
Undercover Policing Inquiry

**Submissions for Tranche 2 Phase 1 on
behalf of Core Participants:**

**Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Lindsey German**

Witness:

Michael Chant

**James Scobie KC | Garden Court Chambers
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submitted 24th June 2024

Introduction:

We represent the following core participants in this tranche of the Inquiry; the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and former members leading members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Lindsey German, John Rees and Chris Nineham. We also represent the witness Michael Chant a representative of the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist Leninist) (RCPB-ML)

In our previous statements to the Inquiry we have kept our focus on the evidence and have avoided making significant observations on the Inquiry's procedure.

However, the manner in which Tranche 2 has been prepared has left us unable to continue without making reference to the circumstances in which this statement has been drafted.

This statement has been served, in accordance with the Inquiry's direction, on Monday the 24th June 2024. The process of disclosure to the non-state core participants on the Epiq platform began on the 3rd June 2024. In total approximately 12,000 pages have been served since that date.

The SWP was the most infiltrated organisation in Tranche 2. Lindsey German was on the Central Committee of the SWP for the entire Tranche 2 period. Prior to this recent part of the disclosure process, Lindsey German had been served with just 42 documents.

All of the remaining material in relation to the SWP has been served in the two and a half weeks since the 6th June 2024. At the time of writing there is still significant material outstanding, including all documents relating to HN95 who was employed at the SWP headquarters in 1986, and who had extensive liaison with MI5.

The witness statement on behalf of the Security Services was served on Friday the 21st June 2024. It is 105 pages long and unsurprisingly makes repeated reference to the SWP. The vast majority¹ of the Security Service documents associated with that statement have not yet been served. Our insight into MI5's involvement has been limited to incomplete disclosure of liaison notes which have been served piecemeal, officer by officer.

We are clearly not in a position to make an opening statement on behalf of Lindsey German. We cannot read material that has not been served. We have not been given the time necessary to read the material that has been served. Plainly if we do not have the time to even read material, we cannot consider and assess it, share it with our clients, take instructions on it and then draft and present an opening statement to the standard that they deserve. We also raise at this stage, the unfairness of Lindsey German being expected to provide oral evidence to this Inquiry in these circumstances.

Consequently, we have restricted our points in relation to Lindsey German and the infiltrations of the SWP and its Central Committee to a bare minimum. We ask for the

¹ It appears. We have not had the time, over the weekend, to count them exactly.

opportunity to expand on those points in a further opening statement at the beginning of Phase 2 in October. In the circumstances, that cannot be an unreasonable request.

We note that the Security Service has been on notice that it would be required to provide a statement on the Tranche 2 period since at least February 2020.² They have had the Tranche 2 Rule 9 request for over 12 months.³ Staff from across the Security Services, as well as legal advisers and counsel⁴ worked on it for 8 months, supplying the Inquiry with a “closed” version in February. It has taken a further 5 months to redact the statement.

We have been given **one weekend** to consider it, without the benefit of the accompanying documents.

This brings us to a wider point. The State core participants have had the benefit of time and considerable resources. They have had access to the material for years and have extensive teams of staff and lawyers. The Police witnesses are retired, on generous tax-payer funded pensions. Most of our core-participants are still working full-time.

This imbalance has always existed in this Inquiry. However, the approach to Tranche 2 is strongly suggestive of a deliberate attempt to silence the non-state core participants.

² When the Tranche 1 Rule 10 request was received. See Witness Z UCPI0000034350/1

³ UCPI0000037010-1

⁴ UCP|0000037010-2

To be clear, we are not aiming this criticism at the Inquiry's legal team. The process of this Inquiry has been delayed from the outset by the Police core-participants. The Home Office has used that delay to criticise the process of the Inquiry and limit its time and resources. The impact of that has doubtless been to place intolerable pressure on the Inquiry's lawyers. Inevitably that pressure has been passed down the line to the non-state core participants and their legal teams. The result of that is to muzzle the victims of this state sponsored policing.

We call on the incoming Government to have the courage to reverse this process in Tranches 3 and 4; to commit to this Inquiry being given the time to ensure that the victims are participants in more than name only.

We will focus the rest of our opening statement on CND. It must be pointed out that whilst we received more disclosure, at an earlier time, for CND, the points made about the late disclosure of the Security Service material, also plainly apply to them.

We note that MI5 has been comparatively silent about their interest in CND⁵ and wholly silent about the SDS reporting on CND that they received between 1981 and 1986⁶.

There has also been no material served by the Home Office or any other Departmental 'customer' of the SDS.

MI5 and Home Office material is plainly fundamental for this Inquiry to discover the truth about the SDS infiltrations of CND. That is a fact, that they must both be very much aware of. The silence is telling.

⁵ UCPI0000037010 Statement of Witness Y. See pages:

8: Reference to the Select Committee investigation into Special Branches (see below), which is not elaborated upon. Note: this document (UCPI0000029255) also refers to 'John Kerry' being de-briefed by MI5, but no mention is made of that by Witness Y.

35: "The Service did not regard CND to be a subversive group... but had a long-standing concern... about subversive influences within that organisation"

36: recognition that MI5 had posed specific CND related questions to the SDS and

Witness Y's retrospective belief (based on one document) that CND had been penetrated by individuals who were counter-subversion subjects of interest. The single document (UCPI0000029229) on which this belief is founded only refers to one [redacted] CPGB member of CND who was in any real position of prominence.

Witness Y does not make reference to a requests made of SDS for information on TUC CND, Labour CND, Liberal CND and Green CND, see UCPI0000029214.

37: Reference to interest in CPGB and Socialist league "infiltration" of CND. (Neither of which were subjects of SDS reporting). An acknowledgement that in 1985 CPBG members in CND were "greatly outnumbered by campaigners with no subversive affiliations"

49: a Reference to a document UCPI0000022163, which is dealt with at page 27 below

66: a reiteration of the point at page 36

69: further recognition of requests for information from SDS about CND

81: Both Cathy Massiter and Annie Machon are referred to in very brief terms

⁶ References made to HN65 'John Kerry' and HN33 'Lee Bonser' are not in relation to CND. HN88 'Timothy Spence is not mentioned at all.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament:

CND was founded in 1958. It is well-known as a broad-church, democratic, mass - membership organisation with groups across the United Kingdom and members from a “broad-section of society.”⁷

CND is also well known for having conducted mass demonstrations on an enormous scale. All of the demonstrations have been peaceful. Prior to and going into the Tranche 2 period, CND posed no significant threat to public order. That fact is inescapable and was inevitably acknowledged by this Inquiry at the outset.⁸

It was also well-known that CND was not, by any definition, a subversive organisation. The very nature of its campaign made it clear that it had no subversive intention. It was and always had been a single-issue campaign. CND attempted to utilise parliamentary democracy to achieve its aim of nuclear disarmament. It would be perverse to conclude that in doing so it wished to undermine parliamentary democracy. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, MI5 had maintained an interest in the organisation because some leading members were associated with the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). However, by the end of the 1970s they had concluded, rightly, albeit later than most, that CND had no subversive intention.

⁷ MPS-0743186/64 para 191

⁸ *HN65 is a sexagenarian. HN65 was deployed against one group in the early 1980s. The deployment is of significant interest to the Inquiry. The group, which was well known, posed no serious threat to public order. Its members posed, and pose, no risk to the safety of HN65. One of the issues which the Inquiry must investigate, publicly, is why HN65 was deployed against the group and what, if anything, was done with intelligence provided on it by HN65.*

https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/20180322_SDS_anonymity_Minded_to_6.pdf

As far as we are aware from the papers served in this Inquiry, CND was not directly targeted by the SDS in the Tranche 1 period. With the dawn of the 1980s, that position changed. The British State's spying on CND reached such a pitch, that two examples leaked and became very public scandals. The way in which the British State dealt with those scandals informs their approach to this Inquiry.

Madeleine Haigh:

In 1981, a CND member, Madeleine Haigh, was visited at her home by two police officers, who claimed to be investigating a fraud. Her mortification, at being associated with any kind of criminality led her to investigate her investigators. Three years later, her determination led to an admission from Sir Philip Knights, the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police. Those visiting officers were from Special Branch. They were investigating Mrs Haigh for her CND membership and the apparently subversive act of writing a letter to her local newspaper about Cruise missiles. This is the first of a number of parallels to be drawn with Special Branch activity in relation to Richard Chessum⁹ and the Troops Out Movement, that featured in the Tranche 1 evidence.

CND's reputation as a peaceful, broad-church, organisation, was the main reason for the public outcry over the treatment of Madeleine Haigh and the oppressive, and repressive, nature of this kind of policing.

⁹ Approximately a decade earlier Richard Chessum first came to the attention of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch for writing a letter. See UCPI0000034182/17 and MPS-0728205.

The Haigh incident was a key driver¹⁰ for the Home Affairs Committee inquiry¹¹ into the activities of Special Branch in 1984. There had been other incidents of public anxiety about Special Branch activity, such as photographs being taken of demonstrators¹² or an arrested student being encouraged to become a police informant¹³. But the Home Affairs Committee had the Haigh case “in mind”¹⁴ when they stated:

*"There is little doubt that the special branches of the police forces have been in danger of acquiring a sinister reputation of a force which persecutes harmless citizens for political reasons, acts in nefarious ways to assist the security services, is accountable to no-one, and represents a threat to our civil liberties..."*¹⁵

The Association of Chief Police Officers assured that inquiry:

- a) that *data on individuals or organisations [was] not collected or held solely on the basis that such a person or organisation supports unpopular causes*¹⁶
- b) that Chief Officers paid “close attention” to ensure that information was only recorded if it had a subversive or public order function.
- c) that Special Branch “would not trawl a whole organisation” because some members may be considered subversive.¹⁷

¹⁰ The Madeline Haigh incident is referred to on numerous occasions in the 1984 Home Affairs Committee Report UCPI0000035160 at pages 8, 20, 31, 32, 34, 42, 48, 59, 60, 72, 73, 75, 76, 93.

¹¹ UCPI0000035160

¹² UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7(ii) and (v)

¹³ UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7(i)

¹⁴ UCPI0000035160/8

¹⁵ UCPI0000035160/5 paragraph 2

¹⁶ UCPI0000035160/27

¹⁷ UCPI0000035160/46

The Metropolitan Police's own Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Colin Hewett, firmly stated that communication interception would only be used against terrorists and certainly not against organisations like CND.¹⁸ He assured the Committee that it "was certainly not true" that records were kept on politically active CND members.¹⁹

All in all, it was presented that Madeleine Haigh was very much an isolated case²⁰ and the officers in question were just "over-zealous".²¹ DAC Hewett's final assurance was that "[the police] do not engage in lots of other activities which are quite improper"²².

The police position was supported by assurances from the Home Office. According to the Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, it was "manifestly untrue"²³ that someone who was not breaking the law and did not plan to, could be watched and have files opened on them. It was made crystal clear that CND could not possibly be considered to be subversive.²⁴ The Madeleine Haigh incident²⁵ was raised so often, by those who wished to criticise Special Branches, because there was no other evidence of them doing anything wrong.²⁶

¹⁸ UCPI0000035160/42

¹⁹ UCPI0000035160/34 para 329

²⁰ UCPI0000035160/32 para 317 and UCPI0000035160/48 para 446.

²¹ UCPI0000035160/18

²² UCPI0000035160

²³ UCPI0000035160/72 para 536

²⁴ UCPI0000035160/72 para 534

²⁵ UCPI0000035160/73 para 540 John Hunt, Conservative MP for Bromley: *I think you will have noticed that we have in fact been very short of hard evidence of any alleged misdeeds by the Special Branch, apart from the case of Mrs Haigh (about which we have heard ad nauseam).*

²⁶ 75 para 550: Leon Brittan, Home Secretary: *... I am making it quite clear that it seems to me that really, in dwelling so much on Mrs Haigh and her case, Mr Winnick is seeking vainly to fill the gap in evidence to which Mr Hunt referred... If all that we can come up with to throw against the Special Branch is the case of Mrs Haigh, then, indeed, this Inquiry will have been vindicated, for the reason that Mr Hunt gave.*

The Home Secretary gave evidence accompanied by a Home Office civil servant, Michael Partridge²⁷. Leon Brittan stated that anyone who was concerned that they might be spied upon by the State, just had to ask themselves a simple set of questions:

*"Let me see, am I going to be the subject of Special Branch interest? But what have I got to do to be the subject of Special Branch interest? Do I threaten the safety or well-being of the State? Well, hardly that. On top of that, do I intend to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy? Well, hardly that. If I put the two together, do I come within that? Well, certainly not."*²⁸

The concept of Parliamentary Privilege prevents us from questioning the integrity of the evidence given in the course of those Committee hearings. Counsel to the Inquiry pointed out in his closing address in Tranche 1 that "*such issues are a matter for Parliament*".²⁹ We hope that in the context of the Tranche 2 evidence, the Inquiry will join us in proposing that the next Parliament does investigate its own process in respect of that Home Affairs Committee Report. The evidence given at that Committee enabled the continuance of the SDS.

As a matter of historical context, as of the 17th April 1985, when the report was published: the Committee congratulated itself on having dispelled the "myths" that had

²⁷ Home Office representatives at the inquiry were as follows: Rt Hon Leon Brittan, QC, MP, Mr M J A Partridge CB, Mr P R A Fulton, Sir Lawrence Byford, CBE, QPM

²⁸ UCPI0000035160/74 para 543

²⁹ CTI Tranche 1 Closing statement para 109

surrounded Special Branch for so long³⁰. They reassured the public that there was nothing for anyone to worry about³¹.

Cathy Massiter:

In 1981, the same year that West Midlands Special Branch were visiting Madelaine Haigh, an experienced MI5 desk officer, Cathy Massiter, was put in charge of the Security Services desk that covered CND. In 1983 she left the Security Service because of her disquiet over MI5's intrusive and oppressive monitoring of citizens, particularly in the trade unions and the peace movement.

In early 1985 Cathy Massiter blew the whistle. The journalist Geoffrey Seed produced a documentary for Channel 4's 20/20 Vision series, titled "MI5's Official Secrets"³². On the 20th of February 1985, only three weeks after the Police and Home Office had given evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) banned the broadcast of the programme.³³ They were concerned that broadcast would lead to prosecution under the Official Secrets Act. The documentary was finally broadcast on the 8th March 1985.

³⁰ UCPI0000035160/73 para 538

³¹ UCPI0000035160/8: *We are satisfied that such public concern as may exist about Special Branch investigations in relation to public order is unfounded.... Unless an activity both threatens the state and is intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy it is not... subversive. The definition [of subversive] does not cover political or industrial activities unless both its limbs apply, which exempts the "law-abiding, non-violent" activities alluded to by NCCL.... We feel that those who are apprehensive about the work of special branches should consider this definition, particularly its requirement that both parts should be fulfilled.*

³² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4>

³³ <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1985/feb/21/2020-vision-programme>

Cathy Massiter's chief concern in respect of CND was that the Security Services were engaging in the political arena; ramping up spying operations from 1981 in the run up to the June 1983 General Election.

In the autumn of 1982³⁴, the Labour Party had adopted unilateral nuclear disarmament at its National Conference and the Party leader, Michael Foot, declared himself a supporter of CND.³⁵

In 1979 CND had had 4267 members³⁶. By April 1982, MI5 were reporting that CND *was expanding at such a rate that [the Chairman] Bruce Kent no longer knew precisely how large its membership was,*³⁷. The Security Service estimate was 30,000 national members and 250,000 local members. By 1983, the national membership had more than doubled to 75,000.³⁸ CND had become a mass dissenting movement and a powerful electoral force, with the potential for changing policy and government.

In January 1983, Michael Heseltine became the Defence Secretary. He visited Greenham Common Airbase in February. In March he set up a special information/propaganda unit, Defence Secretariat 19 or DS19, with the specific purpose of combatting CND's unilateralist message in the run-up to the June general election.

³⁴ Blackpool National Conference September 27th to October 1st 1982.

³⁵ <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=188> "This is why I was a supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and why I remain a supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament... I say that the greatest tasks that this Labour Movement of ours will ever have to undertake, when we get that next Labour Government, is to carry out our policy for securing nuclear disarmament, in this country and throughout the world".

³⁶ CND statement to the UCPI paragraph 2.26

³⁷ Defence of the Realm Chapter 7, page 992.

³⁸ CND statement to the UCPI paragraph 4.48

To fulfil Mr. Heseltine's brief, DS19 went straight to MI5, asking for *information about the subversive political affiliations of leading members of CND including members of the National Council and people working for CND.*³⁹

The Director General of MI5, John Jones, gave in to MoD pressure to supply "dirt" on CND⁴⁰ and gave DS19 the material they requested.

On the 3rd and 4th April 1983, the Conservative press ran articles suggesting that "the hard left, ran CND". The articles named 28 individuals who were either "...*leading members of CND or people who worked for CND*" and attempted to suggest that their motivations were political.⁴¹

On 22nd April 1983 Michael Heseltine sent a letter⁴² to Conservative candidates in marginal seats for use when electioneering. He repeated the narrative used in the press campaign, stating that "*behind the carefully turned phrases about peace, lies the calculated political professionalism of full-time socialists and communists.*" He referred to "*a conspiracy of the left that is now the driving force distorting the language of peace*".

³⁹ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPeelGwEY4> 40 minutes 50 seconds

⁴⁰ Defence of the Realm, Ch.7 page 996.

⁴¹ CND statement to UCPI paragraph 19.14

⁴² CND statement to UCPI Appendix 3

On 23rd April 1983 Heseltine delivered a televised speech⁴³ in which the same language was repeated.

It was this that led to Cathy Massiter's resignation. She said:

*"For several years the Security Service had been saying that CND was not a subversive organisation, there were communists and other subversive groups active in it **but the Security Service stated specifically that it was basically a broad-based organisation drawing support from a very wide range of political opinion***⁴⁴. And yet here was a minister who was receiving these reports asserting quite openly that he considered that CND was being controlled and run by and on behalf of extreme left-wing elements, if not the Kremlin itself... I knew he was wrong.⁴⁵"

As far as Cathy Massiter was concerned, MI5 was providing information on a party-political issue, and that was not a *legitimate function* of the Security Services because *it directly contravenes the Charter*.⁴⁶ So, she resigned, and in March 1985, she blew the whistle.

⁴³ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 43 minutes 05 seconds

⁴⁴ It is of note that Witness Y implies that MI5 did not come to this realisation until 1985, but supplies no evidence to support the timing UCPI0000037010/37

⁴⁵ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 44 minutes 15 seconds

⁴⁶ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 41 minutes 52 seconds

The Charter at UCPI0000035253/4: *It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the Realm as, a whole. You will impress on your staff that the work of the Security Service has no connection whatever with matters of a Party-political character and that they must be scrupulous to avoid any action which could be so misconstrued*

Despite this Cathy Massiter was never prosecuted under the Official Secrets Act. At the time the consensus was that the famous jury equity acquittal of Clive Ponting, in February 1985⁴⁷, had discouraged the State from pursuing another prosecution.

However, the disclosure in this Inquiry, suggests another explanation.

In terms of the **source** of MI5's intelligence on CND, the focus of Cathy Massiter's revelations was on MI5's use of telephone taps and the placing of an MI5 agent inside CND's headquarters. The agent was said to have been an elderly former Communist Party member, named Harry Newton. According to Cathy Massiter, his **first job** inside CND was to attend the CND National Conference in **November 1982** and report "*as soon as possible after the conference who the new people on the National Council were... [so that MI5 could] pass the information on to interested parties in Whitehall*".⁴⁸

After that conference⁴⁹, Newton was said to have volunteered at CND's head office, and became MI5's "*eyes and ears*". He provided "*very general information about what was going on inside CND headquarters*", "*fairly low-level stuff*", "*internal CND documents and papers*" and "*a diagram of the lay out of the offices*".

The clear implication of the broadcast of the Massiter revelations was that Harry Newton, **after November 1982**, was a significant source of the material passed to DS19 in **March 1983**.

⁴⁷ <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/aug/06/clive-ponting-obituary>

⁴⁸ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 36 minutes 57 seconds

⁴⁹ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 37 minutes 30 seconds

However, a Security Service brief to the SDS officer 'John Kerry' makes it clear that the last material that MI5 **themselves** sourced from within CND's Head Office was in October 1982.⁵⁰ If Harry Newton was their agent, his November 1982 Conference report was not his first job, but it was very close to being his last. The following month, Harry Newton was so unwell that he had to move back to Yorkshire⁵¹, far away from CND's Head Office in Goodwin Street. He died a few months later.

In January 1983, MI5 were asking SDS directly for details of the new National Executive Committee of CND.⁵² They made a similar and more detailed request at the end of April.⁵³ Requests of a similar nature followed in 1983,⁵⁴ 1984⁵⁵ and 1985.⁵⁶ So, whilst Cathy Massiter may have given a source, she gave a dead source. She did not give up the real source inside CND. MI5 of course, knew that, as did the Metropolitan Police. The real source was a Metropolitan Police officer, using the name 'John Kerry'.

The broadcast revelations focused on MI5. In respect of Special Branch, they went no further than a passing line from the narrator: "*Cathy Massiter says there were other*

⁵⁰ UCPI0000029229: A Security Service Brief to SDS officer "John Kerry", assuming that he had some contact with CND Head Office and asking for an up-to-date list of the staff working there. The brief is dated 18th October 1983 and states that the list of HQ staff that MI5 currently have is a year old i.e. from October 1982.

NOTE: This document is referred to at page 36 of Witness Y's statement UCPI0000037010. The names of the members suggested to be CPGB members who were prominent at national level have been redacted in all copies that we have seen of this document, including those provided on the Egress system, prior to privacy redactions. The roles of these individuals in CND have also been redacted. However, it is clear that only **one** of them had a role in CND of any real prominence.

⁵¹ Seumas Milne, "The Enemy Within" *Verso* 2004 page 346 -347.

⁵² UCPI0000028809

⁵³ UCPI0000029214

⁵⁴ UCPI0000029229 and UCPI0000028728

⁵⁵ UCPI0000029241, UCPI0000027542 and UCPI0000027545

⁵⁶ UCPI0000029305

*agents inside CND put there by Special Branches around the country.*⁵⁷ A line that says to the British State that she knew more, but to avoid prosecution, would not be saying it. It is the first time that the existence of the SDS, and its regional equivalents, was publicly alluded to. It pre-dated the “True Spies” documentary series by 17 years. The lack of detail on **Special Branch** agents inside CND, meant that no further evidence could be given to the Home Affairs Committee, which in March 1985, had not yet concluded its report.⁵⁸

Had the full revelations been made, then the Home Affairs Committee could not have come to the conclusion that they had dispelled “myths” and there was nothing to worry about. Instead, the minority view of that Committee⁵⁹ would have held sway. Two of the eight voting Committee members, David Winnick MP and Clare Short MP,⁶⁰ did not support the Committee’s conclusions. Instead, they concluded that:

“the civil liberties of a number of individuals... have been undermined by the actions of the special branches and the intelligence services”.

They deplored the fact that such activities had occurred and, in all likelihood, continued to occur. They called for a change in the MI5/Harris definition of “subversion”, which allowed “*too wide a discretion*” to Special Branch⁶¹, and a reversion to the Lord

⁵⁷ “MI5’s Official Secrets”, 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPeElGwEY4> 39 minutes 45 seconds

⁵⁸ The Committee deliberated on 17th March 1985 UCPI0000035160/17 and 27th March 1985 UCPI0000035160/16

⁵⁹ UCPI0000035160/20 paragraphs 24 - 35

⁶⁰ UCPI0000035160/21

⁶¹ UCPI0000035160/21 para 29.

Denning definition of that concept.⁶² They decried the “total lack of Parliamentary scrutiny over these government agencies”.⁶³ And they called for an independent commission of Inquiry into the practices and records of Special Branch.⁶⁴ An inquiry, 30 full years before this one was called and 39 years before the public disclosure of the true extent of the SDS infiltration of CND.

The Massiter revelations must have been terrifying for Special Branch, all the more so because they came before the Home Affairs Committee finalised their report. We can glean some insight from a 1998 document in relation to ‘Lee Bonser’s’ deployment into CND and the wider the peace movement:⁶⁵

“At the height of CND activities a number of potentially embarrassing exposes occurred, most notably the former Security Service officer Cathy Massiter who questioned the Service’s investigation into the activities of CND members. This produced widespread media interest... Clearly any revelation of police involvement in such groups would equally create considerable embarrassment.”

‘Embarrassment’ is the Metropolitan Police’s favourite understatement.⁶⁶ The SDS would, and should, have been finished in 1985. How they were allowed to get away with it should be a major focus of this Inquiry; Parliamentary privilege or not.

⁶² See Closing Statement on behalf of Lindsey German, Richard Chessum and ‘Mary’ page 39 of 73 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 : [...] [subversives are those who] would contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means.’ as at paragraph 230 <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16195994>

⁶³ UCPI0000035160/21 para 34.

⁶⁴ UCPI0000035160/21 para 32.

⁶⁵ MPS-0003062

⁶⁶ Widely used in Annual SDS reports to describe the impact of SDS activity becoming public.

In their Tranche 1 Closing statement, the Non-State Core Participants group proposed that David Winnick and Clare Short be called to give evidence at this Inquiry⁶⁷.

Obtaining new evidence via the Rule 9 process is, as CTI to the Covid Inquiry put it, a way of *side-stepping*⁶⁸ parliamentary privilege and ensuring the Inquiry is not restricted in its search for the truth. Leon Brittan and DAC Hewett are both dead. However, as we understand it, Michael Partridge from the Home Office, now Sir Michael Partridge KCB, is not.⁶⁹ He too should be called.

The Home Office are aware of the evidence that was given on their behalf, to the Home Affairs Committee. They are aware of the evidence that has been given to this Inquiry. It is their responsibility and moral duty to ensure that this Inquiry is enabled to consider evidence of such clear importance.

The SDS in CND:

Cathy Massiter's revelations were ground-breaking. She was both brave and principled to have made them. But they were the tip of the iceberg.

Cathy Massiter was **the** MI5 desk officer for CND from 1981.

⁶⁷ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-NPSCPs.pdf
para 27

⁶⁸ Counsel to the Inquiry's Note for the Second Preliminary Hearing in Module 2 of the UK Covid Inquiry, para 27 <https://covid19.public-inquiry.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2023-02-17-CTI-Submissions-Module-2.pdf>

⁶⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Partridge

At first, CND amounted to *roughly half of her work*. Two and a half years later, CND was all of her work.⁷⁰

Cathy Massiter's placement as the CND desk officer coincided with the deployment of 'John Kerry' (HN65) into CND, in January 1981⁷¹ and the visit to Madeleine Haigh in July 1981.⁷²

The increase in her workload exactly mirrored the increased interest in CND from the SDS. 'Kerry's' reporting increased from May 1981, and then again as he took positions of responsibility⁷³ in CND through 1982 and 1983. As his reports increased so too did Cathy Massiter's workload. By the time she left the service in 1983, she would also have been receiving reports from 'Kathryn 'Lee' Bonser' (HN33)⁷⁴. MI5 had been given the details of the "new peace woman" including a report on her progress and "personal particulars" in July 1983.⁷⁵ Other officers reported on CND as a side-line from their main deployments. In the 1981 to 1983 period, these included, but were not limited to⁷⁶, [REDACTED],⁷⁷ 'Malcolm Shearing' (HN19),⁷⁸ Roger Pearce (HN85)⁷⁹ and 'Alan

⁷⁰ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 35 minutes 02 seconds

⁷¹ UCPI0000016183 "John Kerry's" first report on CND 23rd January 1981.

⁷² <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1983/dec/21/mrs-madeline-haigh>

⁷³ See below at page 30

⁷⁴ The first HN33 report that has been disclosed is from 29th June 1983 - UCPI0000019240. It relates to Lambeth Women for Peace. On 'Bonser's' own account she infiltrated Teddington CND prior to LWP, so there must have been reports that pre-dated this.

⁷⁵ UCPI0000027539

⁷⁶ Some reports on CND have not been attributed to an officer. For example, UCPI0000016189, a report on an 'important' CND meeting in Newcastle. This report has not been disclosed at the time of writing but is referred to in 'Kerry's' statement at para 81.

⁷⁷ [REDACTED]

⁷⁸ UCPI0000018249 a 1982 report from HN19 'Malcolm Shearing' concerning meetings of Streatham CND and their contact list.

⁷⁹ UCPI0000014227 a 1980 report from HN85 Roger Pearce on the growing membership of West London CND

Bond' (HN67)⁸⁰. All of their reports were sent to MI5 at Box 500. They would all have passed over Cathy Massiter's desk, taking up all of her time.

As **the** MI5 desk officer for CND, Cathy Massiter would have known that the reports were from SDS police officers infiltrating the organisation.

Witness Y's statement makes reference⁸¹ to a date in March 1985,⁸² when Detective Chief Superintendent Greenup⁸³ and HN322⁸⁴ met with MI5 because they "*wanted to know what could be done to limit the damage caused by the disclosures*" and "*precisely what Cathy Massiter knew*". MI5 informed DCS Greenup that there was little that could be done and a precise account of what Cathy Massiter knew could not be given. The concern was about the *identities of individual agents*; the knowledge of SDS officers in CND cannot have been in question.

In MI5's own words, in August 1980 "*We explained to... [the SDS] our system of distribution of their reports, stressing that the source of the information was known only to established, experienced desk officers in charge of the targets of interest.*"⁸⁵ A description that fitted Cathy Massiter perfectly.

An MI5 file note from 1982⁸⁶ makes it clear that they had a "list of [SDS] assets" including their source in CND. In May 1983, MI5 knew that 'John Kerry' was the Chair

⁸⁰ UCPI0000019513 a 1983 report on Tooting CND from HN 11 Mike Blake and HN67 'Alan bond', detailing plans for a badge-making and facepainting event, planting 100 wooden crosses, a petition, a drawing/painting competition, selling CND balloons and literature.

⁸¹ UCPI0000037010/81

⁸² UCPI0000029300. This document has not yet been disclosed, so the exact date is not clear.

⁸³ Who does not appear on the T2 timeline list of SDS managers.

⁸⁴ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20180914-First-Witness-Statement-of-HN322.pdf>

⁸⁵ UCPI0000028816/1

⁸⁶ UCPI0000027519: March 1982

of Hampstead CND and a “devoted campaigner”, “with access to the London Regional Office”.⁸⁷ All of the Undercover officers in CND were regularly briefed by MI5.⁸⁸ Many of them, including ‘John Kerry’ were debriefed by MI5 after their deployment.⁸⁹

The Cathy Massiter affair had “*undoubtedly shaken the Met’s confidence*” in MI5⁹⁰. Importantly, the 1985 Annual SDS Report⁹¹ makes it clear that the SDS viewed the Massiter revelations as a breach of **their** security; that required them to take steps to prevent MI5 desk officers knowing the false identities of officers. MI5 had convinced the SDS in November 1974,⁹² that they “*had to know the precise nature of an agent’s access*” in order to evaluate the reports. MI5’s system included a list of the cover names of SDS agents on the front of the main SDS correspondence file.⁹³ That system was said to have changed in March 1985,⁹⁴ the time of Cathy Massiter’s revelations. However, it is clear that desk officers still knew some SDS cover identities after the revelations⁹⁵, including that of ‘Lee Bonser’ at the Greenham Peace camp.

Harry Newton’s short sojourn in 1982, stuffing envelopes and chatting to Bruce Kent next to the sink⁹⁶ in the CND office, was not the news; as shocking as it was at the

⁸⁷ UCPI0000029216

⁸⁸ UCPI0000029216, dated 16/05/1983, a Liaison file between MI5 and SDS, detailing the extent of MI5 briefing. See also: UCPI0000036110, UCPI0000029229, UCPI0000028799,

⁸⁹ UCPI0000029255

⁹⁰ UCPI0000036109

⁹¹ MPS-0728978/6 para 12: 12. *Despite our care occasions arise when security is breached. One such incident occurred in February 1985 when Miss Cathy MASSITER, a former Box 500 desk officer, appeared on Channel Four television to give an account of Security Service surveillance and investigation of trade unionists, members of the National Council for Civil Liberties and in particular members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.*

⁹² UCPI0000030053/2

⁹³ UCPI0000036109

⁹⁴ UCPI Tranche 1 Interim Report: Chapter 4, page 47, paragraph 6.

⁹⁵ UCPI0000036109 April 1985

⁹⁶ CND statement to UCPI paragraph 2.44

time. The real news was the detail behind the Special Branch officers infiltrating CND “*around the country*”; some of them embarking on four-year undercover deployments. Harry Newton had not been needed to attend the CND National Conference in 1982, because ‘John Kerry’ was already going. In fact, he had already been to the National Conference in 1981.⁹⁷ Newton was not required to report back “as soon as possible” so that the information could be passed to Whitehall. In 1981 ‘John Kerry’ had provided a 106-page report, within fifteen days of the conference ending⁹⁸. ‘John Kerry’s’ 1982 Conference report⁹⁹ was 135 pages long and was completed within sixteen days¹⁰⁰. It is worth noting that ‘John Kerry’ reported on 150 named individuals in that report. The list included people like Paul Oestreicher¹⁰¹, with a Special Branch file dating back to 1962. But Harry Newton’s name was not there.

Harry Newton was allegedly “mailing things... doing odd jobs”¹⁰² and reporting “fairly low-level stuff”¹⁰³. ‘John Kerry’ on the other hand, considered himself a “trusted activist”¹⁰⁴. He had already provided details of CND Headquarters and the location of the membership computer.¹⁰⁵ He was providing MI5 with very detailed reports on meetings from CND National Council.¹⁰⁶ He was attending Council meetings of the London Region CND¹⁰⁷ as Secretary/Chair of CND’s Hampstead group.

⁹⁷ UCPI0000016798

⁹⁸ The Conference concluded on 15th November 1981 and ‘Kerry’s’ report was completed and typed up by 30th November.

⁹⁹ UCPI0000016836

¹⁰⁰ Conference concluded on 28th November 1982 and ‘Kerry’s’ report was completed and typed up by 14th December.

¹⁰¹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Oestreicher

¹⁰² “MI5’s Official Secrets”, 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 37 minutes 28 seconds

¹⁰³ “MI5’s Official Secrets”, 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPEelGwEY4> 37 minutes 49 seconds

¹⁰⁴ By March 1982 at the latest UCPI0000017252

¹⁰⁵ UCPI0000018029 in April 1982.

¹⁰⁶ January 1982 UCPI0000017137

¹⁰⁷ May 1982 UCPI0000018112 and June 1982 UCPI0000018370

Harry Newton, at best, was an extra. Ultimately, he was a distraction. He was named as a source of information that, in all likelihood, he did not source. At the end of March 1983, when MI5 handed their material to DS19, for use in the Government's election campaign, Harry Newton was long gone. But 'John Kerry' was two years into his four-year deployment.

'John Kerry' - HN65.

When Madeleine Haigh was being visited, and lied to, by Special Branch officers, 'John Kerry' was actively deceiving CND members across London.

He tricked his way into their homes,¹⁰⁸ attending parties and having dinner,¹⁰⁹ taking their drinks and food as he abused their hospitality, generosity and trust. He smoked 'joints'¹¹⁰ with some members too; and then he reported them for doing the same.¹¹¹ He watched Hawkwind with them at Glastonbury festival, where he can only be "reasonably certain" that he did not share a tent.¹¹² The taxpayer covered this "overtime", and 'John Kerry's' "take-home pay increased significantly".¹¹³ At the time¹¹⁴ the UCOs were earning as much as £25,000 a year, which was over three times the

¹⁰⁸ See for example, UCPI0000018521 and UCPI0000015155

¹⁰⁹ MPS-0743186 paragraph 22 and 152.

¹¹⁰ MPS-0743186 paragraph 153.

¹¹¹ UCPI0000016672

¹¹² MPS-0743186 paragraph 39(a), 40,

¹¹³ MPS-0743186 paragraph 67.

¹¹⁴ UCPI0000036109 17th April 1985

national average wage.¹¹⁵ For each officer who abused the trust of our citizens, four nurses could have been saving lives in hospitals.¹¹⁶

‘John Kerry’ reported on peoples’ sexual relationships¹¹⁷ and sexual activity,¹¹⁸ personal family details,¹¹⁹ personal phone numbers,¹²⁰ employment details,¹²¹ home addresses,¹²² dental hygiene,¹²³ parentage and ethnicity,¹²⁴ life history,¹²⁵ children,¹²⁶ relationship statuses¹²⁷ marriages,¹²⁸ and made apparently derogatory references to sexuality.¹²⁹

He reported on contemplated legal action¹³⁰, lawyers,¹³¹ and an elected Labour Party councillor.¹³² He mocked decent citizens¹³³, including a distinguished ex-serviceman.¹³⁴ He reported on hundreds, if not thousands, of people, most of whom had no police records or Special Branch files and no legitimate reason to have them.

¹¹⁵ <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1985-07-25/debates/7aa47a0d-ce08-4d3c-9787-a63d151e0d1f/AverageEarnings>

¹¹⁶ <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-answers/1985/jul/05/nurses-pay>

¹¹⁷ UCPI0000016672

¹¹⁸ UCPI0000016729

¹¹⁹ UCPI0000016717

¹²⁰ UCPI000001717

¹²¹ UCPI0000018086, UCPI0000018672,

¹²² UCPI0000018601

¹²³ UCPI0000019353

¹²⁴ UCPI0000018241

¹²⁵ UCPI0000018672

¹²⁶ UCPI0000015406

¹²⁷ UCPI0000015406

¹²⁸ UCPI0000020368

¹²⁹ UCPI0000019047

¹³⁰ UCPI0000016700

¹³¹ UCPI0000018417, UCPI0000018583, UCPI0000015563

¹³² UCPI0000020811

¹³³ UCPI0000019353

¹³⁴ UCPI0000018160

He reported on Hampstead Labour Party's torchlit peace march,¹³⁵ Christian CND's 'Peace Pentecost' weekend,¹³⁶ members of Quaker Peace Action,¹³⁷ Ex-Services CND World War I procession,¹³⁸ Families against the bomb¹³⁹ and Teachers for Peace.¹⁴⁰ He reported details of a lot of sponsored walks,¹⁴¹ film-showings and tree planting,¹⁴² as well as theatre and firework displays.¹⁴³ He also reported a children's peace party,¹⁴⁴ a singing ceremony,¹⁴⁵ jumble sales,¹⁴⁶ a sponsored swim and a barn dance.¹⁴⁷

His reports joined those of other officers such as HN67 'Alan Bond's' report on Tooting CND, and their plans for a badge-making and facepainting event, a drawing competition and CND balloon sales¹⁴⁸. All of those reports were sent to MI5.

The Public Order and Subversion rationales.

'John Kerry' maintains that he was not initially tasked into CND. He says there had been plans to deploy him into the SWP¹⁴⁹ or IMG¹⁵⁰ but ultimately, he was deployed without a target.

¹³⁵ UCPI0000016931

¹³⁶ UCPI0000019067

¹³⁷ UCPI0000019070

¹³⁸ UCPI0000019320

¹³⁹ UCPI0000017212

¹⁴⁰ UCPI0000018810

¹⁴¹ UCPI0000018751, UCPI0000015808, UCPI0000015833

¹⁴² UCPI0000015502, UCPI0000019319, UCPI0000020462, UCPI0000019375

¹⁴³ UCPI0000016659

¹⁴⁴ UCPI0000019022

¹⁴⁵ UCPI0000020372

¹⁴⁶ UCPI0000019574, [REDACTED]

¹⁴⁷ UCPI0000015620

¹⁴⁸ UCPI0000019513

¹⁴⁹ Reference in 'Kerry's' undisclosed impact statement see MPS-0743186/13 para 45

¹⁵⁰ MPS-0743186/13 para 45

His first report was on the peace movement in Hampstead.¹⁵¹ There then followed about four months of reporting on the Campaign against Racist Laws, during which time he managed to get himself appointed as “temporary secretary”¹⁵² of the North London branch. He also appears to have reported on a Labour Party Conference¹⁵³ in March 1981, although the report from that event has not been disclosed.¹⁵⁴

But from May 1981,¹⁵⁵ ‘John Kerry’ was reporting exclusively on CND. He says that his infiltration of CND came about “*because of the potential for elements within the campaign to use NVDA [Non-violent direct Action] tactics*”. He says that he identified “*the potential for public disorder that could arise through NVDA by activists and those on the fringes of CND*”¹⁵⁶ and once he had, his infiltration of Hampstead CND was agreed with his managers. In his second statement, ‘John Kerry’ maintains that he “*persuaded Detective Chief Inspector Dave Short to allow him to focus on [CND]*”¹⁵⁷

It would be truly remarkable if a Detective Constable were able to simply choose to infiltrate an organisation as politically sensitive as CND and “persuade” his managers that it was a good idea; particularly on grounds as spurious as non-violent direct action. The “fringes” of CND had been involved in non-violent direct action since CND’s inception, in the late 1950s.¹⁵⁸ And yet the SDS did not infiltrate CND until 1981, which

¹⁵¹ UCPI0000016183

¹⁵² UCPI0000016529

¹⁵³ MPS-0743186/25 para 72

¹⁵⁴ UCPI0000016569 referred to in ‘John Kerry’s’ statement but not disclosed. The date of the report, 29th of March 1981, is three days after the foundation of the SDP by Labour Party defectors (<https://labourlist.org/2012/03/labour-vs-the-sdp-31-years-on-who-was-right/>)

¹⁵⁵ UCPI0000015293

¹⁵⁶ MPS-0743186/20 para 56

¹⁵⁷ MPS-0748517/2 para 6(a)

¹⁵⁸ For example see CND statement to the UCPI paras 2.4, 2.35, 2.36, 10.2

co-incidentally was the same time that the State's political interest in CND commenced.

There was no pressing need for 'John Kerry' to "identify" CND members' involvement in NVDA when members had been engaging in it for 25 years. The undercover reporting makes it clear that much of the NVDA that members engaged in, was publicised in advance in any event.¹⁵⁹ CND members ran open workshops on NVDA that covered issues such as the history and philosophy of NVDA, conflict de-escalation, non-violent communication and legal rights.¹⁶⁰ On 'John Kerry's' own admission, NVDA activity was "centred on Greenham Common",¹⁶¹ he could not get close to that¹⁶², and "the SDS already had an officer there"¹⁶³.

CND's association with Non-violent Direct Action does not constitute a public order justification. "*The criminal law in respect of public order offences is intended to penalise the use of violence and/or intimidation by individuals or groups*"¹⁶⁴.

The SDS was ostensibly established to prevent a repeat of the 1968 violent disorder in Grosvenor Square. The existence of the SDS for **that** purpose was not justifiable.¹⁶⁵ It was certainly not justifiable to prevent making holes in fences, taking part in a sit-in,

¹⁵⁹ CND statement to the UCPI para 10.4 and examples at UCPI0000014867, UCPI0000021951 and UCPI00000020631. See also UCPI0000018839 and specific UCO reference to NVDA events being advertised.

¹⁶⁰ CND statement to UCPI para 11.6

¹⁶¹ MPS-0743186/47 para 140.

¹⁶² MPS-0743186/55 para 163

¹⁶³ MPS-0743186/47 para 139

¹⁶⁴ Statement of Jane Hickman UCPI0000036662-46 para 122, adopting the Crown Prosecution Service definition.

¹⁶⁵ UCPI Tranche 1 Interim Report: Chapter 6 para 28

an occupation with dancing, hide and seek and picnics¹⁶⁶ or an event decorating an airbase fence with poems, flowers and pumpkins.¹⁶⁷

Any implication from 'John Kerry' that "criminal offences" on protests lent a more traditional policing purpose to his deployment,¹⁶⁸ do not withstand scrutiny. The offences envisaged, such as obstructing a highway or breaching the peace,¹⁶⁹ are less serious in the hierarchy of criminality, than his own engagement in supplying cannabis, as a police officer, by passing a joint¹⁷⁰.

CND's commitment to non-violence has always been essential to its core-principles. NVDA, by its nature and name, is non-violent. To try to equate CND member actions with real public disorder is desperate and disingenuous.

Retrospectively, 'John Kerry's' own account has to recognise that CND did not pose a significant risk of public disorder¹⁷¹. His suggestion that elements within CND, and "fellow travellers" alongside it, could potentially pose a public order challenge is hollow. It is a matter of historical and police¹⁷² record that CND, with its broad-based support and array of "fellow travellers" has never posed a risk to public order.

¹⁶⁶ UCPI00000020631 or playing football and hide and seek or planting trees.

¹⁶⁷ UCPI0000014867 26/11/1984 HN33

¹⁶⁸ See for example reference to "criminal offences" at MPS-0743186 para 128.

¹⁶⁹ UCPI0000018839/9

¹⁷⁰ MPS-0743186/50 para 153.

¹⁷¹ MPS-0743186 para 140

¹⁷² The SDS 1981 Annual Report MPS-0728985/9 notes that CND organised "*the biggest rally to take place in this country for many years...*". "*The overwhelming number of genuine pacifists and environmentalists who took part ensured that the demonstration was peaceful and good humoured*". "*Numerous minor demos and pickets... were all peaceful events*".

In any event, the “fellow travellers” were already heavily infiltrated by SDS officers. The reports of those officers overwhelmingly suggest that their target groups had very little interest in CND demonstrations.

Reports indicated that the RCP would not take part in CND demonstrations because they viewed CND as *a militaristic pro-capitalist organisation*.¹⁷³ A report described as giving an “excellent insight” into Brixton SWP, noted that members had occasionally attended local CND meetings in Streatham, but their presence was not encouraged by the SWP branch committee.¹⁷⁴ Another noted that SWP members had thought CND meetings a “waste of time” and expressed disdain that Streatham CND had discussed ways of involving local conservatives in their campaign.¹⁷⁵ Reports on the SWP across London indicated that their interest in CND demonstrations was limited to selling newspapers,¹⁷⁶ rather than engaging with “anti-working class” CND supporters.¹⁷⁷

‘John Kerry’s’ reporting kept up the appearance of gathering intelligence on alleged “subversives”, by occasionally mentioning Trotskyists¹⁷⁸ and anarchists. But the CND infiltration told the police less about their approach to the peace movement than the other, also unjustified, SDS infiltrations. In any event, as early as February 1982, ‘John Kerry’ had been clear that purported “subversive” organisations, such as the SWP and IMG were smaller than Labour and Christian groups in CND with “no foreseeable likelihood of their influence growing” particularly on the National Council.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷³ UCPI0000019622 18/10/1983 HN19 ‘Malcolm Shearing’. See also UCPI0000030086/8, HN122, an RCP associated document referring to CND as “Class collaborators” and “middle class reactionaries”.

¹⁷⁴ MPS-0729272 08/08/1983 and UCPI0000019110 11/05/1983 HN67 ‘Alan Bond’

¹⁷⁵ MPS-0729181 22/12/1982 HN67

¹⁷⁶ UCPI0000019031 22/04/1983 HN67 and UCPI0000019076 27/04/1983 HN82 ‘Nick Green’

¹⁷⁷ UCPI0000019030

¹⁷⁸ MPS-0743186/44 para 132

¹⁷⁹ UCPI0000017164

The officers that infiltrated CND, regularly reported that demonstrations were expected to be entirely peaceful,¹⁸⁰ that CND liaised with police in advance of those demonstrations and had large contingents of organised and trained stewards.¹⁸¹

One of the least attractive arguments put forward by the police, is that reports indicating no disorder, are as valuable to policing as reports of disorder.¹⁸² Logically speaking, it gives licence for the police to spy on everyone. Geoffrey Craft called this “the ultimate defence line.”¹⁸³ In respect of CND, it has no merit at all. Anyone, on any street, at any time in the 1980s could have told the police the conclusion that ‘John Kerry’ came to at the end of his deployment. In his words: “... *there was no real threat of public disorder.*”¹⁸⁴

‘John Kerry’s’ account of a public order motivated deployment does not make any sense.

A more accurate description of the purpose of ‘John Kerry’s’ deployment, in his own words, is that he was “*providing a long—term assessment of the organisation that informed the State’s approach to it.*”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁰ For example, UCPI0000017926, UCPI0000020425, UCPI0000018556, UCPI0000018799, UCPI0000020861.

¹⁸¹ For example, UCPI0000019246

¹⁸² MPS-0743186/45 para 136

¹⁸³ MPS-0728980/5 See UCPI Tranche 1 Closing statement Richard Chessum, Mary and Lindsey German https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 page 17

¹⁸⁴ MPS-0743186/54 para 160

¹⁸⁵ MPS-0743186/20 para 57

'John Kerry' is certainly right that a "long-term assessment" was sought. His infiltration of CND lasted from May 1981 to December 1984.¹⁸⁶ It overlapped with that of 'Lee Bonser', who was deployed from June 1983 until March 1986¹⁸⁷ and 'Timothy Spence' (HN88). 'Timothy Spence' was deployed into the field in October 1983. His first report on CND was in February 1984¹⁸⁸ and he continued to report on them until November 1986.¹⁸⁹

There are SDS reports covering every single one of the CND National conferences in that six-year period.¹⁹⁰ It is of interest that 'John Kerry' accepts attending one, or probably two, of the conferences in his four year infiltration¹⁹¹ and 'Timothy Spence' denies attending the 1986 conference.¹⁹² If they are right about that, then the reports must have come from other undisclosed officers, suggesting an even more extensive infiltration.

It is a feature of the Tranche 2 evidence more generally, that there are an increased number of redacted officer names that are not accompanied by a Herne nominal reference. It is clear that the officers referenced in this Inquiry are just a fraction of the total number.

¹⁸⁶ MPS-0743186/54 para 161

¹⁸⁷ UCPI0000022570

¹⁸⁸ UCPI0000020900

¹⁸⁹ UCPI0000025247

¹⁹⁰ 1981: UCPI0000016798, 1982: UCPI0000016836, 1983: UCPI0000020476, 1984: UCPI0000014831, 1985: UCPI0000010345, 1986: UCPI0000018902

¹⁹¹ MPS-0743186 para 88

¹⁹² MPS-0748356 Para 177

'Timothy Spence's' deployment was unusual in the sense that he was initially targeted into an area rather than a group. A targeting discussion between the SDS and MI5,¹⁹³ indicates that Hackney was apparently so 'subversive' as to warrant a deployment targeting the Borough itself. The Hackney Community Relations Executive¹⁹⁴ was the proposed starting point. 'Timothy Spence' entered Hackney and reported on a number of police monitoring and justice campaigns, community groups¹⁹⁵ and lawyers.¹⁹⁶ Like his fellow CND infiltrators¹⁹⁷, 'Timothy Spence' also reported on the local Council. Hackney Borough Council allowing local CND to use the library as a meeting place was worthy of a report.¹⁹⁸ Whether 'Timothy Spence' himself knew it or not, his deployment was clearly targeted at managing dissent.

As MI5 and SDS had discussed, 'Timothy Spence' found a more defined target at the beginning of 1984,¹⁹⁹ when he started to infiltrate CND. After 'John Kerry's' exfiltration, CND became 'Timothy Spence's' focus²⁰⁰.

'Timothy Spence' is also unusual, because for the most part, his account of his deployment appears to be refreshingly honest. He is very clear that the groups he

¹⁹³ UCPI0000029226

¹⁹⁴ UCPI0000029226

¹⁹⁵ Campaign against the Police Bill UCPI0000020429, the Newham Monitoring Project UCPI0000020504, the Colin Roach campaign, Hackney Council for racial equality UCPI0000020238, Hackney Police Monitoring Group UCPI0000020436, the Angela Whitelock Action Group UCPI0000020435, East London Campaign Against Racist Attacks and Police Harassment UCPI0000020423, Friends of Blair Peach UCPI0000020770, Hackney Teachers Association UCPI0000020337, Campaign Against the Deportation and Criminalisation of Black Youth UCPI0000020380, Hackney Community Action UCPI0000020238,

¹⁹⁶ UCPI0000020429, UCPI0000019693, UCPI0000020485, Newham 7 Defence Campaign UCPI0000020313, Independent Committee of Inquiry into Policing in Hackney UCPI0000022144,

¹⁹⁷ 'Lee Bonser', in reported on Lambeth Council, see UCPI0000020218. 'John Kerry' reported on Sheffield Council, see UCPI0000014831

¹⁹⁸ For example UCPI0000020383,

¹⁹⁹ UCPI0000029226,

²⁰⁰ UCPI0000029255 January 1985: MI5/SDS liaison note describing 'Timothy Spence' as the main CND source post 'Kerry's' departure.

reported on were not subversive²⁰¹ nor “any great threat to public order”.²⁰² Instead, “*their aims were to improve particular aspects of society, from their point of view, rather than overthrow the current workings of the state.*”²⁰³

‘Timothy Spence’ did not see any actual public disorder in the whole of his deployment.²⁰⁴ He saw no violence at all, only shouting and insults.²⁰⁵ CND were not subversive.²⁰⁶ In respect of public order, the highest point is that there was a “potential”, through marches and obstruction of the highway,²⁰⁷ which he rightly acknowledges would have been “minor infringements of the law”.²⁰⁸

Equally, ‘Lee Bonser’ did not see a public order justification for her deployment. Her targets, in CND and then Lambeth Women for Peace and Greenham Common, were “always peaceful.”²⁰⁹ A public order threat went no further than a disruptive sit-in, which “could have caused problems for pedestrians or traffic”²¹⁰. ‘Bonser’ is also clear that her targets could not have been said to be subversive.²¹¹ They were simply “*against nuclear bombs and probably would have preferred a Labour government*”.

²⁰¹ *I do not believe that any of the activity which I witnessed whilst undercover was subversive.* MPS-0748356/71 para 191

²⁰² MPS-0748356 para 92

²⁰³ MPS-0748356 para 92

²⁰⁴ MPS-0748356/70 para 187

²⁰⁵ MPS-0748356/71 para 189

²⁰⁶ MPS-0748356 para 142

²⁰⁷ MPS-0748356 para 141

²⁰⁸ MPS-0748356/91 para 249

²⁰⁹ MPS-0745970 para 59

²¹⁰ MPS-0745970 para 71

²¹¹ MPS-0745970 para 58

'Timothy Spence' says there was a "general interest" in CND from both MI5 and Special Branch; a view which accords with 'John Kerry's' view of an assessment in the interests of the State.

This view is also borne out by the MI5 and SDS liaison documents, over the six full years that CND was directly infiltrated by the SDS. MI5 did not need telling that CND was not even a **potentially** subversive organisation, because they already knew. But if the SDS were slow on the uptake, even they were clear in March 1984 at a meeting with four MI5 officers, that there was "*no... ring of subversives unduly influencing the democratic structure of CND.*"²¹² Despite that knowledge, the SDS continued to "*improve its coverage*" of CND and report the details of the organisation's membership and finances.²¹³

In July 1984 SDS management expressed concern that having three officers in CND was "too much".²¹⁴ However, MI5 were "well-satisfied" with the information they were receiving. They were also so concerned at the "*considerable gap*" that 'John Kerry's' retirement would leave, particularly the loss of his "*valuable access to London CND*"²¹⁵ that they pressed for him to be retained after his expected exfiltration date²¹⁶.

In October 1982,²¹⁷ MI5 had told the SDS that they no longer put much effort into finding agents in certain organisations, such as the SWP, because the SDS had so

²¹² UCPI0000029239

²¹³ See for example UCPI0000014886

²¹⁴ UCPI0000036110 July 1984

²¹⁵ UCPI0000029243 September 1984

²¹⁶ UCPI0000029243 September 1984

²¹⁷ UCPI0000028799

many officers there²¹⁸. By July 1984, with such extensive SDS coverage of CND, it is possible that MI5 took a similar approach. In 1994, Stella Rimmington said on record: *“The allegation that the service investigated organisations which were not in themselves subversive is quite untrue”*.²¹⁹ She did not mention that the SDS were doing it for them.

By November 1984, the same SDS management²²⁰ was declining MI5 proposals to move ‘Timothy Spence’ into an SWP infiltration and insisting that he be ‘John Kerry’s’ successor in CND.²²¹

‘Timothy Spence’ was the last undercover officer in CND. The SDS attempted to obtain MI5 support for a successor to him in October 1986.²²² The Security Service were by now “adamant that there was no requirement”.

The SDS penetration of CND had continued, as the Home Affairs Committee deliberated, despite a clear recognition in Special Branch that it was highly problematic in the light of the Home Affairs Committee investigation.²²³

Similarly, the penetration continued, as Channel 4 broadcast the Cathy Massiter revelations. In fact, on the very day that the documentary aired, ‘Timothy Spence’ was

²¹⁸ Four at the time in the SWP according to this document.

²¹⁹ <https://licensing.screenocean.com/record/120432> at 01 minutes.

²²⁰ Tony Waite

²²¹ UCPI0000029299 November 1984. See also ‘Timothy Spence’s’ statement MPS-0748356 at para 150: *I note that the Security Service appear to have been keen on targeting me against the SWP, but Tony Waite resisted: It also appears that SDS plans were for me to be someone's successor in CND.*

²²² UCPI0000029274

²²³ A Security Service Note about an SDS visit to the Security Service on 24 January 1985 [UCPI0000029255] shows that the SDS/SB were reviewing penetration of CND in light of the Parliamentary Select Committee.

reporting, that as Secretary to the Hackney CND group he was a signatory to their bank account.²²⁴

Interestingly, having been sent to MI5, this particular report was returned as not being of Security interest. Previously, similar reports, including one only six months before²²⁵ from 'Lee Bonser', had not been returned. Similarly, 'Timothy Spence's' report on the 1985 CND National Conference has a hand-written note, indicating that the "Treasurer's Report" on finances had been destroyed on receipt by MI5.²²⁶ MI5 had certainly not been so concerned about keeping copies of "Treasurer's Reports" in 1982²²⁷ and 1984.²²⁸ It appears that having taken the brunt of the media attention post Massiter, MI5 at least wanted to be at least a little more careful in what they were accepting.²²⁹

The SDS on the other hand were relatively unscathed by the Massiter revelations. Ultimately the Home Affairs Committee went the way that Special Branch had wanted. But it would have been incredibly worrying for them at the time. At the time of writing, there has been extremely limited disclosure of internal Police documentation on the issue. However, one document gives an insight into the level of concern that the documentary would have caused them.²³⁰

²²⁴ UCPI0000022163 8 March 1985.

²²⁵ UCPI0000020237

²²⁶ UCPI0000010345

²²⁷ UCPI0000016836/1

²²⁸ UCPI0000014831/5

²²⁹ See Witness Y's account re: this document at UCP|0000037010-49

²³⁰ MPS-0731061/14

In September 1989, Special Branch received intelligence that the journalist Geoffrey Seed was getting close to them again and planning another documentary. This time he had been in contact with a former member of “Big Flame”²³¹, the very person who had confronted SDS officer Rick Clark, with his birth and death certificates in 1976. He had offered Seed a photograph of Clark and “some papers on the subject”. Those papers would doubtless have been the file that Richard Chessum told the Inquiry about.²³²They included the birth and death certificates of the real “Rick Gibson”, as well as the scrawled note that Clark had written to his girlfriend in “Big Flame”. That would have been the first evidence of SDS sexual relationships with activists. If it had been published then, ‘Mary’²³³ would have known the truth far sooner than she did. Every sexual relationship post 1989 would not have happened. ‘Bea’²³⁴ and ‘Jenny’,²³⁵ and every woman abused by an SDS officer thereafter would not have had to experience this Inquiry.

Special Branch went into overdrive. Commander ‘Ops’ was immediately informed. Arrangements were made, through ‘S’ squad “**for the situation to be monitored closely and for any future relevant tapes to be made available for scrutiny**”. Had Mr. Seed been taped since 1985? On whose authority?

The documentary was never made, and the file has never come to light.

²³¹ UCPI Tranche 1 Closing statement Richard Chessum, Mary and Lindsey German
https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 pages 5, 12, 18 and 23-31.

²³² UCPI0000034182/52

²³³ UCPI0000034181

²³⁴ UCPI 0000036778

²³⁵ UCPI0000036919

Managing dissent:

This Inquiry has so far, “*refrained from expressing any view about... the proposition that the SDS was one of the instruments set up by a conservative state to suppress the aspirations of those who wished to produce radical change by political means*”.

The Inquiry has cited “*limited evidence*” as the rationale.²³⁶

However, the Inquiry now has evidence of deployments that served no viable or even remotely arguable, justification on public order or subversive grounds. In addition, there is evidence that the State endorsed and orchestrated a long-term, deeply intrusive, penetration despite that lack of justification. Putting aside the background to the Home Affairs Committee, that we are not permitted to question due to parliamentary privilege, there is evidence that the State prevented parliamentary scrutiny of its activity.²³⁷

In the face of that, this Inquiry will have to answer these questions: Why was an open, broad-church, single-issue organisation with a decades’ long reputation for peaceful protest, suddenly infiltrated in 1981?

And why was it that that organisation was so extensively and persistently penetrated until 1986?

²³⁶ UCPI Tranche 1 Interim Report: Foreword page vi.

²³⁷ See for example the letter to Chief Constables, from the Home Office, that accompanied the Special Branch Guidelines in December 1984: UCPI0000004584 paragraph 5. *Under the definition of subversion given in the Guidelines (paragraph 20) [i.e. the MI5 Definition], **an organisation currently operating within the law may nevertheless be subversive because its long term aims satisfy the definition and therefore be a proper subject of investigation.***

Cathy Massiter was clear that the increased interest in CND was political: *There was a reason for [the increased workload]... CND was a politically sensitive issue... the difference is a political one.*²³⁸

The State's particular interest in CND began in 1981; the same time that CND became a mass dissenting movement, capable of changing policy and potentially government. The language used in the SDS Annual reports is reflective of that. In 1981, the stated concern was that CND would "*prevent the implementation of **Government Policy***".²³⁹

In 1982, that CND would pose "*a more direct challenge to the **Government***".²⁴⁰ In 1983, CND's "***widespread national support***" was a focus.²⁴¹ In 1984²⁴² CND's size²⁴³ was the concern. "*Labour's policy of unilateral disarmament*" and increasing "*public awareness*" were specifically cited as the drivers for the increased membership. CND was said to have "*skilfully manipulated public opinion*". Aside from the obvious irony of that statement, the subtext is that the concern could be assuaged by a skilful manipulation of public opinion in the opposite direction.

The infiltrations were clearly political and were examples of the State's approach to managing dissent.

²³⁸ "MI5's Official Secrets", 20/20 Vision, Channel 4, 1985
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUPeElGwEY4> 35 minutes 02 seconds

²³⁹ MPS-0728985/9

²⁴⁰ MPS-0730904/12

²⁴¹ MPS-0730903/14

²⁴² MPS-0730902/32

²⁴³ Then at 110,000 national members.

Positions of responsibility:

At the close of Tranche 1, on behalf of Richard Chessum, “Mary” and Lindsey German, we set out detailed submissions on the evidence of officers attaining positions of responsibility in the organisations that they infiltrated. We set out the extent of SDS management knowledge and endorsement of this particular tactic; as well as inevitable implications to an organisation, when undercover officers take on such roles.²⁴⁴

Chief Inspector²⁴⁵ Geoff Craft’s method in the Troops Out Movement included a set routine. The undercover officer (1) infiltrated a branch, (2) ensured election to Chair or Secretary position in that branch, (3) used that position to guarantee a delegate role to regional meetings and (4) used presence at those meetings to gain a delegate position to National meetings.

That pattern was exactly replicated by both ‘John Kerry’ and ‘Timothy Spence’ in their infiltrations of CND.

Both ‘John Kerry’ and ‘Timothy Spence’ repeated the standard UCO line about **accidentally** taking these positions of responsibility. This is a corporate line that is taken precisely because the tactic is so obviously de-stabilising and anti-democratic.

‘John Kerry’s’ appointment as temporary secretary of the Campaign against Racist Laws “*only happened*” he says “*because [he] did not look down quickly enough and*

²⁴⁴ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 pages 6-19 and pages 63 -64.

²⁴⁵ Inspector and Chief Inspector of SDS from 1974 to 1976.

*was deemed to have volunteered*²⁴⁶ He “*did not seek*” the role he then obtained at Hampstead CND, he was just chosen to fulfil it.²⁴⁷

He downplayed the position he took by describing it as a “facilitator”²⁴⁸ and said that he was “*disappointed that the Security Service documents consistently refer to [him] as chairman of the Hampstead branch of CND*”. There was no such role of “facilitator” in any CND group. MI5 refer to ‘John Kerry’ as “Chairman”²⁴⁹ because that is what he was. The Chairman was in charge of the group, and the role gave him delegate access to the London Region.

‘John Kerry’ says that his attendance at London CND Council meetings “should not be overstated”²⁵⁰ because the Council only met to “*share news of events and occasionally to organise London-wide events*”. But MI5 were particularly pleased with his attendance, “*as a devoted campaigner*”, at those meetings, and his access to the London Regional Office.²⁵¹ ‘John Kerry’s own reporting was clear that the London Council was “a stepping stone in the hierarchy “of National CND.”²⁵² His position and presence there eased his route into the National Conferences that he and ‘Timothy Spence’ reported on every year.

²⁴⁶ MPS-0743186/24 para 71

²⁴⁷ MPS-0743186/29 para 88

²⁴⁸ MPS-0743186/29 para 88, MPS-0748517/4 para 7(e) and para 26

²⁴⁹ UCPI0000019657

²⁵⁰ MPS-0743186/38 para 112

²⁵¹ UCPI0000029216 and UCPI0000029229

²⁵² UCPI0000019657

In June 1983 'John Kerry' was also the Chief Steward at an important and highly publicised piece of non-violent direct action, involving the linking of hands between the Soviet and US Embassies.

'John Kerry' states that the Chief Steward "*title is grander than [his] actual responsibilities on the day, which were effectively setting up the dais and loudspeakers*"²⁵³. This new account is contradicted by his own report²⁵⁴ from the time, which details his involvement in arranging the timetable for the event, including Stewards meetings at County Hall and Lancaster Gate at 8am and 10am, and ensuring that all stewards were correctly positioned along the route by noon. His report details a concern by the organisers that the numbers attending "*might well exceed their requirements*" and could reach 50,000 demonstrators. That is a concern that a Chief Steward would have to take very seriously indeed, particularly bearing in mind that CND were making arrangements for a further consultation with Scotland Yard and the Park Authorities to arrange contingency plans.

To be Chief Steward at a CND demonstration in London is an enormous responsibility. It is key to ensuring that routes and agreements are kept to and that public order is maintained. 'John Kerry' knew this because he had previously stewarded CND London demonstrations and had given his copy of CND's 'Notes for Marshalls and Stewards'²⁵⁵ to his superiors in the SDS. That document made it clear that all stewards were to behave as "ambassadors for CND" with the responsibility for ensuring that the demonstrations were peaceful and successful. Chief Stewards were responsible for

²⁵³ MPS-0743186/42 para 125

²⁵⁴ UCPI0000019246

²⁵⁵ UCPI0000018233

overseeing all stewarding matters and liaison with police. They were in overall charge of the assembly area and were responsible for instructing “block stewards” who then passed on those instructions to other stewards.

On this occasion, downplaying the role has not served ‘John Kerry’ well. If setting up loudspeakers is all he did when he should have been making sure that that demonstration went as planned, then he put CND at grave risk of tarnishing their unblemished reputation for exceptional stewarding and entirely peaceful demonstrations. For an organisation such as CND, having a Chief Steward who does not do his job at a highly publicised flagship demonstration, is almost as dangerous as the de-stabilising actions undertaken by ‘Rick Gibson’ in the Troops Out Movement.²⁵⁶

As ‘John Kerry’s’ successor,²⁵⁷ ‘Timothy Spence’ exactly mirrored his progress. This was clearly the intention, as a liaison note, in July 1984, between MI5 and SDS makes clear.²⁵⁸

‘Timothy Spence’ became Secretary of the Hackney CND group.²⁵⁹ He also downplays the role. He does not recall taking the position, when he took it, or how he came to take it.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁶ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 Pages 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. See also MPS-0728730, MPS-0728761, MPS-0728774, UCPI0000012332, UCPI0000012328, UCPI000009684, UCPI000009733, UCPI000009790, UCPI000009790, UCPI000009790.

²⁵⁷ UCPI0000029299 November 1984. See also ‘Timothy Spence’s’ statement MPS-0748356 at para 150: *I note that the Security Service appear to have been keen on targeting me against the SWP, but Tony Waite resisted: It also appears that SDS plans were for me to be someone’s successor in CND.*

²⁵⁸ UCPI0000036110 MI5 were concerned that it would be sometime before the “considerable gap” left by Kerry would be filled by Timothy Spence.

²⁵⁹ UCPI0000022163

²⁶⁰ MPS-0748356/62 para 159

Yet, 'Timothy Spence's' own reporting recognises the obvious importance of his role. His early reporting from Hackney group CND blames low membership on group leadership.²⁶¹ By March 1985, six months after he reported that dissatisfaction, he was group secretary himself.²⁶² Immediately after that he was reporting on the London Region Executive and Council meetings and AGM.²⁶³ Like 'John Kerry' before him, he also downplayed that attendance.²⁶⁴

There is an interesting example of the importance of group secretaries in 'Timothy Spence's' reporting. In September 1986,²⁶⁵ London Region CND were proposing to send a peace delegation to Moscow. They sent letters to the group secretaries across London, asking for both their views on the idea and for funding. The response was disappointing, as there were only two replies. Acton CND opposed the idea. But the Hackney Group Secretary, 'Timothy Spence', encouraged it but refused funding.

CND are clear that 'John Kerry' and 'Timothy Spence' took roles that were important in terms of communication, meetings, membership, co-ordination, recruitment, support and representation.²⁶⁶

²⁶¹ UCPI0000014840

²⁶² UCPI0000022163

²⁶³ UCPI0000026945 and UCPI0000026946

²⁶⁴ MPS-0748356/63 para 164

²⁶⁵ UCPI0000022190

²⁶⁶ CND statement to the Inquiry pages 78 and 79

In the case of Rick Clark's²⁶⁷ deployment into the Troops Out Movement, the evidence conclusively demonstrated that the SDS was knowingly used to de-stabilise, and in that case attempt to decapitate, a democratic movement.²⁶⁸

CND was a much larger organisation. No officer could have done that level of damage in a four-year deployment and of course, Rick Clark's exposure as an undercover officer had taught the SDS a lesson about taking too high a role.

But it is interesting that Geoff Craft's fingerprints are all over the style of these officers' progression up the CND hierarchy. Craft had been the SDS Inspector for Clark's deployment. For 'John Kerry's' deployment, he was the Chief Superintendent of Special Branch, with overall responsibility for the SDS, which he described as his "biggest responsibility".²⁶⁹ When Craft left that role and handed over to Chief Superintendent Tucker²⁷⁰, MI5 were still very happy with SDS coverage of the Troops Out Movement and **there were three SDS officers inside CND.**

When he gave evidence in Tranche 1, Craft denied all knowledge of Rick Clark's movement up, and activity in, the hierarchy of the Troops out Movement, despite having signed off almost all of the reports. In respect of CND, despite being in charge of three of the most politically sensitive, and politically driven, deployments in SDS history he denied all knowledge of any CND officer other than 'Lee Bonser'.²⁷¹ He was

²⁶⁷ HN297

²⁶⁸ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 pages 6-19

²⁶⁹ MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12.

²⁷⁰ UCPI0000036110

²⁷¹ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/20220518-ucpi-t1_p3-evidence_hearings-transcript.pdf?v1 Page 127 - 128

unable to assist this Inquiry with why 'John Kerry' was deployed. Furthermore, he was unable to assist with whether there had been pressure put on the SDS from Government and the Home Office to deploy these officers into CND.²⁷² His evidence did not square with his own report in February 1984²⁷³ that the SDS had obtained "first class" information in 1983, "*particularly in the troublesome... Anti-nuclear area*".

'John Kerry's' Detective Inspector, Trevor Butler, who also gave evidence in Tranche 1, said he had "*no dealings with anybody reporting back on the CND*"²⁷⁴ despite having signed off many of 'John Kerry's' reports.²⁷⁵

We reiterate an aspect of our Tranche 1 closing²⁷⁶: One way to ensure the Inquiry concludes there is "limited evidence" of a proposition, is for the Police to refuse to give it.

Q. We know that in around this era the SDS starts infiltrating some new targets, one of which is CND. Are you able to help us as to why the SDS might have become interested in CND?

A. My recollection is that the only time we were really interested in CND was the Greenham Common Women. Clearly we couldn't get male officers into that and we -- we had recruited a lady who would go and join the Greenham Common Women. So we -- that's why we were, if you like, CND involved.

Q. You certainly did that, but you also had an officer who we know as HN65 who infiltrated CND itself. Can you recall what the concern was about CND?

²⁷² Q. You certainly did that, but you also had an officer who we know as HN65 who infiltrated CND itself. Can you recall what the concern was about CND?

No, I can't. I can't at all, I'm sorry.

Q. Can you recall whether there was any pressure from any quarter outside the police to take an interest in CND?

A. No, I can't.

Q. Was there anything coming from the Home Office or from government?

A. Not that I know of.

²⁷³ MPS-0737347/8

²⁷⁴ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/20220520-ucpi-t1_p3-evidence_hearings-transcript.pdf?v2 pages 45 and 113

²⁷⁵ UCPI0000016183; UCPI0000015339; UCPI0000015391; UCPI0000015507; UCPI0000015488; UCPI0000015502; UCPI0000015635; UCPI0000016659; UCPI0000016717; UCPI0000017039

²⁷⁶ UCPI Tranche 1 Closing statement Richard Chessum, Mary and Lindsey German https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 page 63

Counter “subversion” and disruptive assistance.

An important feature of the Tranche 1 evidence²⁷⁷ was the Cabinet Office disclosure indicating that various inter-departmental groups in government were “customers” of the SDS; be they direct as a result of Special Branch membership of those groups from 1972 or circulated via the Security Service as a product of their “intimate” relationship. The purpose of these groups was not simply to gather intelligence but to use it for what they called “counter-subversion”.²⁷⁸

Certainly, in the mid-1970s the Metropolitan Police were attendees at these group meetings, or recipients of their reports and minutes.²⁷⁹ Other named attendees were representatives from the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, Departments of Education and Employment and of course the Security Service.²⁸⁰

One of the methods that was explicitly discussed was the manipulation of the mainstream media, or as the State called it “*the enlivening of the home information machine, especially in relation to the press*”.²⁸¹ The disclosed Cabinet Office

²⁷⁷ UCPI Tranche 1 Closing statement Richard Chessum, Mary and Lindsey German https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 pages 58 – 64.

²⁷⁸ See for example UCPI0000035225: January 1969: Composition and Terms of Reference for the Official Committee on Subversion at Home: “*to focus intelligence about communist and other subversive activities in the UK, to advise Ministers on appropriate measures... to counter these activities and to co-ordinate such counter-measures*”.

²⁷⁹ UCPI0000035307

²⁸⁰ UCPI0000035233/1

²⁸¹ UCPI0000035277/4: “*The proposed group might aim to encourage and support: (a) the dissemination of information, as an extension of the existing work done by the FCO (IRD) under the auspices of the SH (b) the enlivening of the home information machine, especially in relation to the press, the BBC and the ITA. (c) positive counter-action against key subversive groups and individuals on the basis of informed appraisal of the problems involved*”. The IRD was noted as “*enjoying close liaison with SyS and with its existing outlets*”.

documents, detailed a number of examples of the State's media manipulation to further its ends.²⁸²

MI5 certainly had not been averse to engaging in that kind of activity throughout the 1970s.²⁸³

In early April 1983, when the Conservative press ran articles as part of the DS19 propaganda campaign against CND, they named 28 individuals who were either leading members of, or worked for, the organisation.

'John Kerry' had reported on 24 of those 28 members in his 1982 National Conference report.

One of the 28 was reported on in a March 1983 document²⁸⁴ from 'John Kerry' listing the results of the London Region CND Executive Committee election. Incidentally, that report was signed off by none other than...Chief Superintendent Geoff Craft, before it was sent to MI5.

²⁸² UCPI Tranche 1 Closing statement Richard Chessum, Mary and Lindsey German https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/20230222-T1_Closing_Statement-German_Mary_Chessum.pdf?v1 page 63 and for example: UCPI0000035227/3 paragraph (b), UCPI0000035279/4, UCPI0000035279/8. See also: the role of the IRD and IRIS Ltd in the ITV production "Red under the Bed" which was broadcast during the trial of the "Shrewsbury 24". As at <https://www.pilc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/20201002-RT-AM-Grounds-of-Appeal-Against-conviction-page-ref-1.pdf> from page 35.

²⁸³ UCPI0000035255: March 1972: To the Prime Minister: "*a certain amount of useful counter-subversion work is already done – unattributably – by IRD in conjunction with the Security Service.*" There is some evidence that from December 1977 (UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 16) to July 1979 (UCPI0000035311/1) the "counter-subversive role of the Security Service" was focused on providing intelligence, but the wider presence of the Security Service on Committees such as the Dean Committee, Official Committee on Subversion at Home and Official Committee on Communism (Home) indicates an active role in counter-subversion activity. Their covert assistance in "counter-subversion" was considered "vital" UCPI0000035277/5 paragraph 6.

²⁸⁴ UCPI0000018759

Another 'John Kerry' report, from February 1983²⁸⁵ details the meeting of the CND National Council on 15th/16th January 1983 in which the 1983 National officers were elected. It named 11 of the 28. In total, these three reports, **all exactly contemporaneous to the DS19 campaign**, reported on 27 of the 28 members named in the press.

In 'Defence of the Realm' the authorised history of the Security Service, MI5 claimed that the material they gave to DS19 in March 1983, related to only seven members of CND and was "open source"²⁸⁶. Similarly, the MI5 whistleblower Annie Machon wrote that in 1983, the Service had refused requests from Michael Heseltine to hand over CND's "membership lists" and details of members' political activities.²⁸⁷

That in itself raises some interesting questions. The Ministry of Defence must have had its own researchers, capable of accessing "open source" material. They would not have gone to MI5 asking for material that they already had access to themselves. When the approach was made by the MOD, they must have been conscious that their request involved asking MI5 to breach the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive.²⁸⁸ They clearly expected the Directive to be breached and, if the authorised MI5 account of the information given is correct, it was breached.

²⁸⁵ UCPI0000016960

²⁸⁶ Defence of the Realm Ch.7 page 997

²⁸⁷ Annie Machon "Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers" page 205 (the Book Guild) (2005)

²⁸⁸ UCPI0000035253/4: *No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any Government Department unless you are satisfied that an important public interest bearing on the defence of the Realm... is at stake.*

But, if MI5 did only give them “open source” information on seven names, DS19 must have been sorely disappointed. The MOD wanted contemporaneous information, on the CND leadership as of the spring of 1983. Can it simply be a co-incidence that the DS19 press included not seven names but twenty-eight and the SDS had recently reported on twenty-seven of them?

There has been no disclosure of a list of the SDS’s “customers”. If DS19 obtained nothing of any use from MI5, there was nothing to stop them going directly to the Metropolitan Police.

In relation to the Madeleine Haigh incident, Sir Philip Knights made it clear that West Midlands Special Branch had received previous requests directly from the Home Office to “make inquiries” like those involving Mrs. Haigh. He said that he had turned them down.²⁸⁹

But, the SDS had been generating reports that could not conceivably have had any purpose other than the party political. In October 1982 ‘John Kerry’ submitted a report²⁹⁰ stating that London Region CND had prepared a plan for campaigning at the next General Election; there would be a pilot campaign in February 1983, petitioning and leafletting in the Prime Minister’s constituency, an election fund would be set up and members would be asked to pledge time to election campaigning.

²⁸⁹ In an interview with the West Midlands newspaper *Express and Star*
<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1983-12-21/debates/66b5de62-c938-4771-97c3-88ab994f5550/MrsMadelineHaigh>

²⁹⁰ UCPI0000015834

Another report from February 1983,²⁹¹ deals with CND's awareness from the press²⁹², that the Conservative Party was using a publicity agency to counter CND arguments. The SDS report details a member of 'John Kerry's' Hampstead group saying that they knew someone who worked at the agency and would ask them to give advance notice of publicity campaigns.

In July 1982, 'John Kerry' was reporting a forthcoming CND day-school,²⁹³ with discussions on how to counter media bias against CND.

These documents are stark examples of reporting, not on subversion but on engagement in the process of parliamentary democracy. They were signed off by Chief Superintendent, Nigel Short, and sent for onward distribution. We know they were sent to MI5 because it was the Security Services who provided the reports to the Inquiry. We do not know where else they were sent because the Metropolitan Police have destroyed their copies and their front sheets. They are clearly of no use to anyone, other than the Conservative Government and a State interested in preserving the status quo. They have no purpose other than electioneering. There are only two "customers" who would have considered them of any value.

Whilst DS19 were seeking "dirt" on CND, 'Lee Bonser' was approached and asked to join the SDS, with the specific intention of infiltrating the Greenham Peace Camp²⁹⁴. She was asked directly, by a Superintendent, who told her that the Prime Minister

²⁹¹ UCPI0000016955

²⁹² For example, *The Observer*, Sunday January 30th 1983, page 1. The publicity agency's campaign was said to have been tax-payer funded, at a cost of £1 million.

²⁹³ UCPI0000018435

²⁹⁴ 'Lee Bonser' was first deployed into "the field" in June 1983.

herself wanted to know what the Greenham Women were doing, and asked if she would help the police find out.²⁹⁵

'Lee Bonser's' first field report is dated 29th June 1983,²⁹⁶ but she had been deployed into Teddington CND shortly before that date. An internal police document²⁹⁷ suggests a "field" deployment at the beginning of June. Unusually, 'Lee Bonser' only spent two or three months²⁹⁸ in the SDS back office before her deployment. She had been hurried into the "field" after the SDS had been "put under pressure to do something about the Greenham Common Women".²⁹⁹ She had been rapidly vetted on the 1st March 1983 and put into the SDS office on the 7th March 1983.³⁰⁰ The Prime Ministerial request was in February/March 1983; co-incidentally exactly the same time that DS19 were seeking 'dirt' that they could not obtain from MI5.

Jane Hickman, the solicitor to some of the women at the Greenham camp, observes in her statement to the Inquiry³⁰¹ that prior to March 1983 the tabloid media had been "fairly neutral" in its reporting of the Greenham camps. That reporting then deteriorated into a "concerted effort" to "dehumanise and demean" camp occupants. Ms. Hickman notes the correlation between the content of some of those media reports and the reporting of 'Lee Bonser'.

²⁹⁵ MPS-0745970 page 3 of 43.

²⁹⁶ UCPI0000019240

²⁹⁷ MPS-0741650

²⁹⁸ MPS-0745970 paragraph 9

²⁹⁹ UCPI0000029193

³⁰⁰ UCPI0000029193

³⁰¹ Statement of Jane Hickman UCPI0000036662/67 paras 159 -163

Peter Francis has been clear that, whilst deployed in Youth Against Racism in Europe (YRE), in 1993, he gathered intelligence that could undermine support for those campaigning for Stephen Lawrence. He said:

*“I was asked, **the same as all other campaigns**... Is there anything the police could possibly use, through the media to start maybe tarring the campaign? It means the amount of sympathy that that campaign can generate... is going to be vastly diminished.”*

He said that using intelligence to smear a campaign, was a “*general remit*”; “*That is always our remit. We find out the intelligence and if it’s needed it will be used*”.³⁰²

Home Office:

The Home Office knew of the SDS’s existence because they signed authorities for it every year. There is no doubt that they were aware of, and approved, the extensive targeting of CND, because they had sight of the 1983 SDS Annual report³⁰³. There is evidence of an internal Home Office report being prepared in relation to the SDS’s 1983 activity³⁰⁴, but this has not been traced. The Home Office had wanted to be sure

³⁰² “The Police’s Dirty Secret” 2018 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CMUzpsmK38> (from 7 minutes 50 seconds).

³⁰³ MPS-0737347/9

³⁰⁴ *Investigation into links between Special Demonstration Squad and Home Office* by Stephen Taylor http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-0326/2015-01-06_FINAL_Report_on_HO_links_to_SDS_v2_3_REDACTED_FINAL.pdf Paragraph 6.3 *The 1983 report review followed a request by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (MJA Partridge) on behalf of the Permanent Secretary (Sir Brian Cubbon) for more information to see how the squad had adapted since its inception. A review was undertaken by an official and whilst there is reference to a report being produced, this has not been traced. All officials have been contacted as part of this investigation and whilst there was some limited recollection of the SDS, none had any recollection of the review or a report being prepared.*

that the SDS could be “*defended as a current response to current problems*”.³⁰⁵ In other words, they wanted to make sure that the targeting was appropriate in their view. Michael Partridge had written to the Police³⁰⁶ proposing a “discussion” with Deputy Assistant Commissioner Hewett, to inform the Home Office “*about which groups and activities [were] the current focus of the Squad's work and how that is carried out*”.³⁰⁷ Partridge also noted the “*sensitivity of such undercover work*”.

The 1983 report contained details on SDS personnel and targets and included clear reference to the infiltration of “political” and “pressure groups”.³⁰⁸ CND³⁰⁹ was given prominence and was described as “undoubtedly” the main “street” activity of the SDS that year. The report also references the low turnout of the “Peace chain” that ‘John Kerry’ had helped to organise.

Having been made aware of the contents of the annual report, Michael Partridge is noted as confirming that he and Sir Brian Cubbon were “*entirely content with the way the Squad's role had adapted to changing circumstances*”.³¹⁰ Six months later, Partridge accompanied the Home Secretary Leon Brittan, when he gave evidence to the Home Affairs Committee investigation into Special Branch. DAC Hewett had also given evidence shortly before.

³⁰⁵ MPS-0737347/9

³⁰⁶ Assistant Commissioner John Dellow

³⁰⁷ MPS-0730903

³⁰⁸ MPS-0730903/13

³⁰⁹ MPS-0730903/14 CND was the first group to be reviewed in the report.

³¹⁰ MPS-0734164 16th July 1984

It is also beyond doubt that the Home Office also read the 1986 Annual Report,³¹¹ which also contained a significant section on CND³¹² and noted that this was a “*very sensitive area of police monitoring.*”

Sir Michael Partridge signed off the Home Office authorisation for the SDS to continue in 1983,³¹³ 1984,³¹⁴ and 1985³¹⁵. He approved the funding without *challenge to the budget request or scrutiny of expenditure*³¹⁶ despite requests for funding increases that far outstripped inflation³¹⁷. The letter requesting authorisation in 1986 was also sent to him in his then role as Deputy Under Secretary of State.³¹⁸

Sir Michael Partridge had also been a recipient³¹⁹ of a letter from the Security Services, detailing how, in advance of giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee, the Home Office and Police witnesses could “*concert tactics*”, “*agree lines to take*”, and avoid drawing attention to the points they wanted to “*cover-up*”.³²⁰

It is beyond doubt that the Home Office was aware of the *detailed operational activity and all the groups infiltrated in 1983 and 1986.*³²¹ It is inconceivable that there would

³¹¹ MPS-0728977/1 *I am grateful to you for bringing over and discussing the latest annual report on SDS activity.*

³¹² MPS-0728977/18

³¹³ MPS-0734164

³¹⁴ MPS-0730902

³¹⁵ MPS-0728978/1

³¹⁶ *Investigation into links between Special Demonstration Squad and Home Office* by Stephen Taylor page 21 http://data.parliament.uk/DepositedPapers/Files/DEP2015-0326/2015-01-06_FINAL_Report_on_HO_links_to_SDS_v2_3_REDACTED_FINAL.pdf

³¹⁷ Taylor page 21. The increases beyond inflation had commenced in 1979 and continued throughout the 1980s.

³¹⁸ MPS-0728977/2

³¹⁹ UCPI0000035129/1 top right corner.

³²⁰ UCPI0000035129/1 and 2

³²¹ Taylor page 3

have been no discussions in the interim³²². **The Home Office had categorically and enthusiastically endorsed the infiltration of CND by undercover officers.**

As the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Sir Michael Partridge, as he is now, was interviewed by Stephen Taylor³²³ for the 2015 report on the links between the SDS and Home Office. We do not know whether he was asked about his knowledge of the SDS and the evidence given to the Home Affairs Committee. We do know that “*there was very little recollection of anything related to the SDS,*”³²⁴ save for an unnamed official who was in post in 1984, who “*was able to recall discussions on the SDS with the Commander and Deputy Assistant Commissioner at the time*”. That official was apparently unable to recall the detail.³²⁵

We also know “*that the key file which contains the evidence of Home Office interaction in relation to the SDS from 1968 to 2008 probably no longer exists and there is no record of what happened to it.*”³²⁶ Stephen Taylor was not able to “*conclude whether this is human error or deliberate concealment*”. No records remained in the Home

³²² Taylor paragraph 7.1 *There is no evidence of any dialogue in relation to the SDS outside of the correspondence from Operation Herne. It is inconceivable that there would have been no discussions within the Department or with Special Branch or the security services. In particular, it is possible that the annual reports may have been delivered by hand which could have prompted a discussion. However, the nature of the SDS suggests that these may not have been recorded, and if they were, there is no available record*

and 7.3: 7.3 *Another former official who was directly involved in the authorisation of the annual budget in the 1980s could not recall the process but did suggest that any such authorisation at the time would have normally been accompanied by a short briefing either verbally or in writing by a civil servant. This would have provided the senior civil servant with the assurance that the letter could be signed with confidence. As stated above, no records could be found to support this.*

³²³ Sir Brian Cubbon, as Permanent Secretary to the Home Office was also interviewed.

³²⁴ Taylor paragraph 5.5

³²⁵ Taylor paragraph 7.2

³²⁶ Taylor paragraph 3.2.13

Office covering the whole 40-year existence of the SDS save the 24 letters dealing with the annual reports and funding.³²⁷

We do not know whether Michael Partridge informed Leon Brittan of the extent of his knowledge of the SDS, because there are no records.

However, Partridge's successor as Deputy Under Secretary of State, Sir John Chilcot, certainly informed his Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in 1988.³²⁸ Chilcot had read³²⁹ the 1986 report and discussed its contents with Special Branch at the time. He then received letters outlining the work of the SDS in 1987³³⁰ and 1988³³¹ and authorised funding accordingly. When Chilcot referred the work of the SDS to Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary is noted as having 'expressed his approval'.

In June 1989, when Chilcott was still Deputy Under Secretary and Douglas Hurd was still Home Secretary, the annual link to the Home Office was severed. The Home Office still considered the SDS "*valuable but Home Office [had] no further need to know of resource and management aspects unless something of real concern occurs.*"³³²

³²⁷ Taylor page 7 and Para 3.2.14: *Furthermore, outside of the series of letters obtained from Operation Herne, and on the basis of detailed investigation as part of this review, there appears to be no record in the Department of anything related to the SDS during its years of operation from 1968 – 2008.*

³²⁸ Letter referred to at Taylor page 20, but not disclosed at time of writing.

³²⁹ MPS-0728977/1

³³⁰ MPS-0728976/1

³³¹ MPS-0728960/1

³³² Taylor page 6 and paragraph 5.6: *Direct budget allocation ceased from 1990 with a message from the Deputy Under Secretary of State at the time that the Home Office no longer needed to be aware of resource and management issues unless issues of real concern occurred. Once the formal funding link had been severed and accountability was no longer required, there appears to have been very little involvement from the Department.*

We do not know why the Home Office took this view at this stage. However, it is readily apparent that a new approach to funding ensured that the paper trail between the SDS and the Home Office would completely dry up.

When there are no records, there is no evidence.

However, in 1993, the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, was due to personally attend the SDS office with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police.³³³ The absence of documents does not equate to an absence of knowledge.

Both Douglas Hurd and Michael Howard can assist this Inquiry in respect of the key issue of Government knowledge. If the Inquiry has not already done so, they should both be required to provide evidence of their knowledge.

We understand that Home and Cabinet Office material will be served at a later undisclosed date for consideration at the end of Tranche 3.

In their Tranche 1 statement, the Security Service maintained that *“the pressure to investigate these organisations often came from the Prime Minister and from Whitehall.”*³³⁴

In the Authorised history of MI5, it was noted that *“Margaret Thatcher took greater interest in the intelligence community than any prime minister since Winston*

³³³ Taylor page 19

³³⁴ Statement of Witness Z UCPI0000034350/16

*Churchill.*³³⁵ That wording suggests an interest in the wider intelligence community. It is apparent that there was a significant interest in the murkier side of Special Branch. Dennis Skinner MP maintained that in the 1980's Margaret Thatcher turned the police into her own private army.³³⁶ The CND infiltrations suggest an extension of that.

The last point that we will make in relation to CND is the correlation between the start and end of the SDS reporting and national opinion polls.

Correlation between the reporting and opinion polls:

In July 1982, at the same time that 'John Kerry' was reporting on a CND day school on countering bias in the media³³⁷, national opinion polls suggested that 63% of the people in Britain were opposed to the decision to buy Trident and 53% were against Polaris.³³⁸

By November 1986, 66% thought that Britain should continue to possess nuclear weapons, 49% supported the completion of the Trident programme, whilst only 39% supported unconditional removal.³³⁹ The weight of public opinion had shifted and with it the threat to State and Government policy that CND had posed. 'Timothy Spence' completed his final report³⁴⁰ and the SDS infiltration of CND was over.

³³⁵ Defence of the Realm Chapter 7 Page 988

³³⁶ UCPI0000020347/3

³³⁷ UCPI0000018435

³³⁸ <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1982/jul/30/nuclear-weapons-and-public-opinion>

³³⁹ <https://www.julianlewis.net/letters-in-the-press/3117:spirit-and-numbers-in-cnd-28>

³⁴⁰ UCPI0000025247

In addition to this CND was rapidly losing members, and was becoming less of a perceived threat to the establishment.

Cathy Massiter's certainty that the reporting was political was not misplaced.

Lindsey German and the Socialist Workers' Party:

From the disclosure that we have been able to review, it is clear that the SDS continued their relentless infiltration of the SWP throughout the Tranche 2 period.

Since 1973, MI5 had been obsessed with the idea of SDS officers obtaining a place in the SWP headquarters.³⁴¹ In the Tranche 1 period that obsession culminated in 'Colin Clark' and 'Phil Cooper' taking direction setting positions³⁴² in the party; and for six years between 1978 and 1983, satisfying the MI5 orders of obtaining a "permanent" place in the party's "Centre."³⁴³

In the run up to 'Phil Cooper's' 1983 exfiltration, two new officers were placed into the SWP,³⁴⁴ and MI5 affirmed their "*interest in the new National SWP office*".

³⁴¹ UCPI 0000030069/1 and UCPI0000030049 paragraph 2

³⁴² UCPI Interim Report page 102 of 120 paragraph 23.

³⁴³ See https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/20220425-T1P3-LG_RC_M-Opening-Statement.pdf pages 28 -31 and UCPI0000028840 and UCPI0000027519

³⁴⁴ UCPI0000028795 16 September 1982 Security Service note for liaison file concerning meeting between HN68, Dave Short and F6 to discuss intelligence requirements and SDS officer placement

SDS management emphasised how keen they were to find a way of replacing 'Phil Cooper' in HQ,³⁴⁵ but were reluctant to follow the same method that they had previously adopted, of having one undercover officer introduce and recommend another to the party³⁴⁶. The SDS were hopeful that 'Alan Bond' (HN67) would "make a name for himself in time" as he had recently become a committee member in Brixton SWP.

MI5 had considered 'Phil Cooper' to be the SDS's "most difficult" officer,³⁴⁷ but the "levels of access" that he had were set as a benchmark to be replicated.³⁴⁸ The fact that he had left the SWP having "brewed a row" at headquarters was positively reported.³⁴⁹

The SDS admitted that they were finding their coverage of the SWP to be too extensive to justify³⁵⁰ and by May of 1984 were regretfully informing MI5 that there was no hope of more than two officers in the Party.³⁵¹ Further they did not expect that either of the two current officers, 'Nick Green' (HN82) and 'Alan Bond' would "make HQ in their time".

By September 1984, MI5 were fretting about their lack of access to SWP HQ to such an extent that they proposed that 'Timothy Spence' be withdrawn from CND and use

³⁴⁵ UCPI0000029193 02 March 1983

³⁴⁶ Although, it appears that the SDS ultimately did have 'Cooper' introduce 'Bond' to the SWP. At a later stage, after 'Cooper's' deployment had ended, he was suspected of having been a spy. The introduction, at the SWP 1983 conference, led to 'Bond' also falling under suspicion. See UCPI0000033172 May 1985 and Witness Y UCPI0000037010-76

³⁴⁷ UCPI0000028795

³⁴⁸ [REDACTED]

³⁴⁹ UCPI0000028728

³⁵⁰ UCPI0000029193 02 March 1983

³⁵¹ UCPI0000027542

his position in Hackney to gain access to the SWP HQ instead.³⁵² ‘Alan Bond’ was also proving to be difficult, as he would not move from Croydon SWP as he had been directed to do.³⁵³

At the time, ‘Bond’ had embarked on a sexual relationship with a member of Croydon SWP, which perhaps explains his reluctance to move.

Ultimately, ‘Alan Bond’ did make it to HQ.³⁵⁴ He secured work there by pretending to be a carpenter. MI5 gleefully reported that he had learned carpentry on the job from the Readers Digest.

In September 1985³⁵⁵, MI5 met ‘Alan Bond’ whilst he was still a serving officer, to discuss his continued “...*access to SWP new HQ and printshop complex*” and give him specific tasking. ‘Alan Bond’s’ last task before his exfiltration in November was to provide MI5 with extensive reports on the location of SWP’s new office.³⁵⁶ All of those reports have been heavily redacted, no doubt to protect the tradecraft around the kind of “building installation”,³⁵⁷ he had been required to do on MI5’s behalf.

The SDS proudly announced the “*great assistance*” they had given MI5 with the new SWP HQ, in their 1985 Annual report.³⁵⁸

³⁵² UCPI0000029243 24/09/1984

³⁵³ UCPI0000029243 24/09/1984

³⁵⁴ UCPI0000030709

³⁵⁵ UCPI0000029304

³⁵⁶ UCPI0000033220 01 November 1985, UCPI0000033227 26 November 1985, UCPI0000033177 27 November 1985

³⁵⁷ UCPI0000030709

³⁵⁸ MPS-0728978

When 'Alan Bond' left, MI5 offered to do anything they could to help 'Stefan Wesolowski' (HN95) progress in his SWP access. Now MI5 were referring to an officer's progress as his "career" in the SWP.³⁵⁹ In April, MI5 were pleased at this "very good progress" in the SWP.³⁶⁰ By the autumn of 1986 'Stefan Wesolowski' had also managed to find employment at SWP HQ.³⁶¹ He too was summonsed to an in-person meeting with MI5. It also appears that after 'Bond's' exfiltration at the end of 1985, 'Nick Green' had also defied expectations and gained access to the headquarters.³⁶² 'Stefan Wesolowski's' deployment lasted until 1988. We are not clear how long he maintained his access to HQ, because the material relating to his deployment has not been disclosed.

However, by January 1989, MI5 were so keen on an officer accessing HQ again, they were "*happy to help pay to facilitate*" it.³⁶³ When discussing their coverage requirements with the SDS³⁶⁴ they indicated that "*Direct access to SWP HQ and the Party's computer is of prime importance.*" MI5 were also "very happy" that the SDS had decided to deploy 'Mark Kerry' (HN90) into the SWP.

'Mark Kerry' established himself well³⁶⁵ and in the SDS' words "sucked [Lambeth north SWP] dry" of intelligence.³⁶⁶ He progressed enough to be involved in an attempt to

³⁵⁹ UCPI0000029307

³⁶⁰ UCPI0000029266

³⁶¹ UCPI0000029274

³⁶² UCPI0000029274 "HN95 was now being employed at Centre and was in a position to update the information previously supplied by HN82".

³⁶³ UCPI0000030665

³⁶⁴ UCPI0000030666

³⁶⁵ UCPI0000030672

³⁶⁶ UCPI0000021856

help set up a new SWP branch in Kingston,³⁶⁷ but it is not clear that he made it into the SWP HQ.

However, in 1990, the SDS were maintaining their target of having two officers in the SWP at any one time.³⁶⁸ It is not clear who those officers were, because a number are either giving evidence in closed hearings or were never even given Herne nominal identifiers. It may be that an undisclosed officer hit his MI5 target.

When 'Mark Kerry' was debriefed by MI5 in September 1992,³⁶⁹ he suggested that "*black agents stood more chance of getting to SWP Centre*".

In July 1991,³⁷⁰ the SDS were now so well-practiced in targeting their officers into the "Centre" of the SWP that they were concerned that their "*black agent*" Trevor Morris (HN78) might progress "too rapidly" and that he could progress into a position with too "*high [a] public profile.*"³⁷¹

Trevor Morris states that he was a 'close associate' of with at least one member of the SWP Central Committee. However, his own declaration of having been a "*leading SWP member*"³⁷² was characteristically hyperbolic. But it certainly ensured that he received tax-payer funded holidays to Germany³⁷³ and Egypt³⁷⁴ to aid his exfiltration.

³⁶⁷ UCPI0000027599

³⁶⁸ UCPI0000021856

³⁶⁹ UCPI0000029021

³⁷⁰ MPS-0726965

³⁷¹ UCPI0000030722

³⁷² UCPI0000035076/95

³⁷³ MPS-0735352 and MPS-0735353

³⁷⁴ MPS-0735311 and MPS-0527076

MI5's interest in HQ continued certainly into 1995,³⁷⁵ when the fastest routes of securing access to the "Centre" were discussed in their debrief of Trevor Morris.

We are unclear as to exactly how many officers the SDS put into the SWP during Tranche 2, but it certainly appears that a minimum of two was a standard at any one time. It is also apparent that MI5 had their own agents in the SWP over the period.³⁷⁶

The indiscriminate harvesting of intelligence on the SWP's organisational structure, administration, finances and membership continued. Our provisional and incomplete review of the Tranche 2 documents suggests that personal details, employment details and trade union affiliations continued to be a primary focus of the reporting. MI5 certainly required target prioritisation of the membership of certain SWP branches to aid their "vetting" requirements.³⁷⁷

The sexual abuse of the SWP membership, by undercover officers, also continued over the period. We are sure that the Category H opening will address the key features such as 'Alan Bond's' fathering of a child with one of his SWP targets, and the extent to which that was widely known of throughout the SDS and Special Branch.³⁷⁸ 'Alan Bond' was a good friend of Vince Harvey,³⁷⁹ and was the SDS Detective Inspector for Trevor Morris, both of whom deceived SWP members into sexual relationships. 'Alan Bond' was also good friends with John Dines and Bob Lambert³⁸⁰ who Morris also gave character references³⁸¹ in his statement, along with a string of other officers 'Matt

³⁷⁵ UCPI0000026333

³⁷⁶ UCPI0000027600, UCPI0000021856, UCPI0000018315

³⁷⁷ UCPI0000030666

³⁷⁸ MPS-0731969 Statement of HN19 'Malcolm Shearing' and MPS-0728305 re: HN104 'Carlo Neri's' account

³⁷⁹ MPS-0723109

³⁸⁰ MPS-0723109

³⁸¹ UCPI0000035076/179

Raynor' (HN1), Andrew Coles, Jim Boyling and Mark Jenner. Together they have all the hallmarks of a grooming ring.

We also raise an issue in respect of 'Nick Green'. When he booked his place at the Skegness Easter rally in 1985,³⁸² he booked with a female member of Finchley SWP. He completed their registration on the same form, which was a requirement if they wanted to share a room for the weekend. The Inquiry has the woman's details and we ask if enquiries have been made of her?

Public Order:

The SDS Annual reports painted a general picture across the decade, of the SWP posing even less of an alleged public order threat than in Tranche 1. The Annual Reports indicated that street activity had markedly declined³⁸³ or made no reference at all to the SWP being involved in disorder.³⁸⁴ The SWP's focus was said to be on building its base in trade unions³⁸⁵ and concentrating on building a larger³⁸⁶ and more politically aware³⁸⁷ membership.

In 1985³⁸⁸ the SDS needed to show that the SWP was still a "legitimate target" and so stated that they posed a threat to public order but gave no examples of actual involvement in disorder.

³⁸² UCPI0000026349

³⁸³ 1983 MPS-0730903/19

³⁸⁴ 1984 MPS-0730902, 1986 MPS-0728977,

³⁸⁵ 1984 MPS-0730902

³⁸⁶ 1987 MPS-0728976

³⁸⁷ 1986 MPS-0728977

³⁸⁸ MPS-0728978/18

In 1988³⁸⁹ there was reference to an increased SWP involvement in demonstrations, but again no examples of any significant disorder. The reported intelligence that the SWP would “*provoke as much disorder as possible*” in relation to the Poll Tax was shown to be sensationalist and inaccurate. In 1989³⁹⁰, the SDS admitted that “*The Party did not envisage for one moment that the national demonstration would turn into a riot and when it did, the SWP members present, as a whole, made no attempt to become actively involved.*” Instead, the SWP “*spent a considerable amount of time contemplating, theorising and speculating*”. The 1990s were no different. In 1990, the SWP “*took no part as an organisation in any of the disorder that took place... nor did it foresee that any would take place.*”³⁹¹ In 1991, SWP members preferred to “*sell publications, display banners and chant slogans*” than indulge in street violence.³⁹² Generally the SWP “*did not pose any major threat to public disorder*”³⁹³ and “*violent behaviour [was] not a general characteristic... amongst the ranks of the SWP [or the ANL].*”³⁹⁴

Trevor Morris (HN78) disagreed³⁹⁵ with the overall SDS assessment, based on more than a decade of comprehensive infiltration. Instead, he cited his own stories about the 1993 Welling demonstration as an example. We do not propose to give Mr. Morris forewarning, by elaborating here, on the questions that we will be asking Counsel to the Inquiry to pose via the Rule 10 process.

³⁸⁹ MPS-0728960

³⁹⁰ MPS-0730905/13

³⁹¹ MPS-0728958/14

³⁹² MPS-0728957/24

³⁹³ 1992 – 1994 MPS-0728968/24 and MPS-0722654/29

³⁹⁴ MPS-0722654/29

³⁹⁵ UCPI0000035076/77

We simply say that there should be a **full and separate public inquiry** into the events at Welling in 1993. That inquiry should deal with the full police response to that demonstration and should consider the accounts and analysis³⁹⁶ of a wide range of participants. It would not be possible to come to any safe conclusion based on the self-interested account of a serial fantasist and philanderer.

In general terms, we have made submissions previously on the manner in which the police could have prevented disorder in relation to the activities of fascist organisations.³⁹⁷

The Tranche 2 period included the first SDS deployment into a fascist organisation; when ‘Alan ‘Nick’ Nicholson’ (HN56) attempted to infiltrate the British National Party. We have more detailed observations on the SDS and the Inquiry’s approach to fascist infiltrations, that we will make at the beginning of Phase 2, if we are given the opportunity, once we have read and analysed all of the material.

At this stage, it is apparent that the ‘Nicholson’ deployment was simply a token infiltration. He was deployed on a part-time³⁹⁸ basis, into a “moribund unit” of six BNP members,³⁹⁹ that was “near dormant”.⁴⁰⁰ He didn’t do a single report in his first three

³⁹⁶ For example as at UCPI0000027940/6 the *Time Out* report by Vikram Dodd and Julian Kossoff, in respect of material that the Prosecution had initially withheld at the trial of Tony Savvas. An internal police document apparently recognised the police error of creating a “pinch point” at the junction of Upper Wickham Lane and Lodge Hill, “*which led to the perception that police had blocked (the only escape route) off Lodge Hill*”.

³⁹⁷ <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> see pages 9 – 17 of 42.

³⁹⁸ MPS-0745856/12 whilst continuing to work on “other Special Branch work”

³⁹⁹ MPS-0745856/13

⁴⁰⁰ MPS-0745856/24

months.⁴⁰¹ He exfiltrated himself after only ten months⁴⁰² because he was terrified that he would be killed. He believed that he had been 'outed' to the fascists by another undercover SDS officer.⁴⁰³

'Nicholson's' primary conclusion in relation to disorder was that the BNP would "*try to inflict as much physical harm as possible*" on left-wing groups. Any SWP paper seller could have given the Police the same intelligence.

It was clear in 1990 and 1991 that the BNP was not operating out of Loughton, where 'Nicholson' was deployed. They were operating out of their headquarters in Welling.

If there had been a will to prevent the violence that the fascists were engaging in and inciting at the time, 'Nicholson' would have been sent into South-East London.

If operating out of Welling, he would at the very least have been able to confirm that the "bookshop" at Welling was not some sort of 'Mein Kampf' Waterstones. It was fortified like a bunker and was incapable of being "torn down" or indeed "burnt down" by demonstrators, as Trevor Morris alleges.

Subversion:

The Socialist Workers Party did not threaten the safety or well-being of the State in the Tranche 1 period.⁴⁰⁴ It must have been readily apparent that it did not do so in the Tranche 2 period either.

⁴⁰¹ MPS-0745856/16 paras 75-76.

⁴⁰² MPS-0745856/21 para 114

⁴⁰³ MPS-0745856/21 para 115 and MPS-0745856/27 para 148,

⁴⁰⁴ UCPI Tranche 1 Interim Report page 103 of 120 paragraph 27.

From February 1991, the MI5 desk officer (F2B5) in charge of investigating the SWP, was Annie Machon. She was *“tasked to research each area of SWP activities: finance, membership, student numbers, and industrial relations among others, in order to assess whether the party was a threat to national security.”*

Part of her investigation included being the lead of four MI5 officers who de-briefed ‘Mark Kerry’ in September of 1992.⁴⁰⁵

After *“painstaking research”* and access to the intelligence accrued over the 15 years that the SDS had had almost unbroken access to the SWP headquarters; Ms. Machon was in *no doubt* that *“The SWP was small, relatively poor and their politics fell outside MI5’s criteria for investigation....”*. *“Their policies advocated educating people so that they could take part in a democratic movement to replace the existing political system”*. As she said: *“This was hardly the stuff of revolutionary nightmare.”*⁴⁰⁶

Despite Ms Machon’s assessments:

“senior management in F2 ensured that the SWP assumed an increasingly prominent role in the work of the branch and ... unremittingly applied pressure... to beef up the case for the study of the SWP, particularly after its (legitimate) support for a

⁴⁰⁵ De-brief at UCPI0000029021. Annie Machon blew the whistle in 1997. This prompted Massiter-esque concern in Special Branch, who then interviewed ‘Mark Kerry’ themselves because *“clearly all parties present [at the MI5 de-brief] would have had some knowledge of SDS operations.”* MPS-0731166

NOTE: Witness Y (at UCP|0000037010/82) states that in 2001 MI5 provided some information to the SDS regarding the extent to which Machon’s revelations impacted on SDS security. That information has not been disclosed.

⁴⁰⁶ Annie Machon “Spies, Lies and Whistleblowers” Pages 37 to 39

number of industrial disputes in the early nineties, which of course posed no threat to National security or Parliamentary democracy”.

“Even where the service knew that many individuals attended... meetings to protest against specific issues, such as the NHS cuts or the poll tax, subjects of legitimate dissent,” their details were nevertheless recordable by MI5.

It is not surprising that Ms. Machon is barely referred to in the statement of Witness Y.⁴⁰⁷

As we argued in Tranche 1⁴⁰⁸ *The true purpose of these SWP infiltrations was political. economic and industrial.*

In the book ‘Stasiland’⁴⁰⁹ Anna Funder comments:

“The Stasi was the internal army by which the government kept control. Its job was to know everything about everyone, using any means it chose. It knew who your visitors were, it knew who you telephoned, and it knew if your wife slept around. It was a bureaucracy metastasised through East German society: overt and covert...”

The CND and SWP deployments demonstrate that the SDS was a very British Stasi.

⁴⁰⁷ UCPI0000037010/81

⁴⁰⁸ https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/20220425-T1P3-LG_RC_M-Opening-Statement.pdf page 2

⁴⁰⁹ Anna Funder ‘Stasiland – stories from behind the Berlin Wall’ p5 (Granta) (2003)
