
Closing submission for Tranche 1 of the Undercover Policing Inquiry on behalf of:

**Richard Chessum
'Mary'
Lindsey German**

An issue has been raised in respect of our submissions potentially breaching Parliamentary Privilege. We have, for the time being, made redactions to our submissions accordingly. We will consider the law on the issue and return to these areas at the beginning of the Tranche 2 period.

**James Scobie KC | Garden Court Chambers
Piers Marquis | Doughty Street Chambers
Paul Heron | Public Interest Law Centre**

**10th February 2023
(redacted 21st February 2023)**

Introduction:

We represent three core-participants in Tranche 1 of the Inquiry.

We addressed the key issues on behalf of Richard Chessum and “Mary” in our Phase 2 opening statement¹. In our Phase 3 Opening Statement² we focused on Lindsey German, who was a member of the *Socialist Workers’ Party* from 1972 with roles on the Central Committee of that Party for more than thirty years. We ask that this closing statement is read alongside those documents.

We are grateful to the Inquiry for allowing us additional time to present our closing submission. However, we ask those who are listening to consider this statement alongside the published written version which is detailed, fully referenced and available on the Public Interest Law Centre website.

In this closing statement we will demonstrate:

1. The Rick Clark deployment was not simply an intelligence gathering exercise. It was designed, with the knowledge and approval of Special Branch managers and MI5, to undermine a democratic organisation.
2. The undermining of a democratic organisation was one of a range of “counter-measures” endorsed by Government.
3. Post 1972, the principle purpose of the SDS was not to assist with maintaining public order. Its task, in conjunction with MI5, was to spy on citizens who were politically active, particularly in the trade union movement.

¹ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-richard-chessum-and-mary-for-tranche-1-phase-2/>

² <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/>

4. Government knew and approved, encouraged and enabled the continuation of the SDS.
5. From as early as 1975, the SDS management knew of undercover officer sexual relationships with their targets.
6. The Public were continually deceived by Government, as to the function and tasking of Special Branch.

PART ONE:

The Rick Clark deployment:

This Inquiry started with a pre-conception that the deployment of HN297, Richard Clark (“Rick Gibson”) was “unremarkable”.

The evidence of Richard Chessum and “Mary” was critical in demonstrating that that pre-conception was misconceived. And that led to recognition from the Inquiry that a mistake had been made in that pre-judging of a deployment³. That recognition was both welcome and encouraging.

The known facts about Clark’s deployment are as follows:

He dishonestly appropriated the identity of a child who had died.

³ Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 132: *“I’m also deeply indebted to you for the care and thoughtfulness of the written and oral evidence that you’ve provided. My knowledge of the events of 1975 and 1976 in which you participated when I started the Inquiry was very little, as I demonstrated by saying that the deployment of “Rick Gibson” was unremarkable. Plainly it wasn’t. I’m grateful -- very grateful to you for all you’ve done to help put me right about that.”*

He was deployed directly into a university⁴, with the *Troops Out Movement* as his pre-deployment target⁵.

He established a branch of the *Troops Out Movement* where one had not previously existed.⁶

He encouraged others to assist him in that endeavour⁷. When they did so, he opened files on them and reported on them⁸. In Richard Chessum's case that led to his life-long blacklisting.⁹

Clark spent time in the home addresses of these people, abusing their hospitality¹⁰, and embarking on sexual relationships with at least two of them¹¹.

He rose, incrementally, to the top of the *Troops Out Movement*¹². Taking ever higher positions of responsibility within the movement and undertaking executive actions that can only have de-stabilised it¹³; and were plainly likely to de-stabilise it.

⁴ UCPI0000012122.

⁵ UCPI0000012122 and Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 36).

⁶ MPS-0728678

⁷ MPS-0728678 and Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 36).

⁸ Both Richard Chessum and "Mary" were recorded as "no trace" on Special Branch records when Clark named them in reports from 30th of January 1974 UCPI0000012122/3 and UCPI0000012136/1. Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 30): *I had really decided to bow out of active politics a little bit. And it wasn't until Gibson arrived on the scene that -- that I got involved again.* See also Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 64-65).

⁹ Richard Chessum Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 121 to 123.

¹⁰ Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 69-70). "Mary" statement January 2018 paragraph 12.

¹¹ "Mary" statement January 2018 paragraphs 8 and 9.

¹² See chronologically: MPS-0728710, MPS-0728718, MPS-0728721, MPS-0728730, MPS-0728667, MPS-0728669, MPS-0728697, MPS-0728755, MPS-0728736, MPS-0728762, MPS-0728772, MPS-0729779, MPS-0728785,

¹³ MPS-0728730, MPS-0728761, MPS-0728774, UCPI0000012332, UCPI0000012328, UCPI000009684, UCPI000009733, UCPI000009790, UCPI000009790, UCPI000009790.

He then attempted to use that position to de-capitate the whole movement¹⁴, whilst ingratiating himself with *Big Flame* and embarking on at least two further sexual relationships.¹⁵

He only stopped because his activity was discovered; *Big Flame* activists confronted him with his birth and death certificates¹⁶.

The outing of Richard Clark was so significant for the SDS that it went down in SDS folklore and was used as a cautionary tale for decades.¹⁷

All of that is now established. And because it is established, a more important set of issues arises.

In respect of each one of Clark's actions and his objectives, the question is "**Why?**".

Ultimately, why was this officer put where he was, to do what he did?

Richard Chessum was able to come to educated conclusions¹⁸ about some of the reasons for what Clark did; basing those conclusions on his first-hand experience of the man and the Movement, and on the documents that have been disclosed.

But ultimately, he could not give any definitive answer as to Why? Nor of course, could Clark himself, because he died some years ago.

Geoffrey Craft was the SDS Inspector from early 1974¹⁹ until some point in 1976²⁰, when he became the Chief Inspector, a role that he remained in until the autumn of

¹⁴ UCPI0000010775, UCPI0000021388,

¹⁵ Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 104).

¹⁶ Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 109 - 113).

¹⁷ SDS Tradecraft Manual MPS-0527597/8 para 3.1.2. The Manual was authored in February 1995 and updated in March 1996 (MPS-0527598/2).

¹⁸ See for example Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 80, 91, 101, 126-127, 128, 129.

¹⁹ Geoffrey Craft joined the SDS as an Inspector in "the very early part of 1974" (see Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 7).

²⁰ Craft's Central Record of Service (MPS-0734949: not disclosed on OPUS) records his promotion to Detective Chief Inspector in November 1976 (see Craft statement MPS-0747446/8 paragraph 21). However, it appears

1977²¹. He was, therefore, a managing officer of the SDS throughout Clark's deployment, which lasted from December 1974 to September 1976.²² In addition, from 1981 to 1983, Craft was Chief Superintendent of Special Branch, in charge of "S" Squad, with the SDS as his "biggest responsibility"²³. Craft was best placed to assist the Inquiry in respect of Rick Clark's "remarkable" deployment.

Anything that is "remarkable" is also likely to be memorable.

We submitted over seventy pages of questions for Counsel to the Inquiry to ask Geoffrey Craft. Each question was supported by referenced documentary evidence, setting a context, foundation and rationale for asking it. We have published the full set of questions on the Public Interest Law Centre website this morning²⁴.

Those questions were key to understanding both the Rick Clark deployment and, because it was so significant, all of the deployments that followed it.

Because of that significance, we submitted those questions to the Inquiry far in advance of the deadline for doing so²⁵, to ensure that they could be properly considered and included in Counsel to the Inquiry's questions.

that he took on the role of Head of SDS prior to that time (see Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 7), as reports as early as February 1976 (see MPS-0728678) and July 1976 (see UCPI0000010719) are signed off "Chief Inspector GTM Craft". In any event, Craft describes the roles of Inspector and Chief Inspector in the SDS as "interchangeable" (MPS-0747446/8)

²¹ He left the SDS in approximately September 1977 (see Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 8).

²² The first reports associated with HN297 commence in November 1974 (see UCPI0000015053, UCPI0000014979, UCPI0000015060). Richard Chessum believes he first met HN297 in December 1974 (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 38). The first report attributable to HN297 was from February 1975, referencing a meeting on 30th January 1975 (see UCPI0000012122).

Clark's withdrawal was discussed between (HN357) Chief Superintendent Bicknell and Commander Ops (HN1254 Rollo Watts) in September and October 1976 (see MPS-0732910 and MPS-0732916).

²³ First Witness statement of Geoffrey Craft MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12.

²⁴ The full Rule 10 question submission, listing all questions and referencing all sources, can be found annexed to these submissions at www.pilc.org.uk/tranche-1-closing-statement.

²⁵ Craft gave evidence on 18th of May 2022. Rule 10 questions were due to be submitted on behalf of Non-State Core Participants on 11th of May 2022. The questions template on behalf of Richard Chessum and "Mary" was submitted to ILT on 3rd of May 2022 at 13:52.

Many of the key questions were not asked. We do not know why. It may be that the Inquiry already has in mind the documentary evidence, and the strong inferences that can be drawn from them.

But, if there have been pre-conceptions about Geoffrey Craft, based perhaps on his career trajectory²⁶, or the subjective character references of some of the officers who served under him²⁷; we ask the Inquiry to exercise great caution.

The Rick Clark deployment is very important to this Inquiry. It has far-reaching implications in respect of the use to which the unit was put, and the tactics that it used. It would be very fortunate and convenient for many of the State Core-Participants, if the Inquiry were to find that Clark was a maverick officer, who was acting on his own.

On the evidence, that is not a realistic conclusion. It is not sustainable to conclude that Clark did what he did off his own bat, or was running wild.

We are going to reference as much of that documentary evidence, that we included in our questions, as we can in the time available. Then we are going to invite you to draw conclusions from them, that we suggest are inescapable.

Positions of Responsibility:

The key aspect of Rick Clark's deployment was that he set up a branch of the *Troops Out Movement*, and subsequently rose to the top of the Movement nationally.

²⁶ Craft retired as Chief Superintendent of "B" Squad (MPS-0747446/61).

²⁷ See for example Closed officer evidence MPS-0748061/45 "Geoff Craft's attitude was sort of conservative and straight down the line"

Mr. Craft's position, as set out in his statement, was that he knew absolutely nothing about it.²⁸

In his oral evidence to the Inquiry, he conceded, as he had to, that if an officer were to take a position of high office in a political organisation, that would risk influencing the freedom of expression and political action of the group.²⁹

He was then asked³⁰ the following question³¹:

“Mr Craft, if you had known that Richard Clark had risen to high office in the Troops Out Movement, including becoming the convenor to the national secretariat, would you have approved?”

Unsurprisingly, following such a leading question, he answered “No”.

That question is as interesting as the answer. It pre-supposes that Craft was telling the truth, when he said that he knew nothing at all. It also pre-supposes that Rick Clark did what he did, without approval.

These are dangerous pre-conceptions. They bury the truth. They set Rick Clark up; to take the fall for a deployment that **did** impact on the political action and freedom of expression of the Troops Out Movement. They are as wrong as the pre-conception that his deployment was “unremarkable”.

Chief Inspector Craft **did** know that Clark had targeted the movement and set up the branch. He **did** know that Clark had risen to the highest office in the movement. And

²⁸ MPS-0747446/41 : paragraph 97: *“I am told Rick Clark [took senior roles]. I did not know that he was prominent in establishing the SE London branch of TOM, nor did I know anything about his positions of responsibility. I would be very surprised if he did play such a senior role in the group”*.

²⁹ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 78.

³⁰ Unfortunately, much of the evidence that followed on this topic fell under the Restriction Order that was granted at 12:32.

³¹ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 82.

he **did** approve it. He also **did** know that Clark undertook a number of actions that inevitably impacted on the political action and freedom of expression of the movement. He approved that too.

Of course, there is the obvious inconsistency, between the account of a Chief Inspector, maintaining that he employed the highest levels of monitoring and supervision,^{32 33} whilst simultaneously not noticing an officer's 21-month meteoric rise through the movement's hierarchy. To accept that on face-value would be stretching credulity to breaking point.

It is all the more incredible when one looks at Craft's account of how often he looked at the reports of his officers. He would only see reports "if there was something particularly interesting in them",³⁴ and would not sign them, "unless there was something specifically to sign"³⁵.

But the fact is that the report from Clark that dealt with his involvement in establishing the South-East London branch of the *Troops Out Movement*, was so particularly interesting, that Craft did indeed sign it off personally.³⁶

There are four reports, within a month of each other, dealing with Clark's elections as branch secretary³⁷, as a delegate to the London Co-ordinating committee³⁸, the All

³² Craft witness statement: MPS-0747446/14 paragraph 32: "I had day to day involvement in the deployments of SDS undercover officers. We held 1:1s with officers as and when required and there were twice weekly group meetings.... At the twice-weekly meetings everyone would discuss their deployments, who did what with [sic] where, and what was developing in certain areas".

³³ Craft witness statement: MPS-0747446/48 paragraph 113: "We kept in close contact with the officers, met regularly with them and they met regularly with us; we would spot signs of difficulty. I do not think any police officers were more carefully monitored than this lot".

³⁴ MPS-0747446/17 paragraph 35.

³⁵ MPS-0747446/16 paragraph 35.

³⁶ MPS-0728678/2

³⁷ MPS-0728710 18th March 1975

³⁸ MPS- 0728718 2nd of April 1975

London meeting³⁹ and the National Co-ordinating Committee.⁴⁰ All of those were interesting enough to have been signed off by Craft's superior DCI Kneale. The next month Craft was signing off the reports that indicated Clark had achieved those positions.⁴¹

Craft then signed off the report dealing with Clark's further election as delegate to London Co-ordinating Committee.⁴²

Kneale signed off a further election as delegate to National Co-ordinating Committee⁴³ and Clark's attendance at a private meeting with Gerry Lawless, the head of the movement.⁴⁴ But Craft was back signing for the next delegate election two weeks later.⁴⁵

Kneale signed off the election to a National position on the Organising Committee for London,⁴⁶ his election as London Organiser⁴⁷, his nomination for a position on the National Secretariat⁴⁸ and his role as organiser of the National Rally.⁴⁹

But it was Craft who signed off his election to a role on the Press Committee.⁵⁰

³⁹ MPS-0728721 7th April 1975

⁴⁰ MPS-0728730 21st April 1975

⁴¹ MPS-0728731, MPS-0728734, MPS-0728735: May 1975

⁴² MPS-0728667 16th of June 1975

⁴³ MPS-0728669 23rd June 1975

⁴⁴ MPS-0728675 27th of June 1975

⁴⁵ MPS-0728697 7th of July 1975

⁴⁶ MPS-0728755 19th of September 1975

⁴⁷ MPS0728736 20th of October 1975

⁴⁸ MPS – 0728762 17th of November 1975

⁴⁹ MPS-0728772

⁵⁰ MPS-0729779 11th of February 1976

And, most importantly, when Rick Clark took Lawless's position as Convenor of the Secretariat⁵¹ and took charge of the whole movement⁵², it is Craft's signature on the report.

Kneale signed off the reports, dealing with Clark's early attempts to create division and dissent, when he "severely criticised another section of the movement"⁵³ and launched a "scathing attack" on some members⁵⁴.

But once in place at the top, when he "insisted on the removal of TOM Press Officer from the Secretariat"⁵⁵, when as Convenor he delayed a long-planned Trade union delegation to Ireland⁵⁶, severely criticised another member and prepared documents for circulation to the press⁵⁷, Craft signed off every report.

When, as Convenor, Clark censured another very prominent member of the *Troops Out Movement*,⁵⁸ once again it was Craft who signed the report.

And when it was reported that four months into Clark's leadership, at least one prominent organisation withdrew its support for *Troops Out Movement* because the "atmosphere was increasingly reformist",⁵⁹ again it was Craft signing off.

When serious dissent was noted with the *International Marxist Group* over the postponement of the delegation to Northern Ireland⁶⁰ and, that by the time Lawless

⁵¹ MPS0728785 March 1976

⁵² Richard Chessum Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 129

⁵³ MPS-0728730 21st April 1975

⁵⁴ MPS-0728761 13th of October 1975

⁵⁵ MPS-0728774 January 1976

⁵⁶ UCPI0000012332 and UCPI0000012328

⁵⁷ UCPI000009684

⁵⁸ UCPI000009733

⁵⁹ UCPI000009790

⁶⁰ UCPI000009790

returned, two members of the Secretariat had resigned,⁶¹ there at the bottom of the report is Craft's signature.

Rick Clark conspired with members of *Big Flame* to plot opposition and resistance to the leadership of the TOM. He facilitated that, even to the extent of risking the security of the SDS by holding the meeting at his police cover flat.⁶² That critical report was also signed off by Craft.

On the 2nd of September 1976, shortly before his identity was discovered, Clark held a meeting at which the "major aim" of the nine attendees was "the defeat of the present leadership [of TOM] and the replacement of them by independent members".⁶³ Clark was described as "influential" and was named as the second of five proposed new leaders. It was a coup. Signed off by Geoffrey Craft.

In our first opening statement to the Inquiry⁶⁴, we warned of the risk of individual officers being scapegoated and made to 'carry the can'. This was precisely why we did so.

None of those documents were put to Craft, and none of those questions were asked⁶⁵, even though we spoon-fed the Inquiry with them. Instead, Craft was led by the hand, into saying that he neither knew nor approved. Craft should not have had his hand held on any issue, but certainly not one as important as this.

⁶¹ UCPI000009790

⁶² UCPI0000010775 25 July 1976

⁶³ UCPI0000021388

⁶⁴ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-the-core-participants-represented-by-paul-heron/> Page 22 of 26.

⁶⁵ After Craft's main evidence, the lack of questioning was raised as a matter of concern with CTI. One document was then put; the unsatisfactory answers were not engaged with. See Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 pages 146-147.

Craft **knew** that Clark went to the top of the *Troops Out Movement* and conspired to de-stabilise it. His continued approval and authority for it, is stamped on the bottom of every report. His superior officers knew as well; their stamps of approval and authority are there too⁶⁶. The dispersal of the knowledge and approval can be followed up the Metropolitan Police hierarchy just by looking at the minute sheets.⁶⁷

Critically, **every single one** of those reports was sent to MI5 at Box 500. They saw them all.

If they were asked, MI5 would not be able to pretend that they did not know that an SDS officer had rapidly risen through the ranks of the *Troops Out Movement*, right to the very top. They could not pretend that they did not know that an SDS officer was plotting to de-stabilise a democratic movement. They could not say that they were unaware of the source of the reports. Their knowledge that Rick Clark, as “Rick Gibson”, was an SDS agent is clearly stated in a Security Services minute sheet⁶⁸. They knew who he was, and they knew what he was doing.⁶⁹

The likelihood is that that knowledge and approval went higher than that. We shall deal with that aspect more generally at a later stage in these submissions. Richard Walker, a detective sergeant in the SDS back office throughout Clark’s deployment was

⁶⁶ See for example: UCPI0000021388, MPS-0728676/4, UCPI0000021388, UCPI000009733, UCPI0000010775, UCPI000009790.

⁶⁷ Where minute sheets of the reports have been disclosed, it is apparent that Craft was forwarding them on to Chief Superintendents of both “C” Squad and “B” Squad and others. See as an example: MPS-0728668/2

⁶⁸ See UCPI0000030059 a Security Service minute sheet, from September 1977, confirming that MI5 knew that SDS had an agent in Big Flame in the autumn of 1976, and that they knew who he was. “*I have found MPSB unwilling in the past to admit they are able to provide information in certain fields of interest even when they provide detailed reports on them (which may often indicate the identity of their agent). I am thinking particularly of my interest in covering the Big Flame National Conference in October 1976, which I thought might be possible through an SDS agent then in Big Flame. (REDACTED).*”

⁶⁹ Because they had seen every report, from Clark’s establishing the South-East London branch, through his rise to the top and to his conspiring in respect of the coup.

conscious that the reporting was likely to go not just to the Security Services, but to the Home Office as well.⁷⁰

This Inquiry cannot be complicit in scapegoating Rick Clark. Whether Craft remembers it or not, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that Clark was not acting alone.

The Clark deployment conclusively demonstrates that the Metropolitan Police and the Security Services were using a secret police unit to de-stabilise and decapitate a democratic movement. The SDS was authorised and encouraged to do exactly that. That is a fact. The Inquiry cannot shy away from that. We do not expect it will do so.

That fact has far-reaching implications for every aspect of this Inquiry.

As a starting point, it raises questions about the true function of the SDS; it cannot be argued that it was simply an intelligence gathering organisation, when it plainly was not.

It raises questions as to the true state and purpose of the SDS; it is impossible to argue that this activity had any role in preventing disorder or countering subversion, however one chooses to define that conveniently fluid concept.

It casts a shadow over the credibility of any witness who protests that somehow the SDS was a protector of our right to free speech and our democratic right to organise.⁷¹

It is a stark reminder that dishonesty is the life blood of these people. They sought out

⁷⁰ (HN368) SDS Sergeant from September 1974 to April 1978: Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 2 to 4.

⁷¹ See for example Geoffrey Craft himself, at MPS-0747446/26 paragraph 66: *“The concern from the SDS was to provide the quality of intelligence which would enable the policing of public order activities to preserve our right to free speech and to demonstrate our views, within the rule of law, based upon parliamentary democracy. That was always the guiding light of what we did.”*:

a career that was founded on deceit and their success or otherwise depended on how dishonest they could be.

And it puts a perspective on the tactics that were used by the SDS, be they the dishonest appropriation of dead children's identities, the cultivation of false friendships or the sexual exploitation of activists. A State that is prepared to undermine the very democracy that it loudly purports to be protecting, is a State with very few qualms at all.

The Troops Out Movement:

The *Troops Out Movement* was established in 1973⁷². It was a campaign group whose aim was publicly stated and straightforward: self-determination for the Irish people and the withdrawal of British Troops from Northern Ireland⁷³.

Their methods were lobbying Members of Parliament⁷⁴, drafting alternative legislation⁷⁵, and raising awareness with the occasional low-key demonstration, talks and film-screenings⁷⁶.

It had already been infiltrated by the SDS, when Clark was sent in. HN298 'Mike Scott' was reporting on the Movement in 1974 and was withdrawn⁷⁷ after he broke his finger

⁷² Statement of Richard Chessum UCPI0000034182/13

⁷³ Troops Out Movement Constitution MPS-0728728/6

⁷⁴ MPS-0728728/3

⁷⁵ MPS-0728728/3

⁷⁶ MPS-0728734

⁷⁷ from the TOM, his deployment continued elsewhere

punching Gerry Lawless in the face.⁷⁸ Very shortly after “Scott” stopped reporting on the TOM⁷⁹, Rick Clark was sent in⁸⁰.

We know that there were other SDS infiltrations after Clark. Detective Inspector McIntosh, who served in the SDS between April 1976 and autumn 1979⁸¹, noted the successful infiltration of the Movement, and implied infiltrations other than Clark in the period up to 1979.⁸²

The SDS were certainly supplying the Security Services with intelligence on the *Troops Out Movement* in the summer of 1980. The officer involved was involved enough to have been in closed meetings. It is referred to in a liaison file,⁸³ but no disclosure has been provided in respect of the officer who sourced the information, or his role in the Movement.

Towards the end of 1980,⁸⁴ HN96 “Michael James” began reporting on the *Troops Out Movement*, having been encouraged to do so by the SDS management. He was elected to the National Steering Committee⁸⁵ in November and December 1981, taking the position of National Membership Secretary, second only to the National

⁷⁸ HN298 Statement MPS-0746258/48: paragraph 169 to 171.

⁷⁹ It is not clear exactly when HN298 stopped reporting on the TOM. There is a report authored by him on the 22nd of August 1974 UCPI0000016345. Thereafter, there is a gap in his reporting (see IDX058/3) until January 1975 by which time he was infiltrating the WRP. Logically he must have stopped reporting on TOM in the autumn/early winter of 1974.

⁸⁰ Richard Chessum believes he first met Rick Clark in December 1974 (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 38) after Clark had previously written to the TOM National Office (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 36).

⁸¹ Statement of HN244 McIntosh: MPS-0747578/4 paragraph 6: “I left the SDS in the autumn of 1979”, paragraph 14: “I was posted to the SDS in April 1976”.

⁸² Statement of HN244 McIntosh: MPS-0747578/28 paragraph 89(a) “Troops Out was successfully infiltrated. Over the course of my service in the SDS, a number of individuals – I cannot remember precisely- were at one stage or another part of Pro-Irish organisations.”

⁸³ See UCPI0000028816/1 paragraph (b)

⁸⁴ Statement of HN96: MPS-0745772/38 paragraph 184

⁸⁵ UCPI0000016711, UCPI0000016769, UCPI0000016816.

Convenor.⁸⁶ He reported on the *Troops Out Movement* from that position well into 1983.

“Mike Scott” concluded that the *Troops Out Movement* had no subversive objectives and did not employ or approve the use of violence.⁸⁷

There is nothing in any of Rick Clark’s reporting to suggest subversion or any public order risk. The same is true of the reporting of “Michael James”. More generally, there has been no reporting suggesting public disorder at any *Troops Out Movement* event.

Interestingly, Geoffrey Craft was the SDS Detective Inspector and Chief Inspector for both the “Scott” and Clark deployments. He was the Chief Superintendent of “S” Squad, with the SDS as his “biggest responsibility in that role”, at the time of the “James” deployment⁸⁸.

Craft himself agreed that the organisation was not subversive⁸⁹ and the public order risk was “just in case” or trying, as he put it, “to be ahead of the game”⁹⁰ i.e. there was no public order risk, but it was conceivable that there might be, one day. That argument might have a shred of credibility for a one-year deployment, to assess a situation. But Craft had officers in there for, at least, seven of the ten years between 1974 and 1983.⁹¹ Clearly there was no “game to be ahead of”.

It is worth noting, that under the “just in case” theory of public disorder prevention, Special Branch could try to retrospectively justify any infiltration of any protest or campaign group. There did not have to be a genuine risk of disorder or even the

⁸⁶ UCPI0000018793/3

⁸⁷ HN298 Statement MPS-0746258/48: paragraph 167: “*It had no subversive objectives and as far as I am aware did not employ or approve the use of violence to achieve its objectives*”.

⁸⁸ 1981-1983 MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12

⁸⁹ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 108

⁹⁰ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 108

⁹¹ HN298: 1974, HN297: 1975-1976, HN96: 1980-1983. Unknown officer(s) some point in 1977-1979.

suggestion of one. Craft called this “**the ultimate defence line**”⁹² that would prevent any “embarrassment” if the SDS existence were ever to become public knowledge.⁹³ Another way of phrasing “ultimate defence line” is “ultimate excuse”, and it is the excuse that we have heard repeated time and time again.

Absent a subversion or a public order justification; the fallback justification for the repeated infiltrations of TOM seems to be that it might have provided intelligence on Irish Republicans,⁹⁴ particularly in the light of a policy decision not to infiltrate any actual Irish Republican Movement.⁹⁵ It was a soft option, along the lines of the policy decision not to infiltrate fascists because they were too dangerous and criminal for a police officer to infiltrate⁹⁶.

An interest in possible Irish Republicans does not explain why it was that Richard Chessum, “Mary” and countless others had Special Branch files created on them, and the detail of the minutiae of their lives⁹⁷ passed on to the Security Services, with life-changing consequences.

It does not explain why authority and approval was given to undermine the *Troops Out Movement* to the extent that it was undermined. If Big Flame had not discovered and outed Rick Clark when they did, there would have been a coup. It may or may not

⁹² MPS-0728980 page 5.

⁹³ MPS-0728980/5 Annual Report 1976: “The political sensitivity of the SDS operation is fully recognised by all officers concerned and, to protect the ultimate defence line, great care is taken to ensure that penetration of an organisation can be fully justified on the basis of the Commissioner’s responsibility for the preservation of public order in the Metropolis”. Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 63: “*if the operation was to become public, the Commissioner had a strong defence. That we were acting, as police are sworn to act in preservation of the Queen’s peace... It would be an embarrassment if the Commissioner didn’t have the defence, and the defence was quite clear, I think.*”.

⁹⁴ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 106.

⁹⁵ MPS-0728980/3 paragraph 3.

⁹⁶ Angus McIntosh Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 38

⁹⁷ See MPS-0728938, UCPI0000012136, UCPI0000012136, MPS-0728205, UCPI0000012135, UCPI0000006936, UCPI0000012737, MPS-0728938 and <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-richard-chessum-and-mary-for-tranche-1-phase-2/> page 5.

have been successful, but it would inevitably have had consequences for the Movement.

What is clear is that the *Troops out Movement* was riven to the extent that it was widely viewed as being “too busy fighting amongst themselves to do any good work on the troops out issue”.⁹⁸

It had had undercover officers running the Movement for at least five of its first ten years. By the time they left it was a shell of a Movement ; its registered office was a council flat just south of Kings Cross.⁹⁹

Tragically, more than three and a half thousand people lost their lives in the Troubles before the troops eventually left.¹⁰⁰

“Mary”:

There are a number of inconsistencies at the heart of Craft’s evidence about sexual relationships.

On the one hand, Craft emphasises careful recruitment of SDS officers, based on the results of their vetting¹⁰¹, and their good reputation¹⁰² within a small Special Branch, where “everyone had a reputation very quickly”¹⁰³.

On the other hand, Craft claims not to have known about Richard Clark’s reputation within that same small Special Branch, as a bit of a lad¹⁰⁴, a womaniser and a

⁹⁸ UCPI0000011895

⁹⁹ MPS-0748355/42

¹⁰⁰ <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html>

¹⁰¹ MPS—0747446/9 “All of Special Branch had to be vetted and anything out of the ordinary could cause questions with vetting”.

¹⁰² MPS—0747446/9 “we were looking for people had a good reputation within the Branch in terms of the enquiries they did and the way they conducted themselves”

¹⁰³ MPS—0747446/9 paragraph 24.

¹⁰⁴ MPS-0748061/44

“carnivore”,¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶ despite evidence of it being “*generally well known among the existing SDS officers*”¹⁰⁷.

Craft then emphasises the “very close” officer supervision¹⁰⁸ and close camaraderie of the SDS¹⁰⁹ yet claims to have had no knowledge of any sexual relationships at all, despite the proliferation of them under his command¹¹⁰ and two officers being honest enough to say that managers knew, either with certainty,¹¹¹ or in all likelihood.¹¹²

Craft was asked about the “particular risk” of an undercover officer being put directly into a University situation, where he would inevitably be involved with young, single women¹¹³. He replied that he “did not think of that at the time”, but accepted that “with hindsight, of course” he recognised the risk.

That concession was inevitable. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could not recognise the risk. It is even more difficult to square his account that he, a 40 year old¹¹⁴ Detective Chief Inspector of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, was too “naïve”¹¹⁵ to recognise it; but somehow since then, he acquired the necessary life experience to see what is already plain to the rest of us.

¹⁰⁵ MPS-0748061//47

¹⁰⁶ Closed officer gist transcript: MPS-0748061/47 and Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 13

¹⁰⁷ MPS-074806/61 “*Rick had a certain reputation and it gradually came out he had a sexual relationship which led to his being compromised, and that was, to my way of thinking, generally well known among the existing SDS officers*”

¹⁰⁸ MPS-0747446/8 “The principle aspect of this role [Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector] was the supervision and care of the people in the field”. “It was very much a case of supervision, in the real sense”. MPS-0747446/9 “Supervision had to be very close”.

¹⁰⁹ MPS-0747446/41 “We, the team, were so close that I am sure somebody would have picked something up”.

¹¹⁰ That we know of: HN297, HN300, HN354 and (when Craft was Chief Superintendent at “S” squad) HN155 and HN 106.

¹¹¹ HN304 statement MPS-0742282/42 paragraph 146 (a)

¹¹² MPS-0748061/61

¹¹³ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 73.

¹¹⁴ MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12. Geoffrey Craft retired in 1986 at the age of 49.

¹¹⁵ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 143

Craft put an undercover police officer into a university, at a time in history when the sexual revolution was well underway and more permissive attitudes to sexual liberation, particularly in a university setting, were commonplace and common knowledge¹¹⁶.

He did so, in the full knowledge that his success or failure, as an undercover officer was dependent on him forming relationships with activists. Craft was also in the unique position of actually reading and signing off the reports that Rick Clark was generating; yet somehow, he did not see the red flags.

Clark's first six reports included personal details of single, female students¹¹⁷ and made it plain that he was spending time at home with them¹¹⁸.

You do not have to be a detective, let alone a Detective Chief Inspector, to have an alarm bell ring when those reports arrive on your desk. Every one of those reports was

¹¹⁶ See Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 104).

¹¹⁷ "Mary" and her flatmate.

¹¹⁸ On the 11th of February 1974, Richard Clark submitted his very first report (UCPI0000012122) arising from his deployment. It dealt with a meeting on the 30th of January 1974, at Goldsmiths College. It included mention of a woman who had chaired the meeting, and included a physical description of her and an approximate age. A week later, on the 17th of February 1974, DC Richard Clark submitted five reports, at the same time, to the SDS management (MPS-0728678, UCPI0000012136, MPS-0728205, MPS-0728938, MPS-0728206 and UCPI0000012135). The first of the five (MPS-0728678) related to a meeting, on the 6th of February, in the student union bar at Goldsmiths college, to discuss the formation of the South-East London branch of TOM. The five attendees at that meeting were noted as Richard Clark, Richard Chessum, his girlfriend "E", "Mary" and a male member of the IMG.

The second report (MPS-0728205) provided details on Richard Chessum; including a detailed physical description, his address, and the fact that he was "understood" to be co-habiting with his named girlfriend. The third report (MPS-0728938) provided details of that girlfriend, including a detailed physical description and the "understanding" that she lived with Richard Chessum.

The fourth report (UCPI0000012136) provided details of "Mary", including a detailed physical description and her address.

The fifth report (UCPI0000012135) provided further details on the woman who had chaired the 30th of January meeting. This time it included a more detailed physical description, a revised assessment of her height, a different (exact) age, and the fact that she shared her flat with "Mary"; implicitly stating that both she and "Mary" were single. Also included in the physical description was the fact that she suffered from "frequent" asthmatic attacks.

But "Mary's flatmate" had not attended the meeting on the 6th of February. There had been no meeting at which Clark could have ascertained her exact age or height, or her more detailed physical description, or the frequency of her asthma attacks, or the fact (rather than an understanding) of her flat share with "Mary".

signed off by Chief Inspector Craft; at a time when he was closely monitoring his officers, particularly one who had only just entered the field.¹¹⁹

Those reports, along with all the others, went up to other senior officers who also signed them off, before being sent to the Security Service. It would be interesting to hear every one of them plead naivety.

The real insight into Craft's approach to sexual relationships came in the unguarded moments of his exculpatory, belittling assertions¹²⁰ that sexual activity does not require an exchange of CVs and that "these things happen"¹²¹. The truth about his recognition of risk came in his acknowledgement of what he actually saw as an inevitability: "how does one prevent it?"¹²² The line between an accepted inevitability and knowledge is very thin indeed, particularly for an organisation that mastered in deceit and had no qualms about using people generally.

"Graham Coates" (HN304) had "no doubt" that all of the SDS managers were aware of Rick Clark having had at least one sexual relationship¹²³ "*It was made quite plain,*

¹¹⁹ "I do not think any police officers were more carefully monitored than this lot" Statement of Geoffrey Craft MPS-0747446/48 paragraph 113.

¹²⁰ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 71: Q: And what is your view so far as the activist or member of the public who is deceived into sexual relationships by one of your undercover officers?

A: I'm not happy about it, but what is the alternative? Because accepting that rape is not involved, does all sexual activity in terms of modern moral attitudes require a legally endorsed exchange of CVs before sexual activity takes place? And so to the extent to which the man concerned was operating under false colours, is that something which one could prevent? I don't know. That is the way my mind is working. It's wrong, but how does one prevent it?

¹²¹ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page: I don't know. All I can say is that perhaps one – it needs to be emphasised regularly with the -- before it starts and also regularly while the operation is continuing, because I don't think there is any way of preventing it because these things happen, but it – it is a problem.

Q. Did you ever take the view that "these things happen" whilst you were leading the SDS?

A. No, I did not.

¹²² See above.

¹²³ Statement of HN304: MPS-0742282/44 paragraph 146 "*jokey remarks were occasionally made in SDS meetings which I took at face value and believed to be based on truth. I assumed that the women involved were activists, but cannot say whether this was the case or not. My supervising officers would have been aware of these remarks because they were present at the meetings when they were made.*"

T1P2 Transcript 7th May 2021 page 40 "Q. Can I move now to what you heard in terms of joking and banter about Richard Clark and sexual activity in his undercover role. Could you tell us what you can recall, please? A. I can tell you simply that although I cannot recall the conversation -- any conversation verbatim, I can tell you

with jokes and banter, that they knew, we knew, and management knew what was going on."¹²⁴

Craft, used repeated denial as his own ultimate defence line, in the same way that he denied all knowledge of the anti-democratic activity that he repeatedly signed off.

Big Flame and Rick Clark's discovery:

A conspicuous hole in Craft's evidence was that in relation to the discovery of Rick Clark's identity by members of *Big Flame*.

Mr. Craft had a very close involvement in the creation of undercover officer identities,¹²⁵ and was personally involved in the creation of Rick Clark's cover identity.¹²⁶

He was very aware of the "paramount" importance placed on the secrecy of the SDS and the need to avoid the political "embarrassment"¹²⁷ that would befall the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office should the operation become public. He cited his own recognition of the "political sensitivity"¹²⁸ when personally assuring the Home

that what I heard left me in no doubt that the management were aware of that officer's behaviour. Q. And when you say "that officer's behaviour", what behaviour are we talking about? A. Sexual -- sexual relations".
Page 41: *Q. And in terms of the detective inspectors, are you including in the circle of knowledge Detective Inspector Craft? A. I'm including anybody who was in that management structure at that time. They could not have failed to have drawn the obvious conclusions from the comments that were being made."*

¹²⁴ T1P2 Transcript 7th May 2021 page 42

¹²⁵ MPS-0747446/13 Para 30 *"I was very much involved in the invention, development and assessment of cover identities... We felt very secure on birth... knew it was a pretty secure method. I very much oversaw this"*.

¹²⁶ Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 13: *"I didn't recruit him personally, but I -- I was involved assisting his undercover background"*. Although at page 18 he retracted this: *"Do you recall whether or not you assisted him to build his cover legend? A: No not specifically"*.

¹²⁷ MPS-0728981 SDS Annual Report, paragraph 10, authored by Craft's successor, Pryde.

¹²⁸ MPS-0728980/5 paragraph 14.

Office that officers were provided with “the strongest possible cover backgrounds compatible with the modern computer age”.¹²⁹

Craft was also “very much involved in the exfiltration of SDS officers”,¹³⁰ discussing with them how they would come out of the field, what their story would be and how it would be explained. He considered it to be a “serious matter”.

The impact of *Big Flame*’s discovery of Rick Clark’s death certificate must have been ground-shaking for the Metropolitan Police.

Their “computer age” compliant security had been breached. The assurances they had given the Home Office in respect of it, were worthless.

The protracted police applications for anonymity in this Inquiry suggested danger to these officers in their undercover roles. If that were true, every SDS officer in the field would have been at risk. If, as Mr. Craft suggests, Clark’s deployment into the *Troops Out Movement* involved intelligence on Irish Republicanism, the Police would have been fraught with concern about repercussions.

Most importantly, the compromise risked the public outing of the SDS, and the inevitable political fall-out¹³¹. That political fall-out would have been all the more terrifying because Special Branch activity was, in any event, the subject of particular public scrutiny at the time.¹³² The impact would have been all the more significant, in

¹²⁹ MPS-0728980/5 paragraph 13.

¹³⁰ MPS-0747446/15 paragraph 15.

¹³¹ See for example: UCPI0000035264: February 1973: Letter from Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister: *“Ministers should be warned of the importance of maintaining secrecy about this enterprise. Very great political damage indeed could be done if it became known that the Government maintained an organisation which could easily be mis-interpreted as “spying” on good, honest trade unionists and others who claim to defend the liberty of the subject!”*

¹³² UCPI0000035100 Labour MPs raising concerns with the Home Secretary about Special Branch activity in April 1974. See also UCPI0000035101 and UCPI0000035102: Sir James Waddell’s advice to the Home Secretary (Roy Jenkins) as to how to approach the matter.

the context of a deployment into a broad-based, single-issue movement, that could not be justified on either subversion or public order grounds.

It was also in the context of an officer who had been engaged in blatantly anti-democratic activity, within the knowledge of those who outed him, and with a paper trail that confirmed the knowledge and approval of both the Metropolitan Police and the Security Services.

There would have been heads rolling all the way up the hierarchy. How far up it went, would have only depended on the extent to which it could be covered up.

For Craft, as the Chief Inspector in charge, it would have been career ending. He would have been remembered as the officer who presided over the demise of the unit.

A full decade later, in June 1986, Special Branch was so concerned about the details of Rick Clark's deployment being made public that the Commander issued a memorandum directing the attention of "all officers"¹³³, to Richard Chessum; warning them that he was speaking to a freelance investigative journalist about Clark and *Big Flame*.¹³⁴ We do not know exactly when in 1986 Mr Craft retired¹³⁵ but if he was still working in the summer of that year, he himself would have received the alert.

The incident was such a key moment in the SDS history that twenty years later, **every single officer** was "familiar with the story of an SDS officer being confronted with his "own" death certificate".¹³⁶

¹³³ MPS-0731077: Commander's Memorandum No.309, dated 25th of June 1986: "The attention of all officers is directed to the under-mentioned persons:- Richard Chessum [and others redacted for privacy]."

¹³⁴ See also MPS-0731078 and MPS-0731075

¹³⁵ MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12 "retiring in 1986 aged 49."

¹³⁶ SDS Tradecraft Manual MPS-0527597/8 para 3.1.2. "We are all familiar with the story of an SDS officer being confronted with his "own" death certificate." The Manual was authored in February 1995 and updated in March 1996 (MPS-0527598/2).

And yet the statements of the two officers in charge of the SDS at the time; Detective Chief Inspector Craft and Detective Inspector McIntosh, are silent on the issue; conspicuously silent.

The only reference Craft made to the compromise in his statement, was a single sentence in the middle of a paragraph on officer welfare; he referred to an “occasion Rick Clark thought that he had been rumbled and was called to a meeting in a pub”¹³⁷. In the section on the use of deceased children’s identities¹³⁸, there is no reference to it at all.¹³⁹

McIntosh started in the SDS in April 1976¹⁴⁰ and was well in place and working in September 1976.¹⁴¹ In his statement, about exfiltration generally, he said: “I do not remember one [exfiltration] causing any trouble at all”¹⁴². In the section of his statement where he was asked specifically about Rick Clark¹⁴³, he makes no reference at all to the discovery of the death certificate or his exfiltration.

These are striking omissions¹⁴⁴. Senior officers, who are, at best, being deliberately unforthcoming.

¹³⁷ MPS-0747446/15 paragraph 33: “It was the same for welfare: when things went wrong, I was there to be on hand to discuss where we went. Welfare was always our responsibility as the most senior officers in the SDS. On one occasion Rick Clark thought that he had been rumbled and was called to a meeting in a pub; Derek and I both went and kept observation. This is the only time I remember having to do that.”

¹³⁸ MPS-0747446/49

¹³⁹ In fact Craft maintains that “It was inconceivable that the bereaved family would become aware. I can be accused of being naïve...”.

¹⁴⁰ MPS-0747578/6 paragraph 14.

¹⁴¹ See for example MPS-730729/1 and MPS-730728/1

¹⁴² MPS-0747578/16 paragraph 48

¹⁴³ MPS-0747578/50 to 51.

¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, DS Richard Walker (HN368), who was the Detective Sergeant in the SDS back office from September 1974 to April 1978 (Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 2-12) also makes no reference to the discovery of the death certificate or exfiltration in his statement (MPS-0747527). His references to Rick Clark are restricted to a denial of knowledge of sexual activity (MPS-0747527/39).

Coupled with that, is the bizarre insistence from both officers, that neither of them recalls ever having worked with the other. Despite there being an eighteen-month period when they were together in charge of the SDS,¹⁴⁵ Craft states that he did not overlap with McIntosh at all on the SDS¹⁴⁶ and McIntosh states that he does not remember ever working with Craft.¹⁴⁷

They clearly were working with each other. And they were definitely working together in September 1976, the very month of Clark's outing. There is documentary evidence to put that beyond question.¹⁴⁸

Craft maintained his memory block throughout his oral evidence and was unable to explain it but, conceded in the face of the documentary evidence that they must have been working together.¹⁴⁹

McIntosh began by maintaining his memory block¹⁵⁰. He put it down to being away for long training courses in the part of his deployment when he would have overlapped with Craft, particularly for "major incidents".¹⁵¹ That account does not correlate with the actual periods of training that McIntosh is recorded as having done; which only

¹⁴⁵ McIntosh became DI in April 1976 (MPS-0747578/6 paragraph 14). Craft left the SDS, as DCI, in around September 1977 (MPS-0747446/7 paragraph 18).

¹⁴⁶ See MPS-0747446/22 paragraph 51(vii) "Angus McIntosh: we did not overlap at all on the SDS" and paragraph 99 "I do not remember Angus [McIntosh] ever being my Inspector".

¹⁴⁷ HN244 statement MPS-074578/8 paragraph 23: "I do not remember working with Geoff Craft" and paragraph 114: "I do not remember ever working with Geoff Craft".

¹⁴⁸ MPS/730728/1 3rd of September 1976 memo from DCI Craft to Chief Superintendent "S" Squad requesting that DI McIntosh and DS Walker accompany SDS officers to Blackburn. MPS/730729/1 20th of September 1976 Letter of thanks to Commissioner Gilbert from Lancashire Chief Constable, noting McIntosh's attendance in Blackburn [in connection with that SDS work] on the 11th September 1976.

¹⁴⁹ Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 151.

¹⁵⁰ Transcript 19th May 2022 page 18: "Q: By the Inquiry's calculation, when you first joined the SDS, the unit was headed up by Geoffrey Craft, and we understand you have no memory of serving at the same time as him; is that right? A: That's correct, yes."

¹⁵¹ Transcript 19th May 2022 page 18: "Yes, I do. I remember going there [to Blackburn], and I really can't understand why I can't recall working with Mr Craft. I can only presume that the major incidents which may have occurred during that time was during a period I was on other courses."

account for 4 months of the 18 month overlap and which took place in the year **after** the outing of DC Clark.¹⁵²

However, almost imperceptibly, Mr. McIntosh slipped in the middle of his evidence.¹⁵³ Having maintained his zero recollection of working with Craft, he was asked some questions about the management style of DCI Mike Ferguson. He was asked if he recalled Ferguson's rigorous testing of new officers on their identities. "*Was that something common? Did Mike Ferguson tend to do that with UCOs when they first started?*" His reply: "*Geoff Craft as well.*"

In a split second, he let it be known that he remembered working with Geoff Craft only too well. That slip was not followed up by Counsel to the Inquiry. That is unfortunate, because a contrived mutual memory loss is a very convenient thing. It prevents questioning and enquiry on the way in which management discussed, and decided to deal with, events as significant as Rick Clark's outing, or very shortly afterwards (in November 1976¹⁵⁴) the antics of HN300 "Jim Pickford"¹⁵⁵.

Both Craft and McIntosh did expand on their recollections of the Clark outing in their oral evidence¹⁵⁶. Both recalled going to a pub because Clark had been uncovered.

Craft said that he had gone with Derek Kneale, that Clark had given an excuse that *Big Flame* appeared to have accepted, all appeared to be well. He and Kneale had de-briefed Clark the following day and decided to withdraw him anyway. Essentially,

¹⁵² HN244 statement MPS-0747578/8 paragraph 21: 21st February 1977 to 18th March 1977 and 22nd June 1977 to 23rd of September 1977.

¹⁵³ See Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 53. "Q. He [HN155] describes Mike Ferguson firing questions at him prior to his deployment to ensure that he was prepared for it. A. Yes. Q. Was that something common? Did Mike Ferguson tend to do that with UCOs when they first started? A. Geoff Craft as well. I mean, that was - part of the job was to make sure they're prepared to go out and test their cover story and all the aspects with it, yes."

¹⁵⁴ Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 87 and CTI Opening Statement T1P2 176/275 paragraph 30

¹⁵⁵ T1P3 Transcript 19th May 2022 pages 92-93 questioning from the Chair.

¹⁵⁶ McIntosh Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 pages 62 to 67. Craft Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 pages 21to 23.

Craft downplayed the problem and put himself with a more senior officer, who is now deceased and unable to assist.¹⁵⁷

McIntosh said he had gone with a surveillance team. He did not know any details of the potential compromise. He illogically prevaricated on Craft's presence or otherwise; presumed that Geoff Craft had dealt with it with another, unnamed, member of staff; which was why, he said, he did not remember working with Craft... before remembering it, at least to the best of his belief. He accepted that it was an event of "great significance operationally", that "without doubt [the SDS] would have been very concerned about". He just said it had nothing to do with him.

Both were reluctant to refer to the production of a death certificate. Craft did so, obliquely, when pressed.¹⁵⁸ McIntosh maintained that he was not aware of one being produced at the time.¹⁵⁹

Neither account was credible. But both were framed to ensure that any questions on the internal inquiry into the reason for the compromise, were not going to lead anywhere.

Fortunately, there is official confirmation of both the production of the death certificate and how "disturbing" the compromise was for the Metropolitan Police senior officers.¹⁶⁰

Mr Craft's account that Clark came out of the pub, giving no indication of any concern, so they waited until the next day for a de-brief, and then decided there was "little point in leaving him out there", does not fit any of the surrounding circumstances.

¹⁵⁷ Derek Kneale had left the SDS office some months before (IDX096/2: the last SDS reports associated with Kneale are from March 1976). At the time of Clark's uncovering, Kneale was the Detective Superintendent.

¹⁵⁸ Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 23.

¹⁵⁹ Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 63.

¹⁶⁰ MPS-0732910: Internal memos between Chief Superintendent Bicknell and Commander Watts, with the Deputy Assistant Commissioner copied in

Mr Chessum's account, albeit second hand¹⁶¹, that Clark went "white as a sheet" and that his cover flat was stripped overnight¹⁶² is a response that is far more in keeping with the reality of the fear that must have gripped the SDS. This was the biggest risk to their security until the "True Spies" programme.

There must have been extensive internal inquiry. Clark must have been asked how it was that he came to be "rumbled" and his account must have been vigorously examined. Bearing in mind that Mr. Craft was aware that: "people did talk all the time"¹⁶³ and the SDS was much more open than Special Branch, they must have asked other officers what they knew.

Clark told several officers¹⁶⁴ that two sexual relationships had led to his compromise. At least two officers¹⁶⁵ gave evidence about that account in the closed hearings. One of them gave a character reference for Craft, unable to believe that he would have known.¹⁶⁶ Another believed that it was generally well known among the existing SDS officers¹⁶⁷, including at least some of the managers. The latter would have been consistent with the "Graham Coates"¹⁶⁸ account, of wider managerial knowledge. HN126 "Paul Gray" confirmed that when he joined the SDS, just one year after Clark's

¹⁶¹ Big Flame members reported the events in the pub to Richard Chessum. He was shown the Big Flame file on Clark, which included copies of the birth and death certificates and the note. Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 113

¹⁶² Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 112

¹⁶³ MPS-0747446/11 paragraph 26

¹⁶⁴ MPS-0748061/46: Excerpts from Closed officer evidence: "*there were a group of us, four or five or six in this pub, chatting away and I assumed everyone else had heard it [Clark's account that two sexual relationships had led to his compromise] as well*".

¹⁶⁵ Possibly a third at UCPI0000034307/5 paragraph 23; however, because the evidence is unattributed it is difficult to tell.

¹⁶⁶ MPS-0748061/45

¹⁶⁷ MPS-0748061/61: "*Rick had a certain reputation and it gradually came out that he had had a sexual relationship which led to his being compromised and that was, to my way of thinking, generally well known among the existing SDS officers. I wouldn't know if they [managers] knew or if it was just a rank and file thing. I should imagine that some [of the managers] did [know]*".

¹⁶⁸ i.e. T1P2 Transcript 7th May 2021 page 40, as above.

exfiltration¹⁶⁹, the unearthing of the death certificate, was very much in the minds of all officers when they joined the Squad¹⁷⁰ and that he was aware that that security breach was said to have come about because Clark had an affair with an activist.¹⁷¹

A further, strong, indicator of wider managerial knowledge of the sexual relationships leading to the compromise comes from the method of Clark's exfiltration. Commander Watts urged that Clark's withdrawal must be "under suitable cover"¹⁷² i.e. using appropriate methods to ensure that his tracks were covered.

The key feature of that "cover" was Clark sending a note to one of the women that he had had a relationship with, giving a false explanation as to why he had suddenly left.¹⁷³

There was no exploration of that with Craft, despite his close involvement in exfiltration tactics.¹⁷⁴

The documentary evidence conclusively demonstrates that Clark was not a maverick officer, acting in isolation. A conclusion that this letter was unauthorised, and sent

¹⁶⁹ September 1977: MPS-0740761/7 paragraph 18

¹⁷⁰ HN126 Transcript T1P2 12th May 2021 page 54: "Q. Did you consider at any stage the possibility that you might be presented with the death certificate of the individual whose identity you were going to select? A. It wasn't something that I'd thought about, but I was very aware of one of my predecessors having had that done to him a couple of years earlier. It was very much in all our minds when we joined the Squad".

¹⁷¹ HN126 Transcript T1P2 12th May 2021 page 55: "I was assured by the staff in the office that it would be okay; and there were other parts of his deployment that I would never have got into, so in my mind it didn't matter. Page 56: "Q. And then just going back to your previous answer, that you became aware that Richard or Rick Clark had had his death certificate presented to him, you said that there were parts of his deployment that you would never have gotten into and so it didn't concern you; what bits of his deployment were parts that you would never have gotten into? What were you referring to there? A. I think you probably know what I'm talking about. Q. Well, 126, forgive me, I need to elicit the evidence from you, so that you can explain what it is you mean. A. Well -- Q. So was there something in particular that you were referring to? A. From -- yes, I was talking about the fact that he'd obviously had an affair whilst he was undercover. And as a result of that, suspicions had been brought about, and they had passed -- they'd found his death certificate, or the death certificate of the child, which ..."

¹⁷² MPS-0732910/1

¹⁷³ See Richard Chessum Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 106, 107 and 112.

¹⁷⁴ MPS-0747446/15 paragraph 34.

without managerial knowledge, would be as suspect as a conclusion that his anti-democratic activity was similarly unknown and unapproved.

The Rick Clark letter was not an outpouring of honesty, revealing his true status and expressing his heartfelt regret. It was a tactic, designed to reinforce the lie underlying the exfiltration; and therefore, to prevent further enquiry from activists. It was part of Clark's "suitable cover". Ultimately, the "cover" worked, of course. Despite what Craft referred to as the "ingenuity" of the "sinister" *Big Flame*,¹⁷⁵ Clark was not publicly uncovered as an SDS officer.

The letter writing tactic lived on; in the postcard¹⁷⁶ sent to "Madeleine" by Vincent Harvey, and the many, many letters that were sent to the victims of undercover officers thereafter.¹⁷⁷ In the circumstances of the Clark compromise, that letter is the evidence that breaks through the thin line, from inevitable risk of sexual relationships into **definitive knowledge** of them.

The Rick Clark deployment is indeed "remarkable".

On a personal level, it demonstrates the extent to which the SDS were prepared to use people, to get into their homes, to deceive and sexually exploit them.

On a political level, it proves the lie that is the public order justification. There was none. It proves the lie that a "subversive" was anyone other than someone opposed to State interests; in this case the single issue of de-militarisation.

¹⁷⁵ MPS-0728980/4 paragraph 7.

¹⁷⁶ UCPI0000034819

¹⁷⁷ See for example: <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-category-h-core-participants-represented-by-bp-hr-and-hja/> Paragraph 39: Bob Lambert letter to Belinda Harvey. Paragraph 50, 58, 59, 61, 63, 68 and 69: "John Barker" letters to Helen Steel. Paragraph 92: "Bobby Lewis" to "Bea". Paragraph 110: Mark Jenner to "Alison". Paragraph 132 and 134: Jim Boyling postcards and letter to "Rosa", Paragraph 160 and 161: "James Straven" postcards and letter to "Sara".

It demonstrates that SDS deployments were being used for far more than simply intelligence gathering. And finally, it shows who was pulling the strings.

PART TWO:

Masters and Servants:

Both Craft and McIntosh were unwilling to assist with the extent of their liaison with the Security Services during their time as managers.

Craft said that he *“did not have much communication with the Security Service whilst...on the SDS.”*¹⁷⁸

When MI5 wrote to him to *“convey their gratitude for the flow of information [he was] sending [them] on the activities of the SWP”*, there was no formality. Not only was Craft on first name terms with MI5, they used the diminutive of his first name, “Geoff”¹⁷⁹. But Craft does not remember going to the party¹⁸⁰ that MI5 threw for the SDS. Nor does he remember taking DI Pryde to meet MI5 and introduce them to him.¹⁸¹ Nor does he remember being specifically called to a meeting with MI5 to be informed that the existence of the SDS was widely known amongst regional Special Branches.¹⁸²

McIntosh was also very reluctant to accept SDS engagement with the Security Services¹⁸³, despite MI5 describing his last visit to them as “routine”.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸ Craft first statement MPS-0747446 page 18 paragraph 40

¹⁷⁹ MPS-0730700 23rd of June 1977

¹⁸⁰ HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 129

¹⁸¹ HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 8

¹⁸² UCPI0000027451/1 and HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May page 34.

¹⁸³ McIntosh statement: MPS-0747578/14 paragraph 41: “For this reason, I can say with confidence that between 1976 and 1979, the Security Service would have liaised with the SDS at a higher level [than Detective Inspector].”

¹⁸⁴ UCPI0000028810

Whether they remember them or not, SDS engagement with the Security Service was increasing steadily¹⁸⁵ from 1972, at the same time as the public order “ultimate defence line” for deployments was decreasing.¹⁸⁶

Roy Creamer described “80 percent, perhaps more” of “C” Squad’s work as being for MI5¹⁸⁷. “*It was the bread and butter work of most C squad officers*”. That figure would be an underestimate on the face of the documents disclosed to the Inquiry; where reports dealing with public order are few and far between.

Creamer’s account that “*The relationship between “C” Squad and the Security Service is best described as ‘master-servant’... the Security Service was the master*”, is borne out by the MI5 briefings which the SDS were “very ready to accept”¹⁸⁸

The primary objective was not public order, as Mr Craft stated.¹⁸⁹ It was to service MI5 requests for infiltrations into the *Troops Out Movement*¹⁹⁰ and for “*high grade political intelligence particularly on the SWP*”.¹⁹¹

The Ultimate Defence Line: the National Front:

In our last opening statement, we addressed the **six** obvious ways in which the Metropolitan Police could have improved policing¹⁹² and eliminated the risk of public disorder between Fascists and those who opposed them¹⁹³. Had those methods been

¹⁸⁵ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 4

¹⁸⁶ MPS-0730099/8: 1975 SDS Annual Report from Chief Inspector Derek Kneale notes, at paragraph 31, that “*there has, over the past years, been a decline in the disorders associated with political demonstrations*”

¹⁸⁷ MPS-0748287/8 paragraph 16

¹⁸⁸ UCPI0000030893.

¹⁸⁹ HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 120

¹⁹⁰ UCPI0000028816: MI5 interest in TOM.

¹⁹¹ at UCPI0000030893/1

¹⁹² <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> see pages 9 – 17 of 42.

¹⁹³ See Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 pages 121-122.

adopted, the disorder at Red Lion Square, Southall and Lewisham **would not have happened**. Without those events, the Metropolitan Police would have lost their “ultimate defence line” for rationalising their infiltration and surveillance of the *Socialist Workers’ Party*.

There is no evidence of any intelligence from the SDS, impacting on the policing of those demonstrations. Recent disclosure to the Inquiry has shown that the one piece of information reliably thought to have come from the SDS¹⁹⁴ in respect of Lewisham, actually came from a press release from the counter-demonstration’s Ad-hoc organising committee.¹⁹⁵ That press release was the basis of the Special Branch threat assessment¹⁹⁶ that the Home Office requested.¹⁹⁷ The only, solely SDS, intelligence that made it into the threat assessment was the possibility that “*smoke bombs... flour... paint and eggs*” might be used.¹⁹⁸

At Southall, the disorder and violence was not only predicted by the police, but in reality pre-planned by them. Undercover officers were warned off attending to avoid the police violence that ultimately killed Blair Peach.¹⁹⁹

The Government did not need the SDS to tell them that there was going to be trouble at Red Lion Square, Southall, or Lewisham. The “law of the land” may well have entitled the National Front to make use of those places²⁰⁰ at the time. But this was a fascist organisation with its roots in the party that supported Hitler’s rise to power, and

¹⁹⁴ About the intention of those opposing the NF march to gather in Clifton Rise.

¹⁹⁵ MPS-0748275.

¹⁹⁶ MPS-0748286/2 paragraph 7.

¹⁹⁷ MPS-0748278

¹⁹⁸ MPS-0748286/2 paragraph 7: that information coming from “*a secret source which requires to be protected*”.

¹⁹⁹ MPS-0748064/4 – 5: HN41 referred to aspects of the police planning at Southall as a “disastrous mistake” and provided evidence of a pre-planned violent clampdown on demonstrators.

²⁰⁰ See the Chairman’s questioning at transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 128.

the genocidal violence that followed²⁰¹. It was staging deliberately intimidating marches in minority communities. The genocidal violence was fresh in the memories of the sons and daughters²⁰² of those who had fought against it. It was even more fresh in the memories of the communities who faced that violence day after day²⁰³ on the streets and in their businesses and homes²⁰⁴. The violence was so extreme that it was apparently the basis for the high-level policy decision that stopped the SDS from infiltrating the *National Front*.²⁰⁵ **Special Branch were too frightened of violent crime to infiltrate the *National Front*.** Yet the people who were suffering that violence were expected to be silent and tolerate the *National Front* marching in their hundreds through their communities. It was obvious that those communities should have been listened to, and the marches should have been banned. Detective Inspector Roy Creamer felt so strongly that the Lewisham march should have been banned, that he refused to do the Special Branch threat assessment.²⁰⁶ Even the *Daily Express* and *Sun* newspapers called for the *National Front* march to be banned²⁰⁷.

Inevitably, the people of those communities, and those that supported them, were not going to let the fascists pass.

Those three demonstrations have become the “ultimate defence line” for the Metropolitan Police when trying to justify their infiltrations of the *Socialist Workers’*

²⁰¹ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 16.

²⁰² UCPI0000034313/3 Statement of “Madeleine” paragraphs 9-11.

²⁰³ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 119.

²⁰⁴ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 123.

²⁰⁵ Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022: Angus McIntosh page 38: “It [the National Front] was a very violent section and it was often involved in crime, so to put an undercover officer into that would be very, very, very difficult”.

²⁰⁶ MPS-0748287/23 paragraph 43: “I was of the view that the demonstration should be banned, but I did not share that view publicly. I thought I had washed my hands of Lewisham because I declined to do the assessment as I thought the demonstrations should be banned”.

²⁰⁷ MPS-0748271/3

Party. It was the focus of the State's Rule 10 questions of Lindsey German, underpinning the theatrical repetition of the word "overthrow".

There is no Metropolitan Police acknowledgment of expulsions²⁰⁸ of squadists, or the policies of disciplined stewarding²⁰⁹ that the undercover officers themselves were sometimes involved in²¹⁰. There is no acknowledgement of the contemporary police recognition that "*The Socialist Workers' Party does not get involved in violence as an organisation*"²¹¹.

Of course, there is no reference to the community, campaigning and political work the Marxist-left did to counteract the fascist threat.²¹² There is certainly no acknowledgement that the threat of the *National Front*, only finally subsided because the *Anti-Nazi League* held firm against them²¹³.

The *National Front* had the destruction of any form of democracy as a primary intention. Their action throughout the Tranche 1 period²¹⁴ was a clear threat to public order. It was also politically violent. They were following the Nazi playbook from the early 1930s by attempting to dominate and control the streets²¹⁵. Fascist activity therefore fell within Special Branch's remit however it was defined; from the 1967 tasking and the Denning definition, to the 1970, 1972 and 1984 adaptations, all of which we deal with below.

²⁰⁸ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 120-121.

²⁰⁹ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 118.

²¹⁰ UCPI0000034739 paragraph 216, UCPI0000014610/5 paragraph 25, and UCPI0000013228.

²¹¹ See UCPI0000035151/4 paragraph 12. 1981.

²¹² Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 123.

²¹³ Witness statement of Peter Hain: UCPI0000034091: paragraph 208.

²¹⁴ 1968 to 1982

²¹⁵ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May page 16 and page 120.

The lack of SDS interest in fascists was doubtless in part due to fear. The institutionalised racism²¹⁶ at the Metropolitan Police inevitably also played a part. The racist language²¹⁷ used in many of the SDS reports firmly indicates a mindset that was shared by the *National Front*. Infiltrations of fascists, that generated the scale of personal data that was obtained on the left²¹⁸, would have caused such vetting problems for the Metropolitan Police, that they would have struggled to fill their own ranks.

But the Cabinet Office disclosure points to a far more significant rationale for the lack of SDS infiltration of fascists. Fascists were anti-trade union²¹⁹. They had no interest in furthering their aims in an industrial context. Following the successful strikes of the miners, dockers and building workers²²⁰ in 1972, the Government's primary focus in relation to intelligence gathering, was on **trade unions and industry**²²¹.

The *Socialist Workers' Party* and militant trade unionists campaigned for better wages, and against national wage restraint, unsafe working conditions, unemployment and poverty. Ultimately those campaigns led into national actions against wage restraint, and restriction of trade union organisations²²². This inevitably impacted on the concerns of big industry and national Government.

²¹⁶ <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmhaff/139/13903.htm>

²¹⁷ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf as at page 26

²¹⁸ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 6 and pages 28-32.

²¹⁹ <https://www.counterfire.org/article/why-fascists-hate-trade-unions/>

²²⁰ UCPI0000034739/9 Lindsey German

²²¹ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 27.

²²² For example the Industrial Relations Act

Subversives:

In our Opening Statement to the last Phase of the Inquiry, we undertook an analysis of the way in which the State shifted the role of the Metropolitan Police, away from policing duties²²³ into political policing duties.²²⁴

We emphasised the starting point in 1967, that Special Branch officers were tasked with “the prevention of **crimes** directed against the state”²²⁵. A clear task, entirely consistent with the established principles of policing.²²⁶

That was followed by the shift in 1970, with new Terms of Reference²²⁷, to “*defending the realm from... actions of persons and organisations which **may** be judged to be **subversive of the security of the State***”²²⁸. This was a job description²²⁹ taken directly from the Security Service Directive of 1952, from the then Home Secretary David Maxwell-Fyfe.

The shift was accompanied by a definition of subversive behaviour that was **intention** specific and designed to be loose and capable of wide interpretation; “**Broadly**

²²³ Peelian Principles: see Category H Opening Statement T1P3 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-cat-h-cp-t1p3/> and <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent>

²²⁴ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> See pages 17 to 26 of 42.

²²⁵ See the 1967 “Responsibilities of Special Branch” UCPI000030040/1 in which “the prevention of **crimes** directed against the State” was an explicit focus.

²²⁶ MPS-0748337: The Preface to the Met Police and General Orders 1979:

1829 quote from Sir Richard Mayne: *The primary object of an efficient Police is the prevention of crime: the next that of **detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed.***

***To these ends all the efforts of Police must be directed.** The protection of life and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime, will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful, and whether the objects for which the police were appointed have been attained.*

²²⁷ UCPI000004459/1-2 “Home Office ‘Terms of Reference’ for Special Branch April 1970”. Sent to Chief Constables nationwide on the 15th of June 1970.

²²⁸ see UCPI0000034262 and UCPI0000035253/4

²²⁹ Rather than a definition of subversion, see for example CTI’s Opening Statement to Tranche 1 Modules 2B and 2C paragraph 34 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/cti-opening-statement-t1-m2b-m2c/> and CTI’s Opening Statement to Tranche 1 Phase 2 paragraph 113 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/counsel-to-the-inquirys-opening-statement-for-tranche-1-phase-2/> Note: Also Sir John Hunt at UCPI0000035311 “*The Directive does not define “subversive”.*”

speaking...any organisation or individual whose **purpose** is the undermining or overthrow of the established democratic order.”²³⁰ Those Terms of Reference were classified “Confidential” and never released to the public.²³¹

The emphasis on **potentially subversive organisations and individuals**²³² could at least, to some extent, be tempered by the careful application of the Denning definition of subversion.²³³ Under that, very public²³⁴, definition, actions were only subversive if they were “**unlawful**”. A Chief Constable, concerned with real policing *could* apply that definition; if action was not unlawful it could not be subversive.

Crucially, the **public** perspective, was that it was MI5 who were tasked with dealing with subversives, in defence of the realm, against those breaking the law.²³⁵

In 1972, MI5 re-defined the concept.²³⁶ “Subversion” became “*activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, **industrial** or violent means*”.

²³⁰ Terms of Reference for Special Branch UCPI0000004459/4 para. 3

²³¹ See for example UCPI0000004455/1 paragraph 2.

²³² Task of Special Branches: UCPI0000004459/2 and UCPI0000004459/3

²³³ ‘[...] [subversives are those who] would contemplate the overthrow of the Government by **unlawful** means.’ as at paragraph 230 <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16195994>

²³⁴ The Profumo judgment was widely published, with much press interest

<https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/relationships/collections1/parliament-and-the-1960s/lord-dennings-report---profumo-scandal/>

²³⁵ The full text of paragraph 230 of the Denning report is worth repeating: “No one can understand the role of the Security Service in the Profumo affair unless he realises the cardinal principle that their operations are to be used for one purpose, and one purpose only, the Defence of the Realm. They are not to be used so as to pry into any man’s private conduct or business affairs; or even into his political opinions, except in so far as they are subversive, that is they would contemplate the overthrow of government by unlawful means. This principle was enunciated by Sir Findlater Stewart in his report of the 27th of November 1945... which has formed the guide for the Service ever since. It was re-stated by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in a Directive of the 24th of September 1952, and re-affirmed by every Home Secretary since. Most people in this country would, I am sure, whole-heartedly support this principle, for it would be intolerable to us to have anything in the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police, to snoop into all that we do, let alone our morals.”

²³⁶ Statement of “Witness Z” UCPI00000034250/4 at paragraph 13.

That definition was given some false legitimacy²³⁷ in 1975 when the Security Service briefed it for adoption by the House of Lords²³⁸, branding it “*the Harris definition*”²³⁹, a misnomer for what was in reality the “*MI5 definition*”. Importantly, that public re-branding included re-assurances that the definition only applied to those who **broke the law**²⁴⁰, because the freedom to “*join together to express and further views*” was “*fundamental to our democratic traditions*”. People could sleep easily, secure in the knowledge that what was happening in the United Kingdom was so very different to what was happening with the STASI in East Germany.

Later, in 1979, Leon Brittan²⁴¹ attempted to calm concerns about a rampant Special Branch²⁴², by stressing a strict application of the MI5 definition.²⁴³ Before they could be called “subversive” a person or group had to have a desire to overthrow that State **and** be an actual threat to the State²⁴⁴. Like Lord Harris, Brittan stressed that Special Branch was “*concerned with offences against the security of the State*”, implicitly

²³⁷ UCPI0000035240 The Lords debate, in which the “MI5 definition” was first given a public airing, was initiated by Lord Chalfont, with assumed assistance from the IRD. Internal Cabinet Office correspondence (from JM Moss, who was also the Secretary of the suggested that the Cabinet Office (Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary 1973 -1979) “tip-off” the Security Service of the forthcoming debate (Sir Michael Hanley, Director General of the Security Service 1972 – 1978).

²³⁸ UCPI0000034350/4 at paragraph 14. “*formally adopted by Lord Harris of Greenwich, Minister of State at the Home Office in a debate in the House of Lords on 26 February 1975.*”

²³⁹ UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 15.

²⁴⁰ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements> reference: post 9:49 pm. Lord Harris: “*It is fundamental to our democratic traditions that people should be free to join together to express and further their views, whatever others may think of those views, provided they do not break the law*”.

²⁴¹ Then a Minister of State at the Home Office, before becoming Home Secretary in June 1983.

²⁴² The occasion was the third annual “Robin Cook debate”.

²⁴³ UCPI000004431/7 7th of November 1979 and later for example: UCPI0000034268 in 1985

²⁴⁴ See for example CTI’s questioning of Barry Moss: Transcript T1P3 13th May 2022 page 97: Q: *Well, let’s take on your watch in 1980. Are you asking yourself -- are you actually addressing your mind to: does the group my officer is infiltrating not only want to overthrow the state but actually is threatening the state now?*

equating subversion with terrorism.²⁴⁵ Thereby reinforcing the fallacy, for the consumption of the public, that in Britain, police only dealt with crime.

This was retrospective window-dressing²⁴⁶ and a cover-up; there had been no strict application, and neither would there be²⁴⁷. The State was fully conscious that the reality did not match the façade.²⁴⁸

It was appropriately Orwellian, that the delayed²⁴⁹ Special Branch Guidelines²⁵⁰ were finally published, by the Thatcher Government, in **1984**. [REDACTED]

²⁴⁵ UCPI000004431/6: "It needs stressing that the role of the Special Branch is less dramatic than its critics make out. It is concerned with offences against the security of the State, with terrorist or subversive organisations..."

²⁴⁶ UCPI0000035107/2: paragraph 3: This strict application was not considered until formulated as an answer to criticism of Special Branch in discussion between Sir Hayden Phillips and Leon Brittan "You will recall that before the debate on SBs on 7 November, Mr Brittan and I discussed how that definition [i.e. the MI5 definition] fitted with the argument that SBs in carrying out their State security functions were acting properly within the police objectives of maintaining the peace and preventing and detecting crime. The answer which Mr Brittan used in the debate was to say that the "definition is such that both limbs must apply before an activity can properly be regarded as subversive". **In other words, there has to be an actual or potential threat to the safety or well-being of the State which in police terms will mean the detection of an illegal act or the prevention of a possible illegal act.**"

²⁴⁷ See for example UCPI0000004584: 19 December 1984 the confidential letter from Roy Harrington to Chief Constables in which the focus is on intention and not actual threat. As at paragraph 7: *The actions of industrial militants only become subversive when their intent is to threaten the safety and well-being of the State and to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy.*

²⁴⁸ UCPI0000004719/1 paragraph 2: "HMCIC had expressed the view on an earlier occasion that the Security Service sought more information from Special Branches than they really needed". 1979

UCPI000004437/4: paragraph 8: "There have in the relatively recent past been indications that some chief constables are not entirely at ease about the work of Special Branches... whether there was Ministerial approval for the work done by Special Branches on behalf of the Security Service; the nature of the work done on behalf of the Security Service and its potential for creating difficulties in ordinary police work and damaging relations between the police and the public". 1980

UCPI0000004437/7 paragraph 21: Home Office awareness in internal documents that there was not "a water-tight basis on which to justify the work of police officers in investigating and recording the activities of subversives". 1980

UCPI0000004715/4 paragraph 11(a): "How can the work of police officers (which all members of Special Branches are) in investigating subversion, as currently defined, be justified given that the definition covers some activities which are not, as such, unlawful?" 1980

²⁴⁹ There had been "no hurry to re-open the question of the existing term of reference" (Sir Robert Armstrong UCPI0000004719/1) and the Security Service blocked attempts to change them (UCPI000004437/5 paragraph 14 and UCPI0000004426)

²⁵⁰ UCPI0000004538

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Those Guidelines were carefully constructed²⁵⁷ to continue the deception by once again implicitly equating subversion with terrorism, at least as far as the public were concerned.²⁵⁸

[REDACTED]

²⁵⁷ See for example at UCPI000004412/3: in respect of the use of the word “extremists” in paragraph 7 of the Guidelines (see footnote below): *“It is difficult to think of an alternative formula that quite gets the flavour we [the Home Office] want – activities going beyond normal political activism but stopping short of actual terrorism-without raising too many awkward questions”.*

²⁵⁸ UCPI000004538: Guidelines: Paragraph 6: *“A Special Branch assists the Security Service in carrying out its tasks of defending the Realm against attempts at espionage and sabotage or from the actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged to be subversive of the State. A large part of this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism, including the activities of international terrorists and terrorist organisations.*

But, the confidential correspondence accompanying the Guidelines made it clear that the “MI5 definition” had never been read to include an actual threat to the State. The Home Office assured every Chief Constable that “*an organisation currently operating within the law may nevertheless be subversive because its long term aims satisfy the definition.*”²⁵⁹

Crucially, the Guidelines were widely drafted with the clear, but **secret**, intention of enabling the police to **continue** to target those who were “**not engaged in subversion**” as long as they “**may become subversive in the future**”.²⁶⁰ In other words, those who were **potentially, potential subversives**.

[REDACTED]

Paragraph 7: A Special Branch provides information about extremists and terrorist groups to the Security Service (or, in the case of Irish Republican extremists and terrorist groups, to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch).

²⁵⁹ UCPI000004584 paragraph 5. Under the definition of subversion given in the Guidelines (paragraph 20) [i.e. the MI5 Definition], **an organisation currently operating within the law may nevertheless be subversive because its long term aims satisfy the definition and therefore be a proper subject of investigation.**

²⁶⁰ UCPI000004542/1: In respect of the free rein to target potential subversion, Roy Harrington wrote to Maurice Buck, Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police and Honorary Secretary of the ACPO Crime Committee: “I doubt however whether it would be wise to draw this out specifically in Guidelines, which it looks increasingly will be made public. I believe that the existing reference in paragraph 6 to ‘defending the Realm...from the actions of persons or organisations... which may be judged to be subversive of the State’ is wide enough to cover those who it is reasonably believed may become subversive in the future, even if it is not engaged in subversion.”

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The truth is that the words “broadly speaking”, “may”, “undermine”, “well-being”, “political”, “industrial”, “operating within the law” and “long-term”, enabled the Metropolitan Police to be as flexible and intrusive, as MI5 and Government wanted them to be.

Back in 1975, and importantly for our Core-Participants, at the very moment that Lord Harris was releasing the MI5 definition²⁶⁵, Rick Clark was engaged in inveigling his way into Richard Chessum’s home, the hierarchy of the *Troops Out Movement*, and “Mary’s” bed.

Government Connivance:

Successive Governments were well aware that there was no “actual threat” to the State.

In January 1969 the “Official Committee on Subversion at Home” was established on the direction of the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson²⁶⁶. It was composed of key Government Departments²⁶⁷ and immediately concluded that *at no time* were the aims

[REDACTED]

²⁶⁵ The 26th of February 1975. <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements>

²⁶⁶ UCPI0000035225

²⁶⁷ Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Employment and Productivity, Home Office, Department of Education and Science and the Security Services. The secretary was D. Heaton from the Cabinet Office.

of “subversives” (as they were then defined) *within measurable distance of attainment*.²⁶⁸

Instead, the focus of the Committee was mainly on industrial issues and trade unions. Their “concern” more often than not, was about “*the size of recent wage settlements*” and “*the increase in their frequency*”²⁶⁹. It is telling that a Committee specifically designed to deal with subversion, spent much of their time worrying about people who were dedicated to improving standards of living.

The Wilson Government nevertheless encouraged the extension of intelligence gathering activity, and the existing “*intimate relations*” between the Security Services and Special Branch.²⁷⁰ That Government was **fully aware that those “intimate relations” included the SDS** and the work that they were doing. The SDS, and its continuation, had been raised in discussion at the Subversion at Home Committee in 1969²⁷¹, in the presence of representatives from the main Government Ministries, many of whom remained in the Group, or its various incarnations, over the following years²⁷². It is not realistic to suggest that that inter-departmental knowledge of the

²⁶⁸ UCPI0000035229 January 1969 Security Service note on 'Subversion in the United Kingdom'.

²⁶⁹ UCPI0000035226: March 1970: Minutes of a meeting of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home (attendees: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GFN Reddaway), Department of Employment and Productivity (AS Kerr), Home Office (JH Waddell), Department of Education and Science (R Toomey), and representatives of Security Services. “*In discussion concern was expressed not only about the size of recent wage settlements but also the increase in their frequency*”. See also UCPI0000035227/3 paragraph (c).

²⁷⁰ UCPI0000035225: January 1969: “*intelligence coverage is essential and needs to be maintained if not extended. This means the maintenance by the Security Service of the existing intimate relations with Police Forces, particularly the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police...*”

²⁷¹ UCPI0000035230: February 1969: Minutes of a meeting of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home discussing Security Service note on 'Subversion in the United Kingdom': “*In general, intelligence coverage of subversive groups would at least be maintained, and the close co-operation of Security Service with both police and West European security services would continue*”.

And re: the SDS itself, at paragraph (b): “*...there was no reason for complacency, and the defensive arrangements made last year [i.e. the 1968 foundation of the SDS] should continue at least until the summer*”. Note: the participants at this meeting were: Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office), JH Peck and J Tyrer (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), AS Kerr (Department of Employment and Productivity), JH Waddell (Home Office), RJ Guppy (Department of Education and Science), CAG Simkins, R Thistlethwaite and an unnamed other (Security Service). The Secretary was D. Heaton.

²⁷² CTI OS 2B and 2C Annex C.

SDS's existence was restricted to the individuals present or was forgotten without question over the following years.

The Government was also aware that the Security Service were reluctant to use "*their resources to investigate the behaviour of individuals who, however politically repugnant and socially objectionable they may be, are **not** seeking to overthrow the established Constitution by extra-political means.*"²⁷³

The solution to that conundrum was to expand the role of Special Branches. One of the last acts of the Wilson Government, just four days before the 1970 General Election, was the introduction of the 1970 Special Branch Terms of Reference²⁷⁴, which made the relationship with MI5 and the SDS ever more "intimate".

In March 1972, a Security Service report sent to the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, concluded that "*troublesome though these groups are, they do not constitute anything in the nature of an organised conspiracy against the State*".²⁷⁵

The following month, a letter from the Cabinet Office to the Prime Minister²⁷⁶, expressed the view that there was no "*genuinely subversive threat to society*", instead there was a "***pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most forms of established authority... not necessarily a conscious and organised threat.***"²⁷⁷

²⁷³ UCPI0000035225/2

²⁷⁴ UCPI0000004459/1 Special Branch Terms of Reference dated 15th of June 1970. Harold Wilson was Prime Minister until 19th of June 1970.

²⁷⁵ UCPI0000035255: March 1972: Letter from Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister enclosing a Security Service report on 'Subversion in the U.K. - 1972'.

²⁷⁶ UCPI0000035253: April 1972: From Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Office.

²⁷⁷ The full pertinent text: "***Are we facing a genuinely subversive threat to society in the sense which the Security Service understand the phrase, namely a deliberate, conscious and organised attempt by a number of identifiable individuals to overthrow Parliamentary democracy in this country? Or have we to try to deal with something much more indefinable and elusive in the form of a pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most forms of established authority in this country but although it may be exploited from time to time by individuals concerned to foment particular instances of industrial unrest, is not necessarily in itself a conscious and organised threat to society? I think that most people, having considered***

That letter concerned a Ministerial meeting, instigated by the Prime Minister himself, for “*consideration to be given to the question of subversive activity in society, particularly in the **industrial** context.*” The nation’s ruling elite attended; the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord President and the Secretary of State for Employment.²⁷⁸ The Cabinet Office raised two areas for consideration. First, as there was no subversive threat to the security of the State; MI5 were limited in the help they could offer.²⁷⁹ So, could MI5 be persuaded to adopt a more “*aggressive*” approach? Secondly, could the Government respond to the “*reluctant*” conclusion that there was no threat, with “*pervasive, oblique and ‘unattributable’*” action, “*sometimes supplemented by more covert forms of activity*”?²⁸⁰

The conundrum was the same as that faced by the Wilson Government two years before. The response this time was to change the definition of subversion.²⁸¹ The “MI5

*the evidence in the memorandum by the Security Service and studied the terms of MI5’s “Charter” **are driven, however reluctantly, to the latter conclusion.***

²⁷⁸ Reginald Maudling, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Lord Carrington, Robert Carr and Maurice MacMillan respectively.

²⁷⁹ Because the Security Service were governed by their “Charter” (which was attached to the letter at UCPI0000035253/4) which limited their engagement to issues concerning “Defence of the Realm” and which were “subversive to the security of the State” (see paragraph 2).

²⁸⁰ The letter continued: *If so [i.e. a conclusion that there was no subversive threat], however, certain consequences follow. In particular:- (a) The “Charter” implies certain limits to the assistance which the Security Service can provide in dealing with the problem with which we are concerned. The Home Secretary will probably seek an opportunity to make these limits clear to his colleagues. Even so, it is for consideration whether, without infringing them, MI5 could perhaps adopt a rather more “aggressive” attitude in this field; it is possible to detect between the lines of their memorandum that they would not be wholly averse from an invitation to do so. (b) The Government’s main response to the threat, however, must be tailored to the nature of the threat itself, i.e. it must take the form of activity which is pervasive, oblique and “unattributable” as the influences which it is seeking to combat... these efforts could sometimes be supplemented by more covert forms of activity; and after discussion with Mr. Donald Maitland I suggest that Ministers should adopt the proposal at the end of the memorandum by the Security Services and should constitute a small interdepartmental team whose purpose would be to keep subversive developments under review, to improve our information about them and to promote a greater flow of information and guidance to the many bodies - in industry, in the world of the Press and TV and society at large – who are concerned to expose and to withstand “subversion” but are uncertain about the means of doing so and would welcome discrete guidance in this respect”.*

²⁸¹ Discussions were held as to the exact scope of the definition before settling on the wide “MI5 definition”. See for example UCPI0000035250: June 30th 1971: Note for the Record of a meeting held by Sir Burke Trend to discuss Security Service papers on subversion in industry and the mass media: Reddaway (FCO), also CF Heron from Dept of Employment, Sir Philip Allen (HO), Sir Denis Barnes (DEP), Lord Rothschild (Cabinet Office), D

definition” combined with the 1970 Terms of Reference ensured that Special Branch, and in particular the SDS, would be doing MI5’s dirty work for them, pervasively, obliquely, covertly and of course, unattributably.

By August 1972, the slightly re-named “Group on Subversion in Public Life” (“SPL”)²⁸² was formed “*to improve the co-ordination of intelligence on [the re-defined concept of] subversion*”. **Its formation was directed by the Prime Minister, Edward Heath.**²⁸³ **It included the same departments of State as its predecessor.**²⁸⁴ **But for the first time, in recognition of the change in role provided by the new definition of subversion, it also included the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.**²⁸⁵ The first Special Branch attendee at SPL meetings was Deputy Assistant Commissioner Gilbert²⁸⁶. He was promptly informed of the new definition, including the brand-new emphasis on the **political and industrial.**²⁸⁷

The SDS were not being tasked with infiltrating organisations to counter a genuine threat to the State. They were being tasked to infiltrate in order to counter “*opinion*”;²⁸⁸ be it **political** opinion or **industrial** opinion.

Maitland (10 Downing St) and the Director General of the Security Service. “*In discussion it was suggested that **subversion** should be defined as the attempt to overthrow constitutional government by non-parliamentary means. There were no signs of highly organised subversion in this sense in the country, but on the other hand there was evidence of political motivation in the seamen’s strike of 1966, for example, and in more recent times there had been reports, which could not be entirely refuted, of groups of militants moving from site to site during industrial troubles.*”

²⁸² UCPI0000035268

²⁸³ UCPI0000035268/1

²⁸⁴ Home Office, Department of Employment, Security Service, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office UCPI0000035268/1.

²⁸⁵ UCPI0000035268/1.

²⁸⁶ UCPI0000035262: October 1972.

²⁸⁷ UCPI0000035263/4 October 1972: paragraph 5 includes the new definition. The distribution list of the document, including to DAC Gilbert is at UCPI0000035263/2.

²⁸⁸ UCPI0000035253: “*pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most forms of established authority*”.

The role of the SPL was "to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence... particularly in industry"²⁸⁹. The Chairman was Sir James Waddell.

In case there is any doubt about the origin of the intelligence that was being collected; the oversight of the SDS Annual Reports and the decision to continue funding them, was signed off in 1969,²⁹⁰ 1971,²⁹¹ 1972²⁹² and 1974,²⁹³ by Sir James Waddell.

Government knowledge of the SDS role in gathering that intelligence is graphically illustrated by an MI5 policy note from December 1972.²⁹⁴ Those who attended the "Waddell Group" meetings, **knew** that Special Branch and MI5 "were under increasing pressure from Whitehall for more and more detailed information about... subversive influence in trades unions". They **knew** that Special Branch and MI5 were being pressured "to increase agent coverage of industrial affairs, particularly in the Metropolitan area".²⁹⁵ "What [was] needed was **long term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions rather than casual informant sources.**" Waddell's continued authorisation of the SDS guaranteed that "long-term penetration".

²⁸⁹ UCPI0000035269: Terms of Reference of the Group "To supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers concerned".

²⁹⁰ MPS-0728973

²⁹¹ MPS-0728971

²⁹² MPS-0728970/7

²⁹³ MPS-0730906

²⁹⁴ UCPI0000031256

²⁹⁵ UCPI0000031256 Security Service note for policy file entitled "Relations with MPSB about Industrial Subversion" signed by JL Jones (Deputy Director General of the Security Service 1976-1981, Director General of the Security Service 1981-1985. Member of the Dean Committee. Member of the Interdepartmental Group on Subversion in Public Life). "On 6 December 1972 I discussed with Colin Woods (AC Crime) and Vic Gilbert the possibility of our obtaining increased assistance from MPSB in our coverage of subversion in industry. F4 [redacted] was present. **I explained to Woods that we were under increasing pressure from Whitehall (as Vic Gilbert knew from his membership of the Waddell Group) for more and more detail information about subversive activities in industrial disputes and the degree of subversive influence in trades unions. We needed to increase our agent coverage of industrial affairs, particularly in the Metropolitan Area. I said that although our industrial desk had a useful liaison with MPSB C Squad about industrial activity it was mainly productive of overt information about demonstrations and public meetings. What was needed was long term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions rather than casual informant sources. We had some success with Provincial forces in this field.**"

As an aside, that policy note made it clear that it was not only the SDS who used long term undercover officers. “*Provincial forces*” also had “*some success in [that] field*”. Regional Police forces not only knew of the existence of the SDS²⁹⁶ but were using the same method, from at least 1972. That is of particular importance for the infiltrations of the constituency office of the former Member of Parliament, Dave Nellist²⁹⁷, by the West Midlands Police.

The Prime Minister, Edward Heath, attached “*particular importance to Ministers receiving comprehensive reviews... at regular intervals*”²⁹⁸. The existence and the work of the SPL was to be regarded as “*entirely secret*”.²⁹⁹ It is little wonder, that the SDS repeatedly re-assured the Home Office of their awareness of the “political sensitivity”³⁰⁰ of their existence, as well as their “computer age” compliant security.

The close association between the SPL and the SDS continued after Edward Heath’s Government.³⁰¹ In 1975 Sir James Waddell was succeeded as Chair by Robert Armstrong,³⁰² who signed off the SDS Annual Reports in 1976 and 1977.³⁰³ Special Branch retained membership of the SPL Group.³⁰⁴ The “*peculiar sensitivity of the subject*” and Prime Minister Wilson’s “*close interest*”³⁰⁵ in it, ensured that it remained classified as “Top Secret”.³⁰⁶

²⁹⁶ UCPI0000027451/1

²⁹⁷ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-the-core-participants-represented-by-paul-heron/> pages 19 -20.

²⁹⁸ UCPI0000035269

²⁹⁹ UCPI0000035269

³⁰⁰ MPS-0728980/5 paragraph 14.

³⁰¹ Despite a lull post the 1974 General election when the Group’s activity (along with that of the Industrial Assessments Group) were suspended until the “wishes of the new Prime Minister” were known UCPI0000035259

³⁰² UCPI0000035249 23rd of December 1975

³⁰³ MPS-0730742, MPS-0730718

³⁰⁴ UCPI0000035248: January 1976: Now DAC “Jock” Wilson.

³⁰⁵ UCPI0000035248/2

³⁰⁶ UCPI0000035248/3

We have not been provided with the SPL documents that cover Wilson's Government nor that of James Callaghan, who had been the Home Secretary who both co-created the SDS³⁰⁷ in 1969 and oversaw the introduction of the 1970 Terms of Reference. The Inquiry has seen them; and the limited gist evidence that we have had disclosed³⁰⁸ confirms that DAC Gilbert consistently attended the SPL meetings from March 1974 to June 1977, often with James Waddell chairing. Special Branch senior officers, with responsibility for the SDS,³⁰⁹ were recipients of the SPL reports and minutes.

The Inquiry is not in possession of any documentation from the Group between 1979 and 1982, although it clearly remained operational.³¹⁰ However, in December 1979, the Security Service rebuffed any discussion about amendments to the Special Branch Terms of Reference, by arguing that the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, had no doubts about the work carried out by Special Branches, including the work for MI5.³¹¹ Whitelaw, was de facto Deputy Prime Minister³¹² to Margaret Thatcher.³¹³

Whitelaw's successor Leon Brittan had a very strong interest in the 1984 Special Branch Guidelines.³¹⁴ His role in both their drafting³¹⁵, and the tactical considerations

³⁰⁷ MPS-0747104 paragraph 61

³⁰⁸ UCPI0000035307.

³⁰⁹ Victor Gilbert (DAC), Matt Rodger (Commander), R Wilson, Robert Bryan (DAC), Rollo Watts (Commander), Alan Dickinson, HN294 (seniority unclear in 1978 when he was a named recipient, was SDS DS in 1969, DI in 1970 and DCI in 1974) and an officer named as "Low".

³¹⁰ CTI's Opening Statement to Tranche 1 Modules 2B and 2C: Annex A paragraph 6: Sir Hayden Phillips was the Group's Secretary in those years, but does not recall any detail. <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/cti-opening-statement-t1-m2b-m2c/>

³¹¹ UCPI000004426: *"My understanding was that he [Sir Robert Armstrong] was anticipating a need to face possible questioning from a new Home Secretary who might have doubts about the work carried out by Special Branches including that for the Security Services. There are, as far as we are aware, no such doubts in the mind of the present Home Secretary. Therefore, we see no need now to revise the terms of reference and no virtue in re-opening the matter with ACPO."*

³¹² And Home Secretary from 4th May 1979 to 11th June 1983.

³¹³ There has been limited disclosure, in this Tranche, about the extent of Margaret Thatcher's interest in the subject matter, beyond a note from her Principle Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong, in February 1982, noting that she *"was very interested to read the report by the Security Service on exploitation by subversive groups of last year's civil disturbances"*. UCPI35276/2.

³¹⁴ UCPI0000004539/1

³¹⁵ UCPI0000004412/2 to 3 paragraph 6.

surrounding their disclosure to the Home Affairs Select Committee,³¹⁶ suggests that the appetite for intelligence on potential subversives had certainly not declined.

[REDACTED]

The Security Service had repeatedly vetoed³²¹ any attempts to amend the 1970 Special Branch Terms of Reference and the Home Office had delayed consideration because there had been “no public pressure” in respect of Special Branch in the early 1980s.³²² That changed in early 1984 when a Working Party of the Police Panel of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities started asking awkward questions about

³¹⁶ UCPI000004412/2 paragraph 3.

[REDACTED]

³²¹ UCPI0000035095/2 paragraph 7 “*The Security Service have objected to this [amending the 1970 Terms of Reference] in the past, and would probably object vigorously now on the grounds that it will increase public interest at a time when the subject is relatively quiet and has been for some time*” (31st March 1983).

³²² UCPI0000035094/1 paragraph 2.

Special Branch conduct.³²³ Chief Constables became “increasingly nervous”.³²⁴ The pressure was on and work on the guidelines commenced. [REDACTED]

The key difference between the 1970 Terms and the 1984 replacement was the section on the Special Branch relationship with MI5.

The 1970 Terms read:³²⁹ *In consultation with the Security Service to collect, process and record information about subversive or **potentially subversive**³³⁰ organisations*

³²³ UCPI000004455

³²⁴ UCPI000004455 paragraph 3: “Our impression is that the AMA have their teeth firmly into the subject of Special Branches and that they will not let go easily. There are some signs that chief constables are increasingly nervous and waiting anxiously to receive advice and help from the Home Office”.

³²⁹ UCPI000004459/2 (d)

³³⁰ Whether potentially “Subversive” as defined in the Terms “Broadly speaking these are any organisation or individual whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow of the established democratic order” or as later defined by the “MI5 definition”.

or individuals. In practice, as we have heard from almost every officer, that meant “hoovering up” every possible piece of information about anyone who so much as bought a copy of the *Socialist Worker* newspaper.³³¹

The 1984 Terms read:³³² *A Special Branch provides information about extremists and terrorist groups to the Security Service.*

The latter draws attention away from the wholesale collecting and recording of personal information and distracts with the word “provides”; as if to suggest that intelligence was just a by-product of other work (a line that SDS witnesses have been trying, unpersuasively, to hold firm on). Most importantly, it hides the words “potentially subversive” and instead suggests that only **extremists**, who are equated with **terrorists**, have their information passed on.

It is extraordinarily dishonest subterfuge, to try to hide fourteen years of *sinister persecution of harmless citizens for political reasons*, and *nefarious activity* conducted for their masters at MI5.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

³³¹ See for example UCPI0000015483 and UCPI0000015487.

³³² UCPI0000004538/2 at paragraph 7

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The reality was very different. At the time Special Branch Records division held files on **over a million individuals.**³⁴⁰

³³⁴ UCPI0000004672/1

[REDACTED]

³⁴⁰ MPS-0748348: Correspondence between the Security Service and Special Branch, explaining the Special Branch Records section. *“it is essential that the records are kept in such a way that a “no trace” reply to an enquiry can be confidently given if such is the case...As a rough guide to the scope of the records there are about 300,000 files in existence and the Nominal index contains over 900,000 slips”.* *“There are no over 2300 binders each of which holds between 350 and 400 slips. The basic idea of the system is that each individual will only have one slip in the index.”* That correspondence was from 1966, before the SDS was even set up. Our 1984 estimate of one million is conservative in the circumstances.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 346

When the Guidelines were sent to constables they were accompanied by a confidential covering letter Paragraph 5 of that letter had been specifically included by the Security Service³⁴⁷ and included widening of the subversion definition to include “long term

[REDACTED]

³⁴⁷ UCPI0000004651

aims” applicable to those “*who may become subversive in the future*”³⁴⁸. Paragraph 7 dropped any mention of threat at all, for Special Branch officers deciding whether militant trade unionism constituted subversion.

The Home Office, Security Services and Police connived to ensure that those engaged in “law-abiding, non-violent” activities could continue to be infiltrated.

We ask the Inquiry to be conscious of this all-pervading duplicity³⁴⁹ when engaging with Government about their authorisation and knowledge of the SDS.

“Counter-subversion” and anti-democratic “assistance”:

The acknowledged lack of any subversive threat, coupled with the expansion of Special Branch intelligence gathering capability, raises an obvious question, to what use was the SDS intelligence put?

It has been a key feature of the SDS evidence, that first, they gathered everything they could and secondly that they never received complaints about the intelligence they were gathering. They generated vast amounts for the benefit of their “customers”, many of whom have been the subject of redactions.

What is clear from the Cabinet Office disclosure is that the various inter-departmental groups in government were “customers”; be they direct as a result of Special Branch membership of those groups from 1972 or circulated via the Security Service as a

³⁴⁸ See UCPI000004542/1 above. Note: the Chief Constable in question, Maurice Buck, was one of those who gave evidence to the HASC.

³⁴⁹ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 24 of 42.

product of their “intimate” relationship”. The purpose of these groups was not simply to gather intelligence but to use it for what they called “counter-subversion”³⁵⁰.

Bearing in mind, the lack of any threat, the organisations targeted and the methods adopted, “counter-subversive” activity would be more appropriately termed “anti-democratic” activity.

That activity took a number of different forms³⁵¹, many of which are mirrored in the deployments of undercover officers.

Disruption:

It was widely recognised in Government, that internal quarrels and dissent were a “great disabling factor” for political groups³⁵². In August 1968, the Official Committee on Communism (Home) Working Group on Counter Measures held a meeting³⁵³ in respect of the upcoming October demonstration. The first two “main points” of discussion were a recognition of “*dissension within the organising committee*” and then **a stated aim to exploit that dissent**; “*The object should be to allow it to be a demonstrable failure, by encouraging the process of disruption among the organisers and thus minimising its chances of success*”.³⁵⁴ Bearing in mind the primacy of that

³⁵⁰ See for example UCPI0000035225: January 1969: Composition and Terms of Reference for the Official Committee on Subversion at Home: “*to focus intelligence about communist and other subversive activities in the UK, to advise Ministers on appropriate measures... to counter these activities and to co-ordinate such counter-measures*”.

³⁵¹ UCPI0000035277/4: “*The proposed group might aim to encourage and support: (a) the dissemination of information, as an extension of the existing work done by the FCO (IRD) under the auspices of the SH (b) the enlivening of the home information machine, especially in relation to the press, the BBC and the ITA. (c) **positive counter-action against key subversive groups and individuals on the basis of informed appraisal of the problems involved***”. IRD noted as “*enjoying close liaison with SyS and with its existing outlets*”.

³⁵² See for example UCPI0000035252: November 1970 Report on the Extreme Left in Britain: Recognition that internal quarrels (among Trotskyists) are as great a disabling factor.

³⁵³ UCPI0000035233/2 paragraph (a)

³⁵⁴ UCPI0000035233/2 paragraph (b)

aim in the discussion, there must have been additional consideration on the methods that could be used to achieve it. What is the best way of encouraging disruption in a group and minimising its chances of success? The participants in that meeting, like those that followed, included representatives of the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, Departments of Education and Employment and of course the Security Service³⁵⁵; all united in their aim of encouraging disruption.

The SDS had been founded in the preceding month.³⁵⁶ The chances of undercover officers having a disruptive impact on the organisers, i.e. those at the higher levels of the organisations involved, were limited by the short time available before the demonstration. However, the **potential** must have been noted.

The key Ministerial representatives at that 1968 meeting were also present at the meeting of the Subversion at Home Committee the following year, in which the continuation of the SDS was discussed.³⁵⁷ Sir Burke Trend, Richard Thistlethwaite from MI5, John Tyrer from the Foreign Office, David Heaton as Secretary and of course, the Home Office representative Sir James Waddell.³⁵⁸ The growing **potential** that came with longer deployments and deeper infiltrations cannot fail to have been noticed by individuals who had been specifically tasked to “counter-subversion”.

There may not be evidence of disruption being caused by undercover officers in 1968. But there is the clearest possible evidence of disruption being caused in 1975 and 1976, by Rick Clark’s deployment into the *Troops Out Movement*.³⁵⁹ The paper trail from that deployment leads to the inescapable conclusion that the disruption was

³⁵⁵ UCPI0000035233/1

³⁵⁶ July 1968 DOC061/4

³⁵⁷ See above and UCPI0000035230/3 paragraph (b)

³⁵⁸ UCPI0000035230/1

³⁵⁹ See above.

known of, and approved by, Special Branch management and the Security Service.³⁶⁰ At the time of Clark's deployment, Commanders Rollo Watts and Matt Rodger were on the recipient lists of the SPL reports and minutes, and DAC Gilbert was a frequent attendee at the meetings³⁶¹.

The focus of the Inquiry so far, has been on SDS intelligence gathering. However, since at least 1972, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was directly involved via the SPL with those involved in using intelligence for "counter-subversion". Further, and very importantly, at some point between 1970 and 1984 the general remit of Special Branch in respect of subversion, changed. In 1970, Special Branch was tasked with gathering intelligence for the Security Service;³⁶² by 1984 the tasking was widened to include not only intelligence gathering, but also **assistance**.³⁶³

The Clark deployment stands out as a demonstrative example of **assistance** in "counter-subversion"³⁶⁴, by **disruption and de-stabilisation**. There is nothing comparable in any of the other undercover deployments in Tranche 1. It may be that

³⁶⁰ See above and UCPI0000030059.

³⁶¹ UCPI0000035307

³⁶² UCPI000004459 1970 Terms of Reference paragraph (d) "*In consultation with the Security Service to **collect, process and record information** about subversive or potentially subversive organisations and individuals*".

³⁶³ UCPI000004538/1: Paragraph 5: *A Special Branch gathers information about threats to public order...* Paragraph 6: ***A Special Branch assists the Security Service in carrying out its tasks** of defending the Realm against... from the actions of persons and organisations... which may be judged to be subversive of the State*". It is noteworthy that in an earlier draft of the "Guidelines" (see UCPI0000035286/2 July 1983) recognised the expansion of the role beyond intelligence gathering "... *providing the Security Service with information **and support** for its task of defending the nation...*".

³⁶⁴ The Security Service's role was governed by the wording of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive (UCPI0000034262). Tasking in "defence of the Realm" was not limited to intelligence gathering. "*The interpretation and application of the wording in the MFD was a matter for the Director General [of the Security Service]*" (Witness Z UCPI0000034350/3 paragraph 11). There is some evidence that from December 1977 (UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 16) to July 1979 (UCPI0000035311/1) the "counter-subversive role of the Security Service" was focused on providing intelligence, but the wider presence of the Security Service on Committees such as the Dean Committee, Official Committee on Subversion at Home and Official Committee on Communism (Home) suggests indicates an active role in counter-subversion activity. Their covert assistance in "counter-subversion" was considered "vital" (UCPI0000035277/5 paragraph 6). See also: UCPI0000035255: March 1972: To the Prime Minister: "*a certain amount of useful counter-subversion work is already done – unattributably – by IRD in conjunction with the Security Service.*"

as an over-confident deployment, that nearly ended in disaster for everyone from the SDS up to Government, a decision was taken to tone down that kind of activity. It may simply be that the example stood out because the *Troops Out Movement*, as an umbrella organisation, was an easier target for disruption than others. The larger, democratic centralist, *Socialist Workers' Party*, for example, would have been a much harder target.

The Clark deployment is not the only example of assistance.³⁶⁵

Another, much more proximate to the 1984 Guideline drafting, is a Security Service liaison note detailing a meeting between MI5 and Chief Inspector Short of the SDS in 1983. MI5 passed on a brief to the SDS on instructions in respect of the *Socialist Workers' Party*. Short, informed MI5 that "Phil Cooper" (HN155), who had infiltrated the *Socialist Workers' Party* Headquarters, "*is brewing a row at HQ*"³⁶⁶.

That line, though short, is important. First, it is directly indicative of **assistance**, rather than intelligence gathering. Secondly, it is an example of **disruptive assistance** aimed at the SWP. Thirdly, it was relevant enough to the SDS/MI5 relationship for a Chief Inspector to refer to it, and MI5 to note and record it. Fourthly, the fact that the "row" was "brewing", demonstrates that it was an ongoing action; the reference to it, and noting of it, are plainly indicative of approval. Fifthly, for a Chief Inspector to know of the disruptive assistance, it must have been reported to him. The lack of additional

³⁶⁵ See also, another Craft deployment, in respect of the potential use of disruption as a tactic. There is evidence that an SDS officer 'Roger Harris' (HN200) infiltrated the Twickenham branch of the *International Socialists* in 1975 and became Contacts Organiser there (UCPI000007328). The Twickenham branch was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the *Workers' League*. The "opposition", "dissident" members, most of whom were based at Twickenham, called a Special Conference of IS to raise "inadequacies" within the organisation. The request was refused and the Twickenham branch was suspended which prompted them to vote to break away. (UCPI000009608). HN200 as Contacts organiser at a branch with an average of 15 members was one of those who voted on the break-away. He does not remember how he voted but after the vote he became a member of *Workers' League*. (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 169-170 and see Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 98).

³⁶⁶ UCPI0000028728

supporting evidence does not mean it did not happen. It shows that the reports have not been disclosed, by the Metropolitan Police or MI5. The best way to ensure that the Inquiry concludes there is “no evidence” of an activity or tactic, is to provide no evidence of it.

Membership, Propaganda and Electoral interference:

It is no coincidence that Special Branch membership of the Committee on Subversion in Public Life immediately followed the introduction of the “MI5 definition” and its focus on “political” and “industrial” activity.

The very first report³⁶⁷ that Special Branch received from the SPL, was titled “The impact of Subversive Groups on **Trade Union Activity**”.³⁶⁸ It was sent to Deputy Assistant Commissioner Gilbert³⁶⁹, as well as a number of other recipients who were specifically tasked with “counter-subversion” via their Committee memberships.³⁷⁰ A significant focus, from the perspective of Special Branch and the SDS, was on the *Socialist Workers Party*.³⁷¹ In particular their “*main objective... to attract **new recruits** by the virulence of their propaganda*”³⁷². This was followed by some detail on the circulation and “influence” of the *Socialist Worker* newspaper, which “*contributed to*

³⁶⁷ October 1972

³⁶⁸ UCPI0000035263

³⁶⁹ And anyone else at Special Branch who “needed to know”: UCPI0000035263/1

³⁷⁰ including Reddaway (Co-founder of the Information Research Department (IRD), Official Committee on Subversion at Home, Dean Committee, Home Regional Committee) and Barker (IRD), Waddell (Home Office, Dean Committee, Official Committee on Communism (Home) Working Group on Countermeasures, Chairman, Official Committee on Subversion at Home, Official Committee on Communism (Home)) and Security Service representatives including Hanley and Jones (also Dean Committee). Full distribution list at UCPI0000035263/2. 1972.

³⁷¹ International Socialists, at the time.

³⁷² UCPI0000035263/8

*the propagation of militant*³⁷³ *attitudes in industry generally*".³⁷⁴ The emphasis was on: first, the ability of the *Socialist Workers Party* to increase its membership and secondly, the quality and effectiveness of its media.

The membership figures of the *Socialist Workers Party* were a constant fixation of Government³⁷⁵. Equally, the media more generally was a fascination for the various "counter-subversion" groups. The Cabinet Office documents detail a number of examples of Government manipulation of the mainstream media to further its ends.³⁷⁶

It is not a surprise that Government was so fixated. The *Socialist Workers' Party* were not advocating a "putsch", they were advocating a process, of heightening awareness and winning people over "to try to achieve a more democratic society".³⁷⁷ A significant part of that campaigning work in and around 1972, was in industry and was proving very effective.³⁷⁸

A study of "*the range of possible counter-subversion measures*"³⁷⁹ must have included consideration of methods to limit Party membership and newspaper circulation. It is no co-incidence that post 1972, a large number of the many³⁸⁰ SDS officers who

³⁷³ Note: "militant" not "subversive".

³⁷⁴ "through the SW Litho Press it has produced a number of effective broadsheets and propaganda pamphlets covering industrial situations". "The influence of their press has contributed to the propagation of militant attitudes in industry generally... the "Socialist Worker" with a circulation of 25,000 give(s) considerable coverage to industrial affairs".

³⁷⁵ Assessments of membership figures were a principle feature of Committee reports throughout the Tranche 1 period and continued into the Tranche 2 period (see for example December 1984 National Archives CAB 301-485 page 62). They were also a primary feature of SDS reporting, see for example UCPI000009608 and UCPI0000013228.

³⁷⁶ See for example: UCPI0000035227/3 paragraph (b), UCPI0000035279/4, UCPI0000035279/8. See also: the role of the IRD and IRIS Ltd in the ITV production "Red under the Bed" which was broadcast during the trial of the "Shrewsbury 24". As at <https://www.pilc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/20201002-RT-AM-Grounds-of-Appeal-Against-conviction-page-ref-1.pdf> from page 35.

³⁷⁷ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 125.

³⁷⁸ UCPI0000034739/22 Lindsey German paragraphs 47 to 53.

³⁷⁹ UCPI0000035277

³⁸⁰ 24 that we are aware of. See <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 6.

infiltrated the *Socialist Workers' Party*, took positions as either Membership Secretaries or Newspaper organisers.³⁸¹ The officer tendencies to downplay these roles as menial,³⁸² are in conflict with the Government's preoccupation. They were key roles.

The role of a Membership Secretary in any organisation is not to simply record membership, but to engage with and encourage that membership. The role of the 'Paper Organiser' in the *Socialist Workers' Party* was to promote the sales of the newspaper which was the foundation on which the Party was built³⁸³. It was a "very, very central role."³⁸⁴.

The SDS taking positions of responsibility within organisations, fitted the Government requirement for pervasive, oblique and unattributable action.³⁸⁵ It is self-evident that it would be de-stabilising and anti-democratic, whether it led to orchestrated disruption³⁸⁶ or simply put an un-committed individual in a role that would have been

³⁸¹ That we know of:

'Roger Harris' (HN200) Contacts Organiser for the Twickenham branch of the *International Socialists* (UCPI000007328), a branch which was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the *Workers' League* (UCPI000009608).

Vincent Harvey, known as 'Vince Miller' (HN354) District Treasurer and on the social committee of the Outer East London District branch

'Geoff Wallace' (HN296) the "Flame" organiser for the Socialist Workers Party (Hammersmith and Kensington branch) (UCPI0000017698) and a Socialist Workers Party Organiser (UCPI0000016921).

'Jeff Slater' (HN351) Socialist Worker Newspaper Organiser for the North London District of the International Socialists (UCPI0000012014)

'Bill Biggs' (HN356) Branch Treasurer and *Socialist Worker* Organiser of South West London SWP (UCPI0000011996), chaired meetings (UCPI0000013021), a delegate to an aggregate meeting of the South East District where he voted on a proposal to condemn a Central Committee decision (UCPI0000013229), spoke as a Guest speaker at another branch's meeting (UCPI0000013688) and Branch Treasurer of the Brixton branch (UCPI0000015441)

'Paul Gray' (HN126) *Socialist Worker* Organiser for Cricklewood branch and then the North West District (UCPI0000011354). On the District Committee which had control over all of the branches the District covered (UCPI0000013123). Re-elected in 1979 and 1980 (UCPI0000013536 and UCPI0000013949). In his role as an SWP District Committee member, he was on the Organising Committee of the West Hampstead ANL (UCPI0000011497) and the North-West London ANL Co-ordinating Committee (UCPI0000013135)

³⁸² See for example: MPS-0740761: HN126 statement paragraph 167

³⁸³ Statement of Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/12

³⁸⁴ Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 99

³⁸⁵ UCPI0000035253

³⁸⁶ As in the case of Rick Clark, "Phil Cooper" and potentially HN200.

more productively taken by someone else³⁸⁷. The latter was consistent with the Government view that “low-level” “counter-action” was “*often effective*”.³⁸⁸

Trade Unions:

The main concern in Special Branch’s first SPL briefing was the extent to which “*the influence and standing of many right-wing [trade union] leaders had been reduced*”. It bemoaned a “*general swing in major unions away from moderate or right-wing policies*”³⁸⁹ and the “*difficulties*” that “*national officials*” were having in controlling shop stewards and the wider trade union membership.³⁹⁰ The Government problem was with trade union militancy, and the challenges it raised to their social policy and State legislation³⁹¹. Government’s clear aim was to put an end to it.³⁹²

Secret “counter-subversion” documents boasted about the success that Government had had in 1971, including in influencing “certain key trade union elections”.³⁹³ But the successful strike action of 1972³⁹⁴ had shown that electoral interference in the trade unions was not enough. The rank and file and unofficial, factory based, leadership were immune to it. The Government had difficulty putting agents directly onto the shop

³⁸⁷ See for example HN126 “Paul Gray” who did such a poor job as District Newspaper Organiser that the National Organiser had to rebuke him publicly for it UCPI0000013435.

³⁸⁸ UCPI0000035277/2

³⁸⁹ UCPI0000035263/4 paragraph 4.

³⁹⁰ UCPI0000035263/5 paragraph 8.

³⁹¹ UCPI0000035263/4 i.e. “*the legislative proposals contained in ‘In Place of Strife’ and the subsequent passage of the Industrial Relations Act*”

³⁹² Hence the focus on industry in every one of the “counter-subversion” groups see for example UCPI0000035268.

³⁹³ UCPI0000035277/2: Memorandum to Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office) from G. Reddaway (FCO/IRD). “[the counter-subversion groups] *have a record of some success, especially in the publicity field and, via, IRIS Ltd, in certain key trade union elections. This is useful support activity which should be both continued and encouraged.*”

³⁹⁴ UCPI0000035263/1: “*a year of exceptional militancy*”

floor. Certain Parliamentarians and trade unionists were very alive to the threat.³⁹⁵ Strike action, sit-ins and unwillingness to negotiate were not unlawful.

But the extension of Special Branch powers via the “industrial” addition to the subversion definition allowed for widespread indirect infiltration and monitoring of the trade union rank and file. Any organisation that MI5 said was “potentially subversive”³⁹⁶ could be infiltrated; and so any campaign designed to challenge Government policy³⁹⁷ could be dealt with as if it were designed to overthrow the State. Militant trade unionism was the target behind the pretence of dealing with subversion³⁹⁸.

The specific exclusion of any “subversive” threat in relation to infiltrations of militant trade unionism in the 1984 Guidelines,³⁹⁹ cannot have been an accident of drafting. It was a simply a continuation of what had been happening since 1972.

The *Socialist Workers’ Party* Campaigns such as the *Rank and File Organising Committee* and the *Right to Work Campaign* were, in the words of the SDS themselves, “*to fight for the rights of Trades Unions, individuals and groups of workers, against the oppression of management and Government, in particular at this time of high unemployment and anti-union legislation*”⁴⁰⁰. The aim, again in the SDS’s own words, was for “*pressure [to] be brought to bear against management and...*

³⁹⁵ See UCPI0000034699 Home Office correspondence about the concern raised by Labour MPs in 1974; which internally expressed certainty of no direct trade union infiltration by the Security Services; “*and although we have not gone around checking with every chief officer, it would be very surprising if there was any infiltration for ordinary police reasons*”. NOTE: the surprise would be limited to infiltrations for “ordinary” police reasons, not those directed at post 1972 “potential subversion”.

³⁹⁶ Roy Creamer MPS-0748287/7 paragraph 15 “*we were guided entirely by what MI5 felt to be subversive*”.

³⁹⁷ Such as the National Wage restraint policy or the Industrial Relations Act.

³⁹⁸ UCPI0000035277: May 1971: Cover letter to Sir Burke Trend enclosing a memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 'Counter-Subversion' “*National industrial stoppages in which subversive forces have played a part, have underlined the need to fill a gap in our existing defences*”.

³⁹⁹ UCPI0000004584/2 paragraph 7

⁴⁰⁰ UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 7

*government, when fighting short time working, redundancies and unemployment, or demanding improved pay and/or conditions*⁴⁰¹.

That was exactly what Government was worried about and their various groups were designed to deal with. That was why the *Socialist Workers' Party* was infiltrated at the Headquarters level on the direct orders of MI5,⁴⁰² and why the *Right to Work Campaign* was specifically targeted.

'Colin Clark' and 'Phil Cooper' harvested intelligence on the organisational structure of the *Socialist Workers Party*, its administration, finances and membership. They used their attendance at almost every National Delegate Conference and Annual Skegness Rally from 1977 to 1983 to gather and capture personal details of hundreds of attendees. They used their access to the Party Headquarters and computer system to steal the organisation's data, and the data of its members, even going so far as controlling finances.⁴⁰³ As ordered by MI5.

Blacklisting:

The focus of all the reporting⁴⁰⁴ was employment,⁴⁰⁵ education⁴⁰⁶ and trade union⁴⁰⁷ related.

⁴⁰¹ UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 7

⁴⁰² UCPI 0000030069/1 MI5 expressed an interest in March 1973, as to whether the SDS were planning on deploying officers into SWP Headquarters. The *"ideal would be a permanent well-placed employee in... headquarters, not necessarily too high up in the organisation"*. November 1973. UCPI0000030049 paragraph 2. UCPI0000028840 and UCPI0000027519: MI5 was kept updated in respect of 'Clark's' eventual withdrawal and 'Cooper's' succession of him.

⁴⁰³ UCPI0000018091 "for all practical purposes Philip Cooper... signs the cheques and controls the [RTWC] account".

⁴⁰⁴ Not only Cooper and Colin Clark, it was a feature of every SWP deployment.

⁴⁰⁵ See for example For example: UCPI0000017518, UCPI0000017540, UCPI0000017575 UCPI0000011166, UCPI0000011149 UCPI0000011181, UCPI0000011523, UCPI0000011621, UCPI0000011602, UCPI0000011838, UCPI0000011891, UCPI0000012000.

⁴⁰⁶ UCPI0000013228 pages 132 to 133. 64 universities and colleges with details of the number of members in each.

⁴⁰⁷ UCPI0000013228 pages 114 to 115. 42 unions listed.

When Government wrings its hands about trade union militancy and orders “*positive counter-action against key subversive groups and individuals*”⁴⁰⁸; What possible explanation is there for the repeated, targeted and obsessive harvesting of that specific information?

The ultimate anti-democratic counter measure is blacklisting. We dealt with the evidence on this topic extensively in our last opening statement.⁴⁰⁹

Lindsey German was questioned by Counsel to the Inquiry on the apparent inconsistency between the *Socialist Workers' Party* being an open organisation⁴¹⁰ and the need for security measures⁴¹¹ at the 1978 National Delegates Conference. It was a State led line of questioning, designed to suggest that there was something sinister about the Party taking security measures. It was somewhat ridiculous bearing in mind that the State had comprehensively infiltrated the Conference and was fully aware that there was nothing remotely sinister going on.

The principle reason for the security was fear of the threat of blacklisting.⁴¹² By the late 1970s it was common knowledge that people were being sacked and could not find work because of their political opinions.⁴¹³ Blacklisting was a counter-measure.

⁴⁰⁸ UCPI0000035277/4

⁴⁰⁹ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> pages 32 to 40.

⁴¹⁰ UCPI0000034738/42 paragraph 103.

⁴¹¹ Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 33: *But there comes a point, doesn't there, where not everything is done out in the open, and we drew your attention when you were asked to produce a witness statement to the 1978 National Delegate Conference, where a number of security measures were taken, weren't they, to ensure the confidentiality in particular of various documents about party affairs; is that right?*

⁴¹² Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 34

⁴¹³ Lindsey German: *we were very worried about that, and we were worried about people's names being -- you know, their proper names being given, or exactly where they worked being given, because we knew people were being sacked, we knew people were not getting jobs even though they seemed very well qualified for these jobs.*

Not only did it take politically active people out of the workplace⁴¹⁴, it made people afraid to be politically active or militant, there or indeed anywhere else.

We recognise the step in the right direction that Counsel to the Inquiry has taken on this topic⁴¹⁵ but the conclusions do not go far enough on a considered analysis of the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it.

1: There is no doubt that SDS intelligence reports were used for “vetting” purposes. The evidence from the managing officers was clear on the vetting value to MI5 of the SDS reporting.⁴¹⁶

Vetting did not only apply to work in Government departments. It also applied to public corporations and “List-X firms”; private corporations engaged on Government security contracts.⁴¹⁷ The list of those private corporations was extensive;⁴¹⁸ and they covered all sectors of the economy.

2: There is no doubt that SDS reports were used for blacklisting.

⁴¹⁴ See for example Brian Higgins <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/25/brian-higgins-obituary>

⁴¹⁵ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/cti-opening-statement-t1-m2b-m2c/> paragraph 91: *SDS intelligence reports on individuals, once filed in Special Branch records, may have been consulted for vetting purposes. It cannot be ruled out that some were leaked to organisations which used them for blacklisting purposes. The concerns that Richard Chessum and Roy Battersby have raised are plausible. Any such leaks were contrary to established rules. However, it is striking that the rules conflicted with the desire within Government to counter subversive individuals and groups.*

⁴¹⁶ See as one example: DCI Craft: MPS-0747446 : paragraph 152: “ *I would have thought the far-left intelligence provided them [SyS] with a huge base of information for their vetting activity*”.

⁴¹⁷ MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 1: “*Over the years a convention has grown up whereby the Security Service is the normal channel for passing security information about their employees to Government departments, certain public corporations (see list at Annex) and List X firms... Although this is common practice, it does not appear to have been the subject of any formal communication and this note is intended to explain the reasoning behind this procedure*”.

Paragraph 5: “*This, of course, in no way inhibits initial enquiries to identify a person or to discover where he is working. But, once it is evident that he is employed in one of the categories specified in paragraph 2 above [i.e. Government departments, Civil Service, public corporations at Annex, List X firms or the armed forces], reference should be made at once to the Security Service*”.

⁴¹⁸ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1973-07-04/debates/15a91c0d-9fa1-4a18-a4b3-86deffd6034e/GovernmentContracts>

Government accepted and excused the inevitability of it.⁴¹⁹ Employers “pleaded” for intelligence and “when a Special Branch officer is... seeking help from an employer, or from a union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in a one-way traffic.”

It should not be asking a “good deal to expect” a police officer to abide by the criminal law on bribery and corruption.⁴²⁰ It is interesting that Sir James Waddell thought that it was; and that he was prepared to share that view so openly with the Home Secretary himself.⁴²¹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]”

Unsurprisingly, the Government’s own approach was consistently duplicitous. The rules may prevent it but “Where there was overt evidence that a subversive employee was likely to change the scene of his operations, it was possible to ensure that this was given enough unofficial publicity to serve as an adequate warning to firms who might be at risk”.⁴²² The Government simply directed employers to “non-official

⁴¹⁹ UCPI0000034699/2: Home Office correspondence: *The Members expressed fears that information obtained by Special Branch officers about trade unions might be given either to other trade unionists or to employers. This is difficult ground. We know ourselves that some employers plead to be given warning if known agitators seek or obtain employment with them. The official response has always been refusal, sometimes with a hint that there are unofficial bodies which might help. But when a Special Branch officer is himself seeking help from an employer, or from a union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in a one-way traffic. Only good and experienced officers can maintain this position and the most we can do is run the point home whenever there is a chance*

⁴²⁰ See Archbold 2011 Chapter 31 that deals with the criminal law that was applicable at the time i.e. the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (31 – 150) and the current law i.e. the 2010 Bribery Act (31-171).

⁴²¹ UCPI0000034699 was a letter to the Secretary of State for the Home Office, Roy Jenkins, signed by Sir James Waddell.

⁴²² UCPI0000035279/7: The Prime Minister’s PPS had been asked by the Dunlop Group, among others whether there was any way in which a firm could be warned when it was in danger of employing an individual who was known to have been a subversive influence in some other part of industry; he had advised Dunlops to seek help from non-official organisations such as the Economic League. There followed discussion on the prohibition of MI5 passing official information on in these circumstances, however the final conclusion at (c) “Where there

*organisations such as the Economic League*⁴²³ or *“Industrial Research and Information Services Limited” (IRIS)*⁴²⁴. IRIS was the unofficial body that the Governments’ “counter-subversion” groups had liaised with to influence trade union elections.⁴²⁵ They were all working hand in glove.

The SDS reporting on the national membership and trade union affiliations of the *Socialist Workers Party* was ordered by the Security Service. The details were provided to the Security Service and from there, there was no limit on the onward dissemination.

Conclusion:

In the early 1970’s there was a fundamental change in what the SDS was to be, and what it was expected to deliver. It would no longer be a case of an officer sitting at the back of a public meeting and taking notes. It was a squad that was driven to be deep undercover; to draft reports on anything and everything.⁴²⁶ Officers were assigned to organisations for four to five years, using the names of dead children to establish their

was overt evidence that a subversive employee was likely to change the scene of his operations, it was possible to ensure that this was given enough unofficial publicity to serve as an adequate warning to firms who might be at risk”

⁴²³ UCPI0000034699/2: *The official response has always been refusal, sometimes with a hint that there are unofficial bodies which might help*

⁴²⁴ UCPI0000035279/5: *“The Group invited Mr Maitland [Edward Heath’s Principle Private Secretary] to arrange for the two industrialists concerned – (i) the suggestion that, after considering precisely which elements in industry they wished to exert influence, they should seek the help of the Economic League or Industrial Research and Information Services Ltd (IRIS); (ii) the Prime Minister’s gratitude to them for raising the matter and his readiness to consider it further, if necessary, in the light of their discussion with one of these non-official organisations”.*

⁴²⁵ See above: UCPI0000035277/2: Memorandum to Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office) from G. Reddaway (FCO/IRD). *“[the counter-subversion groups] have a record of some success, especially in the publicity field and, via, IRIS Ltd, in certain key trade union elections. This is useful support activity which should be both continued and encouraged.”*

⁴²⁶ HN353: *“I would Hoover up everything, it wasn’t my job to analyse it, I would just report it” (T1P2 Day 10 Transcript of evidence page 8)*

'legend.' It was a squad that would report extensively on trade unionists, socialists, anti-apartheid activists, communists, and those who wanted troops out of Ireland.

Officers such as Rick Clark not only entered an organisation, he instigated and helped establish a branch of that organisation – the *Troops Out Movement*. Following the new direction of what was expected of an SDS officer, he then fought his way to the top of the movement. Along the way he was happy use people as stepping stones. He invaded peoples' lives, and used sex as a tactic to build his credibility. He abused friendships, and undermined activists who were genuinely committed to the cause. Rick Clark was not a rogue officer. He was a foot soldier to the new strategy. His activities were understood, known and crucially, directed.⁴²⁷ They became a blueprint for officers, as they joined campaigns and political parties and moved their way into positions of influence.⁴²⁸

Rick Clark is important to this Inquiry as an example of what was to come from the early 1970's. He represented the new strategy of not just the SDS but the British establishment. An establishment that had already opened a million files on its citizens.

The disclosure we have reviewed demonstrates that political policing was organised on a scale that should shock everyone; not just because of what was being done, but the impact it had on the lives of ordinary people. It was surveillance and spying on an industrial scale.

The new strategy was built on deep infiltration of campaigns and political parties by SDS officers; funded and directed by a cabal of state institutions from Special

⁴²⁷ MPS-0732954

⁴²⁸ See pp14-18 of our submissions showing officers in leading positions in TOM, SWP etc. - https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf

Branches to the Security Services, from the Home Office to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It included a cast of senior civil servants and outside bodies such as the Economic League.⁴²⁹ This army of surveillance lead all the way from the door of successive Cabinet Ministers and successive Prime Ministers.⁴³⁰

In their defence the British establishment claimed to be defending democracy, but it was not a defence of democracy, it was the undermining of democracy in defence of the establishment.

James Scobie KC
Garden Court Chambers

Piers Marquis
Doughty Street Chambers

Paul Heron
Public Interest Law Centre

10th February 2023

⁴²⁹ UCPI0000034308, Paragraph 56

⁴³⁰ HN354 statement paragraph 175.