



addressing the questions posed by the Inquiry, is as follows: (i) 1986 – 1989: Head of F8 Division (public order, police effectiveness and firearms control) in the Home Office's Police Department; (ii) 1989 – 1993: Head of F4 Division (terrorism and national security) in the Home Office's Police Department; (iii) 1993 – 1995: Under-Secretary, Head of Home Office's Organised International Crime Directorate; (iv) 1996 – November 2000: Director General in the expanded Organised International Crime Directorate; (v) December 2000 – June 2001: Acting Permanent Secretary; and (vi) in June 2001 I resumed my duties as Director General until I retired in 2002. After retirement, I was appointed by the Prime Minister as the Staff Counsellor for the Security and Intelligence Services (2004 –2009). I performed a similar role for the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (now the National Crime Agency) from 2007 to 2013.

2. I make this statement in response to the Inquiry's Rule 9 request to the Home Office of 11 August 2022.
3. The contents of this statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Where appropriate, I indicate which statements are made from my own knowledge and which are matters of information or belief. Where matters are not within my own knowledge, they are based on documents I have seen or are derived from the person or sources I identify.
4. In preparing this statement, there has been shown to me 143 documents provided by the Inquiry, which I have considered and which help inform my statement.



[REDACTED]

5. For ease of reference I have addressed each of the Inquiry's questions individually, and in the same order as they appear in the Rule 9 request. I have done my best to answer each question, and used the material provided by the Inquiry to assist me in doing so, but it will be apparent that I do not know the answer to a number of questions that the Inquiry has posed, This is usually because the question relates to matters which fall outside my time in the relevant post or in which I had no direct involvement. I wish to assure the Inquiry that I have given all of its questions careful attention and been as helpful and comprehensive as I can in providing my answers.

Background

6. I regret to say that I am only able to provide limited assistance of the matters raised by the Inquiry, because they largely were not within my knowledge at the relevant time. In particular, to the best of my recollection, I was not aware of the existence of the Special Demonstration Squad ("SDS") until I was informed of the SDS's existence in the context of this Inquiry.
7. In order to understand this, it is important to understand the Home Office's departmental structure and priorities at the time. For most of the time that I worked in policing at the Home Office, policing was dealt with by the Police Department, headed by a Deputy Under Secretary (now more commonly known as a Director General), supported by two Assistant Under Secretaries (now more commonly known as Directors). The Police Department was divided into different divisions, each of which was led by a Head of Division (now more commonly

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

known as Deputy Directors), each of which had a different area of responsibility. Each division was identifiable by an F number. For example, as I recall, F1 was responsible for police funding, F2 was responsible for police powers and procedures, F4 was responsible for terrorism and national security, F5 was responsible for police training, F6 was responsible for responding to civil emergencies, and F8 was responsible for public order, police effectiveness and firearms control. I do not recall what F3 and F7 were responsible for. I was Head of F8 from 1987 to early 1989 and Head of F4 from early 1989 to 1993.

8. In my capacity as Head of F8, I had contact with the Metropolitan Police in order to ensure that the Home Secretary was properly informed on major public order events, such as the Notting Hill Carnival . F8 also led on policy issues that were relevant to the Metropolitan Police including, for example, equipment that the police might use to secure public order. To the best of my recollection, however, I had no discussion with the Metropolitan Police about the SDS. To provide some context, during the period in which I was Head of F8, public order became a relatively lower priority in contrast to firearms control policy, due to the Hungerford Shootings and the requirement for major new firearms legislation, which dominated F8's officials' activities for some time.
9. F4 was responsible for the special branches and it seems likely that any contact with the Home Office in respect of the special branches came through that division. The names referenced in the documents provided by the Inquiry that I recognise tend to confirm that, for example Roy Sterlini, [REDACTED], Roy Harrington and Hayden Phillips.

[REDACTED]



10. However, when I became Head of F4 immediately after the aircraft bombing in Lockerbie in December 1988, our focus was exclusively on counter-terrorism. This focus had already been building given the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("IRA")'s declared intention (soon acted upon) to intensify its bombing campaign on the UK mainland.
11. In terms of my contact with the special branches for the purpose of this work, there was routine reporting to the Home Secretary on such matters as the personal protection provided by MPS special branch for the Royal Family. I and my colleagues also had extensive contact with the Metropolitan Police special branch ("MPSB") and the bomb squad (I am unclear whether they were part of the same organisation or separate) on the terrorism threat and on specific terrorist incidents. However, as I recall, I had no discussion with the Metropolitan Police about the SDS.
12. At the time MPSB had lead responsibility for Irish Republican terrorism. Following a Home Office led review in the early 1990s this responsibility was transferred to the Security Service by a decision by then Home Secretary Ken Clarke. Some blood was spilt in the process but both the Security Service and MPSB worked extremely hard to ensure co-operative effort to combat the IRA with much encouragement from the Home Office. It is worth noting by way of context here that in 1989 the existence of the Security Service was put on a statutory basis, as was soon afterwards the SIS and GCHQ, so the general atmosphere was of much greater openness though not on operational matters.





13. On my promotion to Under Secretary in 1993 my responsibilities included both F8 and F4. In the early 1990s there was a fairly major re-structuring of the Home Office, with a shift of focus on outcomes, meaning that the Police Department was seen less as dealing with policing issues as one concerned with crime reduction. I headed a new Organised International Crime Directorate ("OICD"), which incorporated, as well as F4 and F8, other parts of the Home Office dealing with things such as extradition and mutual legal assistance. Terrorism and national security were also included but not in the Directorate's title because officials were seen by members of the Provisional IRA as potential targets.
14. The international dimension of OICD's work continued to expand through the structures of the EU and the G7 to the extent that an additional Director was appointed. The lead on international Home Office business was historically taken by the Director of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate because of the significance of immigration issues in the EU, but with the UK's opt out from the Schengen Agreement that became less problematic, and I was asked additionally to take over the lead responsibility on the Home Office's international work on my promotion to Director General in 1996.
15. Between December 2000 and June 2001 I had the role of Acting Permanent Secretary. In my short period in the role I am confident that I did not encounter anything concerning the SDS, nor in my positions as Director and Director General. I did not encounter anything concerning the SDS in my post retirement roles.



[REDACTED]

Answers to the Inquiry's questions

16. I now go on to specifically answer the Inquiry's questions, and which should be read in conjunction with these answers.

17. In attempting to answer the Inquiry's specific questions to me I am drawing on my wider experience of security matters acquired largely after I left F8 division.

However, I would repeat that, to the best of my knowledge, I was unaware of the SDS and had no dealings with the MPSB regarding the SDS.

Personal details

Q1. Please give your full name and date of birth

18. My name is Frederick John Warne and I was born on [REDACTED] 1944.

Civil service career

Q2.1 When you joined the Civil Service.

Q2.2 As best you can recall, an outline of the positions you held within the Civil Service and at which grade.

19. I joined the Civil Service in 1962 as an Executive Officer working in the Immigration Department. In 1964 I transferred to the Ministers' Private Office

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

supporting various private secretaries. In 1966 I was appointed Private Secretary to the Minister of State. In 1969 I was promoted to Higher Executive Officer. In 1972 I joined the Fast Stream and I was posted to the Prison Department. In 1974 I was promoted to Principal and then worked in what was called the Criminal Department, dealing with alleged wrongful convictions.

20. I joined the Police Department in 1979, working between 1979 to 1983 in a division known as F2 on police powers including the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In 1983 I was promoted to the Senior Civil Service as Grade 5 and then moved into a more political environment as Head of F8 in 1987. Between 1989 and 1993 I was Head of F4. In 1993 I was appointed Director. In 1996 I was appointed Director General until 2002, when I retired. As stated above, there was a short period between end of December 2000 and June 2001 when I was acting Permanent Secretary.

Q2.3 Details of any roles or positions (even if informal) in which you were required to oversee, coordinate or otherwise interact with the Metropolitan Police Service Special Branch ('MPSB').

21. I identify the roles and position in which I interacted with the MPSB in paragraphs 8 to 14 above.

Q3. Please provide an explanation of the departments, sections or agencies within the Home Office which existed to direct or superintend the police, and, to your knowledge, how these changed over time.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

22. I outline the department structures that were in place during my time at the Home Office in paragraphs 7 to 14 above. It is important to understand that, although the Home Office maintained a close relationship with the police in order to ensure the Home Secretary could fulfill their functions, the police remained operationally independent from the Home Office; and so I would not consider it to be accurate to say that the Home Secretary 'directed' or 'superintended' the Metropolitan Police. There was a tripartite relationship between the Home Secretary, police authorities and the Chief Constables. It was the Home Secretary's role as Police Authority for the Metropolitan Police that was directly concerned with the Metropolitan Police's overall performance. The Home Secretary still had a wider governmental role in ensuring that policing in the UK properly protected the Queen's peace, secured public order and maintained public confidence. Policy issues of interest to the Home Secretary might have included police funding, sufficient police numbers, whether the police were adequately structured to cope with present day threats, whether they were making sufficient use of modern technology and ensuring that the legislative framework was appropriate for the exercise of police powers and the criminal justice process.

Special Branch

Q4: What was the purpose and remit of MPSB as you understood it?

[REDACTED]

24. The relationship between the Home Office and MPSB during my time at the Home Office was open, frank and co-operative. The individuals I worked with at MPSB had sufficient experience, understood and respected the Home Office's role and the Home Office understood MPSB's operational independence.

Q5.1: Did this change over your time within the Home Office? If so, how?

25. The relationship between the Home Office and MPSB did not change during my time in the Home Office, apart from a short period before the MPSB's lead intelligence role on Irish Republican terrorism was transferred to the Security Service in the early 1990s when relationships were strained. This remained the position.

Q6: During your time within the Home Office, what interaction, if any, did you have with officers or managers of MPSB? Please consider in particular page 4 of MPS-0738057 (interview notes of Donald Buchanan, former Commander of SO12 1991-1994), where you were specifically named in reference to briefings with the Home Office. To the best of your recollection:

Q6.1 Over what period of time did you attend regular briefings with members of Special Branch?

Q6.2 What was the frequency and purpose of these briefings?

Q6.3 How did you come to be involved in these briefings?



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Q6.2 What was the frequency and purpose of these briefings?

Q6.3 How did you come to be involved in these briefings?

Q6.4 Who would attend these briefings?

Q6.5 What sort of issues were discussed?

Q6.7 Did you ever have any concerns about anything that you had become aware of in these briefings? If so, were they raised with others?

26. The context in which Commander Buchanan refers to me in document MPS-0738057 is not clear, but I did not ever attend regular briefings with MPSB, including during my time as Head of F8 or Head of F4.

Q6.6 How much influence did you feel you had over what was happening in Special Branch?

27. My influence over MPSB was only to the extent that MPSB was aware of the Home Secretary's legitimate interest in non-operational matters.

Q6.8 What was your relationship like with Donald Buchanan and Ben Gunn (former Commander of SO12 1988-1990)?



[REDACTED]

28. My relationship with Donald Buchanan and Ben Gunn was limited and professional. I infrequently discussed public order issues with Donald Buchanan during my time as Head of F8. I worked more closely with Ben Gunn during my time as Head of F4 in the context of counter-terrorism. I do not recall discussing the SDS with either of them.

Q6.9 Do you agree that they were "not popular with [the] Home Office"? Why?

29. I do not agree that they were unpopular with the Home Office. We all respected each other's roles.

Q6.10 Were you aware at the time of any concerns regarding the relationship between the Home Office and Special Branch?

30. I was not aware of any concerns around the relationship between MPSB and the Home Office, except that there was some tension between the two organisations and during the transition of lead intelligence responsibility on combatting the threat from the IRA from MPSB to the Security Service (see response to 5.1 above).



Q7: Please consider MPS-0733126, specifically page 5, which concerns a request to Special Branch from the Home Office for an assessment of the proposed demonstration to coincide with the anniversary of the death of Blair Peach in 1980.

Q7.1: Did the Home Office consider that the justice campaign which followed the death of Blair Peach was a proper target for Special Branch investigation? Why so?

Q7.2: What was the purpose, as you understood it, of such assessments (including post-demonstration assessment such as UCPI0000035151) prepared by MPSB for the Home Office?

31. MPS-0733126 appears to be a request from F4. This was not a matter that I was involved in or have any recollection of. I do not know what the Home Office considered at the time in terms of whether the justice campaign which followed the death of Blair Peach was a proper target for Special Branch investigation or what the purpose of the request was. I do not know what the purpose of the request was, and I do not know what view the Home Office took of the request.

Q7.3: In your experience, how frequently were such assessments sought?

32. I do not know how frequently such assessments were sought. In my experience they were sought infrequently and only in connection with large scale events e.g. Notting Hill Carnival, which could present public order issues.



[REDACTED]

Q7.4 As far as you are able to assist, how were the responses received from MPSB (see pages 6-9 and 29-32) regarded within the Home Office?

Q7.4.1 Were they considered to be of value? Why so?

33. I do not know how the responses were received or whether they were considered to be of value.

Q8: Please consider UCPI0000035096 which appears to be a note authored by Hayden Phillips concerning the Home Office reaction to a report provided by MPSB (which is not within the Inquiry's possession but appears to concern 'Political Extremism and Campaign for Police Accountability within the Metropolitan Police District').

Q8.1: If possible, please can you explain what this MPSB report contained and why it prompted 'very serious concern' within the Home Office?

Q8.1.1: If you are unable to recall the report, based on the documents provided, why do you consider that this report is likely to have prompted the concern it did?

34. I do not recall this report. As far as I am aware I never saw it and would not have had reason to because it was during the period that I was working in F8 rather than in F4. I am additionally unable to discern from the papers provided by the Inquiry why it would cause 'very serious concern'.



Q8.2: *As far as you can recall, was there any awareness within the Home Office that MPSB may be pushing to the limit a 'broader concept of public order intelligence'?*

Q8.2.1: *If so, why was this a concern and what, if anything, was done in response?*

Q8.2.2: *If not, please explain why this appears to have been of particular concern to the Home Office.*

35. Not to my knowledge, but again I do not recall the report and I was not working in F4 at the time.

Q8.3: *Were the actions proposed within paragraph 3 in fact taken in response? What was the result?*

Q8.4: *What did Hayden Phillips mean when he said he considered that this was 'dangerous in implication'?*

Q8.4.1: *Was this a concern based on the limits which were considered to properly apply to Special Branch activities? If so, what did you consider these to be in this regard?*

Q8.5 *What did he mean by 'that particular skeleton is still in our cupboard'?*

36. I do not know the answer to these questions.

Q8.6: *Was the 'review of the role of Special Branches' (paragraph 3) a reference to work which was ongoing at this time to update the Special Branch Terms of Reference?*



[REDACTED]

37. I do not know, but I assume that he is referring to the need to produce fresh guidelines on the work of the special branches, which at that point had not been done, but which was completed in 1984.

Q8.7: How did Hayden Phillips consider that this review would deal with this issue?

Q8.7.1: As far as you are concerned did this take place?

Q8.7.2 Do you now consider this to have been adequate?

38. I do not know the answer to these questions.

Q9: The Inquiry has seen documents relating to public concern articulated to the Home Office about the involvement of Special Branch officers within trade unions and industrial disputes (see, for example UCPI0000035102, UCPI0000035101, UCPI0000034700, UCPI0000035100, UCPI0000034699 and UCPI0000035086).

Q9.1: What were considered to be the proper limits, if any, on Special Branch activities within trade unions and industrial disputes?

39. These documents derive from 1974, which was well before my time even in F8, so I have no knowledge of Home Office views or actions on this issue at that time. I do not recall any issues concerning the involvement of special branches in trade union or industrial disputes arising during my time in F8 or F4. This may have been because the 1984 Guidance was more comprehensive and I note that

[REDACTED]

the 1984 Guidance which deals with these matters makes clear that trade union activities are not subversive.

Q9.2: How did the Home Office ensure that activities remained within such limits?

40. While I do not recall any issues in respect of the involvement of special branches in trade unions or industrial disputes, and I didn't work on policing in 1974, I would say more generally that the Home Office would have relied upon Chief Officers to ensure that activities remained within the 1970s Guidelines.

Q9.3: As far as you can recall, how were the specific concerns detailed above viewed within the Home Office?

Q9.4: Within UCPI0000035100 [REDACTED] notes the need to give the Home Secretary 'fairly specific information of the kind of activity that goes on'. As far as you are able to assist, what sort of information was provided?

41. I do not know.

Q9.4.1: More generally, how much information of the activities of Special Branch was ordinarily shared with the Home Secretary? In what circumstances would this take place?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

42. In the context of the work with Special Branch that I was involved with during my time in F4, mainly counter-terrorism, the Permanent Secretary had regular meetings with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, which would provide an opportunity for the Home Office to raise or answer any queries that arose. In the context of terrorism, the Home Secretary would have MPSB's assessments of current threats and responses to terrorism incidents. However, more broadly I am unable to say.

Q9.5: What was the attitude within the Home Office towards blacklisting or passing of information about those deemed to hold subversive views to employers or other private sector organisations?

43. I do not know. It was not an issue that to my recollection was ever raised with me.

Q9.5.1: Do the comments made on page 2 of UCPI0000034699 represent the approach as you recall it?

44. I do not know. This was before I started working on policing issues.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q9.6: *The Inquiry understands that these concerns, at least in part, led to the issuing of a circular authored by the Security Service entitled Subversive Activities in Industrial Disputes (UCPI0000034699 and UCPI0000004545). Is this understanding correct?*

Q9.6.1: *If so, please explain why this was considered necessary and/or desirable?*

45. I do not know.

Subversion

Q10: *What role did you understand Special Branch played in countering subversion?*

Q10.1: *How did you understand this role to correspond with that of the Security Service?*

46. Special Branch had two roles in countering subversion. Firstly, at the tactical level to acquire information about risks to public order arising from significant events. Secondly, to assist the Security Service in fulfilling their counter-subversion functions.

Q11: *During your time within the Home Office, what did you understand the applicable definition of subversion to be?*

47. During my time in the Home Office I understood the definition of subversion to be as set out in the 1984 Guidelines.

[REDACTED]

Q11.1: Did you understand it to be that given by the then Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell-Fife, as a directive to the Security Service in 1952 (UCPI0000034262)?

48. The document that I have seen is not clear on a definition of counter subversion. By the time that I was working on intelligence issues the matter was very clearly set out in the 1984 Guidelines. I have never understood the definition to have been given by Sir David Maxwell-Fife.

Q11.2: Thereafter, did you understand it to be that (privately) defined by John Jones of the Security Service and, later, publicly espoused by Lord Harris of Greenwich in 1975 (UCPI0000034264 and UCPI0000034265)?

49. I had no reason to consider a definition of subversion prior to the issues of the 1984 Guidelines.

Q11.2.1: Did you understand that both limbs of this definition would need to be met before an activity or group could be deemed subversive, as the then Home Secretary explained to Parliament in 1979 (UCPI0000004431, p7)?

50. The two limbs as set out at page 7 of document UCPI0000004431 are also contained in the 1984 Guidelines, therefore yes, my understanding was that both limbs had to be satisfied.

[REDACTED]

Q11.2.2 If so, as far as you understood it, how realistic or immediate would the threat posed by a group or activity to the safety or wellbeing of the state need to be to fall within this definition?

51. The threat would have to be realistic and not fanciful but it need not be immediate because the threat might consist of long term plans.

Q11.3: What role did the Home Office play in establishing these definitions and their revision?

52. I do not know where the definitions came from. However the Home Office carried out a root and branch review of the existing guidance (including in particular the 1970 Guidelines that was issued by Chief Officers of Police), which resulted in the Home Secretary issuing the 1984 Guidelines which established the definitions of relevant concepts including subversion.

Q12: Please consider UCPI0000035086. Does the analysis of [REDACTED] (on page 1) - that the application of the definition of subversion ultimately remained a matter for Chief Constables, correspond with your understanding? If not, why not?

Q12.1: If so, what consideration was given to ensuring that this interpretation remained consistent with the definition?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

53. No it is not my understanding that the application of the definition of subversion ultimately remained a matter for Chief Constables because I think that the application of the definition would have been subject to any guidance from the Security Service. I agree that the definition and the standards to be applied under it are matters for the Home Secretary.

Q12.2: Was the 'proper role of the Security Service in relation to subversion' (paragraph 2) considered the primary means by which judgements made by Special Branch were kept within acceptable bounds?

Q12.2.1: If so, as far as you are aware, how did this work in practice?

54. I do not know.

Q12.2.2: If not, what else was used to ensure that Special Branch was operating within this definition?

55. While I cannot definitively answer this question, I think the Home Office would have regarded it as the Chief Officer's responsibility to ensure that the guidance was complied with and would have expected the Security Service to advise the Home Office if they had any concerns.

[REDACTED]

Q13: Please consider UCPI0000004658. The comments made by a representative of the Security Service at paragraph 6 suggest in his view, the problems which led to criticism of Special Branch lay within the definition of subversion, and specifically attempts to equate it with non-criminal activity. As far as you were aware, was this view shared within the Home Office? If possible, please explain why this was or was not the case.

56. I do not know whether this view was shared within the Home Office, nor do I know what the views of the Home Office were at that time.

Q14: Please consider UCPI0000035107 (particularly the comments repeated within paragraph 2) which considers a response to a recent controversy concerning Special Branch and was signed on Hayden Phillips' behalf.

Q14.1: Was it accepted that 'political views of potential subversives' were a legitimate area of interest to Special Branch?

Q14.1.1: If so, was monitoring of potential subversives considered consistent with the first limb of the test for subversion (requiring an actual threat to the safety or wellbeing of the state)? In answer to this question you may wish to refer to the comments made by David Heaton in November 1979, with the context of the revision to the Terms of Reference to Special Branch (UCPI0000004716, paragraph 2).

Q14.2: Was it accepted that Special Branch officers would need to become involved on the fringes of legitimate political activity?

Q14.2.1: If so, why was this considered justified?

[REDACTED]

Q14.3: Were you aware that Special Branch faced difficulties in distinguishing between legitimate political activity and subversion as suggested?

Q14.3.1: If so, given that this was leading to some public concern, what was done to ensure that Special Branches were able to act appropriately in this regard?

57. I do not know. This relates to internal consideration within the Home Office in 1979, which was before I worked on policing matters, and I am not aware of prevailing views. I was not aware of any difficulties being experienced, which suggested that the 1984 Guidelines helped clarify the position.

Q14.4: Did you understand Special Branch officers to be 'highly skilled and well supervised'?

Q14.4.1: Where did this understanding come from? Was this based on anything other than reassurances provided by those who managed them?

58. As stated above, I cannot comment on the position in 1979, but the general impression I gained during the period 1989 – 1995, when I was more closely involved with counter terrorism in particular, was that Special Branch officers were highly skilled but sometimes lacked adequate supervision and that their tenure of office was often too long.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q15. Please consider the F4 discussion paper, likely authored in 1980, within UCPI0000004437. The Inquiry understand that UCPI0000004459 represents the underlined 1970 Terms of Reference, referred to as Annex A with paragraph 15 of the discussion paper. The author appear to have underlined the terms 'which may be judged to be subversive' (para 2), 'subversive or potentially subversive' (para 3(d)) and 'a subversive or political [objective]' (para 3(e)) as difficult aspects of this document.

Q15.1: Do you agree that this suggests that the author considered there was a problem with how broadly subversion was drawn?

59. It might suggest that the author considered that there was a problem but I do not know. It appears to be a valuable discussion paper airing all the issues that needed to be considered to assist the revision of the 1970 Guidelines process. I do not know how informed the author was, and I do not know the author's views.

Q15.2: Did you or others within the Home Office share this concern? Why/why not?

60. I was not involved at the time, and during the time I was working in policing the definition of subversion set out in the 1984 Guidelines did not give rise to difficulties.

Q16: Please also consider the proposed revision to the Special Branch Terms of Reference at Annex B to this discussion paper UCPI00000034701. At paragraph 4 the understood definition of subversion is repeated, but this is then supplemented with the

[REDACTED]

words 'activities of organisations or individuals which, while operating at present within the law, have as their long term aim the overthrow of Parliamentary democracy'.

Q16.1: Did you consider this to be a widening of the definition or a clarification?

61. This was not something I worked on, therefore I cannot speak to the intention behind the proposed revision. However, if asked now my own view is that the proposed extension was superfluous because those intent upon overthrowing Parliamentary democracy may find ways of avoiding criminal activity or acting within the law at least initially.

Q16.2: Did you or others within the Home Office consider this proposed extended wording of the accepted definition would have unequivocally caught activity which was lawful and posed no present threat to the continuation of Parliamentary democracy?

Q16.3: Was this extended definition of concern? Please give reasons for your answer.

62. I do not know because I was not working on policing matters at this time.

Q17: The Inquiry notes that this proposed amendment was not repeated within the revised Guidelines which were later published, but was included within the unpublished covering letter addressed to Chief Constables (UCPI0000004538) and UCPI0000004584, paragraph 5).

[REDACTED]

64. That is my understanding from the papers provided by the Inquiry. I did not work on policing matters at this time.

Q19: Did you play any role in the drafting or promulgation of these original Terms of Reference or their revision in the 1970's and early 1980's? If so, please explain the nature and extent of your involvement?

65. No.

Q20: Comments by David Heaton of 2 October 1978 (UCPI0000035084, p3-4) suggest that he anticipated increasing public scrutiny and questioning of Special Branches, and so felt that public guidance would be helpful to deploy in response. He drew an analogy to the published Security Service Charter (see the 'Maxwell-Fife Directive' (UCPI0000034262)).

Q20.1: As far as you can recall, was responding to public scrutiny the only or main reason why the Terms of Reference were considered worthy of updating?

Q20.2: If not, please explain what else prompted the initial exercise to update the Terms of Reference?

66. I do not know what triggered the review, but I do understand the need to have a document that could be put in the public domain.

[REDACTED]

Q21: Please consider the note prepared by [REDACTED] in April 1979 (UCPI0000004719) which refers to comments made by HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary ('HMCIC') that 'the Security Services sought more information from Special Branches than they really needed' and that the 1970 Terms of Reference were unclear on the proper limits of this relationship. Similarly, a comment by David Heaton on 13 October 1978 (page 4 of UCPI0000035084), repeats a view apparently expressed by Sir Colin Woods (who was, at that time, HMCIC) that MPSB might well do less work for the Security Service.

Q21.1: Were you aware of any concern (expressed by HMCIC, MPSB or any other body) that excessive or improper demands were placed on MPSB by the Security Service?

67. I was not aware of any concerns, nor was I in a position to be aware of any concerns because I was not yet working on policing matters.

Q21.1.1: If so, please explain the nature and origin of this concern and any action which was taken in response.

Q21.1.2: If not, please explain how you believe the Home Office would have approached such an issue?

82. I believe the Home Office would have had discussions with the Security Service and used the Inspectorate of the Constabulary to establish to what extent police forces saw this as a problem.

[REDACTED]

Q21.2: Do you recall that the Terms of Reference issued in 1970 were considered insufficient in this or any other regard?

Q21.2.1: If so, please explain the nature and origin of this concern and any action which was taken in response.

83. I am not able to assist as it was before I worked in the Policing Department.

Q22: Please consider UCPI0000004718, which is a letter from Hayden Phillips to Rex Bryan of the MPS, sent in August 1979, which proposes the possible revision to the 1970 Terms of Reference.

Q22.1: Please explain the circumstances, as you recall them, which led to the sending of this letter.

84. I do not know the circumstances that led to the drafting of the letter, because I was not involved.

Q22.2 Page 2 repeats comments made by Sir Robert Armstrong; 'the climate of opinion in which Special Branches... operate has changed quite considerably since 1970'. Is the Inquiry correct to infer that he considered the existing Terms of Reference were inadequate for the work Special Branch was doing in the late 1970s?

Q22.2.1: Did you share this view? Why?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

85. From my reading of the papers, especially in the light of Parliamentary interest in the matter, it was thought right to review the guidance and consider whether it could be made public, but I didn't have a view at the time because I was not involved.

Q22.3: This letter suggests that Hayden Phillips did not consider that a revision was likely to lead to the end of 'disturbing' incidents, as that was better addressed through proper supervision and experience. Was the purpose of the proposed revision, at least in part, therefore intended to address and/or reduce such incidents?

86. Again, I do not know. I can only speculate that it was a timely point to review it, rather than that there was a starting point that the existing guidance was itself wrong, but that is my interpretation of the document with which I have been provided and I was not involved.

Q22.3.1: What overview, if any, did the Home Office have of the adequacy of Special Branch recruitment, training and deployment? (In response to this question you may wish to consider the final paragraph of the MPSB letter received in reply (UCPI0000035109) and the comments at the end of page 1 of UCPI0000004417).

Q22.3.1.1: Was the role of HMCIC considered important in this regard? Why?

87. I do not know what overview the Home Office had, but from my experience the role of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary ("HMCIC") is to offer an

[REDACTED]

overview of police performance and problems arising based on regular inspection of forces, reporting to the Home Secretary. It would be important in complementing the views of Chief Officers, insofar as it was a more independent source of information on policing.

Q23: Please consider UCPI0000035108 which was a note from HMCIC, received in reply, which opposes any publication of a revised Terms of Reference for Special Branch.

Q23.1: Did you and/or others within the Home Office agree that publication could be 'emotive or even provocative' amongst some groups?

Q23.2: How was this response viewed generally within the Home Office?

Q23.3: What effect did the reluctance to publish expressed have on the proposed revision?

88. I do not know because I was not involved.

Q23.4: Please also consider a similar letter sent in September 1983 (UCPI0000004666). Are you able to explain why HMCIC appears to have consistently taken a more conservative view regarding publication that the police themselves throughout this process?

89. Experience suggests that HMCIC would have been approaching this more from an operational policing point of view, whereas Home Office officials would have

[REDACTED]

been considering this from a governmental point of view and the Home Secretary's accountability to Parliament.

Q24: Please consider UCPI0000004426. This letter from the Security Service suggests that a meeting chaired by Sir Robert Armstrong in December 1978 did not conclude that there was a pressing need to revise the 1970 Terms of Reference.

Q24.1: Does this accord with your understanding, notwithstanding the documents referred to above?

Q24.2: Within this letter the author also suggests that they considered little advantage would be gained from redrafting the Special Branch Terms of Reference as had been proposed. What effect did this reluctance have on this process?

Q24.3: How was this response viewed generally within the Home Office?

90. I am afraid I cannot offer a view on this because I was not involved. Home Office officials would be more aware than the Security Service of the political dimensions.

Q25: Is the Inquiry correct to understand that this reluctance to publish a revised Terms of Reference from HMCIC and the Security Service led to such plans being dropped in the autumn of 1979 (see the comments of Phillipa Drew at p8 of UCPI0000035084)?



91. I do not know the answer to this question. I am not in a position to comment because I was not working on policing matters at that time.

Q26: Please consider the subsequent submission made to Sir Brian Cubbon by David Heaton (UCPI0000004715), along with a paper prepared by F4 on the topic (UCPI0000004437), the proposed revision to the Terms of Reference (UCPI00000034701) and Sir Brian's response (UCPI0000004427).

Q26.1: Does the paper prepared by F4 accurately reflect the issues behind attempts to update and publish the Terms of Reference of Special Branch at this point in time? If not, why not?

92. I was not involved, but it appears to me from the papers that the paper prepared by F4 was a starting point for the review.

Q26.2: Did the view expressed by David Heaton that attempts to consolidate the existing guidance had resulted in a 'poor thing' (UCPI0000004715, p4) reflect the general view within the Home Office at the time?

Q26.3: In your view is the Inquiry correct to infer that the questions posed by David Heaton at paragraph 11 of his submission were considered to be of significant importance by the Home Office? Why?



[REDACTED]

Q26.4: *Do you recall that ministers at this time (late 1980) failed to share the same disquiet about the work of Special Branches as their predecessors (paragraph 14)? Presumably a reference to ministers in the previous Labour Government. If so, please explain what you mean.*

Q26.5 *Is the Inquiry correct to conclude that work on revision to the Terms of Reference was paused after the meeting proposed by Sir Brian Cubbon? In answer to this question you may be assisted by reference to paragraph 4 of UCPI0000035095.*

Q26.5.1: *If so, can you explain why this occurred, despite the comments by David Heaton within the final sentence of page 1, paragraph 2 of UCPI0000004437?*

93. I do not know because I was not involved.

Q27: *Please consider UCPI0000035095 and UCPI0000004431. Did this note and letters authored by Hayden Phillips, which appear to signal the resumption of the process of revising and publishing the Terms of Reference, come at the prompting of the police (specifically, Ken Oxford)?*

94. This appears from the papers to have been a result of prompting from the police but there may have been other factors involved, and I am only speculating because I was not involved.

Q27.1: *What view did you take of the 'veto' which had been used by the Security Service?*

[REDACTED]

95. I wouldn't regard it as a veto because if the Home Secretary had concluded that revised guidance should be published, he would act accordingly while trying to allay the Security Service concerns. In the event, it appears that the Security Service did not object. However, I was not involved at this time.

Q27.2: Did you consider their position to be overly conservative?

96. I was not involved, but if I had been involved I would have considered it to be overly conservative.

Q27.3: Do your comments in paragraph 5 ('the relationship with the Security Service might be made more explicit to discourage any private enterprise by police forces on subjects where the Security Service should be taking the lead') suggest that you understood this was a problem which needed to be addressed?

97. These were not my comments they were Hayden Phillips' comments.

Q28: Please consider UCPI0000004434. To your knowledge, was this the first time that a draft of the new Guidelines (as they [had] become known by this time) was shown to the Home Secretary?

Q28.1 Was this process undertaken with the Home Secretary's knowledge and/or agreement? If not, why not?

[REDACTED]

98. I do not know, I was not involved, but that appears to be the case from the papers. I do not know whether the process was done with the Home Secretary's knowledge, but if it was not it is not unusual for officials to do a lot of ground work before putting substantive proposals to Ministers.

Q29: Please consider UCPI0000035090. Is the Inquiry correct to understand that the announcement of an investigation into Special Branches to be held by the Home Affairs Select Committee in the spring of 1984, prompted the acceleration and conclusion of the process or revision which has been resumed a year beforehand? As far as you are able to recall, why this change matter?

99. From my reading of the papers yes, but this is not from my recollection. It would be clearly more advantageous for the Home Secretary to say that the exercise had been completed rather than to say that it was still in progress.

Q30: Please consider UCPI0000004645, a note of a meeting chaired by Roy Harrington. Why was the decision taken not to publish the covering letter to the Special Branch Guidelines 'under any circumstances' (paragraph 5)?

100. I do not know, I was not involved.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q31: Please consider UCPI0000004637. It appears that the passage in question concerning 'potentially subversive' organisations was then included within the covering letter to the Guidelines (UCPI0000004415, page 6 and UCPI0000004678). Why did Roy Harrington consider that these comments could be accommodated 'without difficulty'? You may wish to note that [REDACTED] also took a similar view (UCPI0000035129, paragraph 6).

Q31.1: Was the original omission of the category deliberate? If so, why?

Q31.2: Was any consideration given to the fact that addition of this category would theoretically increase the range and scope of Special Branch activities into groups which did not, at that moment in time, meet the test for subversion? If so, what was the result?

Q31.3: Was the inclusion of this passage intended to provide authorisation for the reality that groups of this nature were already covered by the activities of Special Branch?

Q31.3: Why was this category omitted from the Guidelines which were to be published (UCPI0000004542), and only explicitly included within the covering letter?

Q31.4.1: Was this based on concern at possible public reaction to the scope of Special Branch activities which this would reveal?

101. I do not know and I am unable to say even from my reading of the papers provided by the Inquiry. I was not involved.

Q32: Please consider UCPI0000004632. Did you consider the comments on the increasing need for better intelligence on public order to be a reference to the work of the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SDS? If so, how did this aspect of MPSB's work affect the attempts to review the Terms of Reference?

Q32.1: More generally, to what extent, if at all, were the work and operational practices of the SDS, as opposed to Special Branch, considered when work was done to revise the Special Branch Terms of Reference?

102. I do not know whether this was a reference to the work of the SDS. I was not aware that the SDS existed until this Inquiry, but it seems on my reading of the papers that the reference is capable of being interpreted more broadly than strictly as a reference to the SDS.

Special Demonstration Squad

Q33: During your career, what knowledge did you have of the Special Demonstration Squad of MPSB?

Q33.1: What did you understand its origins to be?

Q33.2: What did you understand its purpose and remit to be?

Q33.3: What groups did you understand it sought intelligence in respect of?

Q33.3.1: Did you understand these to be primarily left-wing in political nature? If so, why?

103. I was not aware of the SDS's existence until this Inquiry. I set out in paragraphs 8 to 14 the focus of my work during my career at the Home Office.

[REDACTED]

Critically during my time in F4 the top priority was counter-terrorism. Insofar as F4 was responsible from a policy perspective for the special branches, SDS did not feature to the best of my recollection.

Q34: How much information regarding the detail of authorisation or operation of the SDS was shared with the Home Secretary?

Q34.1: What was the rationale behind this approach?

104. While I am not sure what happened in previous years, and I am not aware when the SDS was authorised, I have no recollection of anything on this subject being shared with the Home Secretary during my time as Head of F4.

Q35: How much information regarding the detail of authorisation or operation of the SDS was shared with you as the Head of the Public Order Unit?

105. None.

Q36: As far as you were aware, did knowledge of the SDS extend outside the Home Office into other parts of Government?

Q36.1: If so, did this extend to Downing Street and/or the Cabinet Office and/or the Prime Minister's Office, and what was the level or extent of detail known?

[REDACTED]

106. I do not know the answer to this question. I was not aware of the SDS's existence until this Inquiry.

Q37: What methods did you understand that the SDS used to obtain the intelligence it sought and how did this differ from more traditional Special Branch tactics?

107. I do not know the answer to this question and I cannot deduce that from the papers provided by the Inquiry.

Q38: What influence, if any, did the Home Office have over the methods or tactics used by the SDS?

108. I do not know. It appears from the papers that the continuation of the SDS was the subject of annual review as a Home Office requirement. However, it is unclear what happened to that process and I do not believe it existed during my time as Head of F4.

Q39: What influence, if any, did the Home Office have over the groups targeted by the SDS?

109. I do not know. However, from my experience the Home Office would not influence which groups were targeted. This would be an operational decision.

[REDACTED]

Q40: During your time within the Home Office, what interaction, if any, did you have with officers or managers of the SDS?

110. I had no contact with anyone that I knew to be an officer of the SDS, because I didn't know it existed. I may have been in contact with MPSB managers with responsibility for the SDS who had other roles in the MPS.

Q41: Please again consider in particular the briefings mentioned on page 4 of MPS-0738057.

Q41.1: How often was the SDS discussed at these briefings?

Q41.2: How much influence did you feel you had over what was happening in the SDS?

111. I did not attend any briefings at which the SDS was discussed.

Q42: To your knowledge, what role did the Home Office play in the establishment, continuation, authorisation and funding of the SDS? In answer to this question you may be assisted by reference to the SDS Annual Reports and corresponding letters from the Home Office authorising its continuation within your witness pack.

112. I have no knowledge of the Home Office's role in the establishment, continuation, authorisation and funding of the SDS. However, from the papers provided by the Inquiry it seems that approval was given by the Home Office and this was renewed annually for a number of years.

[REDACTED]

Q42.1: What, if any, obligation of secrecy did the Home Office attach to its work?

Q42.2: What consideration, if any, was given by the Home Office to the legality of the operation of the SDS?

Q42.3: Was any other Government department involved in any of these tasks? If so, which?

113. I do not know, I was not involved in this work and was not aware of the SDS's existence until this Inquiry.

Q43: The Inquiry understands that the Annual Reports which were prepared on an annual basis by the manager in charge of the SDS, or his deputy, were not ordinarily shared with the Home Office. Instead, a letter was prepared by a more senior manager within the MPS, based on this report, and sent to the Home Office to seek approval. To the best of your knowledge, is this understanding correct?

114. From reading the papers it appears that the reports were included with the senior manager's letter to the Home Office. However, I do not have any personal knowledge given I was not involved in this work and was not aware of the SDS' existence until this Inquiry.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q44: Please consider MPS-0724116, MPS-0724109, MPS-0724130 and MPS-0724177 which are letters from the Home Office, mostly authored by Sir James Waddell (Deputy Under-Secretary of State), authorising the SDS' continuation in the years immediately following its inception in 1968. As far as you are able to assist

Q44.1: Why was there concern that 'embarrassment' would be caused to the Home Secretary were the squad's existence to become known, so as to require reiteration of the need for secrecy within these letters?

Q44.2 Was this concern based on the nature of the infiltrations conducted by the SDS, either in terms of the types of groups reported or the methods used to that end or both?

Q44.2.1: If so, how was it envisioned that publication of this activity would be of concern to the Home Office?

Q44.3: Was the SDS (at this time or later) considered controversial by the Home Office? If so, why?

Q44.4: Did this (or any other) concern lead to a requirement from the Home Office that the SDS remained secret?

115. I do not know what the thinking was at that time and it is not discernable from the papers either.

Q44.5: Why was the early view expressed by James Waddell (MPS-0724177) that the SDS 'should not be a permanent feature of the Branch' not followed?

[REDACTED]

116. It seems to me from the papers provided by the Inquiry that the process of review means that it was not permanent. However, during my time in F4 there was no renewal process of which I was aware. I do not know why. I was also not aware of such a process at any other point in my career.

Q45: The Inquiry has received evidence that police officers deployed within the SDS from the mid-1970s onwards consistently utilised the identities of deceased children in support of their cover identities.

Q45.1: Were you aware of this practice?

Q45.2: Was this practice approved of (either tacitly or explicitly) by you or others within the Home Office?

Q45.3: If not, what is/was your reaction to learning of this practice?

117. I had no knowledge of that practice and I do not know if it was approved by the Home Office. My reaction based on subsequent experience is that the MPSB would have been well advised to seek advice from the Security Service on this area to determine whether there were other ways of achieving their objectives, because the Security Service had extensive knowledge of using informants, but this is based on my experience and not on any personal knowledge of this practice.

[REDACTED]

Q46: The Inquiry has received evidence that several officers deployed within the SDS during your time in the Home Office engaged in sexual activity, in their cover identities, with those on whom they reported.

Q46.1: Was this known about within the Home Office?

Q46.2: Was the risk of such behaviour taking place considered within the Home Office?

If not, why not

Q46.3: Was this behaviour approved of (either tacitly or explicitly) by you or others within the Home Office?

118. I do not know if it was known, considered or approved by the Home Office.

During my time working in policing I was not aware that this occurred.

Q46.4: If not, what is your reaction to learning of this?

119. I did not react to it because I was not aware that it occurred. If the question is directed to my reaction now then the answer is that I am both surprised and profoundly disappointed that officers engaged in sexual activities in their cover identities with those whom they reported.

Q46.5: Please consider UCPI0000027446 which is a Security Service file note recording a conversation between the then head of the SDS, David Short, and representatives of the Security Service. Within paragraph 5 it is recorded that an SDS officer, HN106, had

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

'probably bedded' someone on whom he was reporting, thus indicating an awareness of this behaviour amongst the management of the SDS and/or representatives of the Security Service.

Q46.5.1: To your knowledge, was such information ever passed on to the Home Office (by the Security Service or MPSB), either in respect of this or other such incidents?

120. I do not know.

Q46.5.2: Would you have expected to have been informed of such behaviour? If not, why not?

121. No, I would expect it to be a situation to be handled by managers at the SDS.

Q47: Please consider UCPI0000027515 which is a further Security Service file note. Within paragraph 5 concern from HN68 (a manager within the SDS) is noted because one of the deployed officers he oversaw ('Phil Cooper') had regular access to an MP at the House of Commons as part of his deployment.

Q47.1.1: To your knowledge was information such as this ever passed on to the Home Office (by the Security Service or MPSB), either in respect of this or other such incidents?

122. I do not know.



Q47.1.2: Would you have been expected to have been informed of such incidents? If not, why not?

Q47.1.3: If the Home Office had been aware of deployments of this nature would this have been considered acceptable? Why so?

123. I would not have expected it to be reported to the Home Office, provided that MPSB had engaged with the Security Service on any wider issues with a view to understanding if there were any other inquiries that they were engaged in that involved Members of Parliament. Thereafter the Home Office would have been concerned if there was any potential breach of Parliamentary privilege and the Wilson Doctrine, i.e. that MPs should not be subject to intrusive surveillance.

Q48: Please consider MPS-0730658 and MPS-0730745. These concern an internal MPSB review, conducted at the instigation of Commander Matt Rodger in 1976, to assess the continued value of the SDS and intended to support a submission to Sir Robert Armstrong for the continuation of the squad. The short review was conducted predominantly by current or former managers of the SDS but did include some input from police recipients of SDS intelligence, and supported its continuation. The subsequent letter sent to the Home Office seeking continued authorisation for the SDS made reference to this review (MPS-0728980, page 13).

Q48.1: To your knowledge, was this review ever sent to the Home Office?

124. I do not know.





Q48.2: Having now considered the review and learned that it was authored solely by MPSPB managers, most with SDS connections, would it have been considered adequate if this had been known and it had been sent to the Home Office at the time? Why?

125. Applying my experience from a later period, I think the Home Office might well have asked for a view from the Security Service as well, but I do not know if that would have been the attitude at the time.

Q48.3: What view was taken by the Home Office of assurances such as that given in the letter that 'the degree of coverage necessary is under constant review...in order to ensure the minimising of risk and of unnecessary activity by the squad'?

126. I do not know.

Q48.3.1: Were they considered satisfactory for your purposes at the time?

127. They weren't for my purposes. I was not involved.

Q48.3.1.1: If yes, with hindsight, do you consider that the Home Office should have taken a different approach? Why?



[REDACTED]

128. I was not aware of the review or the assurances. My own view now would be that it was not unreasonable to respect the assurances of senior officers as sufficient.

Q49: Please consider MPS-0730903 (page 1) and MPS-0737347 (page 9, minute 24) which record that Roy Harrington attended a meeting with Commander Phelan on 5 June 1984. This meeting was arranged at the behest of Sir Brian Cubbon due to concerns about the continued justification for the SDS. At this meeting it appears that Mr Harrington was shown a copy of the 1983 Annual Report and 'expressed a view that he had enough material to allay Sir Brian Cubbon's fears'. It appears that the results of this meeting were reported back, and as predicted, Sir Brian Cubbon was content (MPS-0734164).

Q49.1: To your knowledge, was this the first time that an SDS annual report had been shared with a Home Office official?

Q49.2: If so, what were the concerns which led to this change of approach towards authorisation of the SDS?

Q49.2.1: Did these concerns relate to the public issues surrounding the activities of Special Branches more generally, rather than the SDS specifically, at the time (for example those discussed within UCPI0000004455)?

Q49.2.2: Was this concern prompted by the announcement of an investigation into Special Branches to be held by the Home Affairs Select Committee in the spring of 1984 (UCPI0000035099)?

[REDACTED]

Q49.2.3: What impact, if any, did the ongoing effort to revise and publish the Special Branch Terms of Reference have on this apparent change of approach towards authorisation of the SDS?

Q49.3: To the best of your memory, what within the 1983 SDS Annual Report (MPS-0730903, page 5 onwards) allayed the concerns Sir Brian Cubbon had expressed?

Q49.4: Are you able to recall what was included in the internal Home Office note which Mr Harrington intended to prepare after the meeting above?

129. I do not know. This is not within my knowledge.

The Security Service

Q50: What did you understand was the nature of the working relationship between the Security Service (MI5) and the SDS?

130. I have no knowledge of the working relationship at the time. I would have expected the relationship to have been conducted between the Security Service and MPSB managers, not exclusively with the SDS.

Q51: Did you understand that the Security Service had any influence over the groups targeted by the SDS? If so, what type and/or level of influence?

[REDACTED]

134. I do not know what the Home Office's view was at the time. As far as I understand from the papers provided by the Inquiry the SDS was set up to provide intelligence on issues relating to public order. Intelligence that would have been of interest to the Security Service would have been a by-product and not the reason for the establishment of the SDS.

Q55: Please consider UCPI0000035089 which is a note from Sir Brian Cubbon to Roy Harrington concerning the question of Special Branch accountability in the context of the revision to the Special Branch Guidelines (considered above). Sir Brian's expressed view was that, although theoretically possible, in practice, the prospect of Special Branch declining a Security Service task could never arise. In note responding, HMCIC commented that Chief Constables do, in fact decline tasks which the Security Service wish their Special Branch to carry out on occasion (UCPI0000035088).

Q55.1: Did you consider that a Special Branch could properly and/or realistically decline to assist the Security Service?

Q55.2: What was your understanding of the limits, if any, which applied to Special Branch in assistance to the Security Service?

135. My experience suggests that there might be two limits: capacity, and any reasonably based concerns about the legitimacy of the action requested in respect of the Security Services' and special branches' functions and legality.



Q55.2.1: Do you recall being aware of these limits being met or surpassed? If so, please explain the circumstances.

136. I do not recall any of these limits either being met or surpassed. I expect any disputes were resolved by constructive discussion. As I read the papers the SDS was part of MPSB rather than a separate body and therefore accountable like the rest of MPSB to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.

Q55.3: Would you have considered any work undertaken by the SDS in assistance to the Security Service would have been equally subject to any applicable limits? Why so?

137. Yes. Please see my answer to 55.2.1 above.

Q56: Please consider UCPI0000035119, UCPI0000035124, UCPI0000035123, UCPI0000034284, UCPI0000035121 and UCPI0000035120 which concern a review commissioned by the Home Office into possible duplication of work between the Security Service and Special Branch (before the inception of the SDS in 1968).

Q56.1: Are you able to recall what was the basis for this concern within the Home Office regarding possible duplication of work?

Q56.2: Do you recall whether a similar concern applied to the work of the SDS?

Q56.2.1: If so, what, if anything, was done in response?



[REDACTED]

138. I am not able to recall because I was not involved in that consideration and I do not know if there were any concerns applied to the work of the SDS.

Committee on Subversion in Public Life

Q57: Please consider UCPI0000034266 (an extract from Defence of the Realm, by Christopher Andrew), which suggests that the committee on Subversion in Public Life was chaired by Sir Robert Armstrong from its resurrection in 1976. As far as you are able to assist

Q57.1: What was the remit of this committee?

Q57.2: What awareness did you have of its work?

Q57.3: What involvement, if any, did you have with its work?

Q57.4: To what extent was the committee aware of the SDS and its operations and benefit from its intelligence?

Q57.5: Did you understand the committee to have any relevance to identification of groups selected for infiltration by the SDS, or any other aspect of its work? If so, what?

139. Until I read the material provided by the Inquiry I had no knowledge that the Committee existed so I have no awareness of its work.

[REDACTED]

Q57.6: *Were you aware of any other committees or bodies which operated within Government and had similar areas of interest? If so, please explain what these were.*

140. I am not aware of what specifically was considered by this committee, and I am not aware of any other such bodies or committees with an interest in subversion in public life or anything similar.

Statement of Truth

I believe the content of this statement to be true.

Signed:

[REDACTED]

Dated: 13/10/22

Full name: Frederick John Warne

[REDACTED]