


Cover Sheet

Date signed: 23 February 2022

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

I, Geoffrey Theodore Michael Craft, c/o Designated Lawyers, PO Box 73779, London WC1A 9NL, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a Rule 9 request dated 26 January 2022. It provides my full recollection of my time as Chief Superintendent of Special Branch (SB) insofar as it touched on any involvement with the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).
2. I am known in this Public Inquiry by the nominal HN34. I have provided a witness statement, dated 7 December 2020, in relation to my time as Inspector and then Chief Inspector within the SDS. I do not repeat any of my personal details, or the background information on my career, herein as I have already detailed same in my earlier statement.
3. I note at the outset that my memory is affected by having twice been involved with the SDS, and it is therefore sometimes difficult to distinguish what happened in each period given the significant passage of time since I was a SB



officer in the role of Chief Superintendent S Squad. That notwithstanding, I have attempted to provide full answers to the questions I have been asked.

Nature and Role of Chief Superintendent

4. I have been referred to paragraph 12 of my first witness statement where I said:
"I became Chief Superintendent and took over S Squad. The SDS was my biggest responsibility in that role. I think that was around 1981 until 1983".
5. I am asked how I was recruited to this role and by whom. I would have been appointed by the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of SB but I cannot recall who that was. I did not apply for the role; I came up for promotion and the Chief Superintendent S Squad appointment was vacant. I had experience in the areas S Squad had responsibility for, so would have been considered suitable for the role. One of these areas was familiar to me as a result of my previous time in the SDS. However, S Squad was responsible for all operational support for SB and my most recent posting (prior to my promotion) was Superintendent Operations in the Irish Republican field. I was therefore very experienced in anti-terrorist work which was a serious and significant part of S Squad's work at the time.
6. The Inquiry asks whether my previous experience in the SDS was a relevant factor in my recruitment. I do believe that my previous experience with the SDS was a factor in my recruitment to this post because I was aware of the SDS and the work it was doing. However, I reiterate what I have said at paragraph 5 above in relation to my more recent experience at the time of my promotion. In

[REDACTED]

my view, a high level operational role is likely to have been more relevant to my appointment given that S Squad's remit was broader than the SDS.

7. I am asked what role, if any, I had in a number of areas connected to the SDS whilst I was Chief Superintendent and how this differed from my time as an Inspector or Chief Inspector. As stated at paragraph 88 of my first witness statement, senior officers' *"involvement was in terms of oversight rather than day-to-day involvement in decision-making"* in relation to the SDS. This was true of my time as Chief Superintendent S Squad and the relationship I had with the SDS in that role. As Chief Superintendent S Squad I had oversight responsibility for five units of varying sizes, of which the SDS was one, so I was not involved in the minutiae of decision-making in any of the units under my purview. I could not be involved in day-to-day decision-making but maintained, with the assistance of Superintendent S Squad, daily contact with the managers of each of the five units. This was very different to the role I had as a manager within the SDS where I was directly involved with the running of the unit.

8. In response to the specific queries asked, I reply as follows:

- a. I was not involved in the recruiting of Undercover Officers (UCOs), as that was dealt with by the Inspector and Chief Inspector in charge of the SDS, together with the Superintendent (see paragraph 23 of my previous witness statement). However, I would probably have been aware of people joining the unit or of potential new recruits who were under active consideration.




- b. I was not involved in recruiting other members of the SDS (such as office staff).
- c. The training of SDS UCOs was 'on-the-job'. I had no role in the training of UCOs.
- d. Equally, I had no role in training other members of the SDS.
- e. The tasking of UCOS, including the choice of their targets, was not something that I was involved in as Chief Superintendent S Squad. The tasking of the SDS came from C Squad, and would have been communicated in discussion between Chief Superintendent C Squad and the Chief Inspector of the SDS. I would have been made aware of the areas in which the UCOs were deployed, but I did not have a decision-making role in this regard. I am asked in particular what my level of involvement with deployed UCOs was when I was Chief Superintendent. It was negligible, and would only have been when I visited the SDS safe flats from time to time. I note from my first witness statement that I have already informed the Inquiry that I or the Superintendent would visit every other month. I cannot specifically remember on how many occasions I did visit the safe flats to meet with the UCOs, but it would have been a handful of times per year.
- f. In my first witness statement I noted that the monitoring of SDS officers' welfare was a matter which the Inspector and Chief Inspector in the SDS

[REDACTED]

took seriously, and I stated *"I know this level of supervision continued when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad, because I wanted to know what was happening. Supervision had to be very close"*. The welfare of SDS UCOs was a concern of mine. As Chief Superintendent I was responsible for the welfare of all of those under my command, and ensured that I was made aware of any welfare issues which were arising. Although the MPS was hierarchical in nature, S Squad was sufficiently small and close-knit that if there had been an issue I would have been approached. I cannot now recall any such issues being raised.

g. As Chief Superintendent S Squad, I was not involved in the exfiltration of SDS UCOs.

h. As Chief Superintendent S Squad, I was not involved in the assessment and approval of SDS intelligence reports. Assessment and approval of SDS reporting would have been dealt with by C Squad. At MPS-0737347-8 I comment that the *"quality of information produced, particularly in the troublesome Animal Liberation and Anti-Nuclear areas, has been first class and much credit is due to Chief Inspector Short and his staff"*. I do not believe that I saw much of the reporting, but I would have been aware of significant intelligence from my daily liaison with the SDS managers. The type of information I was given would have included intelligence which had assisted in policing or preventing disorder. At this distance of time, I cannot recall with precision any specific detail of the conversations, but my comments in 1984 will


accurately reflect the quality of the intelligence as I understood it at the time.

- i. I was not involved in the onward dissemination of SDS intelligence reports.
- j. As Chief Superintendent S Squad, I was not involved in responses to specific requests for intelligence made by police or other government bodies (including the Security Service).
- k. I was not involved in the production of SDS paperwork; that was a matter for the SDS, not the Chief Superintendent S Squad.
- l. I was not involved in the payment of UCOs, or the payment of overtime, as that was something that would have been dealt with by the MPS (for basic pay) and by the SDS management for any overtime approval. I have been referred to an incident which I detailed in brief at paragraph 154 of my first witness statement. The person who I mentioned in that paragraph was an SDS UCO, but I cannot be sure as to who it was at this distance of time. I have been asked to explain, as best I can, what occurred. I recall very little. However, I do remember Chief Inspector Short mentioning that he had to deal with a UCO in relation to an unreasonable overtime claim. I cannot now remember more. If the problem had continued I would have been informed of it, and I anticipate that if I had been informed there was an ongoing issue the individual

[REDACTED]


would have been removed from the SDS (as outlined in my first witness statement) or other serious intervention would have been needed. If that had happened I would have known about it, and I think that is the sort of thing I would probably remember if it had happened. For this reason, I believe that the issue was resolved.

- m. I had no involvement in the procurement and administration of SDS safe flats and cover accommodation when I was Chief Superintendent. [REDACTED]

1

- [REDACTED]
- n. I would have, from time to time, spoken to the Chief Superintendent of C Squad about the work of the SDS as they were the SDS's primary intelligence customer. I would also have spoken to Commander Operations, but I cannot now recall any specific occasions where this happened or topics which I would have discussed.

- o. I am asked about dealings with the Security Service. Although I had dealings with the Security Service in connection with various matters when I held senior roles in SB, I have no recollection of ever meeting with the Security Service in connection with the SDS. As I stated in my first witness statement, liaison between the two organisations was facilitated by C Squad when I was Inspector/Chief Inspector in the SDS and this remained the case when I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. I have been shown UCPI0000029239. The Inquiry says that this document "*tends to suggest*" that I was "*a main point of contact for F*



Branch of the Security Service at that time". I am asked if this is a correct assumption for the Inquiry to make. It is not. Whilst the minute records that *"...as before, DCI Short suggested that F6 should make the approach to Geoff Craft"* I have no recollection of being asked to approve or facilitate a meeting between HN33 and the Security Service. It is not my note, and I am not named as an attendee of the meeting which is minuted, so I do not know on what basis I have been named. I also note that DCI Short told the Security Service *"that Geoff Craft is moving to C Squad in April and that he would be out of SDS by the end of the week"*. Not only is liaison something I do not recall, but this lunchtime discussion appears to have been right at the conclusion of my period as Chief Superintendent S Squad so it is perfectly possible that I had left my post before the Security Service wrote the note of the meeting. I do not recall any approach by the Security Service at the conclusion of my time in that role.

- p. I do not recall liaising with the Home Office on matters relating to the SDS, or indeed any matters, when I was Chief Superintendent of S Squad. If I had, I think I would remember it.
- q. I do not recall liaising with any other government body when I was Chief Superintendent of S Squad.



Annual Reports

9. I have been asked what role, if any, I had in the preparation or dissemination of SDS Annual Reports whilst Chief Superintendent S Squad. I have been referred to MPS-0731858 and MPS-0737347. When I was Chief Superintendent S Squad, I neither compiled nor prepared the reports. My role was to approve the report, and minute it through to Commander Operations. For example, at MPS-0731858-7 there is a minute sent by me on 12 March 1981 where I note the *"multifarious fringe political groups brought about the inevitable drain on police manpower and in 1981 is showing no sign of the problem abating"*, and refer to the effect of inflation on the minimal running costs of the unit. My minute is addressed to Commander Operations. The Commander refers it on to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner, whose reply appears on MPS-0731858-8 authorising a letter to the Home Office. The same pattern can be seen on MPS-0737347. It would appear that the liaison with the Home Office was therefore undertaken from instruction at Deputy Assistant Commissioner level.

10. I have been shown MPS-0730903, which is the SDS Annual Report for 1983. Within that report, I have been referred to page 30 where my name appears within the agenda for the then Commissioner's visit to the SDS. I have also had the benefit of checking paragraph 49 of my witness statement where I describe a visit to the SDS safe flat by the then Commissioner, and a concern about salmonella following the visit. I have been asked a series of questions, and I answer as follows:



- a. I believe that the visit mentioned in paragraph 49 of my first witness statement is likely to be the visit to the safe house by Sir Kenneth Newman QPM, as I believe he visited the SDS safe flat on only one occasion.
- b. I can recall nothing of the visit other than that which is recorded in my witness statement. Although I am listed on the schedule, I do not believe that I actually attended the safe flat for the visit. I believe my role was limited to explaining the work of S Squad before the Commissioner and Chief Inspector Short left for the safe flat.
- c. My recollection is that very little about the running of the unit would be shared with senior officers up to and including the Commissioner. The SDS was a secret operation, and the 'need to know' principle applied. What senior officers needed to know was the product of the unit, and the justification for its existence (as set out in the Annual Reports).
- d. I do not recall any issues being escalated to me, and therefore do not recall any issues being escalated to more senior officers above me.

Specific Officers

11. I am asked to look at MPS-0526785, which includes a minute written by me on a report concerning 2 HN12's arrest for bill-posting.

- [REDACTED]
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- a. I have no recollection of the incident with [REDACTED] HN12 [REDACTED] described within the report, or my minute.
- b. I cannot recall the incident, and therefore have no recollection of my involvement in the episode. I can see from the documents that I minuted the report which had been issued (in my role as Chief Superintendent), and forwarded it up the chain of command to Commander Operations.
- c. On page 2 of the document, my note reads "the arrest of an SDS field officer will have done no harm to his standing amongst his comrades". I am asked whether this comment suggests that I thought the arrest *and conviction* (my emphasis added) of a UCO in their cover identity was a positive outcome in a deployment. It does not. An arrest was often a possibility as the UCOs were involved in public order activities, and I agree with my comments that an arrest is unlikely to do harm to a UCO in the eyes of their cover group. A conviction is different. I would not have expected the UCOs to be taking a leading role in disorder, but I can see how people could be swept up in conduct so as not to blow their cover. A conviction would have carried weight with the activist group, but I am not sure that I would categorise it as an "*unintended positive*"; it would be more accurately termed an unfortunate but realistic possibility. I acknowledge that there was a chance that it would enhance a UCO's credibility – however, I would not have encouraged a UCO to put themselves in a position where they were prosecuted.



- d. I do not believe that I considered whether or not the conviction of a UCO in their cover identity would amount to a miscarriage of justice. Absent any specific policies (and there were none), whatever was going to happen in relation to a UCO's conviction would have been beyond my control. I do not know whether this matter was considered in more detail by others. In an ideal world, the UCOs would not have been arrested and therefore this situation would not have arisen.
- e. I have been asked whether any consideration was given to the fact that, by using an assumed identity, the police officer involved was likely to be misleading the court. Had 2 HN12's case proceeded to a trial, I anticipate that DCI Short or I would have attended court and revealed that the defendant was a UCO to the clerk (in private) in order that the court was not misled. I cannot speak for what happened in other cases, but that would have been my approach in such proceedings. I do note from MPS-0526785-3 that DCI Short, as the most senior officer within the SDS, decided how to "handle the situation" having taken relevant matters into account. The UCO admitted the offence and was fined in his cover identity, and in DCI Short's view "this matter has been resolved satisfactorily without prejudice to Special Demonstration Squad operations in this particular field". I do also note that the arrest and prosecution was described as an "unwelcome experience" which reflects my view, expressed at (d) above, that in an ideal world a UCO would not be arrested.

[REDACTED]

2

12. The Inquiry informs me that [REDACTED] HN12 [REDACTED] may have had a sexual relationship with an activist in his undercover identity. I remember [REDACTED] HN12 [REDACTED] but I was not aware of that suggestion whilst I was Chief Superintendent S Squad – and I am genuinely surprised by the suggestion that he may have been involved with an activist. The first I heard of such a suggestion was when I saw the questions posed by the Inquiry, which I have addressed in this statement. I recall nothing of his recruitment.

3

13. The Inquiry informs me that [REDACTED] HN67 [REDACTED] may have had a sexual relationship with an activist in his undercover identity and/or may have fathered a child in his undercover identity. I remember [REDACTED] HN67 [REDACTED] but I was not aware of that suggestion whilst I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. The first I heard of such a suggestion was when I saw the questions posed by the Inquiry, which have addressed in this statement. I recall nothing of his recruitment.

14. The Inquiry informs me that Mike Chitty had sexual relationships with activists in his undercover identity. I remember Mike Chitty but I was not aware of this behaviour whilst I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. The first I heard of such suggestions was when I saw the questions posed by the Inquiry, which I have addressed in this statement. I recall nothing of his recruitment.

15. The Inquiry informs me that Bob Lambert had sexual relationships with activists in his undercover identity, and that he fathered a child in his undercover identity. I do not know Bob Lambert and do not recall being told anything about him. I do recall reading about Bob Lambert's relationships in the press. As I do not

[REDACTED]

know Bob Lambert, it follows that I recall nothing of his recruitment. If, as is suggested, it is correct that he deployed shortly after my tenure as Chief Superintendent S Squad I would not expect to have heard of him.

16. In relation to the preceding questions on sexual relationships with activists, I am asked what my reaction is to learning that a number of deployed UCOs appear to have been doing this around the time I was Chief Superintendent S Squad. These suggestions have all come as a surprise, especially in relation to [REDACTED] ² HN12. [REDACTED] I am disappointed to hear of these allegations. For MPS officers, sexual activity on duty has always been serious professional misconduct. There was no grey area, and MPS officers would know from their training that they would have risked being dismissed if they had been caught. In my view, any UCOs who were caught doing this should have been removed from the SDS and their careers in the MPS would have been seriously affected. Given the risks to the officer, and the SDS, it is perhaps unsurprising that UCOs who had sexual relationships did not reveal this to the SDS management. It is most unlikely that a person who was acting inappropriately would have brought it to the attention of their supervising officer. If that person did not notify their immediate supervisor in the SDS, it would not have come to my attention as Chief Superintendent S Squad. In my view, sexual relationships with activists would have been beyond stupid, and I am taken aback that there seem to be multiple allegations or incidents.

[REDACTED]

17. I have been asked some questions about the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), following on from a comment at paragraph 79 of my first witness statement that the CND was not a focus for the SDS. I have been informed that [REDACTED] ⁴ HN33/98 [REDACTED] ⁵ HN65 [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] ⁶ HN88 [REDACTED] all submitted reporting on anti-nuclear groups, which included the CND.

- a. [REDACTED] ⁴ HN33/98 [REDACTED] was recruited to report on the Greenham Common Women. There were real risks concerning the women breaking in to the US Air Force base and security risks arising from that – both military security, and the security of the women (in the event that the US troops fired upon activists). [REDACTED] ⁴ HN33/98's [REDACTED] reporting on the CND was likely, in my view, to be ancillary to what she was learning whilst deployed with the Greenham Common women. I do not recall [REDACTED] ⁵ HN65 [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] ⁶ HN88 [REDACTED] so I do not feel able to comment on their deployments. In my experience, as an Inspector and Chief Inspector in the SDS, it was not unusual for UCOs (when I was DCI) to come across information on associated groups or connected interests during their deployment – or indeed for deployments to evolve or change in focus over time. All reporting was passed to C Squad. Beyond this speculation, I am unable to say why these individuals reported on the CND.
- b. I am asked what role I had in authorising these deployments. The short answer is none. It was not for the Chief Superintendent of S Squad to authorise deployments; tasking was a matter for C Squad, in conjunction with the SDS. I do recall occasionally speaking to [REDACTED] ⁴ HN33/98 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

when I visited the safe flats (albeit I do not now remember what we discussed), and being aware of her deployment as it was rather unusual, but I do not recall any role in authorising it. I do not, at this distance of time, recall [REDACTED] ⁵ HN65 or [REDACTED] ⁶ HN88's deployments.

- c. I do not recall being involved in discussions on the justification for reporting on anti-nuclear groups. I do recall that the justification for Greenham Common was preventing violence in relation to a US Air Force Base. I cannot comment further on justification. At one stage, I do recall there was a concern about potential subversion of CND by political groups, including the Communist Party of Great Britain. I believe that C Squad or the Security Service would be better placed to assist with the risk of subversion (if it was so) associated with the CND.

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed

Geoffrey Craft

Dated:

23-2-2022