been asked why certain types of information were recorded in relation to certain persons. As I have previously stated, the SDS was a conduit, and actioned requests for information. The SDS recorded information, and did not filter the information gathered as the SDS was not gathering it for its own purposes. We

[REDACTED]

acted on behalf of other persons, with no oversight of the broader purpose of the information. Where I have indicated that Special Branch, or the Security Service, would be better able to answer that is because either a) they would have been the requesting customer (such as A8, or S Squad, or the Security Service); or b) I was not sufficiently senior during this period to know (for the reasons set out at paragraphs 40-41). I am unable to identify a named individual because I cannot recall who in Special Branch may have asked. I would not have known who at the Security Service decided what to ask Special Branch or the SDS for – as identified earlier in this statement, I think communication of this kind was likely to have been Chief Superintendent level at least. I have therefore tried to answer the queries to the best of my ability, and with the benefit of hindsight and the documents themselves, but the purpose or value of intelligence reports is known by the recipient rather than the entity acting as a conduit:

a. UCPI0000010719 this report from 1976 updated a file on a person

53A

[REDACTED] A known person's health was relevant as adverse health may cause a person's activities to cease. Equally, when a person died their file would be closed.

b. UCPI0000017622 this report on a person of interest to Special Branch would have been to update his reference file. The information in relation to the trade union may have been relevant to his activities, but this is a matter that Special Branch would be better placed to comment on.

c. UCPI0000017523 this report is on persons known to Special Branch [REDACTED]

53B

[REDACTED] My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to a) their

53C

activities, and b) vetting. However, [REDACTED] Special Branch would be better placed to answer questions on this.

- d. UCPI000017563 this report is on a person known to Special Branch. My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to a) their activities, and b) vetting. However, Special Branch would be better placed to answer questions on this.

53D

e. [REDACTED]

- f. UCPI0000010996 the subject of this report has a Special Branch reference number, therefore was a person of interest to Special Branch. Regrettably, in the late 1970s, a person's sexual orientation was a relevant consideration for vetting purposes as homosexuality was thought to carry a heightened risk of blackmail threats. That risk has hopefully now gone. As the report describes living arrangements, and co-habitation, it may have been necessary to confirm that those mentioned might be in a relationship. The associations of persons of interest may be relevant to a) their activities, and b) vetting.

- g. UCPI0000011086 the subject of this report has a Special Branch reference number [REDACTED] therefore was a person of interest to Special Branch [REDACTED] I do not know why, specifically, the information on the person of interest's child was included. Although now an offensive term, "mongoloid" was used to describe people with Down's Syndrome at the time – including by the medical profession.

53E

[REDACTED]

h. UCPI0000011602 is a 1977 report that I appear to have signed (even though I was not a Chief Superintendent as appears in typeface). The subject of this report has a Special Branch reference number and a Security Service number, therefore was a person of interest to Special Branch and the Security Service. I can only speculate that the child's race may have been included as part of the identification purposes. The purpose of many of the reports would, I recall, be needed to create a comprehensive history of the person who was of interest to the police or to the Security Service.

i. UCPI0000011874 is a report on a teenager who has a Special Branch reference number, therefore she was a person of interest to Special Branch. The fact that the individual was young was probably not considered to be as relevant as her interest or involvement in the organisation (I cannot say which of these was of interest to Special Branch). My recollection is that people who started in the organisations when they were young tended to stay in the groups, and some activist groups would seek to recruit young people to further their causes without necessarily having their best interests at heart. I cannot recall this individual, or why she was of interest to Special Branch.

j. UCPI0000011924 is a report which appears to be updating the file of an individual known to Special Branch [REDACTED] 53F The fact that a person has left a relevant organisation would, I suspect, have been of relevance to [REDACTED] 53F Special Branch [REDACTED] 53F files.

k. UCPI0000011275 the individual photographed has a Special Branch number, therefore was a person known to Special Branch. The

[REDACTED]

individual, in spite of their relative youth, is noted as being a member of the Socialist Workers' Party, and School Kids Against the Nazis. Although I cannot recall specifically, I suspect that the School Kids Against the Nazis was set up and controlled by a target group, rather than a group of children acting on their own initiative. I can speculate that the photo would have been purely to assist identification should it be required.

l. UCPI0000021782 is a report on a teenager who is the sister of someone known to Special Branch [REDACTED] ^{53G} All of her other siblings were known to Special Branch (and I cannot assist with why). She is therefore a member of an activist family, and a member of School Kids Against the Nazis who were a known activist group backed and used by adult activists. Special Branch [REDACTED] ^{53G} would be better placed to comment on why this individual was of interest.

m. UCPI0000011389 this report provides an update on banking information on seven people known to Special Branch. [REDACTED] ^{53H}

[REDACTED] I am unable to speculate as to why this information may have been of interest, save that it was likely updating the files already held on all of them.

n. UCPI0000013062 contains information on a person [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ^{53I}


The fact that a couple were separating is likely to have been relevant to evidence of their known associations.

o. Some of the individuals in the reports commented on by the HN244 had Security Service File references and so would have been of interest to the Security Service. The information in those reports may therefore have been of interest to the Security Service and is relevant to why the information was recorded by the SDS.

[REDACTED]

190. For all of the documents listed at para.189, the information would be reported because it would have come to light in the course of a UCO's deployment, and therefore as a result of targeting from a requesting party (be it a desk within Special Branch, the Security Services, or another police department). The personal files held by Special Branch were marked 'confidential' and above, so this information would have been restricted. I imagine that the Security Services had a similar policy.

191. As with all information reports, the utility of the information is a matter for the requesting party. Targeting direction for the SDS would come from a requesting party, as a result of interest in a group or cause, and UCOs would report on what was happening within the group. Occasionally, some of the information in the reports from the UCOs might seem mundane; this is likely to be because the UCO was within a group at a quieter time. I should add that I have been asked about a narrow selection of 14 reports, out of the thousands which would have been produced by the SDS on an annual basis. It is inevitable that within a wider information gathering exercise there will be some which is more useful, some which is less useful, and some which may seem irrelevant out of context. The SDS would not be in a position to assess the utility of any report, especially given the public order climate in the late 1970s where disorder was an issue, and policing resources needed to be deployed to meet public need. I would guess that the Security Service needed the information for similar reasons.



Reporting on Trade Unions

192. Information on the Trade Unions would have been reported if relevant to a deployment, or requested by the Security Service or Special Branch. I do not know what use it was to the Security Service, or elsewhere in Special Branch – only those organisations would be able to answer that. I can say that the SDS did not infiltrate trade unions in my time at the unit. Special Branch had their own informants in the Trade Unions, and the SDS would only have reported on additional material if asked. I can only speculate that the reason was a link between the Trade Union leaders and communist activism but as I was not requesting the intelligence I do not know why it was sought. From a policing point of view, I can see that information on strike tactics in relation to public order may have been desirable.

Reporting for Public Order Purposes

193. Reporting for public order purposes was undertaken normally by way of a written report which would have been compiled by Dick Scully (in my time) from information provided by the UCOs. In cases of urgency information would be relayed by telephone by myself, Dick Scully, or another person in the SDS office.

194. Reports on forthcoming demonstrations were of interest to the Metropolitan Police for the policing of public spaces and demonstrations. I envisage the information would have been relevant to various policing matters, including ensuring an appropriate police presence which would be able to cope with the event but would not appear heavy-handed or occupy officers unnecessarily,

[REDACTED]

ensuring the safety of civilians not involved in the protest, assessing the risk of damage to property (and taking appropriate action), and ensuring the safety of those protestors present. Normal policing matters would also include strategic planning on how many officers were required. I have seen UCPI0000013343 which is a report on a forthcoming demonstration. Three of the twelve members of the organising meeting were known to Special Branch [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Reporting on groups

195. I have been shown UCPI0000013063, which is a comprehensive report on the Socialist Workers' Party – in essence, an update on the new large branch and its activities. The report shows how the structure of a known organisation of interest has changed. Of the persons listed, there are a large number who were known to Special Branch [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Special Branch would be able to explain why they needed this, or what use it was put to, but I cannot assist with that.

Contributing to policing and counter-subversion

196. In terms of what the SDS achieved for the benefit of policing, I can say that it obtained all of the requests for intelligence on public order and national security that were requested of it when I was involved. There were never any complaints or suggestions that we were running short on the information that the police and Security Service needed. I would not have known what everything we were asked to get was later directed to, so it is hard for me to

[REDACTED]

quantify the benefit. It was very much a case that the SDS did what we were told, and didn't question it. If the SDS was given a target, the order was not queried. It was actioned. Personally, I felt that the SDS achieved the goals that we had been set for the benefit of policing.

197. I believe that the SDS also achieved the goals that we had been set for the benefit of the Security Service for the same reasons as set out above.

Overtime Payments

198. Overtime was a considerable component of a UCOs pay. In the ordinary way, overtime was paid at a higher rate than a normal employment rate. Because of the nature of their duties, UCOs were working very long hours (i.e. everything but sleep). However, some of the overtime was not paid in money, it was calculated as time off in lieu. This had two benefits: a) it kept the overtime bill down, and b) it enabled the UCO to disappear for a long break after their deployment.

199. I never formed the impression that any SDS officer may be influenced to stay in the unit longer because of the overtime. It was always stressed to UCOs that overtime was an extra and should never be considered regular income. There is always a risk with overtime, and the expenditure had to be justified, but I didn't think that anyone wanted to be undercover because they wanted the money. In any event, it was not down to the officer to decide how long they stayed. Whilst I was there, the deployment was four years maximum, and it would be down to the senior officers to decide when to terminate a deployment – not the UCO. If a UCO

[REDACTED]

wanted to terminate his deployment, they could have been withdrawn from undercover duties on request – although I do not recall any request being made in my time at the SDS. I think that most UCOs stayed undercover for around three years, and then began to “exfiltrate”. Some may have started to “exfiltrate” later. I cannot recall, or be sure, of specific time periods, but I think [REDACTED] ⁵⁶ may have gone over four years and maybe [REDACTED] ⁵⁷ [REDACTED] HN13 [REDACTED] HN353 [REDACTED]. A factor in leaving a UCO deployed for longer would be if there would be a risk to his safety if he exited at a certain point.

200. I do not think that, in the course of my tenure in the SDS, any UCO painted an overly optimistic picture of the intelligence they were gathering in order to generate more overtime. There may have been officers where I paid extra attention to the overtime they were claiming. I did this not because I was worried about their claims being genuine, but because I wanted to keep a weather eye on their welfare. I was able to see from the amount of overtime claimed whether they needed more contact due to the long hours, and personal stress which could arise following a lack of commitment to their own families. I cannot identify any officer who was saying enthusiastic things about their deployment in order to stay there fruitlessly.

Formal policies and procedures


201. There were no formal policies or procedures, bar the Police Regulations, whilst I was part of the SDS.

The Security Service

202. I did not have regular formal contact with the Security Service; contact would have been significantly more senior than my level for policy matters. For the practical purposes of running the unit, contact would be much more casual but I would describe that contact as very infrequent (at Detective Inspector level) for reasons already set out in this statement.

203. The topics discussed in UCPI0000028810 were not typical – as far as I was concerned – because meetings like that were not typical. Regular meetings at my level were not organised until the end of my tenure at the unit. From the two that I recall – which are the two where there are minutes – the meetings were agenda-driven. A more senior officer may be able to assist the Inquiry on the number of meetings carried out at a more senior level.

58



204. My understanding was that there was a good relationship between Special Branch, the SDS and the Security Service. I understood from my limited experience, and from senior officers, that the approach was cordial and collaborative but the information flow was very much one-way. The Security Service would send a request and the SDS provided the information. I cannot recall a single instance in my time of the Security Service assisting the SDS.

205. Most of the information obtained by the SDS ultimately went to the Security Service.

Oversight Bodies

206. I cannot recall if an outside body with regulatory or oversight responsibility visited the SDS when I was part of the unit. I would be very surprised if it had happened because of the strict 'need to know' basis which the SDS operated under.

Leaving the SDS

207. I left the SDS in the Autumn of 1979, on promotion. There would not have been an option to stay in the SDS when I was promoted.

Post SDS police career

208. My police career is summarised at the beginning of this statement. Immediately on leaving the SDS, I went to a specialist squad, and my work there did not overlap with the type of public order information the SDS obtained. After I left the SDS, I do not believe that I, or those who I managed, sought, used or disseminated intelligence from the SDS. It would have been highly unlikely that anything would have crossed my areas of work in the other posts given the policing roles I held. I think I was on B Squad in a general duty role for a brief period and may have unknowingly received information from SDS – but I did not actively seek information from the SDS nor did I knowingly disseminate it. I cannot therefore rule out the possibility that some SDS information which had relevance to my work came to me in B Squad, but I can't

[REDACTED]

think of an occasion where this happened and I know I did not ask for information from the SDS.

Any other matters

209. During my period with the SDS, the voiced opinion of senior management was that the squad was achieving the demanded objectives – particularly in relation to public order matters – without there being any suggestion that regulations or security requirements were breached. Although the officers had been selected for the purpose, supervision was maintained at high level with frequent group and individual meetings. The loyalty of the UCOs was never deemed in doubt, and morale was good in spite of the difficulties and dangers of leading a double life. I had no inkling of any domestic issues in respect of any officer whilst I was a Detective Inspector in the unit; had I suspected, or known, something had taken place, I would have taken action.

Request for documents

210. I do not have any documents, diaries or other records which are potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference. I have not been shown any documents other than those in my witness bundle.

Diversity

211. I am male.

212. My racial origin is white British.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

59

Angus McIntosh

Signed:

Dated: 16th February 2021