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Date signed: 22 January 2021

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

I, Trevor Charles Butler, c/o the Designated Lawyer, PO Box 73779, London, WC1A 9NL, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 5 November 2020. It provides my full recollection of my time as a manager in the Special Demonstration Squad ('SDS') of the Metropolitan Police Service ('MPS').

Personal Details

2. My full name is Trevor Charles Butler and my date of birth is 1 [REDACTED] 1942.

Police Career before joining the Special Demonstration Squad

3. I joined the MPS on 21 October 1963. I undertook initial police training at Peel House and then Hendon. As was normal, I then spent two years on probation. I cannot recall being treated any differently from the other constables during that time.
4. I joined the Special Branch of the MPS ('MPSB') on 8 April 1968 as a Detective Constable ('DC'). Entry to MPSB was competitive and required a formal application, a written examination and an interview. As I had studied languages at school, I was also assessed in these. I spent 18 months or so on B Squad enquiries initially, during which time I completed my MPSB probationary period. In October 1969, I was posted to E Squad for approximately two years. I was transferred to C Squad in September 1971 and promoted to Detective Sergeant ('DS') two months later.
5. After ten months on C Squad, I went to Southend Airport on port duty until June 1975 when I returned to B Squad in New Scotland Yard. In June 1977, I was promoted to

Inspector and returned to uniform duty at Barkingside Police Station for about one year's interchange duty.

6. I returned to MPSB C Squad in July 1978 as a Detective Inspector ('DI') and was posted from there to the SDS in September 1979.
7. Prior to the recruitment process for joining the SDS, which I describe in greater detail in the next section, I had had no contact with the unit. While the phrase "secret and sensitive" source generally indicated information obtained through technical means such as intercept material, even with the benefit of hindsight, I do not recall it being possible to discern from reporting that any information came from an undercover officer ('UCO').
8. As with the majority of junior MPSB officers, I had attended meetings of groups in plain clothes i.e. my work suit and tie. If asked, I would probably have given a name that was not my own. I would not consider this to be undercover policing. In general, these were either fairly large meetings where MPSB officers could pass unnoticed, or very small affairs where you would be asked to leave if you were not one of the half-dozen or so regular attendees.

Selection for the Special Demonstration Squad

9. It was common knowledge in the MPSB that S Squad existed because this was the home of our surveillance, photographic and technical sections. It was known within the Branch at the time that it had an undercover capability although the name was not common knowledge and there was probably more rumour than detail. This capability was kept secret from those outside MPSB. Who those officers were, what they did and where they operated were protected.
10. It was only when I was a DS that I had direct, regular contact with a former UCO – for the first time as far as I was aware. [redacted] ³ It was [redacted] following his deployment, ² [redacted] for a few months. ³⁽ⁱ⁾ [redacted] [redacted] Even then, we did not discuss his previous role in any detail, if at all.

11. At this point, it is worth mentioning the 'need-to-know' culture that was prevalent in the Branch throughout my time there. I recall particularly well that when I joined the MPSB, a senior officer, possibly a Detective Chief Superintendent, addressed my batch of new joiners and told us in no uncertain terms that we were to forget that we were in Special Branch at all. As far as our families and friends were concerned, we were CID officers and that was the end of it. Even conducting enquiries within MPSB, we did not ask questions of each other about such work except perhaps on basic matters of logistics: whether the other officer knew of a café or pub in a certain area which was suitable for a meeting. It was unthinkable to ask what enquiry an officer was on or who they were meeting.
12. In that context, I found the SDS contribution to the 'True Spies' programme astounding. It was an earth-shattering breach of the "need to know" principle, and I know that some long-standing friendships have been destroyed as a result.
13. As far as my selection for a managerial role is concerned, all I know is based on the interview I had at the time. All MPSB officers in New Scotland Yard were expected to sign in for work before 10am and, if there was a message for you, this would be pencilled against your name in the day book. One morning, there was a pencilled note against my name to go and speak to Chief Superintendents Kneale and Pryde. These two officers were in charge of S Squad, of which the SDS formed a part.
14. I duly went to see them in the S Squad office, where they sat opposite each other. They confirmed with me that I had passed for Inspector as a 'competitor' (the highest grade of pass), that I had recently returned from interchange duty, and that I played a lot of ⁴ sport. They asked if I would be interested in joining the SDS as a manager and, alongside my administrative duties, focus on assisting UCOs with their preparation for promotion examinations and keeping them fit. As I remember it, I had no hesitation in accepting their invitation.
15. It seems likely that my selection to be interviewed for the managerial role in the SDS was in part a matter of timing and my availability. MPSB was approximately 450 officers at that time, if I recall correctly, and the officers who worked in New Scotland

Yard were well-known to each other, whether directly or by reputation. I imagine that the more senior managers were looking for an individual with a particular set of abilities and I happened to fit the bill. I do not know if other candidates were considered at the same time as me, or even if I was their first choice.

16. I cannot remember how much time passed following this interview but I joined the SDS in September 1979. I took the managerial role that was offered to me because I felt that I had experience and skills that would be of benefit to the UCOs professionally in their broader career development as well as their welfare more generally.

My Role

17. I was assigned to the SDS as DI to succeed Angus McIntosh. Mike Ferguson was the Detective Chief Inspector ('DCI') in charge of the unit at that time, and I became his second-in-command.
18. I was promoted to DCI in July 1981 during my time with the unit. The Annual Report for 1980 (MPS-0728962) which is under cover of a letter dated 23 March 1981 is signed by me on page 10 as an Acting Chief Inspector. Taking this together with some of the other documents in my witness pack which I discuss further at paragraph 22 below, it appears that I was an Acting Chief Inspector from at least March 1981, and so it appears that I was in charge of the SDS for a significant portion of that year.

Dates of Service

19. I have considered the Security Service Note for File dated 25 November 1981 (UCPI0000028840) and this matches my recollection of the conclusion of my posting with the SDS. Having consulted my Personal Record Summary, which I retained following my service with the MPS and a copy of which I append to this statement, it is clear that I moved on in January 1982. As outlined at paragraph 16 and immediately above, I was a manager in the SDS between September 1979 and January 1982. This is a considerably shorter period than has been suggested by the Inquiry in my Rule 9 request.

Training and guidance in the Special Demonstration Squad

20. I completed the Junior CID course in 1969 at a very early stage in my MPSB career and the Inspectors' course at Bramshill before I returned to the Branch in 1978 but there were no courses specifically for the managers in the SDS. As far as I am aware, there was no directly relevant training available at any time I was with the unit, whether for UCOs or their managers. It follows that this was not repeated or refreshed.
21. I do not believe that there was any race or sex equality training required by or generally available to MPS officers at any time prior to or during my service with the SDS. I certainly do not believe that I ever participated in any such training.

Duties

22. As outlined at paragraph 18 above and having considered my Personal Record Summary, my substantive promotion to DCI took place on 6 July 1981. I have considered the Security Service Notes for File dated 1 August 1980 and 3 February 1981 (UCPI0000028816 and UCPI0000028817 respectively). It would certainly have been unusual for two DIs to have attended together unless DCI Moss had moved on. Alternatively, it might just have been part of the overall transition. I cannot specifically recall when I took charge of the SDS. Reading the two documents above together with paragraph 2 of the Security Service Note for File dated 20 July 1981 (UCPI0000028828), the most likely inference is that I did have a period as Acting DCI for at least some of the first half of 1981.
23. My role was managerial but I viewed it as more of a supporting and enabling role in support of the UCOs. As DI, I accompanied DCI Moss to meetings with the Security Service, and dealt with a number of administrative matters, including:
 - (a) dealing with 5 in the Traffic department on the procurement and disposal of UCOs' cover vehicles, albeit DS Chris Skey had the lead on this;
 - (b) 6
ensuring that UCO's cover vehicles were road legal

(c)

Details involvement in management of finances and safehouses for the SDS"

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24. As far as I can recall, the SDS's finances were kept separate from the MPSB finance system.

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We were nonetheless expected to keep accurate records and account for our expenses, which were not extravagant by any means.

25. As I had discussed with Chief Superintendents Kneale and Pryde, I maintained a focus on coaching UCOs in advance of their promotion exams and looking after their welfare more generally. I would try to meet with each UCO on a one-to-one basis each fortnight, usually over ⁹ sport and a light meal. I also ran regular classes for promotion candidates and I set them work to complete which I would mark and return with feedback. Apart from this taking place during the bi-weekly meetings, it was the same preparation as was provided for other officers in the Branch and more generally.

26. I also recall travelling to other parts of Great Britain on at least two occasions and liaising with the local Special Branch on both of those occasions, which I discuss in greater detail at paragraphs 83-85 below. These were:

(a) East Lothian for the Torness Anti-Nuclear campaign where we were hosted by, and I liaised with, the Lothian and Borders Constabulary's Special Branch; and

(b) Merseyside Special Branch, although I do not remember the reason for the meeting.

27. As DCI, I continued to attend meetings with the Security Service and took more of a leadership role in the unit, handing over more of the administrative duties to DI

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HN68 There was no step change in roles, possibly because I stayed in the same unit on promotion.

28. One issue which remained constant through my time as a manager was the vexed question of overtime. In particular, when Geoffrey Craft was a Superintendent and /

or Chief Superintendent in the S Squad office, he took an almost crusading attitude to reducing the amount of overtime that the UCOs did. He and I had some difficult conversations on the subject. On one occasion when he visited one of the SDS safe houses, a UCO asked Geoffrey Craft directly whether he was responsible for pressure to reduce overtime, which he flatly denied. By that time, I believe I was the DCI in charge of the unit, and that decreased the amount of trust the UCOs had in me as their manager, as well as cooling my relationship with him in the S Squad office, albeit this remained thoroughly professional throughout. It was fortunate that I did not have much longer to serve on the SDS at that point and that ¹¹ [REDACTED] HN68 [REDACTED] was my DI: he was a tremendously capable officer and manager, and had significant experience as a UCO, and this maintained the trust between the UCOs and our office.

29. I consistently took the view that the UCOs should have been paid an additional allowance instead of overtime. It would have simplified questions such as how much overtime an officer could claim for when they were away with their group over a weekend for a demonstration, or at a conference outside London.
30. I have been asked a number of questions about my role in particular matters of interest to the Inquiry.
- (a) I do not recall having any role in identifying officers as potential UCOs. My role in recruiting officers into the SDS was to interview them and also meet with them and their spouse at home to ensure that they both understood in general terms what the role required, in particular the long hours and weekend duties, for the three or four years which followed. If an officer was married or in a long-term relationship, we would not have recruited them into the SDS without the full support of their spouse or partner. While it was not an official "qualification" for the UCO role, as far as I can recall UCOs during my time were all married.
- (b) There was not a great turnover of officers during my time with the SDS and it is difficult now for me to recall the qualities which were required. In that respect, I think there was a certain deference to any former UCO who was part of the selection process "knowing it when they saw it".

- (c) While I remember interviewing ¹² [REDACTED] HN65 [REDACTED] for the SDS, I do not remember that he received a reprimand as a result of a conviction for drink driving. I do not believe that this formed any part of our consideration during the selection process. Had there been any significant doubt about him because of this issue, I doubt he would ever have been approached or made it to interview. It may be that we made it clear to him at interview that, having fallen foul of the law previously, he would have to be doubly careful given the sensitivity of the role he was performing.
- (d) As I do not recall any examples from my time with the SDS, my response to the general question about whether previous convictions affected an officer's suitability for the SDS is somewhat hypothetical. Any conviction will cast doubt on an officer's suitability for a policing role, and there are some convictions which were and are wholly inconsistent with continuing service as a police officer. Provided the offence was not so serious as to imperil their career or their vetting, it may have been a consideration in their selection but it would not have been determinative.
- (e) As well as ¹³ [REDACTED] HN65 [REDACTED] I must have had a role in interviewing candidates for the SDS but I cannot remember which officers these were, other than one of them might have been Roger Pearce. I do not recall ever having a role in talent spotting officers within MPSB who might have been suitable candidates.
- (f) The selection of managers was dealt with by the S Squad office, as my experience demonstrated. I believe that the DSs and the typist were appointed from New Scotland Yard. We could possibly have objected if we did not think they were suitable but the question never arose. Work was divided between the DSs such that one dealt with UCO vehicles and our accommodation while the other handled reports and dealt with Branch matters that did not require more senior input.
- (g) There was no formal training for UCOs and I had no role in their preparation for deployment. This was all dealt with between the newcomer and those UCOs

then in the field. The newcomer would attend meetings in the safe houses and spend the balance of their time preparing their legend. It may be that they assisted with reports and filing to give them a broad view of what was required but, as long as they were gainfully employed during their time in the back office, I took no active part in this.

- (h) There was no formal training provided for managers or office staff. While the SDS was a top secret unit and our work was important, the daily routine within the office was very stable and predictable unless something went seriously wrong, which I do not recall them doing during my time. A new arrival into a role would have a brief handover with the outgoing officer, during which the duties were explained, and then other members of the office would be on hand to provide guidance if necessary.

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31. I have considered the extract from **HN106's** witness statement to the Inquiry regarding the selection of targets and agree with what he says. During my time with the SDS, our focus was primarily on public order and on the extreme left-wing and anarchist groups. This was not a question of political bias, in my mind, but rather that these groups had sufficient mass as to pose a threat of disorder. The extreme right-wing and race-based groups did not attract the numbers or demonstrate the same level of risk, albeit there might be limited violent disorder on occasions. There was no direction from MPSB to target extreme right-wing groups, and in any event the greatest risk of extreme right-wing groups becoming involved in public disorder and violence occurred when there were confrontations between them and the extreme left. We had to prioritise because of our small size, and our coverage of the extreme left-wing meant that we had forewarning of counter-demonstrations. It should not be forgotten that the Cold War was still in progress and there was, at the time at least, a real fear of extreme left-wing groups providing assistance to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact in the event of any conflict in Europe.
32. I understand that very little of the reporting which has been provided- has come from MPSB archives. It is therefore natural that the reports which have been obtained from the Security Service would contain information generally of interest to them,

specifically in relation to counter-subversion and vetting matters, rather than the more tangible information on numbers, groups and intentions that the MPSB squads would have relied on in provide the MPS uniform public order branch ('A8') with threat assessments ahead of any demonstration. Indications that a planned march or picket was likely to receive little support were just as useful to A8 as intelligence of an event that would attract tens or hundreds of thousands: both allowed uniformed officers to be rostered in sufficient numbers to meet the assessed threat, without unnecessarily cancelling leave or incurring overtime payments.

33. There could be periods of weeks when a UCO's group was not actively planning events and so they would have limited scope for public order reporting. However, to be in a position to obtain useful intelligence, UCOs had to remain engaged and gain the confidence of their groups and the influential activists in them which meant attending meetings regularly. They were also, first and foremost, MPSB officers who were used to reporting and understood the latent value of information. As they were putting in long hours with their groups to maintain their cover, I am sure that sub-consciously at least they felt obliged to 'earn their keep' by turning in reports on membership, start points for further enquiries and the internal dynamics of their groups. This may occasionally have included gossip or irrelevance and I respond to questions about some specific examples at paragraph 128 below.
34. In that regard, it is important to remember that the UCOs were operating largely in isolation. They did not have access to reporting from other sources that would have assisted them in evaluating the information that they provided, and this was done deliberately because it may also have given them knowledge that would have undermined their cover identity if they revealed it by mistake. Similarly, I do not believe that I or any of the other managers ever expressly fed back on the content of a UCO's report because we did not want to discourage them in the slightest from providing all the information that came their way, just in case that by doing so a vital piece of the jigsaw was missed in future.
35. As with the preparation of new UCOs more generally, I had no role in the invention, development or assessment of a UCO's cover identity [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] they all found their own way, just as they did with finding their cover accommodation. We never visited cover addresses or approved them. I may have asked questions of UCOs who were about to deploy to confirm that they were comfortable with their cover identity but I do not have any specific recollection of doing so and it would most likely have been because the officer requested it.

36. I had no role in procuring cover documents for UCOs and I have already dealt with my role as regards cover vehicles at paragraph 23(a)-(b) above, which was largely maintaining the relationship with the Traffic department [REDACTED]. 17
37. The deployment of UCOs was determined based on geographical coverage and ensuring that we did not leave any blind spots. I do not recall ever being required to determine whether a UCO was ready to deploy into the field. If there had been any adverse feedback about a newcomer's preparation, I am sure that would have made its way back to the managers and we would have reacted accordingly.
38. As I have outlined above, I was selected as a manager in the SDS with a welfare and career progression focus and so this naturally occupied a good deal of my direct managerial time. I used to play 18 sport with each UCO on a regular basis, and tried not to leave much longer than a month between our meetings. This gave them an opportunity to raise any issues with me and for us to have a general discussion. Unless required by other duties, I was also at each of the bi-weekly safe house meetings. The first half-hour of one meeting a week was set aside for a properly structured class for promotion candidates.
39. I have read the memo dated 7 December 1981 requesting a separate venue for candidates sitting promotion examinations (MPS-0527306). Our officers required a safe venue because it was not sensible for them to be associating with 200 other police officers in a hall. There was also the risk that one of the other candidates would recognise them in their cover identity at a later date and unwittingly reveal the UCO as a police officer.

40. I do not recall having any role in the exfiltration of UCOs. MPSB would have tried to take the officer's views on his next job into consideration, as well as making sure that the role was suitably out of the public eye, and that the timing was appropriate in terms of fitting in overdue leave and re-rostered rest days before they started elsewhere. I do not remember any officer having to leave the field urgently during my time and so, while there may have been contingency plans in place, I do not recall these ever being used or what they were.
41. I had no role in writing up or assessing UCOs' reports. There was a typist in the office at Vincent Square and one of the DSs would ensure that the handwritten notes were typed up and checked. I only started signing reports when I was in the Chief Inspector's role. My signature on a report indicates approval only in the loosest sense: I did not add to, edit or comment upon reports in any way. It was for others to collate the information and assess the value.
42. All SDS reports were routed through S Squad, almost without exception. I have considered the report dated 18 September 1981 (UCPI0000015602) which was after I was promoted to DCI and I confirm that it is my signature on the report. The manuscript comment on the first page regarding passing information on an individual 18(i) to [REDACTED] a SyS liaison partner [REDACTED] is not something that is likely to have been added within MPSB: it is most "un-Branch-like". Reports circulated internally would have a minute sheet attached to them as a cover sheet and onward dissemination and comment would be written onto the minute sheet and never onto the report itself. For that reason, I believe that the comment on a named individual's details being 18(i) passed to [REDACTED] a SyS liaison partner [REDACTED] would have been added by the Security Service.
43. Paragraph 2(b) of the Security Service's Note for File dated 1 August 1980 (UCPI0000028816) makes it clear that, because the information referred to came from a closed meeting, DCI Moss wanted to confirm with the source whether the information could be passed on to [REDACTED] liaison partners. 19 I do not recall the specific meeting or what action DCI Moss took following it.

44. As the existence of the SDS was kept secret from those outside MPSB, and only shared on an absolute need-to-know basis with the Security Service and the Home Office, requests for intelligence would not be routed to the unit directly. I do not remember the process for MPSB receiving and directing requests for intelligence but it seems likely that, apart from the Security Service, all requests would have come to us indirectly via S Squad. I have considered the Security Service Loose Minute dated 3 March 1981 (UCPI0000029199) and the other documents in my witness pack which show that I attended meetings with the Security Service much more frequently than I thought I had, which I deal with in more detail at paragraph 48 below. It seems likely that I would have been the conduit for such requests. There may have been circumstances in which a UCO could not safely obtain the information requested but I have no specific memory of this occurring or how it was dealt with. As my recollection of meetings with the Security Service is so different from what the documents show, it is difficult for me to be certain whether the requests are typical. The sample of documents provided seems to indicate that they were.

45. Beyond the UCOs' reports and the unit's annual report, I do not recall the SDS producing much paperwork. We certainly did not write policy or training manuals. I have already described the process by which the UCOs' reports were produced. I cannot recall how the annual reports were written: they appear to be a survey of each year's intelligence reports and financial information with some additional commentary. On that basis, I believe that they may well have been a team effort within the office, albeit the DCI in charge approved it before it went to S Squad, who appear to have added their input before it went further up the chain.

46. I had no role in UCOs' cover accommodation: that was dealt with by each individual officer. ²⁰ [REDACTED] I do not recall having any role in procuring the safe houses or our office in Vincent Square. ²¹ [REDACTED]

47. Beyond maintaining a good working relationship with Mr ²² [REDACTED] of the Traffic department and an individual in the MPS property department, whose name I cannot

remember, the SDS had no direct links with the remainder of the MPS as far as I can recall.

48. The documents in my witness pack show that I had frequent meetings with the Security Service (F6 counter-subversion joint co-ordination) and I certainly remember meeting ²²⁽ⁱ⁾ [redacted] Sys officer [redacted] and even playing ²³ sport against him. Liaison between MPSB and the Security Service was not unusual, although I do not recall the contact being as frequent as the documents in my witness pack show. When I was in B Squad before the SDS, I remember attending Security Service premises [redacted]

²³⁽ⁱ⁾ [redacted]

49. I remember meeting an individual from the Home Office for lunch once a month. I do not remember the department he was from, his name or his role but I vaguely recall that he had a role in enabling SDS operations.

50. I do not recall ever liaising or dealing with any other government body as far as I am aware. As a general rule and given the covert nature of the unit, it was far more appropriate to deal with other organisations at arm's length through S Squad, directly maintaining only limited and discreet relationships with key individuals.

Premises and meetings with other Special Demonstration Squad undercover officers

51. The S Squad office was in New Scotland Yard, which is where I believe the SDS office was based when I first joined the unit. We then moved the SDS office to Vincent Square, ²⁴ [redacted], which we shared with the photographic section, and possibly the surveillance section, which were also part of S Squad; see the Annual Report for 1980 dated 23 March 1981 at paragraph 7 (MPS-0728962).

52. The SDS also had two flats in South and West London, and known as "South" and "West" respectively. I cannot now remember the addresses of these premises but they did not change between 1979 and 1982 while I was a manager with the SDS. These were the safe houses where the bi-weekly meetings would take place.

53. My primary place of work was New Scotland Yard, initially, and then Vincent Square. I attended almost every meeting that took place at either South or West during my tenure.

SDS Management Structure

54. The officers who served in management positions during my time in the SDS were:

(a) Mike Ferguson was the DCI very briefly when I started as DI.

(b) Barry Moss was the DCI for a period between 1980 and 1981.

(c) ²⁵ [redacted] HN68 [redacted] was the DI when I took overall responsibility for the unit in 1981.

55. Another officer who I recognise as being associated with the SDS but who was not a manager during my tenure is Angus McIntosh. He was my predecessor as DI.

56. The Inquiry has asked whether ²⁶ [redacted] was a manager with the SDS during my tenure but I do not recognise the name.

57. The following individuals served in administrative or junior management positions during my tenure:

(a) Richard Scully was a DS.

(b) Paul Croyden was a DS.

(c) Martin Gray succeeded Paul Croyden as a DS.

58. As I have mentioned elsewhere, Chris Skey was another DS while I was a manager. There was also a typist whose name I cannot now recall.

The Chain of Command

59. I have been asked a series of questions about the chain of command beyond the SDS, which was as follows:

- (a) S Squad: I do not recall if there was a Chief Superintendent and a Superintendent, or two Chief Superintendents there as a matter of course. It was not particularly relevant because they acted in concert and we did as S Squad directed.
- (b) S Squad reported to Commander Operations MPSB, who was in turn responsible to the Head of MPSB who held the rank of Deputy Assistant Commissioner.
- (c) Above that level, I cannot recall whether functional responsibility went upward through the ranks sequentially (Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Commissioner) or followed a different route. Ultimate responsibility rested, then as now, with the Commissioner.

60. I cannot now recall whether Sir David McNee was the Commissioner during my tenure in the SDS, nor whether Patrick Kavanagh CBE QPM was the Deputy Commissioner. These are likely to be appointments of public record and therefore independently verifiable.

61. I have seen Gilbert Kelland's name on letters from the Home Office dated 1 April 1980 and 1 March 1982 (MPS-0728963 and MPS-0728985) and to the Home Office dated 23 March 1981 (MPS-0728962) all relating to authority and funding for continued SDS operations. From this, it seems likely that the Assistant Commissioner (Crime) was in the SDS chain of command for much if not all of my tenure. I also recall Dave Veness may have occupied this role at some point. I do not recall whether David Powis was the other Assistant Commissioner.

62. Similarly, I am unable to remember whether Robert Bryan and Colin Hewett were Deputy Assistant Commissioners at the relevant time.

63. John Wilson was certainly Commander Operations at the end of my tenure because I recall my conversation with him just prior to my posting away from the SDS which I deal with in more detail at paragraph 158 below. I do not recall whether Phil Saunders was Commander Operations or Commander Administration. If he was the latter, then he would have been outside the SDS chain of command.

64. While there I have some doubt over their ranks, Chief Superintendents Derek Kneale, Ken Pryde and Geoffrey Craft were all in the S Squad office during my time as a manager with the SDS. Dave Short was also in the S Squad office briefly as a DCI and then he came into the SDS to replace me when I moved on in early 1982.

Undercover Officers

65. The following UCOs were members of the SDS during my tenure: [REDACTED] 27

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] HN356, HN80, HN126, HN106, HN96, HN155, HN20 and others

66. I am reasonably confident that the following officers joined the SDS during my time as a manager: [REDACTED] 28

[REDACTED] HN65, Roger Pearce, HN19 and others

67. There were no other UCOs that I can recall being on the SDS during my time.

Special Demonstration Squad – Role and Annual Reports

68. The role and purpose of the SDS was primarily providing public order intelligence. The reporting that the Inquiry has in its possession may appear to demonstrate a greater focus on counter-subversion but this is most likely attributable to these reports being retrieved in large part from the Security Service's archives. After SDS reports left the office, they became the responsibility of S Squad and we kept no copies, so I cannot comment on what happened to our public order reporting.

69. I do not recall the Annual Report for 1979 at all (MPS-0728963), even though it is my signature at the bottom of page 12. Given that I know I moved to B Squad in January 1982, it seems that the Annual Report for 1981 (MPS-0728985) which is under cover of a letter dated 1 March 1982 must have been largely completed by the end of 1981 in order for me to have signed it. As I have described elsewhere, I believe that the SDS Annual Reports were created by collaborative effort.

70. These Annual Reports would not have been produced unless they had been requested and, while I do not directly recollect the circumstances, the correspondence which accompanies them makes it clear that Home Office authority to continue SDS

operations had to be sought annually and the Annual Reports were used as part of that process.

71. My signature at the end of each of the Annual Reports for 1979, 1981 and 1981 shows that I was responsible for their contents but I certainly do not recall reviewing the UCOs' reports for the year in order to compile the lists of groups or the summaries for the main groups covered. It is likely that my role was editorial.
72. While I do not now recognise many of the groups referred to in the overall coverage, that may be because some of them were very minor and UCOs had only passing contact with them but were still able to gain useful intelligence. Paragraph 2 of the Annual Report for 1980 (MPS-0728962-3) makes it clear that the groups listed "have been penetrated directly or to a sufficient extent to enable monitoring of their more important activities". In my opinion, the reports do present an accurate factual picture of SDS operations and intelligence at the time. Again, it would be very "un-Branch-like" to put a gloss on any document.
73. As I have described at paragraph 37 above, SDS coverage was geographic and confined to the extreme left-wing and anarchist groups. In general, UCOs were left to infiltrate targets of opportunity within a given area. I can only think of one UCO who was tasked into a specific group [REDACTED] 29 [REDACTED] and was debriefed extensively by the Security Service at the end of his deployment. There may have been a small number of others but I do not now recall who they were.
74. UCOs targeting decisions were based on where they might best obtain information on demonstrations. The SWP was particularly active in organising and coordinating events, and this group provided a focus for public order intelligence. There was occasionally some trial and error involved as some groups turned out to be of peripheral importance from an intelligence perspective, despite their own publicity.
75. Given the primary role of the SDS to gather public order intelligence, it seems reasonable to adopt measures of success based on UCOs accurately forecasting events with potential public order implications and maintaining their cover. Against those

two yardsticks, UCOs were uniformly successful in infiltrating Trotskyist, Marxist-Leninist and Anarchist groups. The "pro-Irish", Anti-Fascist and Anti-Nuclear groups (with the exception of CND) were largely front organisations for the main Trotskyist and Marxist-Leninist groups, or were affiliated to them in some other way.

76. For each organisation listed immediately above, the SDS had no role in policing crime in the strict sense of that term. UCOs were not interested in obtaining evidence for criminal prosecutions, while being careful to avoid becoming involved in, or encouraging the commission of, criminal acts. Any assistance that the Security Service derived from the UCOs was incidental to their deployments, albeit they would try to respond to requests for information where they could. The balance of reporting is tipped largely in favour of the Security Service because, as I understand it, it has provided the majority of the reports that are available to the Inquiry.
77. I do not know why the SDS did not target either the Official IRA or the Provisional IRA, although I am aware that this was a policy decision that was taken at a more senior level. It was a correct decision in my view: it would have been nonsense to imagine that an ordinary C Squad officer would be able to infiltrate either group successfully.
78. I have considered the Marxist-Leninist and Anti-Fascist groups listed in the Annual Report for 1979 (MPS-0728963) and for 1980 (MPS-0728962) and in particular [REDACTED] 30 [REDACTED] and 'Schoolkids against the Nazis'. I do not recollect the groups themselves and I cannot comment directly on the extent to which the monitoring of these groups assisted with policing crime and public disorder or assisted the Security Service. It seems to me more likely than not that these were groups which were not penetrated directly but where UCOs obtained information indirectly through related adult groups. Furthermore, I doubt these groups were formed or directed by children as such and expect that they were fronts for or puppets of other far left-wing groups using children to further their own agendas.
79. I have considered the 1979 Annual Report (MPS-0728963) and the reports dated 30 May and 17 October 1979 (UCPI0000021297 and UCPI0000013500) which relate to the death of Blair Peach and the subsequent campaign but I cannot really comment on

whether the campaigners sought to discredit and criticise the police, or whether they were reported on for that reason. The former report pre-dates my time with the SDS by a number of months, although I note that there is a significant focus on the SWP within the report. I was still very new in post when the latter was submitted, and so I did not have the insight to be directing officers' efforts. Again, as far as I recall, the Anti-Nazi League was affiliated to the SWP.

80. I cannot now recall what public order issues arose in connection with the death of Blair Peach, although I imagine that there is plenty of information in the public domain from which these could be assessed.

81. The SDS's move to ³² Vincent Square that is reported in the Annual Report for 1980 (MPS-0728962) had no real effect on operational independence or managerial oversight. It was an appropriate venue for us to work from, probably more so than New Scotland Yard, and we lost none of our accountability, certainly not when seen from the UCOs' perspective. There is objectively a difference between being in a different building and having your senior officers down the corridor but ultimately it comes down to levels of trust: either the senior managers trusted us to carry out our work appropriately or they did not. I am sure that S Squad would have put us on a shorter rein wherever we were located if they had doubted our performance or our standards of behaviour.

82. I have considered the Annual Report for 1980 at paragraphs 8-9 (MPS-0728962) and agree that this section deals with welfare explicitly. Clearly Chief Superintendents Kneale and Pryde had this in mind when they interviewed me for the role as DI in the SDS but there was nothing in that conversation in particular that indicated that they considered there to be a shortfall in the welfare provision before I joined. I do not know whether my approach differed from that of my predecessors significantly.

83. The protest at Torness was unusual in that there was a camp of up to 10,000 protesters set up at the site. It was also unusual because I went up to East Lothian on at least one occasion to support the UCO who was within the camp. I remember that DCI Moss was also up there, which explains the reference in the Security Service Note

for File of the meeting on 8 April 1980 (UCPI0000028814). We liaised closely with the Lothian and Borders Police Special Branch, and I am reasonably certain that they understood that we had an officer with the activists in the camp, even if this was never stated expressly.

84. As I recall, I also travelled to Merseyside on one occasion with DS Croyden to liaise with local Special Branch there, albeit the precise circumstances escape me. It may have related to one of the Right to Work marches that were a feature of the time. Similarly, I remember travelling back from somewhere, I think it was Scotland, through Yorkshire. In each case, it is the journey itself that has stuck in my mind. On the way back from the former visit we were stopped by an officer from the Leicestershire Constabulary, and on the latter we had lunch in a pub owned by the Sam Smiths brewery, which sticks in my mind.
85. There were not many occasions when we would travel to be near to a UCO or notify another force of our activity. My recollection now is that the UCO would have to be outside the MPS jurisdiction for more than a day or two before we would consider accompanying them discreetly. If that was the case, then it was good form to liaise with the local Special Branch so that they were aware that MPSB had an interest, even if we did not always disclose precisely what form that interest took. If the UCO was only out of our area for the day, then we would not travel and we did not inform the local Special Branch.
86. I have considered the Annual Report for 1981 (MPS-0728985) and the passage indicated at paragraph 16 in particular. As to the conclusion that the Brixton Riots were not instigated by any known subversive group, that was an inference anyone could draw from the information we received. If you are in the business of providing intelligence, negative assessments can be just as valuable as positive reports. That paragraph indicates that good intelligence about these groups showed that they were *not involved and the riots had none of the hallmarks of being organised. They were more spontaneous than that.* I am reasonably certain that members of some of the anarchist groups we covered joined in on an *ad hoc* basis, however.

87. I am not certain that there was a Superintendent in the S Squad office or whether the senior officers were both Chief Superintendents. At any rate, one of the two had specific responsibility for the SDS, although I cannot now remember whether this was Chief Superintendent Kneale or Pryde. Later, Geoffrey Craft had particular responsibility for the SDS.
88. I met with the senior officer in S Squad less than once a week. As I have described elsewhere, the Branch was small and everyone knew everyone else, particularly at the more senior ranks. With the exception of the overtime issues that I have dealt with at paragraph 28 above, the senior officers in the S Squad office would not have felt the need to supervise the SDS management closely. Occasionally they would request specific information about events that had been well-publicised but otherwise the SDS was left to get on with things.
89. All MPSB reporting was signed off by an officer more senior than the individual who drafted it, albeit in the mainstream Squads it was more usually signed off at a slightly lower managerial level. S Squad was structured slightly differently because it contained the technical, photographic and surveillance sections as well as the SDS but there was no real significance in the fact that a report was signed on behalf of a Chief Superintendent, and the Inquiry is correct in its belief that this sign off was delegated to the DCI in the SDS as a matter of course.
90. The decisions that were taken regarding the dissemination of the reports were of far greater significance. The S Squad office would have completed a minute sheet which was attached to the front of each report, and this showed which file(s) the report should be added to and which Squads should see it. Occasionally, reports of particular quality or importance would be sent to more senior officers. It is unfortunate that the copies of reports I have been provided with all appear to have come from the Security Service because this crucial detail will be missing: the minute sheet would have been kept and filed with the original report. It would always show the direct recipients of the report and occasionally it might have a brief comment on it, such as "outstanding work".

91. The SDS sign off procedure largely replicated the general MPSB procedure. There were usually two or three DCIs sitting in each squad's office and reports would be submitted to them by the DCs and DSs. These would be checked and signed off and the minute sheet filled in. If the report was particularly interesting or covered a range of matters, it might go to 8 or 10 people, as well as going onto its own file if the individuals or groups concerned had their own RF, or onto a '400' bulk file if not.
92. I believe that public order information would have been passed to A8 through one of the 'conventional' desks. This would most likely have been C Squad given its responsibility for left-wing and anarchist groups. If the information was urgent, it would have been dealt with by a telephone call, potentially via the MPSB Reserve. As an example, on routine MPSB work an officer might have been required to cover Speaker's Corner on a Sunday morning. Immediately afterwards, he would have put a message in by telephone to the MPSB Reserve, briefly summarising what had occurred. This would have been written down and marked 'report to follow', which the officer would have completed on the following Monday. If there was an urgent and important matter, MPSB Reserve would call out a senior officer.
93. Above Chief Superintendent, there was not much involvement at all in the SDS. Commander Operations or Commander Administration might visit one of the safe houses occasionally but I do not believe that they would have routinely seen the reports. There would be a three-line whip for the UCOs and the senior officer would give them a bit of a pep talk and thank them for their work. I am not certain but a Deputy Assistant Commissioner may have visited a safe house on one occasion. I cannot remember anyone more senior visiting.
94. It is clear from the correspondence cited at paragraph 61 above that the Assistant Commissioner (Crime) dealt with the Home Office regarding the authorisation of and funding for SDS operations but I do not believe that he or anyone more senior was ever involved directly. Beyond going to the S Squad office to deal with SDS matters face-to-face, we were left very much alone. As far as I was concerned then and now, the SDS provided a terrific service, trouble free, and the only officer who ever complained that it cost a lot of money was Geoffrey Craft. I do not recall there ever

being a dressing down from a senior officer or any indication that the SDS was causing problems.

Responses regarding Specific Undercover Officers

33:

HN21

95. I did not instruct or encourage ³⁴ HN21 to report on the Blair Peach Campaign and do not believe that any of the other managers did so either during my time with the SDS. However, if a UCO's target group was involved in a campaign they would inevitably report on it as a matter of course. I do not recall any reporting on Blair Peach's funeral, which was before I joined the SDS in any event.

35

HN21

96. I was not aware that ³⁵ HN21 had admitted any inappropriate behaviour with two females, who I understand were not members of his target group(s), before reading about it in this Rule 9 request. It follows that I could not have done anything about it at the time.

36

HN106 ³⁶ "Lionel Barry Tomkins"

97. As with the allegations in respect of ³⁷ HN21 above, I was wholly unaware of any alleged impropriety between ³⁸ HN106 and ³⁸ Privacy or ³⁸ Privacy prior to reading this R9 request. In particular, I have no recollection of speaking with ³⁸ HN106 about an intercepted call, whether as he suggests in his statement or at all. It seems unlikely that I would have been quite so easy going if I had been aware that he was spending as much time as he claims at ³⁸ Privacy's home, even if this was entirely platonic.

98. From the passage provided to me, it seems as though he was quite close to the lady. I know that he was married with young children at the time and I believe I would have reminded him about his obligations to them and to the job in fairly strong terms if I had even the slightest suspicion that he had or was tempted to stray. I would certainly have checked with him that his wife knew where he was on the evenings when he stayed over. It is possible that ³⁹ HN106 has mixed me up with one of the other managers.

40

[REDACTED]

41

99.

[REDACTED]

I do not recall discussions on the SDS about how to deflect suspicion about UCOs not being in a relationship.

42

43

100.

[REDACTED]

In my view this was not an issue because this could and should have been adequately addressed in their legend.

44

101.

[REDACTED]

45

HN65 [REDACTED] "Anthony Kerr"

102. I do not believe that I knew much of the detail of Rick Clark's "outing" until I read the passage from ⁴⁵ [REDACTED] HN65's [REDACTED] statement, although I may have been told that he was withdrawn with some haste when his cover was compromised. If I knew anything about the alleged impropriety at the time, I would probably have treated it as a very uncharacteristic outlier. The early termination of his deployment, and the risk of exposing the SDS, should have been enough of a warning to subsequent UCOs.

103. If I had been aware of any impropriety, I would not have tolerated it: the UCO would have been removed just as soon as I could make it happen. The issue arose later when I was in Protection and one of the PCs on the team had an affair with a member of the principal's / Prime Minister's secretarial team and I had him removed. I do not consider myself a prude but my principal and their office did not need any distractions because of one of my officer's dalliances.

104. As I have described above, I had very little involvement with the training or preparation of new UCOs for their deployments. I do not know if the use of Rick Clark as a cautionary example was fostered by other managers but I did not do so: I do not know enough about it even now to be able to talk about it effectively for a role that I have never performed myself.

Responses on Specific Issues

Positions of responsibility in target groups

105. I am told that a number of UCOs assumed positions of responsibility within their target groups. UCOs did not require permission before they did anything that was consistent with their role as a police officer first and foremost, although the managers took care to be available to provide guidance. As regards taking up a position of responsibility: as long as they kept within acceptable parameters, they were encouraged to take on positions that improved the quality of the information they could obtain. The rule against acting as *agent provocateur* meant that they could not influence their organisation's actions or collect house bricks for use as missiles but it did not stop them occupying administrative positions such as membership secretary or treasurer. As managers, we had a reasonable expectation that they would keep us informed.

106. Roles which brought UCOs into direct conflict with their basic policing role of maintaining the Queen's peace were not permissible. If there was doubt over the scope of the role or its potential to involve them in taking decisions that influenced coming events, then there would have been a discussion that involved the S Squad office as well as the SDS managers and the individual UCO. Some officers seemed to produce greater detail than others, probably because they had more opportunity or better access. As a manager, I would encourage UCOs to become as involved as they could without crossing the line between acceptable recording roles and unacceptable direction setting and incitement. The better UCOs in my view were those who appeared to be well-known and liked within their organisations and were helpful.

Use of deceased children's identities

107. I am told that a number of UCOs who were deployed during my time as a manager adopted the identities of deceased children as part of their legends. I have no idea when this practice began. When I joined the SDS, I had no idea that was how they established their cover identities, although I now believe the tactic was firmly established by that time. I do not recall precisely when I became aware of it: I believe one prospective UCO mentioned in passing how tedious it was going through the telephone directory checking names, presumably to reduce the risk of running into a relative of the deceased child.
108. Once I was aware of the practice, I considered that this was a reasonable method of establishing a cover identity. As far as I can recall, none of the prospective UCOs ever asked me whether or not they should use the tactic. I agree that I tacitly approved of the tactic.
109. I do not believe the potential impact on the families of the deceased children was ever discussed. The SDS was a top secret unit carrying out highly sensitive work and the assumption was that relatives would never become aware of the practice. I acknowledge that the revelation of this practice has caused hurt to a number of families, and greatly regret that hurt, I nonetheless still believe that it was necessary for the UCOs to protect themselves and the SDS in this way.

Sexual relationships in undercover identities

110. I do not recall that I ever had a conversation on the topic of UCOs having sexual relationships in their undercover identities in all my time with the SDS, whether *formally or informally*. There just was not an occasion on which I felt anything needed to be said. The UCOs were all colleagues, and in some cases friends, whose wives and families I knew. If the topic had ever arisen, I would have been concerned about the impact on the women involved and the family of the officer, as well as the compromise of his cover identity and the wider SDS operation. Given what now appears to have been going on around that time, perhaps it did need saying after all, notwithstanding the trust that I felt went with their role as MPSB officers.

111. As far as I am aware, Barry Moss never passed on any instructions or guidance on the subject and never discussed it informally in my presence. I was a very close friend of 46 HN68 and I am confident he would have told me if any of the UCOs had ever disclosed any impropriety to him or if he had ever had any sort of conversation about sexual relations with one of them.
112. As I have said elsewhere, my view now is that there was no need for UCOs to have intimate relationships, even those short of sexual activity, while they were in their cover identities. Rather than strengthening their cover, it would have increased the risk of an accidental unmasking in my opinion. It could also have caused harm to anyone caught up in the deception and marital difficulties for the UCOs because, as far as I can recall, all of the UCOs during my time were married. Without making any moral judgment, that would have had serious implications for any UCO engaged in stressful and potentially dangerous work.
113. I do not and did not know of any UCOs whose service in the SDS overlapped with mine engaging in sexual activity with others whilst in their cover identity.

Commission of Criminal Offences whilst Undercover

114. I did not give any UCOs advice or instructions about the commission of criminal offences in their cover identities or generally. These were MPSB officers and I felt that I did not need to do so because it would have been an insult to their intelligence. Any UCO who did require such instructions, and in my view there were not any at the time, also would have demonstrated a distinct lack of judgment by those responsible for selecting them both for service with the SDS and with the Branch more generally. I did not have any professional contact with the SDS after I finished there as a manager, so I do not presume to speak for the officers who followed me.
115. Similarly, I do not remember any informal conversations with UCOs about criminal offences. That is not to say that this did not happen, but if it did the offences were probably so minor that they were forgotten almost immediately. That may also explain why I do not recall any of the other managers having this sort of discussion with our UCOs, either formally or informally.

116. I have read paragraph 3 of the Security Service Note for File dated 4 October 1979 (UCPI0000028810). The content of that paragraph is characteristic of the attitude of Mike Ferguson, who would not have been too concerned about possible minor criminality provided there was intelligence benefit. I am not sure that I adopted wholly the same approach but there was definitely a balance to be struck that permitted UCOs to maintain their cover and reach positions where they had access to better quality information.
117. As far as I recall, the only method for the SDS to “insulate [its] sources” was as Mike Ferguson described it: no prosecution would be pursued against any of the UCO’s co-arrestees. I am not wholly certain, however, because it never happened during my tenure. There may have been a system, including for agents more broadly, where a senior MPS officer would approach the court if a prosecution could not be avoided. I cannot be sure that ever happened or whether I was just told it would happen in certain circumstances. That potentially provided an additional layer of protection.
118. I do not believe that I was ever made aware of a UCO committing a criminal offence while undercover.

Agent Provocateur

119. As far as I was aware at the time all MPSB officers had a shared understanding that they could not act as an agent provocateur, in the same way that they knew they could not commit criminal offences. For that reason, I do not believe this was ever formally or informally discussed, whether by myself or any of the other managers.
120. UCOs were with their target groups primarily to gather information, not to engage in criminality or encourage others to do so. If they could prevent unlawful behaviour without compromising their cover that was a distinct benefit of their deployment but there was no expectation in this regard. Had they been faced with serious criminality where lives were at risk, I would have expected UCOs to compromise their cover.

Contact with the Criminal Justice System as the Suspect or the Defendant

121. I do not think I ever gave any sort of advice or guidance to UCOs about what to do if they became caught up in the criminal justice system. After this amount of time it is difficult to distinguish what was said rather than thinking that was what should happen. I believe that the general instruction was for UCOs to attempt to call a manager if they could, and we would work it out for that particular set of circumstances. If they could not get in touch with the office, UCOs were trusted to follow the best course of action as they saw it at the time, and we would sort things out if we had to when they did make us aware. In any event, I do not believe that any of the UCOs I managed ever got caught up in this way.

Violence and Public Disorder

122. It was a fundamental but unwritten rule for the UCOs that they were there to observe and report. Clearly they had to attend numerous events where there was a risk of violence or public disorder but my feeling was that they knew to avoid direct involvement. I never felt that I had to get involved in those sorts of conversations: if that had been the case, then it would have meant that we had recruited the wrong people.

123. I am not aware that other managers had any kind of discussion with the UCOs about the risk of violence and public disorder. It may be that some had a slightly different attitude, although I think that is unlikely, but they did not say anything in my presence and it was not something they discussed with me. I am not aware of any of the UCOs getting caught up in violence or public disorder when I was a manager although their target groups did and they would have been present on some of these occasions.

Legally Professionally Privileged Material

124. I believe that the concept of legally privileged material was covered on the junior CID course and so I would have been familiar with the concept when I was a manager in the SDS. As the UCOs would generally have attended the same course either before joining MPSB or in their early days with the Branch, I do not think it was ever

considered necessary to discuss this with them. I am fairly certain that I never gave the UCOs any instructions, advice or guidance on this topic, nor do I believe that any was given or requested. Similarly, the UCOs were never told to go and look for or obtain legally privileged material.

125. I do not recall that any of the UCOs reported legally privileged material during my time with the unit. Insofar as they may have come across it and either reported it or not, it would have been because the information was shared at some form of meeting or otherwise published to their group.

Activities of Elected Politicians

126. As far as I can remember, I never gave the UCOs any instructions, advice or guidance on reporting on or interacting with elected politicians – neither to warn them off or encourage them. I imagine the same is true for the other managers. I cannot now remember if MPs had files in the MPSB registry, or folios in the secret green files, which were kept separately and where you could only see the specific folio that you had requested.
127. It is entirely possible that UCOs reported that an MP attended a meeting or event and whether they spoke at it, and provided a summary of any speech. If an MP was scheduled to address a meeting or demonstration in many cases this would have indicated a larger attendance, and possibly the mood and intentions of the attendees. I do not recall any specific examples but see, for example, the report dated 1 April 1981 (UCPI0000016568) which deals with a meeting at which an MP spoke. In my view, paragraph 5 of the report deals in straightforward terms with what was said and how it was received by the attendees.

Reporting on Individuals

128. I have been asked to consider a small selection of reports and provide my comments against each:

46(i)



(a)UCPI0000014184 dated 18 August 1980 - I do not know for certain why the officer reported that the couple had separated. It appears to have meant a change of address for one of the individuals and that may in turn have affected their attendance and activity within their group. One of the individuals was a full-time party organiser and so he would have been reasonably important in that area. The other also had her own MPSB file and so was presumably of interest in her own right. The officer would not have been tasked to find out information about their personal relationship but clearly considered that it had value for keeping the files up to date. Not all the information that MPSB obtained and recorded had immediate intelligence value but occasionally it had a latent value, and he would have lost nothing if it later turned out not to be important. The focus appears to be on the implications of the separation for the couple's political activities.

(b)UCPI0000014258 dated 2 September 1980 – This appears to be a comprehensive report compiled on opening a new MPSB file and some of the contents may have come from other sources. The officer has reported a belief that the marriage was not consummated and that the couple do not live together, which tends to support the view that it was a marriage of convenience. I believe that this group frequently engaged in sham marriages in order to circumvent immigration rules. While other aspects of the report are useful, I would agree that some of the detail is not necessarily relevant. The format and contents are not unusual for an MPSB comprehensive report whether or not this was produced by a UCO.

(c)UCPI0000015431 dated 24 June 1981 – accompanies a photograph of an individual who was a member of the SWP. This report was submitted at a time when there were far fewer openly gay people and so the description may have been more useful for identification purposes and he may have been involved in related activism. The officer may even have been uncertain that the description was correct, hence the use of inverted commas.

(d)UCPI0000015469 dated 10 July 1981 – there is a strong possibility that a lot of the names and addresses obtained from the individual's address book are irrelevant. It is also certain that the officer who provided them would have been criticised if he had not copied the names and addresses when he had access to them, or had he not done so accurately. It is difficult to say at the point of collection what is relevant but if the individual became a significant player who was later arrested for serious offences, those investigating would have found it very useful to know who his contacts were.

46(i)

(e)UCPI0000015507 dated 20 July 1981 and UCPI0000017041 dated 29 December 1981 – while it may seem distasteful to some, it was important to record when significant individuals who were the subject of MPSB files had died so that their files could be updated and closed accordingly. The former gives details of a planned memorial service, which could have been a significant event in itself. The latter gives details of a funeral which appears to have had political overtones and it might be that the UCO in question could not reasonably have been absent. Clearly if there had been an intrusive presence at the funerals themselves, that could rightly have been criticised.

46(i)

(h)UCPI0000016729 dated 17 November 1981 – while the fact that the individual has moved to a new address is relevant for keeping MPSB files updated, the remainder of the report appears somewhat gratuitous but could follow on from previous reporting and may have been thought a relevant feature of the individual's profile. I have no doubt that the officer did not imagine it would be subject to public scrutiny nearly forty years later.

(i)UCPI0000016738 also dated 17 November 1981 – this report does not allege any impropriety by the individual. It is clear that he only intends to draw unemployment benefit "when eligible". The focus, however, is that he has more time to devote to political work for the RCP and a record of an individual's employment or lack of employment and their plans and means would be relevant to a full picture of them.

(j)UCPI0000016823 dated 11 December 1981 – there is a great deal more to the report than the subject's mental health, although this does have a bearing on the tolerance of other anarchists for him. I agree that some of the detail is a little too personal.

(k)UCPI0000017032 dated 18 December 1981 – this is a detailed report on someone who was very active with the RCP and much of the detail is useful. The description of her finances is perhaps a little intrusive but may in due course have indicated a significant donation to party funds, if tied in with other information.

(l)Some of the individuals in the reports commented on by HN307 in, amongst other places, paragraphs 128 and 133 had Security Service File references and so would have been of interest to the Security Service. The information in those reports may therefore have been of interest to the Security Service and is relevant to why the information was recorded by the SDS.

129. Having considered the reports above, a close reading shows that each of them contains relevant and useful information, even though parts may seem unacceptable

in today's context. The difficulty is that you either have state-controlled organisations that keep a record of potential extremists and activists, or you do not. When something untoward happens, there will be some who will most likely criticise the state if it does not react quickly enough, and in a targeted fashion, to investigate the perpetrators and bring them to justice. That is much more difficult to do from a standing start. I do not believe that individuals finding their names on a Special Branch or Security Service file is too high a price to pay for comprehensive intelligence coverage, providing that those individuals were not unlawfully discriminated against because of this.

130. I would also emphasise that numerous MPSB files contained information of the same kind whether or not reported by a UCO or obtained from another source. This was the kind of information the Branch and the Security Service collected as part of the wider intelligence picture.
131. It is also important for the Inquiry to understand the latent value of some information and the fact that intelligence collection inevitably harvests both wheat and chaff. For that reason, I do not believe I ever criticised any officer, whether UCO or otherwise, for reporting in too much or potentially inappropriate detail. I did not want to discourage them from making their reports as comprehensive as possible. There may have been occasions when the reports were cut very slightly when they were being typed up *but never to remove detail. It was for the regular desks and the Security Service to put in the analytical work.*
132. In hindsight, some events may have had less significance than they were assigned at the time, and some groups were victims of their own PR in that they attracted Special Branch and Security Service interest beyond their actual relevance and importance but I doubt whether *very many people in the early 1980s would have predicted the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact within a decade.*

Reporting on Trade Unions

133. I have considered the three reports indicated by the Inquiry that relate to trade unions:

46(i)

a) UCPI0000013754 dated 8 February 1980 – it is clear that this is an SWP meeting regarding the support it was organising around the country. All except one of the attendees have MPSB file references against their names.

b) UCPI0000015585 dated 10 September 1981 and UCPI0000015626 dated 23 September 1981 – both cover the same CND bulletin written by a member of the SWP. The reports deal with a CND attempt to influence trade unions and garner their support, including financially. This was initiated by the SWP element within CND and refers to three forthcoming demonstrations.

Insofar as this is representative of some reporting which mentions trade unions, it does not focus on the trade unions themselves but provides information about possible subversion of those organisations, as well as more public order oriented considerations of possible numbers of attendees in the event that CND successfully generated active support from within the trades union movement. If I recall correctly, there were at least a couple of very significant CND marches in London in the early 1980s.

Reporting for Public Order Purposes

134. The UCOs would maintain a constant flow of information from their groups which would cover the essentials of what each was planning and doing. They would also provide updating reports that were useful to the officers working on enquiries.
135. I also remember receiving messages through S Squad along the lines of "A8 are getting terribly worked up about an event a fortnight Saturday, what can you find out about it?" Even then, there was generally time for a UCO to attend one of the regular meetings and pass their information on. While I do not now recall specific examples of it happening during my time, I am sure that if matters developed during the course of an event that might lead to disorder, a UCO would have found some way of slipping off to use a public telephone either to us in the office or to the SB reserve. These more focused and time sensitive tasks were a good way of reminding the UCOs that their reporting was relevant and useful to our police colleagues.

136. The UCOs' reports on forthcoming demonstrations were of great use in public order policing but they were not, or at least should not, have been the sole source of intelligence. It was one source from which A8 and the local divisions could triangulate the levels of support for an event and activists' likely intentions, including whether there was a significant risk of disorder or violence.
137. The more accurate the information on which these assessments were based, the better their estimate of the manpower required to police the event, and whether specialist police would be required. That in turn ensured that leave was not cancelled and unnecessary overtime avoided on the one hand, whilst being reasonably certain that they could respond appropriately to all but the most extraordinary developments on the other.

Reporting on Groups

138. I have considered the report on an SWP district dated 26 February 1980 (UCPI0000013803) but I disagree that it considers the group in any particular depth: it reports the membership, branches and the district committee members. That is not to say that it was not useful: the majority of MPSB officers would have had little idea of the composition, numbers and leadership of the various activist groups. Snapshots such as this would have contributed to the overall London intelligence picture on the SWP.
139. I have no direct knowledge of how the Security Service used this reporting but I imagine that it influenced their operational decision-making, including the deployment of technical means, as well as feeding into that organisation's role in national security vetting.

Social Justice Campaigns

140. The report dated 18 August 1980 (UCP0000015540) describes a public meeting of the Winston Rose Action Campaign, at which an undeclared SWP activist and an openly anti-police ELWAR activist spoke. I do not believe that a UCO was tasked to attend the meeting: it is more likely that they attended with other members of ELWAR (a front

for the RCP) or the SWP who were in turn seeking to influence the campaign. It is clear from the report that the more radical speakers found some limited sympathy for the direct action they proposed, including attacks on the police. The report's value is in the information regarding the planned vigil and the mood of the attendees.

141. I do not recall tasking UCOs to report on social justice campaigns, either generally or specifically, nor can I definitively state on the limited reports I have seen that this never happened.

Identification of Activists

142. I have considered the Security Service Note for File dated 7 October 1981 (UCPI0000027529) which does not specifically deal with photographs for identification purposes, and which I believe actually refers to photographs of the interior of SWP headquarters. It does contain an implicit request for a copy of the SWP membership list. I do not recall ever passing photographs to the Security Service, although it appears that I did on that occasion. As I observe elsewhere, however, I do not recall having the degree of contact with the Security Service that is apparent on the face of their records.
143. The report dated 23 January 1980 (UCPI0000013727) with a photograph attached appears to have been passed to the Security Service. As a general rule, decisions on the dissemination of reports were taken at S Squad level or higher. I doubt the photograph was taken by a UCO but they could be tasked to identify people in photographs taken by others.
144. It was considered important generally to be able to identify of persons of interest from photographs. MPSB had its own photographic section, with which we shared the building at Vincent Square. From that baseline, the importance of identifying activists depended on the perceived importance of their group or the risk that they posed.

Contribution to policing and counter-subversion

145. The SDS's main achievement for the benefit of policing was its contribution to intelligence about public disorder and it is a shame that so few of those records

appear to have been preserved. This is followed by the provision of information to update MPSB files. It was never the Branch's role to contribute directly to the prevention or detection of crime. Key successes which are apparent from the relevant annual reports are:

- (a) The prevention of serious disorder and property damage at Torness (MPS-0728962-8 para.16);
- (b) Effective policing along the route of the 1980 Right to Work march from Port Talbot (MPS-0728962-9 para.19);
- (c) The assistance provided to Lancashire Constabulary in policing the Right to Work march from Liverpool to Blackpool (MPS-0728985-9 para.18); and
- (d) Advance notice of the potential subversion of CND activities through the use of direct action against Cruise missile deployments.

146. MPSB and the Security Service had a close relationship and a, usually healthy, rivalry almost by tradition. MPSB and the wider MPS, A8 in particular, were the unit's primary customer and the SDS provided largely collateral assistance to the Security Service. Its records show that the SDS co-operated readily with them to meet specific intelligence requirements. The Security Service occasionally showed a great deal of interest in our output, such as a report one of the UCOs produced on the IMG. Even if we did provide intelligence 'to order' for the Security Service, that was still of benefit to the Branch, and one of its functions was to support the Security Service.

Overtime Payments

147. Overtime was a significant component of a UCO's overall pay, so much so that there was constant pressure on me to reduce the amount of overtime that the UCOs claimed, in particular from Geoffrey Craft. In my experience, pay was an important element for the UCOs but nobody ever asked to stay with the SDS for the money. Every officer defended their position when there were attempts to reduce overtime and this was reasonable given the hours they worked and the sacrifices they made.

The whole issue could have been solved by offering UCOs a generous allowance, which was a position I maintained throughout most of my time with the SDS.

148. I never had the impression that a UCO was influenced to paint an overly optimistic picture of what they achieved during their deployment because of the overtime that was on offer. I have described at paragraph 33 above that UCOs might on occasion have submitted reports which were of marginal relevance because their group was in a quiet period but they were still attending meetings to maintain their cover. This never came across as attempting to justify their overtime, and I would rather they reported something than got out of the habit of reporting altogether.
149. Similarly, I never felt that a UCO was influenced to stay on the unit for the overtime when this was against his welfare interests. My focus as a manager was on UCOs' welfare and I would not have permitted this in any event.

Formal Policies and Procedures

150. I am reasonably certain that the SDS did not have any of its own formal policies or procedures. We were a squad within Special Branch and, beyond our specialised role, were just the same as the other squads. We were subject to MPSB and MPS policies and procedures.

The Security Service

151. I have considered the selection of Security Service Notes for File and Loose Minutes provided as part of my witness pack (UCPI0000028810, UCPI0000029198, UCPI0000028812, UCPI0000028813, UCPI0000028814, UCPI0000028816, UCPI0000028817, UCPI0000028819, UCPI0000029200, UCPI0000028824, UCPI0000028828, UCPI0000029203, UCPI0000027529, UCPI0000029029, UCPI0000027532, UCPI0000028840, UCPI0000029192). I did not remember that I had quite so many meetings with the desk officer at the Security Service as these documents show. The first of these dated 4 October 1979 places emphasis on the value of regular meetings (UCPI0000028810-3 para.4). I remember [redacted] SyS officer [redacted] 46(ii) very clearly. The meetings appear to have had formal and informal elements, which

makes sense from promoting a spirit of co-operation. As far as I can recall the SDS representatives at these meetings did not make any written notes: we relied on our memories.

152. A number of the Security Service Notes for File have been redacted notwithstanding the fact that I was involved and present at the time. I am advised that the redactions cannot have been made pursuant to statutory bars on the disclosure of interception-related materials and I cannot comment on whether they conceal references to Security Service informants, intelligence from telephone taps or eavesdropping devices or something else considered too sensitive for me to be reminded of. It is possible that sight of the redacted information might jog my memory about the SDS relationship with the Security Service, which was clearly much closer than I previously recalled.

153. As I understood them at the time, the meetings between the SDS and the Security Service were an opportunity to maximise the coverage possible with both organisations' scarce resources. As far as I am aware, both the SDS and the Security Service operated on the 'need to know' principle, and so I think we were both careful not to reveal anything more than the bare minimum to ensure effective cooperation. That made things awkward on occasions (Note for File dated 7 October 1981 (UCPI0000027529-1 para.4)). The relationship as I recall it, and as it seems to me now, was unequal and favoured the Security Service.

154. While the SDS managers were responsible for this liaison role on our side, the decisions on the dissemination of our reports were taken by the S Squad office, and done via official channels. Insofar as documents were provided directly to the Security Service at these meetings, that would only have happened with approval at senior level. The Security Service would pass questions to us for our UCOs which we would answer if we could.

155. I have considered in particular the reference to paragraph 2 of the Security Service Note for File dated 21 October 1981 (UCPI0000029029). This seems to build on the previous meeting recorded in the Note for File dated 7 October 1981

(UCPI0000027529-1) and it is possible that, rather than being a notification requirement, this was a gentle reminder to the SDS to ensure the necessary authorisation was in place for the UCOs' activity. I do not believe that there was any control by the Security Service over the SDS. We would co-operate as far as we were able and accommodate their requests within our policing remit but we existed primarily to service the needs of Special Branch and the MPS.

156. The Security Service occasionally provided the SDS with preparatory notes or briefs but in general our information flowed in their direction. One particular occasion is referred to when I am supposed to have called from the offices of the Security Service to our office to check on some details. I do not think this would have happened as described unless there was some particular urgency. In particular, I do not recall there being an appropriate telephone line in the SDS office. I understand that one of the UCOs has suggested there was a secret telephone line in one of the safe houses. That was not the case in my time: these were not common items and, as the safe house was unoccupied for lengthy periods of time, there was too much of a risk of unauthorised access.

Oversight Bodies

157. There were no visits by any member of an outside body with regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing to the SDS during my time.

Leaving the SDS

158. I left the SDS in early 1982. I was called over to New Scotland Yard and Commander Wilson told me that my time was up. I protested because I was enjoying the role but he warned me that I could not spend too long with the unit because there was a danger of losing my objectivity: he said that it was time for me to move on to another role before I unquestioningly took the side of the UCOs in all matters. There was nothing strange about moving on after approximately two years: that was about the standard period in any one management role at that time.

Post Special Demonstration Squad Police Career

159. After I left the SDS, I went to the National Joint Unit on B Squad until 1985 and then onto Protection where I spent the rest of my career. As far as I am aware, I did not have any further contact with the SDS or the intelligence it provided after in either role.
160. After retiring from the MPSB, I worked for a time with former Special Branch colleagues but these roles did not draw on any knowledge, experience or contacts gained while I was in the SDS.

Any other matters

161. I value the UCOs and their work very highly. I think that they did an excellent job in providing public order information and intelligence in advance of demonstrations, as well as updating the records held by MPSB and the Security Service. Despite the perpetual battle on overtime, in my view the UCOs were worth every penny.

Request for documents

162. I have refreshed my memory by reference to a summary of my Personal Record Summary, a copy of which is provided herewith. I have not retained any other documents which might be relevant.

Diversity

163. I am a white English male.

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed:

Trevor Butler

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Date:

17/3/2021

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