

# Cover Sheet

[REDACTED]

Second Witness Statement of David Smith

Date signed: 1 July 2022

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IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO UNDERCOVER POLICING

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I, David Smith, c/o the Designated Lawyer, PO Box 73779, London, WC1A 9NL, WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:

1. This witness statement is made in response to a supplemental Rule 9 request dated 15 June 2020. It is an addendum to my previous Rule 9 statement dated 2 December 2020 and as such it adopts the abbreviations used previously but omits the detail within that statement. References to paragraphs in that statement are in square brackets. It also deals with my recollections dealing with the SDS and SDS intelligence as a manager in 'C' Squad.

**Personal Details**

2. My full name is David Smith and my date of birth is [REDACTED] <sup>1</sup>1939.

**Relevant background information**

3. As the Inquiry is already aware, I was the first office manager in the SDS between October 1970 and October 1974 as a DS [4, 9, 11]. I subsequently had two postings to 'C' Squad: as a DCI between November 1981 and late 1985, responsible for extreme right wing and animal rights matters; and as the Chief Superintendent in overall charge of 'C' Squad between August 1988 until my retirement in 1989 [4].

**Withdrawal of a UCO**

4. During my oral evidence to the Inquiry on Monday 16 May 2022, I spoke about a UCO who had been withdrawn from the field and who lacked a "*proper identity*"

[REDACTED]

(transcript, page 92 lines 13-20). Later in that session, I confirmed that this officer was not [REDACTED] HN45 [REDACTED] Jill Mosdell or [REDACTED] HN348 [REDACTED] (transcript, page 121 lines 1-12).

5. The UCO in question was [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED], and the Inquiry's understanding of when this took place is correct, as far as I can recall.

6. I knew this officer almost from the start of our respective careers. [REDACTED]

HN103 explains his working relationship with HN340 in the MPS, prior to the SDS

[REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED] was already deployed as a UCO in the SDS when I joined as the office manager in October 1970.

7. My recollection of what occurred is as follows:

(a) The SDS managers were aware that there was some interest in [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED]'s 'real' identity from a group which he associated with. I believe it was the IMG that suspected he was possibly in the military.

(b) [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED] was invited to meet one or two individuals from the group at a location well away from his usual area. Phil Saunders, [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] and myself went to a nearby location, ready to assist [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED] if the meeting went badly. There may have been a fourth officer with us but I cannot remember who that was.

(c) We waited somewhere near the Old Vic theatre. I assume it had a line of sight to where [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED]'s meeting was taking place. We did not have any radios or any other means for him to let us know if things were not going well otherwise.

(d) Nothing of any significance occurred at the meeting and we did not have to assist [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED] that evening. He was withdrawn from his deployment very shortly thereafter – within the space of one or two days.

8. I am told that [REDACTED] HN340 [REDACTED] was told by the SDS managers that he could not join the IMG, but I cannot remember the precise purpose of that meeting. Nevertheless, it was such that, out of an abundance of caution, Phil Saunders and [REDACTED] HN294 [REDACTED] decided that we should be on hand. I do not remember anything about a suspicious call to

[REDACTED]

[12] HN340's landlady, or [REDACTED] the publication of his photograph. [14]  
[REDACTED]

9. In about 2015 when the Inquiry was established, [REDACTED] HN340 [15] telephoned me to discuss this development. It was then that he told me that he had never had any 'proper identity'. This statement was made in the context of the use by later UCOs of the identities of deceased children. It is clear to me that [REDACTED] HN340 [15] was aware during his deployment that his back story would not have stood up to any serious scrutiny.

### SDS Safe Houses

10. I am also asked about the institution of a second SDS safe house during the period I was the office manager. My recollection was that there were three changes of safe house during the period [41]:

(a) Within a month of starting in role, the SDS safe house moved from [REDACTED] west London [16] to [REDACTED] north London [17]. In my first statement I said this was [REDACTED] elsewhere in north London [18] but I now believe it was further north. Sir Robert Mark visited the SDS in the [REDACTED] north London [17] safe house.

(b) After a further 18 months, it moved from [REDACTED] north London [19] to [REDACTED] west London [20]. I deal with the circumstances of that move in more detail at paragraph 11 below.

(c) The SDS safe house then became two safe houses: in [REDACTED] west London [21] and in [REDACTED] south London [22].

11. The security concerns that caused the move from the [REDACTED] north London [23] safe house to [REDACTED] west London [23] were that an activist known to a member of the SDS was seen in the vicinity of the [REDACTED] north London [24] flat. I am not aware that the location was compromised but we were aware of an increased risk of that occurring. The SDS had been using the same safe house for a little while, so it was prudent to move anyway.

12. There was a deliberate decision to create a second safe house in about 1973, although I do not remember exactly why. It seems likely that the choice of two locations meant that there was less chance of setting patterns of attendance that might cause

[REDACTED]

suspicion. There were various other procedural changes, including the move away from leasing cars to buying them outright. Suggestions would very often come from the UCOs themselves: they were at the sharp end and that tended to concentrate the mind.

#### **Perspective as a 'C' Squad Manager**

13. I have a distinct recollection of dealing with A8 directly while I was the office manager for the SDS, but that would only have been when information had to be passed urgently. I cannot recall any specific examples.
14. As I have stated at paragraph 3 above, I was the DCI on 'C' Squad responsible for the extreme right wing animal rights. It was partly based on my experience in the back office that I pushed for SDS deployment into the extreme right wing. Issues of football violence and anti-semitism were increasing and the Anti-Nazi League had re-formed, so in my view it was important to get intelligence from both sides. My suggestion went to Chief Superintendent Kneale, who had been the DCI towards the end of my time,  
[REDACTED] 25
15. As DCI, I received the SDS reports and would minute the file, indicating which DI and / or DS it should go to, as well as any other individuals who might have to act on or note the information it contained. Over time, the desks developed a good idea what the various groups were about based on the SDS reports. It was this in particular that allowed for greater accuracy in the threat assessments that 'C' Squad produced. Clearly if there was specific information about an event that would also be woven in, appropriately sanitised where necessary. This permitted A8 to have the right resources in place.
16. While my areas were not of great interest to the Security Service, I shared an office with three other DCIs and there were regular letters requesting MPSB assistance with enquiries. I believe these came in at Superintendent level and were allocated by area. They were treated as routine, and it was rare that the letter would express any urgency, and so a response would usually be forthcoming from MPSB in about a month or two. For our record-keeping purposes, there was a ledger in the office and


[REDACTED]

each request was assigned a number. As I recall, there was usually some overlap: we had mutual interests but different perspectives.

17. I would speak with the Security Service on the telephone reasonably frequently. As Chief Superintendent, I visited the Security Service when I took over 'C' Squad but that was the limit of my direct contact.
18. When I arrived at 'C' Squad as Chief Superintendent, the SDS was transferred to my control away from 'S' Squad. This was just after the Scutt affair. From my perspective, this did not change the professional, friendly relationships that I recalled from my time as DCI. As an organisation, however, I think that the Security Service was already positioning itself for the post-Cold War context.
19. In 'C' Squad, threat assessments were usually prepared by a DI. In their absence these might be prepared by a senior and experienced DS and, for the biggest events, a DCI might have the task. As I have said above, the specific detail provided by the SDS was helpful but it was the overall greater understanding that allowed for more accurate assessments to be prepared even in the temporary absence of SDS reporting – particularly if the gap was a short one.
20. The threat assessments were significant for A8 in my view. On the day I was selected for promotion to Chief Superintendent, Commander Gunn invited me to his office to congratulate me. The Commander TO20 was in there and reminded me of an incident when, as a DCI in 'C' Squad, I had opposed a uniform Chief Superintendent who had wanted to cancel a march through the East End. I had been steadfast in reassuring them that there would not be trouble – and there hadn't been.
21. I'm not aware that there were any oral briefings about forthcoming demonstrations, although there were occasions when information was passed by telephone because of urgency.

### **Statement of Truth**

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.



Signed:

D Smith

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Date:

1.7.22

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