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E02786195    06/2023

HC 1539

Home/UCPI Interim Report for Tranche 1/Chapter 5: The Special Demonstration Squad 1977 to 1982

Chapter 5: The Special Demonstration Squad 1977 to 1982

  1. HN2697 David McNee succeeded HN3810 Sir Robert Mark as Commissioner following the latter’s resignation in March 1977. HN34 Detective Chief Inspector Geoffrey Craft was succeeded as the officer in operational charge of the SDS by: HN608 Superintendent Kenneth Pryde in September/October 1977; HN135 Detective Chief Inspector Michael Ferguson in January/February 1978; HN218 Detective Chief Inspector Barry Moss in February/March 1980; and HN307 Detective Inspector Trevor Butler in January 1981. HN244 Angus McIntosh was the Detective Inspector, until succeeded by Trevor Butler at the end of 1979 and by HN68 in January 1981. Michael Ferguson was the first SDS detective chief inspector to have served as an undercover officer before his appointment.
  2. Surviving records of the interaction between the Security Service and the SDS between the end of 1974 and early 1979 are sparse. On 23 June 1977, the Security Service conveyed the gratitude of their Socialist Workers Party (SWP) desk to Geoffrey Craft for the flow of information about the SWP,1 and on 15 September 1977 Geoffrey Craft told them that most SDS effort was being put into the SWP.2 However, Security Service thoughts of coordination in the deployment of agents came to nothing when, in December 1977, HN1254 Commander Rollo Watts stated that the Commissioner had made it clear that agents were to be run solely in the context of law and order.3
  3. From 1979 onwards, the relationship became closer. On 17 August 1979, the Security Service noted that the SDS was ready to accept a Security Service brief (i.e. set of questions) on organisations and individuals and to respond to “specific feedback”. The Security Service stated its requirement for “high grade political intelligence particularly on the SWP”, unlikely to be obtained by traditional means.4
  4. From then on, regular discussions between the Head of section F6 and the Detective Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector in operational command of the SDS took place, at which Security Service requests for intelligence were discussed. The topics covered in 1979 included the following: the Fourth International World Congress held 5–14 November 1979;5 the SWP National Conference in 1979;6 and the debriefing by the SDS of HN354 (“Vince Miller”) Vincent Harvey.7
  5. The relationship became even closer after the appointment of Barry Moss as the Detective Chief Inspector of the SDS in 1980 and of Trevor Butler in 1981. Monthly meetings were held from February 1981 onwards, at which requests and comments from both the Security Service and the SDS were exchanged. The Security Service frequently expressed appreciation of SDS coverage of the SWP, so that on 20 October 1982, F6 was able to explain to HN99 Detective Chief Inspector Nigel Short (known as Dave Short), who replaced Trevor Butler in early 1982, that the Security Service’s coverage of the SWP had lessened because of the excellence of the SDS coverage.8 Requests were made for coverage of other Trotskyist groups, including the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP),9 and of anarchist groups.10 In an internal note dated 14 May 1981, F6’s visits to the SDS were described as routine.11 An appendix dated 8 July 1981, prepared in anticipation of the visit to the Security Service by Sir David McNee and HN2187 Assistant Commissioner (Crime) Gilbert Kelland on 12 August 1981, stated that the extreme left-wing section of F6 worked in close liaison with the SDS and that monthly targeting meetings were held.12 As Security Service Witness Z states in the witness statement dated 22 March 2021, the interests of the Security Service and the SDS did not always coincide, but they did overlap sufficiently to justify close cooperation between them.13
  6. The contemporaneous documents suggest that the Home Office took little, if any, interest in the activities of the SDS during this period and received little information about them. The letters seeking annual renewal of funding for the SDS were sent by the Assistant Commissioner (Crime) to the Deputy Under Secretary as follows: from HN1166 John Wilson to Robert Armstrong in 197614 and 1977;15 and from Gilbert Kelland to Robert Andrew or Hayden Phillips from 1978 to 1983 (apart from 1982 when somebody wrote on Gilbert Kelland’s behalf).16 All of these letters stated that the primary focus of the SDS was the gathering of intelligence on left-wing and anarchist groups to give advance warning of events that might disrupt the public order. A valuable by-product was the security intelligence provided to the Security Service. In his letter dated 4 April 1978, Gilbert Kelland made specific reference to Grunwick and the left-/ right-wing confrontations culminating in Lewisham;17 and, in his letter dated 7 March 1980, he stated that the SDS “was able to provide useful information which was invaluable, enabling uniformed officers to be effectively deployed” in Southall on the occasion of the death of Blair Peach.18
  7. Events in 1984 establish that it is very unlikely that the SDS annual reports were provided to the Home Office in this period. On 29 May 1984, Michael Partridge, then Deputy Under Secretary responsible for police affairs, stated to Assistant Commissioner (Crime) John Dellow when approving expenditure for the SDS for 1984/1985 that it would be helpful for “us” to know which groups and activities were the current focus of the SDS.19 The Head of the F4 Division in the Home Office Police Department, Roy Harrington, then visited HN587 Commander Peter Phelan and was shown by him the 1983 annual report.20 On 16 July 1984, Roy Harrington wrote to Peter Phelan that he had reported on his reading of the annual report to Michael Partridge and Sir Brian Cubbon, the Permanent Under Secretary, and that both were entirely content with the way that the squad’s role had been adapted to changing circumstances, and with the arrangements for liaison with the Security Service.21 On 7 June 1984, HN2185 Deputy Assistant Commissioner (Crime) Colin Hewett stated to the Assistant Commissioner (Crime) Gilbert Kelland: “[W]e should include in the annual letter for renewal some comment on the targeting of the squad and the results being achieved.”22 None of this would have been necessary if the annual report had been routinely sent to the Home Office.

    Grunwick and the “Battle of Lewisham”
  8. The annual report for 1977 was prepared by Kenneth Pryde.23 The main focus of the report was on the contribution made by SDS reporting to the policing of two serious events of public disorder: the mass picketing of Grunwick Film Processing Laboratories in June and July 1977, and the “Battle of Lewisham” on 13 August 1977. All SDS reporting on both events was by undercover officers who had infiltrated Trotskyist and Maoist groups.
  9. HN354 joined the SDS in early 1976. His deployment began in late 1976.24 He approached the International Socialists (IS) (renamed the SWP on 1 January 1977) by buying its newspaper, the Socialist Worker, and began to attend meetings of the Walthamstow branch in January 1977.25 He became a member of the branch and reported on its affairs until 9 October 1979.26 He was elected branch treasurer in or soon after June 1977,27 treasurer of the Outer East London district in late July 197728 and to the branch committee on 26 April 1978.29 He had access to the financial and membership records of both branch and district and reported on both throughout his deployment, in the belief that his intelligence contributed to the knowledge which Special Branch and the Security Service wished to gather about a subversive group. He also reported on the branch’s somewhat half-hearted attempts to intervene in industrial disputes30 and on more energetic attempts to contest paper sales in Brick Lane with the National Front (NF).31
  10. On 31 May 1977, HN354 reported that it was the intention of the APEX (Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff) trade union and Brent trades council to mount a seven-day mass picket outside Grunwick with effect from 13 June 1977.32 He remembers attending the picket line once, possibly during that week. Uniformed police succeeded in creating a gap through which coaches carrying employees who continued to work at the factory could pass. He did not take part in the pushing and shoving that occurred.33
  11. Two closed undercover officers remember reporting on plans for participation in the picketing.34 No written reports by either to that effect have been retrieved, but I have no reason to doubt that both did report on what they had learnt. One of them was the source of the “invaluable information” supplied by the SDS about last-minute tactics, to which reference is made in the 1977 annual report.35 The report makes no reference to the well-attended and well-publicised mass picket on 22 June 1977, and it is likely that SDS reporting added nothing to it.
  12. HN296 (“Geoff Wallace”) joined the SDS in the summer of 1975.36 It is likely that his deployment began at the end of 1975 in what had become a familiar manner: first by attending public meetings of IS in West London. By January 1976, he had begun to attend the regular weekly meetings of the Hammersmith branch of IS.37 He provided regular reports on the affairs of the branch. Several referred to the participation of its members, identified by him, in local protests about hospital affairs.38 Others dealt with participation in the “Right to Work” campaign.39 In May, June and July 1977, he reported on branch discussions about the Grunwick pickets, including the curious assertion made at a meeting on 14 July 1977 that national publicity about the forthcoming event on 22 July 1977 was a hoax to distract the police.40
  13. Like many other undercover officers, HN296 was elected to branch offices, which gave him access to details of branch members and those with whom they were in contact: by May 1976, he had become treasurer;41 by July 1976, he had become the Socialist Worker organiser;42 and in January 1977, he was elected “Flame” organiser.43 On 2 April 1978, he agreed to become one of a three-member committee to manage logistical arrangements for an Anti-Nazi League (ANL) carnival on 30 April 1978.44 No reports after this date have been retrieved, and it is likely that his deployment ended soon afterwards.
  14. A foretaste of what was to happen in Lewisham on 13 August 1977 occurred at Ducketts Common in Haringey on 23 April 1977, when left-wing demonstrators planned to attack a well-advertised NF rally. Two SDS officers, one of whom was HN353 (“Gary Roberts”), reported on left-wing plans before the event. In his opinion, uniformed officers did not handle the confrontation well, with the consequence that they came under sustained attack, which they resisted with difficulty.
  15. In July 1977, the NF made a plan to hold a march from New Cross to Lewisham on the afternoon of 13 August 1977. They notified the police of their intention to do so and agreed a route. There was considerable local opposition to the planned march and attempts were made to persuade David McNee to exercise his power under section 3 of the Public Order Act 1936 to prohibit it. He declined to do so and successfully resisted a legal challenge to his decision.45 A local organisation, the All Lewisham Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (ALCARAF), headed by the Mayor of Lewisham, Roger Godsiff, planned to stage a counter-march on the same day, terminating at the point at which the NF march would start. The timing and route of the counter-march were also agreed with the police.46 In his affidavit, sworn on 10 August 1977 for the purpose of the legal proceedings, David McNee expressed his confidence, justified by events, that both would adhere to the routes agreed with the police.47
  16. The SWP also planned to oppose the NF march. On 2 July 1977, members of the Lea Valley district, who had been present at a demonstration in support of the “Lewisham 24 Defence Committee” (a group which supported young Black people arrested in Lewisham for muggings on 30 May 1977), bemoaned the failure of SWP members to take part. When confrontations with the NF were envisaged, they considered, plans should be made in advance to attract enough supporters to crush the NF by weight of numbers. A report of this meeting, dated 6 July 1977, was made by HN80 (“Colin Clark”).48 On 22 July 1977, HN354 reported on a meeting of the Outer East London district held on 18 July 1977, at which a leading member of the group said that a former NF member who had been recruited into the SWP had suggested that the NF would be armed with missiles at every demonstration.49 Force, the leading member said, should be met with even greater force. All London SWP members should go to Lewisham on 13 August 1977.
  17. HN3093 Roy Creamer, by then responsible for collating intelligence on left-wing groups for Special Branch, must have read these reports. They informed the view he expressed at a meeting held on 27 July 1977, under the chairmanship of acting Assistant Commissioner Wilford Gibson, to determine the police response to the threats posed by the NF march: that the SWP were determined to stop it by throwing a cordon across Clifton Rise.50 They did not inform his correct assessment that there was considerable local opposition to the march and that the ALCARAF march would be a sincere attempt to express that opposition. Nor did they inform the assessment expressed by the detective inspector responsible for monitoring the extreme right wing that the NF would not accept a ban of the march without causing trouble elsewhere in London and possibly in Lewisham as well.
  18. On 1 August 1977, HN80 reported that, at a meeting on 23 July 1977 at Lewisham Concert Hall, attended by about 100 people, it was resolved that on 13 August 1977 “all like-minded anti-fascist groups should meet at Clifton Rise at 1pm and smash the NF off the streets”.51 This report, too, must have informed police plans.
  19. Intelligence gathered about SWP tactics to counter the NF march was summarised in a report dated 11 August 1977. It was sent to Commander Operations (Special Branch) and Commander A8 (Uniformed Branch).52 As HN1742 Anthony Speed, who was Chief Inspector in A8 at the time, has explained, it would have been the last distillation of intelligence before police plans were settled.53 It must have been based substantially or wholly on the reporting of SDS undercover officers. It stated that: (i) the SWP had acquired a squat in Clifton Rise; (ii) some members of the Lea Valley, Central London, South East London and South West London districts of SWP intended to support the ALCARAF demonstration in the morning and then continue to Clifton Rise; (iii) each branch was asked to provide six “heavies” to act as protection squads; (iv) the main contingent of demonstrators would attempt to block Clifton Rise at 1pm; and (v) the rest would go to New Cross Road, to force the NF to assemble elsewhere.54
  20. The report concluded that the main objective of the SWP was to prevent the NF march from taking place. A specially selected squad would attack supporters to split police ranks. If it failed, the SWP would “attack, harass and intimidate the NF”, with the intention of creating a riot and isolating the rear of the NF column.55 They would then go to the railway station and attack the NF in Lewisham High Street.
  21. It is likely that this report or its contents informed David McNee, when he stated in his affidavit that arrangements had been made for a sufficient number of police to be on duty to control any activity “resulting from the unauthorised meeting of the SWP”.56
  22. Intelligence was gathered by HN80, who attended a meeting of the Seven Sisters and Tottenham branches of the SWP on 10 August 1977, chaired by the convenor of the Seven Sisters branch. The steward for the Lea Valley district contingent of anti-fascist demonstrators explained the tactics to be used: the principal objective was to “attack, harass and intimidate the NF, in order to create a riot situation” and to “drive them from the streets under the cover of the resultant chaos”.57 The cited words are taken from his typed intelligence report which post-dates both events, but I accept that HN80 made an oral report to like effect soon after the meeting. It is at least possible that it was the source of the same words cited in the conclusion of the report dated 11 August 1977 sent to Commanders Operations and A8, referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20 above. HN354 attended a meeting of SWP stewards on 12 August 1977 (after the 11 August report was sent to the relevant branches) to plan the counter- demonstration.58 He was appointed a steward at the meeting. Afterwards, he visited the anticipated route of the march and saw people he did not know place piles of half-bricks gathered from a nearby building site along the route of the march.59 There is no written report of these events, but I accept that his account is truthful and that he reported on them orally before the march took place.
  23. The 1977 annual report refers to information “obtained from penetrated extremist groups” that an empty house opposite Clifton Rise would be occupied on 12 August 1977 by members of the SWP, armed with missiles.60 As a result, the house was searched on the morning of 13 August 1977 by uniformed police. No intelligence report has been retrieved or evidence provided or given by an open or closed undercover officer in precisely these terms; but it is likely that a warning to that effect was given by a closed officer, which caused the search to be made.
  24. This intelligence contributed substantially to the briefing note prepared by the operational commander, Deputy Assistant Commissioner David Helm, for the commanders of the uniformed officers who would police the event.61 It made clear the intention of the left-wing groups, notably the SWP, to occupy Clifton Rise and deny its use to the NF. It is likely that it contributed to the decision of the Commissioner to divert both the NF march and ALCARAF counter-march, a direction with which both complied. It must also have contributed to the decision to deploy large numbers of police – some of them equipped, for the first time on the UK mainland, with riot shields.
  25. Despite these precautions, and as predicted by undercover officers, serious disorder occurred, including the throwing of bricks and other missiles by counter-demonstrators at the NF marchers and the police. HN354 provided truthful, first-hand evidence about what occurred in his immediate vicinity. His group was not throwing bricks, but they were thrown at the police and at the NF marchers by others situated behind his group.62 It is not within my Terms of Reference to make a judgement about police tactics on 13 August 1977. I do, however, conclude that, without the intelligence provided by undercover officers, uniformed officers would have been less well prepared than they were to meet a serious and determined challenge to public order.
  26. At 14:55 on the day of the march, HN1668 Detective Inspector Leslie Willingale, then in temporary operational charge of the SDS, sent a telephone message to the Head of Special Branch, likely to have been based on a telephone report of an undercover officer, stating that SWP “heavies” were being moved to Church Street, Deptford, “ready to attack the National Front marchers”, which was, in fact, just about to set off.63 HN354 was not the source of this report.
  27. What then occurred is illustrated by the television footage of the event, about which no further comment is required.64
  28. Undercover officers also reported on the reaction of some Trotskyist and Maoist groups to the event. On 23 August 1977, HN80, reporting on a debriefing meeting which had taken place at the usual meeting place of the SWP Finsbury Park branch, concluded that the events had been a success: comrades had been able to attack the rear of the NF march and the police had been incapable of separating or controlling the two conflicting factions.65 Lessons were to be learnt from the willingness of local Black youths to throw missiles at police. “Genuine force” had the effect of making police reluctant to enter the crowd to detain individuals.66 HN354 reported on a discussion at the SWP Walthamstow branch on 31 August 1977 about ways in which the SWP should exploit its newfound “fame”.67
  29. By early 1977, HN13 (“Barry Loader”) had succeeded in infiltrating the East London branch of the Communist Party of England (Marxist–Leninist) (CPE (M–L)), a Maoist group. On 23 August 1977, he reported retrospectively on the participation of its members in the events of 13 August 1977.68 They were notified at the last minute of plans to split into three groups, one of which was to ambush the NF march. These plans were, in the event, frustrated because two of the groups became entrapped and were unable to communicate with the third. The lesson to be drawn was to acquire walkie-talkie radios and to counter police riot shields with more sophisticated “weaponry”.69
  30. Neither the events at Grunwick in June and July 1977 nor the “Battle of Lewisham” featured in the retrieved notes of discussions between the Security Service and the SDS in 1977.

    Other reporting on Trotskyist groups
  31. Nothing more of intelligence interest occurred within the SWP Walthamstow branch or Outer East London district infiltrated by HN354. The affairs of the district, renamed Waltham Forest district in January 1979, languished. The district committee, including HN354, resigned.70 His deployment ended in October or November 1979. When it did, the Security Service provided a detailed set of questions for him to answer about the membership and activities of the district.71
  32. The deployment of HN21, a closed officer, into the SWP occurred in the late 1970s. Like many others, the officer accepted local office, which facilitated the obtaining of details of members of the group, as well as its activities.72
  33. HN80 joined the SDS in December 1976 and was deployed on 15 March 1977.73 He was instructed to, and did, research the identity of a deceased child, but claims not to have used the full name and date of birth on the death certificate, because of his distaste for the practice.74 He was tasked to gather intelligence on extreme left-wing activists in the Haringey area, for three purposes: to protect the public in London; to assist the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to deal with demonstrations; and to assist the Security Service in its counter-subversion role.75 He chose to infiltrate the SWP and began to attend meetings of the Seven Sisters branch in May 1977.76 He produced numerous reports about the regular business meetings of the branch from June to September 1977 and about its members. He became treasurer of the branch in November 197777 and then of the Lea Valley district.78 He attended the national delegate conference in 1978 and produced a report on it, for which he received a Deputy Assistant Commissioner’s Commendation.79 There is an unexplained eight-month gap in retrieved reports attributable to him. By 6 July 1979, the name of the branch he infiltrated had changed to the Haringey branch.80 He continued to report on its routine affairs, including his own election as treasurer on 5 September 1979.81 On 28 November 1979, he was elected as part of a “slate” to the district committee.82 In January 1980, the Haringey branch was renamed the Tottenham branch,83 and on 12 March 1980, HN80 was appointed its treasurer.84 He continued to produce reports about routine business.
  34. Meanwhile, HN80 began to play a part in the affairs of the SWP at central level. He took part in the organisation of the “Right to Work” march in 1980 and 1981 and became its treasurer.85 On 9 August 1980, he attended a conference of branch secretaries and leading cadres in London to discuss the organisation of the 1980 march: it was intended that it should culminate in a picket of the Conservative Party conference in Brighton on 10 October 1980, in sufficient numbers to give the police “more than they could handle”.86 On 15 September 1980, he produced a detailed and thoughtful report on the plans of the organisers for the march, which annexed its “official” timetable.87 No disorder was anticipated before 10 October 1980. The march organisers then intended to disrupt the final day of the conference. To that end, they arranged for a train to carry supporters from Victoria Station to Brighton and for coaches to arrive from around the country. HN80 attended and reported on the meeting on 5 October 1980 at which detailed plans were finalised.88 Both he and HN155 (“Phil Cooper”) drove support vehicles during the march and took part in the demonstration by about 8,000 people outside the conference hall. Serious disorder was averted by a large police presence, but HN80 did sustain injuries during it when assaulted about the head and shoulders. He and HN155 received a Commissioner’s Commendation for their part in these events.89
  35. HN80 attended the SWP national delegate conference on 13–16 December 1980 as a steward and produced a detailed report on it, together with a full set of accompanying conference documents.90 His access to the national office enabled him to report on discussions of the national committee91 and to produce copies of internal documents considered or produced by it, in particular weekly bulletins circulated to district and branch secretaries.92 He also attended and reported on meetings to discuss the 1981 “Right to Work” march from Liverpool on 8 October to the Conservative Party conference in Blackpool on 16 October 1981. He predicted that the march would be peaceful, but that on arrival in Blackpool, the campaign was determined to exploit every opportunity to express “their anti-Conservative feelings”.93 Lindsey German remembers positively that HN80 was on the 1981 march and that she worked closely with him for three weeks. Both did their best to ensure that no one on the march would be arrested. I am satisfied that her evidence on this point is correct. HN80’s last significant report was about the 1981 national delegate conference on 7–10 November 1981, which he attended, with HN155, as a member of the conference administrative staff.94 His deployment ended in March 1982.
  36. HN356 (“Bill Biggs”) (who had made the note of the telephone report referred to in paragraph 26 above) joined the SDS at the end of 1977 or early 1978. He was deployed into the SWP in South East London. He attended and reported on meetings of the Plumstead branch, of which he was elected treasurer in April 1978.95 On 29 November 1978, at a meeting of the branch, chaired by him, it was agreed that he would be replaced by another member as treasurer and would instead become the Socialist Worker organiser.96 He reported regularly on the organisation, membership and activities of the SWP in South East London and played an active part in its affairs. On 12 December 1979, he addressed a meeting of the Greenwich branch about his experiences of apartheid in South Africa;97 and on 25 June 1980,98 he chaired a meeting of the same branch at which an Indian Workers’ Association member spoke about attacks on Asians, and the district organiser for the “Right to Work” march stated that he had hired a coach to take protesters to disrupt the Henley Regatta. It is possible, but unlikely, that he attended the SWP party council meeting held on 19 April 1980 and reported on its proceedings.99
  37. By May 1981, HN356 had moved to Brixton, to achieve greater coverage of SWP activity there, following the Brixton riots on 10–13 April 1981. He attended the inaugural meeting of the Brixton branch and was elected its treasurer on 25 June 1981.100 It is likely that his deployment ended in late 1981, because the last retrieved report that may be attributable to him is dated 20 November 1981.101
  38. HN126 (“Paul Gray”) joined the SDS on 17 December 1977.102 His target group was the SWP in North West London, a district chosen because of continued picketing at Grunwick. He was a regular attender at the pickets and reported on them by telephone.103 He began to submit written reports on the Cricklewood branch in March 1978.104 He became the Socialist Worker organiser for the branch on 26 July 1978,105 because he had the use of a van and so could collect copies of the newspaper from the printers for onward distribution.106 When the Cricklewood branch subdivided itself into smaller branches in the second half of 1978, he became a member of the Kilburn branch and often chaired its meetings.107 He produced a lengthy and careful analysis of the structure and organisation of the SWP in London on 10 November 1978.108 He also joined the West Hampstead branch of its sister organisation, the ANL. On 22 October 1978, he was elected to the committee of the newly formed combined Camden Against Racism/ANL West Hampstead and Hampstead group, as delegate to the Camden Against Racism committee.109 He attended meetings of the North West London district of the SWP and, on 11110 and 22 January 1979111 respectively, was elected to the district committee and appointed the district Socialist Worker organiser. He kept on in this role until November 1980.112
  39. At some time during 1981, HN126 may have been the subject of a possible compromise. In consequence, he moved to Paddington and joined the newly formed Paddington branch of the SWP. The last retrieved report of which he is undoubtedly the author concerned a branch discussion on 21 April 1982 about the Falkland Islands crisis.113
  40. The bulk of HN126’s reporting is about the organisation and activities of the SWP at branch and district level and about local members. The great majority of the branch meetings he attended produced, as he acknowledged in a report dated 3 February 1981,114 nothing of interest to Special Branch. When future activities involved demonstrations that might have an impact on public order, he identified them by time, place and, where possible, the numbers likely to participate. Most were unremarkable, such as the proposed bicycle ride to Henley on 6 July 1980 to protest at the ban on the wearing of trousers by women at the Regatta.115
  41. In the light of what occurred, one event was not. On 19 April 1979, HN126 reported on decisions taken by the North West London district on 17 April 1979.116 They included a decision to encourage members to participate in a demonstration at Southall Town Hall on 23 April 1979, in opposition to an election meeting to be held there by the NF, provided that it did not interfere with paper sales. HN126 did not attend the demonstration.117 The North West London district held a public meeting on 24 April 1979, which was addressed by Tony Cliff.118 He contrasted the careful planning for an event in Leicester on 21 April 1979, which had resulted in a successful attack on the police, with the lack of planning for the confrontation on 23 April 1979, which had resulted in many injuries of demonstrators. It was the occasion on which Blair Peach sustained fatal injuries. It is not within my Terms of Reference to enquire into how or by whom they were inflicted, nor into the manner in which the MPS handled the subsequent investigation by Commander John Cass.
  42. HN41 attended and reported on the demonstration in Southall. He left Southall before the events which gave rise to the death of Blair Peach.119
  43. The Southall demonstration on 23 April 1979, the march and rally on 27 April 1980 to mark the anniversary of the death of Blair Peach, and a non-event on 30 August 1981 provide examples of the value of SDS reporting to the policing of events that might give rise to a risk of public disorder.
  44. Meetings between local police and community leaders in Southall revealed the depth of anger felt by Asian residents about the decision by the London Borough of Ealing (which it was obliged to make) to allow the NF to hold the election meeting, and the residents’ determination to stage a peaceful sit-down protest outside the venue on the day of the meeting. A careful assessment of the risks of disorder was made on 20 April 1979 by a detective inspector in Special Branch who was not part of the SDS.120 He accepted that that was the intention of the local community, but stated that “white” left and extreme left organisations, such as the SWP, ANL and Socialist Unity group, wished to stop the meeting taking place and were likely to use violent means to do so.121 He cited two articles to that effect in the latest edition of the Socialist Worker, with quotations: “We will not be intimidated by police. We will use any means necessary to stop the meeting” and “The Nazis must not be allowed to get anywhere near Southall Town Hall.”122 SDS reporting provided a marginal contribution only to his assessment.
  45. The Friends of Blair Peach, in a letter dated 4 February 1980 written by a well-known SWP figure, applied to the Department of the Environment for permission to hold a rally in Trafalgar Square on the afternoon of 27 April 1980.123 The Department of the Environment sought the advice of the Home Office, which in turn asked for an assessment from HN819 Chief Superintendent Derek Kneale.124 It was provided on 27 March and updated on 24 April 1980.125 The conclusion was that there would be between 2,500 and 3,000 marchers, that the organisers did not intend a violent confrontation with the police, but the possibility of trouble could not be wholly ruled out.126 The sources of intelligence referred to did not include undercover reporting, but were mainly Security Service reporting of Communist Party of Great Britain arrangements,127 ANL/SWP leaflets and newspapers128 and reporting of bussing arrangements from provincial forces.129 It is unsurprising that no express reference was made to undercover reporting, but the earlier assessment did refer to one topic on which SDS reports had been made: the poor turn-out at prior events in October 1979 and January 1980.130 It did not refer to the other protests intended, which were the subject of SDS advance reports: pickets on 23 April 1980 at 14 London police stations.131 No advance reports about the march and rally on 27 April 1980 have been retrieved. It is very unlikely that they were made and have been discarded. The clear conclusion I draw is that there were none and that SDS reporting contributed little of value to the overall assessment of the likelihood of disorder at the rally. In the event, it passed off without significant disorder. There was only one arrest in Trafalgar Square.132
  46. On 10 August 1981, NF leaders provided details to senior police officers about a demonstration they intended to hold in Fulham during the Notting Hill Carnival on 30 August 1981.133 Their plans did not include a rally at Eel Brook Common at 2pm. HN126 attended a secret meeting of an ANL organising committee on 17 August 1981, on which he reported two days later, at which it was planned to stage a rally on the Common at 11am to forestall the NF and then to prevent them from rallying elsewhere.134 An undated Special Branch threat assessment correctly discounted the risk of disorder created by the ANL because their strategy was based on the misconception identified by HN126.135
  47. HN155 joined the SDS in the autumn of 1979, at the suggestion of Michael Ferguson.136 Although HN155 received no formal training, he spent a significant time in the back office and, before he was deployed, was interrogated shrewdly on at least one occasion by Michael Ferguson and HN68.137 He was tasked to infiltrate the SWP. His recollection of the early part of his deployment is imperfect, but it can be pieced together by reference to intelligence reports in which he is named in his cover name. The first such report is about the inaugural meeting of the Waltham Forest Anti-Nuclear Campaign (ANC) on 19 February 1980,138 at which he was elected branch treasurer. Subsequent reports record that the group intended to and did participate in the “occupation” of the site of the Torness nuclear power station on 3 May 1980,139 which he recalls attending.140 Thereafter, he attended the first annual general meeting of the ANC on 14 June 1980141 and a conference of the London region Anti- Nuclear Alliance on 12 July 1980, as a member of the Waltham Forest ANC.142 By this time, he was attending local SWP meetings, including those held by Waltham Forest district.143 He also took part in the “Right to Work” march, which took place from Port Talbot to Brighton between 23 September and 10 October 1980, which HN80 had helped organise.144He attended an SWP/ANL demonstration on 4 April 1981 at West Ham, when fighting between them and their targets was forestalled by prompt police action.145
  48. HN155 then began to participate in the affairs of the SWP at national level. By November 1981, he and HN80 were 2 of the 12 members of the administrative staff of the national delegate conference held 7–10 November 1981.146 By 6 January 1982, he had joined the central planning committee for an SWP “Right to Work” demonstration in London on 21 February 1982, as treasurer.147 This gave him control over the “Right to Work” campaign bank account148 and to correspondence with the honorary national treasurer of the campaign, Ernie Roberts MP.149 It also permitted him to obtain the central committee weekly bulletin, along with details of plans for a peaceful march of 700 people.150
  49. His role as treasurer of the campaign gave him access to the headquarters of the SWP, where he had a desk, and to members of the central committee.151 According to Lindsey German, whose evidence I again accept, he kept a low profile but was able to rub shoulders with those at the very top of the SWP. From 12 January 1982 onwards, he obtained copies of the weekly bulletins of the central committee for distribution to district and branch organisers and secretaries. He regularly produced lists of names and addresses of district and branch offices,152 of persons registered to take part in SWP events,153 of SWP speakers154 and details of forthcoming events organised by the SWP.155 He helped organise the picket of delegates attending the Conservative Party conference in Brighton on 8 October 1982.156 His estimate of the numbers likely to attend (500–600), and of the plan to obtain entry to the conference by means of forged tickets, may have assisted local police to ensure, as happened, that it passed off without serious disorder.
  50. He attended the SWP national delegate conference on 13–15 November 1982 as a member of the conference administration staff, and produced a lengthy report on its proceedings.157 Registration slips of those attending permitted him to obtain a statistical table, giving the total membership of the SWP (4,200 in 1982) and its breakdown, by sex, class and union position.158 He also attended the closed national committee meeting on 15 January 1983,159 at which it was decided that the SWP should support demonstrations at Greenham Common and Faslane during Easter week 1983. When the SWP acquired a computer for use in its national office in May 1981, he was able to produce computer lists of all SWP organisers on 20 January 1983,160 and of current and former subscribers to the Socialist Worker on 11 April161 and 5 August 1983.162
  51. For just under two years, HN155 produced, on a regular basis, and in the central committee’s own words, what it wanted its district and branch officers and, through them, its members, to know about its views and plans. He was the author of, or a significant contributor to, a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the organisation, intentions and leadership of the SWP, dated 29 September 1982,163 produced in response to a Security Service request.164 He also reported on the SWP national delegate conference held on 22–24 October 1983.165 His reporting was, like that of other officers, forwarded to the Security Service, who expressed their appreciation of it.166

    Other deployments
  52. As already noted in paragraph 29, HN13 had, by early 1977, managed to infiltrate the CPE (M–L). It took him over a year to do so. His route in was via diligent attendance at study groups and party-building sessions conducted by the Communist Unity Association167 and the Progressive Cultural Association,168 Maoist talking shops. After the “Battle of Lewisham”, he was one of two SDS undercover officers selected to express their view to Deputy Assistant Commissioner David Helm, the commander of the uniformed branch responsible for public order, on 4 November 1977.169 The East London branch of the CPE (M–L) had, by then, become involved in frequent clashes with the NF and the police, in some of which HN13 had been involved. He was arrested on two occasions for public order offences and prosecuted in his cover name.
  53. The first prosecution (for insulting behaviour) arose out of an incident or incidents occurring on an anti-fascist march from Ilford to Barking on 17 September 1977. HN13 and seven others appeared at Barking Magistrates’ Court on 21 September 1977. They were remanded for trial at the same court on 3 January 1978. A note to that effect was signed by Geoffrey Craft on the same day.170 Geoffrey Craft recalled in his oral evidence that he attended the court on one day and told the court clerk and female magistrate (singular) – who may have been a stipendiary magistrate – that HN13 was an undercover police officer.171 I accept his evidence. Although he was not able to remember whether he provided that information on 21 September, it is likely that he did. HN13 and his co-defendants were tried by a bench of three lay magistrates on 3–5 January and 10–12 April 1978.172 HN13 and two others were acquitted. Four were convicted. The eighth did not answer to his bail. A note signed by acting Chief Superintendent Kenneth Pryde, dated 6 January 1978, reported that a court official had been told that one of the defendants was an informant.173 It is an inadequate description of what Geoffrey Craft had done and it is unlikely to have referred to that. The likelihood is that the information recorded in the note was given to a court official on 3 January 1978 by someone other than Geoffrey Craft. If so, the court would have been misled.
  54. The second prosecution arose out of a clash between extreme left and right during the Brixton by-election on 15 April 1978. On 29 June 1978, HN13 was convicted, fined and bound over for 12 months.174 According to a note dated 28 April 1978, acting Chief Superintendent Kenneth Pryde told a “court official” that HN13 was “a valuable informant in the public order field” on HN13’s first appearance on 26 April 1978.175 There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the note. It establishes that the court was misled. The identity of the other three defendants and the outcome of the proceedings in their cases are known.
  55. Four of the defendants convicted in one or other of the two cases have been traced and letters delivered to them by the Inquiry. The conviction of any of the four who wish it to be will be referred to the miscarriage of justice panel. HN13 remained deployed after each case was concluded.
  56. In early 1977, HN304 (“Graham Coates”), who had been deployed in the second half of 1976 into the Hackney branch of IS, sought, and was given, the approval of his managers to transfer into anarchist groups.176 He began by becoming involved with the Zero Collective and then the Anarchy Collective. The first retrieved report, dated 4 January 1977,177 is of a meeting convened by the Federation of London Anarchists Group (FLAG), addressed by Dave Morris of the Anarchy Collective. HN304 was an occasional contributor to the magazine produced by the Anarchy Collective.178 He also reported on other anarchist groups, such as the Freedom Collective179 and Persons Unknown.180 He describes, as being typical of the anarchist groups on which he reported, a meeting of the East London Libertarians on 16 February 1977 which decided nothing.181 He understood that the purpose of his deployment was to achieve advance warning of any anarchist group that might pose a threat to public order comparable to that posed in 1970–1971 by the Angry Brigade.182 Nothing in his reporting suggested that there was any such risk, a fact which he confirmed in his oral evidence: by way of example, the Freedom Collective, which he got to know reasonably well, was “an organisation of wishful thinkers”.183 All six of the anarchist groups on which he reported featured in the 1977 and 1978 SDS annual reports.184 He produced a valedictory report on 14 May 1979, which described the low state of morale and activity in the groups he had infiltrated.185 He believes that he was then redirected towards Croydon SWP,186 but no reporting about it attributable to him has been retrieved.
  57. The deployment of HN304 had a major impact on his family, his wife and two young children. His own view is that he was divorced because of the stresses and strains caused by it.187
  58. HN96 (“Michael James”) joined the SDS in late 1978.188 He spoke extensively to HN296, who was then about to leave.189 At the suggestion of HN96, Michael Ferguson and Angus McIntosh introduced themselves to his then wife and reassured her that they would look after the security of her husband.190 This is the first evidenced instance of a visit by SDS managers to the spouse of an undercover officer about to be deployed. HN96’s cover accommodation eventually included a flat shared with HN106 (“Barry Tompkins”).191 He obtained details of the identity of a deceased child from St Catherine’s House, visited the city where the child’s parents lived and, with the aid of a local Special Branch officer, established that they had left the city.192 He was initially tasked to infiltrate the SWP in East London and did so for about two years.193 On 5 September 1979, he was elected by the Clapton branch to the Hackney district committee,194 whose task was to implement decisions taken centrally. He reported on plans for events that might have an impact on public order. An early example is a report of plans made at a meeting of the Clapton branch of SWP on 21 March 1979 for a demonstration against the NF in Brick Lane.195
  59. By December 1980, HN96 had begun to attend social events and meetings of the Troops Out Movement (TOM) in East London. At the suggestion of his managers, he then focused on TOM.196 By November 1981, he had joined the national steering committee of TOM as membership and affiliation secretary, a position he held until March 1983, when his deployment was about to end.197 He also became treasurer of the May 8th Movement (a planned demonstration to commemorate hunger strikers on 8 May 1982), until he resigned in January 1983.198 He reported on the plans for the annual Bloody Sunday marches, in Coventry on 31 January 1982199 and in Leeds on 30 January 1983.200 He attended and reported on TOM national delegate conferences on 3–4 April 1982,201 11 September 1982202 and 19–20 March 1983,203 on plans for a TOM delegation to Belfast in August 1982, and on periodic discussions and differences between TOM and (Provisional) Sinn Fein.
  60. HN96 understood, correctly, that Special Branch and the Security Service were interested in intelligence relevant to their counter-subversion tasks and, so, reported extensively on individual members of both the SWP and TOM. The most surprising thing about his deployment into TOM is how it started: as a result of a sideways move initiated by him, rather than tasking by his managers. He also reported on, but did not infiltrate, Red Action204 and the Irish Republican Socialist Party.205
  61. HN106 joined the SDS in the second half of 1978.206 He was not tasked to infiltrate a particular group, but was told to focus on the extreme left.207 He infiltrated a series of Trotskyist groups, beginning with the Spartacus League from mid-1979 until May 1980.208 The next was the group that began as the Revolutionary Communist Tendency (RCT)209 and ended up as the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) in 1981,210 after a number of “mergers” with other Trotskyist splinter groups and changes of name.211 HN106 participated in RCT/RCP front groups, of which the most active was the East London Workers Against Racism (ELWAR).212 With the exception of ELWAR, all of these groups spent most of their time holding sparsely attended public meetings on issues of revolutionary interest.213 The membership of each was small. Their potential for inciting or participating in public disorder was minimal.
  62. ELWAR was different. It was formed to attract Black and Asian people to the Trotskyist cause by supporting them. This required practical steps to be taken – to promote demonstrations on issues such as discrimination in housing, and to form vigilante groups to patrol the areas in which they lived. On 16 April 1981, HN106 reported that the RCT would form a South London Workers Against Racism group, following the riots in Brixton on 11 and 12 April 1981.214 He reported on arrangements made by ELWAR for pickets and demonstrations to support the Roach family support committee on 7 February 1983.215 He did not attend the private meeting of the committee at which the arrangements were made, but did attend and report on the demonstration staged by ELWAR at a public meeting of the Hackney police committee at Hackney Town Hall on 7 February 1983.216
  63. In keeping with Special Branch practice, HN106 reported extensively on individual members or associates of the groups he had infiltrated217 and on their private, working and political life.218
  64. No undercover officer was deployed into an extreme right-wing group during this period, for two reasons: first, as stated by Geoffrey Craft in the 1976 annual report, Special Branch already had excellent sources within the extreme right; second, as Barry Moss stated in his oral evidence, infiltration carried with it an unacceptable risk of violence – either to the officer or in which he might be required to participate to prove his credentials.

    The annual reports 1978 to 1981
  65. Michael Ferguson’s 1978 annual report was the first to be produced by a detective chief inspector who had served as an undercover officer.219 It is of interest for a number of reasons. First, it provides an insight into the views of an officer, who had joined the SDS soon after the event that had caused it to be founded, about that event. It is likely that his perspective was widely shared within the MPS. It was that extremists had viewed the demonstration of 27 October 1968 as a vehicle for causing serious disorder by direct confrontation with the police, and that the organisers of the demonstration had little or no interest in avoiding that, whatever their declared intentions. Second, since then, numerous left-wing political groups had been penetrated by extremists set upon creating disorder. Third, events in 1979 were likely to provide them with ample opportunity to do so. One of the four elements required for successful policing of public order problems across a broad spectrum was knowledge of the intentions of those involved. He considered that the SDS was formed to provide that knowledge and its continued activity would prove to be of immense value in doing so.
  66. The annual reports for 1979, 1980 and 1981 were signed by Trevor Butler.220 With one exception, they are factual and uncontroversial descriptions of the main events covered by the squad. The exception is to be found in the 1979 report, which sets out a view of the events in Southall on 23 April 1979 and its aftermath that – in light of the publication in April 2010 of the report by the police officer who investigated the death of Blair Peach, Commander Cass – must now be seen as partial and inadequate.221 More typical is the accurate summary, in the 1980 report, of the reporting by HN80 and HN155 about the 1980 “Right to Work” march, culminating in Brighton on 10 October 1980, and its use in enabling Sussex police to cope with the march.222 The 1981 report is significant because of what it reveals about the limitations of SDS reporting. It correctly states that the most significant event in the public order field that year was the rioting in Brixton between 10 and 13 April 1981.223 It also, correctly, summarised reporting (some of which will be dealt with in Tranche 2) that “known members of subversive organisations” and anarchists had not instigated the disorder.224 This was the first, but not the last, occasion on which SDS reporting had given no forewarning of serious public disorder, because the groups infiltrated by undercover officers were not responsible for causing it. It also did not fit the long-held view that the principal threat to public order arose from the exploitation by left-wing extremists of political and industrial issues for their own revolutionary purposes.

    Sexual relationships
  67. In his written witness statement, HN354 admitted that he had had, as he put it, four “one night stands”, two with female activists, during his deployment, conducted in his cover identity.225 It is to his credit that he provided identifying details of the two activists, which has permitted the Inquiry to trace both of them. One of them, “Madeleine”, has provided a written witness statement and given oral evidence. She was, and remains, an idealist. At the time of HN354’s deployment, she was a member of the same SWP branch and district as him and believed him to be a fellow activist.226 She, and those with whom she associated, abhorred violence and posed no real threat to public order. Although I believe that she has underestimated the threat posed by others, I am satisfied that her evidence about her immediate associates and her relationship with HN354 is true and, where it conflicts with his, is to be preferred.
  68. Her own marriage had come to an end in 1977. She said that during the three years of their acquaintanceship, she had come to know and like HN354. She thought of him as an ordinary working guy and a lovely and engaging person, with a sad personal history. There was an element of truth in his history: his own long-term relationship had come to an end in 1977, but the remainder was a fiction, created by him to deter inquisitiveness. At a noisy party attended by both of them and other SWP members in the late summer of 1979, he pulled her onto his lap and told her how hard it had been for him to get to know her. She enjoyed chatting and flirting with him. When the party ended, he took her back to the house that she and others occupied in his van and went inside. They then went upstairs to her room. Both knew what was going to happen and wanted it to happen. He stayed the night and left after breakfast.
  69. Their sexual relationship continued for up to two months. During that time, they would have sexual intercourse in her room approximately once a week. Unlike the first night, he would always leave before dawn. She had a kindly manager at her place of work, in whom she confided. She told him about her relationship with HN354, “Vince”, and his nocturnal habit. He made a jokey entry in his diary on 9 January 1980, which spoke of it.227 I have no doubt that the document is genuine. It is a true record of what “Madeleine” told her manager soon after HN354 disappeared from her life. There was no reason for her to have invented a story about him. It confirms the truth of what she said in evidence. Her evidence was also confirmed after she had given it by written evidence provided by Julia Poynter, then a fellow activist and friend of hers.
  70. The manner in which HN354 gave oral evidence about this issue showed that he was deeply uncomfortable about it. It is to his credit that, before he gave oral evidence, he freely accepted that what he had admitted he had done was wrong and regretted the injury he had caused “Madeleine”.228 It is possible that the difference between his evidence and hers arises from a wish on his part to bury an aspect of his past that he knows to be discreditable; but it cannot alter it.
  71. Both “Madeleine” and HN354 gave a similar account of a further fleeting sexual relationship with another female activist, which occurred as his deployment was about to end.229 It can have served no purpose relevant to his deployment. Nothing in the evidence of “Madeleine” about the two relationships suggests that he used either as a cynical tactic to further his deployment, not least because he gained nothing that might have done so from them.
  72. HN155 was interviewed by David Reid, in the presence of Brian Lockie, both employed by the MPS as independent risk assessors, on 14 November 2017.230 Their purpose was to make an assessment of the risk to HN155 of the disclosure of his real and/or cover name during the Inquiry. David Reid was the lead assessor and interviewer. He had a form on which the topics to be covered were typed in numbered paragraphs. Paragraph 4.12 dealt with “Relationships entered into”. On it, he made the following handwritten notes:

    “Lived a full alternative life in all aspects but cannot recall specifics. No long or medium-term relationships + there were groupies who’d want to spend the night with a central committee member. Not a member but close to it. But not going to disclose further. Would only give 1st name. Cannot recall their names. 2 or 3 +? women. Dalliances not all ended in full sex. Probably drinking. Never purposefully gave surname but not volunteered.”231

  73. He produced a typed report soon after the interview, probably on the next day,232 which, with minor alterations, reproduced the text of his note. The final sentence reads: “He initially stated there may have been 2 or 3 women but then said there may possibly have been a few more, and that the encounters would have followed drink.”233
  74. In accordance with his usual practice, David Reid met HN155 again, on 18 November 2017, to permit him to read and check the accuracy of the typed report. He did read it, including paragraph 4.12 and asked for the last eight words of the last sentence to be deleted (“and that the encounters would have followed drink”). The copy retained by David Reid contains an asterisk (*) and a line through the deleted words.234 The final assessment, dated 23 November 2017, omits the deleted words and adds the following: “N155 clarified during the ‘fact check’ that these were purely social encounters, and not done to enhance his deployment.”235
  75. In his impact statement dated 29 January 2019, HN155 maintained that the risk assessors had misinterpreted his comments. In paragraph 10, he states:

    “I recall being quite clear that I did not engage in any sexual activity while I was undercover. To the best of my recollection, the risk assessors responded that it would have been quite possible and not surprising if my deployment had taken such a turn, given its length and depth. I accepted this and went on to discuss the SWP social scene, the status or cachet enjoyed by those within its inner circle, meetings in pubs, flirtatious chats and the fact that sexual activity could have been an option.”236

    He acknowledged that he had been given the opportunity to “fact check” the draft risk assessment, but did not read it in depth. In his witness statement prepared for the hearing, he stated that he did not engage in any sexual activity while in his cover identity.237

  76. David Reid and Brian Lockie gave oral evidence during the hearing. They were plainly truthful witnesses. I am sure that David Reid would not have made a handwritten note that would have seriously distorted what HN155 had said. The possibility of misunderstanding was catered for by the “fact check”. The handwritten deletion provides strong support for the conclusion that HN155 did read paragraph 4.12 and require the deletion to be made. I reject, as manifestly unfounded, the suggestion that David Reid put forward a proposition to HN155 during the original interview, which he mistakenly purported to accept.
  77. HN155 has not been required to give oral evidence, for medical reasons. One of the reports submitted in support of his application that he should not be required to do so was that of Dr Noreen Tehrani dated 18 November 2020.238 In it, she expressed the opinion that one of the reasons why he should not be required to give oral evidence was that he would not be a reliable witness. I did not understand that opinion to be based upon Dr Noreen Tehrani’s professional expertise. I have, however, considered whether or not what HN155 did say to David Reid about sexual relationships might itself have been so unreliable as to be worthless. I am satisfied that it was not, both because it was against his interest and because he had the opportunity to, and did, check and alter the text four days later.
  78. For the reasons given, I am satisfied that HN155 did admit to David Reid and Brian Lockie that he had had casual sexual relationships with female activists in his cover identity during his deployment. I have no reason to believe that he did so to enhance his cover and further his deployment.
  79. Two closed officers gave evidence about sexual relationships. HN302 was a single man when deployed. Early on in his deployment a friendship developed between him in his cover identity and a female activist whom he described as peripheral to his group. He said that after an evening in a public house both went to his cover flat, where they had protected sexual intercourse by “joint agreement”.239 He did not see her again. He believed that his friendship with her may have bolstered his cover, but he did not seek it to do so. He did not tell his managers about the encounter.240 Although, as HN302 did not recall her name, I have not heard from the female activist, I believe that HN302 was telling me the truth, about an incident that he volunteered, as he remembered it.
  80. HN21 was married when deployed. While attending a course in his cover identity undertaken with a view to fulfilling his deployment, he became friendly with a woman attending the same course. He said that he had protected sexual intercourse with her on two occasions. The relationship ended when she formed a relationship with another man.241 His account in oral evidence differed from his witness statement in which he admitted to kissing and fondling another woman on the course as well. HN21 has long-term health problems, which may have contributed to confusion or inefficiency in checking the witness statement before it was signed. The evidence that he gave about his deployment was clear and detailed and, I believe, truthful. The Inquiry has made efforts to trace the woman concerned, without success. Subject to the possibility that she may be traced and may contradict his account, I believe that the evidence he gave to me was the truth as he remembers it. He expressed proper shame about the betrayal of his wife and the breach of his duties as a police officer. I am satisfied that the relationship was not undertaken with a view to bolstering his cover. He did not tell his managers about it.
Chapter 4
Chapter 6


  1. MPS-0730700
  2. UCPI0000030058
  3. UCPI0000030060
  4. UCPI0000030893 p1
  5. UCPI0000028790
  6. UCPI0000029198
  7. Ibid.
  8. UCPI0000028799
  9. UCPI0000028794, UCPI0000029212
  10. UCPI0000029199
  11. UCPI0000028821
  12. UCPI0000030761
  13. First Witness Statement of Witness Z
  14. MPS-0728980
  15. MPS-0730719
  16. MPS-0730689, MPS-0728964, MPS-0728963, MPS-0728962, MPS-0728985 and MPS-0730904
  17. MPS-0730689
  18. MPS-0728963 p2
  19. MPS-0730903
  20. MPS-0737347 p9
  21. MPS-0734164
  22. MPS-0737347 p10
  23. MPS-0728981
  24. First Witness Statement of HN354 para 61
  25. HN354 Transcript of Oral Evidence pp42–3
  26. UCPI0000013462
  27. UCPI0000017456
  28. UCPI0000011144
  29. UCPI0000017902
  30. UCPI0000017345, UCPI0000012994, UCPI0000013040
  31. First Witness Statement of HN354 para 156
  32. UCPI0000017438
  33. First Witness Statement of HN354 para 99
  34. Unattributed Excerpts from Closed Officer Evidence
  35. MPS-0728981 para 21
  36. MPS-0730673
  37. UCPI0000009576
  38. UCPI0000012227
  39. UCPI0000012265
  40. UCPI0000011055
  41. UCPI0000009695
  42. UCPI0000017921, UCPI0000017922 and UCPI0000017917
  43. UCPI0000017698
  44. UCPI0000011981
  45. DOC064 and First Witness Statement of Anthony Speed para 59
  46. MPS-0748286
  47. MPS-0748487
  48. UCPI0000017537
  49. UCPI0000011059
  50. MPS-0748210
  51. UCPI0000011111 p2
  52. MPS-0733365
  53. First Witness Statement of Anthony Speed
  54. MPS-0733365 p3
  55. MPS-0733365 p3 para 6
  56. MPS-0748487 p4
  57. UCPI0000011188 p1
  58. HN354 Transcript of Oral Evidence p159 line 12, First Witness Statement of HN354 para 105
  59. HN354 Transcript of Oral Evidence p160 line 15
  60. MPS-0728981 p14 para 26
  61. MPS-0748334
  62. HN354 Transcript of Oral Evidence p164 line 23, First Witness Statement of HN354 paras 106–109
  63. MPS-0733366
  64. DOC042, DOC043
  65. UCPI0000011182
  66. Ibid. p2
  67. UCPI0000010957 p1
  68. UCPI0000011180
  69. Ibid. p2
  70. UCPI0000013240
  71. UCPI0000029198
  72. HN21 Transcript of Oral Evidence p20
  73. First Witness Statement of HN80 para 11, MPS-0732916
  74. First Witness Statement of HN80 para 21
  75. Ibid. para 36
  76. Ibid. para 30
  77. UCPI0000011543
  78. UCPI0000013658
  79. UCPI0000013228
  80. UCPI0000021030
  81. UCPI0000013559
  82. UCPI0000013692 p2
  83. UCPI0000013876
  84. UCPI0000013958
  85. First Witness Statement of HN80 paras 88–93, MPS-0729027
  86. MPS-0729029 p10
  87. UCPI0000014264
  88. UCPI0000014569
  89. First Witness Statement of HN80 paras 95–7, UCPI0000014610 p7
  90. UCPI0000016148
  91. UCPI0000015617
  92. UCPI0000015398
  93. UCPI0000015664 p2
  94. UCPI0000016752
  95. UCPI0000011996
  96. UCPI0000013021
  97. UCPI0000013688
  98. UCPI0000014053
  99. UCPI0000014044
  100. UCPI0000015441
  101. UCPI0000016753
  102. MPS-0740410
  103. First Witness Statement of HN126 para 240
  104. UCPI0000011859
  105. UCPI0000011354
  106. First Witness Statement of HN126 para 140
  107. UCPI0000013001
  108. UCPI0000012967
  109. UCPI0000012960
  110. UCPI0000013111
  111. UCPI0000013123
  112. First Witness Statement of HN126 para 174
  113. UCPI0000018035
  114. UCPI0000016199
  115. UCPI0000014046
  116. UCPI0000021193
  117. HN126 Transcript of Oral Evidence p192 line 3
  118. UCPI0000021207
  119. Closed Officer Gist para 35, HN41 Transcript of Oral Evidence
  120. MPS-0748293
  121. Ibid. p2
  122. Ibid. pp3–4
  123. MPS-0733126 p4
  124. Ibid. p5
  125. Ibid. p13, p32
  126. Ibid. p30
  127. Ibid. p17
  128. Ibid.p10–12, p28
  129. Ibid. p21
  130. UCPI0000020068UCPI0000013500UCPI0000013753
  131. UCPI0000013891
  132. The Times, 28 April 1980, DOC087
  133. UCPI0000035302
  134. UCPI0000015541
  135. UCPI0000035302
  136. Supplemented Witness Statement of HN155 para 10
  137. Ibid. para 17
  138. UCPI0000013893
  139. UCPI0000013918
  140. Supplemented Witness Statement of HN155 para 58
  141. UCPI0000014199
  142. UCPI0000014213
  143. UCPI0000014201
  144. Supplemented Witness Statement of HN155 para 76
  145. UCPI0000016599
  146. UCPI0000016752 p12
  147. UCPI0000017060
  148. UCPI0000018091
  149. UCPI0000017202UCPI0000017152 p10
  150. UCPI0000017184
  151. UCPI0000018482
  152. UCPI0000016946
  153. UCPI0000018180
  154. UCPI0000017997
  155. UCPI0000018426
  156. UCPI0000018663
  157. UCPI0000015994
  158. Ibid. p90
  159. UCPI0000016977
  160. UCPI0000016946
  161. UCPI0000019044
  162. UCPI0000019386
  163. UCPI0000015751
  164. UCPI0000028782
  165. MPS-0735900
  166. UCPI0000028728MPS-0730009 and MPS-0735901
  167. UCPI0000009611
  168. UCPI0000017425
  169. MPS-0732885
  170. MPS-0526784 p12
  171. HN34 Transcript of Oral Evidence p88
  172. UCPI0000011984
  173. MPS-0526784 p10
  174. Ibid. p6, UCPI0000011356
  175. MPS-0526784 p7
  176. First Witness Statement of HN304 para 34
  177. UCPI0000017641
  178. First Witness Statement of HN304 para 89
  179. UCPI0000017806
  180. UCPI0000021764
  181. UCPI0000017761 and First Witness Statement of HN304 para 94
  182. First Witness Statement of HN304 para 87
  183. HN304 Transcript of Oral Evidence p112 line 17
  184. MPS-0728981 and MPS-0728964
  185. UCPI0000010632
  186. First Witness Statement of HN304 para 47
  187. Ibid. para 154c
  188. First Witness Statement of HN96 para 8
  189. Ibid. para 24
  190. Ibid. para 21
  191. Ibid. para 62
  192. Ibid. para 46
  193. Ibid. para 72
  194. UCPI0000013376
  195. UCPI0000013238
  196. First Witness Statement of HN96 para 75
  197. Ibid. paras 199–206, UCPI0000016816UCPI0000018793
  198. UCPI0000017973UCPI0000016904
  199. UCPI0000017075
  200. UCPI0000016878
  201. UCPI0000018324
  202. UCPI0000015779
  203. UCPI0000018793
  204. UCPI0000018238UCPI0000017224
  205. UCPI0000017973
  206. First Witness Statement of HN106 para 9
  207. Ibid. para 31
  208. UCPI0000013345UCPI0000013999
  209. UCPI0000015575
  210. UCPI0000016727
  211. UCPI0000014148
  212. UCPI0000016552
  213. UCPI0000017225
  214. UCPI0000016611
  215. UCPI0000016951UCPI0000016959
  216. UCPI0000018731
  217. UCPI0000018782UCPI0000018522
  218. UCPI0000019130
  219. MPS-0728964
  220. MPS-0728963MPS-0728962 and MPS-0728985
  221. MPS-0728963 p10, para 9
  222. MPS-0728962 p9, para 19
  223. MPS-0728985 p9, para 16
  224. Ibid.
  225. First Witness Statement of HN354 paras 165–9
  226. First Witness Statement of “Madeleine” para 17
  227. UCPI0000034310
  228. Supplemented Witness Statement of HN354 para 247
  229. Supplemented Witness Statement of HN354 para 167, First Witness Statement of “Madeleine” para 81
  230. First Witness Statement of David Reid para 4
  231. Ibid. paras 7–8, MPS-0746346
  232. David Reid Transcript of Oral Evidence p198 line 14
  233. MPS-0746710
  234. Ibid.
  235. UCPI0000034398
  236. Supplemented Witness Statement of HN155 para 115
  237. Ibid. para 114–15
  238. UCPI0000034360
  239. Transcript of HN302’’s evidence to the Inquiry p5
  240. Closed Officer Gist para 20a and Transcript of HN302’s evidence to the Inquiry
  241. Closed Officer Gist para 20b and Transcript of HN21’s evidence to the Inquiry