

Cover Sheet



Witness: First Witness Statement of Anthony John Greenslade / HN2401

Exhibits Referred to: None

Date Statement Made: 27 July 2021

UNDERCOVER POLICING INQUIRY

Witness: Anthony John Greenslade / HN2401

Occupation: Retired

Address: c/o Metropolitan Police Service, Directorate of Legal Services, Empress State Building, London SW6 1TR

1. I have been asked to provide a witness statement regarding my involvement in the Special Demonstration Squad ("the SDS") for the purpose of assisting the Undercover Policing Inquiry ("the Inquiry"). In preparing this statement I have sought to answer all the questions asked of me in the Rule 9 request dated 17 June 2021 and first provided to me on 30 June 2021.
2. I have been shown the witness bundle provided by the Inquiry for the purpose of making this witness statement. I have not refreshed my memory by looking at any other document.

Personal details

3. My full name is Anthony John Greenslade. My date of birth is 1  1938.

[REDACTED]

Police career before and after the SDS

4. I joined the Metropolitan Police Service as a cadet in September 1954, I think. I became a constable on 22 July 1957, as recorded on my Central Record of Service (Doc 1: MPS-0747691). I joined Special Branch on 25 April 1960 as a Detective Constable. I worked first in C Squad, from 1960 to 1964. Every summer we went to ports, so my posting to C Squad was interrupted each summer for that – I was posted to the Ports of Lydd, Lympne, Folkestone and Dover. I became permanent at Dover in 1964 for just under 3 years and then returned to Scotland Yard. I was then on sensitive work until I went to Anguilla in November 1969, over Christmas, until January 1970. I came back to Special Branch in February 1970 and was posted to a section concerned with Black Power until 1971. I was then put onto the Bomb Squad until January 1974. I got involved with the SDS whilst on the Bomb Squad. From January 1974 to 1977 I was posted to the Port of Folkestone. I was then posted to B Squad briefly before going onto protection duties. I was on protection with the Home Secretary Merlyn Rees until the election in 1979 and then Home Secretary William Whitelaw until 1980. I returned to Scotland Yard and was involved in running the Protection Squad until 1982. I then went to Heathrow as the number 2. I returned to Scotland Yard in 1984 and was in charge of the Protection Squad. In 1985 I returned to Heathrow and was in charge. I stayed there until my retirement on 29 September 1987. I retired as a Detective Chief Superintendent.

5. I had no contact with the SDS prior to my involvement in the unit. I had not previously done any undercover policing work or work using an undercover identity.

[REDACTED]

Selection for the SDS

6. I vaguely knew about the SDS before I became involved in the unit but we were not encouraged to ask any questions.

7. I did not consider myself in the SDS. I was formally on the Bomb Squad and continued doing that work (surveillance and the inquiry into the acts of the Angry Brigade). I was running surveillance in the Bomb Squad with Derek Brice, and he was involved in running the SDS with [REDACTED] ² who was the number 1.

8. I became involved in the SDS because I was a safe pair of hands and I got things done quickly. Rollo Watts, who was Chief Superintendent, put me onto the SDS initially to buy 12 cars for £5,000. They wanted these cars because they had had a bad experience renting cars. Rollo was also concerned that people be promoted and benefit from their experience on the SDS. They had a bad record of promotional exam success and so I was to run promotion classes to get them through. Morale was low at the time, and I was put on to try and improve morale. I think Rollo asked me to do the promotion exam training as well. I did it on my own.

9. The king pin of the SDS at the time was [REDACTED] ³ HN294. He virtually ran the SDS as fiefdom. I do not think he was very good at management. I knew [REDACTED] ³ HN294 and he probably knew Derek Brice and I worked closely together running surveillance. I was probably brought in on Derek's recommendation (he was about to leave the police altogether).

[REDACTED]

10. I was told I was to become involved with the SDS. It sounded interesting.

My role

11. I thought I was a Sergeant whilst involved with the SDS but the documents in my witness bundle state I was a Detective Inspector and they must be right. I was promoted to that rank whilst on the Bomb Squad. I stayed in this rank throughout my involvement in the SDS. I was promoted again later.

12. When I first became involved in the SDS I was to do the vehicles task and I went to the flat once a week to do the promotion classes. I then got involved, by accident, in finding a flat for the SDS to meet because [REDACTED] ⁴ [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] was not very well and Derek Brice was about to resign.

Dates of service

13. I was involved in the SDS for about 6 months from the summer of 1973 to Christmas.

14. I am told in the rule 9 request that a "DS Greenslade" is listed as part of a surveillance team in a document dated 14 April 1973. I have not been provided with a copy of this document, but this would have been a Special Branch operation when I was in the Bomb Squad.

[REDACTED] ⁵ [REDACTED] HN353 [REDACTED] in his witness statement, has named me as being in his chain of command in the SDS and that the Inquiry believes he served in the SDS from spring 1974 to 1978. He is wrong about this:

[REDACTED]

I was in Folkestone from January 1974 until 1977 so I could not have been involved in his management.

Training and guidance in the SDS

16. I did not have any training for my role in the SDS. I did not receive any refresher advice, guidance or instructions.
17. I did not receive any training on race equality or sex equality from the Metropolitan Police Service prior to or during my involvement with the SDS.

Duties

18. As set out above, I was involved in the purchase of vehicles, training for promotion exams and then locating SDS premises.
19. There were two aspects to my role in purchasing vehicles. First, to identify suitable cars and second to purchase them.

[REDACTED]

would be on the lookout for vehicles when I drove past garages. Vehicles were bought individually not in one go. I have been referred to a Special Branch memorandum dated 28 November 1973 (Doc 2: MPS-0747708).

[REDACTED] I do not remember getting involved in repairs. Otherwise the process set out in that document is accurate.

[REDACTED]

20. Morale was also low on the SDS at the time I became involved. I was put on to try and improve morale and to run promotion classes to get the officers through. As stated above, the SDS had a bad record of promotional exam success. You had to learn "A reports" by rote for the promotion exams, and we would test each individual part of the police instruction book and practice that week by week. I did not have experience of training officers for promotion exams prior to this. I do not know why I was picked for this role. I ran weekly sessions of 3-4 hours of training for the exams. I trained 6 officers. I remember [REDACTED] officers including HN343 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] They were self-selected for the training; you had to apply to take the exam. I was supposed to train them up to the exam. I got three out of the six officers through.

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21. I was also involved in finding accommodation for the SDS office. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] One SDS officer – [REDACTED] HN45 – lived there as a sort of housekeeper.

9

22. I did not have a role in recruiting undercover officers. They were recruited randomly. I do not think there was a set procedure. It was largely, at that time, under the control of [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] I do not know what attributes or personal circumstances were sought in an SDS undercover officer. I am told in the rule 9 request that [REDACTED]

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An SDS officer says I recommended them for the SDS role having previously acted as that officer's manager. It is possible. I did not recommend anyone else for the SDS.

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23. I was not involved with training undercover officers or other members of the SDS; tasking undercover officers or choosing their targets; inventing, developing or assessing undercover identities; obtaining cover documents; provision of cover employment; deployments of undercover officers; anything to do with intelligence or intelligence reports; exfiltration; paying undercover officers or authorising overtime; producing any SDS paperwork; liaising or otherwise dealing with the Security Service, the Home office or other government body.

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24. Other than my involvement in locating the West London safe house, I was not involved in procuring or administering SDS safe houses and accommodation.

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25. I was involved in the procurement of vehicles as set out above, but not in their administration. I was aware that the SDS vehicles were road legal


15

HN294

dealt with this, assisted by Derek Brice.

16

26. I was not involved in the management of SDS officers but I maintained contact with them through promotion classes for morale purposes.



27. I was not involved with welfare other than insofar as it was part of my contact with the undercover officers through promotion exam classes. We went out a couple of times to play cricket as a group. It was a way to improve morale amongst undercover officers. I forget how I knew morale was low, but I did. Other people, for example **TN47** ¹⁸ were put on the SDS for the same reason. **He** ¹⁸ was a Chief Inspector. I do not know what he was there to do but I knew he was brought in due to low morale. I was not told what the source or cause of the low morale was.

28. Save as set out above in relation to the purchase of vehicles, I only liaised/dealt with Special Branch and/or Metropolitan Police Service personnel who were not part of the SDS whilst doing my Bomb Squad work.

Premises and meetings with other SDS undercover officers

29. I attended both SDS flats whilst involved with the SDS. The flats were the office. One flat was in South East London – I think in **[REDACTED]** ¹⁹ – and the other was in **west London** ²⁰

[REDACTED]

30. I had a desk in Scotland Yard on the Bomb Squad. The only thing I did SDS-wise from Scotland Yard was going to the cash office to be given the cash to purchase vehicles for the SDS. Sometimes I might have called in to see [REDACTED] HN294 or Derek Brice in their office at Scotland Yard. 21

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31. In addition to [REDACTED] HN294's office, there was an office at Scotland Yard where Sergeants and others would do SDS admin. I never went in there.

SDS management structure

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32. When I was involved in the SDS, Derek Brice and [REDACTED] HN294 served in management positions. Above them was Rollo Watts, Chief Superintendent.

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33. Philip Saunders, [REDACTED] HN332, Derek Kneale and Geoffrey Craft were not involved in the SDS when I was. They might have been involved in management later. Philip Saunders was Commander Operations at the time, I think.

34. I do not know who served in administrative or junior management positions below the rank of Detective Inspector at that time. I knew David Smith, but not during my involvement with the SDS.

35. Conrad Dixon set up the SDS. He was a big, robust man and had a big personality. He set up the Squad. He was not involved in it when I was there but I had lots of dealings with him. I went onto the Bomb Squad was because he

[REDACTED]

wanted to get rid of me from the Black Power Squad. I knew nothing about the SDS from him.

Chain of command

36. The chain of command within the Metropolitan Police Service but above the SDS was probably as set out in the rule 9 request, namely: Superintendent, Chief Superintendent, Commander Special Branch, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner. However, this was not a chain of command I was aware of or had dealings with at the time.
37. I do not remember if Sir Robert Mark was Commissioner at the time of my involvement in the SDS. I do not know if John Hill or James Staritt were Deputy Commissioners. I do not know if the Assistant Commissioners were Colin Woods or Peter Brodie. The Deputy Assistant Commissioner might have been Vic Gilbert. Rollo Watts was never Commander; he might have been Acting Commander, but he was a Chief Superintendent. Matt Rodger and Vic Gilbert were both Commanders. David Bicknell was not Chief Superintendent in my chain of command. Ron Floor was the number 2 to Rollo Watts; he was Superintendent. There were no other Superintendents.
38. I remember Matt Rodger visiting the SDS flat. I do not remember how many times he visited. He would socialise with the undercover officers, offer support and probably stay for lunch. I was there for the visits, as were management. I do not remember Rollo Watts or Ron Floor visiting the SDS. [REDACTED] ²⁷ HN294 would attend the SDS flat regularly.

[REDACTED]

Undercover officers

39. The following undercover officers were on the SDS at the same time as I was involved in the unit:

28

[REDACTED]

HN68, HN338, HN343,
HN298, HN301,
HN342/299, HN303,
HN200, HN351, HN155
and others

29

40. I remember [REDACTED] HN300 [REDACTED] but do not remember him on the SDS. I do not remember [REDACTED] HN353 [REDACTED] at all.

30

41.

[REDACTED]

31

SDS – Role and Annual Reports

42. The role and purpose of the SDS was public order and to detect who was organising demonstrations.

43. I did not have a role in compiling annual reports. I knew annual reports were written but did not know what their purpose was. Presumably it was for Home Office funding.

44. I have been referred to the annual reports for 1973-1974 (Doc 3: MPS-0728975; Doc 4: MPS-0730906). I think they are quite effectual but I cannot comment on

[REDACTED]

the accuracy of the annual reports as I was not involved in the intelligence being obtained or targeting of officers [REDACTED]

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33

45. I think [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] largely decided the fields/groups undercover officers infiltrated, in consultation with Chief Superintendent C Squad. I do not know how these decisions were made. I do not know specifically why certain groups/fields were targeted, other than from common sense. I cannot comment on how successful infiltrations were, how groups came to be infiltrated, whether and how the deployments contributed to policing or assisted the Security Service or other policing purpose.

Management structure

46. I have been referred to a diagram showing the current structure and proposed structure of C Squad as at July 1973 (Doc 5: MPS-0737401) and a manuscript diagram of the managerial structure labelled 'Current' (Doc 6: MPS-0737402). I never left the Bomb Squad, so I am double booked by this diagram. I do not remember Detective Inspector [REDACTED] HN332 [REDACTED] 34 being on the SDS. I remember Chief Inspector [REDACTED] 35 HN324 [REDACTED] he was involved in the Bomb Squad. I do not remember him

[REDACTED]

being in charge of ultra-left, X Squad or the SDS. Chief Inspector Imbert came onto the Bomb Squad as Superintendent as I was about to leave. The Communist and Industrial units being under Chief Inspector [REDACTED] ³⁶ sounds right.

47. The diagram of the proposed structure does not accord with my memory of the management structure at the time. I only remember one Superintendent under Rollo Watts, and that was Ron Floor. The SDS was managed by a Chief Inspector, [REDACTED] ³⁸ **HN294** who sat under the Superintendent and Chief Superintendent.

48. The management structure did not change whilst I was involved in the SDS, apart from [REDACTED] ³⁹ **TN47** joining briefly for a few weeks before I left.

49. I have been referred to paragraph 1 of the 1974 Annual Report (Doc 4) which refers to the SDS now being part of the newly created 'S' Squad "and, as such, now has the added benefit of a Chief Superintendent and Superintendent, thus improving still further the degree of supervision which is so necessary in this delicate field of operations". I was not aware of any difficulties in the SDS due to lack of supervision prior to creation of S Squad.

Senior Managers in the Chain of Command

50. Ron Floor, the Superintendent, had very little involvement in the running and/or supervision of the SDS. The whole thing was centred on [REDACTED] ⁴¹ **HN294** I cannot say how frequently he was involved or on what sort of business. Ron Floor basically did not want to know. The only dealings I had with him related to [REDACTED] ⁴²

[REDACTED]

42

[REDACTED] He had just been passed over for promotion and he did not really want to know.

51. Rollo Watts, the Chief Superintendent, did not have much involvement in the running and/or supervision of the SDS to my knowledge. I cannot say how frequently he was involved in the SDS or on what sort of business. I had no dealings with him. He must have had some involvement [REDACTED]

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52. I do not know what involvement Commander Special Branch had with the running and/or supervision of the SDS. There was an occasional visit. I was not party to any discussions between him and Rollo Watts. I cannot say how frequently he was involved or on what sort of business. I had no dealings with him.

53. I do not know what involvement the Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or Commissioner had with the running and/or supervision of the SDS. I cannot say how frequently they were involved or on what sort of business. I had no dealings with them.

[REDACTED]

44

54. [REDACTED]

44



Questions about specific issues

Positions of responsibility in target groups

55. I do not know whether prior permission was required for undercover officers assuming positions of responsibility within their target groups or whether guidance was given on the issue. In general terms the advantage of assuming a position of responsibility within a group would be for obtaining knowledge about their membership. It should have been pre-authorized. I do not know about risks or disadvantages of assuming a position of responsibility from the SDS' perspective. I do not know if particular posts were thought to be beneficial.

Use of deceased children's identities

56. I was not aware of the use of deceased children's identities and do not know anything about it in the context of the SDS. I do not know when it started, who devised it, who authorised it, or what considerations were given by management as to its impact on the surviving family of a deceased child of the use of their relatives' identities for police purposes.

Sexual relationships in undercover identity

57. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice, guidance about sexual contact, whilst operating undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about sexual contact whilst they operated undercover. To my knowledge, no manager gave undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about sexual contact whilst operating undercover.

[REDACTED]

58. My attitude to sexual activity between undercover members of the SDS and civilians whom they met in their undercover identities was that it was unacceptable.

59. To my knowledge, none of the undercover police officers on the SDS at the same time I was involved engaged in sexual activity with others whilst in their cover identity.

Commission of criminal offences whilst undercover

60. I did not give undercover officers orders, instructions, advice, guidance about the commission of criminal offences whilst operating undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about committing criminal offences whilst they operated undercover. To my knowledge, no manager gave undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about the commission of criminal offences whilst operating undercover.

61. I did not have an attitude to the commission of criminal offences by officers undercover officers: I did not consider it, was never asked my opinion or expressed my view. Looking back now, it would have been wrong.

62. To my knowledge, none of the undercover police officers on the SDS at the same time I was involved committed a criminal offence whilst undercover.

[REDACTED]

Agent provocateur

63. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice, guidance about whether or not they could provoke, encourage or cause a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst operating undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about whether or not they could provoke, encourage or cause a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst they operated undercover. To my knowledge, no manager gave undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about whether or not they could provoke, encourage or cause a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst operating undercover.

64. To my knowledge, none of the undercover police officers on the SDS at the same time as I was involved provoked, encouraged or caused a third party to commit a criminal offence whilst undercover.

Contact with the criminal justice system as the suspect or the defendant

65. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about what to do if involved as either the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about what to do if involved as either the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover. To my knowledge, no manager give undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about what to do if involved as either the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover.

[REDACTED]

66. To my knowledge, none of the undercover officers on the SDS at the same time as I was involved become involved as either the suspect or defendant in criminal proceedings whilst undercover.

Violence and public disorder

67. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about the risk of becoming involved in either violence or public disorder whilst undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers about the risk of becoming involved in either violence or public disorder whilst undercover. To my knowledge, no manager gave undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about the risk of becoming involved in either violence or public disorder whilst undercover.

68. To my knowledge, none of the undercover officers on the SDS at the same time as I was involved became involved in either violence or public disorder whilst undercover.

Legally professionally privileged material

69. I did not know what legally professionally privileged material was when involved in the SDS. It has been explained to me in the course of providing this witness statement.

70. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about how to identify and deal with legally privileged information whilst undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers

[REDACTED]

about how to identify and deal with legally privileged information whilst undercover. To my knowledge, no manager gave any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance about identifying and dealing with legally privileged information whilst undercover.

71. To my knowledge, none of the undercover officers on the SDS when I was involved came across or reported legally professionally privileged information whilst undercover.

Activities of elected politicians

72. I did not give any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance in relation to interacting with or reporting on elected politicians whilst undercover. I did not have any informal conversations with undercover officers in relation to interacting with or reporting on elected politicians whilst undercover. To my knowledge, no manager gave any undercover officers orders, instructions, advice or guidance in relation to interacting with or reporting on elected politicians whilst undercover.

73. To my knowledge, none of the undercover officers on the SDS when I was involved interacted with or reported on elected politicians whilst undercover.

Reporting on individuals

74. I have been referred to a report containing a description of an activist (Doc 8: MPS-0739208) as an example of reporting on various aspects of individuals' lives. This is the sort of report Special Branch was always creating; it is a normal

[REDACTED]

Special Branch report into the background of a person with potential extremist activity. I am not aware of any guidance by the SDS as to the level of personal detail which was considered helpful to the reader of the report, but there would not need to be because it was standard within Special Branch. Everyone would have the experience of what to do.

Reporting on trade unions

75. Information about trade unions would have been reported because of the effect of trade unions on the economy. This was at the time of Arthur Scargill. The information would have been of use to Special Branch and/or the Security Service when concerned with the disruption to the economy, for example at the time the lights were on for 3 hours and then off for 3 hours due to lack of coal.

Contribution to police and counter subversion

76. The SDS provided advance warning of demonstrations. That was the whole purpose of it: its name was the Special Demonstration Squad. It started during the anti-Vietnam movement in 1968.

77. I suppose the SDS assisted the Security Service in identifying extremists and plans for possible disruption.

Overtime payments

78. Overtime payments were a substantial part of officer pay. [REDACTED] 45 HN155 [REDACTED] was the highest paid Detective Sergeant in the Metropolitan Police Service at that time because of overtime. His nickname was [REDACTED] 46



79. I did not get the impression, in relation to any undercover officer on the SDS, that the amount of overtime on offer influenced them to stay in the unit longer than might otherwise have been the case, influenced them to paint an overly optimistic picture of what they were achieving whilst deployed or influenced them to stay in the unit when doing so was not in their best interests from a welfare point of view.

Formal policies and procedures

80. To my knowledge, there were not any formal written SDS policies and procedures when I was involved in the unit.

The Security Service

81. I did not have any contact or dealings with the Security Service during my involvement with the SDS. I do not know what the relationship was like between the SDS and the Security Service.

82. The SDS provided advance warning of demonstrations to the Security Service. I cannot think of anything that the Security Service did for the SDS.

Oversight bodies

83. No one from an outside body with a form of regulatory or oversight responsibility for policing visited the SDS during the period of my involvement.



Leaving the SDS

84. I finished with the SDS around Christmas 1973. A vacancy became available at Folkestone. I was unpopular with management because of the way I ran surveillance. I was criticised for spending too much money and so I was keen to leave London. The work with the SDS that I was brought in to do was also done by this point.
85. There was no handover or exit process; I just ceased involvement. There had not been any conversation around when my involvement with the SDS would cease nor was there an indication of how long my involvement would be for when I started.
86. After my involvement in the SDS ended, I did not manage, seek, receive, use or disseminate intelligence emanating from the SDS.

Any other matters

87. The only matter I wish to add is that I disagreed fundamentally with the principle of undercover policing. It was damaging to individuals: many suffered from the work, and some left the police afterwards. I think some people are psychologically unsuited to that sort of work, as I am.

Request for documents

88. I do not have any documents or other information which is potentially relevant to the Inquiry's terms of reference.

[Redacted]

Diversity information

89. I am male.

90. My racial origin is Anglo Saxon.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed:

[Redacted]
A Greenslade

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Dated:

[Redacted]
27-7-2021

48