APPENDIX C
FIELD DEPLOYMENTS

INDEX

THE VIETNAM SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN AND THE BRITISH VIETNAM SOLIDARITY FRONT

This section should be read alongside Part D in the main submissions

Introduction

1. The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) was founded in 1965 by individuals involved in the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. The founding conference (4-5 June 1966) was attended by 200 people from a broad cross-section of the left-wing. At this stage, however, a split emerged between the Trotskyist and pro-Chinese faction of Communists (or Maoists) adherents, Abhimanyu (Albert) Manchanda and other Maoists quitting the conference and subsequently forming the British Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF).[1] By 1967, the VSC was substantially controlled by Trotskyists,[2] one of whom went on to found the International Marxist Group (IMG) in 1968.[3]

2. The VSC had international connections with other groups campaigning on the issue of Vietnam.[4]

3. The VSC organised the key anti-war demonstrations in London of the late 1960s, which encouraged thousands of students onto the streets and culminated in violent protests outside the American Embassy. The IMG was considered to be the driving force behind it and claimed 'much of the credit for the major VSC demonstrations.'[5] The BVSF competed with the VSC and, for example, organised a break-away protest from the VSC-organised anti-Vietnam war demonstration on 27 October 1968; they also sought the appeal of students by organising their own demonstrations through fronts like the 'March 9th Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam'.[6]

4. In the 1968-1982 T1 period, 15 SDS UCOs either reported on, or were deployed into the VSC, and seven UCOs reported on, or were deployed into, Maoist groups or groups with Maoist members. Reporting on the VSC occurred during the period 1968-1972. Between 1968 and 1970 reporting on Maoist groups focused on organisations such as the BVSF and the October 27th Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam. There is a limited amount of reporting on the BVSF into 1973. From 1970 there were specific deployments into a broader range of

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[1] MPSB report on a meeting of the newly-formed BVSF on 24/07/1966, MPS-0736497/1.

[2] CAB 301-509 - Security Service paper - 'Subversion in the UK – Spring 1968' (the VSC 'broke off relations in November 1967' with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, §4) UCPI0000035235/2.

[3] CAB 163-268 - Security Service paper - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/26.

[4] CAB 301-509 - Security Service paper - 'Subversion in the United Kingdom – Spring 1968', UCPI0000035235/3.

[5] CAB 163–268 - Security Service paper - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI00000035309/28.

[6] MPSB report on the March 9th Committee for Solidarity with Vietnam, MPS-0748322/1.

Maoist groups not necessarily focussed on Vietnam, which are considered below in 'Maoists' section.[7]

The VSC a public order threat 1967-1970

5.   VSC demonstrations began in July 1967, attracting several thousand attendees and leading to multiple arrests. A larger demonstration followed in October 1967 with approximately 10,000 attendees, which resulted in altercations with police at Grosvenor Square.

6.   The demonstration on 17 March 1968 was again larger and more violent than its predecessors, and resulted in rioting with multiple injuries, arrests and prosecutions. Tariq Ali, a member of the National Committee of the VSC said of the March 1968 demonstration that 'our aim was to get into the [US] Embassy and occupy it'.[8] In his book 'Street Fighting Years', he said: 'If we had been prepared, we could have occupied the Embassy, which would have had a tremendous propaganda value. However, we were taken by surprise by the militancy and the extent of our own support'.[9]

7.   Further VSC demonstrations took place in July 1968.[10] The October 1968 'Autumn Offensive' was intended to be a very large event. The first VSC Ad-Hoc Committee meeting for mobilisation for the October demonstration (held on 16 July 1968) listed 15 groups including the VSC, indicating the breadth of the support for the upcoming demonstration.[11] Concern about what would occur reached the highest levels of Government

8.   Although the public VSC position on the October 1968 demonstration was that it should be non-violent, the VSC were notable in public order policing terms for their disinclination to co-operate with police.[12] Further, notwithstanding the official message, some publications associated with the VSC engaged in subtle promotion of violence: for example Black Dwarf, edited by Tariq Ali, suggested to those readers planning to attend the October 1968 demonstration:

> And as for those fireworks you were thinking about bringing down for your nephew or the razor blades you were thinking of using to shave with, send them down in advance in plain cover. THE COACHES MUST GET THROUGH. WE

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[7] HN45 from November 1970 to February 1973, HN13 from 1975 to late 1978.

[8] Tariq Ali, Transcript 11/11/2020, 9/5-6 and 12/14-24.

[9] 'Street Fighting Years – An Autobiography of the Sixties' by Tariq Ali, first published in 1987/251.

[10] For example, there was a VSC demonstration in London on 21/07/1968, (see reference in CAB 134-3248 Security Service paper titled "Subversion in the United Kingdom", UCPI0000035229/2) and one in Bradford on 13/07/1968 directed against the Prime Minister and the Rector of the Paris University due to the strong line he took against the students at the Sorbonne: Special Branch file on Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, (June 1968-August 1968), MPS-0722098/18.

[11] MPSB file on Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (June 1968-August 1968), MPS-0722098/208.

[12] Report of the MPS Working Party on Public Order 1968, MPS-0748196. Also see Tariq Ali, Transcript 11/11/2020, 62/1-3.

WILL NOT BE PROVOKED, SCARED OR FRAMED BY ANY POLICE
METHODS. [13]

9.   In the event the October 1968 demonstration was estimated to have been
     attended by around 25,000 people; disorder was confined to Maoist and
     anarchist factions (see further in Part D of the closing statement). The Maoist
     attraction to disorder was apparent therefore at the October 1968 demonstrations
     and thereafter.

10. Whilst the ongoing success of the VSC was to a degree tied to public opinion on
     the war in Vietnam, it remained able to draw supporters to the streets of London
     after October 1968, and events continued in 1969[14] and 1970. The VSC was listed
     in the 7 November 1969 SDS memorandum (forming part of the 1969 Annual
     Report) as one of the groups posing the main threat to public order.[15] Although
     the SDS recognised that interest in the Vietnam issue was waning ('The Vietnam
     issue which briefly united the extremist factions appears, temporarily at least, to
     have lost its appeal and to date no alternative unifying cause has been found'[16]).
     Nevertheless, resurgence was also feared, and it was 'known that attempts are
     already being made to organise support for imminent demonstration in America
     with simultaneous activity here.'[17]

11. Whilst the early part of 1970 saw a reduction in public disorder arising from VSC
     events, there was a resurgence of anti-Vietnam war activity in May 1970[18], with
     the VSC leading a demonstration on 9 May 1970 with 4000 demonstrators
     attending Grosvenor Square and its vicinity (whose 'efforts were effectively
     rebuffed by uniformed police', despite that 'the vehemence and fury of the
     participants was most marked'). This event led to 58 arrests, damage to property
     and injuries to 65 police officers.[19]

12. By 1972, SDS management assessed that increased interest in domestic issues
     meant international issues (such as the Vietnam war) had become less emotive:[20]

          The majority of the big demonstrations in recent times have, because of the lack of
          sufficiently emotive home-based issues, been in protest against traumatic events
          abroad… The feeling amongst extremists now is that they no longer need to look
          outside this country for issues which will attract mass opposition to the policies
          of the government – unemployment, inflation, 'anti-trade union legislation' and

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[13] MPSB intelligence report, MPS-0728406/13.
[14] See mention, for example, CAB 134-3248 - 'Minutes of a meeting of the Official Committee of
Subversion at Home', UCPI0000035230/2 §(b).
[15] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/7.
[16] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/6.
[17] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/10.
[18] For example, on 06/05/1970 three crude petrol bombs were thrown at a window of the US Embassy
(an incident claimed by the US-based 'Third World Liberation Front'), see MPSB Annual Report for
1970, MPS-0747835/24.
[19] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/25.
[20] SDS Annual Report 1972, MPS-0728970/15.

the record number of strikes in 1972 are seen by them as evidence of the breakdown of capitalist society which they have every intention of speeding.

13.   1972 was the last year that the VSC was listed as group infiltrated by the SDS.[21]

The VSC as a subversive threat

14.   The subversive threat posed by the VSC in 1968 and 1969 is considered in Part D of the closing statement. It is clear that the particular subversive threat believed to be posed by the (Trotskyist) VSC was tied to its success in organising major demonstrations. The Security Service's assessment in 1969 was that: [22]

> It has been many years since subversion has been as much in the minds of the British people as it is today. This is because last year the subversive threat no longer derived from political activity and industrial action, largely by the Communist Party, but because it also found expression in major incidents of violence either in the form of demonstrations such as those in London on 17 March, 21 July and 27 October, or of student disturbances…

Summary of intelligence on VSC and Maoist anti-Vietnam war groups in the early years of the SDS

15.   Twelve officers joined the SDS prior to 27 October 1968 with the remit of gaining intelligence on the October demonstration, which involved all attending VSC meetings and some attending meetings of Maoist-led groups.

16.   In the period leading up to the October demonstration, the UCO coverage of the VSC was wide-reaching and covered many branches across London.[23] Coverage of the BVSF in the same period was narrower, limited geographically to central London (W1)[24] and north-west London (NW5)[25].

17.   Some overlap existed and this was thought to be a positive: HN336 commented that it 'was a good idea because the meetings were always attended by 20-25 people from all sorts of political persuasions.'[26]

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[21] SDS Annual Report 1973, MPS-0728975.

[22] CAB 134-3248 - Security Service paper - 'Subversion in the United Kingdom', 23/01/1969, UCPI0000035229/2. And see CAB 301-509 Security Service paper - 'Subversion in the United Kingdom – Spring 1968', UCPI0000035235/5 which notes that the law and order aspects meant that liaison with Special Branches needed to be particularly close.

[23] Notting Hill, Earls Court, West London, Leyton, Havering, Croydon, Hampstead, Kilburn and Willesden, Camden, Kentish Town, Lambeth and SE London (Catford).

[24] For example, Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0732693; MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000014312; Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0736481.

[25] For example, Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0736480.

[26] HN336, Witness Statement, MPS-0739316 §65.

18. Consideration of the reporting reveals that the focus was on the Vietnam demonstrations and/or particular individuals, such as Abhimanyu Manchanda, and the groups with which they were associated.[27] It was necessary to attend associated meetings in light of the fact that these groups were 'constantly splintering and re-forming under new names' and membership of the groups was fairly fluid.[28]

19. It was known that the 'The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign is an uneasy coalition of warring factions'.[29] The opposition which developed between the Trotskyist and Maoist groupings (as reported by the SDS UCOs) in particular made clear the need to have access to the intentions of each faction,[30] and, because these matters affected the potential tone and level of disorder of the demonstration, they were of interest up to Government level.[31]

20. Intelligence made clear that even within the VSC there were a range of views beyond the official VSC line of no violence. A report dated 5 September 1968 identifies the difference between the official line and that which was being discussed at branch level, highlighting the effectiveness of the initial intelligence gathering and the need to monitor widely:

> Officially left-wing groups are condemning the use of violence, making arrangements of one steward to every ten marchers, and appointing 'political commissioners' to stop dissident groups getting out of line. At the local level, tactics are being discussed by ad-hoc groups. There is general agreement on two points. One is that steel poles be used as banner holders so that the poles can be used as offensive weapons at the appropriate moment and the other is that the march be halted by spreading out and blocking the road close to the large department stores so that the windows can be broken by activists carrying bricks.[32]

21. UCOs were able access meetings which could not be accessed by normal MPSB officers (such as 'private' or unadvertised meetings). They had access to formal

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[27] For example, Manchanda features in all of HN135's reporting on the BVSF, and consider a report on a meeting of the Joint Committee of Communists on 07/09/1968 (SB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0733966) which does not immediately appear related to the Vietnam demonstrations, but was attended by Albert Manchanda.

[28] HN45, Witness Statement, MPS-0741095 §28.

[29] MPSB intelligence report dated 03/10/1968, MPS-0730096/6.

[30] See, for example, MPSB intelligence report MPS-0730062/2 dated 16 /08/1968, which indicates that there would be scope for spontaneous and possibly violent action by the more extreme factional elements; and MPSB intelligence report MPS-0730065/2-3 dated 30/08/1968 which outlines the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation's proposal for the route of the demonstration and notes they were aligned with Maoists on the issue of violence and advocated the throwing of missiles at buildings.

[31] CAB 301-509 - Minutes of meeting of Cabinet Officer Committee on Communism (Home) Working Group on Counter Measures 15/08/1968, UCPI0000035233/2.

[32] MPSB intelligence report, MPS-0730066/1.

statements and also private views on these.[33] They were able to discover plans for violence and disorder as they formed,[34] and keep abreast of changes and developments as to the likely route to be taken and tactics to be employed by different groups of demonstrators. They were able to obtain advance information about planning that MPSB could be confident was accurate.

22. In short, the SDS's wide-ranging coverage in the run up to the October demonstration allowed the SDS management (i.e. DCI Dixon) to identify the different views held by differing branches on issues such as the use of violence, and different discussions on how, when and where disturbances might occur in order to accurately assess any threat of disorder and violence, the likely places it might occur and who was most likely to be involved, and so to provide effective assessments to the uniform police, Security Service and Home Office. [35]

23. As to the reporting of particular UCOs, the following examples are of note:

    a. HN68 and HN331 attended meetings of Notting Hill VSC (a branch which was more supportive of the use of violence). They were able to report on activist intentions to 'thwart police plans' including discussions of exchanging banners to confuse police. The view that it was 'stupid to fight with the police' but 'far easier to set fire to motor vehicles by turning them on their side, puncturing the petrol tanks with a spike and setting fire to the petrol'.[36] The route of the demonstration was also discussed as were tactics to be used which included sticking together and taking part in surprise attacks and skirmishes, linking arms, and going armed with various defensive and offensive items and weapons including pen-knives, needles, pepper and fireworks.[37] It was also reported that many International Socialist members attended a meeting and were 'obviously there to try and take over the Notting Hill VSC because of their militant reputation'.[38]

    b. HN335 reported on Maoists and the Earls' Court VSC.[39] He was able to report on the BVSF's intention to accompany the main demonstration on 27 October only in order to recruit people to march

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[33] For example, it is clear the intelligence was gained not only from the open discussion at the branch level meetings but also in private conversations: 'Many leading members who are committed publicly to the Sheffield decisions are, nevertheless, saying privately that the march should pass through Grosvenor Square and that the Earls Court and Notting Hill Gate branches of the VSC have decided that the American Embassy is their final 'objective', MPSB intelligence report MPS-0730064/1.

[34] For example, a report at MPSB file on the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (August 1968-January 1969) MPS-0722099/45 notes the expressed view that view that it was 'stupid to fight with the police' but 'far easier to set fire to motor vehicles by turning them on their side, puncturing the petrol tanks with a spike and setting fire to the petrol'.

[35] As he successfully did, as can be seen from his weekly intelligence summaries.

[36] MPSB file on the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (August 1968-January 1969) MPS-0722099/45.

[37] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0730070/2.

[38] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0730758/2.

[39] C Dixon 'Penetration of Extremist Groups' MPS-0724119/9.

to the US Embassy, and that members had been advised to wear 'protective clothing and goggles' should tear gas be used.[40]

c. HN330 and HN334 were deployed into Havering VSC where they attended both public and private meetings. They were able to gain information such as how the branch had been formed by Havering International Socialists,[41] the expected numbers at the demonstration,[42] and that fifty anarchists were expected to travel from Swansea to attend the demonstration.[43]

d. DS Crampton, one of the three female UCOs who attended VSC meetings, was a witness in a successful criminal prosecution for incitement to riot and distributing threatening writing before being transferred back to general Special Branch duties.[44] The conviction related to a pamphlet entitled 'The Potential of a Militant Demonstration' which advocated the use of weapons at the October demonstration such as catapults, metal ball-bearings and Molotov cocktails.

e. HN325 was able to attend a VSC stewards meeting on 25 October 1968 where 25 messengers were nominated to convey the orders of VSC leaders up and down the columns.

24. In the aftermath of the October demonstration MPSB considered it 'necessary to maintain our penetration squad until the problems of public order, associated with the present protest movement, have subsided. The question of its continuance in other fields can then be reviewed' and that it was 'absolutely necessary for this Branch to furnish the Home Office, Security Service and our uniform colleagues, [with] top class information'.[45]

25. The SDS continued, therefore, to accrue intelligence from VSC branches after the October 1968 demonstration, including ascertaining differing views on whether the more controlled October 1968 demonstration had been a success or a failure.[46] As soon as the day after the October demonstration, the BVSF were

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[40] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0736480/2.
[41] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0733932/2.
[42] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0731911/2.
[43] MPSB intelligence report MPS-0731907.
[44] MPSB minutes sheets titled 'The Potential of a Militant Demonstration', MPS-0739147; Composite documents relating to prosecution for incitement to riot, MPS-0739152; MPSB intelligence report MPS-0739150.
[45] Words of Commander Ferguson Smith in Minute sheet re: maintaining a covert police penetration squad following the Autumn Offensive, MPS-0730219/2.
[46] For example, at Hampstead VSC the amount of disagreement was such that members left a meeting stating that they would set up a separate branch; Croydon VSC felt that the demonstration was a partial success; members at the South West London Ad-Hoc Committee meeting expressed dissatisfaction about the lack of militarism and lack of targets: all in MPSB file on the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (August 1968-January 1969) MPS-0722099/201, 203.

planning a further demonstration.[47] Shortly thereafter, discussion turned to a further large-scale demonstration in March 1969.[48] Other groups, for example the Revolutionary Socialist Students Foundation (RSSF), were also planning demonstrations unrelated to Vietnam.[49]

26. Whilst the original and early SDS deployments focused on the VSC, some of the later, longer deployments involved infiltration of groups simultaneously or the UCO moved onto different groups over time.[50]

27. Continuing deployments enabled UCOs to provide intelligence on these activities and planning for the March 1969 demonstration, which could not easily (if at all) have been secured by other means.[51] From a private meeting of the Kilburn and Willesden VSC, HN329 learned of information about a demonstration to be held at Brent town hall with groups to attend identified and an estimate of numbers. At a further meeting use of violence was debated and the decision on tactics was recorded in his report.[52] HN325 produced a 36 page report on a two-day National Conference of the VSC in February 1969 which was only open to delegates and accredited observers[53] and was able to attend private meetings where he gained information about future demonstrations and plans – for example an intended sit in at Heathrow airport and a march to Grosvenor Square, and established that the IMG had effective control of the organisation. HN325 was told of a plan to seize a building.[54] HN326 reported on the Central London VSC in 1970 and learned of the intention to cause 'traffic chaos and disorder'.[55] HN326 also reported on a demonstration route to be taken which included the City of London in order to have the advantage over the City police who had lesser demonstration experience.[56]

28. From a private meeting of the BVSF, HN336 and HN135 learned of the organisation's support for other groups such as the RSSF and their moves to arrange a general strike and rally on the same day.[57]

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[47] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report MPS-0736479/2.

[48] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report, MPS-0736476/2; MPSB intelligence report, UCPI0000014318.

[49] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005785/1.

[50] For example, HN336 reported on the British Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF), then moved Camden VSC, then to Kentish Town VSC and at the same time British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam and then the Stop the Seventies Tour (STST); HN135 first reported on the BSVF, and then moved to reporting on the ICRSC and then STST.

[51] See Roy Creamer, Witness Statement, MPS-0747215 §59iii, suggesting the information in MPSB intelligence report MPS-0747725 must have come from the SDS; and note his evidence at Roy Creamer, Transcript 16/05/2022 161/24-162/1, that reporting on the working committee would not have been possible using traditional methods.

[52] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000007685.

[53] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005797/5.

[54] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade Report UCPI0000007758/2.

[55] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005813/1.

[56] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005814/1.

[57] MPSB intelligence report MPS-0736439.

29. Throughout the UCO infiltration of the VSC there are examples of that organisation's reluctance to work openly with the police and limiting the discussion of some topics to private meetings. For example, HN329 reported on a National VSC Working Committee meeting in September 1969 where the issue of violence was raised but nothing said because 'the Committee might be infiltrated'.[58] HN338 reported in 1971 on a meeting of five members of the VSC Working Committee who discussed not informing police of the route of a demonstration.[59] HN338 in 1972 reported a plan to discuss at a private meeting what action to be taken (in the form of demonstrations or pickets) in the light of the recent escalation of the Vietnam war by America.[60]

30. Infiltration of the VSC led to intelligence on other matters also. For example, HN329 reported on Camden VSC but was able to report on CND demonstrations.[61] At one private meeting there were discussions about participation in the CND rally, the expectation of Maoist support and the anticipated numbers of attendees being 1,000.[62] HN329 also learned of demonstrations against the Israeli Primate Minister speaking at the Theatre Royal. Even intelligence about decisions not to attend a particular demonstration would have been useful in assessing proportionate policing responses.

31. HN335's continued reporting on Maoist groups enabled a picture to be built up by the end of 1968 on the range of Maoist groups with which Abhimanyu Manchanda was associated, the formation of other front organisations and the divisions and personal rivalries between him and other leading personalities.[63] Although the 'Maoist cliques' with which he was affiliated were small and only a fraction of the overall Maoist strength, it was MPSB's (Roy Creamer's) assessment that he encouraged members in their Maoist stance and but for him they would probably not be in extremist politics.[64] Abhimanyu Manchanda was planning further demonstrations, which it was noted would provide an indication of the strength of his support. Roy Creamer, considered that Abhimanyu Manchanda had 'the potential… to offer' the 'ultimate in revolutionary activity'[65] and so the purpose of reports such as these was to understand 'which groups were doing the mischief'.[66] Roy Creamer's view was shared by HN336, who said in oral evidence: 'one of the underlying gospels… that Abhimanyu Manchanda would be promoting revolution. And so the

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[58] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005802/1.
[59] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005832/1.
[60] MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000005840.
[61] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade report UCPI0000007692/2.
[62] MPSB Routine Meeting/Poster Parade report UCPI0000007693/2.
[63] By way of example, MPSB intelligence report UCPI0000026382.
[64] Report by Roy Creamer to 'identify those elements among Maoist organisations which cause disruption on mass demonstrations, and are of interest in a public order context', UCPI0000014320.
[65] Roy Creamer, Transcript 16/05/22, 163/2-3.
[66] Roy Creamer, Transcript 16/05/22, 161/24 – 162/1.

thought of… or the prospect of further people joining that group and revolution being one of their targets would be of interest.'[67]

32.   Abhimanyu Manchanda features in all of HN135's reporting on the BVSF.[68] HN135 and HN336 reported on the BVSF conference in April 1969[69] and this attracted attention from senior officers in the minute sheet dated 8 May 1969, noting that Abhimanyu Manchanda espoused violent revolution.[70] However, they were in a position to assess that 'Manchanda did not appear to hold out any immediate prospects of this uncomfortable eventuality taking place in England'.[71]

Conclusion

33.   As set out at Part C of the closing statement, the Inquiry may wish to conclude that the initial infiltration of the VSC and related Maoist groups in the run up to the October 1968 demonstration was adequately justified. These deployments were in direct response to the violence of the March 1968 demonstration, coupled with the avowed intention of the VSC to hold a larger demonstration in October 1968. Given the VSC was an umbrella group covering activists with different opinions, interests and aims, it was necessary to obtain detailed intelligence about their different tactics, routes and targets. The police response to the October 1968 demonstration was targeted, thanks to the valuable intelligence provided by the SDS which contributed to the overall success of the policing operations on the day.

34.   When assessing the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for continuing to infiltrate these groups after October 1968, the Inquiry is invited to consider the value of this work both as drawn out in the examples within paragraphs above and the reporting viewed holistically. The Inquiry may conclude that the groups continued to pose a public order threat in light of the numbers which could be brought to the streets and the attitudes displayed. This was notwithstanding the waning of general public interest in Vietnam, because the subversive elements within the groups also sought to exploit other issues that captured the public's imagination. The attitudes of the IMG-controlled VSC and Maoist groups towards co-operation with the police, and the willingness of their adherents to court disorder in private, meant that covert means were necessary. These factors meant that a close watch over the activities of certain individuals was also valuable both to policing disorder and to counter-subversion work. The SDS was able to provide substantial high-quality intelligence at a time when there were significant public order issues and social

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[67] HN336, Transcript 16/11/2020, 27/13-18.
[68] CTI opening for Tranche 1, Phase 1, Appendix 2, page 124 §39.2.
[69] MPSB intelligence report MPS-073644; A Manchanda BVSF "Open Conference Political Report" MPS-0736447.
[70] MPSB minute sheet regarding reporting on BVSF conference held in April 1969, MPS-0736445. MPSB intelligence report MPS-0736446/2.
[71] MPSB intelligence report MPS-0736446/2.

tension worldwide, and the need for reliable intelligence was perceived to be paramount.

STOP THE SEVENTY TOUR

Introduction

35.   The Stop the Seventy Tour ('STST') was formed in September 1969. It was affiliated to the Anti-Apartheid Movement ('AAM'). The STST focused entirely on sport to engage students, and sought the appeal of young people to create public disorder.[72]   The AAM had been set up ten years earlier as the Boycott Movement, before changing its name to AAM in 1960, to campaign predominantly against the apartheid regime in South Africa and provide international solidarity for groups in the country calling for democratic government.[73]

36.   MPSB regarded the AAM as Communist-influenced, and the majority of supporters who attended its rallies as peaceful, but it was also aware that a minority of extremists used AAM-organised rallies as a pretext for more violent forms of protest against the sale of arms to South Africa.[74] MPSB estimated that about 50,000 people in the UK supported the AAM's campaigns, including groups like the Young Liberals,[75] but it was also aware that it used affiliated organisations like the STST as a means of appealing to young people to create public disorder without jeopardising the respectability of AAM.[76]

37.   The short-term objective of the STST was to stop the British tour of the all-white South African cricket team to the UK. Its long-term aim was to isolate apartheid South Africa, with the ultimate objective of bringing apartheid to an end. It began by protesting during the 1969 South African Springboks rugby tour as a way of securing the abandonment of the 1970 South African cricket tour.[77]   In January 1970, it organised a march to Twickenham Stadium by around 2,000 of its supporters with the aim of disrupting a Springbok rugby match to gain publicity, which resulted in 28 arrests.[78]

38.   It then publicised the fact that it had planned four demonstrations in 1970 as part of its campaign against the South African cricket tour: at Heathrow Airport on 2 June; during the first game at Lord's on 6 June; at Swansea on 25 July; and at the Oval on 13 August.[79]   The pressure from the planned protests, which also included a trade union boycott of all services to the visitors, led the Cricket Council to cancel the tour before the South African Team arrived in the UK.[80]

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[72] SDS report of the Annual General Meeting of the AAM in 1969, UCPI0000034318/2.
[73] Christabel Gurney, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034326 §9.
[74] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/31.
[75] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/28-9.
[76] SDS report of the Annual General Meeting of the AAM in 1969, UCPI0000034318/2.
[77] Jonathan Rosenhead, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034074 §13.
[78] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/27.
[79] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/29.
[80] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/28.

39. Lord Peter Hain, Professor Jonathan Rosenhead and Christabel Guerney were key figures in the STST at the time, and all gave evidence to the Inquiry. The stated ethos of the STST was one of "Non-Violent Direct Action" ("NVDA") namely the 'actual disruption of matches rather than the more traditional picketing or demonstrating'.[81] This was a strategy calculated to ensure 'that the authorities were forced to overreact'.[82] NDVA did not preclude breaches of 'minor…criminal law'.[83] STST demonstrations attracted tens of thousands of attendees.[84]

STST Subversive Threat

40. The STST was of interest to Government, and concerns were expressed by the Cabinet Office Official Committee on Subversion at Home in 1970 that the STST was proving to be the new cause around which students could unite following the decline of protest surrounding Vietnam. A note for that Committee dated 6 March 1970 states that after the VSC anti-war protests:

> Nothing …gripped student imagination until the tour of the Springboks at the end of 1969. The issue of anti-apartheid dovetailed into that of anti-imperialism, a cause which has long been put forward as the only common issue which both Communists and Trotskyists, usually at daggers drawn, could unite.[85]

41. The note continues:

> Firms and individuals with investments in South Africa have been under attack for a long time …The issue has had new life breathed into it by the Springboks tour and the forthcoming tour of the South African cricket team this summer. The South African investments are a prime manifestation of 'imperialism' is the claim of both Communists and Trotskyists and …It is this particular issue which has sparked off the new wave of student protest in universities.[86]

42. While the paper acknowledged that the numbers of Trotskyists and Communists are small in relation to the total student population, it still considered that 'the influence is considerable and significant.'[87] The STST was also considered to be a significant threat into the future:

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[81] Extract of 'Don't Play with Apartheid', UCPI0000031857/2.
[82] Extract of 'Don't Play with Apartheid', UCPI0000031857/2.
[83] Jonathan Rosenhead, Transcript 29/04/2021, 23/3-16.
[84] Jonathan Rosenhead, Transcript 29/04/2021, 24/8-17.
[85] CAB 134-3248 - Security Services Memorandum - 'The Current Situation Amongst British Students', UCPI0000035228/2.
[86] CAB 301-536 - Briefing Note for Sir Burke Trend on meeting of Official Committee on Subversion at Home and note on STST, UCPI0000035228/2.
[87] CAB 301-536 - Briefing Note for Sir Burke Trend on meeting of Official Committee on Subversion at Home and note on STST, UCPI0000035228/3.

Incursions into university, allegations of 'Spies on the campus' and protest against apartheid and imperialism have set the pattern for 1970. The next main target will be the visit of the South African cricket team and a formidable combination of opponents is already in motion.[88]

43. The view of the Security Services was anti-apartheid was 'tending to replace Vietnam as the current protest slogan.'[89] Minutes of a meeting of the Committee on Subversion at Home on 11 March 1970 stated that 'The Security Service would keep in close touch with the Home Office in order to advise on the deployment of police resources at demonstrations'.[90]

44. Interest on the part of the Security Services in groups associated with the STST continued even after their activities had started to wind down. In January 1972, there was further interest in the Young Liberals noted in a meeting between MPSB and the Security Services. The Young Liberals were being examined for their potential by the SDS. The Security Service expressed an interest and offered 'any assistance from [their] department'.[91]

STST Public Order Threat

45. From the perspective of the SDS, the primary motive for seeking intelligence on the STST campaign was in relation to the public order threat posed by mass demonstrations, and the direct actions organised by its members. Concern about the public order implications of the campaign were set out in the SDS Annual Report 1970:

> In addition, a clear pattern of cause and effect was observed which underlined the basic reasons for the formation of the [SDS]. When there was a sufficiently emotive issue – such as the [STST]…campaign which guaranteed broad based support and the attention of the mass media the extremists were able seriously to threaten the maintenance of order, making it imperative that advance information of their plans was available.[92]

46. Despite the group's stated ethos of non-violence, Professor Jonathan Rosenhead acknowledged that, with demonstrations the size of those organised by the STST,

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[88] CAB 301-536 - Briefing Note for Sir Burke Trend on meeting of Official Committee on Subversion at Home and note on STST, UCPI0000035228/4.

[89] CAB 301-536 - Briefing Note for Sir Burke Trend on meeting of Official Committee on Subversion at Home and note on STST, UCPI0000035275/1. The document is dated 10 /03/970 and encloses a brief on the STST Committee about its national conference, its committee and branch structure, noting that the committees and individual branches 'will have a great deal of discretion and autonomy', and plans for four major national demonstrations.

[90] CAB 134-3248 - Minutes of meeting of Official Committee on Subversion at Home discussing student protest, UCPI0000035226/2.

[91] UCPI0000030066 - Special Branch Letter enclosing minutes of a meeting between Security Service, Commander Roger, Dixon, Saunders, HN294 and DS Smith held on 13 January 1972, UCPI0000030066.

[92] SDS Annual Report 1970, MPS-0728972/3 §10.

the group could not be sure of the disposition of the participants.[93] This concern was mirrored in a report of the first National Conference of the STST Committee in March 1970, in which HN135 reported that:

> [T]he only real ground for disagreement amongst the delegates was on the question of whether or not violence should be used at the demonstrations… and indeed what constituted 'violence'. Some felt that property came within the definition, and also the threat of violence at a later date was in itself a violent demonstration. Despite this difference, it was stressed that S.T.S.T. was not a monolithic organisation, and its avowed policy was one of non-violent militant direct action, if individuals or individual groups felt violence was called for then they must be the final judges of what action was appropriate.[94]

47.   In addition to this, the rhetoric used by the STST indicated potential intentions which could have had significant public order consequences. On the arrival of the Springboks in the UK, STST Secretary Hugh Geach made a statement confirming that the campaign would 'hound them wherever they go'.[95] At an STST press conference on 10 September 1969 it was said that future tours would be 'severely disrupted'.[96] Peter Hain's letter to The Guardian claimed 'next summer could see a season consisting of an endless series of protests and disruptions'.[97] Louis Eakes of Young Liberals said that Lords Cricket Ground would become 'the Ulster of the sporting world next summer'.[98] Peter Hain was spokesperson and chairman of the STST, conceded the high-profile nature of sports and that the campaign would evince strong emotions from supporters and sometimes anger from sports fans.[99] At a Springboks match in Swansea in 1969 protestors ran onto the rugby pitch and were assaulted by rugby stewards. Lord Hain said that at the time he was worried that someone might get killed.[100]

48.   HN336 stated in evidence that there was passionate revulsion to apartheid, and the impending sporting visits gave the protestors an opportunity to vent their objection. He thought that the STST was therefore worth pursuing in terms of potential public order difficulty.[101] HN336's opinion was that the threat for public disorder was huge re STST.[102] He saw public disorder and violent scenes[103] and said he thought that the SDS managers were concerned about the potential for criminal damage and violence.[104]

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[93] Jonathan Rosenhead, Transcript 29/04/2021, 25/10-22.
[94] Intelligence report by HN135 on the first national conference, UCPI0000008660/3.
[95] Extract of 'Don't Play with Apartheid', UCPI0000031857/3.
[96] Hain (1971), p.122.
[97] Hain (1971), p.121; Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 29/05-12.
[98] Hain (1971), p.122.
[99] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 35/2.
[100] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 45/3.
[101] HN336, Transcript 16/11/2020, 50/15-24.
[102] HN336, Transcript 16/11/2020, 51/18.
[103] HN336, Transcript 16/11/2020, 52/21.
[104] HN336, Transcript 16/11/2020, 63/21.

Direct action and minor criminality

49. It is clear that 'non-violent' did not translate into the use of methods that were necessarily lawful.[105] As accepted by Lord Hain in his evidence before the Inquiry, there was a distinction between STST and a group such as AAM engaged in conventional mainstream protest.[106] In addition, he acknowledged that '…undoubtedly, the non-violent direct action that I advocated and participated in did excite police interest, of course'.[107] Furthermore, Lord Hain accepted that because there was no central command of the STST, he could not control what everyone did.[108]

50. The offences committed included digging up a pitch in Oxford, spraying weedkiller onto the pitch, protestors handcuffing themselves to goalposts at Twickenham and gumming up the players' bedroom door locks with a solidifying agent.[109] An activist got onto the coach and chained himself to the steering wheel causing minor road traffic accident.[110] Lord Hain also accepted that STST protesters were encouraged to sit down along the route to the ground to disrupt the flow of spectators.[111] At a rugby match in Bristol on New Year's Eve in 1969, the match was interrupted for 10 minutes after a demonstrator ran onto pitch and scattered tacks. Lord Hain stated that had been done by a supporter off his own bat.[112]

Non-collaboration with Police

51. To achieve their goals, the STST needed to have the element of surprise.[113] For success, the police could not be aware of what the protestors were planning. Lord Hain accepted that they would not have told police of their intention to run onto the pitch: 'The novelty, the surprise of NVDA was its potency'.[114] Lord Hain also accepted that the unpredictable nature of the threat they posed made them difficult to police.[115] As STST did not work collaboratively with the police, advance notice about its demonstrations could not have been gathered through standard policing techniques. [116]

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[105] Jonathan Rosenhead, Transcript 29/04/21, 23/13-16; Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/ 2021, 96/19. This apparently caused some tension within the Liberal Party, 97/6.
[106] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 15/18.
[107] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 17/15.
[108] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 59/14.
[109] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 47/5, 57/21.
[110] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 56/19.
[111] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 53/5; UCPI0000008656, §3(1).
[112] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 57/13 - 59/06.
[113] Jonathan Rosenhead, Transcript 29/04/2021, 36/10-11.
[114] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 42/16.
[115] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 41/6; Extract of 'Don't Play with Apartheid': UCPI0000031857/3.
[116] SDS Annual Report 1970, MPS-0728972/5.

Summary of Intelligence on the STST

52. Most of the SDS UCO deployments into the STST were focused on the timeframe during which the STST was most active, and the UCOs concerned typically also infiltrated other groups such as VSC, IMG, IS and Irish support groups.[117]

      a. HN135 reported on the STST between 1969 and June 1970.
      b. HN336 reported on the STST between March and May 1970.
      c. HN339 reported on the AAM and the STST in early 1971.
      d. HN346 reported on the STST and AAM between April 1970 and Feb 1973 when it was 'widening its remit to more general anti-racist causes'.[118]
      e. HN298 reported on the Putney Young Liberals between 1972 and 1974.

53. The Inquiry is invited to conclude that SDS reporting assisted the policing of these events. For example, a report attributed to HN135 dated 9 December 1969, set out basic tactics for the International Match at Twickenham that was due to be held on 20 December 1969, which included a mass demonstration outside the ground, protesters handcuffing themselves to the goal posts, and an attempt to gain employment at the Park Lane Hotel where the Springboks were due to be staying.[119] A further report attributed to HN135 of the STST National Conference on 7 March 1970 included details of plans to demonstrate at all places where the team assembled, the airport and hotels. The first big demonstration would be on the 6 June and preliminary demonstrations would take place at locations including the Rothman's Tennis tournament and a badminton tournament at Wembley.[120]

Conclusion

54. In considering the adequacy of contemporaneous justification for infiltration of the STST, the Inquiry is invited to recognise that the STST intended to cause disruption to Springbok events (by NVDA), and that it was right for the police to be engaged with this public order issue. It is clear from the contemporaneous Cabinet Office papers that there was interest in, and a demand for intelligence in relation to the STST's activities at the highest level of Government, due to concerns about the public order threat posed. The organisers within STST utilised surprise as a key tactic and so covert means were considered necessary to ascertain information about the group's plans in order to police the potential issue. The SDS's mangers at the time believed the work was successful in meeting the threat.

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[117] Except HN346 who was deployed only into anti-racist groups.
[118] CTI Opening Tranche 1, Phase 1, §45.4.
[119] Intelligence report by HN135 on 09/12/1969, UCPI0000008656.
[120] Intelligence report by HN135 on the first national conference, UCPI0000008660.

55. The Inquiry will, nonetheless, wish to consider whether the threat the group posed to public order was sufficiently severe, such that the use of the undercover tactic was adequately justified.

56. Lord Hain was wrong to expect police to choose 'a side' (any side) in policing a demonstration.[121] The duty of the police is to keep the Queen's/King's peace and not to 'choose sides' on a political issue (regardless of how compelling the arguments may be).

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[121] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 41/ 17.

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS / SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY AND SWP SPLINTER GROUPS

57. The International Socialists (IS), which became the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in 1977, had more UCOs deployed into it than any other group in Tranche 1. It was 'the main and best known group in the field of public disorder through its willingness to take up any platform…and [had] the ability to attract and commit to the streets large numbers of 'rent a mob' demonstrators.'[122] During the Tranche 1 period, IS grew to be the largest, or one of the largest, Trotskyist groups in Britain. Its activity was wide spread. Though initially focussed on students, its focus shifted over time to industrial membership. Its membership included many manual workers and students. The group was active in unions covering, amongst others, engineering, plumbing, teaching, journalism and local government. Its strength lay in the flexibility of its organisational structure, comprising autonomous local organisers[123] and in its powerful propaganda capacity, which included a printing subsidiary, S W Litho, through which the SWP weekly paper, 'The Socialist Worker', was published.[124]

58. The IS/SWP was and is a revolutionary socialist party which sought the abolition of Parliament, the establishment of workers' councils (soviets) the replacement of private ownership of property and collective ownership of the means of production.[125] Today, the party describes itself as grounded in a 'tradition of socialism from below,'[126] extolling the virtues of the Russian Revolution of 1917.[127] They were hostile to the police[128] whom they regarded as fascist and 'enemies of the working class.'[129] They had a significant role in major disorders associated with high profile anti-fascist demonstrations such as Lewisham,[130] Wood Green, and Southall. They were also involved with industrial unrest such as that associated with the Grunwick strike. A number of groups were regarded as 'front organisations' for the SWP: the Right to Work Campaign and the Anti-Nazi League to name but a few. Lindsey German, a key figure with the SWP, gave live evidence to the Inquiry.

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[122] SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-0728981/4-5 §4.

[123] Security Services minute sheet regarding SWP coverage in London and future requirements, UCPI0000027775.

[124] MPSB Annual Report 1971, MPS-0747786/20.

[125] Lindsey German 'A Question of Class' (1996) 16; V Lenin "The State and Revolution" (https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch01.htm#s3 – section "Class society and the state").

[126] Based on the work of political thinkers such as Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Vladamir Lenin, Leon Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg – this was essentially that the emancipation of the working class which needs to come from the working class itself.

[127] https://socialistworker.co.uk/swp-brief-history/

[128] Lindsey German, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034739 §83.

[129] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/4 §8

[130] See Appendix D for the Battle of Lewisham case study.

59.   Between 1968 and 1982 there were 17 UCOs deployed into the IS/SWP.[131] From 1968 to 1974 they were relatively few in number – there were 5 UCOs deployed into this field.[132] The remaining 11 UCOs were deployed during 1975-1982.[133] The increase in the number of UCOs deployed into the SWP coincided with the increase in violent confrontation with the National Front.

IS/SWP as a subversive concern

60.   Whether or not, in hindsight, the IS/SWP is considered to constitute a subversive organisation, the view of the Security Services at the time, was clear that it was.[134] As observed by Witness Z:

> Between 1968 and 1983, within the context of its investigations into subversion the Security Service was most interested in subversive groups that sought to influence non-subversive organisations, through obtaining membership of those organisations (for example, Trade Unions) in order to achieve the subversive goal of undermining parliamentary democracy …[Trotskyist groups] aimed to identify and make contacts in groups considered alienated from society, for the purpose of hastening their disillusionment with the capitalist system and ultimately to further the cause of revolution, and sought to use deliberately violent challenge to authority…From the mid-1970s, Trotskyist groups such as the Socialist Workers

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[131] HN68 (1968-1973 – attended 1 meeting of the Camden IS with HN334 in August 1968).
    HN334 (1968 – attended 1 meeting of Camden IS with HN68).
    HN339 (1970-71, Lambeth IS between Jan 71-Oct 71).
    HN301 (1971-1976, initially Hammersmith and Fulham, later Wandsworth and Battersea, later still Paddington 1971-1976).
HN343 (1971 – 73 – various branches but especially Hammersmith and Fulham).
HN200 (1974-77 – Twickenham branch);
HN351 (1974-75, Tottenham IS).
HN353 (1974-78, infiltrated the Finsbury branch of the IS in 1974 for approximately 1 year before moving to the IMG).
HN296 (1975-1978, Hammersmith branch and Inner West London District).
HN304 (1976-1979- Hackney branch approximately July 1976 to May1977, Croydon SWP 1979).
HN354 (1976-79, Walthamstow branch, Outer East London District).
HN126 (1977-82, North West London District, Cricklewood and Kilburn Branch and Paddington Branch from end of 1981).
HN80 (1977-82, Seven Sisters/Haringey branch, Lea Valley District, Right to Work Campaign).
HN356/HN124 (1978-82, 02/78-12/81 South East London District, Plumstead and Greenwich branches, Brixton branch by June 1981).
HN96 (1978-83, East London, Clapton, Hackney District Committee, Stoke Newington).
HN155 (1979-84, SWP Right to Work Campaign).
[132] HN68, HN334, HN339, HN301 and HN343.
[133] HN200, HN351, HN353, HN296, HN304, HN354, HN126, HN80, HN356/HN124, HN96, HN155.
[134] 'Subversion in the UK – 1972'. The Security Service writes that Trotskyist groups believe that 'the country will decline into a pre-revolutionary situation' due to the 'decaying capitalist system' and that 'because of economic hardship, the working class will be induced to accept Trotskyist leadership which will steer the proletariat into direct confrontation with the forces of authority until the point of revolution is reached… The Trotskyists see no need to build mass parties or secure Parliamentary power for this purpose. …Much of the Trotskyist effort is occupied in manipulating front organisations which they use to maintain what is often a deliberately violent challenge to authority', UCPI0000034279/3-4.

Party began to seek subversive influence within political institutions. To prevent violence and maintain the protection of parliamentary democracy, the Security Service used intelligence gathered on these groups to work with the police to prevent and prosecute subversive actors.[135]

61.   Witness Z continues:

The Security Service's priorities were influenced by the historical context of the Cold War at the time.   The USSR's expansionist support of revolutionary movements worldwide, and incidents such as in Paris in May 1968 in which ultra left student demonstrations turned violent and the Communist-backed general strikes brought France close to revolution, meant there was sufficient concern to justify monitoring subversive groups in Britain who were seeking to undermine parliamentary democracy.[136]

62.   Security Service interest in the SWP can be traced back to 1971 in relation to its involvement in industrial disputes. A Security Service note to the Home Office dated July 1971 stated that 'Trotskyist philosophy leads its adherents to exploit all industrial disputes as a means of hastening a political confrontation with the power of the State'. [137] The purpose of Trotskyist groups was to stoke industrial unrest to hasten the revolution. In 1972, the remit of MPSB was to provide the Commissioner and Home Office with intelligence regarding the law and order aspects of industrial disputes in London, 'and to provide the Security Service with intelligence about the subversive elements of these disputes'[138]. From the mid 1970s, the Security Services interest in the SWP stemmed more from its concern that it was seeking 'subversive influence within political institutions'.[139] At this stage, the Security Service used intelligence gained on these groups with the aim of preventing violence and protecting parliamentary democracy, working with police 'to prevent and prosecute subversive actors'.[140] By the mid 1970s, the Security Services and MPSB were holding regular, informal meetings.[141]   By 1979, the Security Service were seeking 'high grade political

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[135]Witness Z, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034350 §51-53.

[136] Witness Z, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034350 §55.

[137] CAB 301-490-1 - Letters to and from Sir Burke Trend enclosing document titled 'Security Services Note on Organised Disruption in Industry', UCPI0000035257/4 §5.

[138] Witness Z, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034350 §26, 'the Security Service considered that, in respect of the coverage and reporting of industrial disputes, the MPSB's remit was to provide the Commissioner/Home Office with intelligence about the law and order of industrial disputes within the London area, and to provide the Security Service with intelligence about the subversive elements of these disputes. The MPSB's remit did not include undertaking work already covered by other Government departments, such as the production of general reports on industrial and trade union matters, not did it have any responsibility for safeguarding national security, which remained the sole responsibility of the Security Service'. See also UCPI0000031256 "Security Services note for policy file entitled 'Relations with MPSB about industrial subversion".

[139] Witness Z, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034350 §53.

[140] Witness Z, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034350 §53.

[141] Witness Z, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034350 §73.

intelligence' on the SWP.[142] The type of information sought concerned the influence of SWP HQ. A Security Services briefing note for the SWP National Conference dated 6/11/1979 requests:

> Any comment which can be made from a local point of view on the points of central organisation and policy raised therein...industrial policies: what local action is planned on strikes and cuts, and how much direction is received from SWP HQ?...What is the effective controlling body of the local branch/district of SWP? Is it the branch, the district or HQ. How much HQ control is felt at branch level? We usually see (if several weeks after the event) the weekly letter sent out to branches by the National Secretary. Is this the main directive from HQ or are there others? [149]

63. A further Security Services note dated 5/11/1979 sets out a further request for information from the conference, which included a list of delegates and:

   a. Industrial situation and policies: what is the SWP's assessment of their intervention in [gist: recent strikes]
   b. Government spending cuts: is the SWP establishing any centralised direction of policies? To what lengths is it envisaged that local protests will go?
   c. SWP factions: we would be particularly interested in any comment on the activities (recent and planned for the future), size and membership of the SWP journalists faction and the publication "Charter".
   d. SWP structure and organisation: to some extent in response to complaints led by [redacted] and [redacted] that the Party's organisation is too concentrated on the Central Committee, Tony Cliff and other leaders have been discussing a re-structuring of SWP organising bodies, possibly introducing an Executive Committee elected by the National Conference....Details of any decisions reached would be welcome.[143]

64. These notes indicate an interest in the activities higher up the organisational chain which may have influenced the decision to deploy HN80 and HN155 into the higher echelons of this group.

65. Other Security Services notes suggest that they also influenced decisions on which branches to penetrate. A Security Services note dated 6 August 1981 sought information on 'SW, SE and S London Districts, all figure in National Office preoccupations, especially given the impact of Brixton, and are currently in a state of flux...'[144] N356/124 had been deployed into the south east London District in 1978 and moved to Brixton in June 1981.

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[142] Security Services note for liaison file summarising developments in liaison of F6 and SDS since beginning of 1979 UCPI0000030893/1.

[143] Security Services note for liaison file of meeting with DCI Ferguson, UCPI0000029198.

[144] Security Services Minute Sheet concerning cooperation between Security Service and SDS in coverage of SWP activities and members, UCPI0000027528/2.

66.   The interest of the Security Service in the HQ and central committees of the SWP is likely to correspond to their primary preoccupation with the subversive aims of the SWP. While HN80 and HN155 were able to report on the 'upper echelons' of the SWP providing intelligence on the SWPs membership and organisation nationally,[145] UCO penetration of branches, as opposed to the infiltration of the IS HQ, is indicative of the primary concern of the SDS, which was public order.

Industrial Disputes

67.   During the period 1971-1973 the IS 'transformed itself from a university-based group to an industrially orientated one.'[146] The IS/SWP actively recruited in trade unions and were considered to play 'a prominent part in all demonstrations dealing with industrial matters.'[147] The SDS believed that the objective of the SWP was to exacerbate industrial disputes.[148] They were concerned that successful IS recruitment campaigns in the 1970s would lead to 'even greater militancy in strikes and demonstrations.'[149] The view that the IS/SWP were committed to the infiltrating trade unions to cause significant public disorder continued later in the decade.[150] The SWP were involved in the Grunwick dispute that took place between 1976-1978. Of this, Lindsey German stated when the disorder occurred, it was 'to stop the scabs going in'.[151] She claimed that the police were responsible for the disorder that occurred.[152] However, this is in contrast to the conclusions reached by Lord Scarman in his report on the Grunwick disorders: 'The Union [APEX], we are satisfied had no intention of provoking violence and civil disorder by calling for the mass picket. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the risk of a mass picket getting out of control was known. A mass picket allows violent extremists to participate. Such people cannot be prevented from joining it and will use the opportunity it

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[145] CTI Opening Tranche 1, Phase 2, §43.22.

[146] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/9 §23.

[147]'As in previous years, the Trotskyists have proved to be the largest and one of the most troublesome groupings in the extremist field… Supporters of the [IS] have played a prominent part in all demonstrations dealing with industrial matters and will undoubtably continue to do so', SDS Annual Report 1974, MPS-0730906/15 §27.

[148] 'Industrial affairs, however, put everything else in numerical perspective: the miners' strike attracted more support for their marches, meetings and pickets than extremist factions could ever hope for… it is never their intention [Trotskyists particularly the International Socialists] to assist in resolving the disputes, but to exacerbate them and the massive demonstrations the trade unions can conjure up provide ideal cover', SDS Annual Report 1972, MPS-0728970/12 §15.

[149] SDS Annual Report 1973, MPS-0728975/4 states the IS and the WRP 'are going all-out with their recruitment campaigns aimed at improving their positions in the trade unions: the real progress they are making does not bode well for the future of industrial harmony'. Page 7 of the report states that 'The apparent success that such group …have recently had in recruiting suggests that even greater militancy in strikes and demonstrations can be expected'.

[150] 'The ultra-left also remains committed to infiltration of Trade Unions and will attempt to exacerbate any industrial dispute… and to use such situations as propaganda platforms through the causing of large-scale public disorder situations', SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-0728981/15 §31.

[151] Lindsey German, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034739 §236.

[152] Lindsey German, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034739 §235.

presents to provoke civil disorder which in itself is sure to prejudice the very cause which the picket was called to promote'.[153] As noted in the CTI's Opening Statement for T1P2, there is no evidence that the trade unions were targeting by UCOs[154] Mention of unions in reporting were related to the SWP's involvement in industrial relations.

Anti-fascist Activity 1974-1977

68. As noted by the Security Service, the summer of 1974 saw a comparatively peaceful industrial relations climate, a void which the IS filled with anti-fascist campaigning.[155] However, with the emergence of right wing extremism, the SDS anticipated public disorder as a result of IS involvement in anti-fascist activity.[156] The 1975 SDS Annual Report alludes to National Front marches in March and October during which a number of arrests were made.[157] The 1976 Annual Report states that the IS have 'gone to considerable lengths to confront the 'fascists' with overwhelming numbers and to 'drive them off the streets'.[158] Despite this, the focus at this time was on containing potentially violent situations without overreaction, using information supplied by the SDS.[159]

69. The SWP/IS's acrimonious relationship with police, would not have facilitated constructive information sharing in advance of demonstrations and public events, to enable the appropriate policing of them. The SDS provided police forces with accurate assessments of the likely ultra-left involvement in clashes with the far right. In Bethnal Green, for example, they enabled the police to frustrate the strong IS contingents on all bar one occasion, when under the guise of the Hackney Trades Council march against racialism, the IS 'succeeded in forcing a brief but furious encounter with a small group of National Front supporters'.[160] The exact number of clashes that were avoided, as a result of SDS intelligence, cannot now be known, as the necessary documentary evidence (pre- and post-demonstration reports, planning minutes) and witness accounts (from A8/uniform branch) are no longer available.

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[153] Scarman report into the Grunwick dispute §63 DOC082.
[154] CTI Opening Statement for Tranche 1 Phase 2, page 15 §46.
[155] Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service Report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/12 §34.
[156] 'Obviously the growing economic problems in this country will be seized upon by the 'ultra-left' as an ideal opportunity for them to further their skills at disruption, by strikes, and anti-government demonstrations …Similarly, the current situation will probably prompt an upsurge in the fortunes of the extreme right wing in general and the National Front in particular. Bearing in mind the clashes of the past year… Added to this is a long-feared possibility of racial violence since large numbers of unemployed plus the current resurgence of a right-wing extremism can only serve to fan the flames of race hatred', SDS Annual Report 1974, MPS-0730906/16 §33.
[157] SDS Annual Report of 1975 refers to National Front (NF) marches on the 25 March and 11 October during which a number of arrests were made, MPS-0730099/6-7 §§22 & 23.
[158] SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-0728980/3 §4.
[159] SDS Annual Report 1974, MPS-0730906/1.
[160] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/9 §29.

SWP Related/Sponsored Groups

The Anti-Nazi League

70. The Anti-Nazi League (ANL) was an SWP initiative set up in the aftermath of the Lewisham demonstration in 1977. The National Front had been experiencing an upturn in electoral support during this period. The GLC council elections in May 1977 saw 91 National Front Greater London Council (GLC) candidates gain 120000 votes, and the third largest vote share in Inner London. It averaged over 10% of the vote in Hackney, Newham, and Tower Hamlets, challenging the Liberal position as the third party in London. There was concern, by the ANL, that this would translate into success in the Parliamentary elections which eventually took place in 1979. [161]

71. The ANL 'insisted that the fascists and the National Front had to be confronted physically on the streets in order to prevent them gaining support from the very beginning.'[162] During 1977 there had been an escalation of violence and street fighting 'on an unprecedented scale' between the NF and the SWP, which peaked in the Lewisham street battle in August 1977.[163] A Special Branch report following Lewisham noted:

> We are certainly in a new era of violent demonstration which may demand some kind of alternative policing if it gets worse…The fundamental option is whether or not we seek to police demonstrations in accord with time-honoured tradition, or, in meeting violence with violence, and in order to protect the innocent public and preserve the safety of the police we move towards para-military control of public disorder[164]

72. The noticeable increase in conflict coincides with the increased numbers of UCOs deployed in the SWP by the SDS.

73. From the outset, the ANL was regarded as a 'front' organisation for the SWP.[165] The three executive positions were occupied by Lord Hain as press officer, Earnie Roberts MP treasurer, and Paul Holborow (a member of the SWP) was organiser.[166] The group's Steering Committee consisted of representatives from a number of groups, including the SWP, but the Security Service report on the 1981 ANL Annual Conference states that 'the SWP wields a greater degree of influence over the ANL than its representation on the Steering Committee

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[161] Box 500 report of 1981 ANL Annual Conference, MPS-0729094/3 §1.
[162] Lindsey German, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034739 §71.
[163] SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-072898/13 §23. See also Appendix D for an analysis of the Battle of Lewisham.
[164] Draft Special Branch Paper following the demonstration at Lewisham, MPS-0748340/7 §1.
[165] MPSB Annual Report 1980, MPS-0747792/3.
[166] MPSB intelligence report on steps taken by the Anti-Nazi League to mobilise its supporters against the National Front and other extreme right parties, UCPI0000011887/1 §2.

suggests'. [167] A MPSB report dated 15th March 1978, attributed to HN296, states that Paul Holborow had established:

> [A] national and district structure which in effect means that a member of a particular District of the Socialist Workers Party is appointed to organise within his District the signing up of ANL supporters (to this end, SWP branch members are being instructed 'en masse' to take membership cards and 'spread the word'.)…The political line of the Anti-Nazi League is much broader than that of the Socialist Workers Party…Therefore, in its recruiting drive on behalf of the ANL, Branch members of the SWP have been instructed to argue whatever political line is most convenient but that if, as a result of contact made, they feel that the person approached would also be suitable for membership of the SWP, they should encourage him or her to join the Party…The rise of Peter HAIN within the ANL has caused some consternation in SWP circles, since the latter believe that he is beginning to overshadow Paul HOLBOROW, who were supposed to retain overall control …[an activist]…has also indicated that certain members of the SWP Central Committee are a little afraid of losing their grip on the reigns of the ANL[168].

74. UCOs who had infiltrated the IS/SWP reported on the ANL from its creation. HN126 was already deployed into the SWP and reported on the inaugural meeting of his local ANL 'district'[169]. He recalls joining the ANL 'because that was what was expected as a member of the SWP'[170]. HN296 [1976-1978] was deployed into the Hammersmith Branch of the IS. He reported on the relationship between the ANL and the SWP[171] as well as other matters towards the end of his deployment[172]. HN80 [1977-82] was deployed in North London and has told the Inquiry that he was not involved with the ANL to any great extent[173] but did attend some ANL events, for example, at an ANL carnival in April 1978.[174] HN356 infiltrated the SWP in South East London and some of his reporting extended to the ANL. HN96 [1978-1982], who was also deployed into the SWP, provided some reporting on the ANL which included the ANL 1981 National Conference[175]. Whilst the ANL did present a public order threat, reporting on it stemmed from UCO deployments into the IS/SWP. It was suggested by Lord Peter Hain that MPSB should have kept an eye on the SWP but not the ANL.[176] However, this ignores the reality that those who joined the

[167] Box 500 report of 1981 ANL Annual Conference, MPS-0729094/3 §4.

[168] MPSB intelligence report on the ANL UCPI0000011887 1-2.

[169] HN126, Witness Statement, MPS-0740761 §194; MPSB report on the inaugural meeting of the North-West London Anti-Nazi League, UCPI0000021728/1 §2.

[170] HN126, Witness Statement, MPS-0740761 §194.

[171]MPSB report on steps taken by the Anti-Nazi League to mobilise its supporters against the National Front, UCPI0000011887.

[172] For example, see MPSB report listing attendees at an Anti-Nazi League meeting, UCPI0000011794.

[173] HN80, Witness Statement, UCPI0000033626 §104.

[174]MPSB report listing persons identified as being present in the Anti-Nazi League Carnival, UCPI0000021653; see also MPSB report listing participants in an Anti-Nazi League demonstration UCPI0000012985.

[175] MPSB report on the 1981 National Conference of the Anti-Nazi League, UCPI0000016579.

[176] Peter Hain, Transcript 30/04/2021, 149/1.

SWP were expected to join the ANL and participate in ANL activities. The interest of the Security Service in the ANL similarly appears to be in relation to its ties to the SWP, as indicated by requests for information made by the Security Service at liaison meetings with the SDS[177].

75. It was predicted by the SDS that the violence could increase in 1978 due to the decision made by the National Front to field 318 candidates in the General Election.[178] The 1978 SDS Annual Report observes that the efforts of SDS officers had paid dividends:

> Throughout the year intelligence relating to the National Front/Anti-Nazi League confrontations was provided. The most interesting examples of this related to Brick Lane, E1, [redacted] N1, Walthamstow Market, E17, Ealing Broadway W5 and the Whitgift Centre Croydon. But finally in this context, the Remembrance Day Parade, held under the auspices of the National Front in Whitehall, which could have been the scene of considerable public disorder, did in fact pass without undue incident, primarily because of the information obtained by SDS officers in the 24 hours preceding this event. (It should be stressed that extremist groups now only co-operate notionally with police on public demonstrations, and that their plans for any 'direct action' are rarely finalised more than 24 hours beforehand).[179]

76. The General Election took place in 1979 and the SDS reported that the SWP took 'advantage of the National Front's election campaign to provoke hostile confrontation whenever possible'.[180] The ANL played a decreasing part in anti-fascist demonstrations in 1980.[181] By 1982, the decline of the right-wing movement meant that the ANL considered it counter-productive to counter it, as it would mobile otherwise passive right-wing support[182].

The Right to Work Campaign

77. In the latter part of 1975, IS set up the 'Right to Work' (RTW) campaign. The object of the RTW campaign was to protest against cuts in public expenditure, wage restraint and unemployment[183]. A number of SDS UCOs[184] reported on the campaign between 1976 and 1982. When the campaign was established, its leader was John Deason, a full-time IS central Committee member[185]. Similar to the Anti-Nazi League set up in 1977, the RTW campaign was considered by

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[177] Security Services note for liaison file of meeting with DCI Ferguson and containing briefs prepared by F7, UCPI0000029198/3 §f.
[178] SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-0728981 15 §30.
[179] SDS Annual Report 1978 MPS-0728964/8 §(a).
[180] SDS Annual Report 1979 MPS-0728963/2 §3.
[181] SDS Annual Report 1980 MPS-0728962/9.
[182] SDS Annual Report 1982 MPS-0730904/14.
[183] MPSB Annual Report 1976, MPS-0747789/2 §2.
[184] Including HN80, HN155 and HN356.
[185] MPSB Annual Report 1976, MPS-0747789/2 §2.

Special Branch to be an SWP 'Front' organisation.[186] There were RTW marches once or twice a year and the campaign presented significant public order concerns.

78. The first march organised was from Manchester to London in 1976 and was regarded as the 'most successful Trotskyist-inspired event' of that year.[187] An entry for this event in the MPSB Annual Reports of 1976 describes how it degenerated into a series of clashes with police and numerous arrests:

> …The journey to London was uneventful and took place in an atmosphere almost devoid of publicity in the national press. However, the frustration felt by the marchers at the lack of interest in their cause manifested itself in violence on the 19 March when the group became involved in clashes with police at Staples Corner, West Hendon, resulting in 43 police officers being injured and 44 demonstrators being arrested[188].

79. The Commissioner's Report for 1976 describes a group of protesters, who were activity seeking conflict with the police. On arrival in London the numbers on the march:

> [W]ere augmented by members of local branches of the International Socialists and from then onwards the organisers became most unco-operative and belligerent and it seemed almost as if they were actively seeking a confrontation with the police. …police were subjected to a sudden and violent attack after advising the marchers not to attempt to cross an uncompleted flyover. Order was quickly restored with the help of police reinforcements. [189]

80. The SDS Annual Report 1976 noted that, 'The publicity gained from the fracas… turn[ed] a non-event into an overnight success from the organisers' viewpoint' and 'once again the need for police to be in sufficient numbers to deter the violence of the revolutionary left which bubbles constantly below the surface'.[190]

81. A further march, from London to the Trade Union Congress in Brighton, took place in September 1976 was described by the MPSB as 'smaller but more disciplined'[191]. The Commissioner's Report noted that the organisers of the 750 strong march 'were warned in the strongest terms that disorder would not be tolerated and a very strong police presence was allocated to the march. It left London peacefully but caused some disorder on arrival at Brighton'.[192]

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[186] MPSB Annual Report 1982, MPS-0747794/6-7.
[187] MPSB Annual Report 1976, MPS-0747789/2 §2.
[188] MPSB Annual Report 1976, MPS-0747789/2.
[189] Commissioner's Report 1976 Ch 3 MPS-0747811.
[190] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/8 §27.
[191] MPSB Annual Report 1976, MPS-0747789/2-3.
[192] Commissioner's Report 1976 Ch 3 MPS-0747811.

82. In September 1980, the RTW campaign organised a march from Port Talbot through London to Brighton and held a demonstration, with TUC support, outside the Conservative Party Conference. The SDS Annual Report for that year described it as 'the largest event of 1980'. It noted that:

> …[S]mall 'events' en route [were] frustrated by advance information passed to local police, but furthermore, Sussex Police were provided with what amounted to a blue-print of the demonstration in their area which enabled the considerable police requirements to be well-tailored to the event.[193]

83. There were incidents between marchers and members of the British Movement in Bristol and Slough where 'minor injuries were inflicted on supporters of both factions' but '[m]ost of these attempts were thwarted due to prior notice being given to police'.[194] In relation to the demonstration outside the Conference itself it states:

> …[T]here can be little doubt that had it not been for the presence of large numbers of police on duty outside, serious public disorder would have ensured relating in damage to property and physical assaults on conference delegates. The march organisers, having witnessed the strength of police were visibly crestfallen and had no other option but to advise those intent on charging the police lines and undertaken other forms of direct confrontation with police and delegates to curb their activities.[195]

84. Similarly in October 1981, the RTW campaign organised a march from Liverpool to the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool where approximately 5000 people took part in an ''anti-Tory' demonstration'. It states that 'Lancashire police have placed on record their appreciation of the assistance rendered by the SDS in connection with this event…'.[196] In February 1982 the RTW campaign organised a five-day 'March on Parliament' held from 21st to 25th February.[197] The SDS Annual Report 1982 notes that 'Advanced plans were known and proved invaluable in policing…'.[198]

85. HN155 [1979-1984] was deployed into the RTW campaign, which he states:

> [B]ecame a significant part of my deployment due to its political nature, the threat of violence on marches, and my involvement as treasurer. The RTW campaign was of interest to the SDS because it involved large numbers of people on marches lasting a number of days. Hundreds or thousands of local activists would join the

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[193] SDS Annual Report 1980, MPS-0728962/9.

[194] MPSB report on the political background, organisation and finances for the 1980 Right to Work march, UCPI0000014610/6 §28.

[195] MPSB report on the political background, organisation and finances of the 1980 Right to Work march UCPI0000014610/7 §§ 35 & 36.

[196] SDS Annual Report 1981, MPS-0728985/9 §18.

[197] MPSB Annual Report 1982, MPS-0747794/13 §§6 & 7.

[198] SDS Annual Report 1982, MPS-0730904 /13.

march along with way, which included Marxists and anarchists. There were planned demonstrations in major towns along the route as the march passed through and it was important to provide intelligence to allow the local constabularies to assess the risk of public disorder and ensure an appropriate police presence.'[199]

86. HN80 [1977-1982] recalls some violence at the conclusion of the 1980 march at which he was assaulted about the head and shoulders and 'struck out in self-defence', receiving a commendation 'for his actions during this incident'.[200] HN80 was also involved in the organising committee for the 1981 march. HN80 states that the reports provided do not reflect the reports that he produced 'a lot of which were telephoned in and were necessarily brief indications of likely demonstrations and other matters of relevance to public order policing'[201] and says that he believes 'the absence of a complete SB archive and the retrieval of reports from the Security Service to compensate for the has skewed the tone of the reporting' due to 'the absence of a number of reports' dealing with numbers and intentions prior to demonstrations and other events.[202]

87. Barry Moss - HN218 was questioned in live evidence in relation to trouble being 'entirely predictable' and the extent to which SDS intelligence brought an outcome that could have been much worse and he states:

> It seems fairly plain, sir, with respect. The SDS predicted that…the march from – from Wales would attract little disorder, leaving aside possible rowdyism and drunkenness from the marchers, which proved to be the case, it appears…[the SDS report then says that] fresh faces would join the march when it got to London, which actually did happen…the [disorder at Southall] involved a fracas with a member of the public, not the police. And then the report correctly said that there would be disorder in Brighton, which there would have been without an enormous number of police.[203]

88. **The Workers' Fight (WF)/International Communist League (ICL)** group was formed from a small number of members who had been pushed out of the Revolutionary Socialist League (Militant) in the 1960s.[204] A reconstituted WF was formed in combination with a breakaway faction which split from the IS in the early 1970's as a result of disagreements over IS's policies on Ireland[205] and/or the IS position on the membership of the EEC.[206] In 1975, Workers' Fight merged with Workers' Power to form the International Communist League.[207]

[199] HN155, Witness Statement, MPS-0747546 §74.
[200] HN80, Transcript 12/05/2021, 12/1-19.
[201] HN80, Witness Statement, UCPI0000033626 §32.
[202] HN80, Witness Statement, UCPI0000033626 §123.
[203] HN218 Barry Moss, Transcript 13/05/22, 126/10.
[204] https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/workers-fight-uk/index.htm
[205] MPSB intelligence Special Branch report on the history of the Workers' League, including a list of supporters and trade union affiliations, UCPI0000009698/1 §2.
[206] https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/workers-fight-uk/index.htm
[207] https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/workers-fight-uk/index.htm

89. **The Workers' League,** represented a significant mid-1970's split from the IS.[208] It followed the expulsion of the grouping around Jim Higgins and was said to have "*collapsed quickly*" afterwards.[209] It was formed of IS members mostly based in Twickenham, and was reported on by HN200 [1974-1977] who had initially reported on the Twickenham branch of the IS[210]. The Workers League was described as 'fairly quiet'[211] in the 1976 Special Branch report and did not appear cause significant public order concerns. No other UCO reported on them.

The Spartacist League

90. Interest in the International Communist League, Workers' Fight and the short-lived Workers' League, appeared to be based on the fact that these groups emerged out of splits with the IS, who were of interest in terms of public order, rather than on evidence that they posed a public order threat in their own right. HN155 noted that 'there were no clear lines between any of the groups and it may be that those individuals joined and became influential members of the SWP in future'.[212]

Red Action

91. Red Action was formed in 1981 by former SWP members – so called 'squadists' – who had been expelled from the party. HN96, who was deployed into the Hackney SWP and had peripheral interaction with the group, stated that 'their main aim was to get into violent confrontations with the National Front'[213]. They were tolerated within the SWP 'because Red Action would face off against similarly violent elements in National Front counter demonstrations'[214] N96 says that he was told about the involvement of Red Action in violent confrontations at demonstrations by other members of the SWP. They engaged in violence to achieve their aims and presented a threat to public order.[215] Red Action were infiltrated between 1982 and 1983.

92. In February 1982, the Security Service sought information about Red Action.[216] A Security Services minute dated 18th June 1982 states that the SWP desks

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[208] https://splitsandfusions.wordpress.com/2017/10/23/the-workers-league-is-opposition/

[209] https://www.workersliberty.org/story/2017-07-26/did-anyone-get-it-right-1970s;
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2002/oct/21/guardianobituaries.obituaries

[210] HN200, Transcript 05/05/2021, 137/8.

[211] MSPB Annual Report 1976, MPS-0747789/10 §1.

[212] HN155, Witness Statement, MPS-0747546 §80.

[213] HN96, Witness Statement, MPS-0745772 §177.

[214] HN96, Witness Statement, MPS-0745772 §177.

[215] HN96, Witness Statement, MPS-0745772 §177.

[216] Security Services Minute Sheet concerning meeting with SDS and requests for information about the SWP and Red Action. Information sought included Red Action's composition, policies, contacts with like-minded groups, plans for involvement in possible street riots, finance, and whether there have been any changes in the Party's publicised view on the use of violence, UCPI0000028844/1 §2.

'stressed their interest' in Red Action decision making within the SWP.[217] The 1982 Special branch Annual Report makes reference to Red Action, saying that it was formed in January of that year 'by a small group of potentially violent Trotskyists who had broken away from, or had been expelled by, the SWP'.[218] It states that it supports Irish Republican groups, advocating 'direct and violent action against racist and fascist groups'.[219]

Women's Voice and the Engineers Charters Group

93.   While the rational for reporting on openly violent groups like Red Action is obvious, there are groups that appear to have been reported on just because of they were associated with the SWP. This includes Women's Voice, a newspaper and magazine started in 1972 and continued until it was shut down by the SWP in 1982, and the Engineers Charters Group, a rank and file group for engineering workers that was part of the SWP. The interest of the Security Service in Women's Voice was clearly in relation to the SWP, as a file note from 1979 asks 'What are the views of the District Women's Voice members to the current WV/SWP debate? How active are WV members in SWP affairs?'[220].

Conclusion

94.   When assessing the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for infiltration of IS/SWP in the T1 period, the Inquiry is invited to recognise that the IS/SWP presented threats both in terms of public order and subversion. IS/SWP is notable for its involvement in major public order events throughout the period. The SDS Annual Reports make clear that SDS managers regarded the SWP as the group presenting the biggest public order threat, and this is reflected in the number of UCOs deployed into that group. Some of the reports of industrial disputes such as Grunwick[221] and the RtW marches contain sentiments that will have led to concern that the SWP intended to cause trouble at picket lines. As the 1970's progressed, it became clear that their intention was to physically confront fascists at every opportunity. The extent of the public order threat posed by the group is clear.

95.   Whilst not all of the groups that were affiliated to the SWP presented a concern on the grounds that they were subversive, the SWP itself was a revolutionary group seeking to exert influence over the causes and campaigns of the day. The available evidence demonstrates that activities of the SWP were of significant

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[217] Security Services note for liaison file concerning meeting with HN68, and, later DCI Short to discuss current interests, UCPI0000028783/1 §5.
[218] MPSB Annual Report 1982, MPS-0747794/7 §2.
[219] MPSB Annual Report 1982, MPS-0747794/7 §2.
[220] Security Service note for liaison file of meeting with DCI Ferguson, UCPI0000029198/9.
[221] See for instance MPSB report on the Grunwick dispute UCPI0000035336/2.

interest to the Security Services, and suggests that responding to Security Service requests for information about the SWP formed a strand of SDS work.

96. The information provided by UCOs included intelligence that would not have been available through attendance at public meetings or through more formal police liaison with demonstration planners, not least because the SWP were in general hostile to the police. There is evidence which clearly indicates the value of SDS reporting at a time when demonstrations – particularly those associated with the National Front – were producing an extremely serious degree of violence.

THE INTERNATIONAL MARXIST GROUP (IMG)

Public Order Threat

97.   At the start of the T1 period the IMG was the smallest of the three main Trotskyist groups but described as the most 'flamboyant'[222] and 'exert[ing] an influence on the ultra-left out of all proportion to its size'. It 'attempted to intervene in most demonstrations'.[223] IMG was particularly involved in bringing students into campaigns.[224] Its capacity to influence industrial affairs was limited, but its strength and significance lay in its ability to inspire 'large numbers of young people to campaign in support of its causes'.[225]

98.   The IMG 'became nationally significant in 1967-1968 when, as the driving force behind the VSC, it claimed much of the credit for the major VSC demonstrations'.[226] After the VSC demonstration, it became involved in anti-fascist activity and lent its support to various Irish Republican groups. It was of particular interest to the MPSB on public order grounds between 1968 and 1978.

The IMG as a Subversive Threat

99.   The IMG was the British section of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (USFI) which, according to the evidence of Tariq Ali, 'was created by Leon Trotsky in 1938, after he broke completely with Stalin and Stalinism'. [227] Of all the Trotskyist groups, it was considered to be 'the only one to have substantive international connections'[228]. In 1974, the Cabinet Office considered that there was close contact between the IMG and the USFI and 'to a large extent USFI is responsible for the overall direction of the IMG policy at the present time…'[229]. Intelligence supplied by UCOs on IMG activity were gratefully received by the Security Service. [230]

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[222] 'The most vocal and consistently active support for any issue, whether it was Ireland, Vietnam, Palestine or Women's Liberation came from the Trotskyists. The International Marxist Group was as usual the most flamboyant of the three main Trotskyist factions although the International Socialists were often the most numerous', SDS Annual Report 1972, MPS-0728970/11 §12.

[223] 'With a membership of about 650 the [IMG]…remained the smallest of the three main Trotskyist organisations, yet it exerted an influence on the ultra-left out of all proportion to its size. The numerically small, but highly militant International Marxist Group, has attempted to intervene in most demonstrations. It has remained a basically student-orientated group, despite constant attempts to broaden its base.' Special Branch Annual Reports 1974 MPS-0747787/11.

[224] MPSB Annual Report 1972, MPS-0747796/20.

[225] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Services report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/7 §14.

[226] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell enclosing Security Services Report tilted 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974, UCPI0000035309/28 §13'.

[227] Tariq Ali, Transcript 11/11/20, 102/16.

[228] MPSB Annual Report 1973, MPS-0747833/13.

[229] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Services report, 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/5.

[230] Minute sheet discussing report from HN338 on IMG dissension, MPS-0729093/2; Special Branch report on the 1976 National Conference of the IMG, UCPI0000021343; a similar report for 1978 - Special

Anti-fascist campaigning

100. During 1974, the IMG participated in anti-fascist campaigning with other Left groups and took part in several demonstrations against the National Front, such as the demonstration in Red Lion Square on 15 June 1974, where there was IMG representation in the group who were involved in a violent clash with the police. Kevin Gatley was killed. The public inquiry into the disorders chaired by Lord Scarman, stated that the riot which led to the death of Kevin Gately was caused by the IMG and they carried 'a measure of moral responsibility for his death'.[231]

101. HN353 was deployed into the IMG between 1974-78. Although much of his reporting is missing, he explained that he reported on anti-National Front demonstrations in Wood Green and Lewisham in 1977. He:

> [W]itnessed the usual punch ups at demonstrations with the IMG... There was public disorder when the left wing and right wing met in public and the police were generally in between the two groups. …the demonstrations at Lewisham and Wood Green stick in my mind as particularly violent, …I recall thinking there weren't enough police at Wood Green, there was many a physical confrontation and to try to avoid getting hit by the opposing sides.[232]

102. In relation to Wood Green, HN353 recalled reporting that he had gone out with members of the IMG who were scouting the route to be taken by the National Front march. IMG members seemed to know the route (at the time there was no obligation for processions to report their route to the police) and were 'scoping for good attack points and sources of ammunition (i.e. rubble)'.[233] HN353 stated that this was reported back and he would have included a sketch of the route which he drove to the SDS DS's home. He also reported back after the demonstration including on IMG tactics, what happened, who attended, and the attempts on the part of 'the IMG to violently confront the National Front'.[234]

103. Roy Creamer was asked what his view was, from a policing perspective, of the IMG:

> It was one of those difficult things in those days that they claimed, and maybe rightly, that they didn't want violence, no, no, no, but they weren't going to do an awful lot to stop it. If you contrast them, say, with Gerry Healy's lot, we'd call it the Socialist Labour League, Healy would have none of it. He'd say 'We're going to have a march which are disciplined and you'll all do as you're told and if the police say 'Do this, do this, you've got to behave'. And I think he did that really to show up the falseness of the IMG who were not prepared to discipline (a) because

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Branch report on the Eighth National Conference of the IMG, British Section of the fourth International, UCPI0000011360.

[231] Scarman report into Red Lion Square disorders DOC088/50.

[232] HN353, Witness Statement, MPS-0740413 §67.

[233] HN353, Witness Statement, MPS-0740413 §20.

[234] HN353, Witness Statement, MPS-0740413 §20.

they weren't numerically very strong themselves. …certainly wasn't enough to provide marshals. Nor were they the types of people that wanted to be marshals and keep discipline. …So they didn't want to reign in on any disorder or rows or, you know, fights with the police or anything like that…I think they stood on the side and said, 'It's not our fault, no, no, no. That's not what we wanted. We didn't mean that'.[235]

Irish Support Groups

104. As well as contributing to the establishment of the VSC, the IMG was involved in founding the Troops Out Movement (TOM).[236] In addition, the 1970 Special Branch Annual Report described the Irish Solidarity Campaign as an IMG 'front organisation'[237].

105. The 1972, the Special Branch Annual Report stated that:

> …The [International Marxist] Group gave unqualified support to both arms of the Irish Republican Army and played a prominent part during the year in the activities of the Anti-Internment League. It is worthy of note that its members were well to the fore in the militant demonstration held under the auspices of the League on 5 February when attempts to breach unformed police cordons across Downing Street resulted in 127 arrests[238].

106. In 1973, the Special Branch Annual Report stated that the IS, the IMG and the Socialist Labour League (SLL) formed an ad hoc alliance to 'protest at police raids on the homes of Irish Republicans connected with the Anti-Internment League'.[239] In 1974 it is stated that:

> In the Irish field the Group gave unqualified support to both wings of the IRA (although it was careful to dissociate itself from the terrorist campaign in England) and played a prominent part on the activities of the Troops Out Movement and the Irish Political Hostages Campaign[240].

107. A Cabinet Office document discussed the internal split in the IMG over Irish policies, in its security threat assessment in 1974 noting 'the formation of a small splinter group under Gerry Lawless, a militant Irish Trotskyist with close Provisional IRA associations. Lawless was particularly critical of IMG's attempt

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[235] Roy Creamer, Transcript 16/05/22, 139/11.
[236] J Tranmer "A Force to be Reckoned With? The Radical Left in the 1970s" in French Journal of British Studies (2017) §24.
[237] MPSB Annual Report 1971 MPS-0747786/21 §1.
[238] MPSB Annual Report 1972, MPS-0747796/3
[239] MPSB Annual Report 1973, MPS-0747833/10-11.
[240] MPSB Annual Report 1974, MPS-0747787 11.

to take over the Troops Out Movement (TOM), arguing that it would have a disruptive effect.'[241]

Conclusion

108. When assessing the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for infiltration of the IMG, the Inquiry is invited to note the interest in the IMG as both a public order and subversive threat. Lord Scarman's view of the role of the IMG in the Red Lion Square disorder in 1974 will have supported the contemporaneous view that uniform police needed to have advance information about the possible plans of this group, and IMG's continued involvement in other such counter-demonstrations in later years will have furthered that view.

109. In addition, the Security Service was interested in the activities of the IMG and were provided with intelligence about the group by SDS officers.

110. The IMG's reluctance to engage with the police (and its tolerance of violence at demonstrations), meant that covert means to establish their plans were thought necessary.

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[241] CAB 163-268 Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Services report. 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974' UCPI0000035309/9 §22.

THE SOCIALIST LABOUR LEAGUE/WORKERS REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

111. The SLL/WRP was the most industrially-oriented of the Trotskyist groups. It established itself in a number of unions and industries, including the motor industry, dockers, power workers, NUT, the Post Office Engineers Union and AUEW.

112. In 1967, the Socialist Labour League (SLL), which became the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) in 1973, accounted for about half the total Trotskyist strength in the country.[242] It was the largest Trotskyist organisation, a position it held until the 1970s, when it was overtaken by the SWP. In 1970, had a membership of around 2,000 and a daily circulation of 20,000 for its daily paper, Workers Press.[243] By 1971, the SLL's members were estimated at just over 1,000, and their activities were concentrated on a campaign concentrated in the industrial field where the League played an active part in labour disputes at Fords, the Upper Clyde Shipyards, and Plessey's Alexandria works.[244] The group's daily publication, *'Workers' Press'*, was mainly concerned with attempting to influence industrial matters, and as of 1971 had a daily circulation of over 20,000.[245]

113. The WRP was born out of the SLL in November 1973, and various radical policy changes were made, as a result of which, the Party doubled in size within three months to become the largest of the three main Trotskyist groups.[246] By 1981, WRP was a well-organised and affluent Trotskyist organisation with the largest paper membership of a group of its kind in the UK.[247]

114. The group operated through youth training centres around the country where deprived youths were offered industrial training alongside political indoctrination[248] and would also field candidates in general elections, though without much success, gathering only a few thousand votes in the early 1980s.[249] The SLL's youth section was called the 'Young Socialists', and as at 1971, had 1,300 members and a circulation for its fortnightly newspaper, 'Keep Left' of 22,000. The Young Socialists organised various events including a rally at Alexandra Palace against the Industrial Relations Bill and a Summer Fair held at Highbury Grove School.[250]

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[242] CAB 301-509 - Security Service paper on 'Subversion in the United Kingdom - Autumn 1967' and note from the Secretary of the Official Committee on Communism (Home) UCPI0000035236/8 §22.
[243] MPSB Annual Report 1980, MPS-0747835/16.
[244] Ibid.
[245] Ibid.
[246] MPSB Annual Report, MPS-0747787/5.
[247] MPSB Annual Report 1981, MPS-0747793/9.
[248] MPSB Annual Report, MPS-0747794/8.
[249] MPSB Annual Report, MPS-0747795/4
[250] MPSB Annual Report, MPS-0747786/19.

115. The SLL did not engage with other left-wing groups in supporting the major demonstrations of the day. It boycotted the October 1968 Vietnam demonstrations and did not support the Anti-Nazi League or participate in clashes with the National Front. It did organise some mass demonstrations, for example, a rally protesting escalating unemployment in 1972 which attracted over 8,000 demonstrators.[251]

116. A minute of a meeting between the MPSB and the Security Service in January 1972 indicates the rationale for the lack of infiltration into this group. The SLL activities were principally industrial and they had at that stage presented no real problem in the public order field. At the meeting Commander Rodger advised that it had been suggested that an officer penetrate this field, perhaps due to the numbers they drew at events. The SLL/WRP was a security conscious organisation and the measures they took to combat police spies and informants is heavily referenced in the reporting.[252] The consensus of the meeting was that in view of the group's stringent security precautions, such penetration would be a lengthy process and require exceptional dedication, probably outweighing its potential value.[253]

117. A file note dated 13 November 1973 appears to indicate a shift in the view of the Security Service and defined the SLL as a 'primary target'.[254] The Security Service assessment on the significance of the ultra-left in 1974 stated that when the SLL became the WRP in November of that year, the transformation from what was essentially a propaganda organisation into a revolutionary party took place because the founder of the SLL believed that the 'historic pre-conditions necessary for the proletarian revolution were beginning to manifest themselves in Britain and that the time was ripe for the revolutionary party to lead the working class to power.'[255] HN303 was deployed from early 1974.[256]

118. It appears that this 'transformation' meant that the WRP was of greater interest to the Security Service, resulting in requests for information in 1974 and 1975.[257] Details of the discovery of a bugging device after the police raid[258] were passed

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[251] J Trammer §24.

[252] MPSB reports covering: meeting of North London Sub-District WRP, UCPI0000009964; First Party Conference of WRP, UCPI0000012168; and Special Delegate Conference of WRP, UCPI0000022002 and UCPI0000009950

[253] MPSB letter enclosing minutes of a meeting between Security Service, Commander Rodger, Dixon, Saunders, HN294 and DS Smith UCPI0000030066.

[254] MPSB Security Service Note UCPI0000030049/1 §2.

[255] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/20.

[256] MPSB Intelligence Report authored by HN303 dated 14/01/1974, UCPI0000009963.

[257] MPSB reports regarding: personal details of a member of the WRP, UCPI0000015041; clarification of the term 'sleeping' WRP members, in response to Box 500 letter, UCPI0000006993; clarification on individual membership of the WRP Central Committee in response to Box 500 letter, UCPI0000007000; details of a 16-year-old member of Hackney Young Socialists signed by DI Craft, UCPI0000009259.

[258] MPSB letter to Box 500 highlighting withdrawal of its source from WRP and enclosing report concerning WRP Education Centre in Derbyshire, UCPI0000012240; MPSB report concerning abortive

onto the Security Service by the SDS, who confirmed the information was of particular interest.[259]

119. Infiltration of the WRP proved to be a stepping stone in an unexpected way. HN303, who infiltrated the WRP [260] was asked to infiltrate the National Front. The 1975 SDS Annual Report states:

> For the first time an officer has penetrated the National Front, at the instigation of a leading member of the Workers Revolutionary Party with whom he is particularly friendly. By attending National Front meetings in the East End of London he has discovered a small group of hard line fascists, dissatisfied with the National Front leadership, calling themselves the Legion of St George, whose intent it to move even further to the right. Although few in number, such a group could well pose future public order problems.[261]

120. There appears to have been a subsequent shift of thinking in 1975. The SDS Annual Report confirms the potential for public disorder by WRP appears to have diminished and therefore SDS coverage of this organisation would be withdrawn.[262] The reporting of HN303, who was at this time reporting on the National Front was also not considered necessary, due to the availability of other intelligence sources, and it was considered unnecessary to replace him.[263] The Inquiry may consider that this demonstrated a responsive approach to the sources of reporting.

121. The infiltration into the WRP is an example of a group that was regarded as a potential stepping stone into other groups. This is illustrated in a file note dated 20 March 1979, which records a discussion with the Security Service and DCI Mike Ferguson. It notes that the WRP was not considered to be a law and order problem, nevertheless DCI Ferguson was ready to put a source into the WRP if this would legitimately act as a stepping stone for the penetration of an SDS target.[264] This view is confirmed again a few months later in a file note dated 17 August 1979.

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police raid on WRP Education Centre, Derbyshire and security measures put in place by Gerry Healy, UCPI0000009265.

[259] Onward copy of MPSB report on WRP 'White Meadows' Education Centre UCPI0000033495; Roy Battersby, Witness Statement, UCPI0000034741 §67.

[260] Security Service note for policy file concerning meeting between DCI HN294, DI Brice and Security Service to discuss queries from F1B desks UCPI0000030050.

[261]

SDS Annual Report 1975, MPS-0733099/2.

[262] SDS Annual Report 1975, MPS-0730099/8 §28. HN298 was withdrawn the following month.

[263] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/4 §9

[264] Security Service note for policy file concerning meeting between DCI Ferguson and Security Service to discuss how cooperation between F6 and SDS could be developed, UCPI0000028835.

UCO Deployment into the WRP

122. While there was some peripheral reporting by other UCOs, HN303 appears to be the only UCO who deployed into the WRP.[265] HN298 stated he was never involved in the WRP and therefore reporting on this group must have come from another source, although he accepts he may have reported on the group peripherally.[266] HN298 did, however, have approval from HN332, DAC Gilbert Kelland and Commander Rodger to travel to the WRP's education centre in White Meadows House, Derby if he were to be invited.[267] On 7 February 1976, HN298 was directed by the WRP to attend a course at the WRP education centre the following day. Despite DAC Gilbert Kelland's decision on 6 February 1976 to cancel the authority for the visit to the education centre given the police raid in Derbyshire, HN298 was not warned and accordingly travelled to the education centre.[268] The trip was referred to as his 'swan song' and on 8 March 1976, Acting Commander Watts concluded 'it is valuable for us to learn that, despite all the speculation, the courses at 'White Meadows' do not include incitement to public disorder'.[269]

Conclusion

123. The Inquiry may conclude that the infiltration of and subsequent withdrawal from the WRP demonstrated that the SDS management did engage with the question of whether infiltration of particular groups was justified. HN303 was deployed into the group for two years; the deployment only having begun when the Security Service and MPSB considered there was a perceived need in light of the changes to the group and given that they were secretive and security conscious. During that time it became apparent that the group did not present a law and order problem, and HN303 was withdrawn. Part of the contemporaneous justification for this deployment and its length also lay in the influence of the Security Service.

124. The potential to infiltrate the group as a stepping stone indicated a strategy of using one group to gain access to another group. In 1975, that happened without design when HN303 was asked by the WRP to infiltrate the National Front. Although subsequently it was decided in 1979 that a further infiltration of the WRP to gain access to another target was not of value, overall this deployment

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[265] SLL is mentioned in 2 of HN345's reports MPS-0737411/1 & 12 re a 2,000 strong SLL rally at Alexandra Palace and there are no reports in HN351's WP.

[266] HN298, Witness Statement, MPS-0746258 §184.

[267] Minute sheet containing correspondence between various managers including the Commander and DAC discussing HN298's reporting of WRP course in Derbyshire, MPS-0741115.

[268] 'It is an unfortunate coincidence that [HN298] should have become involved in this course at such short notice and before his authority to attend could be withdrawn.' Minute sheet containing correspondence between various managers including the Commander and DAC discussing HN298's reporting of WRP course in Derbyshire, MPS-0741115/2.

[269] Minute sheet containing correspondence between various managers including the Commander and DAC discussing HN298's reporting of WRP course in Derbyshire, MPS-0741115/3.

demonstrates that UCOs were not generally deployed without a public order reason being present, unless it was to gain access to a more dangerous group.

MAOIST AND MARXIST-LENINIST GROUPS

125. Many of the Maoist groups first of interest to the SDS arose out of the initial infiltration of the BVSF, and were those in the orbit and control of the leading figure within that group, Abhimanyu Manchanda, who commanded a small cadre of Maoists divided between a range of groups.[270] An explanation for MPS interest can be seen in an assessment prepared by DS Roy Creamer in January 1969. He explained that the emergence of Maoist groups which 'cause disruption on mass demonstration and are of interest in a public order context' was a relatively new development.[271] The purpose of the report was to identity the 'leaders' who were able to attract a 'near-hooligan element' to extremist politics.[272] The 'main' such leader identified was Abhimanyu Manchanda, who, following the VSC demonstrations had been able to 'emerge from the obscurity… to being a public figure whom the press look upon as the Tariq Ali of the pro-Chinese communists.'[273] 'To a casual supporter he may appear to offer the ultimate in revolutionary activity, and no-one is likely to be excluded from his groups for aggressiveness or violence on public demonstrations. At the same time he is, in public, evasive and claims not to advocate strong arm methods. His favourite political argument is to accuse others (especially the police) of violence.'[274]

126. Groups associated with Abhimanyu Manchanda and of interest to the SDS included:[275]
    a. The Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League (RMLL)/ Marxist-Leninist Workers Association (MWLA). The RMLL was run by Abhimanyu Manchanda. In 1971, RMLL dissolved in order to escape Manchanda's influence, before later reforming as the under the leadership of Mike Earl and Chris MacKinnon as the MWLA.
    b. The Women's Liberation Front (WLF). Founded in 1969 and run by Diane Langford (who was married to Abhimanyu Manchanda). It first came to public notice when five of its members were arrested in November 1970 whilst protesting at the "Miss World" contest. They were also involved in Manchanda's industrial agitation plans. In 1972 this group changed its name to the Revolutionary Women's Union (RWU) (again, a move reportedly designed to separate the group from Diane Langford and Abhimanyu Manchanda).
    c. Friends of China. A group controlled by Abhimanyu Manchanda with similar membership to other groups.

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[270] Special Branch Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/16; and see 1-4, 18, 25, 28, 31-32 above (relating to the BVSF).
[271] Roy Creamer MPSB assessment at UCPI000014320/1.
[272] Roy Creamer MPSB assessment at UCPI000014320/1.
[273] Roy Creamer MPSB assessment at UCPI000014320/3.
[274] Roy Creamer MPSB assessment at UCPI000014320/3.
[275] Noting that the British Vietnam Solidarity Front (BVSF), also controlled by Abhimanyu Manchanda, is considered above.

127. In 1970 MPSB was able to conclude that groups under the control of Abhimanyu Manchanda 'undertook little significant public activity during 1970', noting the decline in the numbers he was able to command having reduced to 'no more than 50 persons'. In 1971 (informed by SDS intelligence), MPSB noted that the Maoists' 'proclivity to foment disorder was seen on remarkably few occasions' and their 'ardour was confined in the main to a series of internal feuds and schisms'[276] but the inference was that Maoist encouragement of violence and disorder nonetheless still occurred on occasion.

128. The Security Service assessment in 1972 accorded with that of MPSB, and was that, although small in total number, and fragmented in many groups, Maoist adherents attracted by the Red Guard movement in China were known to display violence in demonstrations organised by others.[277] In relation to industrial disputes, the Cabinet Office Group on Subversion in Public Life stated that 'Notwithstanding the violence which has occurred in recent picketing incidents the use of violence is not generally advocated by militants or subversive groups... Only some Trotskyist and Maoist elements would openly encourage violence'.[278]

129. The 1973 SDS Annual Report states that the détente between China and the USA had driven Maoist groups into a period of introspection and removed most of their previous excuses for violent protest.[279]

130. However, in 1974 the Security Service singled out the Communist Party of England (Marxist-Leninist) CPE(M-L) as being the exception to the general assessment of Maoist organisations (whose 'significance… lie[s] in their limited nuisance value in industrial disputes and on demonstrations'[280]). CPE(M-L) was described as an 'extreme and militant group', 'a secretive body which appears to be well financed', and that '[d]espite its small membership', it possessed an expensive printing press and had been able to field 15 candidates across 1974 elections. Significantly from a law and order perspective, '[i]ts policies are characterised by its belief in the use of violence', including assault, causing explosions and violent opposition to National Front demonstrations.[281]

131. The Security Service report on the threat of subversion in the UK, dating to April 1976, notes under the heading 'Political Terrorism' in respect of Maoist influenced groups, a possibility that they might be trying to acquire criminal

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[276] MPSB Annual Report 1971, MPS-0747786/15.
[277] Security Service paper titled 'Subversion in the UK -1972' at UCPI0000034279/4 §9.
[278] CAB 301-492 - Security Service Report on 'The Impact of Subversive Groups on Trade Union Activity', UCPI0000035263/5.
[279] SDS Annual Report 1973, MPS-0728975/4 §15.
[280] CAB 163-268 - Security Service paper - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/13 §37.
[281] CAB 163-268 - Security Service paper - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974' UCPI0000035309/13 §38.

expertise which 'could herald an increase in 'revolutionary criminality'.[282] In a report the following year, Maoists are again mentioned under the heading 'Political Terrorism', as being known to recruit [redacted] 'possibly with the intention of putting their expertise to violent uses'.[283]

132. MPSB considered Maoists in this period to be 'unpredictable'[284] and that some maintained their reputation as a threat to public order. The 1977 MPSB Annual Report notes that CPE(M-L) 'have provided small but very violent contingents on anti-National Front marches; the bulk of their membership of about 100 persons is in East London and are a continuing source of trouble to the police'.[285] The 1978 MPSB Annual Report says of the Maoist East London People's Front: 'It was, of course, ELPF members who instigated the trouble at the picket of the NF election meeting at Ilford on 25 February. It did not escalate into a larger incident because the Trotskyist elements at the picket would not support the ELPF agitators.'[286]

133. The Maoist public order threat was noted by the Security Service in its May 1979 paper on the threat of subversion in the UK:[287]

> In contrast with the position in many other West European countries, Maoist groups in Britain have attracted only a fraction of the support enjoyed by Trotskyist groups. Maoists here are divided between a number of small and unstable groups of which the largest, the [CPE(M-L)] has only 400 members. Maoists do not have sufficient strengths to make significant impact in any field; but individuals occasionally indulge in violence during demonstrations, especially when there are opportunities for confrontation with authority.

UCO Deployment into Maoist / Marxist-Leninist groups from 1970

134. The reporting of SDS officers targeted into the BVSF are considered above at paragraphs 31-32 and reporting on the Maoist influenced Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front (INLSF) is considered below at paragraphs 192-193 Three SDS officers targeted towards Maoist organisations in the T1 period are considered here. These are:

   a. HN45 (1970-1973), who principally reported on the BVSF, the RMLL and related or follower groups such as the MLWA (born out of the split

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[282]CAB 301-489 - Security Service paper - 'The Threat of Subversion to the UK April 1976', UCPI0000035247/17 §42.

[283]CAB 163-269 - Security Service paper - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035333/7 §21.

[284] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/10 §36.

[285] MPSB Annual Report 1977, MPS-0747790/4.

[286] MPSB Annual Report 1978, MPS-0747791/12.

[287] PREM 19-2843 - Security Service paper - 'The Threat of Subversion in the UK', provided to the new Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, UCPI0000035314/13 §26.

between Abhimanyu Manchanda and the RMLL and dissolution of the latter).

b. HN348 (1970/71-1973), was tasked to report on the Maoist WLF (which appears to have come to the attention of the SDS following HN45's report of 22 January 1971 and due to its links with the RMLL).[288] Insofar as she reported on other groups, they were linked to the WLF or the reporting was prompted by her infiltration of that principal group.

c. HN13 (1975-1978). HN13 was deployed into a range of Maoist groups between 1975-1978. He reported primarily on the CPE(M-L) East London Branch, which provided entry into several associated and front organisations including the Community Unity Association (M-L); East London People's Front (ELPF); the Progressive Cultural Association (PCA) and the Outer East London Anti-Fascist and Anti-Racist Committee' (OELAFARC).

HN45 (mid 1970 - early 1973)

135. HN45 was tasked to infiltrate Maoist groups to find out what they were 'all about', their plans, and their members.[289] He reported on the BVSF[290], RMLL and associated groups, and so he frequently reported on Abhimanyu Manchanda.[291]

136. In January 1971, HN45 reported the RMLL's plans to 'now concentrate its activities' on 'political agitation in industry' (a topic of concern in Government as revealed in the Cabinet Office papers[292]). Abhimanyu Manchanda 'directed' three individuals to obtain employment at the Ford factory in Dagenham.[293] He also 'stressed the need for members to be cautious in their approach… so as not to draw the attention of employers and others to their activities at the outset'.[294]

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[288] HN45 report on RMLL UCPI0000010567.

[289] HN45, Witness Statement, MPS-0741095 §28, §32.

[290] HN45's continued reporting on the BVSF enabled assessment of the position of the group over time, the extent of its current activities and the role of Albert Manchanda (see report on the BVSF dated 5 May 1972 at UCPI0000010246), which is clearly the product of extensive knowledge of the workings of the group built up over time.

[291] In light of Maoist support for the use of violence at the October demonstration (see SDS reports MPS-0738693 and MPS-0722099/45), Abhimanyu Manchanda's 'cult of personality' (Roy Creamer report at UCPI0000014320/3), and his/the BVSF's promotion of revolution even into 1969 (MPSB report on BVSF, MPS-0736446/2), continued interest in Abhimanyu Manchanda and associated groups in this period is understandable.

[292] It is of note that in 1971, the Security Service considered the 'pro-Chinese groups operating in the trade union movement (mainly confined to the [Amalgamated Engineering Union] AUEW) are as yet of minor significance': FCO 168-44448 - Security Service paper - 'Subversion in Industry and the Mass Media, 1965-1971, UCPI0000035278/7. §10

[293] HN45 report 22/01/1971, UCPI0000010567 §4.

[294] HN45 report on a meeting of the RMLL, UCPI0000010567 §8.

137. HN45's report charted the internal machinations and politics of the RMLL, including in mid-1971 the rejection by its members of Abhimanyu Manchanda's leadership.[295] HN45's reported view was that, regardless of Abhimanyu Manchanda's position, 'the damage to the RMLL is irreparable'.[296]

138. Following the dissolution of the RMLL, HN45 reported on the MLWA.[297] It is apparent from reporting in the year following its formation that the MLWA was a small[298] and inactive group[299] without any plans for public functions[300] and ultimately, as CTI suggests[301], an ineffective and powerless force. This negative intelligence nonetheless may have had some value: as HN45 explained in evidence, whilst giving his view frankly that in hindsight it was a waste of time: 'you have to be in an organisation to discover what their ethos is and how they're going to react', that is, to ascertain whether the group is subversive or violent in it outlook, assess its strength, and so be in a position to reach a view whether it poses a threat in either regard.[302]

139. In addition, some of HN45's early reporting on MLWA did not make certain the eventual conclusion:

    a. The initial intelligence was that the group would be 'closely modelled' on the North London Alliance in Defence of Workers Rights, and support had been pledged by a number of groups – the Black Union Freedom Party, Schools Action Union, the Marxist Leninist Education Association and the Communist Federation of Britain.[303] The intelligence picture developed over the ensuing months: by the report of 11 February 1972 it is said that of the original organisations that pledged support only Schools Action Union now did,[304] but by the report of 14 September 1972 only the occasional meeting was attended by Schools Action Union.[305]

    b. The dissolution of the RMLL had not, in May 1971, affected the BVSF, Friends of China, WLF.

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[295] See HN45's reports at UCPI0000011741, UCPI0000011742, and UCPI0000010918.

[296] HN45 report on the future of the RMLL, UCPI0000011741/2 §11.

[297] HN45 report on the dissolution of the RMLL and the creation of the MLWA, UCPI0000011746/1.

[298] HN45 report on MLWA, UCPI0000014363/1 §2.

[299] HN45 reports on MLWA, UCPI0000014360/1 §2 and UCPI0000014363/1 §1.

[300] HN45 report on MLWA, UCPI0000014360/1 §2.

[301] CTI's Tranche 1 Phase 2 Opening Statement, page 82, §2.10.

[302] HN45, Transcript 27/04/2021, 135/12-14.

[303] HN45 report on the dissolution of the RMLL and the creation of the MLWA, UCPI0000011746/1.

[304] HN45 report on MLWA, UCPI0000014360/1 §4.

[305] HN45 report on MLWA, UCPI0000014363/1 §4. And note: the Maoist School's Action Union was of interest to those in Government in at this time due to its militancy. See National Archive reports at MPS-0748490, describing SAU as "very largely dominated by adults, some unconnected with education, who are bent on mischief". See also National Archive reports at MPS-0748493, MPS-0748491, MPS-0748494, and MPS-0748492.

c. HN45 continued to provide advance intelligence of demonstrations. For example, in July 1971 he reported on a public meeting and a demonstration organised by the North London Alliance in Defence of Workers Rights on consecutive days.[306] The report notes the mood of the meeting as 'one of extreme militancy' and that at the public meeting 'Every effort would be made to exclude police… and stewards would be appointed for that purpose' and at the demonstration members were encouraged to 'link arms so as to avoid police'. HN45 was able to provide the groups in support and an indication of the attitude of attendees.[307]

140. Despite limited HN45 reporting having been recovered for 1972, it can be seen that in HN45 was invited to run the Maoist bookshop Banner Books,[308] which MPSB considered would be advantageous on a temporary basis as it would allow the SDS to be privy to the 'inner workings and policy' of the bookshop, obtain access to records and mailing lists of persons of interest, and to provide a plan of and keys to the premises.[309] In December 1972 HN45 was in a position to submit an analysis of the work of the CPE(M-L), comprising information obtained from an 'unusually reliable source'.

HN348 (early 1971 – early 1973)

141. On 22 January 1971, HN45 had reported on a meeting to plan activities for the RMLL and for the year ahead, along with the activities of related organisations such as the WLF. The report explained that the WLF would extend its activities into the industrial sphere: it had opened two new branches, one of which had been 'carefully chosen' for its location near a Metal Box Company factory which employed a large number of women,[310] and WLF members, who were also members of the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades, 'intended to try and organise women members of that union'[311]

142. Shortly after this, HN348 was deployed and tasked to report on the WLF. HN348 sought to make clear in her evidence to the Inquiry that she *wasn't* tasked to report on the women's movement as a whole, it was specific factions within it (i.e., the Maoist WLF) which were of interest.[312] She was tasked to this group because MPSB 'did not know much about them and wanted to find out what was

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[306] HN45 report on a meeting of North London Alliance in Defence of Workers' Rights, UCPI0000025264.
[307] Another example is HN45's report of 18 November 1971, on the attempt to organise support for a picket outside Tottenham Magistrates' Court to coincide with the trial of three members of the London Alliance in Defence of Workers Rights, UCPI0000010935.
[308] Memorandum by HN332 considering the possibility of HN45 running Banner Books, MPS-0730516 §4.
[309] Memorandum by HN332 considering the possibility of HN45 running Banner Books, MPS-0730516.
[310] HN45 report on a meeting of the RMLL, UCPI0000010567 §5.
[311] HN45 report on a meeting of the RMLL, UCPI0000010567 §6.
[312] HN348, Transcript 18/11/2020, 43/9-12; 46/3-14.

really happening,'[313] and specifically, because of links with other, more extreme groups (such as the Angry Brigade or Irish support groups).[314] Although HN348 said in her witness statement that she did not discover links[315] her reporting demonstrates that she did, in fact, report on a range of such links.[316]

143. HN348 also provided prospective intelligence on demonstrations organised by other groups of varying sizes, for example demonstrations organised by the Muswell Hill group of the Stop the Cuts Campaign[317], the Indian Workers Association Great Britain[318], the Black Unity and Freedom Party[319] [320], and by the wider women's liberation movement.[321]

144. The WLF was also linked with smaller campaign groups, such as the North London Alliance in Defence of Workers Rights, which organised several demonstrations and pickets in the summer of 1971. As CTI has acknowledged, HN348 provided prospective intelligence on such activities in her reports of 20 July 1971[322], 27 July 1971[323], 4 August 1971[324], and 24 September 1971[325]. This intelligence was not limited to dates and locations, but included an indication of the size of the demonstration, the route, the groups in attendance and tactics.[326]

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[313] HN348, Supplement Witness Statement, MPS-0741698 §38.

[314] HN348, Transcript 18/11/2020, 46/3-14.

[315] HN348, Supplement Witness Statement, MPS-0741698 §35.

[316] See report of 15/03/1971 which records an attendee at a WLF 'study group' praising recent IRA action and describing it as 'a good way to start a revolution', UCPI0000026692/1§1 and HN348's comment at HN348, Transcript 18/11/2020 50/14-22; a report of 07/05/1971 which records a WLF attendee's links with Clann na h'Éireann (a Great Britain based Sinn Féin support organisation) and that they had been invited to attend meetings of that organisation's new branch in North London, UCPI0000026999; a report of 01/12/1971 which records an attendee at a WLF meeting publicising an upcoming INLSF torch-lighting procession and inviting WLF members to contribute financially to a wreath, UCPI0000027025/2§5; a report on the WLF conference held on 25-26/03/1972 which confirms the attendance of the 'Angry Brigade section', who were 'far more prepared to become involved in open direct action' and 'self-confessed advocates of violence and disruption as a means of overthrowing the existing system of government', UCPI0000008274/6-7 §§34-35; a report dated 28/09/1972 at which upcoming events by other Maoist groups were mentioned, such as the North London Alliance, the CPGB and the PSC, UCPI0000011758.

[317] HN348 reports on WLF, UCPI0000026993/1 and UCPI0000026994/1.

[318] HN348 report on WLF, UCPI0000026993/1.

[319] HN348's report on WLF, UCPI0000027006/1 §1.

[320] HN348 reports on WLF, UCPI0000027001/1 §4 and UCPI0000027002/1 §4.

[321] For example, in a 05/03/1971 report concerning a WLF 'Study Group', HN348 reported an upcoming Women's Liberation Movement demonstration together with the time, start and end location, and that speeches were planned enroute at Trafalgar Square, UCPI0000026990/2; in a report dated 18/01/1973, HN348 provided intelligence about plans by the 'Women's Liberation Workshop' in conjunction with 'many other women's extremist groups' to hold a national demonstration in London proving details of the date, organiser, and anticipated support, UCPI0000008291/1.

[322] HN348 report on WLF, UCPI0000027006/1.

[323] HN348 report on WLF, UCPI0000027007/1 §3.

[324] HN348 report on North London Alliance in Defence of Workers' Rights, UCPI0000025267/1 §4.

[325] HN348 report on WLF, UCPI0000027020/1 §3.

[326] E.g., HN348 report on WLF, UCPI0000027020/1 §4.

145. In some cases, HN348's reporting suggested the potential for disorder. For example, in relation to one of the Stop the Cuts Campaign demonstrations, HN348 reported that an attendee at a WLF study group had commented in private conversation to another, 'we also have a little something planned for inside as well'.[327] In relation to the BUFP demonstration, HN348 reported that attendees had been told that if police made an arrest 'all should make an effort to get themselves arrested, as this would result in a public enquiry'.[328]

146. In February 1972 the WLF changed its name to the Revolutionary Women's Union (RWU).[329] The underlying reason (later reported) was a membership break away from Diane Langford and Abhimanyu Manchanda.[330] Asked to outline the aims and activities of the new group, one member considered it 'was socialist and had revolutionary aims'.[331] On 2 October 1972 HN348 reported that it was the RWU's policy to encourage members to obtain work in factories with the aim of promoting militant action in the workplace and to recruit for the group.[332] In November 1972 HN348 reported on the attempts by Diane Langford and Abhimanyu Manchanda to revive the WLF, but 'the new membership is understood to be very small'.[333]

147. HN348 also provided specifically in response to requests for information from the Security Service, making clear their interests in this area persisted into 1973.[334]

HN13 (mid 1975-mid 1978)

148. HN13 reported on the Community Unity Association (M-L) which at this time was leading an attempted consolidation of Maoist groups.[335] By 1977 HN13 was reporting on the CPE(M-L) East London Branch, which provided entry into several associated and front organisations including the East London People's Front (ELPF); the Progressive Cultural Association (PCA) and the Outer East London Anti-Fascist and Anti-Racist Committee' (OELAFARC).

149. During this period a number of Maoist groups were involved in the violent counter-demonstrations to extreme right/National Front marches. The 1976 SDS Annual Report noted that the anti-fascist/anti-racist committees, controlled by

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[327] HN348 report on a WLF study group meeting, UCPI0000026994/1.

[328] HN348 report on WLF, UCPI0000027006/1 §1.

[329] HN348 report on WLF and name change to RWU, UCPI0000010908.

[330] HN348 report dated concerning efforts to revive the WLF, UCPI0000011764.

[331] HN348 report on Haringey Women's Liberation Workshop, UCPI0000008304/1 §3.

[332] HN348 report on member of RWU and North London Alliance, UCPI0000011761/1.

[333] HN348 report concerning efforts to revive the WLF, UCPI0000011764.

[334] For example, HN348 authored a report dated 02/02/1973 providing details regarding the address of the London Alliance in Defence of Workers' Rights in direct response to a letter from the Security Service asking about a change of address and telephone number at the new address, UCPI0000014736 §1.

[335] See MPSB reports at UCPI0000009611; UCPI0000021499; UCPI0000021613.

Maoists, 'tend to be used by revolutionaries as a cloak for the organisation of violent confrontations with the ultra-right and police who they bracket together as 'fascists and enemies of the working class'.[336]

150. The 1977 SDS Annual Report described the CPE(M-L) in particular as a 'secretive and numerically small but disciplined and fanatical [group] which continues to represent a major threat to public order on any occasion that it takes to the streets in confrontation with the extreme right and the police'. The listed Maoist groups 'are all of the type committed to non-cooperation with the authorities (i.e., the police) and to causing maximum disorder possible at public demonstrations. Rarely will they inform police officially of their intentions and the intelligence obtained by the SDS therefore, is of paramount importance in the provision of effective public order policing.'[337]

151. HN13's deployment appears to have been directed to this issue. He reported on a meeting of the PCA at which there had been discussion of the Harringay National Front demonstration on 23 March 1977. The view was expressed that the behaviour of CPE(M-L) had been 'insufficiently militant'.[338] 'Next time', the report relays 'the CPE(M-L) would seize the role of leaders. There would be no eggs tomatoes and flour – these would be replaced by stones, bottles and cans' and members 'pulling the [police] horses heads down by the reins'[339].

152. HN13 was present with the CPE(M-L) at the 'Battle of Lewisham' (13 August 1977) and reported before the demonstration[340] (see further at Appendix D). He also reported in the wake of the demonstration on the revised tactics of the CPE(M-L), including the use of ambush tactics and the use of communication techniques, such as runners, walkie talkies and the interception of police radios, in order to launch an 'attack' on the National Front.[341] The CPE(M-L) view was that 'with the advent of the police shield, more sophisticated 'weaponry' is required in the riot situation'.[342]

153. In the SDS's Lewisham debrief (on 1 September 1977)[343], it was noted that whilst the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) took most of the credit, the CPE(M-L) was 'capable of disproportionate amount of disruption for its size'. It had been trying to perfect petrol bombs (which it considered using at Lewisham), and was noted to be particularly security conscious, participants giving incorrect addresses

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[336] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/4.
[337] SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-0728981/5- 6.
[338] SDS report on the PCA, UCPI0000017425/1.
[339] SDS report on the PCA, UCPI0000017425 /2.
[340] HN13 report UCPI0000011117 /1.
[341] HN13 report UCPI0000011180/2.
[342] HN13 report UCPI0000011180/2.
[343] DI Les Willingale post Lewisham notes, MPS-0732886; and see MPS-0732885.

when arrested (coordinated by this 'well-oiled machine'), thereby limiting useful intelligence that could be gathered by less intrusive means e.g., police raids.[344]

154. It is evident that the Security Service (which the evidence shows discussed Maoists with the SDS and MPSB management),[345] were sufficiently interested to record in February 1979, that the SDS's 'former CPE(M-L) source' (HN13) had withdrawn from the field and they were actively investigating a replacement.[346]

Conclusion

155. In considering the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for the deployments of HN45 and HN348, these should be seen in the context of the role of the BVSF and Abhimanyu Manchanda in the 1968-1970 anti-Vietnam war demonstrations and of the concern within MPSB and the Security Service about Maoists in the early 1970s. However, it appears a fair summation that both deployments charted Abhimanyu Manchanda's star fading across a variety of groups within which he had had various degrees of influence. Nonetheless, in both cases the UCOs were able to establish links between the groups and the personalities, and ultimately to conclude that Abhimanyu Manchanda was unable to command a significant following, and thus no longer posed a significant public order threat as he had been thought to earlier in the period.

156. Although WLF meetings in particular often had few attendees, meetings took place in activists' homes, and demonstrably focussed on social issues affecting women and children,[347] Maoist groups in this period were fragmented – which meant managers may not have been concerned that intelligence would be accrued from small group meetings and from reporting links as they emerged in the course of a deployment. The deployment of HN348 should not be assessed as infiltration of the 'women's liberation movement': the WLF then RWU were both Maoist groups looking at women's issues, operating in the mode of other 'front' groups common in the field.

157. The Inquiry is asked to recognise that until a deployment bears fruit with intelligence of the inner operations of secretive groups, it may not be possible to ascertain exactly what level of risk they posed to public order or the state. It takes time to reach this position. Nonetheless, the MPS recognises that the Inquiry will be concerned with the length of deployments into groups which had become, or been demonstrated to be of low public order or subversive threat. Whilst consideration of what the appropriate length should have been may be difficult with an incomplete evidential (reporting) picture, the Inquiry should also take

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[344] Geoffrey Craft was asked about this document and stated that this reporting was important because of the violence and petrol bombs referred to and that it indicated that rioting was moving into a new era, where the police needed to be protected: Geoffrey Craft, Witness Statement, MPS-0747446 §103.
[345] Security Service note for file re meeting to discuss how co-operation between F6 and SDS could be developed UCPI0000028835/1 §b.
[346] Security Service note for file dated 20 March 1977 at §b, UCPI0000028835/1.
[347] For example, reports at UCPI0000026988/3, UCPI0000026989/3.

into account the historical context to ascertain the pressures on the decision makers at the time.

158. In considering the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for the deployment of HN13 the Inquiry is invited to note both public order and subversive bases for the contemporaneous justification. This deployment was of a different character and had a different focus to those which had taken place at the beginning of the 1970s. HN13 provided intelligence on the CPE(M-L) at a time when the group posed a notable public order threat in the context of increasingly violent clashes between the extreme right and the extreme left wing. CPE(M-L) was also secretive and opposed to co-operation with the police (as clear from Security Service as well as MPSB reports), necessitating covert means to establish their plans. There were clear indicators that their plans and intentions were violent. It appears that HN13's reporting provided useful intelligence on a clear and present public order threat. The adequacy of the contemporaneous justification should therefore be assessed in that context.

ANARCHIST GROUPS

Introduction

159. The concern regarding the activities of the anarchists during the T1 period stemmed from the activities of the Angry Brigade, a neo-anarchist group which emerged at the start of the 1970s. Angry Brigade were described as a 'violence-prone revolutionary group'[348], representing in the 1970s 'the most violent form of political protest in present day society' second only to the IRA.[349] Their activities can be traced back to the period following their inception in 1967. In August of that year, a group calling themselves the '1st of May Group' fired shots at the US embassy and scattered leaflets in support of the people of Vietnam. The gun that was used in this incident was seized at HQ of the Angry Brigade at 359 Amhurst Road, Stoke Newington.[350]

The Public Order Threat

160. In 1969 there were a string of violent acts and bombings that took place on the Continent and in the UK that were believed to have been the work of the Angry Brigade or other anarchist groups:

3 February	Two unexploded bombs were discovered on the London premises of the Bank of Bilbao and the Bank of Spain attributed to First of May Group;
9 February	First of May Group bomb the Bank of Spain in Liverpool;
15 March	Bank of Bilbao bombed and Anarchists Alan Barlow and Phil Carver arrested and found with letter claiming responsibility from First of May Group;
16 August	Firebombing of Home of Conservative MP Duncan Sandys (former son-in-law of Winston Churchill);
17 August	Ulster office in London firebombed and Anarchist Ian Purdie arrested;
9 October	Petrol bombs discovered in left luggage locker in London.

161. 1970 started out much in the same way that 1969 had ended with more bombings and several bomb attacks continued throughout the year:

20 February	3 students arrested attempting to firebomb a Barclays Bank in London;
28 March	Bomb found at Waterloo station;
6 May	Petrol bombs thrown at the American Embassy;

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[348] CAB 163-269 - Security Services report - 'The Threat of Subversion to the UK: April 1977' UCPI0000035333/7.

[349] CAB 301-490-1 - Letter from Sir Burke Trend to the PM enclosing Security Services report - 'Subversion in the UK – 1972', UCPI0000035255/10.

[350] See entry in Appendix A dated 21/08/1967 to MPS CL Closing Statement for Tranche 1

10 May	An incendiary device found aboard an Iberian airliner at Heathrow (and on Iberian planes in other European capitals) claimed by First of May Group;
19 May	Conservative association at Wembley;
22 May	An explosive device discovered at a police station in Paddington thought to be the first action undertaken by the Angry Brigade;
10 June	Firebomb attack at Conservative Association, Brixton;
18 June	Bomb attack at Lambeth Court;
30 June	Firebomb attack at an Army depot in Kimber Road, SW18;
7 July	Firebomb attack at an Army recruiting office in South London and at an Army Officer Training Centre in Holborn;
10 July	Bomb attack at the home of a retired police officer in Stoke Newington;
30 August	Bomb attack at the home of the Commissioner Sir John Walden;
8 September	Bomb attack at the home of the Attorney General in Chelsea;
21 September	Firebomb attack at the Conservation Association in Wimbledon;
26 September	Firebomb attack at the Conservative Association in Hampstead and bombs planted at the Barclays Bank branch at Heathrow;
8 October	Second bomb attack at the home of the Attorney General in Chelsea;
26 October	Bomb planted at the Barclays Bank branch in Stoke Newington;
20 November	A bomb planted, which exploded, near a BBC van on the evening of the Miss World contest;
9 December	A bomb was planted, which exploded, at the Department of Employment and Productivity London, shortly after a police search.

162. In early December 1970 the Bomb Squad was formed. It linked intelligence that MPSB had or was able to obtain, with the investigative experience of Central CID.[351] At the time, it was noted that the bomb had was not being used by extremist groups other than Irish and Anarchist groups.[352]

163. In 1971, there continued to be a string of violent attacks, which put the newly formed Bomb Squad to work:

12 January	Two bombs were planted, and exploded, at the home of the Minister of Employment, Robert Carr;
30 January	Firebomb attack at the Conservative Association, Slough;
18 March	A bomb was planted at the offices of the Ford Motor Company;
1 May	A bomb planted at the Biba boutique in Kensington exploded; A bomb was planted, and exploded, at the home of a director of the Ford Motor Company.

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[351] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/5
[352] MPSB Annual Report 1970 MPS-0747835/5.

164. In March 1971 Ian Purdie was arrested and charged with conspiracy to cause the Angry Brigade bombings. He and Jake Prescott were tried in December 1971. Purdie was acquitted, Prescott convicted of conspiracy but acquitted of the individual bombings and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. In August 1971 four other members of the group were arrested at an address at Amhurst Road in Hackney, John Barker, Hilary Creek, Anna Mendelson and Jim Greenfield. They were convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment in December 1972. Other people including Stuart Christie, Christopher Bott, Angela Weir and Kate McLean were acquitted.

165. As well as the more extreme manifestations of protest, anarchist groups were associated with incidents of unrest during numerous demonstrations in the period including the VSC demonstration of 17 March 1968[353] and an Anti-Apartheid Movement rally in Trafalgar Square on 25 October 1970[354] to name but a few. This remained a concern throughout the 1970s. It is noted in the 1976 Annual Report that:

> [L]ittle has changed on the anarchist front in last year. Those professing the creed are a continuing nuisance on demonstrations and from the circles in which they move come rumour of the formation of Angry Brigade type cells bent on violence. Several individuals known to hold such views have appeared in political groups recently and SDS coverage of anarchist groups continues in the hope that advance warning may be obtained of any intention to carry out political protest into the realms of violence.[355]

166. The SDS Annual Report 1977 notes that:

> Anarchist activity remains as sinister and potentially dangerous as before with a high potential for creating disorder at demonstrations. With political kidnapping on the continent and the suicides of Baader Meinhof members featuring in the events of the past year, the anarchist supported Campaign Against Repression in Western Germany and Black Aid organisations have emerged as a contact point with German revolutionaries and it is felt that support for and any perpetration of such violent crime in this country would come from the small and intense Anarchist cells that exist.[356]

167. However, anarchist groups presented particular difficulties for the SDS. Anarchists tended to live in communes,[357] act in isolation,[358] or in small splinter groups and adopted a way of life that was thought of as distasteful and which UCOs would be required to adopt.[359] As noted in the SDS Annual Report 1970

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[353] Telegram from DI Saunders to CSI Special Branch authored by DS Creamer, MPS-0733954.
[354] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/31.
[355] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/3.
[356] SDS Annual Report 1977, MPS-0728981/16.
[357] SDS Annual Report 1970, MPS-0728972/5.
[358] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/7.
[359] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/7.

(with a reference to petrol bomb incidents which could be taken as referring to anarchist groups):

> There are signs that the extremists are seeking an outlet in small, isolated acts such as the recent petrol bomb incidents in London. The danger is that being planned and executed by small cliques, advance information or evidence after the event cannot be guaranteed without resorting to more sophisticated methods of penetration by the SOS than are necessary for the coverage of large-scale demonstrations[360].

The Subversive Threat

168. Notwithstanding the convictions of members of the Angry Brigade at the end of 1972, it appears that they continued to be a source of inspiration to other budding anarchist groups. This also raised concerns for the Security Services. Cabinet Office documents from 1974 reveal that anarchist groups remained on the radar of security concerns.[361] Anarchism, the Alternative Society and the urban guerrilla were regarded as on the same political spectrum, with:

> [T]raditional anarchism as being at one end of the spectrum, … the urban guerrilla at the other, and the Alternative Society in between…Further along the spectrum is the Anarchist Black Cross (ABC) founded by Stuart CHRISTIE who had connections with the Angry Brigade.[362]

169. The differences between groups are further acknowledged:

> A new-comer is Big Flame which has its own links with individuals who were sympathetic to the Angry Brigade. …It is now the most active and influential of the industrially orientated groups in this area…By contrast, the Alternative Society is an amorphous mass, a movement, almost a youth culture, rather than organisation… By no means all of the Alternative Society can be called subversive, and it is important to distinguish the truly subversive elements in this difficult area.[363]

170. The document concludes:

> In addition to the danger of the closer links between the Ultra Left and the IRA, the probable existence of neo-anarchist cells or groups of Angry Brigade type could lead to further isolated acts of violence. These are more likely to be gestures of protest than deliberate contributions to revolution…Traditional anarchists are likely to remain peaceful and no great threat to security…However, the

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[360] SDS Annual Report 1970, MPS-0728972/5.

[361] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974' UCPI0000035309/14 §39-43 and 55. The concerns of the Security Services prior to this date can be seen at UCPI0000034279 §11-12.

[362] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974' UCPI0000035309/14 §39 and 41.

[363] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974' UCPI0000035309/14 §42-43.

subversive motivation of a relatively small number of individuals within the Alternative Society will continue to present a security threat.[364]

171. Cabinet Office documents from 1979 notes that 'The main threat to security comes from a small minority, representing a distinctive viewpoint within Anarchism, who are prepared to use terrorist violence in order to demonstrate their opposition to the authority of the state'[365]. Reference is made to the Angry Brigade bombings of 1970 to 1971, as well as further anarchist bombings in 1973 and plans uncovered to carry out a series of attacks in 1978. The report notes: 'Further conspiracies of this sort may be expected to emerge from time to time. Although, therefore, they are essentially subversive, the main threats posed by Anarchist groups are of a law and order and possibly terrorist nature.'[366]

UCO Deployments

172. Reporting from UCOs deployed into the field illustrate the ongoing threat presented by anarchist groups:

HN326 (1968-1971)

173. HN326 infiltrated the West Ham Anarchists, joining some of their meetings and visited the Freedom Press[367], an Anarchist hang out. A report dated 26 April 1969[368] states HN326 comments that 'some of these groups were quite nasty pieces of work insofar as they would cause criminal damage and go wild at demonstrations'[369]. However, whilst he did experience some disorder at the South African Embassy which anarchists were involved in, the West Ham Anarchists were not particularly violent. HN326 very quickly felt the group were not worth SDS attention and DCI Dixon supported that view, so HN326 was redeployed.

HN300 (1974-1977)

174. HN300 infiltrated anarchist groups between 1974 and 1976 including the Anarchist Workers' Association (AWA) in Kingston in 1975 and the Anarchist Workers Association in Wandsworth from its start in July 1975. He also reported generally on groups operating in the Wandsworth and Battersea area. A report

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[364] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974' UCPI0000035309/18 §55-56.

[365] PREM 19-2843 - Letter from Sir John Hunt to the PM attaching Security Services paper - 'The Threat of Subversion in the UK' UCPI0000035314 14 §29.

[366] PREM 19-2843 - Letter from Sir John Hunt to the PM attaching Security Services paper - 'The Threat of Subversion in the UK' UCPI0000035314 8 §10.

[367] HN326, Witness Statement, MPS-0738584 §50.

[368] HN326 intelligence report concerning poor attendance at the West Ham Anarchist Group, UCPI0000008161.

[369] HN326, Witness Statement, MPS-0738584 §50.

of 19 March 1975[370] contains a pamphlet setting out the aims and principles of the AWA which include:

> the only meaningful transformation of society is through the development of the working-class organisations and by means of violent social revolution. Violence becomes inevitable for the working class to defend themselves the onslaught of the dispossessed ruling class. The task of the AWA is to aid the preparation of the working class for their seizure of power.

> We must be prepared for any eventuality; the notion of capitalism being voted out of existence via Parliamentary election is pathetic in the extreme.

175. Another report attributed to HN300 dated 16 August 1976[371] records that a member of the AWA has applied to join the Marylebone Rifle and Pistol Club because 'in his opinion…the time will soon come when most revolutionaries should be familiar with firearms'.

HN304 (1975-79)

176. HN304 reported on the Zero Collective and the Anarchy Collective. He knew Dave Morris and met Albert Meltzer (regarded as the grandfather of British anarchism) on two occasions. Some of the meetings that he reported on took place at 29 Grosvenor Avenue itself[372]. There is a report dated 22 September 1977[373]about Dave Morris which reads:

> Morris has stated to his close friends that, although he is uncertain within himself about the present and future trends of the Anarchist movement, he nevertheless feels that he is being inextricably drawn towards the more violent side of it. He regards it as inevitable in fact that he will eventually have to resort to violence.

177. When HN304 gave evidence he explained he recorded this because he felt it was information that should be reported, albeit that Dave Morris was not, to his knowledge, a violent man.[374]

178. HN304 told the Inquiry that saw a copy of The Anarchist Cookbook (a 1971 book by William Powell containing instructions for the manufacture of explosive), which was kept by a member of the Anarchy Collective at their home for

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[370] MPSB report on a meeting of the Anarchist Workers Association to promote a new branch of the Association in Kingston, UCPI0000006950.
[371] MPSB report stating that a member of the Anarchist Workers Association has applied to join the Marylebone Rifle and Pistol Club, UCPI0000010807.
[372] MPSB report on a regular weekly meeting of the Anarchy Collective discussing the proposed premises of the Anarchist Centre and the forthcoming edition of Anarchy, UCPI0000010598.
[373] MPSB report stating that Dave Morris has expressed a willingness to use violence in pursuit of his anarchist aims, UCPI0000011003.
[374] HN304, Transcript 07/05/2021, 101/15.

unknown purposes.[375]   In terms of public order, he assessed the Anarcho-syndicalists as more likely to have a detrimental effect and the group Persons Unknown (PUNK), who he also reported on to a small degree, to have been more likely to commit criminal offences.

Conclusion

179. When assessing the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for infiltration of anarchist groups, the Inquiry is invited to recognise this movement's long history of extreme violence, via adherents to the movement such as the Angry Brigade. This provides an explanation for the level of concern about the potential threat posed by Anarchist Groups in later years. In addition, Anarchists also continued to take any opportunity to cause disruption at large scale demonstrations. Given the history of their activities during this period there was a clear public order interest in discovering their plans. By definition it would have been notoriously difficult to secure their engagement in that regard. The available evidence shows that their activities were also of interest to the Security Service.

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[375] HN304, Transcript 07/05/2021, 112/2-13.

IRISH SUPPORT GROUPS

Introduction

180. In addition to the 'Autumn Offensive' in October 1968, clashes between the police and civil rights demonstrators in Londonderry in October 1968 marked the start of 'The Troubles'. In 1969, violence and rioting marked escalating tensions between the nationalist and unionist communities in Northern Ireland. It is no surprise therefore that in May 1969 the SDS anticipated that 'the situation in Northern Ireland would attract the attention of extreme elements in this country'[376] and would 'mobilise demonstrators on the London Streets'.[377] Further events followed on 22 June 1969, a rally at Trafalgar Square organised by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association ('NICRA')[378] and a further demonstration was proposed on 20 July 1969 at Speakers Corner.[379] In August 1969 the 'Battle of Bogside' in Londonderry and the subsequent deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland, saw further protests and marches on the mainland.[380] The SDS therefore sought coverage of Irish Civil Rights activities using UCOs to provide accurate intelligence in the field of public order, so that the correct number of police would be in the right place at the right time.[381]

181. It is against this backdrop that the SDS considered the continued existence of the SDS vital[382] and HN68 commenced his deployment into the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign ('ICRSC') in May 1969[383] and the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association ('NICRA'). He reported on key figures, such as Gerry Lawless[384] and Brendan Magill[385].

182. During 1968-1982 11 UCOs either reported on, or were deployed into groups campaigning on Irish-related issues.

The Public Order Threat

Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign

183. The Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (ICRSC) was a Trotskyist-dominated organisation with prominent members who were active in the International

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[376] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/7-8 §6.

[377] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/5 §10.

[378] HN68 report concerning a meeting of the IRCSC, UCPI0000016074/1 §4; MPSB report concerning a meeting of ICRSC UCPI0000008661/1 §3.

[379] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning a meeting of the ICRSC UCPI0000008661/2 §9(i).

[380] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning a meeting of the ICRSC UCPI0000008661/2 §9(ii).

[381] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/5 §11.

[382] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/5 §11.

[383] HN68 report concerning a meeting of the ICRSC, UCPI0000016100.

[384] MPSB Intelligence Reports UCPI0000016100/1, UCPI0000009875/1, UCPI0000008654/1, UCPI0000008690/2 §11, UCPI0000008663.

[385] MPSB Intelligence Report on a private meeting of the IRCSC discussing an upcoming demonstration, UCPI0000008642/1.

Socialists[386]. The ICRSC became the Irish Solidarity Campaign (ISC) in October 1970 at a conference of 75 representatives of most of the extremist organisations preoccupied with Ireland.[387] This gives insight into the breadth of the organisations concerned.

184. A significant volume of reporting supports the conclusion that Irish civil rights activities staged in London in the early 1970s were often associated with public order. The MPSB Annual Report in 1970[388] for example, says of the 28 June 1970 that:

> [A]bout 1,000 demonstrators, drawn principally from the Irish Civil Rights Campaign and the Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front, attempted to storm the Ulster Office as a protest against DEVLIN's arrest. They hurled milk bottles, pennies and banner poles at police lines, but they were repulsed and 32 arrests were made for such offenses as threatening behaviour, assault on police and possessing offensive weapons.[389]

185. Further, in 1971, James Roche, an active ICRSC member (and subsequent ICRSC President)[390] threw two CS gas grenades from the Strangers' Gallery at the House of Commons onto the floor of the Chamber.[391]

186. HN340 who was deployed into the ISC around October 1970,[392] reported on meetings where some members expressed support for the IRA, acts of terrorism, acquiring arms and establishing an armed wing[393].

187. The Inquiry has acknowledged that intelligence about fundraising for a terrorist organisation may be a legitimate aim when considering the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification. The plans to carry out collections for the IRA by ISC members who were also IMG members was also relevant and clearly of interest to MPSB in this period.[394]

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[386] CAB 301-490-1 - report on 'The Extreme Left in Britain'. 'IS has links with revolutionary student circles in Ulster; it is an important factor, with other Trotskyists in the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign in this country (John Palmer… is both a leading IS member and prominent in the Campaign's affairs), UCPI0000035252/5

[387] SDS Annual Report 1970, MPS-0728972 §13.

[388] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/10.

[389] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/8.

[390] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/11.

[391] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/9.

[392] MPSB Intelligence Report on a meeting of the Islington branch of the ICRSC discussing the recent National Founding conference, MPS-0738663.

[393] HN340, Transcript 16/11/2020, 166/25 - 168/25 regarding the bombings in Aldershot and potential of King Street as future target; MPSB Intelligence Report MPS-0738216/1 §5; MPSB Intelligence Report MPS-0738269/1; MPSB Intelligence Report UCPI0000008500/2; and HN340, Witness Statement, MPS-0740414 §76.

[394] CTI Opening Tranche 1, Phase 2, Appendix 1 Page 99 §10.9.1; HN342/299 on an ISC meeting at the IMG centre, UCPI0000008275/1 §4.

188. The available evidence also suggests the IRSC had access to weapons,[395] for example, a handful of pistols supplied by the IRA,[396] there was a further supply of firearms,[397] and a plan for a large consignment of firearms.[398] The NICRA are reported by HN68, as confirming their capability of firearms training also.[399] These reports will have made clear the value of intelligence on organisations such as these, regardless of whether any plans came to fruition.

Sinn Féin

189. It appears that HN68 used his credentials as an ICRSC activist to move first into NICRA, which was actively engaged in various civil rights protests in 1970[400] then into Sinn Féin in 1971.[401] The infiltration had been achieved with 'good and patient grounding'[402]. HN68 was the first UCO to be deployed for a significant length of time, spending over 4 years in the field; this supports the view of the SDS managers that time to build credibility was necessary and it was unlikely that intelligence could have been gathered by other means.

The Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front

190. The INLSF was reported on by HN347 from January to August 1971. In 1970 the MPSB considered the 'Maoist-dominated' Irish National Liberation Solidarity Front ('INLSF') to have been particularly involved in the various civil rights protests and was considered to be militant. By 1971 the INLSF ceased[403][OBJ].

191. The INLSF had an inner core which was on an invite-only basis and comprised a few members who decided on the group's actions. Norman Temple gave evidence to the Inquiry that in order to be invited to the inner group you had to be trusted and that HN347 never reached that level of bring trusted. While HN347 was unable to penetrate the inner core due to the limited length of his deployment into this group, the Inquiry may conclude that his withdrawal demonstrates an appropriate response to a reduction in or reassessment of the threat posed.

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[395] HN68 report concerning a meeting of the Steering committee of the ICRSC, MPS-0732172/4 §11.
[396] HN68 report regarding visit to Ireland by members of the London Federation of Anarchists, MPS-0736146/1.
[397] HN68 report concerning the attempted procurement of firearms by a member of the ICRSC, MPS-0739936/1 §2a.
[398] HN68 report concerning the attempted procurement of firearms by a member of the ICRSC, MPS-0739936/1 §2.
[399] HN68 report concerning the Hammersmith branch of NICRA, MPS-0739888 §3
[400] MPSB Annual Report 1970, MPS-0747835/11.
[401] CTI Opening Tranche 1, Phase 1, Appendix A, page 83, §4.14.
[402] SDS Annual Report 1971, MPS-0728971/4 §7.
[403] SDS Annual Report, MPS-0728971/5 §8.

The Northern Minorities Defence Force

192. The Northern Minorities Defence Forces' ('NMDF') leadership was considered extremely militant,[404] with a leading member described as having good working knowledge of explosives and radio operating[405] and a member who had close ties to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.[406] In 1972 the NMDF believed there was to be imminent civil war in Northern Ireland and accordingly were designing a training programme for volunteers which was to include instruction on radio theory, field craft, weapon handling theory and general discipline.[407] HN344 reported on their plans to train and send men to assist Active Service Units[408] and their discussion of training by joining rifle clubs.[409] The reporting also includes reference to anticipated violence at a rally on 29 April 1972.[410] The value of reporting on an organisation such as this is self-evident.

193. HN344 was invited to go to Londonderry by the NMDF,[411] the Commander considered the matter on 27 May 1972 and posed the following questions to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner:

> Are we therefore justified in allowing one of our own officers to enter such an area which is outside our jurisdiction for a start, quite apart from the danger to which he will be exposed? Is this a function for a Metropolitan Police officer?[412]

194. This demonstrates consideration of the appropriateness of police actions and the welfare of the UCOs. It being considered too dangerous HN344 was accordingly not authorised to go. It appears that thereafter HN344 reported on the Anti-Internment League ('AIL') rather than the NMDF.

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[404] Memorandum enclosing MPSB Intelligence Report concerning a private meeting of the Northern Minority Defence Force, MPS-0734406/2 §1.

[405] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning meetings of the Northern Minority Defence Force, MPS-0734410/4 §4.

[406] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning meetings of the Northern Minority Defence Force held to select a National Executive Meeting, MPS-0734415/2 §8.

[407] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning meetings of the Northern Minority Defence Force MPS-0734410/8 §7.

[408] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning meetings of the Northern Minority Defence Force, MPS-0734410/1 §4.

[409] Memorandum enclosing MPSB intelligence Report concerning a private meeting of the Northern Minority Defence Force, MPS-0734406/5.

[410] MPSB Intelligence Report regarding a meeting of the Northern Minority Defence Force, MPS-0734411/1 §4

[411] MPS File Note by HN344 concerning potential trip to Londonderry with the Northern Minorities Defence Force, MPS-0724171/3

[412] MPS File Note by HN344 concerning potential trip to Londonderry with the Northern Minorities Defence Force, MPS-0724171/4.

The Anti-Internment League

195. There had been attempts over the years to bring the different Irish civil rights organisations under one umbrella, which had been hampered by factionalism until the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland on 9 August 1971 provided a shared concern, and the AIL came into being.[413]

196. The combined strength of these groups made the AIL a likely public order threat; and AIL's first demonstration attracted around 2,500 people, with 21 people arrested for public order offences.[414] The demonstration showed an unprecedented degree of cooperation between as many as 13 groups (including Sinn Féin and IS).[415] In a letter to the Prime Minister enclosing a report on subversion, student Trotskyist groups, who were involved in the AIL's demonstrations, were reported as being responsible for much of the violence in AIL protests.[416]

197. The Security Service in 1974 described the IMG as controlling the AIL, which relied on large-scale demonstrations to gain popular support and resembled the VSC.[417] Public demonstrations in London following incidents in Northern Ireland[418] continued in 1972, with the AIL-sponsored demonstration in London a week after the Bloody Sunday shootings on 30 January 1972, where MPSB's view was that the numbers of participants and militancy almost rivalled those of the massive Vietnam demonstrations of past years.[419] The demonstration resulted in 127 arrests.[420].

198. HN344 reported on AIL demonstrations including plans for violence where organisers hoped that participants would rampage down Whitehall and the surrounding area, smashing windows.[421] HN344 was also present at an AIL counter demonstration where there were 'scuffles' at a march of the Gloucester Regiment.[422]

199. HN298 reported on the ISC and AIL amongst other groups and reported that at the first post-merger meeting it was mentioned that the Peoples Democracy were forming 'a force' which was understood to be an armed unit quite distinct from

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[413] MPSB Annual Report 1971, MPS-0747786/8.
[414] MPSB Annual Report 1971, MPS-0747786/8.
[415] MPSB Annual Report 1971, MPS-0747786/8.
[416] CAB 301-490-1 - Letter from Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister enclosing Security Service report on 'Subversion in the UK – 1972', UCPI0000035255/19 §9.
[417] CAB 163-268 - Letter from James Waddell to Sir John Hunt attaching Security Service report 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/28 §13.
[418] SDS Annual Report 1969, MPS-0728973/5 §10.
[419] MPSB Annual Report 1972, MPS-0747796/7.
[420] MPSB Annual Report 1972, MPS-0747796/3.
[421] MPSB Intelligence Report concerning arrests following the AIL demonstration, UCPI0000008651 §4.
[422] Minute sheet enclosing MPSB Intelligence Report, MPS-0728828/3 §3.

many involved with either wing of the IRA.[423] The revolutionary aspirations of the AIL included building of the revolutionary vanguard would be the only way to help the working class of Ireland in their bloody struggle against British Imperialism.[424] At the Conference, Sinn Féin delegates are said to have expressed their unequivocal support for the Republican Movement and the Provisional IRA, defending its bombing campaigns which were thought to be 'a well thought out strategy to rid Ireland of the tentacles of capitalism' with the IS delegate declaring unconditional support for the IRA in their struggle for freedom.[425]

The Troops Out Movement

200. The Troops Out Movement ('TOM') was formed in late 1973. The group was connected to Trotskyist groups and had IMG and SWP members on the board.[426] In the 1974 SDS Annual Report, DCI Kneale noted that on 27 October 1974 the TOM, following a fairly extensive national campaign, attracted 6,500 supporters and sympathisers to a rally in central London most from the 'ultra-left' organisations, which now finds itself the mouthpiece of protest against the activities of the British Government in Ireland.[427] The following year TOM, along with Big Flame Irish Commission and the Bloody Sunday Commemoration Ad-hoc Committee, all reported on by HN297, were listed as the principal organisations whose activities had the greatest potential for public disorder.[428]

201. The 1975 SDS Annual report stated that:

> [C]overage of Irish activists has centred on the fringe organisations such as the TOM… Demonstrations organised by purely Irish groups during the past year have excited little public interest and have been poorly attended. There are, however, slight indications that Irish extremists are becoming more active in demonstrations, and this trend will be watched by the SDS.[429]

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[423] HN298 report on the first meeting following the amalgamation of the AIL and ISC, UCPI0000007991/2 §8.

[424] Minute sheet concerning a MPSB report concerning a meeting of the AIL, MPS-0728841/4 §7; MPSB Intelligence Report on an Anti-Internment League National Conference, MPS-0728845/2 §5.

[425] MPSB report on an Anti-Internment League National Conference, MPS-0728845/3 §8-9.

[426] MPSB Annual Report 1980, MPS-0747792/4. HN299 states that he reported on the IMG, attempting to reach positions of prominence in TOM as some of its members advocated violence to achieve its political aims; and as such, in his opinion, an IMG-controlled TOM could present a serious threat to public order, HN299, Transcript 29/04/2021, 10/12-17. Furthermore, according to HN298, IMG had a significant interested in TOM and this was of interest to Special Branch. IMG were endeavouring to infiltrate anywhere where they could really cause problems, particularly Gerry Lawless, who was described by HN298 as a 'nasty individual', HN298 Transcript, 04/11/2021, 135/9-25.

[427] SDS Annual Report 1974, MPS-0730906/14 §26.

[428] SDS Annual Report 1975, MPS-0730099/1.

[429] SDS Annual Report 1975, MPS-0730099/3 §8.

202. TOM was therefore named as one of the organisations given close attention by the SDS during 1976.[430] The SDS Annual Report stated that under present conditions the risk to officers would be too great to justify an attempt of infiltration into the official and provisional wings of the Irish Republican Movement but that much useful information had been obtained through the TOM.[431]

203. After two years in the SWP, HN96 reported on the Hackney TOM,[432] he became the Membership and Affiliation Secretary on the National Steering Committee[433] and was on the Organising Committee for the March 1982 demonstration, which enabled him to obtain detailed public order intelligence.[434] There was a concern that TOM might be utilised to support Irish Republican terrorist groups[435] such that HN96 was able to report a new address for a TOM member who was involved in the Republican movement and whose flat, he said, was raided by the anti-terrorist branch the following day.[436]

204. HN297 also held positions which enabled him to gain high-level intelligence on TOM, for example sitting on the London Co-ordinating Committee of TOM and became the Convenor of the Secretariat.[437] Richard Chessum gave evidence that as a member of the Co-ordinating Committee HN297 would have been able to understand all aspects of activities of London wide TOM and its campaigning and strategic plans.[438] HN297 was invited to visit Northern Ireland although this was not authorised as it was considered an unacceptable risk.[439]

205. Geoffrey Craft explained the importance of the SDS targeting 'pro-Irish' groups, in particular TOM, and its contribution to policing public disorder:

> The Troops Out Movement was a broad front organisation; some people were purely TOM, but also involved were lefties and Irish Sinn Fein. Infiltrations were useful for public order and identifying Sinn Fein members, which ultimately could be useful because those people could, and did, support IRA-active people who came to the mainland. … TOM was quite big because of their numbers on demonstrations, so we needed to know what was happening. … They very much contributed to policing public order: we could find out how large demonstrations were going to

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[430] SDS Annual Report 1976 MPS-0728980/1 §2.

[431] SDS Annual Report 1976, MPS-0728980/3 §3.

[432] HN96, Witness Statement, MPS-0745772 §189-190.

[433] HN96, Witness Statement, MPS-0745772 §199; MPSB Intelligence Report listing members of the National Steering Committee of TOM, UCPI0000018080 which records that HN96 held this position in May 1982.

[434] HN96, Witness Statement, MPS-0745772 §210.

[435] HN96, Witness statement, MPS-0745772 §228.

[436] HN96, Witness statement, MPS-0745772 §100.

[437] MPSB Intelligence Report MPS-0728743/3 §3

[438] Richard Chessum, Transcript 05/05/2021, 82/7-23.

[439] Minute sheet containing correspondence between HN332, Cmdr Ops and DAC discussing a potential trip by DC Clark to Northern Ireland, MPS-0732953/1.

be, whether any groups were going to splinter and break into buildings etc. This would affect the numbers of police required at a demonstration. The background is these were revolutionary people with intention to do away with Parliamentary democracy, starting with mob rule.[440]

The Big Flame

206. The Big Flame was described by the Security Service as a Neo Anarchist group that believed in the use of violence under certain circumstances[441] and had links with individuals who were sympathetic to the Angry Brigade.[442] HN297 reported on this group.[443]

Conclusion

207. In assessing the adequacy of the contemporaneous justification for deployments into this field the historical context is of particular importance. In 1973 alone there were 97 Irish Republican incidents involving the use of car bombs, time bombs, letter bombs and incendiary devices placing great operational strain on the MPSB[444]. It is unsurprising in the circumstances that the MPS needed to have the means to obtain information about who was or might be involved in these activities, which including an understanding of how they were supported and funded. In addition, events in Northern Ireland, and changes in Government policy had public order implications in London. SDS UCOs were able to provide intelligence not only in relation to demonstrations, many of which caused public disorder, but also may have supplied intelligence that was relevant to counter-terrorism, much of which could not be obtained by other means.

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[440] HN34, Witness statement, MPS-0747446 §70.

[441] CAB 163-268 - Security Service Report - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/58 §55-56.

[442] CAB 163-268 - Security Service Report - 'The Security Significance of the Ultra Left in the UK in 1974', UCPI0000035309/1

[443] MPSB Intelligence Report regarding Big Flame, UCPI0000009775/1.

[444] MPSB Annual Report 1973, MPS-0747833/3.